essay about sex organs

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A guide to female anatomy

Female anatomy includes the external genitals, or the vulva, and the internal reproductive organs, which include the ovaries and the uterus.

One major difference between males and females is their reproductive organs. Anatomy specific to females generally relates to sexual function, reproduction, and hormone control.

Males and females have physically different sexual anatomy, but all sex organs come from the same bundle of cells during fetal development. A baby’s biological sex is determined at the moment the father’s sperm meets the mother’s egg.

This article will look in detail at the structure and function of the female internal and external organs.

Below is a 3D model of female anatomy, which is fully interactive . Explore the model using your mouse pad or touchscreen to understand more about female anatomy .

External anatomy

The external female anatomy includes the pubis and the vulva. The following sections discuss these in more detail.

The mons pubis, or public mound, is the fleshy area on the pelvic bone where females typically grow pubic hair.

The vulva refers to the external parts of a female’s genitals. It consists of several parts, including the labia majora, the labia minora, and the glans clitoris.

The list below provides more detail on these parts:

• Labia majora. These are the fleshy outer lips on either side of the vaginal opening. The word “labia” is Latin for “lips.” These outer lips usually grow pubic hair.
• Labia minora. These are the inner lips. They sit inside the outer lips but can be varying sizes. In some females, for example, the inner lips extend beyond the outer lips.
• Clitoris. The glans clitoris sits at the top of the vulva, located where the inner lips meet. It is usually around the size of a pea, though size varies from person to person. Only the tip of the clitoris is visible, but it has two shafts that extend into the body by as much as 5 inches. The clitoris contains many nerve endings that are very sensitive, especially during sexual stimulation.
• Clitoral hood. The clitoral hood is the fold of skin that surrounds the head of the clitoris. It protects the clitoris from friction.
• Urethral opening. The opening to the urethra sits above the vaginal opening. The urethra connects to the bladder, and the opening is where urine exits the body.

Internal anatomy

The internal female anatomy begins at the vagina, which is the canal that leads from the vulva to the uterus.

The cervix separates the vagina from the uterus, and the fallopian tubes connect the ovaries with the uterus.

The following sections discuss these organs in more detail.

As mentioned above, the vagina is the canal that connects the vulva with the uterus. The opening to the vagina is part of the vulva.

The vagina can vary in size, but the average length is about 2.5 to 3 inches . That said, it expands in length during arousal.

It also contains special structures called Bartholin’s glands. These are two “ pea-sized ” glands that sit on either side of the vaginal opening. These glands are responsible for secreting lubrication to keep the vaginal tissues from becoming too dry.

The cervix is the lower portion of the uterus. It is a cylinder-shaped area of tissue that separates the vagina from the rest of the uterus.

During birth, the cervix dilates to allow the baby to move through the vagina.

The uterus is located in the middle of the pelvic cavity. This muscular sac will house the fetus during pregnancy.

During a female’s monthly menstrual cycle, the lining of the uterus thickens with blood in preparation for the release of an egg from one of the ovaries. This is to prepare a nourishing environment for a fetus if pregnancy occurs.

If pregnancy does not occur, the uterine lining sheds. This is called the menstrual period. It occurs every around 28 days, though cycle length varies between females.

The upper portion of the uterus is connected to the ovaries by the fallopian tubes.

The ovaries are egg-shaped organs attached to fallopian tubes on the left and right sides of the body. Each ovary is roughly the size of an almond. Most females are born with two ovaries that produce eggs.

In addition to producing eggs, the ovaries also produce hormones. Namely, they release estrogen and progesterone .

Fallopian tubes

The fallopian tubes connect the ovaries to the uterus. When the ovaries release an egg, the egg travels down the fallopian tube toward the uterus for potential fertilization.

If a fertilized egg implants in the fallopian tube, doctors call this an ectopic pregnancy . An ectopic pregnancy is a medical emergency because the fallopian tube can rupture.

The hymen is a membrane of tissue that covers the external vaginal opening. Not all females have a hymen, however.

The hymen can rupture as a result of pelvic injury, sports activity, pelvic examination, sexual intercourse, or childbirth. The absence of a hymen does not mean that a female has been sexually active.

Many people consider breasts “accessory organs” to the female reproductive system, as they are responsible for supplying milk to an infant after childbirth.

The major external components of the breasts include the:

• Nipple. The nipple is the rounded area where milk drains to feed a baby. They have many nerve endings that can make them an area of sexual stimulation. Nipples do not always protrude. Some females have flat or inverted nipples .
• Areola. The areola is the pigmented area that surrounds the nipple. It is circular and varies in size from person to person. It contains small glands, called Montgomery glands, that secrete lubrication to keep the nipple from drying out, especially when nursing.
• Breast tissue. The breast is the area of skin on the chest that is composed of fat, muscle, and ligament tissue, as well as an intricate network of blood vessels and glands. These areas are specialized for breastfeeding. Breast tissue size varies greatly from person to person, often due to a combination of individual genetics and body mass.

Internally, the breasts are primarily composed of fat. The amount of fat can determine breast size. However, breast size has no bearing on the amount of milk someone is able to produce.

The internal anatomy of the breasts include the:

• Alveoli. These are milk secreting cells grouped into clusters inside the breasts.
• Lactiferous ducts. These are special channels that open on the nipple’s surface. Breast milk exits through these ducts to nourish a baby.
• Lobules. These are collections of alveoli in the breast that secrete milk. The lobules drain into lactiferous ducts, then into lactiferous sinuses that promote milk flow from the nipple.
• Mammary glands. These are responsible for producing breast milk.

The female body contains many organs that work together to achieve a variety of functions.

The shape and size of many of these organs naturally vary from person to person. However, if a female is concerned that any part of their anatomy might not be “normal,” they can talk to their doctor.

Last medically reviewed on November 5, 2019

• Biology / Biochemistry
• Pregnancy / Obstetrics
• Sexual Health / STDs
• Women's Health / Gynecology

How we reviewed this article:

• Chapter 27: The reproductive system. Anatomy and physiology of the female reproductive system. (n.d.). https://opentextbc.ca/anatomyandphysiology/chapter/27-2-anatomy-and-physiology-of-the-female-reproductive-system/
• Lee, M. Y., et al. (2015). Clinical pathology of Bartholin’s glands: A review of the literature. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4483306/
• The female reproductive system. (n.d.). https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-ap/chapter/the-female-reproductive-system/
• Vulvar anatomy. (n.d.). https://www.nva.org/what-is-vulvodynia/vulvar-anatomy/
• Zucca-Matthes, G., et al. (2016). Anatomy of the nipple and breast ducts. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4716863/

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1.10: The Psychology of Human Sexuality

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Northwest Vista College

Sexuality is one of the fundamental drives behind everyone’s feelings, thoughts, and behaviors. It defines the means of biological reproduction, describes psychological and sociological representations of self, and orients a person’s attraction to others. Further, it shapes the brain and body to be pleasure-seeking. Yet, as important as sexuality is to being human, it is often viewed as a taboo topic for personal or scientific inquiry.

Learning Objectives

• Explain how scientists study human sexuality.
• Share a definition of human sexuality.
• Distinguish between sex, gender, and sexual orientation.
• Review common and alternative sexual behaviors.
• Appraise how pleasure, sexual behaviors, and consent are intertwined.

Introduction

Sex makes the world go around: It makes babies bond, children giggle, adolescents flirt, and adults have babies. It is addressed in the holy books of the world’s great religions, and it infiltrates every part of society. It influences the way we dress, joke, and talk. In many ways, sex defines who we are. It is so important, the eminent neuropsychologist Karl Pribram (1958) described sex as one of four basic human drive states. Drive states motivate us to accomplish goals. They are linked to our survival. According to Pribram, feeding, fighting, fleeing, and sex are the four drives behind every thought, feeling, and behavior. Since these drives are so closely associated with our psychological and physical health, you might assume people would study, understand, and discuss them openly. Your assumption would be generally correct for three of the four drives (Malacane & Beckmeyer, 2016). Can you guess which drive is the least understood and openly discussed?

This module presents an opportunity for you to think openly and objectively about sex. Without shame or taboo, using science as a lens, we examine fundamental aspects of human sexuality—including gender, sexual orientation, fantasies, behaviors, paraphilias, and sexual consent.

The History of Scientific Investigations of Sex

The history of human sexuality is as long as human history itself—200,000+ years and counting (Antón & Swisher, 2004). For almost as long as we have been having sex, we have been creating art, writing, and talking about it. Some of the earliest recovered artifacts from ancient cultures are thought to be fertility totems. The Hindu Kama Sutra (400 BCE to 200 CE)—an ancient text discussing love, desire, and pleasure—includes a how-to manual for having sexual intercourse. Rules, advice, and stories about sex are also contained in the Muslim Qur’an , Jewish Torah, and Christian Bible .

By contrast, people have been scientifically investigating sex for only about 125 years. The first scientific investigations of sex employed the case study method of research. Using this method, the English physician Henry Havelock Ellis (1859-1939) examined diverse topics within sexuality, including arousal and masturbation. From 1897 to 1923, his findings were published in a seven-volume set of books titled Studies in the Psychology of Sex. Among his most noteworthy findings is that transgender people are distinct from homosexual people. Ellis’s studies led him to be an advocate of equal rights for women and comprehensive human sexuality education in public schools.

Using case studies, the Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) is credited with being the first scientist to link sex to healthy development and to recognize humans as being sexual throughout their lifespans, including childhood (Freud, 1905). Freud (1923) argued that people progress through five stages of psychosexual development : oral, anal, phallic, latent, and genital. According to Freud, each of these stages could be passed through in a healthy or unhealthy manner. In unhealthy manners, people might develop psychological problems, such as frigidity, impotence, or anal-retentiveness.

The American biologist Alfred Kinsey (1894-1956) is commonly referred to as the father of human sexuality research. Kinsey was a world-renowned expert on wasps but later changed his focus to the study of humans. This shift happened because he wanted to teach a course on marriage but found data on human sexual behavior lacking. He believed that sexual knowledge was the product of guesswork and had never really been studied systematically or in an unbiased way. He decided to collect information himself using the survey method , and set a goal of interviewing 100 thousand people about their sexual histories. Although he fell short of his goal, he still managed to collect 18 thousand interviews! Many “behind closed doors” behaviors investigated by contemporary scientists are based on Kinsey’s seminal work.

Today, a broad range of scientific research on sexuality continues. It’s a topic that spans various disciplines, including anthropology, biology, neurology, psychology, and sociology.

Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation: Three Different Parts of You

Applying for a credit card or filling out a job application requires your name, address, and birth-date. Additionally, applications usually ask for your sex or gender. It’s common for us to use the terms “sex” and “gender” interchangeably. However, in modern usage, these terms are distinct from one another.

Sex describes means of biological reproduction. Sex includes sexual organs, such as ovaries—defining what it is to be a female—or testes—defining what it is to be a male. Interestingly, biological sex is not as easily defined or determined as you might expect (see the section on variations in sex, below). By contrast, the term gender describes psychological ( gender identity ) and sociological ( gender role ) representations of biological sex. At an early age, we begin learning cultural norms for what is considered masculine and feminine. For example, children may associate long hair or dresses with femininity. Later in life, as adults, we often conform to these norms by behaving in gender-specific ways: as men, we build houses; as women, we bake cookies (Marshall, 1989; Money et al., 1955; Weinraub et al., 1984).

Because cultures change over time, so too do ideas about gender. For example, European and American cultures today associate pink with femininity and blue with masculinity. However, less than a century ago, these same cultures were swaddling baby boys in pink, because of its masculine associations with “blood and war,” and dressing little girls in blue, because of its feminine associations with the Virgin Mary (Kimmel, 1996).

Sex and gender are important aspects of a person’s identity. However, they do not tell us about a person’s sexual orientation (Rule & Ambady, 2008). Sexual orientation refers to a person’s sexual attraction to others. Within the context of sexual orientation, sexual attraction refers to a person’s capacity to arouse the sexual interest of another, or, conversely, the sexual interest one person feels toward another.

While some argue that sexual attraction is primarily driven by reproduction (e.g., Geary, 1998), empirical studies point to pleasure as the primary force behind our sex drive. For example, in a survey of college students who were asked, “Why do people have sex?” respondents gave more than 230 unique responses, most of which were related to pleasure rather than reproduction (Meston & Buss, 2007). Here’s a thought-experiment to further demonstrate how reproduction has relatively little to do with driving sexual attraction: Add the number of times you’ve had and hope to have sex during your lifetime. With this number in mind, consider how many times the goal was (or will be) for reproduction versus how many it was (or will be) for pleasure. Which number is greater?

Although a person’s intimate behavior may have sexual fluidity —changing due to circumstances (Diamond, 2009)—sexual orientations are relatively stable over one’s lifespan, and are genetically rooted (Frankowski, 2004). One method of measuring these genetic roots is the sexual orientation concordance rate (SOCR). An SOCR is the probability that a pair of individuals has the same sexual orientation. SOCRs are calculated and compared between people who share the same genetics ( monozygotic twins , 99%); some of the same genetics ( dizygotic twins , 50%); siblings (50%); and non-related people, randomly selected from the population. Researchers find SOCRs are highest for monozygotic twins; and SOCRs for dizygotic twins, siblings, and randomly-selected pairs do not significantly differ from one another (Bailey et al. 2016; Kendler et al., 2000). Because sexual orientation is a hotly debated issue, an appreciation of the genetic aspects of attraction can be an important piece of this dialogue.

On Being Normal: Variations in Sex, Gender, and Sexual Orientation

“ Only the human mind invents categories and tries to force facts into separated pigeon-holes. The living world is a continuum in each and every one of its aspects. The sooner we learn this concerning human sexual behavior, the sooner we shall reach a sound understanding of the realities of sex. ” (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948, pp. 638–639)

We live in an era when sex, gender, and sexual orientation are controversial religious and political issues. Some nations have laws against homosexuality, while others have laws protecting same-sex marriages. At a time when there seems to be little agreement among religious and political groups, it makes sense to wonder, “What is normal?” and, “Who decides?”

The international scientific and medical communities (e.g., World Health Organization, World Medical Association, World Psychiatric Association, Association for Psychological Science) view variations of sex, gender, and sexual orientation as normal. Furthermore, variations of sex, gender, and sexual orientation occur naturally throughout the animal kingdom. More than 500 animal species have homosexual or bisexual orientations (Lehrer, 2006). More than 65,000 animal species are intersex —born with either an absence or some combination of male and female reproductive organs, sex hormones, or sex chromosomes (Jarne & Auld, 2006). In humans, intersex individuals make up about two percent—more than 150 million people—of the world’s population (Blackless et al., 2000). There are dozens of intersex conditions, such as Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome and Turner’s Syndrome (Lee et al., 2006). The term “syndrome” can be misleading; although intersex individuals may have physical limitations (e.g., about a third of Turner’s individuals have heart defects; Matura et al., 2007), they otherwise lead relatively normal intellectual, personal, and social lives. In any case, intersex individuals demonstrate the diverse variations of biological sex.

Just as biological sex varies more widely than is commonly thought, so too does gender. Cisgender individuals’ gender identities correspond with their birth sexes, whereas transgender individuals’ gender identities do not correspond with their birth sexes. Because gender is so deeply ingrained culturally, rates of transgender individuals vary widely around the world (see Table 1).

Although incidence rates of transgender individuals differ significantly between cultures, transgender females (TGFs) —whose birth sex was male—are by far the most frequent type of transgender individuals in any culture. Of the 18 countries studied by Meier and Labuski (2013), 16 of them had higher rates of TGFs than transgender males (TGMs) —whose birth sex was female— and the 18 country TGF to TGM ratio was 3 to 1. TGFs have diverse levels of androgyny —having both feminine and masculine characteristics. For example, five percent of the Samoan population are TGFs referred to as fa'afafine , who range in androgyny from mostly masculine to mostly feminine (Tan, 2016); in Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Bangladesh, TGFs are referred to as hijras, recognized by their governments as a third gender, and range in androgyny from only having a few masculine characteristics to being entirely feminine (Pasquesoone, 2014); and as many as six percent of biological males living in Oaxaca, Mexico are TGFs referred to as muxes , who range in androgyny from mostly masculine to mostly feminine (Stephen, 2002).

Sexual orientation is as diverse as gender identity. Instead of thinking of sexual orientation as being two categories—homosexual and heterosexual—Kinsey argued that it’s a continuum (Kinsey, Pomeroy, & Martin, 1948). He measured orientation on a continuum, using a 7-point Likert scale called the Heterosexual-Homosexual Rating Scale, in which 0 is exclusively heterosexual , 3 is bisexual , and 6 is exclusively homosexual . Later researchers using this method have found 18% to 39% of Europeans and Americans identifying as somewhere between heterosexual and homosexual (Lucas et al., 2017; YouGov.com, 2015). These percentages drop dramatically (0.5% to 1.9%) when researchers force individuals to respond using only two categories (Copen, Chandra, & Febo-Vazquez, 2016; Gates, 2011).

What Are You Doing? A Brief Guide to Sexual Behavior

Just as we may wonder what characterizes particular gender or sexual orientations as “normal,” we might have similar questions about sexual behaviors. What is considered sexually normal depends on culture. Some cultures are sexually-restrictive—such as one extreme example off the coast of Ireland, studied in the mid-20th century, known as the island of Inis Beag . The inhabitants of Inis Beag detested nudity and viewed sex as a necessary evil for the sole purpose of reproduction. They wore clothes when they bathed and even while having sex. Further, sex education was nonexistent, as was breast feeding (Messenger, 1989). By contrast, Mangaians , of the South Pacific island of A’ua’u, are an example of a highly sexually-permissive culture. Young Mangaian boys are encouraged to masturbate. By age 13, they’re instructed by older males on how to sexually perform and maximize orgasms for themselves and their partners. When the boys are a bit older, this formal instruction is replaced with hands-on coaching by older females. Young girls are also expected to explore their sexuality and develop a breadth of sexual knowledge before marriage (Marshall & Suggs, 1971). These cultures make clear that what are considered sexually normal behaviors depends on time and place.

Sexual behaviors are linked to, but distinct from, fantasies. Leitenberg and Henning (1995) define sexual fantasies as “any mental imagery that is sexually arousing.” One of the more common fantasies is the replacement fantasy —fantasizing about someone other than one’s current partner (Hicks & Leitenberg, 2001). In addition, more than 50% of people have forced-sex fantasies (Critelli & Bivona, 2008). However, this does not mean most of us want to be cheating on our partners or be involved in sexual assault. Sexual fantasies are not equal to sexual behaviors.

Sexual fantasies are often a context for the sexual behavior of masturbation —tactile (physical) stimulation of the body for sexual pleasure. Historically, masturbation has earned a bad reputation; it’s been described as “self-abuse,” and falsely associated with causing adverse side effects, such as hairy palms, acne, blindness, insanity, and even death (Kellogg, 1888). However, empirical evidence links masturbation to increased levels of sexual and marital satisfaction, and physical and psychological health (Hurlburt & Whitaker, 1991; Levin, 2007). There is even evidence that masturbation significantly decreases the risk of developing prostate cancer among males over the age of 50 (Dimitropoulou et al., 2009). Masturbation is common among males and females in the U.S. Robbins et al. (2011) found that 74% of males and 48% of females reported masturbating. However, frequency of masturbation is affected by culture. An Australian study found that only 58% of males and 42% of females reported masturbating (Smith, Rosenthal, & Reichler, 1996). Further, rates of reported masturbation by males and females in India are even lower, at 46% and 13%, respectively (Ramadugu et al., 2011).

Coital sex is the term for vaginal-penile intercourse, which occurs for about 3 to 13 minutes on average—though its duration and frequency decrease with age (Corty & Guardiani, 2008; Smith et al., 2012). Traditionally, people are known as “virgins” before they engage in coital sex, and have “lost” their virginity afterwards. Durex (2005) found the average age of first coital experiences across 41 different countries to be 17 years, with a low of 16 (Iceland), and a high of 20 (India). There is tremendous variation regarding frequency of coital sex. For example, the average number of times per year a person in Greece (138) or France (120) engages in coital sex is between 1.6 and 3 times greater than in India (75) or Japan (45; Durex, 2005).

Oral sex includes cunnilingus —oral stimulation of the female’s external sex organs, and fellatio —oral stimulation of the male’s external sex organs. The prevalence of oral sex widely differs between cultures—with Western cultures, such as the U.S., Canada, and Austria, reporting higher rates (greater than 75%); and Eastern and African cultures, such as Japan and Nigeria, reporting lower rates (less than 10%; Copen, Chandra, & Febo-Vazquez, 2016; Malacad & Hess, 2010; Wylie, 2009). Not only are there differences between cultures regarding how many people engage in oral sex, there are differences in its very definition. For example, most college students in the U.S. do not believe cunnilingus or fellatio are sexual behaviors—and more than a third of college students believe oral sex is a form of abstinence (Barnett et al., 2017; Horan, Phillips, & Hagan, 1998; Sanders & Reinisch, 1999).

Anal sex refers to penetration of the anus by an object. Anal sex is not exclusively a “homosexual behavior.” The anus has extensive sensory-nerve innervation and is often experienced as an erogenous zone, no matter where a person is on the Heterosexual-Homosexual Rating Scale (Cordeau et al., 2014). When heterosexual people are asked about their sexual behaviors, more than a third (about 40%) of both males and females report having had anal sex at some time during their life (Chandra, Mosher, & Copen, 2011; Copen, Chandra, & Febo-Vazquez, 2016). Comparatively, when homosexual men are asked about their most recent sexual behaviors, more than a third (37%) report having had anal sex (Rosenberger et al., 2011). Like heterosexual people, homosexual people engage in a variety of sexual behaviors, the most frequent being masturbation, romantic kissing, and oral sex (Rosenberger et al., 2011). The prevalence of anal sex widely differs between cultures. For example, people in Greece and Italy report high rates of anal sex (greater than 50%), whereas people in China and India report low rates of anal sex (less than 15%; Durex, 2005).

In contrast to “more common” sexual behaviors, there is a vast array of alternative sexual behaviors. Some of these behaviors, such as voyeurism , exhibitionism , and pedophilia are classified in the DSM as paraphilic disorders —behaviors that victimize and cause harm to others or one’s self (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Sadism —inflicting pain upon another person to experience pleasure for one’s self—and masochism —receiving pain from another person to experience pleasure for one’s self—are also classified in the DSM as paraphilic disorders. However, if an individual consensually engages in these behaviors, the term “disorder” is replaced with the term “interest.” Janus and Janus (1993) found that 14% of males and 11% of females have engaged in some form of sadism and/or masochism.

Sexual Consent

Clearly, people engage in a multitude of behaviors whose variety is limited only by our own imaginations. Further, our standards for what’s normal differs substantially from culture to culture. However, there is one aspect of sexual behavior that is universally acceptable—indeed, fundamental and necessary. At the heart of what qualifies as sexually “normal” is the concept of consent. Sexual consent refers to the voluntary, conscious, and empathic participation in a sexual act, which can be withdrawn at any time (Jozkowski & Peterson, 2013). Sexual consent is the baseline for what are considered normal —acceptable and healthy—behaviors; whereas, nonconsensual sex—i.e., forced, pressured or unconscious participation—is unacceptable and unhealthy. When engaging in sexual behaviors with a partner, a clear and explicit understanding of your boundaries, as well as your partner’s boundaries, is essential. We recommend safer-sex practices , such as condoms, honesty, and communication, whenever you engage in a sexual act. Discussing likes, dislikes, and limits prior to sexual exploration reduces the likelihood of miscommunication and misjudging nonverbal cues. In the heat of the moment, things are not always what they seem. For example, Kristen Jozkowski and her colleagues (2014) found that females tend to use verbal strategies of consent, whereas males tend to rely on nonverbal indications of consent. Awareness of this basic mismatch between heterosexual couples’ exchanges of consent may proactively reduce miscommunication and unwanted sexual advances.

The universal principles of pleasure, sexual behaviors, and consent are intertwined. Consent is the foundation on which sexual activity needs to be built. Understanding and practicing empathic consent requires sexual literacy and an ability to effectively communicate desires and limits, as well as to respect others’ parameters.

Considering the amount of attention people give to the topic of sex, it’s surprising how little most actually know about it. Historically, people’s beliefs about sexuality have emerged as having absolute moral, physical, and psychological boundaries. The truth is, sex is less concrete than most people assume. Gender and sexual orientation, for example, are not either/or categories. Instead, they are continuums. Similarly, sexual fantasies and behaviors vary greatly by individual and culture. Ultimately, open discussions about sexual identity and sexual practices will help people better understand themselves, others, and the world around them.

Acknowledgements

The authors are indebted to Robert Biswas-Diener, Trina Cowan, Kara Paige, and Liz Wright for editing drafts of this module.

Outside Resources

Discussion Questions

• Of the four basic human drive states Karl Pribram describes as being linked to our survival, why do you think the sex drive is the least likely to be openly and objectively addressed?
• How might you go about scientifically investigating attitudes and behaviors regarding masturbation across various cultures?
• Discuss the three different parts of you as described by this module.
• How would you define “natural” human sexual behavior with respect to sex, gender, and sexual orientation? How does nature (i.e., the animal kingdom) help us define what is considered natural?
• Why do humans feel compelled to categorize themselves and others based on their sex, gender, and sexual orientation? What would the world be like if these categories were removed?
• How has culture influenced your sexual attitudes and behaviors?
• The concept of sexual consent is seemingly simple; however, as this module presents, it is oftentimes skewed or ignored. Identify at least three factors that contribute to the complexities of consent, and how these factors might best be addressed to reduce unwanted sexual advances.
• American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.
• Antón, S. C., & Swisher III, C. C. (2004). Early dispersals of homo from Africa. Annual Review of Anthropology , 33, 271–296.
• Bailey, J. M., Vasey, P. L., Diamond, L. M., Breedlove, S. M., Vilain, E., & Epprecht, M. (2016). Sexual orientation, controversy, and science. Psychological Science in the Public Interest , 17, 45-101
• Barnett, M. D., Fleck, L. K., Marsden, A. D., & Martin, K. J. (2017). Sexual semantics: The meanings of sex, virginity, and abstinence for university students. Personality and Individual Differences , 106, 203–208.
• Blackless, M., Charuvastra, A., Derryck, A., Fausto-Sterling, A., Lauzanne, K., & Lee, E. (2000). How sexually dimorphic are we? Review and synthesis. American Journal of Human Biology , 12, 151-166.
• Chandra, A., Mosher, W. D., & Copen, C. (2011). Sexual behavior, sexual attraction, and sexual identity in the United States: Data From the 2006–2008 National Survey of Family Growth. National Health Statistics Report , 36, 1-35.
• Conron, J., Scott, G., Stowell, G. S., & Landers, S. (2012). Transgender health in Massachusetts: Results from a household probability sample of adults. American Journal of Public Health , 102, 118–122.
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• Cordeau, D., Bélanger, M., Beaulieu-Prévost, D., & Courtois, F. (2014). The assessment of sensory detection thresholds on the perineum and breast compared with control body sites. Journal of Sexual Medicine , 11, 1741–1748.
• Corty, E. W., &, Guardiani, J. M. (2008). Canadian and American sex therapists perceptions of normal and abnormal ejaculatory latencies: How long should intercourse last? Journal of Sexual Medicine , 5, 1251-1256.
• Critelli, J. W., & Bivona, J. M. (2008). Women\'s erotic rape fantasies: An evaluation of theory and research. The Journal of Sex Research , 45, 57-70.
• De Gascun, C., Kelly, J., Salter, N., Lucey, J., & O’Shea, D. (2006). Gender identity disorder. Irish Medical Journal , 99, 146–148.
• Diamond, L. M. (2009). Sexual Fluidity: Understanding Women’s Love and Desire . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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• Dulko, S., & Imielinskia, C. (2004). The epidemiology of transsexualism in Poland. Journal of Psychosomatic Research , 56, 637.
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• Frankowski, B. L. (2004). Sexual orientation and adolescents. Pediatrics , 113, 1827–1832.
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• Gates, G. (2011). How Many People are Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender? Williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu.
• Geary, D. C. (1998). Male, female: The evolution of human sex differences . Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association.
• Hicks, T. V., & Leitenberg, H. (2001). Sexual fantasies about one’s partner versus someone else: Gender differences in incidence and frequency. Journal of Sex Research , 38, 43-51.
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Human Reproductive System

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• A.S., Nursing, Chattahoochee Technical College

The human reproductive system and the ability to reproduce make life possible. In  sexual reproduction , two individuals produce offspring that have some of the genetic characteristics of both parents. The primary function of the human reproductive system is to produce sex cells . When a male and female sex cell unite, an offspring grows and develops.

The reproductive system is usually comprised of either male or female reproductive organs and structures. The growth and activity of these parts are regulated by  hormones . The reproductive system is closely associated with other  organ systems , particularly the  endocrine system  and urinary system. 

Gamete Production

Gametes are produced by a two-part cell division process called  meiosis . Through a sequence of steps, replicated DNA  in a parent cell is distributed among four  daughter cells . Meiosis produces gametes that are considered haploid because they have half the number of  chromosomes  as the parent cell. Human sex cells contain one complete set of 23 chromosomes. When sex cells unite during  fertilization , the two haploid sex cells become one  diploid  cell that contains all 46 chromosomes.

Spermatogenesis

The production of sperm cells is known as  spermatogenesis . Stem cells develop into mature sperm cells by first dividing mitotically to produce identical copies of themselves and then meiotically to create unique daughter cells called spermatids. Spermatids then transform into mature spermatozoa through spermiogenesis. This process occurs continuously and takes place within the male testes. Hundreds of millions of sperm must be released in order for fertilization to take place.

Oogenesis  (ovum development) occurs in the female ovaries. In meiosis I of oogenesis, daughter cells divide asymmetrically. This asymmetrical cytokinesis results in one large egg cell (oocyte) and smaller cells called polar bodies. The polar bodies degrade and are not fertilized. After meiosis I is complete, the egg cell is called a secondary oocyte. The haploid secondary oocyte will only complete the second meiotic stage if it encounters a sperm cell. Once fertilization is initiated, the secondary oocyte completes meiosis II and becomes an ovum. The ovum fuses with the sperm cell and fertilization completes while embryonic development begins. A fertilized ovum is called a zygote.

Reproductive System Disease

The reproductive system is susceptible to a number of diseases and disorders. These are of varying degrees of detriment to the body. This includes  cancer  that can develop in reproductive organs such as the uterus, ovaries, testicles, and prostate.

Disorders of the female reproductive system include endometriosis—a painful condition in which endometrial tissue develops outside of the uterus—ovarian cysts, uterine polyps, and uterine prolapse.

Disorders of the male reproductive system include testicular torsion—twisting of the testes—testicular under-activity resulting in low testosterone production called hypogonadism, enlarged prostate gland, swelling of the scrotum called hydrocele, and inflammation of the epididymis.

Reproductive Organs

Both male and female reproductive systems have internal and external structures. Reproductive organs are considered to be either primary or secondary organs based on their role. The primary reproductive organs of either system are called  gonads  (ovaries and testes) and these are responsible for  gamete  (sperm and egg cell) and hormone production. Other reproductive structures and organs are considered secondary reproductive structures and they aid in the growth and maturation of gametes and offspring.

Female Reproductive System

The female reproductive system is comprised of both internal and external reproductive organs that both enable fertilization and support embryonic development. Structures of the female reproductive system include:

• Labia majora: Larger lip-like external structures that cover and protect other reproductive structures.
• Labia minora: Smaller lip-like external structures found inside the labia majora. They provide protection to the clitoris, urethra, and vaginal openings.
• Clitoris: Sensitive sexual organ located in the uppermost section of the vaginal opening. The clitoris contains thousands of sensory nerve endings that respond to sexual stimulation and promote vaginal lubrication.
• Vagina: Fibrous, muscular canal leading from the cervix to the external portion of the genital canal. The penis enters the vagina during sexual intercourse.
• Cervix: Opening of the uterus. This strong, narrow structure expands to allow sperm to flow from the vagina into the uterus.
• Uterus: Internal organ that houses and nurtures female gametes after fertilization, commonly called the womb. A placenta, which encases a growing embryo, develops and attaches itself to the uterine wall during pregnancy. An umbilical cord stretches from the fetus to its placenta to provide nutrients from a mother to an unborn baby.
• Fallopian tubes: Uterine tubes that transport egg cells from the ovaries to the uterus. Fertile eggs are released from ovaries into fallopian tubes during ovulation and typically fertilized from there.
• Ovaries: Primary reproductive structures that produce female gametes (eggs) and sex hormones. There is one ovary on either side of the uterus.

Male Reproductive System

The male reproductive system consists of sexual organs, accessory glands, and a series of duct systems that provide a pathway for sperm cells to exit the body and fertilize an egg. Male genitalia only equips an organism to initiate fertilization and does not support the development of a growing fetus. Male sex organs include:

• Penis: The main organ involved in sexual intercourse. This organ is composed of erectile tissue, connective tissue , and skin. The urethra stretches the length of the penis and allows either urine or sperm to pass through its external opening.
• Testes: Male primary reproductive structures that produce male gametes (sperm) and sex hormones. Testes are also called testicles.
• Scrotum: External pouch of skin that contains the testes. Because the scrotum is located outside of the abdomen, it can reach temperatures that are lower than that of internal body structures. Lower temperatures are necessary for proper sperm development.
• Epididymis: System of ducts that receive immature sperm from the testes. The epididymis functions to develop immature sperm and house mature sperm.
• Ductus Deferens or Vas Deferens: Fibrous, muscular tubes that are continuous with the epididymis and provide a pathway for sperm to travel from the epididymis to the urethra
• Urethra: Tube that extends from the urinary bladder through the penis. This canal allows for the excretion of reproductive fluids (semen) and urine from the body. Sphincters prevent urine from entering the urethra while semen is passing through.
• Seminal Vesicles: Glands that produce fluid to nurture and provide energy to sperm cells. Tubes leading from the seminal vesicles join the ductus deferens to form the ejaculatory duct.
• Ejaculatory Duct: Duct formed from the union of the ductus deferens and seminal vesicles. Each ejaculatory duct empties into the urethra.
• Prostate Gland: Gland that produces a milky, alkaline fluid that increases sperm motility. The contents of the prostate empty into the urethra.
• Bulbourethral or Cowper's Glands: Small glands located at the base of the penis. In response to sexual stimulation, these glands secrete an alkaline fluid which helps to neutralize acidity from the vagina and urine in the urethra.
• Farabee, M.J. The Reproductive System . Estrella Mountain Community College, 2007.
• " Introduction to the Reproductive System ." SEER Training Modules , National Cancer Institute | U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
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Module 11: The Reproductive System

Development of the male and female reproductive systems, learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Explain how bipotential tissues are directed to develop into male or female sex organs
• Name the rudimentary duct systems in the embryo that are precursors to male or female internal sex organs
• Describe the hormonal changes that bring about puberty, and the secondary sex characteristics of men and women

The development of the reproductive systems begins soon after fertilization of the egg, with primordial gonads beginning to develop approximately one month after conception. Reproductive development continues in utero, but there is little change in the reproductive system between infancy and puberty.

Development of the Sexual Organs in the Embryo and Fetus

Females are considered the “fundamental” sex—that is, without much chemical prompting, all fertilized eggs would develop into females. To become a male, an individual must be exposed to the cascade of factors initiated by a single gene on the male Y chromosome. This is called the SRY ( S ex-determining R egion of the Y chromosome). Because females do not have a Y chromosome, they do not have the SRY gene. Without a functional SRY gene, an individual will be female.

In both male and female embryos, the same group of cells has the potential to develop into either the male or female gonads; this tissue is considered bipotential. The SRY gene actively recruits other genes that begin to develop the testes, and suppresses genes that are important in female development. As part of this SRY -prompted cascade, germ cells in the bipotential gonads differentiate into spermatogonia. Without SRY , different genes are expressed, oogonia form, and primordial follicles develop in the primitive ovary.

Soon after the formation of the testis, the Leydig cells begin to secrete testosterone. Testosterone can influence tissues that are bipotential to become male reproductive structures. For example, with exposure to testosterone, cells that could become either the glans penis or the glans clitoris form the glans penis. Without testosterone, these same cells differentiate into the clitoris.

Not all tissues in the reproductive tract are bipotential. The internal reproductive structures (for example the uterus, uterine tubes, and part of the vagina in females; and the epididymis, ductus deferens, and seminal vesicles in males) form from one of two rudimentary duct systems in the embryo. For proper reproductive function in the adult, one set of these ducts must develop properly, and the other must degrade. In males, secretions from sustentacular cells trigger a degradation of the female duct, called the Müllerian duct . At the same time, testosterone secretion stimulates growth of the male tract, the Wolffian duct . Without such sustentacular cell secretion, the Müllerian duct will develop; without testosterone, the Wolffian duct will degrade. Thus, the developing offspring will be female. For more information and a figure of differentiation of the gonads, seek additional content on fetal development.

Practice Questions

A baby’s gender is determined at conception, and the different genitalia of male and female fetuses develop from the same tissues in the embryo. View this animation to see a comparison of the development of structures of the female and male reproductive systems in a growing fetus. Where are the testes located for most of gestational time?

Further Sexual Development Occurs at Puberty

Puberty is the stage of development at which individuals become sexually mature. Though the outcomes of puberty for boys and girls are very different, the hormonal control of the process is very similar. In addition, though the timing of these events varies between individuals, the sequence of changes that occur is predictable for male and female adolescents. As shown in the image below, a concerted release of hormones from the hypothalamus (GnRH), the anterior pituitary (LH and FSH), and the gonads (either testosterone or estrogen) is responsible for the maturation of the reproductive systems and the development of secondary sex characteristics , which are physical changes that serve auxiliary roles in reproduction.

The first changes begin around the age of eight or nine when the production of LH becomes detectable. The release of LH occurs primarily at night during sleep and precedes the physical changes of puberty by several years. In pre-pubertal children, the sensitivity of the negative feedback system in the hypothalamus and pituitary is very high. This means that very low concentrations of androgens or estrogens will negatively feed back onto the hypothalamus and pituitary, keeping the production of GnRH, LH, and FSH low.

As an individual approaches puberty, two changes in sensitivity occur. The first is a decrease of sensitivity in the hypothalamus and pituitary to negative feedback, meaning that it takes increasingly larger concentrations of sex steroid hormones to stop the production of LH and FSH. The second change in sensitivity is an increase in sensitivity of the gonads to the FSH and LH signals, meaning the gonads of adults are more responsive to gonadotropins than are the gonads of children. As a result of these two changes, the levels of LH and FSH slowly increase and lead to the enlargement and maturation of the gonads, which in turn leads to secretion of higher levels of sex hormones and the initiation of spermatogenesis and folliculogenesis.

In addition to age, multiple factors can affect the age of onset of puberty, including genetics, environment, and psychological stress. One of the more important influences may be nutrition; historical data demonstrate the effect of better and more consistent nutrition on the age of menarche in girls in the United States, which decreased from an average age of approximately 17 years of age in 1860 to the current age of approximately 12.75 years in 1960, as it remains today. Some studies indicate a link between puberty onset and the amount of stored fat in an individual. This effect is more pronounced in girls, but has been documented in both sexes. Body fat, corresponding with secretion of the hormone leptin by adipose cells, appears to have a strong role in determining menarche. This may reflect to some extent the high metabolic costs of gestation and lactation. In girls who are lean and highly active, such as gymnasts, there is often a delay in the onset of puberty.

Figure 1. Click to view a larger image. During puberty, the release of LH and FSH from the anterior pituitary stimulates the gonads to produce sex hormones in both male and female adolescents.

Signs of Puberty

Different sex steroid hormone concentrations between the sexes also contribute to the development and function of secondary sexual characteristics. Examples of secondary sexual characteristics are listed in Table 1.

As a girl reaches puberty, typically the first change that is visible is the development of the breast tissue. This is followed by the growth of axillary and pubic hair. A growth spurt normally starts at approximately age 9 to 11, and may last two years or more. During this time, a girl’s height can increase 3 inches a year. The next step in puberty is menarche, the start of menstruation.

In boys, the growth of the testes is typically the first physical sign of the beginning of puberty, which is followed by growth and pigmentation of the scrotum and growth of the penis. The next step is the growth of hair, including armpit, pubic, chest, and facial hair. Testosterone stimulates the growth of the larynx and thickening and lengthening of the vocal folds, which causes the voice to drop in pitch. The first fertile ejaculations typically appear at approximately 15 years of age, but this age can vary widely across individual boys. Unlike the early growth spurt observed in females, the male growth spurt occurs toward the end of puberty, at approximately age 11 to 13, and a boy’s height can increase as much as 4 inches a year. In some males, pubertal development can continue through the early 20s.

Chapter Review

The reproductive systems of males and females begin to develop soon after conception. A gene on the male’s Y chromosome called SRY is critical in stimulating a cascade of events that simultaneously stimulate testis development and repress the development of female structures. Testosterone produced by Leydig cells in the embryonic testis stimulates the development of male sexual organs. If testosterone is not present, female sexual organs will develop.

Whereas the gonads and some other reproductive tissues are considered bipotential, the tissue that forms the internal reproductive structures stems from ducts that will develop into only male (Wolffian) or female (Müllerian) structures. To be able to reproduce as an adult, one of these systems must develop properly and the other must degrade.

Further development of the reproductive systems occurs at puberty. The initiation of the changes that occur in puberty is the result of a decrease in sensitivity to negative feedback in the hypothalamus and pituitary gland, and an increase in sensitivity of the gonads to FSH and LH stimulation. These changes lead to increases in either estrogen or testosterone, in female and male adolescents, respectively. The increase in sex steroid hormones leads to maturation of the gonads and other reproductive organs. The initiation of spermatogenesis begins in boys, and girls begin ovulating and menstruating. Increases in sex steroid hormones also lead to the development of secondary sex characteristics such as breast development in girls and facial hair and larynx growth in boys.

Critical Thinking Questions

• Identify the changes in sensitivity that occur in the hypothalamus, pituitary, and gonads as a boy or girl approaches puberty. Explain how these changes lead to the increases of sex steroid hormone secretions that drive many pubertal changes.
• Explain how the internal female and male reproductive structures develop from two different duct systems.
• Explain what would occur during fetal development to an XY individual with a mutation causing a nonfunctional SRY gene.
• As an individual approaches puberty, two changes in sensitivity occur. The first is a decrease of sensitivity in the hypothalamus and pituitary to negative feedback, meaning that it takes increasingly larger concentrations of sex steroid hormones to stop the production of LH and FSH. The second change in sensitivity is an increase in the sensitivity of the gonads to the FSH and LH signals, meaning that the gonads of adults are more responsive to gonadotropins than are the gonads of children. As a result of these two changes, the levels of LH and FSH slowly increase and lead to the enlargement and maturation of the gonads, which in turn leads to secretion of higher levels of sex hormones and the initiation of spermatogenesis and folliculogenesis.
• The internal reproductive structures form from one of two rudimentary duct systems in the embryo. Testosterone secretion stimulates growth of the male tract, the Wolffian duct. Secretions of sustentacular cells trigger a degradation of the female tract, the Müllerian duct. Without these stimuli, the Müllerian duct will develop and the Wolffian duct will degrade, resulting in a female embryo.
• If the SRY gene were not functional, the XY individual would be genetically a male, but would develop female reproductive structures.

Müllerian duct: duct system present in the embryo that will eventually form the internal female reproductive structures

puberty: life stage during which a male or female adolescent becomes anatomically and physiologically capable of reproduction

secondary sex characteristics: physical characteristics that are influenced by sex steroid hormones and have supporting roles in reproductive function

Wolffian duct: duct system present in the embryo that will eventually form the internal male reproductive structures

• Anatomy & Physiology. Provided by : OpenStax CNX. Located at : http://cnx.org/contents/[email protected] . License : CC BY: Attribution . License Terms : Download for free at http://cnx.org/contents/[email protected]

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• Magnetic resonance...

Magnetic resonance imaging of male and female genitals during coitus and female sexual arousal

• Related content
• Peer review
• Willibrord Weijmar Schultz , associate professor of gynaecology ( w.c.m.weymar.schultz{at}oprit.rug.nl ) a ,
• Pek van Andel , physiologist b ,
• Ida Sabelis , anthropologist d ,
• Eduard Mooyaart , radiologist c
• a Department of Gynaecology, University Hospital Groningen, PO Box 30 001, 9700 RB Groningen, Netherlands
• b Laboratory for Cell Biology and Electron Microscopy, University Hospital Groningen
• c Department of Radiology, University Hospital Groningen
• d Department of Business Anthropology VU, De Boelen 1081C-NL, 1081 HV, Amsterdam
• Correspondence to: W Weijmar Schultz

Objective: To find out whether taking images of the male and female genitals during coitus is feasible and to find out whether former and current ideas about the anatomy during sexual intercourse and during female sexual arousal are based on assumptions or on facts.

Design: Observational study.

Setting: University hospital in the Netherlands.

Methods: Magnetic resonance imaging was used to study the female sexual response and the male and female genitals during coitus. Thirteen experiments were performed with eight couples and three single women.

Results: The images obtained showed that during intercourse in the “missionary position” the penis has the shape of a boomerang and 1/3 of its length consists of the root of the penis. During female sexual arousal without intercourse the uterus was raised and the anterior vaginal wall lengthened. The size of the uterus did not increase during sexual arousal.

Conclusion: Taking magnetic resonance images of the male and female genitals during coitus is feasible and contributes to understanding of anatomy.

Introduction

“I expose to men the origin of their first, and perhaps second, reason for existing.” 1 Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) wrote these words above his drawing “The Copulation” in about 1493 (fig 1 ). 2 The Renaissance sketch shows a transparent view of the anatomy of sexual intercourse as envisaged by the anatomists of his time. The semen was supposed to come down from the brain through a channel which can be seen in the spine of the man. In the woman the right lactiferous duct is depicted as originating in the right female breast and ending in the genital area. Even a genius like Leonardo da Vinci distorted men's and women's bodies—as seen now—to fit the ideology of his time and to the notions of his colleagues, who he paid tribute to.

“The Copulation” as imagined and drawn by Leonardo da Vinci. 2 With permission from the Royal Collection. Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II is gratefully acknowledged.

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The first careful study—since the sketch by Leonardo da Vinci—of the interaction of male and female human genitals during coitus was published by Dickinson in 1933 (fig 2 ). 3 A glass test tube as big as a penis in erection inserted into the vagina of female subjects who were sexually aroused by clitoral stimulation (occasionally with a vibrator) guided him in constructing his pictorial supposition.

Midsagittal image of the anatomy of sexual intercourse envisaged by R L Dickinson and drawn by R S Kendall 3

In the 1960s Masters and Johnson made their assessments with an artificial penis that could mechanically imitate natural coitus and by “direct observation”—the introduction of a speculum and bimanual palpation. 4 5 Their most remarkable observations regarding sexual arousal in the woman were the backwards and upwards movements of the anterior vaginal wall (vaginal tenting) and a 50-100% greater volume of the uterus. This increase disappeared 10-20 minutes after orgasm When sexual excitement without orgasm occurred, the volume returned to normal in 30-60 minutes. Masters and Johnson presumed that the greater volume of the uterus was due to engorgement with blood However, they qualified their presumption: “In view of the artificial nature of the equipment, legitimate issue may be raised with the integrity of observed reaction patterns.” 4

In 1992 Riley et al published an ultrasound study on copulation. 6 The images were of relatively poor quality as they used hand held, self scanning equipment, and none of the images was overview. We used magnetic resonance imaging to study the anatomy and physiology of human sexual intercourse. Our search started in 1991 when one of us (PvA) saw a black and white slide of a midsagittal magnetic resonance image of the mouth and throat of a professional singer who was singing “aaa.” He remembered Leonardo's drawing and wondered whether it would be possible to take such an image of human coitus We decided to try, as an ad hoc “instrument-oriented” study, despite the unscientific and other irrelevant reactions we expected and received: honi soit, qui mal y pense.

Magnetic resonance imaging had already been used as a diagnostic tool to study erectile impotence 7 ; it is particularly attractive for this kind of study because it produces images with exquisite anatomical detail that are clearer than those obtained with ultrasonography or radiography, and—as far as we know—it is safe. The aim of the study was initially to find out whether taking images of the male and female genitals during coitus is feasible, and later whether former and current ideas about the anatomy during sexual intercourse and during female sexual arousal are based on assumptions or on facts.

Subjects and methods

The participants (pairs of men and women) were recruited by personal invitation and through a local scientific television programme Respondents were invited to participate if they met the following criteria: older than 18 years, intact uterus and ovaries, and a small to average weight/height index. The experimental procedure was explained in a letter sent to respondents along with an informed consent form. Participants were assured confidentiality, privacy, anonymity, and the possibility of withdrawing from the study at any time. After written informed consent had been obtained, the participants were invited to come for a scan when the equipment was available on a Saturday.

The tube in which the couple would have intercourse stood in a room next to a control room where the searchers were sitting behind the scanning console and screen. An improvised curtain covered the window between the two rooms, so the intercom was the only means of communication Imaging was first done in a 1.5 Tesla Philips magnet system (Gyroscan S15) and later in a 1.5 Tesla magnet system from Siemens Vision. To increase the space in the tube, the table was removed: the internal diameter of the tube is then 50 cm. The participants were asked to lie with pelvises near the marked centre of the tube and not to move during imaging. After a preview, 10 mm thick sagittal images were taken with a half-Fourier acquisition single shot turbo SE T2 weighted pulse sequence (HASTE) The echo time was 64 ms, with a repetition time of 4.4 ms With this fast acquisition technique, 11 slices of relatively good quality were obtained within 14 seconds.

Magnetic resonance imaging during coitus (8 couples) and sexual arousal (11 women)

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The volunteers were shown the equipment in the two rooms, and personal and gynaecological histories were taken. The experimental procedure was explained, and all investigators left the imaging room. After a preliminary image for positioning the true pelvis of the woman was taken, the first image was taken with her lying on her back (image 1). Then the male was asked to climb into the tube and begin face to face coitus in the superior position (image 2). After this shot—successful or not—the man was asked to leave the tube and the woman was asked to stimulate her clitoris manually and to inform the researchers by intercom when she had reached the preorgasmic stage. Then she stopped the autostimulation for a third image (image 3). After that image was taken the woman restarted the stimulation to achieve an orgasm. Twenty minutes after the orgasm, the fourth image was taken (image 4). At the end of the experiment, the images were evaluated in the presence of the participants.

Thirteen experiments were performed with eight couples (three couples performed two experiments each) and three single women. The table shows age, weight/height index, parity, type of contraception, female orgasm (yes/no), and the depth of penetration (partial or complete) No women reported having a “g-spot” or producing female ejaculation during orgasm. On two Saturdays in 1991 (experiments 1 and 2) the first couple succeeded with complete penetration that lasted sufficiently long for the images to be taken. The Philips 1.5 Tesla magnet system at that time required a relatively long acquisition time (52 seconds) and had a relatively poor signal: noise ratio. This gave low quality images with many movement artefacts. In 1996 the Siemens Vision 1.5 Tesla magnet system became available and provided the opportunity to continue our search for sharp images. Six couples succeeded in partial, though not complete, penetration (experiments 3 and 7-11). In 1998 sildenafil (Viagra) became available in the Netherlands The two couples in experiments 9 and 11 were invited to repeat the procedure one hour after the man had taken one 25 mg tablet of sildenafil. They succeeded with complete penetration that lasted long enough (12 seconds) for sharp images to be taken (experiments 12 and 13).

Midsagittal image of the anatomy of sexual intercourse (experiment 12). P=penis, Ur=urethra, Pe=perineum, U=uterus, S=symphysis, B=bladder, I=intestine, L5=lumbar 5, Sc=scrotum

Midsagittal images of sexual response in a multiparous woman (experiment 9): (left) at rest; (centre) pre-orgasmic phase; (right) 20 minutes after orgasm

Figure 3 shows a midsagittal image of the anatomy of sexual intercourse with the woman lying on her back and the man on top of her. The root of the penis (1/3 of the length) and the erect pendulous body (2/3 of the length) are visible. The pendulous part of the erect penis moved upwards at an angle of about 120° to the root of the penis, and almost parallel to the woman's spine. In all the experiments this phenomenon occurred in this coital position and was not related to the depth of penetration. In complete penetration the penis filled up the anterior fornix (experiments 1, 2 and 13) or the posterior fornix (experiment 12; fig 3 ). During intromission the pubic bones of the men and the women did not approach each other closely: the female pubic bone stayed about 4 cm cranial to that of the male. The uterus was raised by 2.4 cm. The changed configuration of the bladder was caused by penile stretching of the anterior vaginal wall during intromission, plus the raising of the uterus and the increase in bladder size as it filled. The subjective level of sexual arousal of the participants, men and women, during the experiment was described afterwards as average.

Eight women had a complete sexual response during sexual stimulation (experiments 4-11) and these women described their orgasm as “superficial.” The sexual response of one of these women is shown in figure 4 . In the pre-orgasmic phase the anterior vaginal wall lengthened by 1 cm and the uterus rose within the pelvis. This is a typical response in all experiments except one (experiment 10). During sexual arousal without coitus, the position and size of the uterus hardly changed. It was not possible on these magnetic resonance images to distinguish between the vaginal wall, the urethra, and the clitoris These images did not show widening of the vaginal canal, structures suggesting a Gräfenberg spot, or a separate reservoir of fluid indicating “female ejaculation.”

In Sex and the Human Female Reproductive Tract Levin stated: “The scientific study of the interaction of human genitals during coitus and after ejaculation with and without female orgasm has always been difficult and controversial with ethical, technical and social problems.” 8 We experienced this personally. It took years, a lobby, undesired publicity, and a godsend (two tablets of sildenafil 25 mg) to obtain our images. They show that such pictures are feasible and add to our knowledge of anatomy. 9

We did not foresee that the men would have more problems with sexual performance (maintaining their erection) than the women in the scanner. All the women had a complete sexual response, but they described their orgasm as superficial. Only the first couple was able to perform coitus adequately without sildenafil (experiments 1 and 2). The reason might be that they were the only participants in the real sense: involved in the research right from the beginning because of their scientific curiosity, knowledge of the body, and artistic commitment. And as amateur street acrobats they are trained and used to performing under stress.

Anatomy revealed

The hypothesised anatomy of human coitus, as drawn by Leonardo da Vinci in about 1493 and by Dickinson in 1933, could be tested with magnetic resonance imaging. According to our images, the caudal position of the male pelvis during intercourse, the potential size of the bulb of the corpus spongiosum, and the capacity of the penis in erection to make an angle of around 120° to the root of the penis, enabled penetration along the bottom of the symphysis up to the woman's promontorium (fig 3 ) or to the middle part of the sacrum (fig 4 ) almost parallel to her spine. The “hidden” position of the root of the penis must have been the reason for the difference between the angle of penetration as envisaged by Dickinson and the penetration angle on our images. The images showed that during “missionary position” intercourse the penis is not straight, as drawn by Leonardo. It has the shape of a boomerang and not of an S as envisaged by Dickinson Leonardo and Dickinson clearly underestimated the size of the root of the penis. Scanning of the position of the human genitals during coitus gives a convincing impression of the enormous size of the average penis in erection (root plus pendulous part is 22 cm) and of the volume of vaginal and pelvic space required by the pendulous part of the penis.

Contemporary scientific knowledge about internal genital changes during female sexual arousal relates mainly to the vagina (thickening of the vaginal wall due to vasodilation, lubrication, widening of the vaginal cavity), the urethra (possible engorgement of the vascular tissue of the urethra), and the uterus (upwards movement of the uterus=tenting effect+change in position of the uterus+change in size of the uterus). Recent research on the anatomical relation between urethra and clitoris showed that the perineal urethra is embedded in the anterior vaginal wall and is surrounded by erectile tissue in all directions except posteriorly where it relates to the vaginal wall. 10 The bulbs of the vestibule directly relate to the other clitoral components and the urethra. Details of the vaginal wall, the urethra, and the bulbs of the vestibule were unfortunately beyond the resolution of our current equipment. However, we were able to see displacement of the uterus (upwards) and lengthening of the anterior vaginal wall and hardly any change in the position of the uterus during sexual arousal, unless it was caused by intromission of the penis.

In contrast to the findings of Masters and Johnson, 4 our images did not show an increase in the size of the uterus during sexual arousal. These observations are not surprising. From an anatomical and physiological point of view there is no basis for a 50-100% increase in the volume of the uterus in such a short time. Masters and Johnson made their observations with bimanual palpation. Their interpretation may have been caused by the raising of the uterus or filling of the bladder during their experiments.

Changes during sexual arousal

Magnetic resonance imaging showed strikingly that during female sexual arousal changes occurred in the anterior vaginal wall. These changes took place in the vaginal wall itself (the engorgement as such is not visible on the images), through the raising of the uterus, displacement of the uterus caused by penetration of the penis, and through gradual filling of the bladder. Histological studies 11 12 and immunohistochemistry 13 have shown that the anterior wall of the vagina has denser innervation than the posterior wall. This is supported by clinical studies 14 15 and research into vaginal sensitivity to electric stimuli 16 in which the anterior vaginal wall—with the urethra behind it—was found to be relatively sensitive. Hoch's concept of a clitoral-vaginal sensory arm of the orgasmic reflex refers specifically to the anterior vaginal wall and the deeper tissues—the urinary bladder, the periurethral tissues, and Halban's fascia 15 —and our images support this.

What started as artistic and scientific curiosity has now been realised. We have shown that magnetic resonance images of the female sexual response and the male and female genitals during coitus are feasible and beautiful; that the penis during intercourse in the “missionary position” has the shape of a boomerang and not of an S as drawn by Dickinson; and that, in contrast to the findings of Masters and Johnson, there was no evidence of an increase in the volume of the uterus during sexual arousal.

What is already known on this topic

It has been extremely difficult to investigate anatomical changes during the act of coitus and the female sexual response

Modern magnetic resonance imaging allows exploration of aspects of living anatomy

What this paper adds

Taking MR images of the male and female genitals during coitus is feasible

During ‘missionary position’ intercourse the penis has the shape of a boomerang

During female sexual arousal without intercourse the uterus rises and the anterior vaginal wall lengthens

The size of the uterus does not increase during sexual arousal

The Polish-German physician and philosopher Ludwik Fleck (1896-1961) used images of female genital anatomy to illustrate the cultural conditioning of scientific knowledge. In his treatise Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact he states: “In science, just as in art and in life, only what is true to culture is true to nature.” 17 Magnetic resonance images, objective as they are, show the anatomy of human coitus and the female sexual response that is true to nature.

Acknowledgments

We thank our volunteers for their cooperation, laughter, and permission to publish intimate MR images of them; those hospital officials on duty who had the intellectual courage to allow us to continue this search despite obtrusive and sniffing press hounds; Professor J Kremer for his encouragement to use the scanner to study female sexology and for his critical reading the typescript; and Professor W Mali for offering the use of equipment at the University Hospital Utrecht. P van Andel does not want to be acknowledged for his idea of using MRI to study coitus. He excuses himself by quoting the French romantic poet Alphonse de Lamartine (1790-1869): “C'est singulier! Moi, je pense jamais, mes idées pensent pour moi.”

Contributors: WWS initiated and coordinated the formulation of the study hypothesis, designed the protocol, and participated in data collection, interpretation of the findings, and writing of the paper; he is guarantor of the study. PvA had the original idea for the present study, and participated in formulation of the study hypothesis, data collection, interpretation of the findings, and writing of the paper. IS, together with her partner, participated in the first two experiments and helped design the protocol. EM participated in the execution of the study, particularly data collection and interpretation of the magnetic resonance findings.

Funding No additional funding.

Competing interests None declared.

• Dickinson RL
• Masters WH ,
• Calderone MS
• Johnson VE ,
• Bezemer W ,
• Cohen-Kettenis P ,
• Van Son-Schoones N
• Bohndorf K ,
• Van Andel P
• O'Connell HE ,
• Hutson JM ,
• Anderson CR ,
• de Sigalony JPH ,
• Hilleges M ,
• Falconer C ,
• Ekman-Ordeberg G ,
• Weijmar Schultz WCM ,
• van de Wiel HBM ,
• Klatter JA ,

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23.2: Anatomy of the Male Reproductive System

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• Whitney Menefee, Julie Jenks, Chiara Mazzasette, & Kim-Leiloni Nguyen
• Reedley College, Butte College, Pasadena City College, & Mt. San Antonio College via ASCCC Open Educational Resources Initiative

By the end of the section, you will be able to:

• Describe the structure and function of the organs of the male reproductive system
• Describe the structure and function of the sperm cell
• Explain the events during spermatogenesis that produce haploid sperm from diploid cells
• Identify the importance of testosterone in male reproductive function

Unique for its role in human reproduction, a gamete is a specialized sex cell carrying 23 chromosomes—one half the number in body cells. At fertilization, the chromosomes in one male gamete, called a sperm (or spermatozoon), combine with the chromosomes in one female gamete, called an oocyte. The function of the male reproductive system is to produce sperm and transfer them to the female reproductive tract. The structures of the male reproductive system include the testes, the epididymides, the penis, and the ducts and glands that produce and carry semen (Figure 23.2.1). Sperm exit the scrotum through the ductus deferens, which is bundled in the spermatic cord. The spermatic cord is comprised of the ductus deferens, testicular artery, autonomic nerve, lymphatic vessel, and plexus of testicular veins. The seminal vesicles and prostate gland add fluids to the sperm to create semen. The paired testes are a crucial component in this process, as they produce both sperm and androgens, the hormones that support male reproductive physiology. In humans, the most important male androgen is testosterone. Several accessory organs and ducts aid the process of sperm maturation and transport the sperm and other seminal components to the penis, which delivers sperm to the female reproductive tract. In this section, we examine each of these different structures, and discuss the process of sperm production and transport. Details about these male anatomical structures will be discussed below.

The testes are located in a skin-covered, highly pigmented, muscular sack called the scrotum that extends from the body behind the penis (see Figure 23.2.1). This location is important in sperm production, which occurs within the testes, and proceeds more efficiently when the testes are kept 2 to 4°C below core body temperature.

The dartos muscle makes up the subcutaneous muscle layer of the scrotum (Figure 23.2.2). It continues internally to make up the scrotal septum, a wall that divides the scrotum into two compartments, each housing one testis. Descending from the internal oblique muscle of the abdominal wall are the two cremaster muscles , which cover each testis like a muscular net. By contracting simultaneously, the dartos and cremaster muscles can elevate the testes in cold weather (or water), moving the testes closer to the body and decreasing the surface area of the scrotum to retain heat. Alternatively, as the environmental temperature increases, the scrotum relaxes, moving the testes farther from the body core and increasing scrotal surface area, which promotes heat loss. Externally, the scrotum has a raised medial thickening on the surface called the raphe.

The testes (singular = testis) are the male gonads —that is, the male reproductive organs. They produce both sperm and androgens, such as testosterone, and are active throughout the reproductive lifespan of the male.

Paired ovals, the testes are each approximately 4 to 5 cm in length and are housed within the scrotum (see Figure 23.2.2). They are surrounded by two distinct layers of protective connective tissue. Immediately deep to the cremaster muscle is the tunica vaginalis. The outer tunica vaginalis is a serous membrane that has both a parietal and a thin visceral layer. Beneath the tunica vaginalis is the tunica albuginea , a tough, white, dense connective tissue layer covering the testis itself. Not only does the tunica albuginea cover the outside of the testis, it also invaginates to form septa that divide the testis into 300 to 400 structures called lobules . Within the lobules, sperm develop in structures called seminiferous tubules (Figure 23.2.3). During the seventh month of the developmental period of a male fetus, each testis moves through the abdominal musculature to descend into the scrotal cavity. This is called the “descent of the testis.” Cryptorchidism is the clinical term used when one or both of the testes fail to descend into the scrotum prior to birth.

The tightly coiled seminiferous tubules form the bulk of each testis. They are composed of developing sperm cells surrounding a lumen, the hollow center of the tubule, where formed sperm are released into the duct system of the testis. Specifically, from the lumens of the seminiferous tubules, sperm move into the straight tubules (or tubuli recti), and from there into a fine meshwork of tubules called the rete testes . Sperm leave the rete testes, and the testis itself, through the 15 to 20 efferent ductules that cross the tunica albuginea.

Interstitial cells (also known as Leydig cells ) produce testosterone and are located in between the seminiferous tubules (Figure 23.2.4) Inside the seminiferous tubules are six different cell types. These include supporting cells called sustentacular cells , as well as five types of developing sperm cells called germ cells . Germ cell development progresses from the basement membrane—at the perimeter of the tubule—toward the lumen. Let’s look more closely at these cell types.

Sertoli Cells

Surrounding all stages of the developing sperm cells are elongate, branching Sertoli cells ( Figure 23.2.4). Sertoli cells are a type of supporting cell called sustentacular cells, or sustenocyte, that are typically found in epithelial tissue. Sertoli cells secrete signaling molecules that promote sperm production and can control whether germ cells live or die. Sertoli cells (also known as nurse cells) produce androgen- binding protein. This is needed for testosterone to actually have effects on the developing sperm. These cells also produce inhibin - this feeds back to the anterior pituitary gland to regulate sperm production. They extend physically around the germ cells from the peripheral basement membrane of the seminiferous tubules to the lumen. Tight junctions between these sustentacular cells create the blood–testis barrier , which keeps bloodborne substances from reaching the germ cells and, at the same time, keeps surface antigens on developing germ cells from escaping into the bloodstream and prompting an autoimmune response.

The least mature cells, the spermatogonia (singular = spermatogonium), line the basement membrane inside the tubule. Spermatogonia are the stem cells of the testis, which means that they are still able to differentiate into a variety of different cell types throughout adulthood. Spermatogonia divide to produce primary and secondary spermatocytes , then spermatids , which finally produce formed sperm. The process that begins with spermatogonia and concludes with the production of sperm is called spermatogenesis .

Spermatogenesis

As just noted, spermatogenesis occurs in the seminiferous tubules that form the bulk of each testis (Figure 23.2.3). The process begins at puberty, after which time sperm are produced constantly throughout a man’s life. One production cycle, from spermatogonia through formed sperm, takes approximately 64 days. A new cycle starts approximately every 16 days, although this timing is not synchronous across the seminiferous tubules. Sperm counts—the total number of sperm a man produces—slowly decline after age 35, and some studies suggest that smoking can lower sperm counts irrespective of age.

The process of spermatogenesis begins with mitosis of the diploid spermatogonia in which one spermatogonium becomes two primary spermatocytes. Because these cells are diploid (2 n ), they each have a complete copy of the father’s genetic material, or 46 chromosomes. After mitosis, the primary spermatocytes begin the two rounds of meiosis, i.e. meiosis I resulting in secondary spermatocytes, and meiosis II, resulting in spermatids. Mature gametes are haploid (1 n ), containing 23 chromosomes—meaning that daughter cells of spermatogonia must undergo a second cellular division through the process of meiosis Figure 23.2.4). These spermatids will continue with spermiogenesis to become spermatozoa, also known as sperm. A cross section of a seminiferous tubule will show the early cells of spermatogenesis at the outer edge and the more mature cells migrating toward the lumen in the center.

Two identical diploid cells result from spermatogonia mitosis. One of these cells remains a spermatogonium, and the other becomes a primary spermatocyte , the next stage in the process of spermatogenesis. As in mitosis, DNA is replicated in a primary spermatocyte, and the cell undergoes cell division to produce two cells with identical chromosomes. Each of these is a secondary spermatocyte . Now a second round of cell division occurs in both of the secondary spermatocytes, separating the chromosome pairs. This second meiotic division results in a total of four cells with only half of the number of chromosomes. Each of these new cells is a spermatid . Although haploid, early spermatids look very similar to cells in the earlier stages of spermatogenesis, with a round shape, central nucleus, and large amount of cytoplasm. A process called spermiogenesis transforms these early spermatids, reducing the cytoplasm, and beginning the formation of the parts of a true sperm. The fifth stage of germ cell formation— spermatozoa , or formed sperm—is the end result of this process, which occurs in the portion of the tubule nearest the lumen. Eventually, the sperm are released into the lumen and are moved along a series of ducts in the testis toward a structure called the epididymis for the next step of sperm maturation.

Structure of Formed Sperm

Sperm are smaller than most cells in the body; in fact, the volume of a sperm cell is 85,000 times less than that of the female gamete. Approximately 100 to 300 million sperm are produced each day, whereas women typically ovulate only one oocyte per month as is true for most cells in the body, the structure of sperm cells speaks to their function. The head of the sperm contains the extremely compact haploid nucleus with very little cytoplasm (Figure 23.2.5). These qualities contribute to the overall small size of the sperm (the head is only 5 μ m long). A structure called the acrosome covers most of the head of the sperm cell as a “cap” that is filled with lysosomal enzymes important for preparing sperm to participate in fertilization. Tightly packed mitochondria fill the mid-piece of the sperm. ATP produced by these mitochondria will power the flagellum, which extends from the neck and the mid-piece through the tail of the sperm, enabling it to move the entire sperm cell. The central strand of the flagellum, the axial filament, is formed from one centriole inside the maturing sperm cell during the final stages of spermatogenesis.

Sperm Transport

To fertilize an egg, sperm must be moved from the seminiferous tubules in the testes, through the epididymis, and—later during ejaculation—along the length of the penis and out into the female reproductive tract.

Role of the Epididymis

From the lumen of the seminiferous tubules, the immotile sperm are surrounded by testicular fluid and moved to the epididymis (plural = epididymides), a coiled tube attached to the testis where newly formed sperm continue to mature (see Figure 23.2.3). Though the epididymis does not take up much room in its tightly coiled state, it would be approximately 6 m (20 feet) long if straightened. It takes an average of 12 days for sperm to move through the coils of the epididymis, with the shortest recorded transit time in humans being one day. Sperm enter the head of the epididymis and are moved along predominantly by the contraction of smooth muscles lining the epididymal tubes. The more mature sperm are then stored in the tail of the epididymis (the final section) until ejaculation occurs.

Duct System

During ejaculation, sperm exit the tail of the epididymis and are pushed by smooth muscle contraction to the ductus deferens (also called the vas deferens). The ductus deferens is a thick, muscular tube that is bundled together inside the scrotum with connective tissue, blood vessels, and nerves into a structure called the spermatic cord (see Figure 23.2.1 and Figure 23.2.2). Because the ductus deferens is physically accessible within the scrotum, surgical sterilization to interrupt sperm delivery can be performed by cutting and sealing a small section of the ductus (vas) deferens. This procedure is called a vasectomy , and it is an effective form of male birth control. Although it may be possible to reverse a vasectomy, clinicians consider the procedure permanent, and advise men to undergo it only if they are certain they no longer wish to father children.

Interactive Element

Watch this video Vasectomy to learn about a procedure in which a small section of the ductus (vas) deferens is removed from the scrotum. This interrupts the path taken by sperm through the ductus deferens. If sperm do not exit through the vas, either because the man has had a vasectomy or has not ejaculated, in what region of the testis do they remain?

Answer: Sperm remain in the epididymis until they degenerate

From each epididymis, each ductus deferens extends superiorly into the abdominal cavity through the inguinal canal in the abdominal wall. From here, the ductus deferens continues posteriorly to the pelvic cavity, ending posterior to the bladder where it dilates in a region called the ampulla (meaning “flask”).

Sperm make up only 5 percent of the final volume of semen , the thick, milky fluid that the male ejaculates. The bulk of semen is produced by three critical accessory glands of the male reproductive system: the seminal vesicles, the prostate, and the bulbourethral glands (Figure 23.2.6).

Figure 23.2.6: Front View of Male Reproductive System. The structures of the male reproductive system include the testes, the epididymis, the penis, and the ducts and glands that produce and carry semen. Sperm exit the scrotum through the vas deferens. The seminal vesicles, bulborethral gland, and prostate gland add fluids to the sperm to create semen. (Image credit: “ Male Genital System Front View ” by Bioscope, HUG, DIP and Odile Fillod is licensed under CC BY SA 4.0 )

Seminal Vesicles

As sperm pass through the ampulla of the ductus deferens at ejaculation, they mix with fluid from the associated seminal vesicle (see Figure 23.2.6). The paired seminal vesicles are glands that contribute approximately 60 percent of the semen volume. Seminal vesicle fluid contains large amounts of fructose, which is used by the sperm mitochondria to generate ATP to allow movement through the female reproductive tract. Sperm are immobile until mixed with secretions of the seminal glands.

The fluid, now containing both sperm and seminal vesicle secretions, next moves into the associated ejaculatory duct , a short structure formed from the ampulla of the ductus deferens and the duct of the seminal vesicle. The paired ejaculatory ducts transport the seminal fluid into the next structure, the prostate gland.

Prostate Gland

As shown in Figure 23.2.6, the centrally located prostate gland sits anterior to the rectum at the base of the bladder surrounding the prostatic urethra (the portion of the urethra that runs within the prostate). About the size of a walnut, the prostate is formed of both muscular and glandular tissues. It excretes an alkaline, milky fluid to the passing seminal fluid—now called semen—that is critical to first coagulate and then decoagulate the semen following ejaculation. The temporary thickening of semen helps retain it within the female reproductive tract, providing time for sperm to utilize the fructose provided by seminal vesicle secretions. When the semen regains its fluid state, sperm can then pass farther into the female reproductive tract.

The prostate normally doubles in size during puberty. At approximately age 25, it gradually begins to enlarge again. This enlargement does not usually cause problems; however, abnormal growth of the prostate, or benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH), can cause constriction of the urethra as it passes through the middle of the prostate gland, leading to a number of lower urinary tract symptoms, such as a frequent and intense urge to urinate, a weak stream, and a sensation that the bladder has not emptied completely. By age 60, approximately 40 percent of men have some degree of BPH. By age 80, the number of affected individuals has jumped to as many as 80 percent. Treatments for BPH attempt to relieve the pressure on the urethra so that urine can flow more normally. Mild to moderate symptoms are treated with medication, whereas severe enlargement of the prostate is treated by surgery in which a portion of the prostate tissue is removed.

Another common disorder involving the prostate is prostate cancer. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), prostate cancer is the second most common cancer in men. However, some forms of prostate cancer grow very slowly and thus may not ever require treatment. Aggressive forms of prostate cancer, in contrast, involve metastasis to vulnerable organs like the lungs and brain. There is no link between BPH and prostate cancer, but the symptoms are similar. Prostate cancer is detected by a medical history, a blood test, and a rectal exam that allows physicians to palpate the prostate and check for unusual masses. If a mass is detected, the cancer diagnosis is confirmed by biopsy of the cells.

Bulbourethral Glands

The final addition to semen is made by two bulbourethral glands (or Cowper’s glands) that release a thick, salty fluid that lubricates the end of the urethra and the vagina, and helps to clean urine residues from the penile urethra. The fluid from these accessory glands is released after the male becomes sexually aroused, and shortly before the release of the semen. It is therefore sometimes called pre-ejaculate. It is important to note that, in addition to the lubricating proteins, it is possible for bulbourethral fluid to pick up sperm already present in the urethra, and therefore it may be able to cause pregnancy. Once inside the female reproductive tract, sperm will move toward the unfertilized egg and will undergo chemical changes called capacitation in order to fertilize the egg. Capacitation involves destabilization of the acrosomal membrane of the sperm head and greater mobility in the sperm's tail to permit fertilization.

Watch this video Male Anatomy to explore the structures of the male reproductive system and the path of sperm, which starts in the testes and ends as sperm leave the penis through the urethra. Where are sperm deposited after they leave the ejaculatory duct?

Answer: Sperm enter the prostate.

The penis is the male organ of copulation (sexual intercourse). It is flaccid for non-sexual actions, such as urination, and turgid and rod-like with sexual arousal. When erect, the stiffness of the organ allows it to penetrate into the vagina and deposit semen into the female reproductive tract (Figure 23.2.7).

The shaft of the penis surrounds the urethra (Figure 23.2.7). The shaft is composed of three column-like chambers of erectile tissue that span the length of the shaft. Each of the two larger lateral chambers is called a corpus cavernosum (plural = corpora cavernosa). Together, these make up the bulk of the penis. The corpus spongiosum , which can be felt as a raised ridge on the erect penis, is a smaller chamber that surrounds the spongy, or penile, urethra. The end of the penis, called the glans penis , has a high concentration of nerve endings, resulting in very sensitive skin that influences the likelihood of ejaculation (see Figure 23.2.7). The skin from the shaft extends down over the glans and forms a collar called the prepuce (or foreskin). The foreskin also contains a dense concentration of nerve endings, and both lubricate and protect the sensitive skin of the glans penis. A surgical procedure called circumcision, often performed for religious or social reasons, removes the prepuce, typically within days of birth.

Both sexual arousal and REM sleep (during which dreaming occurs) can induce an erection. Penile erections are the result of vasocongestion, or engorgement of the tissues because of more arterial blood flowing into the penis than is leaving in the veins. During sexual arousal, nitric oxide (NO) is released from nerve endings near blood vessels within the corpora cavernosa and spongiosum. Release of NO activates a signaling pathway that results in relaxation of the smooth muscles that surround the penile arteries, causing them to dilate. This dilation increases the amount of blood that can enter the penis and induces the endothelial cells in the penile arterial walls to also secrete NO and perpetuate the vasodilation. The rapid increase in blood volume fills the erectile chambers, and the increased pressure of the filled chambers compresses the thin-walled penile venules, preventing venous drainage of the penis. The result of this increased blood flow to the penis and reduced blood return from the penis is erection. Depending on the flaccid dimensions of a penis, it can increase in size slightly or greatly during erection, with the average length of an erect penis measuring approximately 15 cm.

DISORDERS OF THE...

Male Reproductive System

Erectile dysfunction (ED) is a condition in which a man has difficulty either initiating or maintaining an erection. The combined prevalence of minimal, moderate, and complete ED is approximately 40 percent in men at age 40, and reaches nearly 70 percent by 70 years of age. In addition to aging, ED is associated with diabetes, vascular disease, psychiatric disorders, prostate disorders, the use of some drugs such as certain antidepressants, and problems with the testes resulting in low testosterone concentrations. These physical and emotional conditions can lead to interruptions in the vasodilation pathway and result in an inability to achieve an erection.

Recall that the release of NO induces relaxation of the smooth muscles that surround the penile arteries, leading to the vasodilation necessary to achieve an erection. To reverse the process of vasodilation, an enzyme called phosphodiesterase (PDE) degrades a key component of the NO signaling pathway called cGMP. There are several different forms of this enzyme, and PDE type 5 is the type of PDE found in the tissues of the penis. Scientists discovered that inhibiting PDE5 increases blood flow, and allows vasodilation of the penis to occur.

PDEs and the vasodilation signaling pathway are found in the vasculature in other parts of the body. In the 1990s, clinical trials of a PDE5 inhibitor called sildenafil were initiated to treat hypertension and angina pectoris (chest pain caused by poor blood flow through the heart). The trial showed that the drug was not effective at treating heart conditions, but many men experienced erection and priapism (erection lasting longer than 4 hours). Because of this, a clinical trial was started to investigate the ability of sildenafil to promote erections in men suffering from ED. In 1998, the FDA approved the drug, marketed as Viagra®. Since approval of the drug, sildenafil and similar PDE inhibitors now generate over a billion dollars a year in sales, and are reported to be effective in treating approximately 70 to 85 percent of cases of ED. Importantly, men with health problems—especially those with cardiac disease taking nitrates—should avoid Viagra or talk to their physician to find out if they are a candidate for the use of this drug, as deaths have been reported for at-risk users.

Testosterone

Testosterone, an androgen, is a steroid hormone produced by Leydig cells . The alternate term for Leydig cells, interstitial cells, reflects their location between the seminiferous tubules in the testes. In male embryos, testosterone is secreted by Leydig cells by the seventh week of development, with peak concentrations reached in the second trimester. This early release of testosterone results in the anatomical differentiation of the male sexual organs. In childhood, testosterone concentrations are low. They increase during puberty, activating characteristic physical changes and initiating spermatogenesis.

Functions of Testosterone

The continued presence of testosterone is necessary to keep the male reproductive system working properly, and Leydig cells produce approximately 6 to 7 mg of testosterone per day. Testicular steroidogenesis (the manufacture of androgens, including testosterone) results in testosterone concentrations that are 100 times higher in the testes than in the circulation. Maintaining these normal concentrations of testosterone promotes spermatogenesis, whereas low levels of testosterone can lead to infertility. In addition to intratesticular secretion, testosterone is also released into the systemic circulation and plays an important role in muscle development, bone growth, the development of secondary sex characteristics, and maintaining libido (sex drive) in both males and females. In females, the ovaries secrete small amounts of testosterone, although most is converted to estradiol. A small amount of testosterone is also secreted by the adrenal glands in both sexes.

Control of Testosterone

The regulation of testosterone concentrations throughout the body is critical for male reproductive function. The regulation of Leydig cell production of testosterone begins outside of the testes. The hypothalamus and the pituitary gland in the brain integrate external and internal signals to control testosterone synthesis and secretion. The regulation begins in the hypothalamus . Pulsatile release of a hormone called gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH) from the hypothalamus stimulates the endocrine release of hormones from the pituitary gland. Binding of GnRH to its receptors on the anterior pituitary gland stimulates release of the two gonadotropins: luteinizing hormone (LH) and follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH) . These two hormones are critical for reproductive function in both men and women. In men, FSH binds predominantly to the Sertoli cells within the seminiferous tubules to promote spermatogenesis. FSH also stimulates the Sertoli cells to produce hormones called inhibins, which function to inhibit FSH release from the pituitary, thus reducing testosterone secretion. These polypeptide hormones correlate directly with Sertoli cell function and sperm number; inhibin can be used as a marker of spermatogenic activity. In men, LH binds to receptors on Leydig cells in the testes and upregulates the production of testosterone. Please refer to the Endocrine System, Sections 15.3 and 15.8 for additional details.

AGING AND THE...

Declines in Leydig cell activity can occur in men beginning at 40 to 50 years of age. The resulting reduction in circulating testosterone concentrations can lead to symptoms of andropause, also known as male menopause. While the reduction in sex steroids in men is akin to female menopause, there is no clear sign—such as a lack of a menstrual period—to denote the initiation of andropause. Instead, men report feelings of fatigue, reduced muscle mass, depression, anxiety, irritability, loss of libido, and insomnia. A reduction in spermatogenesis resulting in lowered fertility is also reported, and sexual dysfunction can also be associated with andropausal symptoms.

Whereas some researchers believe that certain aspects of andropause are difficult to tease apart from aging in general, testosterone replacement is sometimes prescribed to alleviate some symptoms. Recent studies have shown a benefit from androgen replacement therapy on the new onset of depression in elderly men; however, other studies caution against testosterone replacement for long-term treatment of andropause symptoms, showing that high doses can sharply increase the risk of both heart disease and prostate cancer.

Concept Review

Gametes are the reproductive cells that combine to form offspring. Organs called gonads produce the gametes, along with the hormones that regulate human reproduction. The male gametes are called sperm. Spermatogenesis, the production of sperm, occurs within the seminiferous tubules that make up most of the testis. The scrotum is the muscular sac that holds the testes outside of the body cavity.

Spermatogenesis begins with mitotic division of spermatogonia (stem cells) to produce primary spermatocytes that undergo the two divisions of meiosis to become secondary spermatocytes, then the haploid spermatids. During spermiogenesis, spermatids are transformed into spermatozoa (formed sperm). Upon release from the seminiferous tubules, sperm are moved to the epididymis where they continue to mature. During ejaculation, sperm exit the epididymis through the ductus deferens, a duct in the spermatic cord that leaves the scrotum. The ampulla of the ductus deferens meets the seminal vesicle, a gland that contributes fructose and proteins, at the ejaculatory duct. The fluid continues through the prostatic urethra, where secretions from the prostate are added to form semen. These secretions help sperm to travel through the urethra and into the female reproductive tract. Secretions from the bulbourethral glands protect sperm and cleanse and lubricate the penile (spongy) urethra.

The penis is the male organ of copulation. Columns of erectile tissue called the corpora cavernosa and corpus spongiosum fill with blood when sexual arousal activates vasodilatation in the blood vessels of the penis. Testosterone regulates and maintains the sex organs and sex drive, and induces the physical changes of puberty. Interplay between the testes and the endocrine system precisely control the production of testosterone.

Review Questions

Q. What are male gametes called?

D. testosterone

Q. Leydig cells ________.

A. are found in between seminiferous tubules

B. activate the sperm flagellum

C. are spermatogonia

D. secrete seminal fluid

Q. Which structure is affected in a vasectomy?

B. ductus deferens

C. prostate gland

D. epididymis

Q. Where is the epididymis?

A. in the scrotum

B. in the testes

C. posterior to the bladder

D. inside the pelvis

Q. Which muscle(s) surround(s) the testes?

A. cremaster

C. A & B

D. smooth muscle

Critical Thinking Questions

Q. Briefly explain why mature gametes carry only one set of chromosomes.

A. Humans have 46 chromosomes. Meiosis is cell division that produces sperm (gametes) with only 23 chromosomes. A single gamete must combine with a gamete from an individual of the opposite sex to produce a fertilized egg, which has a complete set of chromosomes (46) and is the first cell of a new individual.

Q. What special features are evident in sperm cells but not in somatic cells, and how do these specializations function?

A. Unlike somatic cells, sperm are haploid with 23 chromosomes. They also have very little cytoplasm. They have a head with a compact nucleus covered by an acrosome filled with enzymes, and a mid-piece filled with mitochondria that power their movement. They are motile because of their tail, a structure containing a flagellum, which is specialized for movement to find the egg for fertilization.

Q. Name three male accessory glands and explain how each contributes to the semen.

A. The three accessory glands make the following contributions to semen: the seminal vesicle contributes about 60 percent of the semen volume, with fluid that contains large amounts of fructose to power the movement of sperm; the prostate gland contributes substances critical to sperm maturation; and the bulbourethral glands contribute a thick fluid that lubricates the ends of the urethra and the vagina and helps to clean urine residues from the urethra.

Q. Describe how penile erection occurs.

A. During sexual arousal, nitric oxide (NO) is released from nerve endings near blood vessels within the corpora cavernosa and corpus spongiosum. The release of NO activates a signaling pathway that results in relaxation of the smooth muscles that surround the penile arteries, causing them to dilate. This dilation increases the amount of blood that can enter the penis, and induces the endothelial cells in the penile arterial walls to secrete NO, perpetuating the vasodilation. The rapid increase in blood volume fills the erectile chambers, and the increased pressure of the filled chambers compresses the thin-walled penile venules, preventing venous drainage of the penis. An erection is the result of this increased blood flow to the penis and reduced blood return from the penis.

Contributors and Attributions

OpenStax Anatomy & Physiology (CC BY 4.0). Access for free at  https://openstax.org/books/anatomy-and-physiology

27.1 Anatomy and Physiology of the Male Reproductive System

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Describe the structure and function of the organs of the male reproductive system
• Describe the structure and function of the sperm cell
• Explain the events during spermatogenesis that produce haploid sperm from diploid cells
• Identify the importance of testosterone in male reproductive function

Unique for its role in human reproduction, a gamete is a specialized sex cell carrying 23 chromosomes—one half the number in body cells. At fertilization, the chromosomes in one male gamete, called a sperm (or spermatozoon), combine with the chromosomes in one female gamete, called an oocyte. The function of the male reproductive system ( Figure 27.2 ) is to produce sperm and transfer them to the female reproductive tract. The paired testes are a crucial component in this process, as they produce both sperm and androgens, the hormones that support male reproductive physiology. In humans, the most important male androgen is testosterone. Several accessory organs and ducts aid the process of sperm maturation and transport the sperm and other seminal components to the penis, which delivers sperm to the female reproductive tract. In this section, we examine each of these different structures, and discuss the process of sperm production and transport.

The testes are located in a skin-covered, highly pigmented, muscular sack called the scrotum that extends from the body behind the penis (see Figure 27.2 ). This location is important in sperm production, which occurs within the testes, and proceeds more efficiently when the testes are kept 2 to 4°C below core body temperature.

The dartos muscle makes up the subcutaneous muscle layer of the scrotum ( Figure 27.3 ). It continues internally to make up the scrotal septum, a wall that divides the scrotum into two compartments, each housing one testis. Descending from the internal oblique muscle of the abdominal wall are the two cremaster muscles, which cover each testis like a muscular net. By contracting simultaneously, the dartos and cremaster muscles can elevate the testes in cold weather (or water), moving the testes closer to the body and decreasing the surface area of the scrotum to retain heat. Alternatively, as the environmental temperature increases, the scrotum relaxes, moving the testes farther from the body core and increasing scrotal surface area, which promotes heat loss. Externally, the scrotum has a raised medial thickening on the surface called the raphae.

The testes (singular = testis) are the male gonads —that is, the male reproductive organs. They produce both sperm and androgens, such as testosterone, and are active throughout the reproductive lifespan of the male.

Paired ovals, the testes are each approximately 4 to 5 cm in length and are housed within the scrotum (see Figure 27.3 ). They are surrounded by two distinct layers of protective connective tissue ( Figure 27.4 ). The outer tunica vaginalis is a serous membrane that has both a parietal and a thin visceral layer. Beneath the tunica vaginalis is the tunica albuginea, a tough, white, dense connective tissue layer covering the testis itself. Not only does the tunica albuginea cover the outside of the testis, it also invaginates to form septa that divide the testis into 300 to 400 structures called lobules. Within the lobules, sperm develop in structures called seminiferous tubules. During the seventh month of the developmental period of a male fetus, each testis moves through the abdominal musculature to descend into the scrotal cavity. This is called the “descent of the testis.” Cryptorchidism is the clinical term used when one or both of the testes fail to descend into the scrotum prior to birth.

The tightly coiled seminiferous tubules form the bulk of each testis. They are composed of developing sperm cells surrounding a lumen, the hollow center of the tubule, where formed sperm are released into the duct system of the testis. Specifically, from the lumens of the seminiferous tubules, sperm move into the straight tubules (or tubuli recti), and from there into a fine meshwork of tubules called the rete testes. Sperm leave the rete testes, and the testis itself, through the 15 to 20 efferent ductules that cross the tunica albuginea.

Inside the seminiferous tubules are six different cell types. These include supporting cells called sustentacular cells, as well as five types of developing sperm cells called germ cells. Germ cell development progresses from the basement membrane—at the perimeter of the tubule—toward the lumen. Let’s look more closely at these cell types.

Sertoli Cells

Surrounding all stages of the developing sperm cells are elongate, branching Sertoli cells . Sertoli cells are a type of supporting cell called a sustentacular cell, or sustentocyte, that are typically found in epithelial tissue. Sertoli cells secrete signaling molecules that promote sperm production and can control whether germ cells live or die. They extend physically around the germ cells from the peripheral basement membrane of the seminiferous tubules to the lumen. Tight junctions between these sustentacular cells create the blood–testis barrier , which keeps bloodborne substances from reaching the germ cells and, at the same time, keeps surface antigens on developing germ cells from escaping into the bloodstream and prompting an autoimmune response.

The least mature cells, the spermatogonia (singular = spermatogonium), line the basement membrane inside the tubule. Spermatogonia are the stem cells of the testis, which means that they are still able to differentiate into a variety of different cell types throughout adulthood. Spermatogonia divide to produce primary and secondary spermatocytes, then spermatids, which finally produce formed sperm. The process that begins with spermatogonia and concludes with the production of sperm is called spermatogenesis .

Spermatogenesis

As just noted, spermatogenesis occurs in the seminiferous tubules that form the bulk of each testis (see Figure 27.4 ). The process begins at puberty, after which time sperm are produced constantly throughout a man’s life. One production cycle, from spermatogonia through formed sperm, takes approximately 64 days. A new cycle starts approximately every 16 days, although this timing is not synchronous across the seminiferous tubules. Sperm counts—the total number of sperm a man produces—slowly decline after age 35, and some studies suggest that smoking can lower sperm counts irrespective of age.

The process of spermatogenesis begins with mitosis of the diploid spermatogonia ( Figure 27.5 ). Because these cells are diploid (2 n ), they each have a complete copy of the father’s genetic material, or 46 chromosomes. However, mature gametes are haploid (1 n ), containing 23 chromosomes—meaning that daughter cells of spermatogonia must undergo a second cellular division through the process of meiosis.

Two identical diploid cells result from spermatogonia mitosis. One of these cells remains a spermatogonium, and the other becomes a primary spermatocyte , the next stage in the process of spermatogenesis. As in mitosis, DNA is replicated in a primary spermatocyte, before it undergoes a cell division called meiosis I. During meiosis I each of the 23 pairs of chromosomes separates. This results in two cells, called secondary spermatocytes, each with only half the number of chromosomes. Now a second round of cell division (meiosis II) occurs in both of the secondary spermatocytes. During meiosis II each of the 23 replicated chromosomes divides, similar to what happens during mitosis. Thus, meiosis results in separating the chromosome pairs. This second meiotic division results in a total of four cells with only half of the number of chromosomes. Each of these new cells is a spermatid . Although haploid, early spermatids look very similar to cells in the earlier stages of spermatogenesis, with a round shape, central nucleus, and large amount of cytoplasm. A process called spermiogenesis transforms these early spermatids, reducing the cytoplasm, and beginning the formation of the parts of a true sperm. The fifth stage of germ cell formation—spermatozoa, or formed sperm—is the end result of this process, which occurs in the portion of the tubule nearest the lumen. Eventually, the sperm are released into the lumen and are moved along a series of ducts in the testis toward a structure called the epididymis for the next step of sperm maturation.

Structure of Formed Sperm

Sperm are smaller than most cells in the body; in fact, the volume of a sperm cell is 85,000 times less than that of the female gamete. Approximately 100 to 300 million sperm are produced each day, whereas women typically ovulate only one oocyte per month. As is true for most cells in the body, the structure of sperm cells speaks to their function. Sperm have a distinctive head, mid-piece, and tail region ( Figure 27.6 ). The head of the sperm contains the extremely compact haploid nucleus with very little cytoplasm. These qualities contribute to the overall small size of the sperm (the head is only 5 μ m long). A structure called the acrosome covers most of the head of the sperm cell as a “cap” that is filled with lysosomal enzymes important for preparing sperm to participate in fertilization. Tightly packed mitochondria fill the mid-piece of the sperm. ATP produced by these mitochondria will power the flagellum, which extends from the neck and the mid-piece through the tail of the sperm, enabling it to move the entire sperm cell. The central strand of the flagellum, the axial filament, is formed from one centriole inside the maturing sperm cell during the final stages of spermatogenesis.

Sperm Transport

To fertilize an egg, sperm must be moved from the seminiferous tubules in the testes, through the epididymis, and—later during ejaculation—along the length of the penis and out into the female reproductive tract.

Role of the Epididymis

From the lumen of the seminiferous tubules, the immotile sperm are surrounded by testicular fluid and moved to the epididymis (plural = epididymides), a coiled tube attached to the testis where newly formed sperm continue to mature (see Figure 27.4 ). Though the epididymis does not take up much room in its tightly coiled state, it would be approximately 6 m (20 feet) long if straightened. It takes an average of 12 days for sperm to move through the coils of the epididymis, with the shortest recorded transit time in humans being one day. Sperm enter the head of the epididymis and are moved along predominantly by the contraction of smooth muscles lining the epididymal tubes. As they are moved along the length of the epididymis, the sperm further mature and acquire the ability to move under their own power. Once inside the female reproductive tract, they will use this ability to move independently toward the unfertilized egg. The more mature sperm are then stored in the tail of the epididymis (the final section) until ejaculation occurs.

Duct System

During ejaculation, sperm exit the tail of the epididymis and are pushed by smooth muscle contraction to the ductus deferens (also called the vas deferens). The ductus deferens is a thick, muscular tube that is bundled together inside the scrotum with connective tissue, blood vessels, and nerves into a structure called the spermatic cord (see Figure 27.2 and Figure 27.3 ). Because the ductus deferens is physically accessible within the scrotum, surgical sterilization to interrupt sperm delivery can be performed by cutting and sealing a small section of the ductus (vas) deferens. This procedure is called a vasectomy, and it is an effective form of male birth control. Although it may be possible to reverse a vasectomy, clinicians consider the procedure permanent, and advise men to undergo it only if they are certain they no longer wish to father children.

Interactive Link

Interactive link feature.

Watch this video to learn about a vasectomy. As described in this video, a vasectomy is a procedure in which a small section of the ductus (vas) deferens is removed from the scrotum. This interrupts the path taken by sperm through the ductus deferens. If sperm do not exit through the vas, either because the man has had a vasectomy or has not ejaculated, in what region of the testis do they remain?

From each epididymis, each ductus deferens extends superiorly into the abdominal cavity through the inguinal canal in the abdominal wall. From here, the ductus deferens continues posteriorly to the pelvic cavity, ending posterior to the bladder where it dilates in a region called the ampulla (meaning “flask”).

Sperm make up only 5 percent of the final volume of semen , the thick, milky fluid that the male ejaculates. The bulk of semen is produced by three critical accessory glands of the male reproductive system: the seminal vesicles, the prostate, and the bulbourethral glands.

Seminal Vesicles

As sperm pass through the ampulla of the ductus deferens at ejaculation, they mix with fluid from the associated seminal vesicle (see Figure 27.2 ). The paired seminal vesicles are glands that contribute approximately 60 percent of the semen volume. Seminal vesicle fluid contains large amounts of fructose, which is used by the sperm mitochondria to generate ATP to allow movement through the female reproductive tract.

The fluid, now containing both sperm and seminal vesicle secretions, next moves into the associated ejaculatory duct , a short structure formed from the ampulla of the ductus deferens and the duct of the seminal vesicle. The paired ejaculatory ducts transport the seminal fluid into the next structure, the prostate gland.

Prostate Gland

As shown in Figure 27.2 , the centrally located prostate gland sits anterior to the rectum at the base of the bladder surrounding the prostatic urethra (the portion of the urethra that runs within the prostate). About the size of a walnut, the prostate is formed of both muscular and glandular tissues. It excretes an alkaline, milky fluid to the passing seminal fluid—now called semen—that is critical to first coagulate and then decoagulate the semen following ejaculation. The temporary thickening of semen helps retain it within the female reproductive tract, providing time for sperm to utilize the fructose provided by seminal vesicle secretions. When the semen regains its fluid state, sperm can then pass farther into the female reproductive tract.

The prostate normally doubles in size during puberty. At approximately age 25, it gradually begins to enlarge again. This enlargement does not usually cause problems; however, abnormal growth of the prostate, or benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH), can cause constriction of the urethra as it passes through the middle of the prostate gland, leading to a number of lower urinary tract symptoms, such as a frequent and intense urge to urinate, a weak stream, and a sensation that the bladder has not emptied completely. By age 60, approximately 40 percent of men have some degree of BPH. By age 80, the number of affected individuals has jumped to as many as 80 percent. Treatments for BPH attempt to relieve the pressure on the urethra so that urine can flow more normally. Mild to moderate symptoms are treated with medication, whereas severe enlargement of the prostate is treated by surgery in which a portion of the prostate tissue is removed.

Another common disorder involving the prostate is prostate cancer. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), prostate cancer is the second most common cancer in men. However, some forms of prostate cancer grow very slowly and thus may not ever require treatment. Aggressive forms of prostate cancer, in contrast, involve metastasis to vulnerable organs like the lungs and brain. There is no link between BPH and prostate cancer, but the symptoms are similar. Prostate cancer is detected by a medical history, a blood test, and a rectal exam that allows physicians to palpate the prostate and check for unusual masses. If a mass is detected, the cancer diagnosis is confirmed by biopsy of the cells.

Bulbourethral Glands

The final addition to semen is made by two bulbourethral glands (or Cowper’s glands) that release a thick, salty fluid that lubricates the end of the urethra and the vagina, and helps to clean urine residues from the penile urethra. The fluid from these accessory glands is released after the male becomes sexually aroused, and shortly before the release of the semen. It is therefore sometimes called pre-ejaculate. It is important to note that, in addition to the lubricating proteins, it is possible for bulbourethral fluid to pick up sperm already present in the urethra, and therefore it may be able to cause pregnancy.

Watch this video to explore the structures of the male reproductive system and the path of sperm, which starts in the testes and ends as the sperm leave the penis through the urethra. Where are sperm deposited after they leave the ejaculatory duct?

The penis is the male organ of copulation (sexual intercourse). It is flaccid for non-sexual actions, such as urination, and turgid and rod-like with sexual arousal. When erect, the stiffness of the organ allows it to penetrate into the vagina and deposit semen into the female reproductive tract.

The shaft of the penis surrounds the urethra ( Figure 27.7 ). The shaft is composed of three column-like chambers of erectile tissue that span the length of the shaft. Each of the two larger lateral chambers is called a corpus cavernosum (plural = corpora cavernosa). Together, these make up the bulk of the penis. The corpus spongiosum , which can be felt as a raised ridge on the erect penis, is a smaller chamber that surrounds the spongy, or penile, urethra. The end of the penis, called the glans penis , has a high concentration of nerve endings, resulting in very sensitive skin that influences the likelihood of ejaculation (see Figure 27.2 ). The skin from the shaft extends down over the glans and forms a collar called the prepuce (or foreskin). The foreskin also contains a dense concentration of nerve endings, and both lubricate and protect the sensitive skin of the glans penis. A surgical procedure called circumcision, often performed for religious or social reasons, removes the prepuce, typically within days of birth.

Both sexual arousal and REM sleep (during which dreaming occurs) can induce an erection. Penile erections are the result of vasocongestion, or engorgement of the tissues because of more arterial blood flowing into the penis than is leaving in the veins. During sexual arousal, nitric oxide (NO) is released from nerve endings near blood vessels within the corpora cavernosa and spongiosum. Release of NO activates a signaling pathway that results in relaxation of the smooth muscles that surround the penile arteries, causing them to dilate. This dilation increases the amount of blood that can enter the penis and induces the endothelial cells in the penile arterial walls to also secrete NO and perpetuate the vasodilation. The rapid increase in blood volume fills the erectile chambers, and the increased pressure of the filled chambers compresses the thin-walled penile venules, preventing venous drainage of the penis. The result of this increased blood flow to the penis and reduced blood return from the penis is erection. Depending on the flaccid dimensions of a penis, it can increase in size slightly or greatly during erection, with the average length of an erect penis measuring approximately 15 cm.

Disorders of the...

Male reproductive system.

Erectile dysfunction (ED) is a condition in which a man has difficulty either initiating or maintaining an erection. The combined prevalence of minimal, moderate, and complete ED is approximately 40 percent in men at age 40, and reaches nearly 70 percent by 70 years of age. In addition to aging, ED is associated with diabetes, vascular disease, psychiatric disorders, prostate disorders, the use of some drugs such as certain antidepressants, and problems with the testes resulting in low testosterone concentrations. These physical and emotional conditions can lead to interruptions in the vasodilation pathway and result in an inability to achieve an erection.

Recall that the release of NO induces relaxation of the smooth muscles that surround the penile arteries, leading to the vasodilation necessary to achieve an erection. To reverse the process of vasodilation, an enzyme called phosphodiesterase (PDE) degrades a key component of the NO signaling pathway called cGMP. There are several different forms of this enzyme, and PDE type 5 is the type of PDE found in the tissues of the penis. Scientists discovered that inhibiting PDE5 increases blood flow, and allows vasodilation of the penis to occur.

PDEs and the vasodilation signaling pathway are found in the vasculature in other parts of the body. In the 1990s, clinical trials of a PDE5 inhibitor called sildenafil were initiated to treat hypertension and angina pectoris (chest pain caused by poor blood flow through the heart). The trial showed that the drug was not effective at treating heart conditions, but many men experienced erection and priapism (erection lasting longer than 4 hours). Because of this, a clinical trial was started to investigate the ability of sildenafil to promote erections in men suffering from ED. In 1998, the FDA approved the drug, marketed as Viagra ® . Since approval of the drug, sildenafil and similar PDE inhibitors now generate over a billion dollars a year in sales, and are reported to be effective in treating approximately 70 to 85 percent of cases of ED. Importantly, men with health problems—especially those with cardiac disease taking nitrates—should avoid Viagra or talk to their physician to find out if they are a candidate for the use of this drug, as deaths have been reported for at-risk users.

Testosterone

Testosterone, an androgen, is a steroid hormone produced by Leydig cells . The alternate term for Leydig cells, interstitial cells, reflects their location between the seminiferous tubules in the testes. In male embryos, testosterone is secreted by Leydig cells by the seventh week of development, with peak concentrations reached in the second trimester. This early release of testosterone results in the anatomical differentiation of the male sexual organs. In childhood, testosterone concentrations are low. They increase during puberty, activating characteristic physical changes and initiating spermatogenesis.

Functions of Testosterone

The continued presence of testosterone is necessary to keep the male reproductive system working properly, and Leydig cells produce approximately 6 to 7 mg of testosterone per day. Testicular steroidogenesis (the manufacture of androgens, including testosterone) results in testosterone concentrations that are 100 times higher in the testes than in the circulation. Maintaining these normal concentrations of testosterone promotes spermatogenesis, whereas low levels of testosterone can lead to infertility. In addition to intratesticular secretion, testosterone is also released into the systemic circulation and plays an important role in muscle development, bone growth, the development of secondary sex characteristics, and maintaining libido (sex drive) in both males and females. In females, the ovaries secrete small amounts of testosterone, although most is converted to estradiol. A small amount of testosterone is also secreted by the adrenal glands in both sexes.

Control of Testosterone

The regulation of testosterone concentrations throughout the body is critical for male reproductive function. The intricate interplay between the endocrine system and the reproductive system is shown in Figure 27.8 .

The regulation of Leydig cell production of testosterone begins outside of the testes. The hypothalamus and the pituitary gland in the brain integrate external and internal signals to control testosterone synthesis and secretion. The regulation begins in the hypothalamus. Pulsatile release of a hormone called gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH) from the hypothalamus stimulates the endocrine release of hormones from the pituitary gland. Binding of GnRH to its receptors on the anterior pituitary gland stimulates release of the two gonadotropins: luteinizing hormone (LH) and follicle-stimulating hormone (FSH). These two hormones are critical for reproductive function in both men and women. In men, FSH binds predominantly to the Sertoli cells within the seminiferous tubules to promote spermatogenesis. FSH also stimulates the Sertoli cells to produce hormones called inhibins, which function to inhibit FSH release from the pituitary, thus reducing testosterone secretion. These polypeptide hormones correlate directly with Sertoli cell function and sperm number; inhibin B can be used as a marker of spermatogenic activity. In men, LH binds to receptors on Leydig cells in the testes and upregulates the production of testosterone.

A negative feedback loop predominantly controls the synthesis and secretion of both FSH and LH. Low blood concentrations of testosterone stimulate the hypothalamic release of GnRH. GnRH then stimulates the anterior pituitary to secrete LH into the bloodstream. In the testis, LH binds to LH receptors on Leydig cells and stimulates the release of testosterone. When concentrations of testosterone in the blood reach a critical threshold, testosterone itself will bind to androgen receptors on both the hypothalamus and the anterior pituitary, inhibiting the synthesis and secretion of GnRH and LH, respectively. When the blood concentrations of testosterone once again decline, testosterone no longer interacts with the receptors to the same degree and GnRH and LH are once again secreted, stimulating more testosterone production. This same process occurs with FSH and inhibin to control spermatogenesis.

Aging and the...

Declines in Leydig cell activity can occur in men beginning at 40 to 50 years of age. The resulting reduction in circulating testosterone concentrations can lead to symptoms of andropause, also known as male menopause. While the reduction in sex steroids in men is akin to female menopause, there is no clear sign—such as a lack of a menstrual period—to denote the initiation of andropause. Instead, men report feelings of fatigue, reduced muscle mass, depression, anxiety, irritability, loss of libido, and insomnia. A reduction in spermatogenesis resulting in lowered fertility is also reported, and sexual dysfunction can also be associated with andropausal symptoms.

Whereas some researchers believe that certain aspects of andropause are difficult to tease apart from aging in general, testosterone replacement is sometimes prescribed to alleviate some symptoms. Recent studies have shown a benefit from androgen replacement therapy on the new onset of depression in elderly men; however, other studies caution against testosterone replacement for long-term treatment of andropause symptoms, showing that high doses can sharply increase the risk of both heart disease and prostate cancer.

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Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender

Feminism is said to be the movement to end women’s oppression (hooks 2000, 26). One possible way to understand ‘woman’ in this claim is to take it as a sex term: ‘woman’ picks out human females and being a human female depends on various biological and anatomical features (like genitalia). Historically many feminists have understood ‘woman’ differently: not as a sex term, but as a gender term that depends on social and cultural factors (like social position). In so doing, they distinguished sex (being female or male) from gender (being a woman or a man), although most ordinary language users appear to treat the two interchangeably. In feminist philosophy, this distinction has generated a lively debate. Central questions include: What does it mean for gender to be distinct from sex, if anything at all? How should we understand the claim that gender depends on social and/or cultural factors? What does it mean to be gendered woman, man, or genderqueer? This entry outlines and discusses distinctly feminist debates on sex and gender considering both historical and more contemporary positions.

1.1 Biological determinism

1.2 gender terminology, 2.1 gender socialisation, 2.2 gender as feminine and masculine personality, 2.3 gender as feminine and masculine sexuality, 3.1.1 particularity argument, 3.1.2 normativity argument, 3.2 is sex classification solely a matter of biology, 3.3 are sex and gender distinct, 3.4 is the sex/gender distinction useful, 4.1.1 gendered social series, 4.1.2 resemblance nominalism, 4.2.1 social subordination and gender, 4.2.2 gender uniessentialism, 4.2.3 gender as positionality, 5. beyond the binary, 6. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the sex/gender distinction..

The terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ mean different things to different feminist theorists and neither are easy or straightforward to characterise. Sketching out some feminist history of the terms provides a helpful starting point.

Most people ordinarily seem to think that sex and gender are coextensive: women are human females, men are human males. Many feminists have historically disagreed and have endorsed the sex/ gender distinction. Provisionally: ‘sex’ denotes human females and males depending on biological features (chromosomes, sex organs, hormones and other physical features); ‘gender’ denotes women and men depending on social factors (social role, position, behaviour or identity). The main feminist motivation for making this distinction was to counter biological determinism or the view that biology is destiny.

A typical example of a biological determinist view is that of Geddes and Thompson who, in 1889, argued that social, psychological and behavioural traits were caused by metabolic state. Women supposedly conserve energy (being ‘anabolic’) and this makes them passive, conservative, sluggish, stable and uninterested in politics. Men expend their surplus energy (being ‘katabolic’) and this makes them eager, energetic, passionate, variable and, thereby, interested in political and social matters. These biological ‘facts’ about metabolic states were used not only to explain behavioural differences between women and men but also to justify what our social and political arrangements ought to be. More specifically, they were used to argue for withholding from women political rights accorded to men because (according to Geddes and Thompson) “what was decided among the prehistoric Protozoa cannot be annulled by Act of Parliament” (quoted from Moi 1999, 18). It would be inappropriate to grant women political rights, as they are simply not suited to have those rights; it would also be futile since women (due to their biology) would simply not be interested in exercising their political rights. To counter this kind of biological determinism, feminists have argued that behavioural and psychological differences have social, rather than biological, causes. For instance, Simone de Beauvoir famously claimed that one is not born, but rather becomes a woman, and that “social discrimination produces in women moral and intellectual effects so profound that they appear to be caused by nature” (Beauvoir 1972 [original 1949], 18; for more, see the entry on Simone de Beauvoir ). Commonly observed behavioural traits associated with women and men, then, are not caused by anatomy or chromosomes. Rather, they are culturally learned or acquired.

Although biological determinism of the kind endorsed by Geddes and Thompson is nowadays uncommon, the idea that behavioural and psychological differences between women and men have biological causes has not disappeared. In the 1970s, sex differences were used to argue that women should not become airline pilots since they will be hormonally unstable once a month and, therefore, unable to perform their duties as well as men (Rogers 1999, 11). More recently, differences in male and female brains have been said to explain behavioural differences; in particular, the anatomy of corpus callosum, a bundle of nerves that connects the right and left cerebral hemispheres, is thought to be responsible for various psychological and behavioural differences. For instance, in 1992, a Time magazine article surveyed then prominent biological explanations of differences between women and men claiming that women’s thicker corpus callosums could explain what ‘women’s intuition’ is based on and impair women’s ability to perform some specialised visual-spatial skills, like reading maps (Gorman 1992). Anne Fausto-Sterling has questioned the idea that differences in corpus callosums cause behavioural and psychological differences. First, the corpus callosum is a highly variable piece of anatomy; as a result, generalisations about its size, shape and thickness that hold for women and men in general should be viewed with caution. Second, differences in adult human corpus callosums are not found in infants; this may suggest that physical brain differences actually develop as responses to differential treatment. Third, given that visual-spatial skills (like map reading) can be improved by practice, even if women and men’s corpus callosums differ, this does not make the resulting behavioural differences immutable. (Fausto-Sterling 2000b, chapter 5).

In order to distinguish biological differences from social/psychological ones and to talk about the latter, feminists appropriated the term ‘gender’. Psychologists writing on transsexuality were the first to employ gender terminology in this sense. Until the 1960s, ‘gender’ was often used to refer to masculine and feminine words, like le and la in French. However, in order to explain why some people felt that they were ‘trapped in the wrong bodies’, the psychologist Robert Stoller (1968) began using the terms ‘sex’ to pick out biological traits and ‘gender’ to pick out the amount of femininity and masculinity a person exhibited. Although (by and large) a person’s sex and gender complemented each other, separating out these terms seemed to make theoretical sense allowing Stoller to explain the phenomenon of transsexuality: transsexuals’ sex and gender simply don’t match.

Along with psychologists like Stoller, feminists found it useful to distinguish sex and gender. This enabled them to argue that many differences between women and men were socially produced and, therefore, changeable. Gayle Rubin (for instance) uses the phrase ‘sex/gender system’ in order to describe “a set of arrangements by which the biological raw material of human sex and procreation is shaped by human, social intervention” (1975, 165). Rubin employed this system to articulate that “part of social life which is the locus of the oppression of women” (1975, 159) describing gender as the “socially imposed division of the sexes” (1975, 179). Rubin’s thought was that although biological differences are fixed, gender differences are the oppressive results of social interventions that dictate how women and men should behave. Women are oppressed as women and “by having to be women” (Rubin 1975, 204). However, since gender is social, it is thought to be mutable and alterable by political and social reform that would ultimately bring an end to women’s subordination. Feminism should aim to create a “genderless (though not sexless) society, in which one’s sexual anatomy is irrelevant to who one is, what one does, and with whom one makes love” (Rubin 1975, 204).

In some earlier interpretations, like Rubin’s, sex and gender were thought to complement one another. The slogan ‘Gender is the social interpretation of sex’ captures this view. Nicholson calls this ‘the coat-rack view’ of gender: our sexed bodies are like coat racks and “provide the site upon which gender [is] constructed” (1994, 81). Gender conceived of as masculinity and femininity is superimposed upon the ‘coat-rack’ of sex as each society imposes on sexed bodies their cultural conceptions of how males and females should behave. This socially constructs gender differences – or the amount of femininity/masculinity of a person – upon our sexed bodies. That is, according to this interpretation, all humans are either male or female; their sex is fixed. But cultures interpret sexed bodies differently and project different norms on those bodies thereby creating feminine and masculine persons. Distinguishing sex and gender, however, also enables the two to come apart: they are separable in that one can be sexed male and yet be gendered a woman, or vice versa (Haslanger 2000b; Stoljar 1995).

So, this group of feminist arguments against biological determinism suggested that gender differences result from cultural practices and social expectations. Nowadays it is more common to denote this by saying that gender is socially constructed. This means that genders (women and men) and gendered traits (like being nurturing or ambitious) are the “intended or unintended product[s] of a social practice” (Haslanger 1995, 97). But which social practices construct gender, what social construction is and what being of a certain gender amounts to are major feminist controversies. There is no consensus on these issues. (See the entry on intersections between analytic and continental feminism for more on different ways to understand gender.)

2. Gender as socially constructed

One way to interpret Beauvoir’s claim that one is not born but rather becomes a woman is to take it as a claim about gender socialisation: females become women through a process whereby they acquire feminine traits and learn feminine behaviour. Masculinity and femininity are thought to be products of nurture or how individuals are brought up. They are causally constructed (Haslanger 1995, 98): social forces either have a causal role in bringing gendered individuals into existence or (to some substantial sense) shape the way we are qua women and men. And the mechanism of construction is social learning. For instance, Kate Millett takes gender differences to have “essentially cultural, rather than biological bases” that result from differential treatment (1971, 28–9). For her, gender is “the sum total of the parents’, the peers’, and the culture’s notions of what is appropriate to each gender by way of temperament, character, interests, status, worth, gesture, and expression” (Millett 1971, 31). Feminine and masculine gender-norms, however, are problematic in that gendered behaviour conveniently fits with and reinforces women’s subordination so that women are socialised into subordinate social roles: they learn to be passive, ignorant, docile, emotional helpmeets for men (Millett 1971, 26). However, since these roles are simply learned, we can create more equal societies by ‘unlearning’ social roles. That is, feminists should aim to diminish the influence of socialisation.

Social learning theorists hold that a huge array of different influences socialise us as women and men. This being the case, it is extremely difficult to counter gender socialisation. For instance, parents often unconsciously treat their female and male children differently. When parents have been asked to describe their 24- hour old infants, they have done so using gender-stereotypic language: boys are describes as strong, alert and coordinated and girls as tiny, soft and delicate. Parents’ treatment of their infants further reflects these descriptions whether they are aware of this or not (Renzetti & Curran 1992, 32). Some socialisation is more overt: children are often dressed in gender stereotypical clothes and colours (boys are dressed in blue, girls in pink) and parents tend to buy their children gender stereotypical toys. They also (intentionally or not) tend to reinforce certain ‘appropriate’ behaviours. While the precise form of gender socialization has changed since the onset of second-wave feminism, even today girls are discouraged from playing sports like football or from playing ‘rough and tumble’ games and are more likely than boys to be given dolls or cooking toys to play with; boys are told not to ‘cry like a baby’ and are more likely to be given masculine toys like trucks and guns (for more, see Kimmel 2000, 122–126). [ 1 ]

According to social learning theorists, children are also influenced by what they observe in the world around them. This, again, makes countering gender socialisation difficult. For one, children’s books have portrayed males and females in blatantly stereotypical ways: for instance, males as adventurers and leaders, and females as helpers and followers. One way to address gender stereotyping in children’s books has been to portray females in independent roles and males as non-aggressive and nurturing (Renzetti & Curran 1992, 35). Some publishers have attempted an alternative approach by making their characters, for instance, gender-neutral animals or genderless imaginary creatures (like TV’s Teletubbies). However, parents reading books with gender-neutral or genderless characters often undermine the publishers’ efforts by reading them to their children in ways that depict the characters as either feminine or masculine. According to Renzetti and Curran, parents labelled the overwhelming majority of gender-neutral characters masculine whereas those characters that fit feminine gender stereotypes (for instance, by being helpful and caring) were labelled feminine (1992, 35). Socialising influences like these are still thought to send implicit messages regarding how females and males should act and are expected to act shaping us into feminine and masculine persons.

Nancy Chodorow (1978; 1995) has criticised social learning theory as too simplistic to explain gender differences (see also Deaux & Major 1990; Gatens 1996). Instead, she holds that gender is a matter of having feminine and masculine personalities that develop in early infancy as responses to prevalent parenting practices. In particular, gendered personalities develop because women tend to be the primary caretakers of small children. Chodorow holds that because mothers (or other prominent females) tend to care for infants, infant male and female psychic development differs. Crudely put: the mother-daughter relationship differs from the mother-son relationship because mothers are more likely to identify with their daughters than their sons. This unconsciously prompts the mother to encourage her son to psychologically individuate himself from her thereby prompting him to develop well defined and rigid ego boundaries. However, the mother unconsciously discourages the daughter from individuating herself thereby prompting the daughter to develop flexible and blurry ego boundaries. Childhood gender socialisation further builds on and reinforces these unconsciously developed ego boundaries finally producing feminine and masculine persons (1995, 202–206). This perspective has its roots in Freudian psychoanalytic theory, although Chodorow’s approach differs in many ways from Freud’s.

Gendered personalities are supposedly manifested in common gender stereotypical behaviour. Take emotional dependency. Women are stereotypically more emotional and emotionally dependent upon others around them, supposedly finding it difficult to distinguish their own interests and wellbeing from the interests and wellbeing of their children and partners. This is said to be because of their blurry and (somewhat) confused ego boundaries: women find it hard to distinguish their own needs from the needs of those around them because they cannot sufficiently individuate themselves from those close to them. By contrast, men are stereotypically emotionally detached, preferring a career where dispassionate and distanced thinking are virtues. These traits are said to result from men’s well-defined ego boundaries that enable them to prioritise their own needs and interests sometimes at the expense of others’ needs and interests.

Chodorow thinks that these gender differences should and can be changed. Feminine and masculine personalities play a crucial role in women’s oppression since they make females overly attentive to the needs of others and males emotionally deficient. In order to correct the situation, both male and female parents should be equally involved in parenting (Chodorow 1995, 214). This would help in ensuring that children develop sufficiently individuated senses of selves without becoming overly detached, which in turn helps to eradicate common gender stereotypical behaviours.

Catharine MacKinnon develops her theory of gender as a theory of sexuality. Very roughly: the social meaning of sex (gender) is created by sexual objectification of women whereby women are viewed and treated as objects for satisfying men’s desires (MacKinnon 1989). Masculinity is defined as sexual dominance, femininity as sexual submissiveness: genders are “created through the eroticization of dominance and submission. The man/woman difference and the dominance/submission dynamic define each other. This is the social meaning of sex” (MacKinnon 1989, 113). For MacKinnon, gender is constitutively constructed : in defining genders (or masculinity and femininity) we must make reference to social factors (see Haslanger 1995, 98). In particular, we must make reference to the position one occupies in the sexualised dominance/submission dynamic: men occupy the sexually dominant position, women the sexually submissive one. As a result, genders are by definition hierarchical and this hierarchy is fundamentally tied to sexualised power relations. The notion of ‘gender equality’, then, does not make sense to MacKinnon. If sexuality ceased to be a manifestation of dominance, hierarchical genders (that are defined in terms of sexuality) would cease to exist.

So, gender difference for MacKinnon is not a matter of having a particular psychological orientation or behavioural pattern; rather, it is a function of sexuality that is hierarchal in patriarchal societies. This is not to say that men are naturally disposed to sexually objectify women or that women are naturally submissive. Instead, male and female sexualities are socially conditioned: men have been conditioned to find women’s subordination sexy and women have been conditioned to find a particular male version of female sexuality as erotic – one in which it is erotic to be sexually submissive. For MacKinnon, both female and male sexual desires are defined from a male point of view that is conditioned by pornography (MacKinnon 1989, chapter 7). Bluntly put: pornography portrays a false picture of ‘what women want’ suggesting that women in actual fact are and want to be submissive. This conditions men’s sexuality so that they view women’s submission as sexy. And male dominance enforces this male version of sexuality onto women, sometimes by force. MacKinnon’s thought is not that male dominance is a result of social learning (see 2.1.); rather, socialization is an expression of power. That is, socialized differences in masculine and feminine traits, behaviour, and roles are not responsible for power inequalities. Females and males (roughly put) are socialised differently because there are underlying power inequalities. As MacKinnon puts it, ‘dominance’ (power relations) is prior to ‘difference’ (traits, behaviour and roles) (see, MacKinnon 1989, chapter 12). MacKinnon, then, sees legal restrictions on pornography as paramount to ending women’s subordinate status that stems from their gender.

3. Problems with the sex/gender distinction

3.1 is gender uniform.

The positions outlined above share an underlying metaphysical perspective on gender: gender realism . [ 2 ] That is, women as a group are assumed to share some characteristic feature, experience, common condition or criterion that defines their gender and the possession of which makes some individuals women (as opposed to, say, men). All women are thought to differ from all men in this respect (or respects). For example, MacKinnon thought that being treated in sexually objectifying ways is the common condition that defines women’s gender and what women as women share. All women differ from all men in this respect. Further, pointing out females who are not sexually objectified does not provide a counterexample to MacKinnon’s view. Being sexually objectified is constitutive of being a woman; a female who escapes sexual objectification, then, would not count as a woman.

One may want to critique the three accounts outlined by rejecting the particular details of each account. (For instance, see Spelman [1988, chapter 4] for a critique of the details of Chodorow’s view.) A more thoroughgoing critique has been levelled at the general metaphysical perspective of gender realism that underlies these positions. It has come under sustained attack on two grounds: first, that it fails to take into account racial, cultural and class differences between women (particularity argument); second, that it posits a normative ideal of womanhood (normativity argument).

Elizabeth Spelman (1988) has influentially argued against gender realism with her particularity argument. Roughly: gender realists mistakenly assume that gender is constructed independently of race, class, ethnicity and nationality. If gender were separable from, for example, race and class in this manner, all women would experience womanhood in the same way. And this is clearly false. For instance, Harris (1993) and Stone (2007) criticise MacKinnon’s view, that sexual objectification is the common condition that defines women’s gender, for failing to take into account differences in women’s backgrounds that shape their sexuality. The history of racist oppression illustrates that during slavery black women were ‘hypersexualised’ and thought to be always sexually available whereas white women were thought to be pure and sexually virtuous. In fact, the rape of a black woman was thought to be impossible (Harris 1993). So, (the argument goes) sexual objectification cannot serve as the common condition for womanhood since it varies considerably depending on one’s race and class. [ 3 ]

For Spelman, the perspective of ‘white solipsism’ underlies gender realists’ mistake. They assumed that all women share some “golden nugget of womanness” (Spelman 1988, 159) and that the features constitutive of such a nugget are the same for all women regardless of their particular cultural backgrounds. Next, white Western middle-class feminists accounted for the shared features simply by reflecting on the cultural features that condition their gender as women thus supposing that “the womanness underneath the Black woman’s skin is a white woman’s, and deep down inside the Latina woman is an Anglo woman waiting to burst through an obscuring cultural shroud” (Spelman 1988, 13). In so doing, Spelman claims, white middle-class Western feminists passed off their particular view of gender as “a metaphysical truth” (1988, 180) thereby privileging some women while marginalising others. In failing to see the importance of race and class in gender construction, white middle-class Western feminists conflated “the condition of one group of women with the condition of all” (Spelman 1988, 3).

Betty Friedan’s (1963) well-known work is a case in point of white solipsism. [ 4 ] Friedan saw domesticity as the main vehicle of gender oppression and called upon women in general to find jobs outside the home. But she failed to realize that women from less privileged backgrounds, often poor and non-white, already worked outside the home to support their families. Friedan’s suggestion, then, was applicable only to a particular sub-group of women (white middle-class Western housewives). But it was mistakenly taken to apply to all women’s lives — a mistake that was generated by Friedan’s failure to take women’s racial and class differences into account (hooks 2000, 1–3).

Spelman further holds that since social conditioning creates femininity and societies (and sub-groups) that condition it differ from one another, femininity must be differently conditioned in different societies. For her, “females become not simply women but particular kinds of women” (Spelman 1988, 113): white working-class women, black middle-class women, poor Jewish women, wealthy aristocratic European women, and so on.

This line of thought has been extremely influential in feminist philosophy. For instance, Young holds that Spelman has definitively shown that gender realism is untenable (1997, 13). Mikkola (2006) argues that this isn’t so. The arguments Spelman makes do not undermine the idea that there is some characteristic feature, experience, common condition or criterion that defines women’s gender; they simply point out that some particular ways of cashing out what defines womanhood are misguided. So, although Spelman is right to reject those accounts that falsely take the feature that conditions white middle-class Western feminists’ gender to condition women’s gender in general, this leaves open the possibility that women qua women do share something that defines their gender. (See also Haslanger [2000a] for a discussion of why gender realism is not necessarily untenable, and Stoljar [2011] for a discussion of Mikkola’s critique of Spelman.)

Judith Butler critiques the sex/gender distinction on two grounds. They critique gender realism with their normativity argument (1999 [original 1990], chapter 1); they also hold that the sex/gender distinction is unintelligible (this will be discussed in section 3.3.). Butler’s normativity argument is not straightforwardly directed at the metaphysical perspective of gender realism, but rather at its political counterpart: identity politics. This is a form of political mobilization based on membership in some group (e.g. racial, ethnic, cultural, gender) and group membership is thought to be delimited by some common experiences, conditions or features that define the group (Heyes 2000, 58; see also the entry on Identity Politics ). Feminist identity politics, then, presupposes gender realism in that feminist politics is said to be mobilized around women as a group (or category) where membership in this group is fixed by some condition, experience or feature that women supposedly share and that defines their gender.

Butler’s normativity argument makes two claims. The first is akin to Spelman’s particularity argument: unitary gender notions fail to take differences amongst women into account thus failing to recognise “the multiplicity of cultural, social, and political intersections in which the concrete array of ‘women’ are constructed” (Butler 1999, 19–20). In their attempt to undercut biologically deterministic ways of defining what it means to be a woman, feminists inadvertently created new socially constructed accounts of supposedly shared femininity. Butler’s second claim is that such false gender realist accounts are normative. That is, in their attempt to fix feminism’s subject matter, feminists unwittingly defined the term ‘woman’ in a way that implies there is some correct way to be gendered a woman (Butler 1999, 5). That the definition of the term ‘woman’ is fixed supposedly “operates as a policing force which generates and legitimizes certain practices, experiences, etc., and curtails and delegitimizes others” (Nicholson 1998, 293). Following this line of thought, one could say that, for instance, Chodorow’s view of gender suggests that ‘real’ women have feminine personalities and that these are the women feminism should be concerned about. If one does not exhibit a distinctly feminine personality, the implication is that one is not ‘really’ a member of women’s category nor does one properly qualify for feminist political representation.

Butler’s second claim is based on their view that“[i]dentity categories [like that of women] are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary” (Butler 1991, 160). That is, the mistake of those feminists Butler critiques was not that they provided the incorrect definition of ‘woman’. Rather, (the argument goes) their mistake was to attempt to define the term ‘woman’ at all. Butler’s view is that ‘woman’ can never be defined in a way that does not prescribe some “unspoken normative requirements” (like having a feminine personality) that women should conform to (Butler 1999, 9). Butler takes this to be a feature of terms like ‘woman’ that purport to pick out (what they call) ‘identity categories’. They seem to assume that ‘woman’ can never be used in a non-ideological way (Moi 1999, 43) and that it will always encode conditions that are not satisfied by everyone we think of as women. Some explanation for this comes from Butler’s view that all processes of drawing categorical distinctions involve evaluative and normative commitments; these in turn involve the exercise of power and reflect the conditions of those who are socially powerful (Witt 1995).

In order to better understand Butler’s critique, consider their account of gender performativity. For them, standard feminist accounts take gendered individuals to have some essential properties qua gendered individuals or a gender core by virtue of which one is either a man or a woman. This view assumes that women and men, qua women and men, are bearers of various essential and accidental attributes where the former secure gendered persons’ persistence through time as so gendered. But according to Butler this view is false: (i) there are no such essential properties, and (ii) gender is an illusion maintained by prevalent power structures. First, feminists are said to think that genders are socially constructed in that they have the following essential attributes (Butler 1999, 24): women are females with feminine behavioural traits, being heterosexuals whose desire is directed at men; men are males with masculine behavioural traits, being heterosexuals whose desire is directed at women. These are the attributes necessary for gendered individuals and those that enable women and men to persist through time as women and men. Individuals have “intelligible genders” (Butler 1999, 23) if they exhibit this sequence of traits in a coherent manner (where sexual desire follows from sexual orientation that in turn follows from feminine/ masculine behaviours thought to follow from biological sex). Social forces in general deem individuals who exhibit in coherent gender sequences (like lesbians) to be doing their gender ‘wrong’ and they actively discourage such sequencing of traits, for instance, via name-calling and overt homophobic discrimination. Think back to what was said above: having a certain conception of what women are like that mirrors the conditions of socially powerful (white, middle-class, heterosexual, Western) women functions to marginalize and police those who do not fit this conception.

These gender cores, supposedly encoding the above traits, however, are nothing more than illusions created by ideals and practices that seek to render gender uniform through heterosexism, the view that heterosexuality is natural and homosexuality is deviant (Butler 1999, 42). Gender cores are constructed as if they somehow naturally belong to women and men thereby creating gender dimorphism or the belief that one must be either a masculine male or a feminine female. But gender dimorphism only serves a heterosexist social order by implying that since women and men are sharply opposed, it is natural to sexually desire the opposite sex or gender.

Further, being feminine and desiring men (for instance) are standardly assumed to be expressions of one’s gender as a woman. Butler denies this and holds that gender is really performative. It is not “a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is … instituted … through a stylized repetition of [habitual] acts ” (Butler 1999, 179): through wearing certain gender-coded clothing, walking and sitting in certain gender-coded ways, styling one’s hair in gender-coded manner and so on. Gender is not something one is, it is something one does; it is a sequence of acts, a doing rather than a being. And repeatedly engaging in ‘feminising’ and ‘masculinising’ acts congeals gender thereby making people falsely think of gender as something they naturally are . Gender only comes into being through these gendering acts: a female who has sex with men does not express her gender as a woman. This activity (amongst others) makes her gendered a woman.

The constitutive acts that gender individuals create genders as “compelling illusion[s]” (Butler 1990, 271). Our gendered classification scheme is a strong pragmatic construction : social factors wholly determine our use of the scheme and the scheme fails to represent accurately any ‘facts of the matter’ (Haslanger 1995, 100). People think that there are true and real genders, and those deemed to be doing their gender ‘wrong’ are not socially sanctioned. But, genders are true and real only to the extent that they are performed (Butler 1990, 278–9). It does not make sense, then, to say of a male-to-female trans person that s/he is really a man who only appears to be a woman. Instead, males dressing up and acting in ways that are associated with femininity “show that [as Butler suggests] ‘being’ feminine is just a matter of doing certain activities” (Stone 2007, 64). As a result, the trans person’s gender is just as real or true as anyone else’s who is a ‘traditionally’ feminine female or masculine male (Butler 1990, 278). [ 5 ] Without heterosexism that compels people to engage in certain gendering acts, there would not be any genders at all. And ultimately the aim should be to abolish norms that compel people to act in these gendering ways.

For Butler, given that gender is performative, the appropriate response to feminist identity politics involves two things. First, feminists should understand ‘woman’ as open-ended and “a term in process, a becoming, a constructing that cannot rightfully be said to originate or end … it is open to intervention and resignification” (Butler 1999, 43). That is, feminists should not try to define ‘woman’ at all. Second, the category of women “ought not to be the foundation of feminist politics” (Butler 1999, 9). Rather, feminists should focus on providing an account of how power functions and shapes our understandings of womanhood not only in the society at large but also within the feminist movement.

Many people, including many feminists, have ordinarily taken sex ascriptions to be solely a matter of biology with no social or cultural dimension. It is commonplace to think that there are only two sexes and that biological sex classifications are utterly unproblematic. By contrast, some feminists have argued that sex classifications are not unproblematic and that they are not solely a matter of biology. In order to make sense of this, it is helpful to distinguish object- and idea-construction (see Haslanger 2003b for more): social forces can be said to construct certain kinds of objects (e.g. sexed bodies or gendered individuals) and certain kinds of ideas (e.g. sex or gender concepts). First, take the object-construction of sexed bodies. Secondary sex characteristics, or the physiological and biological features commonly associated with males and females, are affected by social practices. In some societies, females’ lower social status has meant that they have been fed less and so, the lack of nutrition has had the effect of making them smaller in size (Jaggar 1983, 37). Uniformity in muscular shape, size and strength within sex categories is not caused entirely by biological factors, but depends heavily on exercise opportunities: if males and females were allowed the same exercise opportunities and equal encouragement to exercise, it is thought that bodily dimorphism would diminish (Fausto-Sterling 1993a, 218). A number of medical phenomena involving bones (like osteoporosis) have social causes directly related to expectations about gender, women’s diet and their exercise opportunities (Fausto-Sterling 2005). These examples suggest that physiological features thought to be sex-specific traits not affected by social and cultural factors are, after all, to some extent products of social conditioning. Social conditioning, then, shapes our biology.

Second, take the idea-construction of sex concepts. Our concept of sex is said to be a product of social forces in the sense that what counts as sex is shaped by social meanings. Standardly, those with XX-chromosomes, ovaries that produce large egg cells, female genitalia, a relatively high proportion of ‘female’ hormones, and other secondary sex characteristics (relatively small body size, less body hair) count as biologically female. Those with XY-chromosomes, testes that produce small sperm cells, male genitalia, a relatively high proportion of ‘male’ hormones and other secondary sex traits (relatively large body size, significant amounts of body hair) count as male. This understanding is fairly recent. The prevalent scientific view from Ancient Greeks until the late 18 th century, did not consider female and male sexes to be distinct categories with specific traits; instead, a ‘one-sex model’ held that males and females were members of the same sex category. Females’ genitals were thought to be the same as males’ but simply directed inside the body; ovaries and testes (for instance) were referred to by the same term and whether the term referred to the former or the latter was made clear by the context (Laqueur 1990, 4). It was not until the late 1700s that scientists began to think of female and male anatomies as radically different moving away from the ‘one-sex model’ of a single sex spectrum to the (nowadays prevalent) ‘two-sex model’ of sexual dimorphism. (For an alternative view, see King 2013.)

Fausto-Sterling has argued that this ‘two-sex model’ isn’t straightforward either (1993b; 2000a; 2000b). Based on a meta-study of empirical medical research, she estimates that 1.7% of population fail to neatly fall within the usual sex classifications possessing various combinations of different sex characteristics (Fausto-Sterling 2000a, 20). In her earlier work, she claimed that intersex individuals make up (at least) three further sex classes: ‘herms’ who possess one testis and one ovary; ‘merms’ who possess testes, some aspects of female genitalia but no ovaries; and ‘ferms’ who have ovaries, some aspects of male genitalia but no testes (Fausto-Sterling 1993b, 21). (In her [2000a], Fausto-Sterling notes that these labels were put forward tongue–in–cheek.) Recognition of intersex people suggests that feminists (and society at large) are wrong to think that humans are either female or male.

To illustrate further the idea-construction of sex, consider the case of the athlete Maria Patiño. Patiño has female genitalia, has always considered herself to be female and was considered so by others. However, she was discovered to have XY chromosomes and was barred from competing in women’s sports (Fausto-Sterling 2000b, 1–3). Patiño’s genitalia were at odds with her chromosomes and the latter were taken to determine her sex. Patiño successfully fought to be recognised as a female athlete arguing that her chromosomes alone were not sufficient to not make her female. Intersex people, like Patiño, illustrate that our understandings of sex differ and suggest that there is no immediately obvious way to settle what sex amounts to purely biologically or scientifically. Deciding what sex is involves evaluative judgements that are influenced by social factors.

Insofar as our cultural conceptions affect our understandings of sex, feminists must be much more careful about sex classifications and rethink what sex amounts to (Stone 2007, chapter 1). More specifically, intersex people illustrate that sex traits associated with females and males need not always go together and that individuals can have some mixture of these traits. This suggests to Stone that sex is a cluster concept: it is sufficient to satisfy enough of the sex features that tend to cluster together in order to count as being of a particular sex. But, one need not satisfy all of those features or some arbitrarily chosen supposedly necessary sex feature, like chromosomes (Stone 2007, 44). This makes sex a matter of degree and sex classifications should take place on a spectrum: one can be more or less female/male but there is no sharp distinction between the two. Further, intersex people (along with trans people) are located at the centre of the sex spectrum and in many cases their sex will be indeterminate (Stone 2007).

More recently, Ayala and Vasilyeva (2015) have argued for an inclusive and extended conception of sex: just as certain tools can be seen to extend our minds beyond the limits of our brains (e.g. white canes), other tools (like dildos) can extend our sex beyond our bodily boundaries. This view aims to motivate the idea that what counts as sex should not be determined by looking inwards at genitalia or other anatomical features. In a different vein, Ásta (2018) argues that sex is a conferred social property. This follows her more general conferralist framework to analyse all social properties: properties that are conferred by others thereby generating a social status that consists in contextually specific constraints and enablements on individual behaviour. The general schema for conferred properties is as follows (Ásta 2018, 8):

Conferred property: what property is conferred. Who: who the subjects are. What: what attitude, state, or action of the subjects matter. When: under what conditions the conferral takes place. Base property: what the subjects are attempting to track (consciously or not), if anything.

With being of a certain sex (e.g. male, female) in mind, Ásta holds that it is a conferred property that merely aims to track physical features. Hence sex is a social – or in fact, an institutional – property rather than a natural one. The schema for sex goes as follows (72):

Conferred property: being female, male. Who: legal authorities, drawing on the expert opinion of doctors, other medical personnel. What: “the recording of a sex in official documents ... The judgment of the doctors (and others) as to what sex role might be the most fitting, given the biological characteristics present.” When: at birth or after surgery/ hormonal treatment. Base property: “the aim is to track as many sex-stereotypical characteristics as possible, and doctors perform surgery in cases where that might help bring the physical characteristics more in line with the stereotype of male and female.”

This (among other things) offers a debunking analysis of sex: it may appear to be a natural property, but on the conferralist analysis is better understood as a conferred legal status. Ásta holds that gender too is a conferred property, but contra the discussion in the following section, she does not think that this collapses the distinction between sex and gender: sex and gender are differently conferred albeit both satisfying the general schema noted above. Nonetheless, on the conferralist framework what underlies both sex and gender is the idea of social construction as social significance: sex-stereotypical characteristics are taken to be socially significant context specifically, whereby they become the basis for conferring sex onto individuals and this brings with it various constraints and enablements on individuals and their behaviour. This fits object- and idea-constructions introduced above, although offers a different general framework to analyse the matter at hand.

In addition to arguing against identity politics and for gender performativity, Butler holds that distinguishing biological sex from social gender is unintelligible. For them, both are socially constructed:

If the immutable character of sex is contested, perhaps this construct called ‘sex’ is as culturally constructed as gender; indeed, perhaps it was always already gender, with the consequence that the distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all. (Butler 1999, 10–11)

(Butler is not alone in claiming that there are no tenable distinctions between nature/culture, biology/construction and sex/gender. See also: Antony 1998; Gatens 1996; Grosz 1994; Prokhovnik 1999.) Butler makes two different claims in the passage cited: that sex is a social construction, and that sex is gender. To unpack their view, consider the two claims in turn. First, the idea that sex is a social construct, for Butler, boils down to the view that our sexed bodies are also performative and, so, they have “no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute [their] reality” (1999, 173). Prima facie , this implausibly implies that female and male bodies do not have independent existence and that if gendering activities ceased, so would physical bodies. This is not Butler’s claim; rather, their position is that bodies viewed as the material foundations on which gender is constructed, are themselves constructed as if they provide such material foundations (Butler 1993). Cultural conceptions about gender figure in “the very apparatus of production whereby sexes themselves are established” (Butler 1999, 11).

For Butler, sexed bodies never exist outside social meanings and how we understand gender shapes how we understand sex (1999, 139). Sexed bodies are not empty matter on which gender is constructed and sex categories are not picked out on the basis of objective features of the world. Instead, our sexed bodies are themselves discursively constructed : they are the way they are, at least to a substantial extent, because of what is attributed to sexed bodies and how they are classified (for discursive construction, see Haslanger 1995, 99). Sex assignment (calling someone female or male) is normative (Butler 1993, 1). [ 6 ] When the doctor calls a newly born infant a girl or a boy, s/he is not making a descriptive claim, but a normative one. In fact, the doctor is performing an illocutionary speech act (see the entry on Speech Acts ). In effect, the doctor’s utterance makes infants into girls or boys. We, then, engage in activities that make it seem as if sexes naturally come in two and that being female or male is an objective feature of the world, rather than being a consequence of certain constitutive acts (that is, rather than being performative). And this is what Butler means in saying that physical bodies never exist outside cultural and social meanings, and that sex is as socially constructed as gender. They do not deny that physical bodies exist. But, they take our understanding of this existence to be a product of social conditioning: social conditioning makes the existence of physical bodies intelligible to us by discursively constructing sexed bodies through certain constitutive acts. (For a helpful introduction to Butler’s views, see Salih 2002.)

For Butler, sex assignment is always in some sense oppressive. Again, this appears to be because of Butler’s general suspicion of classification: sex classification can never be merely descriptive but always has a normative element reflecting evaluative claims of those who are powerful. Conducting a feminist genealogy of the body (or examining why sexed bodies are thought to come naturally as female and male), then, should ground feminist practice (Butler 1993, 28–9). Feminists should examine and uncover ways in which social construction and certain acts that constitute sex shape our understandings of sexed bodies, what kinds of meanings bodies acquire and which practices and illocutionary speech acts ‘make’ our bodies into sexes. Doing so enables feminists to identity how sexed bodies are socially constructed in order to resist such construction.

However, given what was said above, it is far from obvious what we should make of Butler’s claim that sex “was always already gender” (1999, 11). Stone (2007) takes this to mean that sex is gender but goes on to question it arguing that the social construction of both sex and gender does not make sex identical to gender. According to Stone, it would be more accurate for Butler to say that claims about sex imply gender norms. That is, many claims about sex traits (like ‘females are physically weaker than males’) actually carry implications about how women and men are expected to behave. To some extent the claim describes certain facts. But, it also implies that females are not expected to do much heavy lifting and that they would probably not be good at it. So, claims about sex are not identical to claims about gender; rather, they imply claims about gender norms (Stone 2007, 70).

Some feminists hold that the sex/gender distinction is not useful. For a start, it is thought to reflect politically problematic dualistic thinking that undercuts feminist aims: the distinction is taken to reflect and replicate androcentric oppositions between (for instance) mind/body, culture/nature and reason/emotion that have been used to justify women’s oppression (e.g. Grosz 1994; Prokhovnik 1999). The thought is that in oppositions like these, one term is always superior to the other and that the devalued term is usually associated with women (Lloyd 1993). For instance, human subjectivity and agency are identified with the mind but since women are usually identified with their bodies, they are devalued as human subjects and agents. The opposition between mind and body is said to further map on to other distinctions, like reason/emotion, culture/nature, rational/irrational, where one side of each distinction is devalued (one’s bodily features are usually valued less that one’s mind, rationality is usually valued more than irrationality) and women are associated with the devalued terms: they are thought to be closer to bodily features and nature than men, to be irrational, emotional and so on. This is said to be evident (for instance) in job interviews. Men are treated as gender-neutral persons and not asked whether they are planning to take time off to have a family. By contrast, that women face such queries illustrates that they are associated more closely than men with bodily features to do with procreation (Prokhovnik 1999, 126). The opposition between mind and body, then, is thought to map onto the opposition between men and women.

Now, the mind/body dualism is also said to map onto the sex/gender distinction (Grosz 1994; Prokhovnik 1999). The idea is that gender maps onto mind, sex onto body. Although not used by those endorsing this view, the basic idea can be summed by the slogan ‘Gender is between the ears, sex is between the legs’: the implication is that, while sex is immutable, gender is something individuals have control over – it is something we can alter and change through individual choices. However, since women are said to be more closely associated with biological features (and so, to map onto the body side of the mind/body distinction) and men are treated as gender-neutral persons (mapping onto the mind side), the implication is that “man equals gender, which is associated with mind and choice, freedom from body, autonomy, and with the public real; while woman equals sex, associated with the body, reproduction, ‘natural’ rhythms and the private realm” (Prokhovnik 1999, 103). This is said to render the sex/gender distinction inherently repressive and to drain it of any potential for emancipation: rather than facilitating gender role choice for women, it “actually functions to reinforce their association with body, sex, and involuntary ‘natural’ rhythms” (Prokhovnik 1999, 103). Contrary to what feminists like Rubin argued, the sex/gender distinction cannot be used as a theoretical tool that dissociates conceptions of womanhood from biological and reproductive features.

Moi has further argued that the sex/gender distinction is useless given certain theoretical goals (1999, chapter 1). This is not to say that it is utterly worthless; according to Moi, the sex/gender distinction worked well to show that the historically prevalent biological determinism was false. However, for her, the distinction does no useful work “when it comes to producing a good theory of subjectivity” (1999, 6) and “a concrete, historical understanding of what it means to be a woman (or a man) in a given society” (1999, 4–5). That is, the 1960s distinction understood sex as fixed by biology without any cultural or historical dimensions. This understanding, however, ignores lived experiences and embodiment as aspects of womanhood (and manhood) by separating sex from gender and insisting that womanhood is to do with the latter. Rather, embodiment must be included in one’s theory that tries to figure out what it is to be a woman (or a man).

Mikkola (2011) argues that the sex/gender distinction, which underlies views like Rubin’s and MacKinnon’s, has certain unintuitive and undesirable ontological commitments that render the distinction politically unhelpful. First, claiming that gender is socially constructed implies that the existence of women and men is a mind-dependent matter. This suggests that we can do away with women and men simply by altering some social practices, conventions or conditions on which gender depends (whatever those are). However, ordinary social agents find this unintuitive given that (ordinarily) sex and gender are not distinguished. Second, claiming that gender is a product of oppressive social forces suggests that doing away with women and men should be feminism’s political goal. But this harbours ontologically undesirable commitments since many ordinary social agents view their gender to be a source of positive value. So, feminism seems to want to do away with something that should not be done away with, which is unlikely to motivate social agents to act in ways that aim at gender justice. Given these problems, Mikkola argues that feminists should give up the distinction on practical political grounds.

Tomas Bogardus (2020) has argued in an even more radical sense against the sex/gender distinction: as things stand, he holds, feminist philosophers have merely assumed and asserted that the distinction exists, instead of having offered good arguments for the distinction. In other words, feminist philosophers allegedly have yet to offer good reasons to think that ‘woman’ does not simply pick out adult human females. Alex Byrne (2020) argues in a similar vein: the term ‘woman’ does not pick out a social kind as feminist philosophers have “assumed”. Instead, “women are adult human females–nothing more, and nothing less” (2020, 3801). Byrne offers six considerations to ground this AHF (adult, human, female) conception.

• It reproduces the dictionary definition of ‘woman’.
• One would expect English to have a word that picks out the category adult human female, and ‘woman’ is the only candidate.
• AHF explains how we sometimes know that an individual is a woman, despite knowing nothing else relevant about her other than the fact that she is an adult human female.
• AHF stands or falls with the analogous thesis for girls, which can be supported independently.
• AHF predicts the correct verdict in cases of gender role reversal.
• AHF is supported by the fact that ‘woman’ and ‘female’ are often appropriately used as stylistic variants of each other, even in hyperintensional contexts.

Robin Dembroff (2021) responds to Byrne and highlights various problems with Byrne’s argument. First, framing: Byrne assumes from the start that gender terms like ‘woman’ have a single invariant meaning thereby failing to discuss the possibility of terms like ‘woman’ having multiple meanings – something that is a familiar claim made by feminist theorists from various disciplines. Moreover, Byrne (according to Dembroff) assumes without argument that there is a single, universal category of woman – again, something that has been extensively discussed and critiqued by feminist philosophers and theorists. Second, Byrne’s conception of the ‘dominant’ meaning of woman is said to be cherry-picked and it ignores a wealth of contexts outside of philosophy (like the media and the law) where ‘woman’ has a meaning other than AHF . Third, Byrne’s own distinction between biological and social categories fails to establish what he intended to establish: namely, that ‘woman’ picks out a biological rather than a social kind. Hence, Dembroff holds, Byrne’s case fails by its own lights. Byrne (2021) responds to Dembroff’s critique.

Others such as ‘gender critical feminists’ also hold views about the sex/gender distinction in a spirit similar to Bogardus and Byrne. For example, Holly Lawford-Smith (2021) takes the prevalent sex/gender distinction, where ‘female’/‘male’ are used as sex terms and ‘woman’/’man’ as gender terms, not to be helpful. Instead, she takes all of these to be sex terms and holds that (the norms of) femininity/masculinity refer to gender normativity. Because much of the gender critical feminists’ discussion that philosophers have engaged in has taken place in social media, public fora, and other sources outside academic philosophy, this entry will not focus on these discussions.

4. Women as a group

The various critiques of the sex/gender distinction have called into question the viability of the category women . Feminism is the movement to end the oppression women as a group face. But, how should the category of women be understood if feminists accept the above arguments that gender construction is not uniform, that a sharp distinction between biological sex and social gender is false or (at least) not useful, and that various features associated with women play a role in what it is to be a woman, none of which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient (like a variety of social roles, positions, behaviours, traits, bodily features and experiences)? Feminists must be able to address cultural and social differences in gender construction if feminism is to be a genuinely inclusive movement and be careful not to posit commonalities that mask important ways in which women qua women differ. These concerns (among others) have generated a situation where (as Linda Alcoff puts it) feminists aim to speak and make political demands in the name of women, at the same time rejecting the idea that there is a unified category of women (2006, 152). If feminist critiques of the category women are successful, then what (if anything) binds women together, what is it to be a woman, and what kinds of demands can feminists make on behalf of women?

Many have found the fragmentation of the category of women problematic for political reasons (e.g. Alcoff 2006; Bach 2012; Benhabib 1992; Frye 1996; Haslanger 2000b; Heyes 2000; Martin 1994; Mikkola 2007; Stoljar 1995; Stone 2004; Tanesini 1996; Young 1997; Zack 2005). For instance, Young holds that accounts like Spelman’s reduce the category of women to a gerrymandered collection of individuals with nothing to bind them together (1997, 20). Black women differ from white women but members of both groups also differ from one another with respect to nationality, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation and economic position; that is, wealthy white women differ from working-class white women due to their economic and class positions. These sub-groups are themselves diverse: for instance, some working-class white women in Northern Ireland are starkly divided along religious lines. So if we accept Spelman’s position, we risk ending up with individual women and nothing to bind them together. And this is problematic: in order to respond to oppression of women in general, feminists must understand them as a category in some sense. Young writes that without doing so “it is not possible to conceptualize oppression as a systematic, structured, institutional process” (1997, 17). Some, then, take the articulation of an inclusive category of women to be the prerequisite for effective feminist politics and a rich literature has emerged that aims to conceptualise women as a group or a collective (e.g. Alcoff 2006; Ásta 2011; Frye 1996; 2011; Haslanger 2000b; Heyes 2000; Stoljar 1995, 2011; Young 1997; Zack 2005). Articulations of this category can be divided into those that are: (a) gender nominalist — positions that deny there is something women qua women share and that seek to unify women’s social kind by appealing to something external to women; and (b) gender realist — positions that take there to be something women qua women share (although these realist positions differ significantly from those outlined in Section 2). Below we will review some influential gender nominalist and gender realist positions. Before doing so, it is worth noting that not everyone is convinced that attempts to articulate an inclusive category of women can succeed or that worries about what it is to be a woman are in need of being resolved. Mikkola (2016) argues that feminist politics need not rely on overcoming (what she calls) the ‘gender controversy’: that feminists must settle the meaning of gender concepts and articulate a way to ground women’s social kind membership. As she sees it, disputes about ‘what it is to be a woman’ have become theoretically bankrupt and intractable, which has generated an analytical impasse that looks unsurpassable. Instead, Mikkola argues for giving up the quest, which in any case in her view poses no serious political obstacles.

Elizabeth Barnes (2020) responds to the need to offer an inclusive conception of gender somewhat differently, although she endorses the need for feminism to be inclusive particularly of trans people. Barnes holds that typically philosophical theories of gender aim to offer an account of what it is to be a woman (or man, genderqueer, etc.), where such an account is presumed to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for being a woman or an account of our gender terms’ extensions. But, she holds, it is a mistake to expect our theories of gender to do so. For Barnes, a project that offers a metaphysics of gender “should be understood as the project of theorizing what it is —if anything— about the social world that ultimately explains gender” (2020, 706). This project is not equivalent to one that aims to define gender terms or elucidate the application conditions for natural language gender terms though.

4.1 Gender nominalism

Iris Young argues that unless there is “some sense in which ‘woman’ is the name of a social collective [that feminism represents], there is nothing specific to feminist politics” (1997, 13). In order to make the category women intelligible, she argues that women make up a series: a particular kind of social collective “whose members are unified passively by the objects their actions are oriented around and/or by the objectified results of the material effects of the actions of the other” (Young 1997, 23). A series is distinct from a group in that, whereas members of groups are thought to self-consciously share certain goals, projects, traits and/ or self-conceptions, members of series pursue their own individual ends without necessarily having anything at all in common. Young holds that women are not bound together by a shared feature or experience (or set of features and experiences) since she takes Spelman’s particularity argument to have established definitely that no such feature exists (1997, 13; see also: Frye 1996; Heyes 2000). Instead, women’s category is unified by certain practico-inert realities or the ways in which women’s lives and their actions are oriented around certain objects and everyday realities (Young 1997, 23–4). For example, bus commuters make up a series unified through their individual actions being organised around the same practico-inert objects of the bus and the practice of public transport. Women make up a series unified through women’s lives and actions being organised around certain practico-inert objects and realities that position them as women .

Young identifies two broad groups of such practico-inert objects and realities. First, phenomena associated with female bodies (physical facts), biological processes that take place in female bodies (menstruation, pregnancy, childbirth) and social rules associated with these biological processes (social rules of menstruation, for instance). Second, gender-coded objects and practices: pronouns, verbal and visual representations of gender, gender-coded artefacts and social spaces, clothes, cosmetics, tools and furniture. So, women make up a series since their lives and actions are organised around female bodies and certain gender-coded objects. Their series is bound together passively and the unity is “not one that arises from the individuals called women” (Young 1997, 32).

Although Young’s proposal purports to be a response to Spelman’s worries, Stone has questioned whether it is, after all, susceptible to the particularity argument: ultimately, on Young’s view, something women as women share (their practico-inert realities) binds them together (Stone 2004).

Natalie Stoljar holds that unless the category of women is unified, feminist action on behalf of women cannot be justified (1995, 282). Stoljar too is persuaded by the thought that women qua women do not share anything unitary. This prompts her to argue for resemblance nominalism. This is the view that a certain kind of resemblance relation holds between entities of a particular type (for more on resemblance nominalism, see Armstrong 1989, 39–58). Stoljar is not alone in arguing for resemblance relations to make sense of women as a category; others have also done so, usually appealing to Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’ relations (Alcoff 1988; Green & Radford Curry 1991; Heyes 2000; Munro 2006). Stoljar relies more on Price’s resemblance nominalism whereby x is a member of some type F only if x resembles some paradigm or exemplar of F sufficiently closely (Price 1953, 20). For instance, the type of red entities is unified by some chosen red paradigms so that only those entities that sufficiently resemble the paradigms count as red. The type (or category) of women, then, is unified by some chosen woman paradigms so that those who sufficiently resemble the woman paradigms count as women (Stoljar 1995, 284).

Semantic considerations about the concept woman suggest to Stoljar that resemblance nominalism should be endorsed (Stoljar 2000, 28). It seems unlikely that the concept is applied on the basis of some single social feature all and only women possess. By contrast, woman is a cluster concept and our attributions of womanhood pick out “different arrangements of features in different individuals” (Stoljar 2000, 27). More specifically, they pick out the following clusters of features: (a) Female sex; (b) Phenomenological features: menstruation, female sexual experience, child-birth, breast-feeding, fear of walking on the streets at night or fear of rape; (c) Certain roles: wearing typically female clothing, being oppressed on the basis of one’s sex or undertaking care-work; (d) Gender attribution: “calling oneself a woman, being called a woman” (Stoljar 1995, 283–4). For Stoljar, attributions of womanhood are to do with a variety of traits and experiences: those that feminists have historically termed ‘gender traits’ (like social, behavioural, psychological traits) and those termed ‘sex traits’. Nonetheless, she holds that since the concept woman applies to (at least some) trans persons, one can be a woman without being female (Stoljar 1995, 282).

The cluster concept woman does not, however, straightforwardly provide the criterion for picking out the category of women. Rather, the four clusters of features that the concept picks out help single out woman paradigms that in turn help single out the category of women. First, any individual who possesses a feature from at least three of the four clusters mentioned will count as an exemplar of the category. For instance, an African-American with primary and secondary female sex characteristics, who describes herself as a woman and is oppressed on the basis of her sex, along with a white European hermaphrodite brought up ‘as a girl’, who engages in female roles and has female phenomenological features despite lacking female sex characteristics, will count as woman paradigms (Stoljar 1995, 284). [ 7 ] Second, any individual who resembles “any of the paradigms sufficiently closely (on Price’s account, as closely as [the paradigms] resemble each other) will be a member of the resemblance class ‘woman’” (Stoljar 1995, 284). That is, what delimits membership in the category of women is that one resembles sufficiently a woman paradigm.

4.2 Neo-gender realism

In a series of articles collected in her 2012 book, Sally Haslanger argues for a way to define the concept woman that is politically useful, serving as a tool in feminist fights against sexism, and that shows woman to be a social (not a biological) notion. More specifically, Haslanger argues that gender is a matter of occupying either a subordinate or a privileged social position. In some articles, Haslanger is arguing for a revisionary analysis of the concept woman (2000b; 2003a; 2003b). Elsewhere she suggests that her analysis may not be that revisionary after all (2005; 2006). Consider the former argument first. Haslanger’s analysis is, in her terms, ameliorative: it aims to elucidate which gender concepts best help feminists achieve their legitimate purposes thereby elucidating those concepts feminists should be using (Haslanger 2000b, 33). [ 8 ] Now, feminists need gender terminology in order to fight sexist injustices (Haslanger 2000b, 36). In particular, they need gender terms to identify, explain and talk about persistent social inequalities between males and females. Haslanger’s analysis of gender begins with the recognition that females and males differ in two respects: physically and in their social positions. Societies in general tend to “privilege individuals with male bodies” (Haslanger 2000b, 38) so that the social positions they subsequently occupy are better than the social positions of those with female bodies. And this generates persistent sexist injustices. With this in mind, Haslanger specifies how she understands genders:

S is a woman iff [by definition] S is systematically subordinated along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is ‘marked’ as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a female’s biological role in reproduction.

S is a man iff [by definition] S is systematically privileged along some dimension (economic, political, legal, social, etc.), and S is ‘marked’ as a target for this treatment by observed or imagined bodily features presumed to be evidence of a male’s biological role in reproduction. (2003a, 6–7)

These are constitutive of being a woman and a man: what makes calling S a woman apt, is that S is oppressed on sex-marked grounds; what makes calling S a man apt, is that S is privileged on sex-marked grounds.

Haslanger’s ameliorative analysis is counterintuitive in that females who are not sex-marked for oppression, do not count as women. At least arguably, the Queen of England is not oppressed on sex-marked grounds and so, would not count as a woman on Haslanger’s definition. And, similarly, all males who are not privileged would not count as men. This might suggest that Haslanger’s analysis should be rejected in that it does not capture what language users have in mind when applying gender terms. However, Haslanger argues that this is not a reason to reject the definitions, which she takes to be revisionary: they are not meant to capture our intuitive gender terms. In response, Mikkola (2009) has argued that revisionary analyses of gender concepts, like Haslanger’s, are both politically unhelpful and philosophically unnecessary.

Note also that Haslanger’s proposal is eliminativist: gender justice would eradicate gender, since it would abolish those sexist social structures responsible for sex-marked oppression and privilege. If sexist oppression were to cease, women and men would no longer exist (although there would still be males and females). Not all feminists endorse such an eliminativist view though. Stone holds that Haslanger does not leave any room for positively revaluing what it is to be a woman: since Haslanger defines woman in terms of subordination,

any woman who challenges her subordinate status must by definition be challenging her status as a woman, even if she does not intend to … positive change to our gender norms would involve getting rid of the (necessarily subordinate) feminine gender. (Stone 2007, 160)

But according to Stone this is not only undesirable – one should be able to challenge subordination without having to challenge one’s status as a woman. It is also false: “because norms of femininity can be and constantly are being revised, women can be women without thereby being subordinate” (Stone 2007, 162; Mikkola [2016] too argues that Haslanger’s eliminativism is troublesome).

Theodore Bach holds that Haslanger’s eliminativism is undesirable on other grounds, and that Haslanger’s position faces another more serious problem. Feminism faces the following worries (among others):

Representation problem : “if there is no real group of ‘women’, then it is incoherent to make moral claims and advance political policies on behalf of women” (Bach 2012, 234). Commonality problems : (1) There is no feature that all women cross-culturally and transhistorically share. (2) Delimiting women’s social kind with the help of some essential property privileges those who possess it, and marginalizes those who do not (Bach 2012, 235).

According to Bach, Haslanger’s strategy to resolve these problems appeals to ‘social objectivism’. First, we define women “according to a suitably abstract relational property” (Bach 2012, 236), which avoids the commonality problems. Second, Haslanger employs “an ontologically thin notion of ‘objectivity’” (Bach 2012, 236) that answers the representation problem. Haslanger’s solution (Bach holds) is specifically to argue that women make up an objective type because women are objectively similar to one another, and not simply classified together given our background conceptual schemes. Bach claims though that Haslanger’s account is not objective enough, and we should on political grounds “provide a stronger ontological characterization of the genders men and women according to which they are natural kinds with explanatory essences” (Bach 2012, 238). He thus proposes that women make up a natural kind with a historical essence:

The essential property of women, in virtue of which an individual is a member of the kind ‘women,’ is participation in a lineage of women. In order to exemplify this relational property, an individual must be a reproduction of ancestral women, in which case she must have undergone the ontogenetic processes through which a historical gender system replicates women. (Bach 2012, 271)

In short, one is not a woman due to shared surface properties with other women (like occupying a subordinate social position). Rather, one is a woman because one has the right history: one has undergone the ubiquitous ontogenetic process of gender socialization. Thinking about gender in this way supposedly provides a stronger kind unity than Haslanger’s that simply appeals to shared surface properties.

Not everyone agrees; Mikkola (2020) argues that Bach’s metaphysical picture has internal tensions that render it puzzling and that Bach’s metaphysics does not provide good responses to the commonality and presentation problems. The historically essentialist view also has anti-trans implications. After all, trans women who have not undergone female gender socialization won’t count as women on his view (Mikkola [2016, 2020] develops this line of critique in more detail). More worryingly, trans women will count as men contrary to their self-identification. Both Bettcher (2013) and Jenkins (2016) consider the importance of gender self-identification. Bettcher argues that there is more than one ‘correct’ way to understand womanhood: at the very least, the dominant (mainstream), and the resistant (trans) conceptions. Dominant views like that of Bach’s tend to erase trans people’s experiences and to marginalize trans women within feminist movements. Rather than trans women having to defend their self-identifying claims, these claims should be taken at face value right from the start. And so, Bettcher holds, “in analyzing the meaning of terms such as ‘woman,’ it is inappropriate to dismiss alternative ways in which those terms are actually used in trans subcultures; such usage needs to be taken into consideration as part of the analysis” (2013, 235).

Specifically with Haslanger in mind and in a similar vein, Jenkins (2016) discusses how Haslanger’s revisionary approach unduly excludes some trans women from women’s social kind. On Jenkins’s view, Haslanger’s ameliorative methodology in fact yields more than one satisfying target concept: one that “corresponds to Haslanger’s proposed concept and captures the sense of gender as an imposed social class”; another that “captures the sense of gender as a lived identity” (Jenkins 2016, 397). The latter of these allows us to include trans women into women’s social kind, who on Haslanger’s social class approach to gender would inappropriately have been excluded. (See Andler 2017 for the view that Jenkins’s purportedly inclusive conception of gender is still not fully inclusive. Jenkins 2018 responds to this charge and develops the notion of gender identity still further.)

In addition to her revisionary argument, Haslanger has suggested that her ameliorative analysis of woman may not be as revisionary as it first seems (2005, 2006). Although successful in their reference fixing, ordinary language users do not always know precisely what they are talking about. Our language use may be skewed by oppressive ideologies that can “mislead us about the content of our own thoughts” (Haslanger 2005, 12). Although her gender terminology is not intuitive, this could simply be because oppressive ideologies mislead us about the meanings of our gender terms. Our everyday gender terminology might mean something utterly different from what we think it means; and we could be entirely ignorant of this. Perhaps Haslanger’s analysis, then, has captured our everyday gender vocabulary revealing to us the terms that we actually employ: we may be applying ‘woman’ in our everyday language on the basis of sex-marked subordination whether we take ourselves to be doing so or not. If this is so, Haslanger’s gender terminology is not radically revisionist.

Saul (2006) argues that, despite it being possible that we unknowingly apply ‘woman’ on the basis of social subordination, it is extremely difficult to show that this is the case. This would require showing that the gender terminology we in fact employ is Haslanger’s proposed gender terminology. But discovering the grounds on which we apply everyday gender terms is extremely difficult precisely because they are applied in various and idiosyncratic ways (Saul 2006, 129). Haslanger, then, needs to do more in order to show that her analysis is non-revisionary.

Charlotte Witt (2011a; 2011b) argues for a particular sort of gender essentialism, which Witt terms ‘uniessentialism’. Her motivation and starting point is the following: many ordinary social agents report gender being essential to them and claim that they would be a different person were they of a different sex/gender. Uniessentialism attempts to understand and articulate this. However, Witt’s work departs in important respects from the earlier (so-called) essentialist or gender realist positions discussed in Section 2: Witt does not posit some essential property of womanhood of the kind discussed above, which failed to take women’s differences into account. Further, uniessentialism differs significantly from those position developed in response to the problem of how we should conceive of women’s social kind. It is not about solving the standard dispute between gender nominalists and gender realists, or about articulating some supposedly shared property that binds women together and provides a theoretical ground for feminist political solidarity. Rather, uniessentialism aims to make good the widely held belief that gender is constitutive of who we are. [ 9 ]

Uniessentialism is a sort of individual essentialism. Traditionally philosophers distinguish between kind and individual essentialisms: the former examines what binds members of a kind together and what do all members of some kind have in common qua members of that kind. The latter asks: what makes an individual the individual it is. We can further distinguish two sorts of individual essentialisms: Kripkean identity essentialism and Aristotelian uniessentialism. The former asks: what makes an individual that individual? The latter, however, asks a slightly different question: what explains the unity of individuals? What explains that an individual entity exists over and above the sum total of its constituent parts? (The standard feminist debate over gender nominalism and gender realism has largely been about kind essentialism. Being about individual essentialism, Witt’s uniessentialism departs in an important way from the standard debate.) From the two individual essentialisms, Witt endorses the Aristotelian one. On this view, certain functional essences have a unifying role: these essences are responsible for the fact that material parts constitute a new individual, rather than just a lump of stuff or a collection of particles. Witt’s example is of a house: the essential house-functional property (what the entity is for, what its purpose is) unifies the different material parts of a house so that there is a house, and not just a collection of house-constituting particles (2011a, 6). Gender (being a woman/a man) functions in a similar fashion and provides “the principle of normative unity” that organizes, unifies and determines the roles of social individuals (Witt 2011a, 73). Due to this, gender is a uniessential property of social individuals.

It is important to clarify the notions of gender and social individuality that Witt employs. First, gender is a social position that “cluster[s] around the engendering function … women conceive and bear … men beget” (Witt 2011a, 40). These are women and men’s socially mediated reproductive functions (Witt 2011a, 29) and they differ from the biological function of reproduction, which roughly corresponds to sex on the standard sex/gender distinction. Witt writes: “to be a woman is to be recognized to have a particular function in engendering, to be a man is to be recognized to have a different function in engendering” (2011a, 39). Second, Witt distinguishes persons (those who possess self-consciousness), human beings (those who are biologically human) and social individuals (those who occupy social positions synchronically and diachronically). These ontological categories are not equivalent in that they possess different persistence and identity conditions. Social individuals are bound by social normativity, human beings by biological normativity. These normativities differ in two respects: first, social norms differ from one culture to the next whereas biological norms do not; second, unlike biological normativity, social normativity requires “the recognition by others that an agent is both responsive to and evaluable under a social norm” (Witt 2011a, 19). Thus, being a social individual is not equivalent to being a human being. Further, Witt takes personhood to be defined in terms of intrinsic psychological states of self-awareness and self-consciousness. However, social individuality is defined in terms of the extrinsic feature of occupying a social position, which depends for its existence on a social world. So, the two are not equivalent: personhood is essentially about intrinsic features and could exist without a social world, whereas social individuality is essentially about extrinsic features that could not exist without a social world.

Witt’s gender essentialist argument crucially pertains to social individuals , not to persons or human beings: saying that persons or human beings are gendered would be a category mistake. But why is gender essential to social individuals? For Witt, social individuals are those who occupy positions in social reality. Further, “social positions have norms or social roles associated with them; a social role is what an individual who occupies a given social position is responsive to and evaluable under” (Witt 2011a, 59). However, qua social individuals, we occupy multiple social positions at once and over time: we can be women, mothers, immigrants, sisters, academics, wives, community organisers and team-sport coaches synchronically and diachronically. Now, the issue for Witt is what unifies these positions so that a social individual is constituted. After all, a bundle of social position occupancies does not make for an individual (just as a bundle of properties like being white , cube-shaped and sweet do not make for a sugar cube). For Witt, this unifying role is undertaken by gender (being a woman or a man): it is

a pervasive and fundamental social position that unifies and determines all other social positions both synchronically and diachronically. It unifies them not physically, but by providing a principle of normative unity. (2011a, 19–20)

By ‘normative unity’, Witt means the following: given our social roles and social position occupancies, we are responsive to various sets of social norms. These norms are “complex patterns of behaviour and practices that constitute what one ought to do in a situation given one’s social position(s) and one’s social context” (Witt 2011a, 82). The sets of norms can conflict: the norms of motherhood can (and do) conflict with the norms of being an academic philosopher. However, in order for this conflict to exist, the norms must be binding on a single social individual. Witt, then, asks: what explains the existence and unity of the social individual who is subject to conflicting social norms? The answer is gender.

Gender is not just a social role that unifies social individuals. Witt takes it to be the social role — as she puts it, it is the mega social role that unifies social agents. First, gender is a mega social role if it satisfies two conditions (and Witt claims that it does): (1) if it provides the principle of synchronic and diachronic unity of social individuals, and (2) if it inflects and defines a broad range of other social roles. Gender satisfies the first in usually being a life-long social position: a social individual persists just as long as their gendered social position persists. Further, Witt maintains, trans people are not counterexamples to this claim: transitioning entails that the old social individual has ceased to exist and a new one has come into being. And this is consistent with the same person persisting and undergoing social individual change via transitioning. Gender satisfies the second condition too. It inflects other social roles, like being a parent or a professional. The expectations attached to these social roles differ depending on the agent’s gender, since gender imposes different social norms to govern the execution of the further social roles. Now, gender — as opposed to some other social category, like race — is not just a mega social role; it is the unifying mega social role. Cross-cultural and trans-historical considerations support this view. Witt claims that patriarchy is a social universal (2011a, 98). By contrast, racial categorisation varies historically and cross-culturally, and racial oppression is not a universal feature of human cultures. Thus, gender has a better claim to being the social role that is uniessential to social individuals. This account of gender essentialism not only explains social agents’ connectedness to their gender, but it also provides a helpful way to conceive of women’s agency — something that is central to feminist politics.

Linda Alcoff holds that feminism faces an identity crisis: the category of women is feminism’s starting point, but various critiques about gender have fragmented the category and it is not clear how feminists should understand what it is to be a woman (2006, chapter 5). In response, Alcoff develops an account of gender as positionality whereby “gender is, among other things, a position one occupies and from which one can act politically” (2006, 148). In particular, she takes one’s social position to foster the development of specifically gendered identities (or self-conceptions): “The very subjectivity (or subjective experience of being a woman) and the very identity of women are constituted by women’s position” (Alcoff 2006, 148). Alcoff holds that there is an objective basis for distinguishing individuals on the grounds of (actual or expected) reproductive roles:

Women and men are differentiated by virtue of their different relationship of possibility to biological reproduction, with biological reproduction referring to conceiving, giving birth, and breast-feeding, involving one’s body . (Alcoff 2006, 172, italics in original)

The thought is that those standardly classified as biologically female, although they may not actually be able to reproduce, will encounter “a different set of practices, expectations, and feelings in regard to reproduction” than those standardly classified as male (Alcoff 2006, 172). Further, this differential relation to the possibility of reproduction is used as the basis for many cultural and social phenomena that position women and men: it can be

the basis of a variety of social segregations, it can engender the development of differential forms of embodiment experienced throughout life, and it can generate a wide variety of affective responses, from pride, delight, shame, guilt, regret, or great relief from having successfully avoided reproduction. (Alcoff 2006, 172)

Reproduction, then, is an objective basis for distinguishing individuals that takes on a cultural dimension in that it positions women and men differently: depending on the kind of body one has, one’s lived experience will differ. And this fosters the construction of gendered social identities: one’s role in reproduction helps configure how one is socially positioned and this conditions the development of specifically gendered social identities.

Since women are socially positioned in various different contexts, “there is no gender essence all women share” (Alcoff 2006, 147–8). Nonetheless, Alcoff acknowledges that her account is akin to the original 1960s sex/gender distinction insofar as sex difference (understood in terms of the objective division of reproductive labour) provides the foundation for certain cultural arrangements (the development of a gendered social identity). But, with the benefit of hindsight

we can see that maintaining a distinction between the objective category of sexed identity and the varied and culturally contingent practices of gender does not presume an absolute distinction of the old-fashioned sort between culture and a reified nature. (Alcoff 2006, 175)

That is, her view avoids the implausible claim that sex is exclusively to do with nature and gender with culture. Rather, the distinction on the basis of reproductive possibilities shapes and is shaped by the sorts of cultural and social phenomena (like varieties of social segregation) these possibilities gives rise to. For instance, technological interventions can alter sex differences illustrating that this is the case (Alcoff 2006, 175). Women’s specifically gendered social identities that are constituted by their context dependent positions, then, provide the starting point for feminist politics.

Recently Robin Dembroff (2020) has argued that existing metaphysical accounts of gender fail to address non-binary gender identities. This generates two concerns. First, metaphysical accounts of gender (like the ones outlined in previous sections) are insufficient for capturing those who reject binary gender categorisation where people are either men or women. In so doing, these accounts are not satisfying as explanations of gender understood in a more expansive sense that goes beyond the binary. Second, the failure to understand non-binary gender identities contributes to a form of epistemic injustice called ‘hermeneutical injustice’: it feeds into a collective failure to comprehend and analyse concepts and practices that undergird non-binary classification schemes, thereby impeding on one’s ability to fully understand themselves. To overcome these problems, Dembroff suggests an account of genderqueer that they call ‘critical gender kind’:

a kind whose members collectively destabilize one or more elements of dominant gender ideology. Genderqueer, on my proposed model, is a category whose members collectively destabilize the binary axis, or the idea that the only possible genders are the exclusive and exhaustive kinds men and women. (2020, 2)

Note that Dembroff’s position is not to be confused with ‘gender critical feminist’ positions like those noted above, which are critical of the prevalent feminist focus on gender, as opposed to sex, kinds. Dembroff understands genderqueer as a gender kind, but one that is critical of dominant binary understandings of gender.

Dembroff identifies two modes of destabilising the gender binary: principled and existential. Principled destabilising “stems from or otherwise expresses individuals’ social or political commitments regarding gender norms, practices, and structures”, while existential destabilising “stems from or otherwise expresses individuals’ felt or desired gender roles, embodiment, and/or categorization” (2020, 13). These modes are not mutually exclusive, and they can help us understand the difference between allies and members of genderqueer kinds: “While both resist dominant gender ideology, members of [genderqueer] kinds resist (at least in part) due to felt or desired gender categorization that deviates from dominant expectations, norms, and assumptions” (2020, 14). These modes of destabilisation also enable us to formulate an understanding of non-critical gender kinds that binary understandings of women and men’s kinds exemplify. Dembroff defines these kinds as follows:

For a given kind X , X is a non-critical gender kind relative to a given society iff X ’s members collectively restabilize one or more elements of the dominant gender ideology in that society. (2020, 14)

Dembroff’s understanding of critical and non-critical gender kinds importantly makes gender kind membership something more and other than a mere psychological phenomenon. To engage in collectively destabilising or restabilising dominant gender normativity and ideology, we need more than mere attitudes or mental states – resisting or maintaining such normativity requires action as well. In so doing, Dembroff puts their position forward as an alternative to two existing internalist positions about gender. First, to Jennifer McKitrick’s (2015) view whereby gender is dispositional: in a context where someone is disposed to behave in ways that would be taken by others to be indicative of (e.g.) womanhood, the person has a woman’s gender identity. Second, to Jenkin’s (2016, 2018) position that takes an individual’s gender identity to be dependent on which gender-specific norms the person experiences as being relevant to them. On this view, someone is a woman if the person experiences norms associated with women to be relevant to the person in the particular social context that they are in. Neither of these positions well-captures non-binary identities, Dembroff argues, which motivates the account of genderqueer identities as critical gender kinds.

As Dembroff acknowledges, substantive philosophical work on non-binary gender identities is still developing. However, it is important to note that analytic philosophers are beginning to engage in gender metaphysics that goes beyond the binary.

This entry first looked at feminist objections to biological determinism and the claim that gender is socially constructed. Next, it examined feminist critiques of prevalent understandings of gender and sex, and the distinction itself. In response to these concerns, the entry looked at how a unified women’s category could be articulated for feminist political purposes. This illustrated that gender metaphysics — or what it is to be a woman or a man or a genderqueer person — is still very much a live issue. And although contemporary feminist philosophical debates have questioned some of the tenets and details of the original 1960s sex/gender distinction, most still hold onto the view that gender is about social factors and that it is (in some sense) distinct from biological sex. The jury is still out on what the best, the most useful, or (even) the correct definition of gender is.

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Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Philosophy of sexuality.

Among the many topics explored by the philosophy of sexuality are procreation, contraception, celibacy, marriage, adultery, casual sex, flirting, prostitution, homosexuality, masturbation, seduction, rape, sexual harassment, sadomasochism, pornography, bestiality, and pedophilia. What do all these things have in common? All are related in various ways to the vast domain of human sexuality. That is, they are related, on the one hand, to the human desires and activities that involve the search for and attainment of sexual pleasure or satisfaction and, on the other hand, to the human desires and activities that involve the creation of new human beings. For it is a natural feature of human beings that certain sorts of behaviors and certain bodily organs are and can be employed either for pleasure or for reproduction, or for both.

The philosophy of sexuality explores these topics both conceptually and normatively. Conceptual analysis is carried out in the philosophy of sexuality in order to clarify the fundamental notions of sexual desire and sexual activity. Conceptual analysis is also carried out in attempting to arrive at satisfactory definitions of adultery, prostitution, rape, pornography, and so forth. Conceptual analysis (for example: what are the distinctive features of a desire that make it sexual desire instead of something else? In what ways does seduction differ from nonviolent rape?) is often difficult and seemingly picky, but proves rewarding in unanticipated and surprising ways.

Normative philosophy of sexuality inquires about the value of sexual activity and sexual pleasure and of the various forms they take. Thus the philosophy of sexuality is concerned with the perennial questions of sexual morality and constitutes a large branch of applied ethics . Normative philosophy of sexuality investigates what contribution is made to the good or virtuous life by sexuality, and tries to determine what moral obligations we have to refrain from performing certain sexual acts and what moral permissions we have to engage in others.

Some philosophers of sexuality carry out conceptual analysis and the study of sexual ethics separately. They believe that it is one thing to define a sexual phenomenon (such as rape or adultery) and quite another thing to evaluate it. Other philosophers of sexuality believe that a robust distinction between defining a sexual phenomenon and arriving at moral evaluations of it cannot be made, that analyses of sexual concepts and moral evaluations of sexual acts influence each other. Whether there actually is a tidy distinction between values and morals, on the one hand, and natural, social, or conceptual facts , on the other hand, is one of those fascinating, endlessly debated issues in philosophy, and is not limited to the philosophy of sexuality.

Table of Contents

• Metaphysics of Sexuality
• Metaphysical Sexual Pessimism
• Metaphysical Sexual Optimism
• Moral Evaluations
• Nonmoral Evaluations
• The Dangers of Sex
• Sexual Perversion
• Sexual Perversion and Morality
• Aquinas’s Natural Law
• Nagel’s Secular Philosophy
• Female Sexuality and Natural Law
• Debates in Sexual Ethics
• Natural Law vs. Liberal Ethics
• Consent Is Not Sufficient
• Consent Is Sufficient
• What Is “Voluntary”?
• Conceptual Analysis
• Sexual Activity vs. “Having Sex”
• Sexual Activity Without Pleasure
• References and Further Reading

1. Metaphysics of Sexuality

Our moral evaluations of sexual activity are bound to be affected by what we view the nature of the sexual impulse, or of sexual desire, to be in human beings. In this regard there is a deep divide between those philosophers that we might call the metaphysical sexual optimists and those we might call the metaphysical sexual pessimists.

The pessimists in the philosophy of sexuality, such as St. Augustine , Immanuel Kant, and, sometimes, Sigmund Freud , perceive the sexual impulse and acting on it to be something nearly always, if not necessarily, unbefitting the dignity of the human person; they see the essence and the results of the drive to be incompatible with more significant and lofty goals and aspirations of human existence; they fear that the power and demands of the sexual impulse make it a danger to harmonious civilized life; and they find in sexuality a severe threat not only to our proper relations with, and our moral treatment of, other persons, but also equally a threat to our own humanity.

On the other side of the divide are the metaphysical sexual optimists (Plato, in some of his works, sometimes Sigmund Freud, Bertrand Russell, and many contemporary philosophers) who perceive nothing especially obnoxious in the sexual impulse. They view human sexuality as just another and mostly innocuous dimension of our existence as embodied or animal-like creatures; they judge that sexuality, which in some measure has been given to us by evolution, cannot but be conducive to our well-being without detracting from our intellectual propensities; and they praise rather than fear the power of an impulse that can lift us to various high forms of happiness.

The particular sort of metaphysics of sex one believes will influence one’s subsequent judgments about the value and role of sexuality in the good or virtuous life and about what sexual activities are morally wrong and which ones are morally permissible. Let’s explore some of these implications.

2. Metaphysical Sexual Pessimism

An extended version of metaphysical pessimism might make the following claims: In virtue of the nature of sexual desire, a person who sexually desires another person objectifies that other person, both before and during sexual activity. Sex, says Kant, “makes of the loved person an Object of appetite. . . . Taken by itself it is a degradation of human nature” ( Lectures on Ethics , p. 163). Certain types of manipulation and deception seem required prior to engaging in sex with another person, or are so common as to appear part of the nature of the sexual experience. As Bernard Baumrim makes the point, “sexual interaction is essentially manipulative—physically, psychologically, emotionally, and even intellectually” (“Sexual Immorality Delineated,” p. 300). We go out of our way, for example, to make ourselves look more attractive and desirable to the other person than we really are, and we go to great lengths to conceal our defects. And when one person sexually desires another, the other person’s body, his or her lips, thighs, toes, and buttocks are desired as the arousing parts they are, distinct from the person. The other’s genitals, too, are the object of our attention: “sexuality is not an inclination which one human being has for another as such, but is an inclination for the sex of another. . . . [O]nly her sex is the object of his desires” (Kant, Lectures , p. 164).

Further, the sexual act itself is peculiar, with its uncontrollable arousal, involuntary jerkings, and its yearning to master and consume the other person’s body. During the act, a person both loses control of himself and loses regard for the humanity of the other. Our sexuality is a threat to the other’s personhood; but the one who is in the grip of desire is also on the verge of losing his or her personhood. The one who desires depends on the whims of another person to gain satisfaction, and becomes as a result a jellyfish, susceptible to the demands and manipulations of the other: “In desire you are compromised in the eyes of the object of desire, since you have displayed that you have designs which are vulnerable to his intentions” (Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire , p. 82). A person who proposes an irresistible sexual offer to another person may be exploiting someone made weak by sexual desire (see Virginia Held, “Coercion and Coercive Offers,” p. 58).

Moreover, a person who gives in to another’s sexual desire makes a tool of himself or herself. “For the natural use that one sex makes of the other’s sexual organs is enjoyment , for which one gives oneself up to the other. In this act a human being makes himself into a thing, which conflicts with the right of humanity in his own person” (Kant, Metaphysics of Morals , p. 62). Those engaged in sexual activity make themselves willingly into objects for each other merely for the sake of sexual pleasure. Hence both persons are reduced to the animal level. “If . . . a man wishes to satisfy his desire, and a woman hers, they stimulate each other’s desire; their inclinations meet, but their object is not human nature but sex, and each of them dishonours the human nature of the other. They make of humanity an instrument for the satisfaction of their lusts and inclinations, and dishonour it by placing it on a level with animal nature” (Kant, Lectures , p. 164).

Finally, due to the insistent nature of the sexual impulse, once things get going it is often hard to stop them in their tracks, and as a result we often end up doing things sexually that we had never planned or wanted to do. Sexual desire is also powerfully inelastic, one of the passions most likely to challenge reason, compelling us to seek satisfaction even when doing so involves dark-alley gropings, microbiologically filthy acts, slinking around the White House, or getting married impetuously.

Given such a pessimistic metaphysics of human sexuality, one might well conclude that acting on the sexual impulse is always morally wrong. That might, indeed, be precisely the right conclusion to draw, even if it implies the end of Homo sapiens . (This doomsday result is also implied by St. Paul’s praising, in 1 Corinthians 7, sexual celibacy as the ideal spiritual state.) More frequently, however, the pessimistic metaphysicians of sexuality conclude that sexual activity is morally permissible only within marriage (of the lifelong, monogamous, heterosexual sort) and only for the purpose of procreation. Regarding the bodily activities that both lead to procreation and produce sexual pleasure, it is their procreative potential that is singularly significant and bestows value on these activities; seeking pleasure is an impediment to morally virtuous sexuality, and is something that should not be undertaken deliberately or for its own sake. Sexual pleasure at most has instrumental value, in inducing us to engage in an act that has procreation as its primary purpose. Such views are common among Christian thinkers, for example, St. Augustine: “A man turns to good use the evil of concupiscence, and is not overcome by it, when he bridles and restrains its rage . . . and never relaxes his hold upon it except when intent on offspring, and then controls and applies it to the carnal generation of children . . . , not to the subjection of the spirit to the flesh in a sordid servitude” ( On Marriage and Concupiscence , bk. 1, ch. 9).

3. Metaphysical Sexual Optimism

Metaphysical sexual optimists suppose that sexuality is a bonding mechanism that naturally and happily joins people together both sexually and nonsexually. Sexual activity involves pleasing the self and the other at the same time, and these exchanges of pleasure generate both gratitude and affection, which in turn are bound to deepen human relationships and make them more emotionally substantial. Further, and this is the most important point, sexual pleasure is, for a metaphysical optimist, a valuable thing in its own right, something to be cherished and promoted because it has intrinsic and not merely instrumental value. Hence the pursuit of sexual pleasure does not require much intricate justification; sexual activity surely need not be confined to marriage or directed at procreation. The good and virtuous life, while including much else, can also include a wide variety and extent of sexual relations. (See Russell Vannoy’s spirited defense of the value of sexual activity for its own sake, in Sex Without Love .)

Irving Singer is a contemporary philosopher of sexuality who expresses well one form of metaphysical optimism: “For though sexual interest resembles an appetite in some respects, it differs from hunger or thirst in being an interpersonal sensitivity, one that enables us to delight in the mind and character of other persons as well as in their flesh. Though at times people may be used as sexual objects and cast aside once their utility has been exhausted, this is no[t] . . . definitive of sexual desire. . . . By awakening us to the living presence of someone else, sexuality can enable us to treat this other being as just the person he or she happens to be. . . . There is nothing in the nature of sexuality as such that necessarily . . . reduces persons to things. On the contrary, sex may be seen as an instinctual agency by which persons respond to one another through their bodies” ( The Nature of Love , vol. 2, p. 382. See also Jean Hampton, “Defining Wrong and Defining Rape”).

Pausanias, in Plato’s Symposium (181a-3, 183e, 184d), asserts that sexuality in itself is neither good nor bad. He recognizes, as a result, that there can be morally bad and morally good sexual activity, and proposes a corresponding distinction between what he calls “vulgar” eros and “heavenly” eros. A person who has vulgar eros is one who experiences promiscuous sexual desire, has a lust that can be satisfied by any partner, and selfishly seeks only for himself or herself the pleasures of sexual activity. By contrast, a person who has heavenly eros experiences a sexual desire that attaches to a particular person; he or she is as much interested in the other person’s personality and well-being as he or she is concerned to have physical contact with and sexual satisfaction by means of the other person. A similar distinction between sexuality per se and eros is described by C. S. Lewis in his The Four Loves (chapter 5), and it is perhaps what Allan Bloom has in mind when he writes, “Animals have sex and human beings have eros, and no accurate science [or philosophy] is possible without making this distinction” ( Love and Friendship , p. 19).

The divide between metaphysical optimists and metaphysical pessimists might, then, be put this way: metaphysical pessimists think that sexuality, unless it is rigorously constrained by social norms that have become internalized, will tend to be governed by vulgar eros, while metaphysical optimists think that sexuality, by itself, does not lead to or become vulgar, that by its nature it can easily be and often is heavenly. (See the entry, Philosophy of Love. )

4. Moral Evaluations

Of course, we can and often do evaluate sexual activity morally : we inquire whether a sexual act—either a particular occurrence of a sexual act (the act we are doing or want to do right now) or a type of sexual act (say, all instances of homosexual fellatio)—is morally good or morally bad. More specifically, we evaluate, or judge, sexual acts to be morally obligatory, morally permissible, morally supererogatory, or morally wrong. For example: a spouse might have a moral obligation to engage in sex with the other spouse; it might be morally permissible for married couples to employ contraception while engaging in coitus; one person’s agreeing to have sexual relations with another person when the former has no sexual desire of his or her own but does want to please the latter might be an act of supererogation ; and rape and incest are commonly thought to be morally wrong .

Note that if a specific type of sexual act is morally wrong (say, homosexual fellatio), then every instance of that type of act will be morally wrong. However, from the fact that the particular sexual act we are now doing or contemplate doing is morally wrong, it does not follow that any specific type of act is morally wrong; the sexual act that we are contemplating might be wrong for lots of different reasons having nothing to do with the type of sexual act that it is. For example, suppose we are engaging in heterosexual coitus (or anything else), and that this particular act is wrong because it is adulterous. The wrongfulness of our sexual activity does not imply that heterosexual coitus in general (or anything else), as a type of sexual act, is morally wrong. In some cases, of course, a particular sexual act will be wrong for several reasons: not only is it wrong because it is of a specific type (say, it is an instance of homosexual fellatio), but it is also wrong because at least one of the participants is married to someone else (it is wrong also because it is adulterous).

5. Nonmoral Evaluations

We can also evaluate sexual activity (again, either a particular occurrence of a sexual act or a specific type of sexual activity) nonmorally : nonmorally “good” sex is sexual activity that provides pleasure to the participants or is physically or emotionally satisfying, while nonmorally “bad” sex is unexciting, tedious, boring, unenjoyable, or even unpleasant. An analogy will clarify the difference between morally evaluating something as good or bad and nonmorally evaluating it as good or bad. This radio on my desk is a good radio, in the nonmoral sense, because it does for me what I expect from a radio: it consistently provides clear tones. If, instead, the radio hissed and cackled most of the time, it would be a bad radio, nonmorally-speaking, and it would be senseless for me to blame the radio for its faults and threaten it with a trip to hell if it did not improve its behavior. Similarly, sexual activity can be nonmorally good if it provides for us what we expect sexual activity to provide, which is usually sexual pleasure, and this fact has no necessary moral implications..

It is not difficult to see that the fact that a sexual activity is perfectly nonmorally good, by abundantly satisfying both persons, does not mean by itself that the act is morally good: some adulterous sexual activity might well be very pleasing to the participants, yet be morally wrong. Further, the fact that a sexual activity is nonmorally bad, that is, does not produce pleasure for the persons engaged in it, does not by itself mean that the act is morally bad. Unpleasant sexual activity might occur between persons who have little experience engaging in sexual activity (they do not yet know how to do sexual things, or have not yet learned what their likes and dislikes are), but their failure to provide pleasure for each other does not mean by itself that they perform morally wrongful acts.

Thus the moral evaluation of sexual activity is a distinct enterprise from the nonmoral evaluation of sexual activity, even if there do remain important connections between them. For example, the fact that a sexual act provides pleasure to both participants, and is thereby nonmorally good, might be taken as a strong, but only prima facie good, reason for thinking that the act is morally good or at least has some degree of moral value. Indeed, utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and even John Stuart Mill might claim that, in general, the nonmoral goodness of sexual activity goes a long way toward justifying it. Another example: if one person never attempts to provide sexual pleasure to his or her partner, but selfishly insists on experiencing only his or her own pleasure, then that person’s contribution to their sexual activity is morally suspicious or objectionable. But that judgment rests not simply on the fact that he or she did not provide pleasure for the other person, that is, on the fact that the sexual activity was for the other person nonmorally bad. The moral judgment rests, more precisely, on his or her motives for not providing any pleasure, for not making the experience nonmorally good for the other person.

It is one thing to point out that as evaluative categories, moral goodness/badness is quite distinct from nonmoral goodness/badness. It is another thing to wonder, nonetheless, about the emotional or psychological connections between the moral quality of sexual activity and its nonmoral quality. Perhaps morally good sexual activity tends also to be the most satisfying sexual activity, in the nonmoral sense. Whether that is true likely depends on what we mean by “morally good” sexuality and on certain features of human moral psychology. What would our lives be like, if there were always a neat correspondence between the moral quality of a sexual act and its nonmoral quality? I am not sure what such a human sexual world would be like. But examples that violate such a neat correspondence are at the present time, in this world, easy to come by. A sexual act might be both morally and nonmorally good: consider the exciting and joyful sexual activity of a newly-married couple. But a sexual act might be morally good and nonmorally bad: consider the routine sexual acts of this couple after they have been married for ten years. A sexual act might be morally bad yet nonmorally good: one spouse in that couple, married for ten years, commits adultery with another married person and finds their sexual activity to be extraordinarily satisfying. And, finally, a sexual act might be both morally and nonmorally bad: the adulterous couple get tired of each other, eventually no longer experiencing the excitement they once knew. A world in which there was little or no discrepancy between the moral and the nonmoral quality of sexual activity might be a better world than ours, or it might be worse. I would refrain from making such a judgment unless I were pretty sure what the moral goodness and badness of sexual activity amounted to in the first place, and until I knew a lot more about human psychology. Sometimes that a sexual activity is acknowledged to be morally wrong contributes all by itself to its being nonmorally good.

6. The Dangers of Sex

Whether a particular sexual act or a specific type of sexual act provides sexual pleasure is not the only factor in judging its nonmoral quality: pragmatic and prudential considerations also figure into whether a sexual act, all things considered, has a preponderance of nonmoral goodness. Many sexual activities can be physically or psychologically risky, dangerous, or harmful. Anal coitus, for example, whether carried out by a heterosexual couple or by two gay males, can damage delicate tissues and is a mechanism for the potential transmission of various HIV viruses (as is heterosexual genital intercourse). Thus in evaluating whether a sexual act will be overall nonmorally good or bad, not only its anticipated pleasure or satisfaction must be counted, but also all sorts of negative (undesired) side effects: whether the sexual act is likely to damage the body, as in some sadomasochistic acts, or transmit any one of a number of venereal diseases, or result in an unwanted pregnancy, or even whether one might feel regret, anger, or guilt afterwards as a result of having engaged in a sexual act with this person, or in this location, or under these conditions, or of a specific type. Indeed, all these pragmatic and prudential factors also figure into the moral evaluation of sexual activity: intentionally causing unwanted pain or discomfort to one’s partner, or not taking adequate precautions against the possibility of pregnancy, or not informing one’s partner of a suspected case of genital infection (but see David Mayo’s provocative dissent, in “An Obligation to Warn of HIV Infection?”), can be morally wrong. Thus, depending on what particular moral principles about sexuality one embraces, the various ingredients that constitute the nonmoral quality of sexual acts can influence one’s moral judgments.

7. Sexual Perversion

In addition to inquiring about the moral and nonmoral quality of a given sexual act or a type of sexual activity, we can also ask whether the act or type is natural or unnatural (that is, perverted). Natural sexual acts, to provide merely a broad definition, are those acts that either flow naturally from human sexual nature, or at least do not frustrate or counteract sexual tendencies that flow naturally from human sexual desire. An account of what is natural in human sexual desire and activity is part of a philosophical account of human nature in general, what we might call philosophical anthropology, which is a rather large undertaking.

Note that evaluating a particular sexual act or a specific type of sexual activity as being natural or unnatural can very well be distinct from evaluating the act or type either as being morally good or bad or as being nonmorally good or bad. Suppose we assume, for the sake of discussion only, that heterosexual coitus is a natural human sexual activity and that homosexual fellatio is unnatural, or a sexual perversion. Even so, it would not follow from these judgments alone that all heterosexual coitus is morally good (some of it might be adulterous, or rape) or that all homosexual fellatio is morally wrong (some of it, engaged in by consenting adults in the privacy of their homes, might be morally permissible). Further, from the fact that heterosexual coitus is natural, it does not follow that acts of heterosexual coitus will be nonmorally good, that is, pleasurable; nor does it follow from the fact that homosexual fellatio is perverted that it does not or cannot produce sexual pleasure for those people who engage in it. Of course, both natural and unnatural sexual acts can be medically or psychologically risky or dangerous. There is no reason to assume that natural sexual acts are in general more safe than unnatural sexual acts; for example, unprotected heterosexual intercourse is likely more dangerous, in several ways, than mutual homosexual masturbation.

Since there are no necessary connections between, on the one hand, evaluating a particular sexual act or a specific type of sexual activity as being natural or unnatural and, on the other hand, evaluating its moral and nonmoral quality, why would we wonder whether a sexual act or a type of sex was natural or perverted? One reason is simply that understanding what is natural and unnatural in human sexuality helps complete our picture of human nature in general, and allows us to understand our species more fully. With such deliberations, the self-reflection about humanity and the human condition that is the heart of philosophy becomes more complete. A second reason is that an account of the difference between the natural and the perverted in human sexuality might be useful for psychology, especially if we assume that a desire or tendency to engage in perverted sexual activities is a sign or symptom of an underlying mental or psychological pathology.

8. Sexual Perversion and Morality

Finally (a third reason), even though natural sexual activity is not on that score alone morally good and unnatural sexual activity is not necessarily morally wrong, it is still possible to argue that whether a particular sexual act or a specific type of sexuality is natural or unnatural does influence, to a greater or lesser extent, whether the act is morally good or morally bad. Just as whether a sexual act is nonmorally good, that is, produces pleasure for the participants, may be a factor, sometimes an important one, in our evaluating the act morally, whether a sexual act or type of sexual expression is natural or unnatural may also play a role, sometimes a large one, in deciding whether the act is morally good or bad.

A comparison between the sexual philosophy of the medieval Catholic theologian St. Thomas Aquinas and that of the contemporary secular philosophy Thomas Nagel is in this regard instructive. Both Aquinas and Nagel can be understood as assuming that what is unnatural in human sexuality is perverted, and that what is unnatural or perverted in human sexuality is simply that which does not conform with or is inconsistent with natural human sexuality. But beyond these general areas of agreement, there are deep differences between Aquinas and Nagel.

9. Aquinas’s Natural Law

Based upon a comparison of the sexuality of humans and the sexuality of lower animals (mammals, in particular), Aquinas concludes that what is natural in human sexuality is the impulse to engage in heterosexual coitus. Heterosexual coitus is the mechanism designed by the Christian God to insure the preservation of animal species, including humans, and hence engaging in this activity is the primary natural expression of human sexual nature. Further, this God designed each of the parts of the human body to carry out specific functions, and on Aquinas’s view God designed the male penis to implant sperm into the female’s vagina for the purpose of effecting procreation. It follows, for Aquinas, that depositing the sperm elsewhere than inside a human female’s vagina is unnatural: it is a violation of God’s design, contrary to the nature of things as established by God. For this reason alone, on Aquinas’s view, such activities are immoral, a grave offense to the sagacious plan of the Almighty.

Sexual intercourse with lower animals (bestiality), sexual activity with members of one’s own sex (homosexuality), and masturbation, for Aquinas, are unnatural sexual acts and are immoral exactly for that reason. If they are committed intentionally, according to one’s will, they deliberately disrupt the natural order of the world as created by God and which God commanded to be respected. (See Summa Theologiae , vol. 43, 2a2ae, qq. 153-154.) In none of these activities is there any possibility of procreation, and the sexual and other organs are used, or misused, for purposes other than that for which they were designed. Although Aquinas does not say so explicitly, but only hints in this direction, it follows from his philosophy of sexuality that fellatio, even when engaged in by heterosexuals, is also perverted and morally wrong. At least in those cases in which orgasm occurs by means of this act, the sperm is not being placed where it should be placed and procreation is therefore not possible. If the penis entering the vagina is the paradigmatic natural act, then any other combination of anatomical connections will be unnatural and hence immoral; for example, the penis, mouth, or fingers entering the anus. Note that Aquinas’s criterion of the natural, that the sexual act must be procreative in form, and hence must involve a penis inserted into a vagina, makes no mention of human psychology. Aquinas’s line of thought yields an anatomical criterion of natural and perverted sex that refers only to bodily organs and what they might accomplish physiologically and to where they are, or are not, put in relation to each other.

10. Nagel’s Secular Philosophy

Thomas Nagel denies Aquinas’s central presupposition, that in order to discover what is natural in human sexuality we should emphasize what humans and lower animals have in common. Applying this formula, Aquinas concluded that the purpose of sexual activity and the sexual organs in humans was procreation, as it is in the lower animals. Everything else in Aquinas’s sexual philosophy follows more-or-less logically from this. Nagel, by contrast, argues that to discover what is distinctive about the natural human sexuality, and hence derivatively what is unnatural or perverted, we should focus, instead, on what humans and lower animals do not have in common. We should emphasize the ways in which humans are different from animals, the ways in which humans and their sexuality are special. Thus Nagel argues that sexual perversion in humans should be understood as a psychological phenomenon rather than, as in Aquinas’s treatment, in anatomical and physiological terms. For it is human psychology that makes us quite different from other animals, and hence an account of natural human sexuality must acknowledge the uniqueness of human psychology.

Nagel proposes that sexual interactions in which each person responds with sexual arousal to noticing the sexual arousal of the other person exhibit the psychology that is natural to human sexuality. In such an encounter, each person becomes aware of himself or herself and the other person as both the subject and the object of their joint sexual experiences. Perverted sexual encounters or events would be those in which this mutual recognition of arousal is absent, and in which a person remains fully a subject of the sexual experience or fully an object. Perversion, then, is a departure from or a truncation of a psychologically “complete” pattern of arousal and consciousness. (See Nagel’s “Sexual Perversion,” pp. 15-17.) Nothing in Nagel’s psychological account of the natural and the perverted refers to bodily organs or physiological processes. That is, for a sexual encounter to be natural, it need not be procreative in form, as long as the requisite psychology of mutual recognition is present. Whether a sexual activity is natural or perverted does not depend, on Nagel’s view, on what organs are used or where they are put, but only on the character of the psychology of the sexual encounter. Thus Nagel disagrees with Aquinas that homosexual activities, as a specific type of sexual act, are unnatural or perverted, for homosexual fellatio and anal intercourse may very well be accompanied by the mutual recognition of and response to the other’s sexual arousal.

11. Fetishism

It is illuminating to compare what the views of Aquinas and Nagel imply about fetishism, that is, the usually male practice of masturbating while fondling women’s shoes or undergarments. Aquinas and Nagel agree that such activities are unnatural and perverted, but they disagree about the grounds of that evaluation. For Aquinas, masturbating while fondling shoes or undergarments is unnatural because the sperm is not deposited where it should be, and the act thereby has no procreative potential. For Nagel, masturbatory fetishism is perverted for a quite different reason: in this activity, there is no possibility of one persons’ noticing and being aroused by the arousal of another person. The arousal of the fetishist is, from the perspective of natural human psychology, defective. Note, in this example, one more difference between Aquinas and Nagel: Aquinas would judge the sexual activity of the fetishist to be immoral precisely because it is perverted (it violates a natural pattern established by God), while Nagel would not conclude that it must be morally wrong—after all, a fetishistic sexual act might be carried out quite harmlessly—even if it does indicate that something is suspicious about the fetishist’s psychology. The move historically and socially away from a Thomistic moralistic account of sexual perversion toward an amoral psychological account such as Nagel’s is representative of a more widespread trend: the gradual replacement of moral or religious judgments, about all sorts of deviant behavior, by medical or psychiatric judgments and interventions. (See Alan Soble, Sexual Investigations , chapter 4.)

12. Female Sexuality and Natural Law

A different kind of disagreement with Aquinas is registered by Christine Gudorf, a Christian theologian who otherwise has a lot in common with Aquinas. Gudorf agrees that the study of human anatomy and physiology yields insights into God’s plan and design, and that human sexual behavior should conform with God’s creative intentions. That is, Gudorf’s philosophy is squarely within the Thomistic Natural Law tradition. But Gudorf argues that if we take a careful look at the anatomy and physiology of the female sexual organs, and especially the clitoris, instead of focusing exclusively on the male’s penis (which is what Aquinas did), quite different conclusions about God’s plan and design emerge and hence Christian sexual ethics turns out to be less restrictive. In particular, Gudorf claims that the female’s clitoris is an organ whose only purpose is the production of sexual pleasure and, unlike the mixed or dual functionality of the penis, has no connection with procreation. Gudorf concludes that the existence of the clitoris in the female body suggests that God intended that the purpose of sexual activity was as much for sexual pleasure for its own sake as it was for procreation. Therefore, according to Gudorf, pleasurable sexual activity apart from procreation does not violate God’s design, is not unnatural, and hence is not necessarily morally wrong, as long as it occurs in the context of a monogamous marriage ( Sex, Body, and Pleasure , p. 65). Today we are not as confident as Aquinas was that God’s plan can be discovered by a straightforward examination of human and animal bodies; but such healthy skepticism about our ability to discern the intentions of God from facts of the natural world would seem to apply to Gudorf’s proposal as well.

13. Debates in Sexual Ethics

The ethics of sexual behavior, as a branch of applied ethics, is no more and no less contentious than the ethics of anything else that is usually included within the area of applied ethics. Think, for example, of the notorious debates over euthanasia, capital punishment, abortion, and our treatment of lower animals for food, clothing, entertainment, and in medical research. So it should come as no surprise than even though a discussion of sexual ethics might well result in the removal of some confusions and a clarification of the issues, no final answers to questions about the morality of sexual activity are likely to be forthcoming from the philosophy of sexuality. As far as I can tell by surveying the literature on sexual ethics, there are at least three major topics that have received much discussion by philosophers of sexuality and which provide arenas for continual debate.

14. Natural Law vs. Liberal Ethics

We have already encountered one debate: the dispute between a Thomistic Natural Law approach to sexual morality and a more liberal, secular outlook that denies that there is a tight connection between what is unnatural in human sexuality and what is immoral. The secular liberal philosopher emphasizes the values of autonomous choice, self-determination, and pleasure in arriving at moral judgments about sexual behavior, in contrast to the Thomistic tradition that justifies a more restrictive sexual ethics by invoking a divinely imposed scheme to which human action must conform. For a secular liberal philosopher of sexuality, the paradigmatically morally wrong sexual act is rape, in which one person forces himself or herself upon another or uses threats to coerce the other to engage in sexual activity. By contrast, for the liberal, anything done voluntarily between two or more people is generally morally permissible. For the secular liberal, then, a sexual act would be morally wrong if it were dishonest, coercive, or manipulative, and Natural Law theory would agree, except to add that the act’s merely being unnatural is another, independent reason for condemning it morally. Kant, for example, held that “Onanism . . . is abuse of the sexual faculty. . . . By it man sets aside his person and degrades himself below the level of animals. . . . Intercourse between sexus homogenii . . . too is contrary to the ends of humanity”( Lectures , p. 170). The sexual liberal, however, usually finds nothing morally wrong or nonmorally bad about either masturbation or homosexual sexual activity. These activities might be unnatural, and perhaps in some ways prudentially unwise, but in many if not most cases they can be carried out without harm being done either to the participants or to anyone else.

Natural Law is alive and well today among philosophers of sex, even if the details do not match Aquinas’s original version. For example, the contemporary philosopher John Finnis argues that there are morally worthless sexual acts in which “one’s body is treated as instrumental for the securing of the experiential satisfaction of the conscious self” (see “Is Homosexual Conduct Wrong?”). For example, in masturbating or in being anally sodomized, the body is just a tool of sexual satisfaction and, as a result, the person undergoes “disintegration.” “One’s choosing self [becomes] the quasi-slave of the experiencing self which is demanding gratification.” The worthlessness and disintegration attaching to masturbation and sodomy actually attach, for Finnis, to “all extramarital sexual gratification.” This is because only in married, heterosexual coitus do the persons’ “reproductive organs . . . make them a biological . . . unit.” Finnis begins his argument with the metaphysically pessimistic intuition that sexual activity involves treating human bodies and persons instrumentally, and he concludes with the thought that sexual activity in marriage—in particular, genital intercourse—avoids disintegrity because only in this case, as intended by God’s plan, does the couple attain a state of genuine unity: “the orgasmic union of the reproductive organs of husband and wife really unites them biologically.” (See also Finnis’s essay “Law, Morality, and ‘Sexual Orientation’.”)

15. Consent Is Not Sufficient

Another debate is about whether, when there is no harm done to third parties to be concerned about, the fact that two people engage in a sexual act voluntarily, with their own free and informed consent, is sufficient for satisfying the demands of sexual morality. Of course, those in the Natural Law tradition deny that consent is sufficient, since on their view willingly engaging in unnatural sexual acts is morally wrong, but they are not alone in reducing the moral significance of consent. Sexual activity between two persons might be harmful to one or both participants, and a moral paternalist or perfectionist would claim that it is wrong for one person to harm another person, or for the latter to allow the former to engage in this harmful behavior, even when both persons provide free and informed consent to their joint activity. Consent in this case is not sufficient, and as a result some forms of sadomasochistic sexuality turn out to be morally wrong. The denial of the sufficiency of consent is also frequently presupposed by those philosophers who claim that only in a committed relationship is sexual activity between two people morally permissible. The free and informed consent of both parties may be a necessary condition for the morality of their sexual activity, but without the presence of some other ingredient (love, marriage, devotion, and the like) their sexual activity remains mere mutual use or objectification and hence morally objectionable.

In casual sex, for example, two persons are merely using each other for their own sexual pleasure; even when genuinely consensual, these mutual sexual uses do not yield a virtuous sexual act. Kant and Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II) take this position: willingly allowing oneself to be used sexually by another makes an object of oneself. For Kant, sexual activity avoids treating a person merely as a means only in marriage, since here both persons have surrendered their bodies and souls to each other and have achieved a subtle metaphysical unity ( Lectures , p. 167). For Wojtyla, “only love can preclude the use of one person by another” ( Love and Responsibility , p. 30), since love is a unification of persons resulting from a mutual gift of their selves. Note, however, that the thought that a unifying love is the ingredient that justifies sexual activity (beyond consent) has an interesting and ironic implication: gay and lesbian sexual relations would seem to be permissible if they occur within loving, monogamous homosexual marriages (a position defended by the theologians Patricia Jung and Ralph Smith, in Heterosexism ). At this point in the argument, defenders of the view that sexual activity is justifiable only in marriage commonly appeal to Natural Law to rule out homosexual marriage.

16. Consent Is Sufficient

On another view of these matters, the fact that sexual activity is carried out voluntarily by all persons involved means, assuming that no harm to third parties exists, that the sexual activity is morally permissible. In defending such a view of the sufficiency of consent, Thomas Mappes writes that “respect for persons entails that each of us recognize the rightful authority of other persons (as rational beings) to conduct their individual lives as they see fit” (“Sexual Morality and the Concept of Using Another Person,” p. 204). Allowing the other person’s consent to control when the other may engage in sexual activity with me is to respect that person by taking his or her autonomy, his or her ability to reason and make choices, seriously, while not to allow the other to make the decision about when to engage in sexual activity with me is disrespectfully paternalistic. If the other person’s consent is taken as sufficient, that shows that I respect his or her choice of ends, or that even if I do not approve of his or her particular choice of ends, at least I show respect for his or her ends-making capability. According to such a view of the power of consent, there can be no moral objection in principle to casual sexual activity, to sexual activity with strangers, or to promiscuity, as long as the persons involved in the activity genuinely agree to engage in their chosen sexual activities.

If Mappes’s free and informed consent criterion of the morality of sexual activity is correct, we would still have to address several difficult questions. How specific must consent be? When one person agrees vaguely, and in the heat of the moment, with another person, “yes, let’s have sex,” the speaker has not necessarily consented to every type of sexual caress or coital position the second person might have in mind. And how explicit must consent be? Can consent be reliably implied by involuntarily behavior (moans, for example), and do nonverbal cues (erection, lubrication) decisively show that another person has consented to sex? Some philosophers insist that consent must be exceedingly specific as to the sexual acts to be carried out, and some would permit only explicit verbal consent, denying that body language by itself can do an adequate job of expressing the participant’s desires and intentions. (See Alan Soble, “Antioch’s ‘Sexual Offense Policy’.”)

Note also that not all philosophers agree with Mappes and others that fully voluntary consent is always necessary for sexual activity to be morally permissible. Jeffrie Murphy, for example, has raised some doubts (“Some Ruminations on Women, Violence, and the Criminal Law,” p. 218):

“Have sex with me or I will find another girlfriend” strikes me (assuming normal circumstances) as a morally permissible threat, and “Have sex with me and I will marry you” strikes me (assuming the offer is genuine) as a morally permissible offer. . . . We negotiate our way through most of life with schemes of threats and offers . . . and I see no reason why the realm of sexuality should be utterly insulated from this very normal way of being human.

Murphy implies that some threats are coercive and thereby undermine the voluntary nature of the participation in sexual activity of one of the persons, but, he adds, these types of threats are not always morally wrong. Alternatively, we might say that in the cases Murphy describes, the threats and offers do not constitute coercion at all and that they present no obstacle to fully voluntary participation. (See Alan Wertheimer, “Consent and Sexual Relations.”) If so, Murphy’s cases do not establish that voluntary consent is not always required for sexual activity to be morally right.

17. What Is “Voluntary”?

As suggested by Murphy’s examples, another debate concerns the meaning and application of the concept “voluntary.” Whether consent is only necessary for the morality of sexual activity, or also sufficient, any moral principle that relies on consent to make moral distinctions among sexual events presupposes a clear understanding of the “voluntary” aspect of consent. It is safe to say that participation in sexual activity ought not to be physically forced upon one person by another. But this obvious truth leaves matters wide open. Onora O’Neill, for example, thinks that casual sex is morally wrong because the consent it purportedly involves is not likely to be sufficiently voluntary, in light of subtle pressures people commonly put on each other to engage in sexual activity (see “Between Consenting Adults”).

One moral ideal is that genuinely consensual participation in sexual activity requires not a hint of coercion or pressure of any sort. Because engaging in sexual activity can be risky or dangerous in many ways, physically, psychologically, and metaphysically, we would like to be sure, according to this moral ideal, that anyone who engages in sexual activity does so perfectly voluntarily. Some philosophers have argued that this ideal can be realized only when there is substantial economic and social equality between the persons involved in a given sexual encounter. For example, a society that exhibits disparities in the incomes or wealth of its various members is one in which some people will be exposed to economic coercion. If some groups of people (women and members of ethnic minorities, in particular) have less economic and social power than others, members of these groups will be therefore exposed to sexual coercion in particular, among other kinds. One immediate application of this thought is that prostitution, which to many sexual liberals is a business bargain made by a provider of sexual services and a client and is largely characterized by adequately free and informed consent, may be morally wrong, if the economic situation of the prostitute acts as a kind of pressure that negates the voluntary nature of his or her participation. Further, women with children who are economically dependent on their husbands may find themselves in the position of having to engage in sexual activity whether they want to or not, for fear of being abandoned; these women, too, may not be engaging in sexual activity fully voluntarily. The woman who allows herself to be nagged into sex by her husband worries that if she says “no” too often, she will suffer economically, if not also physically and psychologically.

The view that the presence of any kind of pressure at all is coercive, negates the voluntary nature of participation in sexual activity, and hence is morally objectionable has been expressed by Charlene Muehlenhard and Jennifer Schrag (see their “Nonviolent Sexual Coercion”). They list, among other things, “status coercion” (when women are coerced into sexual activity or marriage by a man’s occupation) and “discrimination against lesbians” (which discrimination compels women into having sexual relationships only with men) as forms of coercion that undermine the voluntary nature of participation by women in sexual activity with men. But depending on the kind of case we have in mind, it might be more accurate to say either that some pressures are not coercive and do not appreciably undermine voluntariness, or that some pressures are coercive but are nevertheless not morally objectionable. Is it always true that the presence of any kind of pressure put on one person by another amounts to coercion that negates the voluntary nature of consent, so that subsequent sexual activity is morally wrong?

18. Conceptual Analysis

Conceptual philosophy of sexuality is concerned to analyze and to clarify concepts that are central in this area of philosophy: sexual activity, sexual desire, sexual sensation, sexual perversion, and others. It also attempts to define less abstract concepts, such as prostitution, pornography, and rape. I would like to illustrate the conceptual philosophy of sexuality by focusing on one particular concept, that of “sexual activity,” and explore in what ways it is related to another central concept, that of “sexual pleasure.” One lesson to be learned here is that conceptual philosophy of sexuality can be just as difficult and contentious as normative philosophy of sexuality, and that as a result firm conceptual conclusions are hard to come by.

19. Sexual Activity vs. “Having Sex”

According to a notorious study published in 1999 in the Journal of the American Medical Association (“Would You Say You ‘Had Sex’ If . . . ?” by Stephanie Sanders and June Reinisch), a large percent of undergraduate college students, about 60%, do not think that engaging in oral sex (fellatio and cunnilingus) is “having sex.” This finding is at first glance very surprising, but it is not difficult to comprehend sympathetically. To be sure, as philosophers we easily conclude that oral sex is a specific type of sexual activity. But “sexual activity” is a technical concept, while “having sex” is an ordinary language concept, which refers primarily to heterosexual intercourse. Thus when Monica Lewinsky told her confidant Linda Tripp that she did not “have sex” with William Jefferson Clinton, she was not necessarily self-deceived, lying, or pulling a fast one. She was merely relying on the ordinary language definition or criterion of “having sex,” which is not identical to the philosopher’s concept of “sexual activity,” does not always include oral sex, and usually requires genital intercourse.

Another conclusion might be drawn from the JAMA survey. If we assume that heterosexual coitus by and large, or in many cases, produces more pleasure for the participants than does oral sex, or at least that in heterosexual intercourse there is greater mutuality of sexual pleasure than in one-directional oral sex, and this is why ordinary thought tends to discount the ontological significance of oral sex, then perhaps we can use this to fashion a philosophical account of “sexual activity” that is at once consistent with ordinary thought.

20. Sexual Activity and Sexual Pleasure

In common thought, whether a sexual act is nonmorally good or bad is often associated with whether it is judged to be a sexual act at all. Sometimes we derive little or no pleasure from a sexual act (say, we are primarily giving pleasure to another person, or we are even selling it to the other person), and we think that even though the other person had a sexual experience, we didn’t. Or the other person did try to provide us with sexual pleasure but failed miserably, whether from ignorance of technique or sheer sexual crudity. In such a case it would not be implausible to say that we did not undergo a sexual experience and so did not engage in a sexual act. If Ms. Lewinsky’s performing oral sex on President Clinton was done only for his sake, for his sexual pleasure, and she did it out of consideration for his needs and not hers, then perhaps she did not herself, after all, engage in a sexual act.

Robert Gray is one philosopher who has taken up this line of ordinary thought and has argued that “sexual activity” should be analyzed in terms of the production of sexual pleasure. He asserts that “any activity might become a sexual activity” if sexual pleasure is derived from it, and “no activity is a sexual activity unless sexual pleasure is derived from it” (“Sex and Sexual Perversion,” p. 61). Perhaps Gray is right, since we tend to think that holding hands is a sexual activity when sexual pleasure is produced by doing so, but otherwise holding hands is not very sexual. A handshake is normally not a sexual act, and usually does not yield sexual pleasure; but two lovers caressing each other’s fingers is both a sexual act and produces sexual pleasure for them.

There is another reason for taking seriously the idea that sexual activities are exactly those that produce sexual pleasure. What is it about a sexually perverted activity that makes it sexual ? The act is unnatural, we might say, because it has no connection with one common purpose of sexual activity, that is, procreation. But the only thing that would seem to make the act a sexual perversion is that it does, on a fairly reliable basis, nonetheless produce sexual pleasure. Undergarment fetishism is a sexual perversion, and not merely, say, a “fabric” perversion, because it involves sexual pleasure. Similarly, what is it about homosexual sexual activities that makes them sexual? All such acts are nonprocreative, yet they share something very important in common with procreative heterosexual activities: they produce sexual pleasure, and the same sort of sexual pleasure.

a. Sexual Activity Without Pleasure

Suppose I were to ask you, “How many sexual partners have you had during the last five years”? If you were on your toes, you would ask me, before answering, “What counts as a sexual partner?” (Maybe you are suspicious of my question because you had read Greta Christina’s essay on this topic, “Are We Having Sex Now or What?”) At this point I should give you an adequate analysis of “sexual activity,” and tell you to count anyone with whom you engaged in sexual activity according to this definition. What I should definitely not do is to tell you to count only those people with whom you had a pleasing or satisfactory sexual experience, forgetting about, and hence not counting, those partners with whom you had nonmorally bad sex. But if we accept Gray’s analysis of sexual activity, that sexual acts are exactly those and only those that produce sexual pleasure, I should of course urge you not to count, over those five years, anyone with whom you had a nonmorally bad sexual experience. You will end up reporting to me fewer sexual partners than you in fact had. Maybe that will make you feel better.

The general point is this. If “sexual activity” is logically dependent on “sexual pleasure,” if sexual pleasure is thereby the criterion of sexual activity itself, then sexual pleasure cannot be the gauge of the nonmoral quality of sexual activities. That is, this analysis of “sexual activity” in terms of “sexual pleasure” conflates what it is for an act to be a sexual activity with what it is for an act to be a nonmorally good sexual activity. On such an analysis, procreative sexual activities, when the penis is placed into the vagina, would be sexual activities only when they produce sexual pleasure, and not when they are as sensually boring as a handshake. Further, the victim of a rape, who has not experienced nonmorally good sex, cannot claim that he or she was forced to engage in sexual activity, even if the act compelled on him or her was intercourse or fellatio.

I would prefer to say that the couple who have lost sexual interest in each other, and who engage in routine sexual activities from which they derive no pleasure, are still performing a sexual act. But we are forbidden, by Gray’s proposed analysis, from saying that they engage in nonmorally bad sexual activity, for on his view they have not engaged in any sexual activity at all. Rather, we could say at most that they tried to engage in sexual activity but failed to do so. It may be a sad fact about our sexual world that we can engage in sexual activity and not derive any or much pleasure from it, but that fact should not give us reason for refusing to call these unsatisfactory events “sexual.”

21. References and Further Reading

• Aquinas, St. Thomas. Summa Theologiae . Cambridge, Eng.: Blackfriars, 1964-76.
• Augustine, St. (Aurelius). On Marriage and Concupiscence , in The Works of Aurelius Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, vol. 12 , ed. Marcus Dods. Edinburgh, Scot.: T. & T. Clark, 1874.
• Baker, Robert, Kathleen Wininger, and Frederick Elliston, eds. Philosophy and Sex , 3rd edition. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1998.
• Baumrin, Bernard. “Sexual Immorality Delineated,” in Robert Baker and Frederick Elliston, eds., Philosophy and Sex , 2nd edition. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1984, pp. 300-11.
• Bloom, Allan. Love and Friendship . New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993.
• Christina, Greta. “Are We Having Sex Now or What?” in Alan Soble, ed., The Philosophy of Sex , 3rd edition. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997, pp. 3-8.
• Finnis, John. “Law, Morality, and ‘Sexual Orientation’,” Notre Dame Law Review 69:5 (1994), pp. 1049-76.
• Finnis, John and Martha Nussbaum. “Is Homosexual Conduct Wrong? A Philosophical Exchange,” in Alan Soble, ed., The Philosophy of Sex , 3rd edition. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997, pp. 89-94.
• Gray, Robert. “Sex and Sexual Perversion,” in Alan Soble, ed., The Philosophy of Sex , 3rd edition. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997, pp. 57-66.
• Grisez, Germain. The Way of the Lord Jesus . Quincy, Ill.: Franciscan Press, 1993.
• Gudorf, Christine. Sex, Body, and Pleasure: Reconstructing Christian Sexual Ethics . Cleveland, Ohio: Pilgrim Press, 1994.
• Hampton, Jean. “Defining Wrong and Defining Rape,” in Keith Burgess-Jackson, ed., A Most Detestable Crime: New Philosophical Essays on Rape . New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 118-56.
• Held, Virginia. “Coercion and Coercive Offers,” in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Coercion: Nomos VIX . Chicago, Ill.: Aldine, 1972, pp. 49-62.
• Jung, Patricia, and Ralph Smith. Heterosexism: An Ethical Challenge . Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993.
• Kant, Immanuel. Lectures on Ethics . Translated by Louis Infield. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.
• Kant, Immanuel. The Metaphysics of Morals . Translated by Mary Gregor. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
• Lewis, C. S. The Four Loves . New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1960.
• Mappes, Thomas. “Sexual Morality and the Concept of Using Another Person,” in Thomas Mappes and Jane Zembaty, eds., Social Ethics , 4th edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992, pp. 203-26.
• Mayo, David. “An Obligation to Warn of HIV Infection?” in Alan Soble, ed., Sex, Love and Friendship . Amsterdam. Hol.: Editions Rodopi, 1997, pp. 447-53.
• Muehlenhard, Charlene, and Jennifer Schrag. “Nonviolent Sexual Coercion,” in A. Parrot and L. Bechhofer, eds, Acquaintance Rape. The Hidden Crime . New York: John Wiley, 1991, pp. 115-28.
• Murphy, Jeffrie. “Some Ruminations on Women, Violence, and the Criminal Law,” in Jules Coleman and Allen Buchanan, eds., In Harm’s Way: Essays in Honor of Joel Feinberg . Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 209-30.
• Nagel, Thomas. “Sexual Perversion,” in Alan Soble, ed., The Philosophy of Sex , 3st edition. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997, pp. 9-20.
• O’Neill, Onora. “Between Consenting Adults,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14:3 (1985), pp. 252-77.
• Plato. Symposium . Translated by Michael Joyce, in E. Hamilton and H. Cairns, eds., The Collected Dialogues of Plato . Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961, pp. 526-74.
• Posner, Richard. Sex and Reason . Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992.
• Sanders, Stephanie, and June Reinisch. “Would You Say You ‘Had Sex’ If . . . ?” Journal of the American Medical Association 281:3 (January 20, 1999), pp. 275-77.
• Scruton, Roger. Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic . New York: Free Press, 1986.
• Singer, Irving. The Nature of Love, vol. 2: Courtly and Romantic . Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
• Soble, Alan. “Antioch’s ‘Sexual Offense Policy’: A Philosophical Exploration,” Journal of Social Philosophy 28:1 (1997), pp. 22-36.
• Soble, Alan. The Philosophy of Sex and Love: An Introduction . St. Paul, Minn.: Paragon House, 1998.
• Soble, Alan. Sexual Investigations . New York: New York University Press,1996.
• Soble, Alan. ed. Eros, Agape and Philia . New York: Paragon House, 1989.
• Soble, Alan. ed. The Philosophy of Sex , 3rd edition. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997.
• Soble, Alan. ed. Sex, Love and Friendship . Amsterdam, Hol.: Editions Rodopi, 1996.
• Solomon, Robert, and Kathleen Higgins, eds. The Philosophy of (Erotic) Love . Lawrence. Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 1991.
• Stewart, Robert M., ed. Philosophical Perspectives on Sex and Love . New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Vannoy, Russell. Sex Without Love: A Philosophical Exploration . Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1980.
• Verene, Donald, ed. Sexual Love and Western Morality , 2nd edition. Boston, Mass.: Jones and Bartlett, 1995.
• Wertheimer, Alan. “Consent and Sexual Relations,” Legal Theory 2:2 (1996), pp. 89-112.
• Wojtyla, Karol [Pope John Paul II]. Love and Responsibility . New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1981.

Author Information

Alan Soble Email: [email protected] Drexel University U. S. A.

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Female Reproductive System

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What Is Reproduction?

Reproduction is the process by which organisms make more organisms like themselves. But even though the reproductive system is essential to keeping a species alive, unlike other body systems, it's not essential to keeping an individual alive.

In the human reproductive process, two kinds of sex cells, or  gametes  (GAH-meetz), are involved. The male gamete, or sperm, and the female gamete, the egg or ovum, meet in the female's reproductive system. When sperm fertilizes (meets) an egg, this fertilized egg is called a  zygote  (pronounced: ZYE-goat). The zygote goes through a process of becoming an embryo and developing into a fetus.

The  male reproductive system  and the female reproductive system both are needed for reproduction.

Humans, like other organisms, pass some characteristics of themselves to the next generation. We do this through our  genes , the special carriers of human traits. The genes that parents pass along are what make their children similar to others in their family, but also what make each child unique. These genes come from the male's sperm and the female's egg.

The Female Reproductive System

Like other living things, human beings reproduce. It's what keeps the population going. In humans, this happens when the male and female reproductive systems work together to make a baby.

The female reproductive system includes a group of organs in a woman's lower belly and pelvis.

It's called the reproductive system because it supports the development and growth of a baby.

This system is also responsible for a girl's monthly period, called menstruation.

The female reproductive system has several parts. The  uterus  is where a fetus, or baby, grows. It is a hollow, pear‑shaped organ with a muscular wall.

There are two ovaries, one on either side of the uterus. Ovaries make eggs and hormones like estrogen and progesterone. These hormones help girls develop, and make it possible for a woman to have a baby. The ovaries release an egg as part of a woman's cycle. When an egg is released, it's called  ovulation . Each egg is tiny – about one‑tenth the size of a poppy seed.

Fallopian tubes go from the uterus to the ovaries. During ovulation, an ovary releases an egg into the fallopian tube next to it.

The  cervix  is the lower part of the uterus that opens into the vagina. During childbirth, the cervix expands about 4 inches (10 centimeters) so the baby can travel from the uterus through the vagina and into the world.

The vagina is a tube that connects the uterus to the outside of the body. The entrance to the vagina is on the outside of the body. It's called the  vaginal opening .

The vaginal opening is a hole between a woman's legs, below her urethra (where pee comes out) and above her anus (where poop comes out). Here you can see how the vagina connects to the uterus.

During sex, sperm cells travel through the vagina to the uterus and fallopian tubes. In the fallopian tube, the sperm meets the egg that was released from the ovary during ovulation.

If a sperm cell fertilizes the woman's egg, it's the first step in reproduction (getting pregnant).

If all goes well, in 9 months, a baby will be born.

What Is the Female Reproductive System?

The external part of the female reproductive organs is called the vulva , which means covering. Located between the legs, the vulva covers the opening to the vagina and other reproductive organs inside the body.

The fleshy area located just above the top of the vaginal opening is called the mons pubis. Two pairs of skin flaps called the labia (which means lips) surround the vaginal opening. The clitoris , a small sensory organ, is located toward the front of the vulva where the folds of the labia join. Between the labia are openings to the urethra (the canal that carries pee from the bladder to the outside of the body) and vagina. When girls become sexually mature, the outer labia and the mons pubis are covered by pubic hair.

A female's internal reproductive organs are the vagina, uterus, fallopian tubes, and ovaries.

The vagina is a muscular, hollow tube that extends from the vaginal opening to the uterus. Because it has muscular walls, the vagina can expand and contract. This ability to become wider or narrower allows the vagina to accommodate something as slim as a tampon and as wide as a baby. The vagina's muscular walls are lined with mucous membranes, which keep it protected and moist.

The vagina serves three purposes:

• It's where the penis is inserted during sexual intercourse.
• It's the pathway (the birth canal) through which a baby leaves a woman's body during childbirth.
• It's the route through which menstrual blood leaves the body during periods .

A very thin piece of skin-like tissue called the hymen partly covers the opening of the vagina. Hymens are often different from female to female. Most women find their hymens have stretched or torn after their first sexual experience, and the hymen may bleed a little (this usually causes little, if any, pain). Some women who have had sex don't have much of a change in their hymens, though. And some women's hymens have already stretched even before they have sex.

The vagina connects with the uterus , or womb, at the cervix (which means neck). The cervix has strong, thick walls. The opening of the cervix is very small (no wider than a straw), which is why a tampon can never get lost inside a girl's body. During childbirth, the cervix can expand to allow a baby to pass.

The uterus is shaped like an upside-down pear, with a thick lining and muscular walls — in fact, the uterus contains some of the strongest muscles in the female body. These muscles are able to expand and contract to accommodate a growing fetus and then help push the baby out during labor. When a woman isn't pregnant, the uterus is only about 3 inches (7.5 centimeters) long and 2 inches (5 centimeters) wide.

At the upper corners of the uterus, the fallopian tubes connect the uterus to the ovaries. The ovaries are two oval-shaped organs that lie to the upper right and left of the uterus. They produce, store, and release eggs into the fallopian tubes in the process called ovulation (pronounced: av-yoo-LAY-shun).

There are two fallopian (pronounced: fuh-LO-pee-un) tubes, each attached to a side of the uterus. Within each tube is a tiny passageway no wider than a sewing needle. At the other end of each fallopian tube is a fringed area that looks like a funnel. This fringed area wraps around the ovary but doesn't completely attach to it. When an egg pops out of an ovary, it enters the fallopian tube. Once the egg is in the fallopian tube, tiny hairs in the tube's lining help push it down the narrow passageway toward the uterus.

How Does the Female Reproductive System Work?

The female reproductive system enables a woman to:

• produce eggs (ova)
• have sexual intercourse
• protect and nourish a fertilized egg until it is fully developed

Sexual reproduction couldn't happen without the sexual organs called the  gonads . Most people think of the gonads as the male testicles. But both sexes have gonads: In females the gonads are the ovaries, which make female gametes (eggs). The male gonads make male gametes (sperm).

When a baby girl is born, her ovaries contain hundreds of thousands of eggs, which remain inactive until puberty begins. At puberty, the pituitary gland (in the central part of the brain ) starts making hormones that stimulate the ovaries to make female sex hormones, including estrogen. The secretion of these hormones causes a girl to develop into a sexually mature woman.

Toward the end of puberty, girls begin to release eggs as part of a monthly period called the menstrual cycle. About once a month, during ovulation, an ovary sends a tiny egg into one of the fallopian tubes.

Unless the egg is fertilized by a sperm while in the fallopian tube, the egg leaves the body about 2 weeks later through the uterus — this is menstruation. Blood and tissues from the inner lining of the uterus combine to form the menstrual flow, which in most girls lasts from 3 to 5 days. A girl's first period is called menarche (pronounced: MEH-nar-kee).

It's common for women and girls to have some discomfort in the days leading to their periods. Premenstrual syndrome (PMS) includes both physical and emotional symptoms that many girls and women get right before their periods, such as:

• sore breasts
• constipation
• food cravings
• irritability
• trouble concentrating or handling stress

PMS is usually at its worst during the 7 days before a girl's period starts and disappears after it begins.

Many girls also have belly cramps during the first few days of their periods caused by prostaglandins, chemicals in the body that make the smooth muscle in the uterus contract. These involuntary contractions can be dull or sharp and intense.

It can take up to 2 years from menarche for a girl's body to develop a regular menstrual cycle . During that time, her body is adjusting to the hormones puberty brings. On average, the monthly cycle for an adult woman is 28 days, but the range is from 23 to 35 days.

What Happens If an Egg Is Fertilized?

If a female and male have sex within several days of the female's ovulation, fertilization can happen. When the male ejaculates (when semen leaves the penis), a small amount of semen is deposited into the vagina. Millions of sperm are in this small amount of semen, and they "swim" up from the vagina through the cervix and uterus to meet the egg in the fallopian tube. It takes only one sperm to fertilize the egg.

About 5 to 6 days after the sperm fertilizes the egg, the fertilized egg (pronounced: zygote) has become a multicelled blastocyst. A blastocyst (pronounced: BLAS-tuh-sist) is about the size of a pinhead, and it's a hollow ball of cells with fluid inside. The blastocyst burrows itself into the lining of the uterus, called the endometrium . The hormone estrogen causes the endometrium (pronounced: en-doh-MEE-tree-um) to become thick and rich with blood. Progesterone, another hormone released by the ovaries, keeps the endometrium thick with blood so that the blastocyst can attach to the uterus and absorb nutrients from it. This process is called implantation .

As cells from the blastocyst take in nourishment, another stage of development begins. In the embryonic stage, the inner cells form a flattened circular shape called the embryonic disk, which will develop into a baby. The outer cells become thin membranes that form around the baby. The cells multiply thousands of times and move to new positions to eventually become the embryo (pronounced: EM-bree-oh).

After about 8 weeks, the embryo is about the size of a raspberry, but almost all of its parts — the brain and nerves, the heart and blood, the stomach and intestines, and the muscles and skin — have formed.

During the fetal stage, which lasts from 9 weeks after fertilization to birth, development continues as cells multiply, move, and change. The fetus (pronounced: FEE-tis) floats in amniotic (pronounced: am-nee-AH-tik) fluid inside the amniotic sac. The fetus gets oxygen and nourishment from the mother's blood via the placenta (pronounced: pluh-SEN-tuh). This disk-like structure sticks to the inner lining of the uterus and connects to the fetus via the umbilical (pronounced: um-BIL-ih-kul) cord . The amniotic fluid and membrane cushion the fetus against bumps and jolts to the mother's body.

Pregnancy lasts an average of 280 days — about 9 months. When the baby is ready for birth, its head presses on the cervix, which begins to relax and widen to get ready for the baby to pass into and through the vagina. Mucus has formed a plug in the cervix, which now loosesn. It and amniotic fluid come out through the vagina when the mother's water breaks.

When the contractions of labor begin, the walls of the uterus contract as they are stimulated by the pituitary hormone oxytocin (pronounced: ahk-see-TOE-sin). The contractions cause the cervix to widen and begin to open. After several hours of this widening, the cervix is dilated (opened) enough for the baby to come through. The baby is pushed out of the uterus, through the cervix, and along the birth canal. The baby's head usually comes first. The umbilical cord comes out with the baby. It's clamped and cut close to the navel after the baby is delivered.

The last stage of the birth process involves the delivery of the placenta, which at that point is called the afterbirth. After it has separated from the inner lining of the uterus, contractions of the uterus push it out, along with its membranes and fluids.

Sex Determination in Humans

In humans, sex determination is the process that determines the biological sex of an offspring and, as a result, the sexual characteristics that they will develop. Humans typically develop as either male or female, primarily depending on the combination of sex chromosomes that they inherit from their parents. The human sex chromosomes, called X and Y, are structures in human cells made up of tightly bound deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, and proteins. Those are molecules that contain the instructions for the development and functioning of all life forms, including the development of physical traits and body parts that correspond with each biological sex. Humans who inherit two X chromosomes typically develop as females, while humans with one X and one Y chromosome typically develop as males. Sex determination is the beginning of the development of many characteristics that influence how a human looks and functions as well as the societal expectations that other humans have for each other.

The process of sex determination begins after fertilization, a process where male and female germ cells fuse to form a zygote, or a single-celled, fertilized egg. Germ cells are those that carry genetic information from parents to offspring during fertilization. Male germ cells are sperm cells and female germ cells are egg cells. When the egg and sperm cells fuse, the zygote divides into multiple cells and later forms an embryo. The embryo includes a combination of part of each parent’s genetic information, including one sex chromosome from each parent. The combination of sex chromosomes that an embryo inherits from germ cells determines what biological sex it will later develop as.

A process called meiosis determines the sex chromosome that the parents’ germ cells pass on to their offspring. Meiosis occurs inside of the testes and ovaries, the organs in males and females, respectively, that produce germ cells. During meiosis, each cell divides twice, which results in four cells. When the germ cells fuse during fertilization, the resulting embryo will have the normal amount of genetic material, including two sex chromosomes, because it receives one from each parent. Because females tend to only have X chromosomes, the egg cells that they produce typically carry an X chromosome, while the male sperm cell can carry either an X or Y. Therefore, the sex chromosome that a male sperm carries determines whether the offspring will develop into a male or a female.

Typical males and females differ in a variety of physical traits. The main parts of the male reproductive system include the penis, testicles that appear outside the body on the groin, and accessory glands. The penis is the male external sex organ. The testicles produce sperm and a hormone called testosterone, which causes males to develop deeper voices, bigger muscles, and body and facial hair during puberty. Male accessory glands, including the seminal vesicles and the prostate gland, produce fluids. Those glands are near the bladder of the body and connect to the penis and testicles through a tube called the vas deferens.

The main parts of the female reproductive system include the vagina, uterus, ovaries, and fallopian tubes. The vagina is a female organ that connects the internal reproductive organs to the outside of the body. The uterus is an internal reproductive organ in the lower abdominal region and houses an embryo during pregnancy. The female body typically has two ovaries, placed on the right and left sides of the uterus, that produce egg cells and a hormone called estrogen. Estrogen tells the female body to release egg cells during a process called ovulation. There are also two fallopian tubes that connect each ovary to the uterus.

Discussions about why males and females possess different physical characteristics date back to some of the earliest texts. Aristotle, an ancient Greek philosopher who lived from 384 BCE to 322 BCE, suggested that embryos arose from the mixture of male semen and female blood that comes from the uterus. Aristotle also wrote that the amount of heat present during an embryo’s development determines its biological sex. Specifically, Aristotle proposed that all embryos are meant to develop into males, but embryos that did not have enough heat would stop development early and grow into females. According to historian Maryanne Horowitz, Aristotle’s theories on sex determination lent credibility to the idea that females are a biologically inferior sex because, according to those theories, females were simply underdeveloped males.

Scientists continued to accept Aristotle’s ideas about sex determination for centuries after his time. For example, Aristotle’s ideas partly influenced Galen, a Greek physician and philosopher who lived between 129 CE to 216 CE. Around 200 CE, Galen documented male and female anatomy in a series of texts and depicted the female reproductive system as an identical but inverted version of the male reproductive system. Following Aristotle’s teachings, Galen argued that reproductive organs remain inside of the female body, as the embryo did not develop to the point where it could push those organs outside of the body due to a lack of heat.

It was not until the seventeenth century that scientists began to question Aristotle’s teachings. During that time, scientists began to discover germ cells, although the roles of sperm and egg cells during sex determination remained unclear. In 1651, William Harvey, a physician in the United Kingdom, demonstrated that Aristotle and Galen’s ideas were not completely accurate when he observed an empty uterus of an animal that recently mated. That observation implied that the mixture of fluids alone did not always give rise to an embryo. Rather, Harvey wrote that all mammals arise from egg cells, although he did not observe egg cells within the female body. Later, Antonie van Leeuwenhoek, who studied microorganisms in the Netherlands, was one of the first people to observe sperm cells. He described sperm cells in a letter to the Royal Society of London in London, United Kingdom, in 1676 as small eel-like animals, which he referred to as spermatic animalcules, in the semen of men and male dogs. Leeuwenhoek proposed that the spermatic animalcules provide substance vital to forming embryos, while female egg cells provide nutrients to the embryo.

Scientists began to better understand the role of sperm and egg cells in the creation of embryos during the 1800s, although the mechanisms behind sex determination remained unclear. Karl von Baer, who studied comparative embryology and anatomy in Estonia in 1827, supported Harvey’s theory after discovering mammalian egg cells while observing dog ovaries under a microscope. Then, in 1841, Rudolf Albert von Kölliker, who studied embryos in Switzerland, concluded that rather than being independent animals present in semen, the male testes create sperm cells. Kölliker further suggested that sperm cells need to come into contact with the female egg cell for successful reproduction. Also, in 1876, Oskar Hertwig, who studied embryos and cells in Germany, observed the fusion of nuclei between sperm and egg cells during fertilization. Nuclei are the most central parts of the sperm and egg cells, which control the cell's activities.

Even after learning how embryos formed, it was not until the late nineteenth century that scientists discovered chromosomes and began to understand the mechanisms of sex determination. Hermann Henking, who studied cells in Germany, was one of the first people to observe the X chromosome in 1891. Observing the process of cell division in wasp sperm cells, Henking noticed that some of those cells had twelve chromosomes and others only had eleven. He called the twelfth chromosome the X element but never fully explained its role in sex differentiation. However, in 1899, Clarence Erwin McClung, who researched heredity at the University of Kansas in Lawrence, Kansas, also observed the X chromosome while studying grasshopper sperm cells. McClung hypothesized that the X chromosome helps determine what sex an organism develops as.

In 1905, Edmund Beecher Wilson, who studied genetics at Columbia University in New York City, New York, was one of the first people to observe and study the Y chromosome in the sperm cells of male beetles. Wilson observed equal numbers of chromosomes in several species of insects but noticed that the chromosomes of one pair were different sizes. He hypothesized that the larger chromosome was the X element that Henking previously observed. That same year, Nettie Maria Stevens, who studied genetics at Bryn Mawr College in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, was one of the first people to discuss the role of the Y chromosome in sex differentiation. After noticing that female mealworm egg cells consistently had twenty large chromosomes, while male cells had nineteen large chromosomes and one small one, Stevens hypothesized that the small chromosome paired with the X chromosome. Stevens deduced that the small chromosome determined an organism’s biological sex, depending on its presence. That hypothesis conflicted with other scientists’ beliefs that the X chromosome determined sex. Drawing upon Stevens’s findings, Wilson later named the small chromosome Y, following Henking’s X.

Researchers began to better understand how cells read and carry out the instructions that sex chromosomes carry to determine biological sex during the mid-twentieth century. In 1949, Murray Barr, a medical researcher in Canada, discovered dense masses of chromatin, or condensed material that contain genetic information, in female nerve cells but not male nerve cells. Barr hypothesized that those chromatin masses represent inactivated X chromosomes, or X chromosomes that do not work. Then in 1961, geneticist Mary Lyon proposed that egg cells inactivate one X chromosome. Lyon explained that because X chromosomes carry copies of the same sets of genes, egg cells have to inactivate one of the X chromosomes so those genes do not doubly express.

After the discovery of inactivated X chromosomes in 1949, scientists began to determine an organism’s biological sex by detecting whether dense chromatin masses were present in the organism’s cells. If a chromatin mass was present, that meant that there was an inactive X chromosome within the cell. In that case, scientists could assume that the cell belonged to a female. However, in 1959, two experiments changed that perception. Patricia Jacobs and John Strong, who researched genetics in the United Kingdom, discussed the chromosomal basis of Klinefelter syndrome, a condition that causes males to be born with an extra X chromosome. The extra X chromosome influences the development of features that are more typically associated with female development, such as more prominent breasts and less facial hair and muscle tone. The males that Jacobs and Strong studied had chromatin present in their cells, which usually would have led the researchers to think that they had two X chromosomes and were female. However, Jacobs and Strong realized that the males actually had two X chromosomes in addition to a Y chromosome, or an XXY chromosome combination.

Later, during the 1950s, Charles Ford, who researched the genetics of sex determination in the United Kingdom, led a team of scientists that showed that the presence of chromatin masses should not be an indicator of a person’s biological sex. Ford and his colleagues found that Turner syndrome, a condition that causes females to have delayed sexual development and experience infertility, results from females having a missing X chromosome, or a X0 chromosome combination. Together, the Jacobs and Strong and Ford studies showed that the presence of chromatin cannot itself determine biological sex, and that people can have chromosome combinations beyond those of typical males and females.

Around that same time, researchers began discovering and studying instances of males and females born with chromosome combinations typical of the opposite sex. In 1955, Gim Swyer, an obstetrician in London, United Kingdom, observed and described two of his female patients who had XY chromosome combinations, a condition that is now referred to as Swyer syndrome. People who have Swyer syndrome usually develop female body parts but do not have functional ovaries that produce the hormones necessary to experience puberty. Later, in 1964, Albert de la Chapelle, who worked as a genetics researcher in Finland, became one of the first people to identify a human male who had a XX chromosome combination, a condition that is now known as de la Chapelle syndrome. People who have de la Chapelle syndrome have male body parts but do not have functional testes and experience testosterone deficiency.

Researchers continued to study the mechanisms that cause people to develop Swyer and de la Chapelle syndromes during the 1980s. In 1984, de la Chapelle found that males who had XX chromosome combinations also had a small piece of the Y chromosome attached to one of their X chromosomes, resulting from an error in the separation of chromosomes during meiosis. At that same time, according to geneticist Jennifer Graves, other researchers identified that females who had XY chromosome combinations lacked a small piece of the Y chromosome. Graves explains that during the 1980s, researchers suspected that those added and deleted regions of the Y chromosome contained a gene responsible for allowing an embryo to develop testes and fully develop as a biological male. Scientists referred to that gene as the testes-determining factor, or TDF.

During the 1980s, researchers searched for the TDF along the Y chromosome to understand why its presence pushed embryos to develop as males. It was not until 1990 that Andrew Sinclair, who studied molecular biology in the United Kingdom, identified the location of the TDF on the Y chromosome. Sinclair led a team that used technology that allowed them to read a cell’s DNA and search for the TDF. They read stretches of DNA along the bits of the Y chromosome of males who had XX chromosome combinations to approximate the location of the TDF. They named the region of the Y chromosome that contains the TDF the sex-determining region Y, or the SRY gene, because the presence of that specific region of the Y chromosome determines an embryo’s biological sex. The SRY gene contains instructions for making the SRY protein, which causes the embryo to develop as male. If the SRY gene is present, then the embryo will begin to develop testes around its seventh week of development. Then, during the eighth week, the testes will begin to produce testosterone, which allows male external genitalia to develop. However, if no SRY gene is present, then the undifferentiated embryo will not develop testes and will instead proceed to develop as female.

The SRY does not contain all the genetic information necessary for the development of all sexual characteristics, though. For that reason, people with Swyer syndrome, who have XY chromosomes without an SRY, or de la Chappelle syndrome, who have XX chromosomes with an SRY, do not fully develop the characteristics typical of either biological sex. Such conditions where a person’s body does not fully conform with expectations of male or female bodies are often considered intersex. Intersex is not a singular condition or a distinct biological sex. It is an umbrella term encompassing a variety of phenotypes, such as people with Swyer syndrome, de la Chappelle syndrome, Klinefelter syndrome, or Turner syndrome.

It was not until the 1990s that people began to publicly acknowledge that others could be born intersex. Throughout the twentieth century, when doctors encountered a child born intersex who had some characteristics less typical of their apparent biological sex, the doctors surgically altered the child so that their body fit the expectations of typical males or females. During the 1950s, scientists at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, created a model to forcibly alter children at birth and to help intersex children fit into society, claiming that doing so would maintain their psychological health in the long run. Then, during the 1960s, John Money, a controversial psychologist who researched sex identity in humans, provided support for the Johns Hopkins University model, stating that biological sex was changeable early in life. Money further stated that the manner in which parents raised their child mattered more to a child’s psychological health than their biological sex at birth. However, as intersex children who underwent forcible surgical alterations grew older, many of them were uncomfortable with their assigned biological sex, according to the Intersex Society of North America, or ISNA.

During the 1990s, feminists and intersex activists began to speak out against forcible surgical alterations and raise awareness about the intersex experience. In 1993, Anne Fausto-Sterling, a biologist and feminist activist, wrote articles for The New York Times and The Sciences. In the latter article, Fausto-Sterling explores what the world would be like if society accepted the existence of five genders aligned with being male, female, and three common types of intersex. In response to Fausto-Sterling’s articles, Cheryl Chase, an activist born intersex whose body was surgically altered to conform to a typical female’s, founded the ISNA to mobilize intersex people who had never felt comfortable with their altered bodies. The work of the ISNA, as well as scientists like Fausto-Sterling, helped raise awareness about intersexuality and that intersex people can grow up psychologically healthy without receiving surgical alteration.

The work of intersex advocates helped spread the knowledge that not all bodies strictly conform to typical male and female categories. In line with that, various scholars have called for reconceptualizing biological sex as a spectrum rather than a binary, as human bodies themselves do not consistently develop into two clearly delineated options, and can develop into many varieties beyond what is typically expected of males and females. However, such calls are met with continuous resistance, and those ideas have not been able to spread socially. As of 2021, many countries continue the practice of surgically altering intersex children at an age where the child is not able to give consent. Intersex people continue to fight to end such unconsensual practices that are founded on societal beliefs about how bodies should appear rather than on genuine medical need. Some organizations have amplified intersex people’s concerns, such as Human Rights Watch, which released an article in 2017 that called for an end to forcible surgical alterations on intersex children, deeming such alterations to be medically unnecessary. Nonetheless, social expectations of bodies to conform to male and female categories persist.

The slowly increasing understanding and acceptance of intersex people exemplifies how scientists and society still have a lot to learn about biological sex and the ways sex determination occurs in humans. Though biologists have an understanding that chromosome combinations influence the biological sex that an embryo develops as, biologists still know very little about the specific genes and mechanisms that control the sexual development pathway. Additionally, there are many factors beyond chromosomes that influence the sexual characteristics a person develops, and scientists are continually uncovering more intricacies in the development process. Finally, the events that lead to atypical sexual development have to be further explored.

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• Keierleber, Joseph. “How Chromosomes X and Y Got Their Names, 1891.” The Scientist , February 28, 2019. https://www.the-scientist.com/foundations/how-chromosomes-x-and-y-got-their-names--1891-65508 (Accessed February 7, 2021).
• Kölliker, Rudolf Albert. Embryologie, ou, Traité Complet du Développement de L’homme et des Animaux Supérieurs. [Embryology, or Complete Treatise on the Development of Man and Higher Animals]. Paris, 1882. https://www.biodiversitylibrary.org/item/108888#page/9/mode/1up (Accessed February 7, 2021).
• Kubiak, Jacek Z., Malgorzata Kloc, and Rafal P. Piprek. “History of the Research on Sex Determination.” BioMedical 25 (2020): 19104–12. https://biomedres.us/fulltexts/BJSTR.MS.ID.004194.php (Accessed February 6, 2021).
• Lopata, Alex. “History of the Egg in Embryology.” Journal of Mammalian Ova Research. Japanese Society of Mammalian Ova Research, April 1, 2009. https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jmor/26/1/26_1_2/_pdf/-char/en (Accessed February 7, 2021).
• Lyon, Mary F. “Charles Edmund Ford.” Biographical Memoirs of Fellow of the Royal Society 47 (2001): 189–201. https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rsbm.2001.0011 (Accessed February 7, 2021).
• Mayo Clinic. “Turner syndrome.” Mayo Clinic. https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/turner-syndrome/symptoms-causes/syc-20360782#:~:text=Turner%20syndrome%2C%20a%20condition%20that,to%20develop%20and%20heart%20defects (Accessed February 7, 2021).
• McClung, Clarence Erwin. “The Accessory Chromosome —Sex Determinant?” The Biological Bulletin 3 (1902): 43–84. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.2307/1535527 (Accessed February 7, 2021).
• Mittwoch, Ursula. “Sex Determination in Mythology and History.” Sociedade Brasileira de Endocrinologia e Metabologia 49 (2005): 7–13. https://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0004-27302005000100003 (Accessed February 7, 2021).
• O’Neill, Graeme. “Science; The Gene that Makes a Man of You.” NewScientist , July 21, 1990. https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg12717262-400-science-the-gene-that-makes-a-man-of-you/ (Accessed February 7, 2021).
• Ostrer, Harry. “Swyer Syndrome.” National Organization for Rare Disorders. https://rarediseases.org/rare-diseases/swyer-syndrome/ (Accessed February 7, 2021).
• Panning, Barbara. “X-Chromosome Inactivation: The Molecular Basis of Silencing.” Journal of Biology 7 (2008) https://jbiol.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/jbiol95 (Accessed February 7, 2021).
• Pansky, Ben. “The Development of the Female Genital System: Ovarian Differentiation.” In Review of Medical Embryology. McGraw-Hill, 1982. https://discovery.lifemapsc.com/library/review-of-medical-embryology/chapter-104-development-of-the-female-genital-system-ovarian-differentiation (Accessed February 7, 2021).
• Rastan, Sohaila. “Mary F. Lyon.” Nature 518 (2015): 36. https://www.nature.com/articles/518036a (Accessed February 7, 2021).
• Sinclair, Andrew H., Philippe Berta, Mark S. Palmer, J. Ross Hawkins, Beatrice L. Griffiths, Matthijs J. Smith, Jamie W. Foster, Anna-Maria Frischauf, Robin Lovell-Badge, and Peter N. Goodfellow. “A Gene From the Human Sex-Determining Region Encodes a Protein With Homology to a Conserved DNA-Binding Motif.” Nature 346 (1990): 240–4. http://home.iitk.ac.in/~sganesh/hmg/pdf/sinclair%20-%20sry%201990.PDF (Accessed February 7, 2021).
• Stevens, Nettie M. Studies in Spermatogenesis. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1905. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=pP0CAAAAIAAJ (Accessed February 7, 2021).
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• United Nations Human Rights Council. “Intersex Awareness Day – Wednesday 26 October.” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. October 24, 2016. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20739&LangID=E (Accessed February 7, 2021).
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How To Take Good Care Of Your Reproductive System

Whether you want to have a baby or maximize your overall health, knowing how to take good care of your reproductive system is crucial for a happy and long life. Unfortunately, in the United States, one in eight couples will encounter challenges when trying to conceive. In order to avoid complications, both women and men must prioritize reproductive health and wellness. But how to take good care of your reproductive system? What do you need to do to ensure that you avoid all reproductive health issues? Luckily, you have stumbled on the right article. Below, you will learn everything there is to know about the reproductive system and how to take care of it to stay healthy. Before anything else, make sure to talk to a medical professional for expert advice. If you are located in the area or searching for the best, consult with an OBGYN in Coral Springs, Florida .

That said, here is how to ward off all reproductive health issues and maximize life quality.

A Woman’s Reproductive System: A Brief Overview

A woman’s internal reproductive organs include the uterus, the ovaries, the vagina, and the fallopian tubes. Overall, the female reproductive system is made out of external and internal organs, and it is responsible for sexual activity, menstruation, and fertility. 

The main parts of the external genitals or the vulva include:

• Labia minora
• Labia majora
• Vaginal opening
• Urethra opening

On the other hand, the internal parts include:

• Fallopian tubes

A woman’s reproductive system provides a number of functions. Besides allowing the woman to engage in sexual intercourse, the reproductive system will help an individual reproduce. As you may know, eggs are produced by the ovaries. During ovulation, the eggs get transported to the fallopian tube, where the fertilization process may happen. When the egg is fertilized, it moves to the uterus. This is where the uterine lining thickens in response to normal menstrual cycle hormones. Once it is in the uterus, the fertilized egg may implant into the uterine lining and develop. Without implantation, the uterine lining sheds during a menstrual period. Additionally, a woman’s reproductive system will produce sex hormones to keep a healthy menstrual cycle.

Women who enter menopause will gradually stop creating female hormones needed for regular menstrual cycles. During this life stage, the cycles can be irregular, eventually stopping. Menopausal women do not have menstrual periods anymore.

How to Take Good Care of Your Reproductive System: Follow These Steps

Taking care of your reproductive system should not feel like a burden. By implementing some (or all) of the steps outlined below, you will ensure that your health is in check and that you do not run into infertility complications. Unfortunately, more recently, an increasing number of individuals have led an unhealthy lifestyle that can wreak havoc on reproductive health. For instance, engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse can boost your chances of contracting different sexually transmitted diseases or STDs. As a result, a person with an STD (that is left untreated) can encounter problems, ultimately leading to infertility.

Consult with a healthcare professional such as Dr. White-Videa to receive an expert diagnosis and the best possible treatment for you. Staying on track with regular doctor’s appointments is vital to ensure that your reproductive system remains healthy and strong.

With that in mind, here are some of the best ways to boost reproductive health and wellness.

Get Treated for Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs) Immediately

Each year in the United States, around 19 million individuals contract sexually transmitted diseases or STDs. The good news is that there are some effective ways to lower the chances of getting infected. The number one way to ensure optimal reproductive health and wellness is to educate yourself on STDs, how to protect yourself, and how to get treated. If you believe that you have an STD or that you have been exposed to one, make sure to get tested as soon as possible. You will also want your partner to get tested and receive adequate treatment if the results are positive.

In some cases, an STD does not display symptoms. However, if symptoms are present, they can include unusual discharge, foul-smelling discharge, burning and itching sensations, and vaginal pain. Stay consistent with testing and screening schedules, as these can help you protect yourself from STDs.

Quit Smoking and Alcohol Use

Smoking and alcohol consumption is linked to many reproductive health issues. For example, most smokers and alcohol users also face infertility and other complications. Not only will quitting tobacco and alcohol use help increase fertility levels, but it will bring about plenty of positive health changes. In men, smoking can affect semen volume and lower sperm count. As for women, smoking up to 20 cigarettes daily can affect regular menstrual cycles and lower egg count. 

Always Use Contraception

Using contraception is the best way to plan pregnancies and ensure that the mother and the baby are healthy. Approximately 49 percent of all pregnancies in the United States are unplanned. Planning your pregnancy will help you become the healthiest version of yourself, so your baby can grow strong. Experts recommend using intrauterine devices or IUDs as a long-term option. We suggest condoms, as these also help protect against sexually transmitted diseases.

Keep Your Weight Under Control

If you are overweight or underweight, you can experience fertility problems. Controlling weight is also important for men. Namely, when a man is overweight and has increased body fat, the sperm count can be affected. On the other hand, underweight or overweight women can deal with ovulation complications and possible miscarriages. Hence, we recommend managing your weight and reaching a healthy balance to avoid reproductive health issues.

Take Supplements to Boost Your Health

If you are trying to have a baby and you want to increase your chances of conception, experts recommend staying away from smoking, drinking, and getting tested regularly. First, focus on implementing these changes into your daily life. If your doctor approves, you can also consider supplementing with prenatal DHA and Omega-3 fatty acids. Your doctor may also suggest taking 800mg of folic acid regularly. As for men, Coenzyme Q10 and multivitamins yield the best results. 

Eat a Nourishing and Balanced Diet

What you eat matters. To improve your reproductive health and increase fertility levels, experts recommend consuming a healthy and wholesome diet full of vitamins, minerals, and high-quality protein. Make sure to eat a lot of fiber-rich foods and whole grains. Unfortunately, many people rely on processed foods full of sugar, refined flour, and unhealthy fats. While many of these foods tend to taste delicious and addictive, they can contribute to weight gain and infertility. 

Instead, incorporate many fresh vegetables, fruits, Omega-3 fatty acids (such as seafood, chia seeds, flax seeds, nuts, and salmon), and quality sources of protein (like tofu, chicken breast, fat-free yogurt, and grass-fed beef). On the flip side, minimize processed foods and avoid caffeine.

Reach Out to Us Today

Take care of your mental and physical health and improve your life today. Do you need extra help? Worry not; we’re here. Reach out to the best OBGYN in Coral Springs, Florida, and make an appointment today. You are worth it.

• Biology Article
• Male Reproductive System

The male reproductive system includes testes, external genitalia, i.e. penis and accessory ducts, viz., rete testis, vasa efferentia, epididymis and vas deferens. Unlike the female reproductive system, most parts of the male reproductive system are located outside the body. Apart from these parts, the male reproductive system also includes the male accessory glands that are prostate glands, seminal vesicles and bulbourethral glands.

Table of Contents:

What is reproduction, labelled diagram of male reproductive system, male accessory glands, frequently asked questions.

Reproduction is the biological process of producing offspring of the same kind. It is one of the essential processes that help in providing the continuation of the species, generation after generation.

There are two different types of reproduction:

• Sexual reproduction.
• Asexual reproduction.

Sexual reproduction includes the fusion of male and female gametes that are produced inside the male and female reproductive parts, respectively.

Asexual reproduction does not involve the fusion of male and female gametes. Only one parent is involved and the offspring produced is genetically identical to the parent.

Let’s have a look at the male reproductive system that represents different parts or organs of the male reproductive system with a labelled diagram.

Male reproductive system diagram

Male reproductive system

The male reproductive system includes the testes, scrotum, spermatic ducts, male accessory glands, and penis. All these organs work together to produce sperms, the male gamete, male sex hormones and other components of semen.

• Penis and Urethra are a part of both the reproductive and urinary systems.
• Scrotum, seminal vesicles, vas deferens, testicles (testes), and prostate constitute all the remaining male  reproductive system .

The Penis has a root that is connected to the structures of both the pelvic bones and lower abdominal (the shaft’s visible part) glands that has a cone-shaped end. The urethra’s opening is the channel that carries semen and urine and lies at the tip of the penis. The base of the penis is known as Corona.

It is the male external genitalia. It involves three cylindrical spaces of erectile tissue. The two of which are larger, the corpora cavernosa lie side by side and the third one is the sinus, called corpus spongiosum covers the urethra. The penis becomes rigid when these spaces are filled with blood. The tissues help in the erection of the penis and facilitate insemination. The foreskin covers the enlarged end of the penis called glans penis.

It is a sac of thick skin that protects and surrounds the testes. It also controls the temperature of the testes since they have to be at a slightly lower temperature than the body temperature for suitable sperm creation. The muscles in the wall allow the testes to hang far from the body or shrink to pull them closer for protection and warmth.

A pair of testes are present in humans. Testes are present outside the body in a pouch called the scrotum. They are oval bodies, around 4 to 5 cm in length and 2 to 3 cm wide. Generally, the left testis hangs slightly lower than the right one.

The two primary functions of tests are as follows:

• Producing testosterone – a male sex hormone .
• Producing sperms or spermatogenesis – a carrier of man’s genes.

Each testis contains about 250 testicular lobules or compartments.

Sperms are produced in the seminiferous tubules. Each testicular lobule contains one to three seminiferous tubules. Seminiferous tubules are lined by two types of cells:

• Spermatogonia or male germ cells – They undergo spermatogenesis to produce sperm.
• Sertoli cells – They provide nutrition to germ cells.

Leydig cells or interstitial cells are present outside the seminiferous tubules in the interstitial spaces. They secrete male sex hormones or androgens, e.g. testosterone.

Male Sex Accessory Ducts

Rete testis, vasa efferentia, epididymis and vas deferens are male sex accessory ducts. Seminiferous tubules open into rete testis, which leads to vasa efferentia. Vasa efferentia opens into the epididymis and epididymis leads to vas deferens. It leads to the ejaculatory duct along with a duct from the seminal vesicle. Sperms mature in these ducts. Sperms are stored and transported through these ducts.

It is a tube-like structure that connects the urinary bladder to the urinary meatus. In males, the urethra travels through the penis and is mainly involved in two main functions:

• This region is included in the urinary tract that takes urine from the bladder where semen is ejaculated.
• The Prostate exists beneath the bladder and covers the urethra. The prostate grows larger with age. If the prostate grows too much, it can block the urine flow through the urethra and be responsible for some urinary symptoms.

The male accessory glands include seminal vesicles, prostate and bulbourethral glands. A pair of seminal vesicles are present. The Seminal vesicles are present over the prostate, linked with the vas deferens to create the ejaculatory ducts that travel through the prostate. The male accessory glands generate fluid that nourishes the sperm. It is called seminal plasma. This fluid is rich in fructose, calcium and certain enzymes. It constitutes the maximum volume of the semen, wherein the sperm is ejected during ejaculation.

To know more about the male and female reproductive system, visit BYJU’S.

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What are the primary and accessory sex organs in males?

Testes are the primary sex organs in males. The accessory sex organs include the prostate gland, seminal vesicles, urethra and penis.

What are the structures of testes?

Males have two testes that are suspended in a sac-like structure called the scrotum. The testes are made of coiled tubules called the seminiferous tubules. These tubules continue as vas efferens which then form the epididymis and continue as vas deferens. The terminal part of vas deferens is called the ampulla.

What is external and internal genitalia?

The reproductive organs are generally classified into the external and internal genitalia. External genital organs in males are the scrotum, urethra and penis. The remaining sex organs constitute the internal genitalia.

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From where AMH (anti mullerine hormone) Is secreted ? Please Sir recommend for me.

AMH is produced in the testicles during the very early stages of the foetus’s development.

Nice summary of chapter repr6

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The Teen Trend of Sexual Choking

More from our inbox:, emergency abortions and the supreme court, our father, who led columbia, would be saddened today, hiring discrimination, trump’s own ‘fake news’.

To the Editor:

Re “ Why We Need to Talk About Teen Sex ,” by Peggy Orenstein (Opinion guest essay, April 14):

As a psychotherapist and psychoanalyst who has worked for decades with teens and college-age students, I’m disturbed but not surprised by the trend of choking during sex.

Choking is obviously very dangerous, and unfortunately, social media has made this once uncommon practice more mainstream.

Education is the key with both our youth and parents. Yes, sexual strangulation needs to be part of ongoing conversations about safe sex practices. There clearly needs to be more accountability about this behavior.

There is a line, a boundary, where rough sex, whether it’s consensual or not, crosses into danger, causing devastating long-term effects for participants.

Arden Greenspan Goldberg San Diego

While reading this essay, I was reminded of how feminist writers and activists waved warning flags about the pernicious effects of pornography on women back in the 1970s and ’80s. They published books and essays on the subject, marched in demonstrations and spoke out in the media. They were continually derided as prudes and censors.

Decades later, with violent porn pervasive online and a generation of young women subjected to the sadistic sexual violence normalized by porn, it turns out those prudes and censors were actually Cassandras.

I thank Peggy Orenstein and the researchers in this story for bringing new attention to the issue.

J. Jamakaya Milwaukee

I taught a course on human sexuality to college students during the AIDS epidemic. When I heard about sexual strangulation, I considered briefly: Should I link this practice to arousal and orgasm when speaking to these high-risk young people? I knew that many would then experiment. I chose not to mention it, but I taught them, through role play, how to verbally refuse inappropriate sexual invitations.

Today, I hope instructors in my position will discuss with their students sexual strangulation with a potential partner and help them practice responding to sexual pressure.

Pornography makes partners look willing. Evolution favored a strong sex drive. The planet doesn’t need it anymore.

Elizabeth Powell St. Louis The writer is the author of “Talking Back to Sexual Pressure.”

Re “ 5 Takeaways From the Supreme Court Arguments on Idaho’s Abortion Ban ” (nytimes.com, April 24):

Reading about the hearing at the Supreme Court, I was taken aback at the careful attention some justices paid to ensuring that physicians whose conscience precludes them from performing abortions are excused from violating their beliefs. But some doctors are being forced to violate their conscience by being prevented from performing an abortion on patients whose precarious condition might decline precipitously without such a procedure.

Being forced to refuse medically indicated aid, knowing that the dire consequences violate the Hippocratic oath to do no harm, is an affront to their consciences, which must be considered with the same attention.

Susan Swartz Philadelphia

Re “ On Emergency Abortion Access, Justices Seem Sharply Divided ” (nytimes.com, April 24):

You write that since the Dobbs decision overturning Roe v. Wade, uncertainty about the parameters for legal abortion in several states has led to complaints about doctors being forced to “think like lawyers.”

I am equally concerned that complex medical decisions are being made by nine lawyers being forced to think like doctors.

Jon D. Morrow New York The writer is an obstetrician-gynecologist.

Our father, Michael I. Sovern , played a leading role in resolving Columbia’s 1968 protests. He served as Columbia’s only Jewish president, from 1980 to 1993, and helped negotiate a peaceful end to weeks of anti-apartheid demonstrations.

We cannot know what our father, who died in 2020, would do if he were still president, but we have no doubt he would be deeply saddened by what is happening at the university that he loved and served for more than 60 years.

We believe that he would not want politicians and outsiders not affiliated with Columbia to exploit sincere student protest for their own gains, and, as in the 1980s, he would want protesters to ensure that they do not keep the university from providing the excellent education from which he and so many others benefited.

Finally, we know he would agree that anyone expressing opposition to the Israeli government or Hamas should not make Jewish or Palestinian students feel attacked or unsafe.

Jeff Sovern Elizabeth Sovern Doug Sovern Julie Sovern

Re “ Study Uses Fake Résumés to Measure Bias in Hiring ” (The Upshot, April 15):

The study on hiring discrimination in large U.S. companies, as reported in your story, highlights the importance of social capital in landing a job, especially for people of color.

The study found that even with equivalent qualifications, applicants with Black-sounding names were contacted by employers nearly 10 percent less often than those with white-sounding names.

In a world where such discriminatory hiring practices persist, the ability to build social capital — the relationships and networks that help open doors and advance someone in their career and life pursuits — is paramount.

Research shows that social capital — and in particular, cross-class relationships — is the greatest predictor of economic mobility. Educational institutions, from high schools to community colleges and trade schools, should prioritize helping students build social capital.

By teaching them how to build relationships, facilitating connections with industry professionals, creating mentorship programs that pair students with successful alumni, and, most important, teaching students how to make meaningful requests of those alumni, we can put more people on the path to successful careers.

Because opportunity should hinge on merit, not a name.

Nitzan Pelman Berkeley, Calif. The writer is C.E.O. of Climb Hire Labs, a national nonprofit teaching students and job seekers the art of building social capital.

Re “ Witness Recalls Burying Stories to Shield Trump ” (front page, April 24):

Finally, we have a rather compelling example of that “fake news” that Donald Trump has been ranting about for years.

He not only sought to bury damaging stories. It turns out that he and his fixer, Michael Cohen, working closely with David Pecker, the publisher of The National Enquirer, also concocted and released wholly untrue stories about his political opponents (for example, “Donald Trump Blasts Ted Cruz’s Dad for Photo With J.F.K. Assassin”). So says Mr. Pecker, under oath, in a Manhattan courtroom.

James P. Pehl Marlborough, Mass.

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Anita hill on harvey weinstein reversal: “our movement will persist”.

The workplace rights advocate and head of the Hollywood Commission on what the court’s ruling reveals about misconceptions around sexual violence and how victims and survivors can keep moving forward.

By Anita Hill

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This week’s reversal of Harvey Weinstein’s conviction sent shockwaves through survivor communities. It’s grossly ironic, if not outright cynical, that the release comes during Sexual Assault Awareness Month; it says volumes about the contemporary reality of sexual assault and the limits of legal protections against it.

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Harvey weinstein hospitalized after his rape conviction was overturned in new york, harvey weinstein set to make new york court appearance may 1.

At the heart of the Court’s decision is the ruling that testimony of women who alleged that Weinstein had committed similar prior sexual acts against them was inadmissible. The Court concluded that, rather than offering context for the behavior that three named complainants testified to, the experiences of other women were irrelevant and prejudicial to Weinstein — no matter how similar those experiences were.

But there is another way of looking at this additional testimony — one that is astutely cited by the dissents. In her dissent, Judge Madeline Singas made a compelling argument that the contextual evidence provided in the trial was necessary to rebut antiquated notions about sexual violence that persist in society and among jurors; she noted that the majority opinion “whitewash[es] the facts to conform to a he-said/she-said narrative” — one person’s testimony against another’s, each carrying equal weight. Judge Anthony Cannataro concluded in a separate dissent that “the majority decision represented an unfortunate step backwards from … our understanding of how sex crimes are perpetrated … endangering decades of progress in this incredibly complex and nuanced area of law.”

The majority opinion reflects one view of justice; the dissents another. While we can thank movements like #MeToo for creating an awareness of the pervasive reality of sexual violence, the Court’s interpretation of the law marks a disturbing setback .  Unless and until the New York decides to retry Weinstein, for now this case defines survivor justice for the state of New York.

But that does not mean that this decision will be the final word for victims and survivors. As they have participated in the movement against sexual violence, trauma survivors have, over time, developed their own vision of justice; in her recent book  Truth and Repair , renowned trauma expert and psychiatry professor Judith L. Herman writes that if “secrecy and denial are first line of abusers’ defense,” then public truth telling and “recognizing the survivor’s claim to justice must be the moral community’s first act of solidarity.” Indeed, the Weinstein case may be a rallying cry, to survivors and their communities !

Now, communities must decide how they will ensure justice for sexual abuse survivors.

While many survivors and victims of sexual assault and rape may feel abandoned by the Court, we all can play a role in assuring them that they are not alone. Everyone who wants to see the end of sexual violence must know that no single legal ruling can ever upend the tremendous progress we have made together. By the truth of our testimonies, our movement will persist. And changes to our systems and culture will follow.

Dr. Anita Hill is chair and president of the Hollywood Commission, founded in 2017 to tackle abuse in the entertainment industry, a university professor at Brandeis University , and a member of the Board of Directors of the National Women’s Law Center. Her congressional testimony alleging she was sexually harassed by Justice Clarence Thomas prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court changed the national conversation around workplace abuse and power disparity.

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Trump lawyers say Stormy Daniels refused subpoena outside a Brooklyn bar, papers left ‘at her feet’

Jury selection in Donald Trump’s hush money trial has encountered new setbacks as two seated jurors were excused. Attorneys now need to pick 13 more jurors to serve on the panel.(AP Video: David R. Martin)

FILE - Stormy Daniels appears at an event, May 23, 2018, in West Hollywood, Calif. The hush money trial of former President Donald Trump begins Monday, April 15, 2024, with jury selection. It’s the first criminal trial of a former U.S. commander-in-chief. The charges in the trial center on $130,000 in payments that Trump’s company made to his then-lawyer, Michael Cohen. He paid that sum on Trump’s behalf to keep Daniels from going public, a month before the election, with her claims of a sexual encounter with Trump a decade earlier. (AP Photo/Ringo H.W. Chiu, File)

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Former President Donald Trump approaches to speak to reporters as he leaves a Manhattan courtroom after the second day of his criminal trial, Tuesday, April 16, 2024 in New York. (AP Photo/Mary Altaffer, Pool)

The latest: Get live updates from Donald Trump’s hush money trial

NEW YORK (AP) — Donald Trump’s legal team says it tried serving Stormy Daniels a subpoena as she arrived for an event at a bar in Brooklyn last month, but the porn actor, who is expected to be a witness at the former president’s criminal trial , refused to take it and walked away.

A process server working for Trump’s lawyers said he approached Daniels with papers demanding information related to a documentary recently released about her life and involvement with Trump, but was forced to “leave them at her feet,” according to a court filing made public Wednesday.

“I stated she was served as I identified her and explained to her what the documents were,” process server Dominic DellaPorte wrote. “She did not acknowledge me and kept walking inside the venue, and she had no expression on her face.”

The encounter, prior to a screening of the “Stormy” film at the 3 Dollar Bill nightclub, has touched off a monthlong battle between Trump’s lawyers and Daniels’ attorney that continued this week as the presumptive Republican nominee’s criminal trial began in Manhattan.

Trump’s lawyers are asking Judge Juan M. Merchan to force Daniels to comply with the subpoena. In their filing, they included a photo they said DellaPorte took of Daniels as she strode away.

Daniels’ lawyer Clark Brewster claims they never received the paperwork. He described the requests as an “unwarranted fishing expedition” with no relevance to Trump’s criminal trial.

“The process — instituted on the eve of trial — appears calculated to cause harassment and/or intimidation of a lay witness,” Brewster wrote in an April 9 letter to Merchan. Brewster didn’t immediately reply to a message from The Associated Press seeking comment.

The hush money case is the first of Trump’s four criminal cases to go to trial. Seven jurors have been seated so far. Jury selection is set to resume Thursday.

Daniels is expected to testify about a $130,000 payment she got in 2016 from one of Trump’s lawyers at the time, Michael Cohen, in order to stop her from speaking publicly about a sexual encounter she said she had with Trump years earlier.

Cohen was later reimbursed by Trump’s company for that payment. Trump is accused of falsifying his company’s records to hide the nature of that payment, and other work he did to bury negative stories during the 2016 campaign.

Trump pleaded not guilty last year to 34 felony counts of falsifying business records. He denies having a sexual encounter with Daniels. His lawyers argue the payments to Cohen were legitimate legal expenses, and were recorded correctly.

In a separate filing made public Wednesday, the Manhattan district attorney’s office said that if Trump chooses to testify at the trial, prosecutors plan to challenge his credibility by questioning him about his recent legal setbacks. The filing was made last month under seal.

Trump was recently ordered to pay a $454 million civil penalty following a trial in which a judge ruled he had lied about his wealth on financial statements. In another trial, a jury said he was liable for $83.3 million for defaming writer E. Jean Carroll after she accused him of sexual assault.

Merchan said he plans to hold a hearing Friday to decide whether that will be allowed.

Under New York law, prosecutors can question witnesses about past legal matters in certain circumstances. Trump’s lawyers are opposed. Trump has said he wants to testify, but he is not required to and can always change his mind.

As for the subpoena dispute, it marks the latest attempt by Trump’s lawyers to knock loose potentially damaging information about Daniels, a key prosecution witness.

They are demanding an array of documents related to the promotion and editing of the documentary, “Stormy,” which explores Daniels’ career in the adult film industry and rise to celebrity since her alleged involvement with Trump became publicly known.

They are also requesting Daniels reveal how much, if anything, she was compensated for the film.

Trump’s lawyers contend the film’s premiere last month on NBC’s Peacock streaming service — a week before the trial was originally scheduled to start — stoked negative publicity about Trump, muddying his ability to get a fair trial.

In the filings made public Wednesday, Trump’s attorneys accuse Daniels of “plainly seeking to promote her brand and make money based on her status as a witness.”

The subpoena also demands communications between Daniels and other likely witnesses in the trial, including Cohen and Karen McDougal, a former Playboy model who alleges she had an affair with Trump. It also requests any communications between Daniels and Carroll.

Earlier this month, Merchan blocked an attempt by Trump to subpoena NBC Universal for information related to the documentary. He wrote that subpoena and the demands therein “are the very definition of a fishing expedition.”