essay on types of humanity

Essay on Humanity

500 words essay on humanity.

When we say humanity, we can look at it from a lot of different perspectives. One of the most common ways of understanding is that it is a value of kindness and compassion towards other beings. If you look back at history, you will find many acts of cruelty by humans but at the same time, there are also numerous acts of humanity. An essay on humanity will take us through its meaning and importance.

Importance of Humanity

As humans are progressing as a human race into the future, the true essence of humanity is being corrupted slowly. It is essential to remember that the acts of humanity must not have any kind of personal gain behind them like fame, money or power.

The world we live in today is divided by borders but the reach we can have is limitless. We are lucky enough to have the freedom to travel anywhere and experience anything we wish for. A lot of nations fight constantly to acquire land which results in the loss of many innocent lives.

Similarly, other humanitarian crisis like the ones in Yemen, Syria, Myanmar and more costs the lives of more than millions of people. The situation is not resolving anytime soon, thus we need humanity for this.

Most importantly, humanity does not just limit to humans but also caring for the environment and every living being. We must all come together to show true humanity and help out other humans, animals and our environment to heal and prosper.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

The Great Humanitarians

There are many great humanitarians who live among us and also in history. To name a few, we had Mother Teresa , Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Princess Diana and more. These are just a few of the names which almost everyone knows.

Mother Teresa was a woman who devoted her entire life to serving the poor and needy from a nation. Rabindranath Tagore was an Indian poet who truly believed in humanity and considered it his true religion.

Similarly, Nelson Mandela was a great humanitarian who worked all his life for those in needs. He never discriminated against any person on the basis of colour, sex, creed or anything.

Further, Mahatma Gandhi serves as a great example of devoting his life to free his country and serve his fellow countrymen. He died serving the country and working for the betterment of his nation. Thus, we must all take inspiration from such great people.

The acts and ways of these great humanitarians serve as a great example for us now to do better in our life. We must all indulge in acts of giving back and coming to help those in need. All in all, humanity arises from selfless acts of compassion.

Conclusion of the Essay on Humanity

As technology and capitalism are evolving at a faster rate in this era, we must all spread humanity wherever possible. When we start practising humanity, we can tackle many big problems like global warming, pollution , extinction of animals and more.

FAQ of Essay on Humanity

Question 1: What is the importance of humanity?

Answer 1: Humanity refers to caring for and helping others whenever and wherever possible. It means helping others at times when they need that help the most. It is important as it helps us forget our selfish interests at times when others need our help.

Question 2: How do we show humanity?

Answer 2: All of us are capable of showing humanity. It can be through acknowledging that human beings are equal, regardless of gender, sex, skin colour or anything. We must all model genuine empathy and show gratitude to each other and express respect and humility.

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• Essay On Humanity

Essay on Humanity

Humanity definition.

Humanity is a cumulative term used for all human beings, showing sympathy, empathy, love and treating others with respect. The term humanity is used to describe the act of kindness and compassion towards others. It is one of the unique things that differentiates us from animals. It is a value that binds all of us. A human being requires a gentle heart to show empathy with others.

We as human beings are creative, and with our will and hard work, we can achieve anything in our life. When we reach something in our life, it is considered a milestone of the human race. The value of humanity should be included in academics in schools for a better future.

Humanity can be defined as unconditional love for all human beings irrespective of gender, caste, religion, etc., and it also includes love for plants and animals. The most significant humanitarian dedicates their life serving the poor and needy, which individuals can provide in their lifetime. Serving the impoverished means you are thinking about others more than yourself. If you are capable enough, you must help the poor and needy. It is a sign of good humanitarianism.

Importance of Humanity

As humans, our race is progressing into the future, due to which the true essence of humanity is being corrupted. We should remember that the acts of society should not be involved with our gain, like money, power or fame. Our world, where we inhabit, is divided by borders, but we are fortunate to have the freedom to travel anywhere in this world. A few countries or nations are in the constant process of acquiring land, which results in the loss of many innocent human lives.

Countries like Syria, Yemen, Myanmar and many more have lost many innocent lives. These countries face a crisis, and the situation is still not resolved. In these countries, there is no humanity, but we need it to tackle the ongoing problems. We all should come forward to show true humanity by helping the poor and needy and also for birds, animals, etc. Society will heal and make our environment prosperous.

The Great Humanitarians

While going through our history, we get to know about many humanitarians who used to live among us. These names are well-known personalities that almost everyone knows. A few examples are Nelson Mandala, Mahatma Gandhi, Mother Teresa, etc.

Mahatma Gandhi, popularly known as the Father of the Nation, is a great example who devoted his entire life to free his country from the British rulers. He lost his life serving the nation and working to better the nation. Thus, he is a great inspiration for all humans.

Another inspiration is Nelson Mandela, a great humanitarian who served the poor and needy of the nation. The great poet Rabindranath Tagore truly believed in humanity.

These famous humanitarians’ acts and ways are great examples for today’s generation to help the poor and needy. As good human beings, we should indulge in acts of kindness and giving back. Humanity is all about selfless acts of compassion.

Conclusion of the Essay on Humanity

The happiest man on this planet is one who serves humanity. Real happiness is the inner satisfaction you can get from society; no matter how rich you are, you can’t buy inner happiness.

All religions teach us about humanity, love, and peace in this world. You don’t need to be a rich person to showcase your humanity. Anyone can show their humanity by helping and sharing things with the poor. It can be anything like money, food, clothes, shelter, etc.

But humans have always indulged in acts that defy humanity, but as a generation, we have to rise and strive to live in a world where everybody is living a fair life. And we can attain it through acts of humanity.

An essay on humanity will be of great help while writing an essay. The correct method of writing an essay will help them to crack their exam with flying colours. Students can also visit our BYJU’S website to get more CBSE Essays , question papers, sample papers, etc.

Frequently asked Questions on Humanity Essay

What is the meaning of humanity.

Humanity refers to all the basic qualities that are expected to be exhibited by humans.

Why is humanity important in one’s life?

As a human being, helping and lending support to fellow human beings is an important aspect.

Name some humanitarians who changed the world.

Mother Teresa, Nelson Mandela and Mahatma Gandhi are some humanitarians who changed the world with their actions and are still remembered today.

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Essay on Humanity

Students are often asked to write an essay on Humanity in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Humanity

Understanding humanity.

Humanity is the quality of being human. It involves kindness, empathy, and respect for all living beings. It’s about helping others, understanding their feelings, and acting with compassion.

Importance of Humanity

Humanity is crucial because it brings people together. It helps us understand and respect differences. It’s the foundation of peace and harmony in the world.

Practicing Humanity

We can practice humanity by helping others, showing kindness, and understanding people’s feelings. Even small acts of kindness can make a big difference.

In conclusion, humanity is an essential quality that makes us truly human. It’s about kindness, empathy, and respect for all.

Also check:

• 10 Lines on Humanity
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250 Words Essay on Humanity

Introduction.

Humanity, a term that signifies the quality of being human, is a complex yet profound concept. It encompasses a broad range of characteristics, including empathy, compassion, understanding, and respect for all life forms. These qualities, which are deeply rooted in our moral and ethical frameworks, form the essence of humanity.

Humanity: A Complex Interplay

Humanity is not a standalone trait but a complex interplay of various elements. It involves the ability to understand and empathize with others’ experiences and emotions, thereby fostering connections that transcend cultural, racial, or social barriers. This empathetic connection is the foundation of a harmonious coexistence, where respect for diversity and acceptance of differences are paramount.

Moral Imperative of Humanity

One of the fundamental imperatives of humanity is to act morally and ethically. This involves making decisions that respect the rights, dignity, and freedom of others. It means standing against injustices, advocating for the marginalized, and striving for equity and equality.

Humanity and Sustainability

Humanity also extends to our relationship with the natural world. It involves recognizing our role in the ecosystem, acknowledging our responsibilities towards other species, and striving for sustainable practices that ensure the well-being of our planet.

In essence, humanity is the embodiment of the best aspects of human nature. It is a call to action for each individual to demonstrate empathy, respect, and kindness, not only towards fellow humans but towards all life forms. As we navigate through the complexities of the 21st century, the true measure of our advancement will be gauged not by technological prowess, but by the depth of our humanity.

500 Words Essay on Humanity

Introduction to humanity.

Humanity, a term that signifies the quality of being human, encompasses a multitude of facets. It is a profound concept that embodies compassion, empathy, and mutual respect among individuals. It is the very essence that differentiates us from other species, reflecting our ability to think, comprehend, and express emotions.

The Essence of Humanity

The essence of humanity lies in its intrinsic qualities – love, kindness, and altruism. These are the virtues that bind us together, fostering a sense of belonging and unity. Compassion, a fundamental aspect of humanity, is reflected when we empathize with others’ pain and strive to alleviate their suffering. It is this empathy that fuels our desire to help others, transcending the barriers of race, religion, and nationality.

Humanity and Society

Humanity plays a pivotal role in shaping society. It is the foundation upon which social norms, ethics, and laws are built. It fosters a sense of responsibility towards fellow beings, promoting social harmony and peace. However, the manifestation of humanity is not limited to interpersonal relationships. It extends to our relationship with the environment, urging us to respect and preserve it for future generations.

The Challenges to Humanity

Despite its significance, humanity is often challenged by various factors. Prejudice, discrimination, and violence are stark reminders of the erosion of human values. The rise of technology, while providing numerous benefits, has also led to a decline in human interaction, thus impacting our capacity for empathy and understanding.

Humanity in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

In the era of artificial intelligence, the concept of humanity has taken on new dimensions. As machines become increasingly capable of mimicking human behavior, the question arises – what truly distinguishes us as humans? The answer lies in our ability to feel, empathize, and act out of compassion – traits that machines, despite their sophistication, cannot truly replicate.

Conclusion: The Importance of Upholding Humanity

In conclusion, humanity is not merely a trait; it is a way of life. It is a guiding principle that urges us to act with kindness, respect, and empathy. Despite the challenges we face, it is imperative that we uphold the values of humanity. For it is these values that define us as a species, fostering a sense of community, promoting peace, and driving us towards a better future. As we navigate through the complexities of the modern world, let us remember that our strength lies in our humanity.

In the end, it is not our technological advancements or material possessions that define us, but our ability to empathize, love, and respect – the fundamental qualities that make us truly human.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

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Your Guide to Writing a Humanity Essay

Humanity is showing compassion and kindness to others. Writing a humanity essay involves analyzing various aspects of humanity in detail. This article gives you a guide on how to write a humanity essay.

Humanity essay examines the traits, beliefs, relationships, and experiences of people. It focuses on what it is to be human, as well as the struggles, victories, and bonds we make. The human experience is vast and complex, and writing a humanity essay paper allows you to explore this whether your assignment is to write on historical events, personal experiences, philosophical ideas, or societal issues.

How to write a humanity essay

Below is how you write a humanity essay:

• Choose a topic

Humanity is a broad subject thus you should narrow it down to one of its subtopics. For instance, on a topic like war, you can narrow down to the causes and effects of a war. You should choose a topic that you are interested in and compose a good essay about it.

• Write an essay outline

After choosing the topic, you should conduct in-depth research and write the information from the research in an essay outline. You should properly structure your essay outline where you note down the key points of every section of the essay. This includes the introduction, the body, and the conclusion. Once you start writing your humanity essay, you should use the essay outline as the point of reference.

• Write the introduction

You should begin the introduction with a hook to grab the reader’s attention. This could be an interesting fact about your topic or a rhetorical question. Give background information on the topic and state its relevance. Write a strong thesis statement describing the essay’s main idea. For a better understanding of how to write the introduction, you should research various humanities essay introduction examples.

• Write the body

The body describes the essay’s theme in depth. You should write well-structured paragraphs with a topic sentence that introduces the paragraph’s key point. Then write middle sentences giving fact-based information or examples of the paragraph’s key point. You should also give your interpretation. Complete the paragraphs with a concluding sentence.

Each paragraph should have a unique key point and if two paragraphs are about the same point use proper transition words such as ‘in addition’, ‘however’, or ‘moreover’. When writing the paragraphs, you should explore the essay’s theme giving your analysis and backing it with factual information or statistics. Always cite all the sources you researched your essay from using the instructed writing format.

• Write the conclusion

The conclusion is a summary of the humanity essay thus you should not bring new information to it. You should summarize the essay’s key point. Rephrase the thesis statement and state its significance. Complete the conclusion with a closing statement or a call to action.

Using the steps above, you will be able to compose a good humanity essay. You can structure your humanity essay into a 5-paragraph essay . Research various humanities essay examples to properly comprehend the humanities essay structure.

What kind of essays do humanities use

Below are the various kinds of essays that humanities use:

• Analytical essays

Analytical essays dissect a complicated subject into its constituent parts and examine the connections, importance, and ramifications of each. Critical thinking and making connections between various aspects are prerequisites for these writings.

• Expository Essays

Expository essays give in-depth explanations of a concept on a topic. These essays offer a thorough and impartial investigation of the topic, frequently with the use of illustrations, proof, and understandable explanations.

• Comparative essays

A comparative essay entails comparing and analyzing two or more concepts, books, artworks, and historical events. These essays draw attention to the similarities and differences between the concepts being compared as well as a thorough comprehension of each.

• Literary Analysis Essays

Literary analysis essays analyze and interpret literary works, including plays, novels, and poetry. The topics, characters, symbolism, storytelling devices, and historical background of the work are all explored in depth in these studies.

• Argumentative essay

Argumentative essays provide a coherent argument and back it up with facts, logic, and refutations. These essays require the writer to take a stance on a certain subject and defend their argument throughout the essay.

Importance of humanities in our lives

Below is the importance of studying humanities and the importance of humanities in our lives:

• Promoting cultural understanding and empathy

People can immerse themselves in many cultures and historical eras through the study of the humanities. This exposure develops empathy and promotes a culture that is more understanding and aware of the world around them by enabling children to recognize the challenges, victories, and distinctive viewpoints of others.

• Investigating the state of humanity

The humanities investigate the fundamental aspects of life on Earth, including feelings, goals, worldviews, and social structures. Students learn to struggle with age-old concerns about life, morality, and purpose as well as gain knowledge about the intricacies of human nature via the analysis of literature and philosophy.

• Developing analytical and problem-solving skills

Education in the humanities fosters critical thinking, the assessment of opposing points of view, and the methodical solution to challenging issues. Students can challenge presumptions, take into account different viewpoints, and make well-informed decisions by delving into complex texts, artwork, and historical settings.

• Improving expression and communication

Good education is characterized by effective communication. Humanities studies improve one’s ability to write, speak, and read critically, allowing one to express ideas nuancedly, convincingly, and clearly.

• Cultural heritage preservation

Humanities subjects like literature and art conservation guarantee that human civilization is preserved for coming generations. Societies can comprehend the development of human expression and preserve a close relationship to their historical heritage by studying ancient writings, artifacts, and creative works.

Using the key points above you can compose an importance of humanities in our lives essay and the importance of studying humanities essay.

Tips for writing a humanity essay

• Write an outline

Before you start writing your essay, you should write an outline. Writing an outline helps to properly plan and organize your ideas for the essay. In the outline, you should write the key points of the introduction, the body, and the conclusion. Once you begin writing the essay, use the outline as a guide.

• Come up with a strong thesis statement

The thesis statement describes the main purpose of the essay. It should be able to show the reader what your essay entails. For an argumentative essay, the thesis statement should be your stance in the argument while for an expository essay, the thesis statement should be the essay’s key idea.

• Use the correct structure

When writing your essay, you should use the correct humanities essay structure. This ensures there is a flow of information throughout your essay. You should start with the introduction describing what your essay will entail, write the body paragraphs that describe the theme of the essay in-depth, and complete with a conclusion which is a summary of the whole essay.

• Use proper transition words

When transitioning from one paragraph to the next, you should use proper transition words. You should always have a unique idea for each paragraph and if one paragraph has the same idea as the next you should use proper transition words. Examples of transition words include ‘additionally’, ‘therefore’, or ‘however’. Using transition words provides a consistent flow of information throughout your essay.

• Cite all the sources

When writing humanities essays, you conduct research from different academic sources such as books, articles, journals, or internet blogs. You should properly cite all the sources used in your essay. When citing the sources, you should use the writing format instructed to use in your essay.

• Follow all the instructions

When writing your essay, you should follow all the given instructions. This includes the word count and the writing format. You should avoid plagiarism and write an original paper. Plagiarized essays can be easily detected and you can get harsh academic repercussions for that.

• Proofread the essay

You should proofread the humanity essay severally to omit any mistakes. Proofreading also helps you to check if your work is properly organized. In addition, you can also run your essay on Grammarly to remove any missed mistakes.

Humanities topics ideas

Below are the humanities topics for the essay:

• Importance of human rights
• Social changes in third-world countries
• Causes of interstate conflicts
• Eradication of worldwide poverty
• Importance of preservation of historical facts
• Ethical issues in the society
• Ways to fight corruption in developed countries
• Benefits and disadvantages of early marriages
• The role of the judicial system
• Effects of racism

The above are a few humanities research paper topics you can use for your humanities papers. When choosing a topic, you should choose a topic that you are interested in and can write a good essay about it.

Writing a humanity essay requires you to choose a topic, do research, and compose a well-structured essay. This article gives you a guide on how to write a humanity essay. If you need help with your humanity essay, we provide professional help with essays .

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✍️Essay on Humanity in 100 to 300 Words

• Updated on  
• Oct 26, 2023

Humanity could be understood through different perspectives. Humanity refers to acts of kindness, care, and compassion towards humans or animals. Humanity is the positive quality of human beings. This characteristic involves the feeling of love, care, reason, decision, cry, etc. Our history reveals many acts of inhuman and human behaviour. Such acts differentiate the good and the bad. Some of the key characteristics of Humanity are intelligence, creativity , empathy and compassion. Here are some sample essay on Humanity that will tell about the importance and meaning of Humanity!

Table of Contents

• 1 Essay on Humanity 100 Words
• 2.1 Importance of Humanity 

Also Read: Essay on Family

Essay on Humanity 100 Words

Humanity is the sum of all the qualities that make us human. We should seek inspiration from the great humanitarians from our history like Mahatma Gandhi , Nelson Mandela , Mother Teresa , and many more. They all devoted their life serving the cause of humanity. Their tireless efforts for the betterment of the needy make the world a better place. 

In a world suffering from a humanitarian crisis, there is an urgent need to raise awareness about the works of humanitarians who died serving for a noble cause. World Humanitarian Day is celebrated on 19 August every year to encourage humanity. 

Here are some examples of humanity:

• Firefighters risking their lives to save someone stuck in a burning building.
• Raising voices for basic human rights.
• Blood donation to save lives is also an example of humanity.
• A doctor volunteering to work in a war zone.

Also Read: Famous Personalities in India

Essay on Humanity 300 Words

Humanity is the concept that lies at the core of our existence. It contains the essence of what makes us humans. It encompasses our capacity for empathy, compassion, and understanding, and it is a driving force behind our progress as a species. In a world often characterized by division and war, the essence of humanity shines as a ray of hope, reminding us of our shared values and aspirations.

One of the defining characteristics of humanity is our ability to empathize with others. Empathy allows us to connect with people on a profound level, to feel their joys and sorrows, and to provide support in times of need. It bridges the gaps that might otherwise separate us, creating a sense of unity in the face of adversity. Even comforting a friend in distress is a sign of humanity. 

Also Read: Emotional Intelligence at Workplace

Importance of Humanity 

Compassion is the fundamental element of humanity. It is the driving force behind acts of kindness, charity, and selflessness. Humanity is important to protect cultural, religious, and geographical boundaries, as it is a universal language understood by all.

When we extend some help to those in need out of humanity, we affirm our commitment to the well-being of others and demonstrate our shared responsibility for the betterment of society.

Humanity balances out the evil doings in the world. It creates a better world for all to reside. Humanity is the foundation of the existence of humans because it makes us what we are and differentiate us from other living organism who do not possess the ability to think and feel. It is a testament to our potential for progress and unity.

In conclusion, humanity, with its pillars of empathy, compassion, and understanding, serves as a guiding light in a complex and divided world. These qualities remind us that, despite our differences, we are all part of the human family. 

Related Articles

Humanity is a complex characteristic of any human being. It includes the ability of a person to differentiate between good and bad and to show sympathy and shared connections as human beings. The human race can win any war be it harsh climatic conditions, pandemic, economic crisis, etc, if they have humanity towards each other. Humans have the potential to solve problems and make the world a better place for all.

An essay on humanity should be started with an introduction paragraph stating the zest of the complete essay. It should include the meaning of humanity. You need to highlight the positive characteristics of the act of humanity and how it can work for the betterment of society.

Humanity is very important because this characteristic of human beings makes the world a better place to live. It is what makes us humans. Humanity is the feeling of care and compassion towards other beings and gives us the ability to judge between right and wrong.

For more information on such interesting topics, visit our essay writing page and follow Leverage Edu .

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Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

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Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover

N. Ann Davis, Richard Keshen, and Jeff McMahan (eds.), Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover , Oxford UP, 2010, 290pp., $74.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780195325195.

Reviewed by Gerald Lang, University of Leeds

The metaethical themes are taken up by Roger Crisp’s succinct and powerfully argued essay. For Crisp, the main advantage of the existence of an external grounding for ethics is that it would furnish us with desire-independent external reasons, not just desire-dependent internal reasons, for acting in morally appropriate ways. We would then be in the happy position to say, as Crisp puts it, that “the world — indeed any world — is such that no one should inflict severe suffering on others for the sake of their own trivial pleasure” (p. 178). In his replies, Glover professes dissatisfaction with Crisp’s objectivist picture. He is unable to see how the world’s being such as to give us overriding reasons for not unnecessarily inflicting suffering on others can play any concrete role in demonstrating that we have such reasons (p. 269).

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Home » What is Humanities – Definition, Fields, Types

What is Humanities – Definition, Fields, Types

Table of Contents

Definition:

Humanities are academic disciplines that study the human condition, using methods that are largely analytical, critical, or speculative. As a group, the humanities include the study of history, literature, philosophy, religion, and language.

Humanities are distinguished from the sciences because they use different methods of inquiry. while the sciences rely on experimentation and observation, the humanities rely on interpretation and analysis. This means that the humanities are better suited to answering questions about meaning, value, and identity.

The humanities are valuable because they help us to understand who we are and where we came from. They provide us with a way to make sense of our lives and our world. The humanities can also help us to find answers to some of life’s most difficult questions.

History of Humanities

The study of the humanities has a long and rich history. It began in the ancient world with the works of Plato and Aristotle.

In the medieval period, scholars such as Thomas Aquinas studied the classics of Greek and Roman civilizations.

During the Renaissance, scholars such as Leonardo da Vinci looked to nature and science to better understand humanity.

In more recent centuries, thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche have critiqued traditional notions of morality and truth.

Today, the humanities are more important than ever. They provide us with a way to understand our complex world and ourselves.

They encourage us to think critically, and they provide a space where all can express ideas that are different from those of the mainstream. We believe that the best way to learn is by doing. That’s why we have developed a new approach to humanities education. We call it Humanities Lab.

Fileds of Humanities

The humanities include the study of 

Ancient and Modern Languages

Archaeology, anthropology, human geography .

In the humanities, ancient and modern languages play an important role. Ancient languages such as Latin and Greek are studied in order to better understand the classics of Western literature, philosophy, and history. Modern languages, on the other hand, are studied in order to better understand the cultures of the world today.

Whether you are interested in studying the great works of ancient Greece or Rome, or you want to learn about the peoples and cultures of the world today, a degree in humanities can offer you a wealth of opportunities. If you choose to study ancient languages, you will develop a deep understanding of the classics of Western civilization. If you choose to study modern languages, you will develop an understanding of contemporary culture and society.

Literature is one of the most important aspects of humanities. It allows us to understand the thoughts and experiences of other people. It also helps us see the world from different perspectives.

There are many different types of literature, including novels, short stories, plays, poems, and essays. Each type of literature has its own unique features and purposes. For example, novels tell long stories that usually have a moral or message. Short stories are usually about one event or experience. Plays are meant to be performed in front of an audience. Poems can be about anything, but they often deal with emotions or nature. Essays are usually about one specific topic or issue.

Philosophy is a type of Humanities that studies the nature of existence, reality, and knowledge. It also explores the relationships between individuals and society. Philosophy has been around for centuries, and it continues to evolve as our understanding of the world changes.

History is often considered a part of humanities. The study of history helps people understand the present by giving them a better understanding of the past. It also allows people to see how different cultures have interacted with each other over time.

Archaeology is the study of human history and prehistory through the excavation of sites and the analysis of artifacts. Archaeologists use these techniques to learn about past cultures, how they lived, what they ate, what their beliefs were, and how they interacted with their environment.

Anthropology is a type of Humanities that studies the human condition. It includes aspects of human culture, biology, and evolution. Anthropology seeks to understand what it means to be human in all its diversity.

Human geography is the study of how humans interact with and shape the physical world around them. It is a subfield of anthropology and sociology, and can be divided into two main branches:

Behavioral human geography focuses on the study of human behavior and the way it is shaped by social, economic, and cultural factors.

Physical human geography focuses on the study of the physical features of the earth and how they impact human activity.

Law is a set of rules and regulations that society has agreed upon in order to maintain order and peace. Laws are created by governments, and enforced by police and the courts. There are many different types of laws, ranging from traffic laws to criminal laws.

Religion can be defined as a set of beliefs regarding the nature of the universe, humanity’s place in it, and what happens after death. It is based on faith in a higher power or powers. Religion is a way of life for many people. It helps them to make sense of the world around them

Art can be defined as a type of expression or application that brings about feelings, thoughts, and emotions. It can take the form of paintings, sketches, music, dance, poetry, and more. The key element of art is that it is a means of communication.

Purpose of Humanities

The purpose of the humanities is to study human experience and culture in order to understand our world and ourselves better. The humanities help us to understand the past, make sense of the present, and imagine the future. They give us tools to think critically about important issues and to communicate effectively with others.

The humanities are essential for a well-rounded education. They broaden our perspective and deepen our understanding of the human condition. They enrich our lives and make us more compassionate and thoughtful citizens of the world.

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Kant’s Moral Philosophy

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) argued that the supreme principle of morality is a principle of practical rationality that he dubbed the “Categorical Imperative” (CI). Kant characterized the CI as an objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle that we must follow despite any natural desires we may have to the contrary. All specific moral requirements, according to Kant, are justified by this principle, which means that all immoral actions are irrational because they violate the CI. Other philosophers, such as Hobbes, Locke and Aquinas, had also argued that moral requirements are based on standards of rationality. However, these standards were either instrumental principles of rationality for satisfying one’s desires, as in Hobbes, or external rational principles that are discoverable by reason, as in Locke and Aquinas. Kant agreed with many of his predecessors that an analysis of practical reason reveals the requirement that rational agents must conform to instrumental principles. Yet he also argued that conformity to the CI (a non-instrumental principle), and hence to moral requirements themselves, can nevertheless be shown to be essential to rational agency. This argument was based on his striking doctrine that a rational will must be regarded as autonomous, or free, in the sense of being the author of the law that binds it. The fundamental principle of morality — the CI — is none other than the law of an autonomous will. Thus, at the heart of Kant’s moral philosophy is a conception of reason whose reach in practical affairs goes well beyond that of a Humean ‘slave’ to the passions. Moreover, it is the presence of this self-governing reason in each person that Kant thought offered decisive grounds for viewing each as possessed of equal worth and deserving of equal respect.

Kant’s most influential positions in moral philosophy are found in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (hereafter, “ Groundwork ”) but he developed, enriched, and in some cases modified those views in later works such as The Critique of Practical Reason , The Metaphysics of Morals , Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View , Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason as well as his essays on history and related topics. Kant’s Lectures on Ethics , which were lecture notes taken by three of his students on the courses he gave in moral philosophy, also include relevant material for understanding his views. We will mainly focus on the foundational doctrines of the Groundwork , even though in recent years some scholars have become dissatisfied with this standard approach to Kant’s views and have turned their attention to the later works. We find the standard approach most illuminating, though we will highlight important positions from the later works where needed.

1. Aims and Methods of Moral Philosophy

2. good will, moral worth and duty, 3. duty and respect for moral law, 4. categorical and hypothetical imperatives, 5. the formula of the universal law of nature, 6. the humanity formula, 7. the autonomy formula, 8. the kingdom of ends formula, 9. the unity of the formulas, 10. autonomy, 11. non-rational beings and disabled humans, 12. virtue and vice, 13. normative ethical theory, 14. teleology or deontology, 15. metaethics, other internet resources, related entries.

The most basic aim of moral philosophy, and so also of the Groundwork , is, in Kant’s view, to “seek out” the foundational principle of a “metaphysics of morals,” which Kant understands as a system of a priori moral principles that apply the CI to human persons in all times and cultures. Kant pursues this project through the first two chapters of the Groundwork . He proceeds by analyzing and elucidating commonsense ideas about morality, including the ideas of a “good will” and “duty”. The point of this first project is to come up with a precise statement of the principle or principles on which all of our ordinary moral judgments are based. The judgments in question are supposed to be those that any normal, sane, adult human being would accept on due rational reflection. Nowadays, however, many would regard Kant as being overly optimistic about the depth and extent of moral agreement. Perhaps he is best thought of as drawing on a moral viewpoint that is very widely shared and which contains some general judgments that are very deeply held. In any case, he does not appear to take himself to be primarily addressing a genuine moral skeptic such as those who often populate the works of moral philosophers, that is, someone who doubts that she has any reason to act morally and whose moral behavior hinges on a rational proof that philosophers might try to give. For instance, when, in the third and final chapter of the Groundwork , Kant takes up his second fundamental aim, to “establish” this foundational moral principle as a demand of each person’s own rational will, his conclusion apparently falls short of answering those who want a proof that we really are bound by moral requirements. He rests this second project on the position that we — or at least creatures with rational wills — possess autonomy. The argument of this second project does often appear to try to reach out to a metaphysical fact about our wills. This has led some readers to the conclusion that he is, after all, trying to justify moral requirements by appealing to a fact — our autonomy — that even a moral skeptic would have to recognize.

Kant’s analysis of the common moral concepts of “duty” and “good will” led him to believe that we are free and autonomous as long as morality, itself, is not an illusion. Yet in the Critique of Pure Reason , Kant also tried to show that every event has a cause. Kant recognized that there seems to be a deep tension between these two claims: If causal determinism is true then, it seems, we cannot have the kind of freedom that morality presupposes, which is “a kind of causality” that “can be active, independently of alien causes determining it” (G 4:446).

Kant thought that the only way to resolve this apparent conflict is to distinguish between phenomena , which is what we know through experience, and noumena , which we can consistently think but not know through experience. Our knowledge and understanding of the empirical world, Kant argued, can only arise within the limits of our perceptual and cognitive powers. We should not assume, however, that we know all that may be true about “things in themselves,” although we lack the “intellectual intuition” that would be needed to learn about such things.

These distinctions, according to Kant, allow us to resolve the “antinomy” about free will by interpreting the “thesis” that free will is possible as about noumena and the “antithesis” that every event has a cause as about phenomena. Morality thus presupposes that agents, in an incomprehensible “intelligible world,” are able to make things happen by their own free choices in a “sensible world” in which causal determinism is true.

Many of Kant’s commentators, who are skeptical about these apparently exorbitant metaphysical claims, have attempted to make sense of his discussions of the intelligible and sensible worlds in less metaphysically demanding ways. On one interpretation (Hudson 1994), one and the same act can be described in wholly physical terms (as an appearance) and also in irreducibly mental terms (as a thing in itself). On this compatibilist picture, all acts are causally determined, but a free act is one that can be described as determined by irreducibly mental causes, and in particular by the causality of reason. A second interpretation holds that the intelligible and sensible worlds are used as metaphors for two ways of conceiving of one and the same world (Korsgaard 1996; Allison 1990; Hill 1989a, 1989b). When we are engaging in scientific or empirical investigations, we often take up a perspective in which we think of things as subject to natural causation, but when we deliberate, act, reason and judge, we often take up a different perspective, in which we think of ourselves and others as agents who are not determined by natural causes. When we take up this latter, practical, standpoint, we need not believe that we or others really are free, in any deep metaphysical sense; we need only operate “under the idea of freedom” (G 4:448). Controversy persists, however, about whether Kant’s conception of freedom requires a “two worlds” or “two perspectives” account of the sensible and intelligible worlds (Guyer 1987, 2009; Langton 2001; Kohl 2016; Wood 1984; Hogan 2009).

Although the two most basic aims Kant saw for moral philosophy are to seek out and establish the supreme principle of morality, they are not, in Kant’s view, its only aims. Moral philosophy, for Kant, is most fundamentally addressed to the first-person, deliberative question, “What ought I to do?”, and an answer to that question requires much more than delivering or justifying the fundamental principle of morality. We also need some account, based on this principle, of the nature and extent of the specific moral duties that apply to us. To this end, Kant employs his findings from the Groundwork in The Metaphysics of Morals , and offers a categorization of our basic moral duties to ourselves and others. In addition, Kant thought that moral philosophy should characterize and explain the demands that morality makes on human psychology and forms of human social interaction. These topics, among others, are addressed in central chapters of the second Critique , the Religion and again in the Metaphysics of Morals, and are perhaps given a sustained treatment in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View . Further, a satisfying answer to the question of what one ought to do would have to take into account any political and religious requirements there are. Each of these requirement turn out to be, indirectly at least, also moral obligations for Kant, and are discussed in the Metaphysics of Morals and in Religion . Finally, moral philosophy should say something about the ultimate end of human endeavor, the Highest Good, and its relationship to the moral life. In the Critique of Practical Reason , Kant argued that this Highest Good for humanity is complete moral virtue together with complete happiness, the former being the condition of our deserving the latter. Unfortunately, Kant noted, virtue does not ensure wellbeing and may even conflict with it. Further, he thought that there is no real possibility of moral perfection in this life and indeed few of us fully deserve the happiness we are lucky enough to enjoy. Reason cannot prove or disprove the existence of Divine Providence, on Kant’s view, nor the immortality of the soul, which seem necessary to rectify these things. Nevertheless, Kant argued, an unlimited amount of time to perfect ourselves (immortality) and a commensurate achievement of wellbeing (ensured by God) are “postulates” required by reason when employed in moral matters.

Throughout his moral works, Kant returns time and again to the question of the method moral philosophy should employ when pursuing these aims. A basic theme of these discussions is that the fundamental philosophical issues of morality must be addressed a priori , that is, without drawing on observations of human beings and their behavior. Kant’s insistence on an a priori method to seek out and establish fundamental moral principles, however, does not always appear to be matched by his own practice. The Metaphysics of Morals , for instance, is meant to be based on a priori rational principles, but many of the specific duties that Kant describes, along with some of the arguments he gives in support of them, rely on general facts about human beings and our circumstances that are known from experience.

In one sense, it might seem obvious why Kant insists on an a priori method. A “metaphysics of morals” would be, more or less, an account of the nature and structure of moral requirements — in effect, a categorization of duties and values. Such a project would address such questions as, What is a duty? What kinds of duties are there? What is the good? What kinds of goods are there?, and so on. These appear to be metaphysical questions. Any principle used to provide such categorizations appears to be a principle of metaphysics, in a sense, but Kant did not see them as external moral truths that exist independently of rational agents. Moral requirements, instead, are rational principles that tell us what we have overriding reason to do. Metaphysical principles of this sort are always sought out and established by a priori methods.

Perhaps something like this was behind Kant’s thinking. However, the considerations he offers for an a priori method do not all obviously draw on this sort of rationale. The following are three considerations favoring a priori methods that he emphasizes repeatedly.

The first is that, as Kant and others have conceived of it, ethics initially requires an analysis of our moral concepts. We must understand the concepts of a “good will”, “obligation”, “duty” and so on, as well as their logical relationships to one another, before we can determine whether our use of these concepts is justified. Given that the analysis of concepts is an a priori matter, to the degree that ethics consists of such an analysis, ethics is a priori as a well.

Of course, even were we to agree with Kant that ethics should begin with analysis, and that analysis is or should be an entirely a priori undertaking, this would not explain why all of the fundamental questions of moral philosophy must be pursued a priori . Indeed, one of the most important projects of moral philosophy, for Kant, is to show that we, as rational agents, are bound by moral requirements and that fully rational agents would necessarily comply with them. Kant admits that his analytical arguments for the CI are inadequate on their own because the most they can show is that the CI is the supreme principle of morality if there is such a principle . Kant must therefore address the possibility that morality itself is an illusion by showing that the CI really is an unconditional requirement of reason that applies to us. Even though Kant thought that this project of “establishing” the CI must also be carried out a priori , he did not think we could pursue this project simply by analyzing our moral concepts or examining the actual behavior of others. What is needed, instead, is a “synthetic”, but still a priori , kind of argument that starts from ideas of freedom and rational agency and critically examines the nature and limits of these capacities.

This is the second reason Kant held that fundamental issues in ethics must be addressed with an a priori method: The ultimate subject matter of ethics is the nature and content of the principles that necessarily determine a rational will.

Fundamental issues in moral philosophy must also be settled a priori because of the nature of moral requirements themselves, or so Kant thought. This is a third reason he gives for an a priori method, and it appears to have been of great importance to Kant: Moral requirements present themselves as being unconditionally necessary . But an a posteriori method seems ill-suited to discovering and establishing what we must do whether we feel like doing it or not; surely such a method could only tell us what we actually do. So an a posteriori method of seeking out and establishing the principle that generates such requirements will not support the presentation of moral “oughts” as unconditional necessities. Kant argued that empirical observations could only deliver conclusions about, for instance, the relative advantages of moral behavior in various circumstances or how pleasing it might be in our own eyes or the eyes of others. Such findings clearly would not support the unconditional necessity of moral requirements. To appeal to a posteriori considerations would thus result in a tainted conception of moral requirements. It would view them as demands for which compliance is not unconditionally necessary, but rather necessary only if additional considerations show it to be advantageous, optimific or in some other way felicitous. Thus, Kant argued that if moral philosophy is to guard against undermining the unconditional necessity of obligation in its analysis and defense of moral thought, it must be carried out entirely a priori .

Kant’s analysis of commonsense ideas begins with the thought that the only thing good without qualification is a “good will”. While the phrases “he’s good hearted”, “she’s good natured” and “she means well” are common, “the good will” as Kant thinks of it is not the same as any of these ordinary notions. The idea of a good will is closer to the idea of a “good person”, or, more archaically, a “person of good will”. This use of the term “will” early on in analyzing ordinary moral thought prefigures later and more technical discussions concerning the nature of rational agency. Nevertheless, this idea of a good will is an important commonsense touchstone to which Kant returns throughout his works. The basic idea, as Kant describes it in the Groundwork, is that what makes a good person good is his possession of a will that is in a certain way “determined” by, or makes its decisions on the basis of, whatever basic moral principles there may be. The idea of a good will is supposed to be the idea of one who is committed only to make decisions that she holds to be morally worthy and who takes moral considerations in themselves to be conclusive reasons for guiding her behavior. This sort of disposition or character is something we all highly value, Kant thought. He believes we value it without limitation or qualification. By this, we believe, he means primarily two things.

First, unlike anything else, there is no conceivable circumstance in which we regard our own moral goodness as worth forfeiting simply in order to obtain some desirable object. By contrast, the value of all other desirable qualities, such as courage or cleverness, can be diminished, forgone, or sacrificed under certain circumstances: Courage may be laid aside if it requires injustice, and it is better not to be witty if it requires cruelty. There is no implicit restriction or qualification to the effect that a commitment to give moral considerations decisive weight is worth honoring, but only under such and such circumstances .

Second, possessing and maintaining a steadfast commitment to moral principles is the very condition under which anything else is worth having or pursuing. Intelligence and even pleasure are worth having only on the condition that they do not require giving up one’s fundamental moral convictions. The value of a good will thus cannot be that it secures certain valuable ends, whether of our own or of others, since their value is entirely conditional on our possessing and maintaining a good will. Indeed, since a good will is good under any condition, its goodness must not depend on any particular conditions obtaining. Thus, Kant points out that a good will must then also be good in itself and not in virtue of its relationship to other things such as the agent’s own happiness, overall welfare or any other effects it may or may not produce A good will would still “shine like a jewel” even if it were “completely powerless to carry out its aims” (G 4:394).

In Kant’s terms, a good will is a will whose decisions are wholly determined by moral demands or, as he often refers to this, by the Moral Law. Human beings inevitably feel this Law as a constraint on their natural desires, which is why such Laws, as applied to human beings, are imperatives and duties. A human will in which the Moral Law is decisive is motivated by the thought of duty . A holy or divine will, if it exists, though good, would not be good because it is motivated by thoughts of duty because such a will does not have natural inclinations and so necessarily fulfills moral requirements without feeling constrained to do so. It is the presence of desires that could operate independently of moral demands that makes goodness in human beings a constraint, an essential element of the idea of “duty.” So in analyzing unqualified goodness as it occurs in imperfectly rational creatures such as ourselves, we are investigating the idea of being motivated by the thought that we are constrained to act in certain ways that we might not want to simply from the thought that we are morally required to do so.

Kant confirms this by comparing motivation by duty with other sorts of motives, in particular, with motives of self-interest, self-preservation, sympathy and happiness. He argues that a dutiful action from any of these motives, however praiseworthy it may be, does not express a good will. Assuming an action has moral worth only if it expresses a good will, such actions have no genuine “moral worth.” The conformity of one’s action to duty in such cases is only related by accident to morality. For instance, if one is motivated by happiness alone, then had conditions not conspired to align one’s duty with one’s own happiness one would not have done one’s duty. By contrast, were one to supplant any of these motivations with the motive of duty, the morality of the action would then express one’s determination to act dutifully out of respect for the moral law itself. Only then would the action have moral worth.

Kant’s views in this regard have understandably been the subject of much controversy. Many object that we do not think better of actions done for the sake of duty than actions performed out of emotional concern or sympathy for others, especially those things we do for friends and family. Worse, moral worth appears to require not only that one’s actions be motivated by duty, but also that no other motives, even love or friendship, cooperate. Yet Kant’s defenders have argued that his point is not that we do not admire or praise motivating concerns other than duty, only that from the point of view of someone deliberating about what to do, these concerns are not decisive in the way that considerations of moral duty are. What is crucial in actions that express a good will is that in conforming to duty a perfectly virtuous person always would, and so ideally we should, recognize and be moved by the thought that our conformity is morally obligatory. The motivational structure of the agent should be arranged so that she always treats considerations of duty as sufficient reasons for conforming to those requirements. In other words, we should have a firm commitment not to perform an action if it is morally forbidden and to perform an action if it is morally required. Having a good will, in this sense, is compatible with having feelings and emotions of various kinds, and even with aiming to cultivate some of them in order to counteract desires and inclinations that tempt us to immorality. Controversy persists, however, about whether Kant’s claims about the motive of duty go beyond this basic point (Timmermann 2007; Herman 1993; Wood 1998; Baron 1995).

Suppose for the sake of argument we agree with Kant. We now need to know what distinguishes the principle that lays down our duties from these other motivating principles, and so makes motivation by it the source of unqualified value.

According to Kant, what is singular about motivation by duty is that it consists of bare respect for the moral law. What naturally comes to mind is this: Duties are rules or laws of some sort combined with some sort of felt constraint or incentive on our choices, whether from external coercion by others or from our own powers of reason. For instance, the bylaws of a club lay down duties for its officers and enforce them with sanctions. City and state laws establish the duties of citizens and enforce them with coercive legal power. Thus, if we do something because it is our “civic” duty, or our duty “as a boy scout” or “a good American,” our motivation is respect for the code that makes it our duty. Thinking we are duty bound is simply respecting, as such, certain laws pertaining to us.

However intuitive, this cannot be all of Kant’s meaning. For one thing, as with the Jim Crow laws of the old South and the Nuremberg laws of Nazi Germany, the laws to which these types of “actions from duty” conform may be morally despicable. Respect for such laws could hardly be thought valuable. For another, our motive in conforming our actions to civic and other laws is rarely unconditional respect. We also have an eye toward doing our part in maintaining civil or social order, toward punishments or loss of standing and reputation in violating such laws, and other outcomes of lawful behavior. Indeed, we respect these laws to the degree, but only to the degree, that they do not violate values, laws or principles we hold more dear. Yet Kant thinks that, in acting from duty, we are not at all motivated by a prospective outcome or some other extrinsic feature of our conduct except insofar as these are requirements of duty itself. We are motivated by the mere conformity of our will to law as such.

To act out of respect for the moral law, in Kant’s view, is to be moved to act by a recognition that the moral law is a supremely authoritative standard that binds us and to experience a kind of feeling, which is akin to awe and fear, when we acknowledge the moral law as the source of moral requirements. Human persons inevitably have respect for the moral law even though we are not always moved by it and even though we do not always comply with the moral standards that we nonetheless recognize as authoritative.

Kant’s account of the content of moral requirements and the nature of moral reasoning is based on his analysis of the unique force moral considerations have as reasons to act. The force of moral requirements as reasons is that we cannot ignore them no matter how circumstances might conspire against any other consideration. Basic moral requirements retain their reason-giving force under any circumstance, they have universal validity. So, whatever else may be said of basic moral requirements, their content is universal. Only a universal law could be the content of a requirement that has the reason-giving force of morality. This brings Kant to a preliminary formulation of the CI: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law” (G 4:402). This is the principle which motivates a good will, and which Kant holds to be the fundamental principle of all of morality.

Kant holds that the fundamental principle of our moral duties is a categorical imperative . It is an imperative because it is a command addressed to agents who could follow it but might not (e.g. , “Leave the gun. Take the cannoli.”). It is categorical in virtue of applying to us unconditionally, or simply because we possesses rational wills, without reference to any ends that we might or might not have. It does not, in other words, apply to us on the condition that we have antecedently adopted some goal for ourselves.

There are “oughts” other than our moral duties, according to Kant, but these oughts are distinguished from the moral ought in being based on a quite different kind of principle, one that is the source of hypothetical imperatives . A hypothetical imperative is a command that also applies to us in virtue of our having a rational will, but not simply in virtue of this. It requires us to exercise our wills in a certain way given we have antecedently willed an end. A hypothetical imperative is thus a command in a conditional form. But not any command in this form counts as a hypothetical imperative in Kant’s sense. For instance, “if you’re happy and you know it, clap your hands!” is a conditional command. But the antecedent conditions under which the command “clap your hands” applies to you do not posit any end that you will, but consist rather of emotional and cognitive states you may or may not be in. Further, “if you want pastrami, try the corner deli” is also a command in conditional form, but strictly speaking it too fails to be a hypothetical imperative in Kant’s sense since this command does not apply to us in virtue of our willing some end, but only in virtue of our desiring or wanting an end. For Kant, willing an end involves more than desiring; it requires actively choosing or committing to the end rather than merely finding oneself with a passive desire for it. Further, there is nothing irrational in failing to will means to what one desires. An imperative that applied to us in virtue of our desiring some end would thus not be a hypothetical imperative of practical rationality in Kant’s sense.

The condition under which a hypothetical imperative applies to us, then, is that we will some end. Now, for the most part, the ends we will we might not have willed, and some ends that we do not will we might nevertheless have willed. But there is at least conceptual room for the idea of a natural or inclination-based end that we must will. The distinction between ends that we might or might not will and those, if any, we necessarily will as the kinds of natural beings we are, is the basis for his distinction between two kinds of hypothetical imperatives. Kant names these “problematic” and “assertoric”, based on how the end is willed. If the end is one that we might or might not will — that is, it is a merely possible end — the imperative is problematic. For instance, “Don’t ever take side with anyone against the Family.” is a problematic imperative, even if the end posited here is (apparently) one’s own continued existence. Almost all non-moral, rational imperatives are problematic, since there are virtually no ends that we necessarily will as human beings.

As it turns out, the only (non-moral) end that we will, as a matter of natural necessity, is our own happiness. Any imperative that applied to us because we will our own happiness would thus be an assertoric imperative. Rationality, Kant thinks, can issue no imperative if the end is indeterminate, and happiness is an indeterminate end. Although we can say for the most part that if one is to be happy, one should save for the future, take care of one’s health and nourish one’s relationships, these fail to be genuine commands in the strictest sense and so are instead mere “counsels.” Some people are happy without these, and whether you could be happy without them is, although doubtful, an open question.

Since Kant presents moral and prudential rational requirements as first and foremost demands on our wills rather than on external acts, moral and prudential evaluation is first and foremost an evaluation of the will our actions express. Thus, it is not an error of rationality to fail to take the necessary means to one’s (willed) ends, nor to fail to want to take the means; one only falls foul of non-moral practical reason if one fails to will the means. Likewise, while actions, feelings or desires may be the focus of other moral views, for Kant practical irrationality, both moral and prudential, focuses mainly on our willing.

One recent interpretive dispute (Hill 1973; Schroeder 2009; Rippon 2014) has been about whether hypothetical imperatives, in Kant’s view, have a “wide” or “narrow” scope. That is, do such imperatives tell us to take the necessary means to our ends or give up our ends (wide scope) or do they simply tell us that, if we have an end, then take the necessary means to it.

Kant describes the will as operating on the basis of subjective volitional principles he calls “maxims”. Hence, morality and other rational requirements are, for the most part, demands that apply to the maxims that we act on. . The form of a maxim is “I will A in C in order to realize or produce E ” where “ A ” is some act type, “ C ” is some type of circumstance, and “ E ” is some type of end to be realized or achieved by A in C. Since this is a principle stating only what some agent wills, it is subjective . (A principle that governs any rational will is an objective principle of volition, which Kant refers to as a practical law). For anything to count as human willing, it must be based on a maxim to pursue some end through some means. Hence, in employing a maxim, any human willing already embodies the form of means-end reasoning that calls for evaluation in terms of hypothetical imperatives. To that extent at least, then, anything dignified as human willing is subject to rational requirements.

Kant’s first formulation of the CI states that you are to “act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (G 4:421). O’Neill (1975, 1989) and Rawls (1980, 1989), among others, take this formulation in effect to summarize a decision procedure for moral reasoning, and we will follow their basic outline: First, formulate a maxim that enshrines your proposed plan of action. Second, recast that maxim as a universal law of nature governing all rational agents, and so as holding that all must, by natural law, act as you yourself propose to act in these circumstances. Third, consider whether your maxim is even conceivable in a world governed by this new law of nature. If it is, then, fourth, ask yourself whether you would, or could, rationally will to act on your maxim in such a world. If you could, then your action is morally permissible.

If your maxim fails the third step, you have a “perfect” duty admitting “of no exception in favor of inclination” to refrain from acting on that maxim (G 4:421). If your maxim fails the fourth step, you have an “imperfect” duty requiring you to pursue a policy that can admit of such exceptions. If your maxim passes all four steps, only then is acting on it morally permissible. Following Hill (1971), we can understand the difference in duties as formal: Perfect duties come in the form “One must never (or always) φ to the fullest extent possible in C ”, while imperfect duties, since they require us to adopt an end, at least require that “One must sometimes and to some extent φ in C .” So, for instance, Kant held that the maxim of committing suicide to avoid future unhappiness did not pass the third step, the contradiction in conception test. Hence, one is forbidden to act on the maxim of committing suicide to avoid unhappiness. By contrast, the maxim of refusing to assist others in pursuit of their projects passes the contradiction in conception test, but fails the contradiction in the will test at the fourth step. Hence, we have a duty to sometimes and to some extent aid and assist others.

Kant held that ordinary moral thought recognized moral duties toward ourselves as well as toward others. Hence, together with the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, Kant recognized four categories of duties: perfect duties toward ourselves, perfect duties toward others, imperfect duties toward ourselves and imperfect duties toward others. Kant uses four examples in the Groundwork , one of each kind of duty, to demonstrate that every kind of duty can be derived from the CI, and hence to bolster his case that the CI is indeed the fundamental principle of morality. To refrain from suicide is a perfect duty toward oneself; to refrain from making promises you have no intention of keeping is a perfect duty toward others; to develop one’s talents is an imperfect duty toward oneself; and to contribute to the happiness of others is an imperfect duty toward others. Again, Kant’s interpreters differ over exactly how to reconstruct the derivation of these duties. We will briefly sketch one way of doing so for the perfect duty to others to refrain from lying promises and the imperfect duty to ourselves to develop talents.

Kant’s example of a perfect duty to others concerns a promise you might consider making but have no intention of keeping in order to get needed money. Naturally, being rational requires not contradicting oneself, but there is no self-contradiction in the maxim “I will make lying promises when it achieves something I want.” An immoral action clearly does not involve a self-contradiction in this sense (as would the maxim of finding a married bachelor). Kant’s position is that it is irrational to perform an action if that action’s maxim contradicts itself once made into a universal law of nature . The maxim of lying whenever it gets you what you want generates a contradiction once you try to combine it with the universalized version that all rational agents must, by a law of nature, lie when doing so gets them what they want.

Here is one way of seeing how this might work: If I conceive of a world in which everyone by nature must try to deceive people any time this will get them what they want, I am conceiving of a world in which no practice of giving one’s word could ever arise and, because this is a law of nature, we can assume that it is widely known that no such practice could exist. So I am conceiving of a world in which everyone knows that no practice of giving one’s word exists. My maxim, however, is to make a deceptive promise in order to get needed money. And it is a necessary means of doing this that a practice of taking the word of others exists, so that someone might take my word and I take advantage of their doing so. Thus, in trying to conceive of my maxim in a world in which no one ever takes anyone’s word in such circumstances, and knows this about one another, I am trying to conceive of this: A world in which no practice of giving one’s word exists, but also, at the very same time, a world in which just such a practice does exist, for me to make use of in my maxim. It is a world containing my promise and a world in which there can be no promises. Hence, it is inconceivable that I could sincerely act on my maxim in a world in which my maxim is a universal law of nature. Since it is inconceivable that these two things could exist together, I am forbidden ever to act on the maxim of lying to get money.

By contrast with the maxim of the lying promise, we can easily conceive of adopting a maxim of refusing to develop any of our talents in a world in which that maxim is a universal law of nature. It would undoubtedly be a world more primitive than our own, but pursuing such a policy is still conceivable in it. However, it is not, Kant argues, possible to rationally will this maxim in such a world. The argument for why this is so, however, is not obvious, and some of Kant’s thinking seems hardly convincing: Insofar as we are rational, he says, we already necessarily will that all of our talents and abilities be developed. Hence, although I can conceive of a talentless world, I cannot rationally will that it come about, given that I already will, insofar as I am rational, that I develop all of my own. Yet, given limitations on our time, energy and interest, it is difficult to see how full rationality requires us to aim to fully develop literally all of our talents. Indeed, it seems to require much less, a judicious picking and choosing among one’s abilities. Further, all that is required to show that I cannot will a talentless world is that, insofar as I am rational, I necessarily will that some talents in me be developed, not the dubious claim that I rationally will that they all be developed. Moreover, suppose rationality did require me to aim at developing all of my talents. Then, there seems to be no need to go further in the CI procedure to show that refusing to develop talents is immoral. Given that, insofar as we are rational, we must will to develop capacities, it is by this very fact irrational not to do so.

However, mere failure to conform to something we rationally will is not yet immorality. Failure to conform to instrumental principles, for instance, is irrational but not always immoral. In order to show that this maxim is categorically forbidden, one strategy is to make use of several other of Kant’s claims or assumptions.

First, we must accept Kant’s claim that, by “natural necessity,” we will our own happiness as an end (G 4:415). This is a claim he uses not only to distinguish assertoric from problematic imperatives, but also to argue for the imperfect duty of helping others (G 4:423) He also appears to rely on this claim in each of his examples. Each maxim he is testing appears to have happiness as its aim. One explanation for this is that, since each person necessarily wills her own happiness, maxims in pursuit of this goal will be the typical object of moral evaluation. This, at any rate, is clear in the talents example itself: The forbidden maxim adopted by the ne’er-do-well is supposed to be “devoting his life solely to…enjoyment” (G 4:423) rather than to developing his talents.

Second, we must assume, as also seems reasonable, that a necessary means to achieving (normal) human happiness is not only that we ourselves develop some talent, but also that others develop some capacities of theirs at some time. For instance, I cannot engage in the normal pursuits that make up my own happiness, such as playing piano, writing philosophy or eating delicious meals, unless I have developed some talents myself, and, moreover, someone else has made pianos and written music, taught me writing, harvested foods and developed traditions of their preparation.

Finally, Kant’s examples come on the heels of defending the position that rationality requires conformity to hypothetical imperatives. Thus, we should assume that, necessarily, rational agents will the necessary and available means to any ends that they will. And once we add this to the assumptions that we must will our own happiness as an end, and that developed talents are necessary means to achieving that end, it follows that we cannot rationally will that a world come about in which it is a law that no one ever develops any of their natural talents. We cannot do so, because our own happiness is the very end contained in the maxim of giving ourselves over to pleasure rather than self-development. Since we will the necessary and available means to our ends, we are rationally committed to willing that everyone sometime develop his or her talents. So since we cannot will as a universal law of nature that no one ever develop any talents — given that it is inconsistent with what we now see that we rationally will — we are forbidden from adopting the maxim of refusing to develop any of our own.

Most philosophers who find Kant’s views attractive find them so because of the Humanity Formulation of the CI. This formulation states that we should never act in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as a means only but always as an end in itself. This is often seen as introducing the idea of “respect” for persons, for whatever it is that is essential to our humanity. Kant was clearly right that this and the other formulations bring the CI “closer to intuition” than the Universal Law formula. Intuitively, there seems something wrong with treating human beings as mere instruments with no value beyond this. But this very intuitiveness can also invite misunderstandings.

First, the Humanity Formula does not rule out using people as means to our ends. Clearly this would be an absurd demand, since we apparently do this all the time in morally appropriate ways. Indeed, it is hard to imagine any life that is recognizably human without the use of others in pursuit of our goals. The food we eat, the clothes we wear, the chairs we sit on and the computers we type at are gotten only by way of talents and abilities that have been developed through the exercise of the wills of many people. What the Humanity Formula rules out is engaging in this pervasive use of humanity in such a way that we treat it as a mere means to our ends. Thus, the difference between a horse and a taxi driver is not that we may use one but not the other as a means of transportation. Unlike a horse, the taxi driver’s humanity must at the same time be treated as an end in itself.

Second, it is not human beings per se but the “humanity” in human beings that we must treat as an end in itself. Our “humanity” is that collection of features that make us distinctively human, and these include capacities to engage in self-directed rational behavior and to adopt and pursue our own ends, and any other rational capacities necessarily connected with these. Thus, supposing that the taxi driver has freely exercised his rational capacities in pursuing his line of work, we make permissible use of these capacities as a means only if we behave in a way that he could, when exercising his rational capacities, consent to — for instance, by paying an agreed on price.

Third, the idea of an end has three senses for Kant, two positive senses and a negative sense. An end in the first positive sense is a thing we will to produce or bring about in the world. For instance, if losing weight is my end, then losing weight is something I aim to bring about. An end in this sense guides my actions in that once I will to produce something, I then deliberate about and aim to pursue means of producing it if I am rational. Humanity is not an “end” in this sense, though even in this case, the end “lays down a law” for me. Once I have adopted an end in this sense, it dictates that I do something: I should act in ways that will bring about the end or instead choose to abandon my goal.

An end in the negative sense lays down a law for me as well, and so guides action, but in a different way. Korsgaard (1996) offers self-preservation as an example of an end in a negative sense: We do not try to produce our self-preservation. Rather, the end of self-preservation prevents us from engaging in certain kinds of activities, for instance, picking fights with mobsters, and so on. That is, as an end, it is something I do not act against in pursuing my positive ends, rather than something I produce.

Humanity is in the first instance an end in this negative sense: It is something that limits what I may do in pursuit of my other ends, similar to the way that my end of self-preservation limits what I may do in pursuit of other ends. Insofar as it limits my actions, it is a source of perfect duties. Now many of our ends are subjective in that they are not ends that every rational being must have. Humanity is an objective end, because it is an end that every rational being must have. Hence, my own humanity as well as the humanity of others limit what I am morally permitted to do when I pursue my other, non-mandatory, ends.

The humanity in myself and others is also a positive end, though not in the first positive sense above, as something to be produced by my actions. Rather, it is something to realize, cultivate or further by my actions. Becoming a philosopher, pianist or novelist might be my end in this sense. When my end is becoming a pianist, my actions do not, or at least not simply, produce something, being a pianist, but constitute or realize the activity of being a pianist. Insofar as the humanity in ourselves must be treated as an end in itself in this second positive sense, it must be cultivated, developed or fully actualized. Hence, the humanity in oneself is the source of a duty to develop one’s talents or to “perfect” one’s humanity. When one makes one’s own humanity one’s end, one pursues its development, much as when one makes becoming a pianist one’s end, one pursues the development of piano playing. And insofar as humanity is a positive end in others, I must attempt to further their ends as well. In so doing, I further the humanity in others, by helping further the projects and ends that they have willingly adopted for themselves. It is this sense of humanity as an end-in-itself on which some of Kant’s arguments for imperfect duties rely.

Finally, Kant’s Humanity Formula requires “respect” for the humanity in persons. Proper regard for something with absolute value or worth requires respect for it. But this can invite misunderstandings. One way in which we respect persons, termed “appraisal respect” by Stephen Darwall (1977), is clearly not the same as the kind of respect required by the Humanity Formula: I may respect you as a rebounder but not a scorer, or as a researcher but not as a teacher. When I respect you in this way, I am positively appraising you in light of some achievement or virtue you possess relative to some standard of success. If this were the sort of respect Kant is counseling then clearly it may vary from person to person and is surely not what treating something as an end-in-itself requires. For instance, it does not seem to prevent me from regarding rationality as an achievement and respecting one person as a rational agent in this sense, but not another. And Kant is not telling us to ignore differences, to pretend that we are blind to them on mindless egalitarian grounds. However, a distinct way in which we respect persons, referred to as “recognition respect” by Darwall, better captures Kant’s position: I may respect you because you are a student, a Dean, a doctor or a mother. In such cases of respecting you because of who or what you are, I am giving the proper regard to a certain fact about you, your being a Dean for instance. This sort of respect, unlike appraisal respect, is not a matter of degree based on your having measured up to some standard of assessment. Respect for the humanity in persons is more like Darwall’s recognition respect. We are to respect human beings simply because they are persons and this requires a certain sort of regard. We are not called on to respect them insofar as they have met some standard of evaluation appropriate to persons. And, crucially for Kant, persons cannot lose their humanity by their misdeeds – even the most vicious persons, Kant thought, deserve basic respect as persons with humanity.

The third formulation of the CI is “the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law .” (G 4:432). Although Kant does not state this as an imperative, as he does in the other formulations, it is easy enough to put it in that form: Act so that through your maxims you could be a legislator of universal laws. This sounds very similar to the first formulation. However, in this case we focus on our status as universal law givers rather than universal law followers . This is of course the source of the very dignity of humanity Kant speaks of in the second formulation. A rational will that is merely bound by universal laws could act accordingly from natural and non-moral motives, such as self-interest. But in order to be a legislator of universal laws, such contingent motives, motives that rational agents such as ourselves may or may not have, must be set aside. Hence, we are required, according to this formulation, to conform our behavior to principles that express this autonomy of the rational will — its status as a source of the very universal laws that obligate it. As with the Humanity Formula, this new formulation of the CI does not change the outcome, since each is supposed to formulate the very same moral law, and in some sense “unite” the other formulations within it. Kant takes each formulation that succeeds the first in its own way as bringing the moral law “closer to feeling”. The Autonomy Formula presumably does this by putting on display the source of our dignity and worth, our status as free rational agents who are the source of the authority behind the very moral laws that bind us.

This formulation has gained favor among Kantians in recent years (see Rawls, 1971; Hill, 1972). Many see it as introducing more of a social dimension to Kantian morality. Kant states that the above concept of every rational will as a will that must regard itself as enacting laws binding all rational wills is closely connected to another concept, that of a “systematic union of different rational beings under common laws”, or a “Kingdom of Ends” (G 4:433). The formulation of the CI states that we must “act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely possible kingdom of ends” (G 4:439). It combines the others in that (i) it requires that we conform our actions to the laws of an ideal moral legislature, (ii) that this legislature lays down universal laws, binding all rational wills including our own, and (iii) that those laws are of “a merely possible kingdom” each of whose members equally possesses this status as legislator of universal laws, and hence must be treated always as an end in itself. The intuitive idea behind this formulation is that our fundamental moral obligation is to act only on principles which could earn acceptance by a community of fully rational agents each of whom have an equal share in legislating these principles for their community.

Kant claimed that all of these CI formulas were equivalent. Unfortunately, he does not say in what sense. What he says is that these “are basically only so many formulations of precisely the same law, each one of them by itself uniting the other two within it,” and that the differences between them are “more subjectively than objectively practical” in the sense that each aims “to bring an Idea of reason closer to intuition (by means of a certain analogy) and thus nearer to feeling” (G 4:435). He also says that one formula “follows from” another (G 4:431), and that the concept foundational to one formula “leads to a closely connected” concept at the basis of another formula (G 4:433). Thus, his claim that the formulations are equivalent could be interpreted in a number of ways.

Kant’s statement that each formula “unites the other two within it” initially suggests that the formulas are equivalent in meaning , or at least one could analytically derive one formula from another. Some of Kant’s commentators, for example, have argued along the following lines: That I should always treat humanity as an end in itself entails that I should act only on maxims that are consistent with themselves as universal laws of nature (O’Neill 1975, 1990; Engstrom 2009; Sensen 2011). There are remaining doubts some commentators have, however, about whether this strategy can capture the full meaning of the Humanity Formula or explain all of the duties that Kant claims to derive from it (Wood 1999, 2007; Cureton 2013).

Perhaps, then, if the formulas are not equivalent in meaning, they are nevertheless logically interderivable and hence equivalent in this sense. The universal law formula is not itself derived, as some of Kant’s interpreters have suggested, from the principle of non-contradiction. That would have the consequence that the CI is a logical truth, and Kant insists that it is not or at least that it is not analytic. Since the CI formulas are not logical truths, then, it is possible that they could be logically interderivable. However, despite his claim that each contains the others within it, what we find in the Groundwork seems best interpreted as a derivation of each successive formula from the immediately preceding formula. There are, nonetheless, a few places in which it seems that Kant is trying to work in the opposite direction. One is found in his discussion of the Humanity Formula. There Kant says that only something “ whose existence in itself had an absolute worth” could be the ground of a categorically binding law (G 4:428). He then boldly proclaims that humanity is this absolutely valuable thing, referring to this as a “postulate” that he will argue for in the final chapter of the Groundwork (G 4:429n). One might take this as expressing Kant’s intention to derive thereby the universal law formula from the Humanity Formula: If something is absolutely valuable, then we must act only on maxims that can be universal laws. But (he postulates) humanity is absolutely valuable. Thus , we must act only on maxims that can be universal laws. This (we think) anomalous discussion may well get at some deep sense in which Kant thought the formulations were equivalent. Nonetheless, this derivation of the universal law formulation from the Humanity Formulation seems to require a substantive, synthetic claim, namely, that humanity is indeed absolutely valuable. And if it does require this, then, contrary to Kant’s own insistence, the argument of Groundwork II does not appear to be merely an analytic argument meant simply to establish the content of the moral law.

The most straightforward interpretation of the claim that the formulas are equivalent is as the claim that following or applying each formula would generate all and only the same duties (Allison 2011). This seems to be supported by the fact that Kant used the same examples through the Law of Nature Formula and the Humanity Formula. Thus, the Universal Law Formulation generates a duty to φ if and only if the Humanity Formula generates a duty to φ, (and so on for the other formulations). In other words, respect for humanity as an end in itself could never lead you to act on maxims that would generate a contradiction when universalized, and vice versa. This way of understanding Kant’s claim also fits with his statement that there is no “objective practical difference” between the formulations although there are “subjective” differences. The subjective differences between formulas are presumably differences that appeal in different ways to various conceptions of what morality demands of us. But this difference in meaning is compatible with there being no practical difference, in the sense that conformity to one formulation cannot lead one to violate another formulation.

At the heart of Kant’s moral theory is the idea of autonomy. Most readers interpret Kant as holding that autonomy is a property of rational wills or agents. Understanding the idea of autonomy was, in Kant’s view, key to understanding and justifying the authority that moral requirements have over us. As with Rousseau, whose views influenced Kant, freedom does not consist in being bound by no law, but by laws that are in some sense of one’s own making. The idea of freedom as autonomy thus goes beyond the merely “negative” sense of being free from causes on our conduct originating outside of ourselves. It contains first and foremost the idea of laws made and laid down by oneself, and, in virtue of this, laws that have decisive authority over oneself.

Kant’s basic idea can be grasped intuitively by analogy with the idea of political freedom as autonomy (See Reath 1994). Consider how political freedom in liberal theories is thought to be related to legitimate political authority: A state is free when its citizens are bound only by laws in some sense of their own making — created and put into effect, say, by vote or by elected representatives. The laws of that state then express the will of the citizens who are bound by them. The idea, then, is that the source of legitimate political authority is not external to its citizens, but internal to them, internal to “the will of the people.” It is because the body politic created and enacted these laws for itself that it can be bound by them. An autonomous state is thus one in which the authority of its laws is in the will of the people in that state, rather than in the will of a people external to that state, as when one state imposes laws on another during occupation or colonization. In the latter case, the laws have no legitimate authority over those citizens. In a similar fashion, we may think of a person as free when bound only by her own will and not by the will of another. Her actions then express her own will and not the will of someone or something else. The authority of the principles binding her will is then also not external to her will. It comes from the fact that she willed them. So autonomy, when applied to an individual, ensures that the source of the authority of the principles that bind her is in her own will. Kant’s view can be seen as the view that the moral law is just such a principle. Hence, the “moral legitimacy” of the CI is grounded in its being an expression of each person’s own rational will. It is because each person’s own reason is the legislator and executor of the moral law that it is authoritative for her. (For a contrasting interpretation of autonomy that emphasizes the intrinsic value of freedom of choice and the instrumental role of reason in preserving that value, see Guyer 2007).

Kant argues that the idea of an autonomous will emerges from a consideration of the idea of a will that is free “in a negative sense.” The concept of a rational will is of a will that operates by responding to what it takes to be reasons. This is, firstly, the concept of a will that does not operate through the influence of factors outside of this responsiveness to apparent reasons. For a will to be free is thus for it to be physically and psychologically unforced in its operation. Hence, behaviors that are performed because of obsessions or thought disorders are not free in this negative sense. But also, for Kant, a will that operates by being determined through the operation of natural laws, such as those of biology or psychology, cannot be thought of as operating by responding to reasons. Hence, determination by natural laws is conceptually incompatible with being free in a negative sense.

A crucial move in Kant’s argument is his claim that a rational will cannot act except “under the Idea” of its own freedom (G 4:448). The expression “acting under the Idea of freedom” is easy to misunderstand. It does not mean that a rational will must believe it is free, since determinists are as free as libertarians in Kant’s view. Indeed, Kant goes out of his way in his most famous work, the Critique of Pure Reason , to argue that we have no rational basis for believing our wills to be free. This would involve, he argues, attributing a property to our wills that they would have to have as ‘things in themselves’ apart from the causally determined world of appearances. Of such things, he insists, we can have no knowledge. For much the same reason, Kant is not claiming that a rational will cannot operate without feeling free. Feelings, even the feeling of operating freely or the “looseness” Hume refers to when we act, cannot be used in an a priori argument to establish the CI, since they are empirical data.

One helpful way to understand acting “under the Idea of freedom” is by analogy with acting “under the Idea” that there are purposes in nature: Although there is, according to Kant, no rational basis for the belief that the natural world is (or is not) arranged according to some purpose by a Designer, the actual practices of science often require looking for the purpose of this or that chemical, organ, creature, environment, and so on. Thus, one engages in these natural sciences by searching for purposes in nature. Yet when an evolutionary biologist, for instance, looks for the purpose of some organ in some creature, she does not after all thereby believe that the creature was designed that way, for instance, by a Deity. Nor is she having some feeling of “designedness” in the creature. To say that she “acts under the Idea of” design is to say something about the practice of biology: Practicing biology involves searching for the purposes of the parts of living organisms. In much the same way, although there is no rational justification for the belief that our wills are (or are not) free, the actual practice of practical deliberation and decision consists of a search for the right causal chain of which to be the origin — consists, that is, seeking to be the first causes of things, wholly and completely through the exercise of one’s own will.

Kant says that a will that cannot exercise itself except under the Idea of its freedom is free from a practical point of view ( im practischer Absicht ). In saying such wills are free from a practical point of view, he is saying that in engaging in practical endeavors — trying to decide what to do, what to hold oneself and others responsible for, and so on — one is justified in holding oneself to all of the principles to which one would be justified in holding wills that are autonomous free wills. Thus, once we have established the set of prescriptions, rules, laws and directives that would bind an autonomous free will, we then hold ourselves to this very same of set prescriptions, rules, laws and directives. And one is justified in this because rational agency can only operate by seeking to be the first cause of its actions, and these are the prescriptions, and so on, of being a first cause of action. Therefore, rational agents are free in a negative sense insofar as any practical matter is at issue.

Crucially, rational wills that are negatively free must be autonomous, or so Kant argues. This is because the will is a kind of cause—willing causes action. Kant took from Hume the idea that causation implies universal regularities: if x causes y , then there is some universally valid law connecting X s to Y s. So, if my will is the cause of my φing, then Φing is connected to the sort of willing I engage in by some universal law. But it can’t be a natural law, such as a psychological, physical, chemical or biological law. These laws, which Kant thought were universal too, govern the movements of my body, the workings of my brain and nervous system and the operation of my environment and its effects on me as a material being. But they cannot be the laws governing the operation of my will; that, Kant already argued, is inconsistent with the freedom of my will in a negative sense. So, the will operates according to a universal law, though not one authored by nature, but one of which I am the origin or author. And that is to say that, in viewing my willing to φ as a negatively free cause of my φing, I must view my will as the autonomous cause of my having φed, as causing my having φed by way of some law that I, insofar as I am a rational will, laid down for my will.

Thus, Kant argues, a rational will, insofar as it is rational, is a will conforming itself to those laws valid for any rational will. Addressed to imperfectly rational wills, such as our own, this becomes an imperative: “Conform your action to a universal non-natural law.” Kant assumed that there was some connection between this formal requirement and the formulation of the CI which enjoins us to “Act as though the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature.” But, as commentators have long noticed (see, e.g. , Hill, 1989a, 1989b), it is not clear what the link is between the claim that rational autonomous wills conform themselves to whatever universally valid laws require, and the more substantial and controversial claim that you should evaluate your maxims in the ways implied by the universal law of nature formulation.

Kant appeared not to recognize the gap between the law of an autonomous rational will and the CI, but he was apparently unsatisfied with the argument establishing the CI in Groundwork III for another reason, namely, the fact that it does not prove that we really are free. In the Critique of Practical Reason , he states that it is simply a “fact of reason” ( Factum der Vernunft ) that our wills are bound by the CI, and he uses this to argue that our wills are autonomous. Hence, while in the Groundwork Kant relies on a dubious argument for our autonomy to establish that we are bound by the moral law, in the second Critique , he argues from the bold assertion of our being bound by the moral law to our autonomy.

The apparent failure of Kant’s argument to establish the autonomy of the will, and hence the authority of moral demands over us, has not deterred his followers from trying to make good on this project. One strategy favored recently has been to turn back to the arguments of Groundwork II for help. Kant himself repeatedly claimed that these arguments are merely analytic but that they do not establish that there is anything that answers to the concepts he analyzes. The conclusions are thus fully compatible with morality being, as he puts it, a “mere phantom of the brain” (G 4:445). Kant clearly takes himself to have established that rational agents such as ourselves must take the means to our ends, since this is analytic of rational agency. But there is a chasm between this analytic claim and the supposed synthetic conclusion that rational agency also requires conforming to a further, non-desire based, principle of practical reason such as the CI. Nevertheless, some see arguments in Groundwork II that establish just this. These strategies involve a new “teleological” reading of Kant’s ethics that relies on establishing the existence of an absolute value or an “end in itself” (we say more about this teleological reading below). They begin with Kant’s own stated assumption that there is such an end in itself if and only if there is a categorical imperative binding on all rational agents as such. If this assumption is true, then if one can on independent grounds prove that there is something which is an end in itself, one will have an argument for a categorical imperative. One such strategy, favored by Korsgaard (1996) and Wood (1999) relies on the apparent argument Kant gives that humanity is an end in itself. Guyer, by contrast, sees an argument for freedom as an end in itself (Guyer 2000). Both strategies have faced textual and philosophical hurdles. Considerable interpretive finesse, for instance, is required to explain Kant’s stark insistence on the priority of principles and law over the good in the second Critique (CPrR 5:57–67)

Although most of Kant’s readers understand the property of autonomy as being a property of rational wills, some, such as Thomas E. Hill, have held that Kant’s central idea is that of autonomy is a property, not primarily of wills, but of principles. The core idea is that Kant believed that all moral theories prior to his own went astray because they portrayed fundamental moral principles as appealing to the existing interests of those bound by them. By contrast, in Kant’s view moral principles must not appeal to such interests, for no interest is necessarily universal. Thus, in assuming at the outset that moral principles must embody some interest (or “heteronomous” principles), such theories rule out the very possibility that morality is universally binding. By contrast, the Categorical Imperative, because it does not enshrine existing interests, presumes that rational agents can conform to a principle that does not appeal to their interests (or an “autonomous” principle), and so can fully ground our conception, according to Kant, of what morality requires of us.

A different interpretive strategy, which has gained prominence in recent years, focuses on Kant’s apparent identification, in Groundwork III, of the will and practical reason. One natural way of interpreting Kant’s conception of freedom is to understand it in terms of the freedom and spontaneity of reason itself. This in turn apparently implies that our wills are necessarily aimed at what is rational and reasonable. To will something, on this picture, is to govern oneself in accordance with reason. Often, however, we fail to effectively so govern ourselves because we are imperfect rational beings who are caused to act by our non–rational desires and inclinations. The result, at least on one version of this interpretation (Wolff 1973), is that we either act rationally and reasonably (and so autonomously) or we are merely caused to behave in certain ways by non–rational forces acting on us (and so heteronomously). This is, however, an implausible view. It implies that all irrational acts, and hence all immoral acts, are not willed and therefore not free. Most interpreters have denied that this is the proper interpretation of Kant’s views. However, several prominent commentators nonetheless think that there is some truth in it (Engstrom 2009; Reath 2015; Korsgaard 1996, 2008, 2009). They agree that we always act under the “guise of the good” in the sense that our will is necessarily aimed at what is objectively and subjectively rational and reasonable, but these interpreters also think that, for Kant, there is a middle–ground between perfect conformity to reason and being caused to act by natural forces. In particular, when we act immorally, we are either weak–willed or we are misusing our practical reason by willing badly. We do not have the capacity to aim to act on an immoral maxim because the will is identified with practical reason, so when we will to perform an immoral act, we implicitly but mistakenly take our underlying policy to be required by reason. By representing our immoral act as rational and reasonable, we are not exercising our powers of reason well, so we are simply making a “choice” that is contrary to reason without “willing” it as such. Our choice is nonetheless free and attributable to us because our will was involved in leading us to take the act to be rational and reasonable. It remains to be seen whether, on this complicated interpretation of Kant, it sufficiently allows for the possibility that one can knowingly and willingly do wrong if the will is practical reason and practical reason is, in part, the moral law.

Several recent discussions of Kant’s moral theory have focused on understanding and assessing its implications for how we should regard and treat people with various kinds of disabilities. Kant does not say much explicitly about those with disabilities, but his moral framework is often seen as both hostile to and supportive of the interests of disabled people.

One of the most important criticisms of Kant’s moral theory concerns human beings with severe cognitive disabilities who lack the moral capacities and dispositions that, according to Kant, are needed for people to have dignity, be ends in themselves, possess moral rights, legislate moral laws, be a member of the kingdom of ends, or otherwise have basic moral status (Kittay 2005, Vorhaus 2020, Barclay 2020; cf. the SEP entry cognitive disability and moral status ). When we reflect on what makes us morally special, according to Kant, we find that it is not our contingent properties, the biological species we belong to, or even our capacity to be conscious or to feel pain. Kant argues that rational nature, specifically the moral capacities and dispositions to legislate and follow moral principles, is what gives us inner worth and makes us deserving of respect (G 4:428–36, 446–7; Rel 6:26). Our basic moral status does not come in degrees. It is always equal to that of other people regardless of the level, if any, at which our moral capacities and dispositions are developed, realized, or exercised. Infants and young children, according to Kant, almost always have a moral nature even though their moral capacities and dispositions are undeveloped or underdeveloped (MM 6:280–1, 422; see also Schapiro 1999). Virtually all people with Down Syndrome and autism have basic moral status even if their moral capacities and dispositions are not as fully realized or exercised as they are in other people. Being asleep or in a coma does not preclude someone from having basic moral status even if their moral capacities and dispositions are temporarily or permanently dormant. Some human beings with significant cognitive disabilities, however, do not have even bare capacities or dispositions to recognize, accept, legislate, and follow moral norms. Kant seems to imply that anencephalic infants, those in persistent vegetative states, and other human beings with the most severe cognitive disabilities lack dignity and are not ends in themselves. They are apparently excluded from the moral community in ways that have unacceptable implications for how we should or should not regard and treat them.

There is little or no evidence that Kant himself thought about this problem, which is also connected with the moral status of many non-human animals who seem to matter morally but who lack the moral capacities and dispositions that, according to Kant, are necessary for basic moral status. Kant’s defenders have nonetheless explored what his basic moral framework might imply about the moral status of those with severe cognitive disabilities. One approach is simply to bite the bullet by admitting that people with certain severe cognitive disabilities lack the basic moral status that others of us share (Wood 1998, Sussman 2001. (This general strategy is deployed by Regan and followed by Wood, McMahan, Warren, Merkel, and others. For the claim that such humans are not persons, on Kant’s theory, see also Sussman, Idea , 242.) Proponents of this view can emphasize that, although we do not have duties to such people, we can have duties regarding them, such as duties of moral self-improvement that give us reasons to treat those with significant cognitive disabilities humanely for the sake of improving how we treat other human beings with basic moral status (MM 6:442) or duties of beneficence that give us reasons to care for them as a kindness to their families (G 4:430). Pragmatic considerations might also give us reasons to err on the side of caution when it comes to assessing whether someone entirely lacks the moral capacities and dispositions that ground basic moral status. Because of difficulties making such determinations and the moral risks involved in judging incorrectly, we should perhaps assume, unless we have very strong evidence to the contrary, that each human being has basic moral status (Korsgaard 1996).

A second approach to addressing the problem of moral status for those with significant cognitive disabilities is to emphasize passages in which Kant says all human beings have dignity or are ends in themselves (G 4:428–29; MM 6:410) and to argue that, according to Kant’s theories of biology and psychology, all human beings, including those with severe cognitive disabilities, necessarily have the requisite features of moral personhood (Kain 2009). A third approach is to draw on and perhaps supplement some of Kant’s moral views by, for example, arguing that because we value things, we must value ourselves as ends, which in turn commits us to valuing all human and non-human animals as ends (Korsgaard 2020) or that respect for all human beings is a constitutive feature of rational agency that does not depend on any intrinsic properties of the objects of respect (Sensen 2018).

In addition to discussing the moral status of people with severe cognitive disabilities, Kantian philosophers have also been exploring how his moral theory applies to other moral issues that concern how we should regard and treat people with disabilities. Although Kant’s focus was on specifying principles for all circumstances or for all human contexts, he recognized that a complete specification of his system of moral duties, ends, and ideals must include applications of basic moral standards to particular contexts and groups of people (MM 6:468–9).

When prospective parents choose not to produce children that would likely have disabilities, they might express disrespectful attitudes about existing people with disabilities (Velleman 2015, Sussman 2018). People with disabilities are often ridiculed, abused, treated as children, denied opportunities to continue developing their natural abilities in, for example, assisted living facilities that instead emphasize their comfort, and excluded from friendships or other forms of solidarity in ways that arguably violate moral duties that Kant describes (Cureton 2021, Hill 2020). They often face obstacles to developing and maintaining self-respect by those who regard them as, for example, burdensome, malingering, or curiosities (Stohr 2018). People with disabilities also tend to receive assistance from others that is incompatible with the respect they are owed. Beneficence, according to Kant, must be tempered by respect so that we do not, for example, impose burdensome obligations of gratitude on a blind person who would rather navigate to the next conference session herself, “help” a Deaf person by offering to pay for cochlear implants that he does not want, finish the sentences of someone with a speech impediment in ways that express condescension or pity, or mistake a strict duty to install a wheelchair ramp as an optional duty of charity (Cureton 2016, Holtman 2018).

Kant defines virtue as “the moral strength of a human being’s will in fulfilling his duty” (MM 6:405) and vice as principled immorality (MM 6:390). This definition appears to put Kant’s views on virtue at odds with classical views such as Aristotle’s in several important respects.

First, Kant’s account of virtue presupposes an account of moral duty already in place. Thus, rather than treating admirable character traits as more basic than the notions of right and wrong conduct, Kant takes virtues to be explicable only in terms of a prior account of moral or dutiful behavior. He does not try to make out what shape a good character has and then draw conclusions about how we ought to act on that basis. He sets out the principles of moral conduct based on his philosophical account of rational agency, and then on that basis defines virtue as a kind of strength and resolve to act on those principles despite temptations to the contrary.

Second, virtue is, for Kant, strength of will, and hence does not arise as the result of instilling a “second nature” by a process of habituating or training ourselves to act and feel in particular ways. It is indeed a disposition, but a disposition of one’s will, not a disposition of emotions, feelings, desires or any other feature of human nature that might be amenable to habituation. Moreover, the disposition is to overcome obstacles to moral behavior that Kant thought were ineradicable features of human nature. Thus, virtue appears to be much more like what Aristotle would have thought of as a lesser trait, viz., continence or self-control.

Third, in viewing virtue as a trait grounded in moral principles, and vice as principled transgression of moral law, Kant thought of himself as thoroughly rejecting what he took to be the Aristotelian view that virtue is a mean between two vices. The Aristotelian view, he claimed, assumes that virtue typically differs from vice only in terms of degree rather than in terms of the different principles each involves (MM 6:404, 432). Prodigality and avarice, for instance, do not differ by being too loose or not loose enough with one’s means. They differ in that the prodigal person acts on the principle of acquiring means with the sole intention of enjoyment, while the avaricious person acts on the principle of acquiring means with the sole intention of possessing them.

Fourth, in classical views the distinction between moral and non-moral virtues is not particularly significant. A virtue is some sort of excellence of the soul, but one finds classical theorists treating wit and friendliness alongside courage and justice. Since Kant holds moral virtue to be a trait grounded in moral principle, the boundary between non-moral and moral virtues could not be more sharp. Even so, Kant shows a remarkable interest in non-moral virtues; indeed, much of Anthropology is given over to discussing the nature and sources of a variety of character traits, both moral and non-moral.

Fifth, virtue cannot be a trait of divine beings, if there are such, since it is the power to overcome obstacles that would not be present in them. This is not to say that to be virtuous is to be the victor in a constant and permanent war with ineradicable evil impulses or temptations. Morality is “duty” for human beings because it is possible (and we recognize that it is possible) for our desires and interests to run counter to its demands. Should all of our desires and interests be trained ever so carefully to comport with what morality actually requires of us, this would not change in the least the fact that morality is still duty for us. For should this come to pass, it would not change the fact that each and every desire and interest could have run contrary to the moral law. And it is the fact that they can conflict with moral law, not the fact that they actually do conflict with it, that makes duty a constraint, and hence is virtue essentially a trait concerned with constraint.

Sixth, virtue, while important, does not hold pride of place in Kant’s system in other respects. For instance, he holds that the lack of virtue is compatible with possessing a good will (G 6: 408). That one acts from duty, even repeatedly and reliably can thus be quite compatible with an absence of the moral strength to overcome contrary interests and desires. Indeed, it may often be no challenge at all to do one’s duty from duty alone. Someone with a good will, who is genuinely committed to duty for its own sake, might simply fail to encounter any significant temptation that would reveal the lack of strength to follow through with that commitment. That said, he also appeared to hold that if an act is to be of genuine moral worth, it must be motivated by the kind of purity of motivation achievable only through a permanent, quasi-religious conversion or “revolution” in the orientation of the will of the sort described in Religion . Until one achieves a permanent change in the will’s orientation in this respect, a revolution in which moral righteousness is the nonnegotiable condition of any of one’s pursuits, all of one’s actions that are in accordance with duty are nevertheless morally worthless, no matter what else may be said of them. However, even this revolution in the will must be followed up with a gradual, lifelong strengthening of one’s will to put this revolution into practice. This suggests that Kant’s considered view is that a good will is a will in which this revolution of priorities has been achieved, while a virtuous will is one with the strength to overcome obstacles to its manifestation in practice.

Kant distinguishes between virtue, which is strength of will to do one’s duty from duty, and particular virtues, which are commitments to particular moral ends that we are morally required to adopt. Among the virtues Kant discusses are those of self-respect, honesty, thrift, self-improvement, beneficence, gratitude, sociability, and forgiveness. Kant also distinguishes vice, which is a steadfast commitment to immorality, from particular vices, which involve refusing to adopt specific moral ends or committing to act against those ends. For example, malice, lust, gluttony, greed, laziness, vengefulness, envy, servility, contempt and arrogance are all vices in Kant’s normative ethical theory.

(Interest in Kant’s conception of virtue has rapidly grown in recent years. For further discussion, see Cureton and Hill 2014, forthcoming; Wood 2008; Surprenant 2014; Sherman 1997; O’Neil 1996; Johnson 2008; Hill 2012; Herman 1996; Engstrom 2002; Denis 2006; Cureton forthcoming; Betzler 2008; Baxley 2010).

The Categorical Imperative, in Kant’s view, is an objective, unconditional and necessary principle of reason that applies to all rational agents in all circumstances. Although Kant gives several examples in the Groundwork that illustrate this principle, he goes on to describe in later writings, especially in The Metaphysics of Morals , a complicated normative ethical theory for interpreting and applying the CI to human persons in the natural world. His framework includes various levels, distinctions and application procedures. Kant, in particular, describes two subsidiary principles that are supposed to capture different aspects of the CI. The Universal Principle of Right, which governs issues about justice, rights and external acts that can be coercively enforced, holds that “Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law” (MM 6:230). The Supreme Principle of the Doctrine of Virtue, which governs questions about moral ends, attitudes, and virtue, requires us to “act in accordance with a maxim of ends that it can be a universal law for everyone to have” (MM 6:395). These principles, in turn, justify more specific duties of right and of ethics and virtue.

In Kant’s framework, duties of right are narrow and perfect because they require or forbid particular acts, while duties of ethics and virtue are wide and imperfect because they allow significant latitude in how we may decide to fulfill them. For example, Kant claims that the duty not to steal the property of another person is narrow and perfect because it precisely defines a kind of act that is forbidden. The duty of beneficence, on the other hand, is characterized as wide and imperfect because it does not specify exactly how much assistance we must provide to others.

Even with a system of moral duties in place, Kant admits that judgment is often required to determine how these duties apply to particular circumstances. Moral laws, Kant says, “must be meticulously observed” but “they cannot, after all, have regard to every little circumstance, and the latter may yield exceptions, which do not always find their exact resolution in the laws” (V 27:574; see also CPR A133/B172; MM 6:411).

The received view is that Kant’s moral philosophy is a deontological normative theory at least to this extent: it denies that right and wrong are in some way or other functions of goodness or badness. It denies, in other words, the central claim of teleological moral views. For instance, act consequentialism is one sort of teleological theory. It asserts that the right action is that action of all the alternatives available to the agent that has the best overall outcome. Here, the goodness of the outcome determines the rightness of an action. Another sort of teleological theory might focus instead on character traits. “Virtue ethics” asserts that a right action in any given circumstance is that action a virtuous person does or would perform in those circumstances. In this case, it is the goodness of the character of the person who does or would perform it that determines the rightness of an action. In both cases, as it were, the source or ground of rightness is goodness. And Kant’s own views have typically been classified as deontological precisely because they have seemed to reverse this priority and deny just what such theories assert. Rightness, on the standard reading of Kant, is not grounded in the value of outcomes or character.

There are several reasons why readers have thought that Kant denies the teleological thesis. First, he makes a plethora of statements about outcomes and character traits that appear to imply an outright rejection of both forms of teleology. For instance, in Groundwork I, he says that he takes himself to have argued that “the objectives we may have in acting, and also our actions’ effects considered as ends and what motivates our volition, can give to actions no unconditional or moral worth…[this] can be found nowhere but in the principle of the will, irrespective of the ends that can be brought about by such action” (G 4: 400). This appears to say that moral rightness is not a function of the value of intended or actual outcomes. Kant subsequently says that a categorical imperative “declares an action to be objectively necessary of itself without reference to any purpose—that is, even without any further end” (G 4:415). A categorical imperative “commands a certain line of conduct directly, without assuming or being conditional on any further goal to be reached by that conduct” (G 4:416). These certainly appear to be the words of someone who rejects the idea that what makes actions right is primarily their relationship to what good may come of those actions, someone who rejects outright the act consequentialist form of teleology. Moreover, Kant begins the Groundwork by noting that character traits such as the traditional virtues of courage, resolution, moderation, self-control, or a sympathetic cast of mind possess no unconditional moral worth, (G 4:393–94, 398–99). If the moral rightness of an action is grounded in the value of the character traits of the person who performs or would perform it then it seems Kant thinks that it would be grounded in something of only conditional value. This certainly would not comport well with the virtue ethics form of teleology.

Second, there are deeper theoretical claims and arguments of Kant’s in both the Groundwork and in the second Critique that appear to be incompatible with any sort of teleological form of ethics. These claims and arguments all stem from Kant’s insistence that morality is grounded in the autonomy of a rational will. For instance, Kant states that “if the will seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims for its own giving of universal law…heteronomy always results” (G 4:441). If the law determining right and wrong is grounded in either the value of outcomes or the value of the character of the agent, it seems it will not be found in the fitness of the action’s maxim to be a universal law laid down by the agent’s own rational will. And Kant’s most complete treatment of value, the second Critique’s “On the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason”, appears to be a relentless attack on any sort of teleological moral theory. “The concept of good and evil” he states, “must not be determined before the moral law (for which, as it would seem, this concept would have to be made the basis) but only (as was done here) after it and by means of it” (CPrR 5:63).

A number of Kant’s readers have come to question this received view, however. Perhaps the first philosopher to suggest a teleological reading of Kant was John Stuart Mill. In the first chapter of his Utilitarianism , Mill implies that the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative could only sensibly be interpreted as a test of the consequences of universal adoption of a maxim. Several 20th century theorists have followed Mill’s suggestion, most notably, R. M. Hare. Hare argued that moral judgments such as “Stealing is wrong” are in fact universal prescriptions (“No stealing anywhere by anyone!”). And because they are universal, Hare argued, they forbid making exceptions. That in turn requires moral judgments to give each person’s wellbeing, including our own, equal weight. And when we give each person’s wellbeing equal weight, we are acting to produce the best overall outcome. Thus, in his view, the CI is “simply utilitarianism put into other words” (1993, p. 103). More recently, David Cummiskey (1996) has argued that Kant’s view that moral principles are justified because they are universalizable is compatible with those principles themselves being consequentialist. Indeed, Cummiskey argues that they must be: Respect for the value of humanity entails treating the interests of each as counting for one and one only, and hence for always acting to produce the best overall outcome.

There are also teleological readings of Kant’s ethics that are non-consequentialist. Barbara Herman (1993) has urged philosophers to “leave deontology behind” as an understanding of Kant’s moral theory on the grounds that the conception of practical reason grounding the Categorical Imperative is itself a conception of value. Herman’s idea is that Kant never meant to say that no value grounds moral principles. That, she argues, would imply that there would be no reason to conform to them. Instead, Kant thought the principles of rationality taken together constitute rational agency, and rational agency so constituted itself functions as a value that justifies moral action (1993, 231). Herman’s proposal thus has Kant’s view grounding the rightness of actions in rational agency, and then in turn offering rational agency itself up as a value. Both Paul Guyer and Allen Wood have offered proposals that differ from Herman’s in content, but agree on the general form of teleology that she defends as a reading of Kant. Guyer argues that autonomy itself is the value grounding moral requirements. Moral thinking consists in recognizing the priceless value of a rational agent’s autonomous will, something in light of whose value it is necessary for any rational agent to modify his behavior (1998, 22–35). And Wood argues that humanity itself is the grounding value for Kant. While the second Critique claims that good things owe their value to being the objects of the choices of rational agents, they could not, in his view, acquire any value at all if the source of that value, rational agency, itself had no value (1999, 130; see also 157–8). Finally, Rae Langton has argued that if Kant’s theory is to be thought of as an objectivistic view, we must suppose that the value of humanity and the good will are independent of simply being the objects of our rational choices. If their value thereby becomes the source of the rightness of our actions — say, our actions are right if and because they treat that self-standing value in various ways — then her reading too is teleological.

It is of considerable interest to those who follow Kant to determine which reading — teleological or deontological — was actually Kant’s, as well as which view ought to have been his. A powerful argument for the teleological reading is the motivation for Herman’s proposal: What rationale can we provide for doing our duty at all if we don’t appeal to it’s being good to do it? But a powerful argument for the deontological reading is Kant’s own apparent insistence that the authority of moral demands must come simply from their being the demands of a rational will, quite apart from the value that will may have (see Schneewind 1996; Johnson 2007, 2008; and Reath 1994). On the latter view, moral demands gain their authority simply because a rational will, insofar as you are rational, must will them. Proponents of this reading are left with the burden of answering Herman’s challenge to provide a rationale for having willed such demands, although one response may be that the very question Herman raises does not make sense because it asks, in effect, why it is rational to be rational. On the former view, by contrast, a rationale is at hand: because your will is, insofar as it is rational, good. Proponents of this former reading are, however, then left with the burden of explaining how it could be the autonomy of the will alone that explains the authority of morality.

It has seemed to a number of Kant’s interpreters that it is important to determine whether Kant’s moral philosophy was realist, anti-realist or something else (e.g. a constructivist). The issue is tricky because terms such as “realism,” “anti-realism” and “constructivism” are terms of art, so it is all too easy for interlocutors to talk past one another.

One relevant issue is whether Kant’s views commit him to the thesis that moral judgments are beliefs, and so apt to be evaluated for their truth or falsity (or are “truth apt”).

One might have thought that this question is quite easy to settle. At the basis of morality, Kant argued, is the Categorical Imperative, and imperatives are not truth apt. It makes little sense to ask whether “Leave the gun, take the cannoli.” is true. But, in fact, the question is not at all easy. For one thing, moral judgments such as “Lying is wrong” might well be best analyzed according to Kant’s views as “The Categorical Imperative commands us not to lie”, and this judgment is not an imperative, but a report about what an imperative commands. Thus while at the foundation of morality there would be an imperative which is not truth apt, particular moral judgments themselves would describe what that imperative rules out and so would themselves be truth apt.

Philosophers such as R.M. Hare, however, have taken Kant’s view to be that moral judgments are not truth apt. Although on the surface moral judgments can look as if they describe a moral world, they are, as Hare reads Kant, “prescriptions”, not “descriptions”. This is not, in his view, to say that Kant’s ethics portrays moral judgments as lacking objectivity. Objectivity, according to Hare, is to be understood as universality, and the Categorical Imperative prescribes universally.

A second issue that has received considerable attention is whether Kant is a metaethical constructivist or realist.

Constructivism in metaethics is the view that moral truths are, or are determined by, the outcomes of actual or hypothetical procedures of deliberation or choice. Many who interpret Kant as a constructivist claim that his analysis of “duty” and “good will” reveals that if there are moral requirements then the agents who are bound to them have autonomy of the will (Rawls 1980; Korsgaard 1996; O’Neil 1989; Reath 2006; Hill 1989a, 1989b, 2001; Cureton 2013, 2014; Engstrom 2009). Autonomy, in this sense, means that such agents are both authors and subjects of the moral law and, as such, are not bound by any external requirements that may exist outside of our wills. Instead, we are only subject to moral requirements that we impose on ourselves through the operation of our own reason independently of our natural desires and inclinations. The common error of previous ethical theories, including sentimentalism, egoism and rationalism, is that they failed to recognize that morality presupposes that we have autonomy of the will. These theories mistakenly held that our only reasons to be moral derive from hypothetical imperatives about how to achieve given moral ends that exist independently of the activity of reason itself (for a discussion of Kant’s more specific objections to previous ethical theories, see Schneewind 2009). On these interpretations, Kant is a skeptic about arbitrary authorities, such as God, natural feelings, intrinsic values or primitive reasons that exist independently of us. Only reason itself has genuine authority over us, so we must exercise our shared powers of reasoned deliberation, thought and judgment, guided by the Categorical Imperative as the most basic internal norm of reason, to construct more specific moral requirements. Kantians in this camp, however, disagree about how this rational procedure should be characterized.

Other commentators interpret Kant as a robust moral realist (Ameriks 2003; Wood 1999; Langton 2007; Kain 2004). According to these philosophers, Kant’s theory, properly presented, begins with the claim that rational nature is an objective, agent-neutral and intrinsic value. The moral law then specifies how we should regard and treat agents who have this special status. Autonomy of the will, on this view, is a way of considering moral principles that are grounded in the objective value of rational nature and whose authority is thus independent of the exercise of our wills or rational capacities.

Some interpreters of Kant, most notably Korsgaard (1996), seem to affirm a kind of quietism about metaethics by rejecting many of the assumptions that contemporary metaethical debates rest on. For example, some of these philosophers seem not to want to assert that moral facts and properties just are the outcomes of deliberative procedures. Rather, they seem more eager to reject talk of facts and properties as unnecessary, once a wholly acceptable and defensible procedure is in place for deliberation. That is, the whole framework of facts and properties suggests that there is something we need to moor our moral conceptions to “out there” in reality, when in fact what we only need a route to a decision. Once we are more sensitive to the ethical concerns that really matter to us as rational agents, we will find that many of the questions that animate metaethicists turn out to be non-questions or of only minor importance. Others have raised doubts, however, about whether Kantians can so easily avoid engaging in metaethical debates (Hussain & Shaw 2013).

Primary Sources

Kant’s original German and Latin writings can be found in Königlichen Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), 1900–, Kants gesammelte Schriften, Berlin: Walter De Gruyter. Most translations include volume and page numbers to this standard Academy edition. Citations in this article do so as well. There are many English translations of Kant’s primary ethical writings. The recent Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant provides critical translations of Kant’s published works as well as selections from his correspondence and lectures. The following volumes of that series are especially relevant to his moral theory:

• Practical Philosophy , translated by Mary Gregor, 1996. Includes: “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?,” Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , Critique of Practical Reason , and The Metaphysics of Morals .
• Religion and Rational Theology , translated by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni, 1996. Includes: Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
• Anthropology, History, and Education , translated by Robert Louden and Guenther Zoeller, 2008. Includes: “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim,” Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View , and “Lectures on Pedagogy”
• Lectures on Ethics , translated by Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind, 2001.
• Critique of Pure Reason , translated by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, 1998.

Recent Commentaries on Kant’s Ethical Writings

There have been several comprehensive commentaries on the Groundwork that have been published recently, some of which also include new English translations.

• Allison, Henry, 2011, Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Denis, Lara, 2005, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals , Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press.
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There are also recent commentaries on the The Metaphysics of Morals :

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The classic commentary on the Critique of Practical Reason is:

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Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Religion – The Origin of Humanity Essay

Introduction, literature review, works cited.

The answer to origin of humanity can be traced through evolution of culture of religion. Religion has been in existence since the earlier man’s period, and records that show that some form of gods were worshipped, which can be found on caves and statutes. In addition, practices by Homo sapiens of burying their dead indicate the existence of religion. Religion also appears to be the only unique practice with human beings.

On the other hand, Darwin model of evolution indicates that through adaptation and selection, there were some forms of changes that took place in earlier organism.

By treating religion like some organism, it is possible to explore some its adaptability and selection, which made human beings more superior than other animals. In such cases, certain attributes of a religion succeeded to the next form. Within these trends of religion, it can be possible to trace exactly the period and the type of religious belief that led to humanity perception in human beings.

This paper explores the argument of other Paleolithic’s and archeologist on the origin of religion. It also explores the transformation of the first form of religion to modern type. Then in a generative discussion, it proceeds to argue that cultural changes in religion as opposed to brain development or species evolution are responsible for the change in human perception of themselves.

Mind Development

The past holds the key to understand the present and this is in archaeology hands (Mithens 10). His archeological work looks at how the human brain developed overtime by overcoming various selective pressures. According to his argument, the mind not only creates but is also capable of imagination. He disputed information from evolutionist psychologist, which argued that the mind can act like Swiss army knife.

He argued that when looking at the brain this way, it would not be possible to understand why modern brain is able to perform tasks not present in the ancestral periods. Instead, he suggests that general intelligence exists. Using a cathedral metaphor, he describes three stages of mind development. First is domination by general intelligence, which is supplemented by domain specific modules, and lastly these modules work in concert with an endless information flow to all domains.

After describing his architecture of the brain, he explored the various human evolution stages to describe the various selective pressures present. His journey begins with the exploration of the ape, common human ancestor. In this stage, he makes several deductions including that due to Chimpanzee problems in tool making, they lack technical intelligence and therefore only general intelligence can describe their behavior (Mithen 34).

He also concludes that they posses certain levels of natural history intelligence and social intelligence. The latter is due to their ability to interact. Finally, he attributes their inability to communicate to their low level of general intelligence.

The next human evolution he described is the Homo Habilis. For these, he finds their ability to form shaped tools as an indication of development of certain technical knowledge as opposed to just general intelligence, which cannot be associated with this kind or craftsmanship. As for other types of intelligence like natural history, he considers some development to have taken place. According to him, brain development reached its climax in the neanderthalensis or Homo sapiens species.

Their natural history intelligence was also more developed especially because of the increased demands by the environment. He further points to existing tools in this period as indications of improved technical intelligence (Mithen 38). To him, these humans had knowledge and abilities equivalent to the present human beings. However, he also observes that they lacked the connection between natural history intelligence and technical intelligence necessary to design multiple-purpose tools.

According to his argument, modern culture originated from increased assimilation of various specialized modules. Therefore, human beings developed objects such as artifacts to communicate social messages. In time, human also demonstrated abilities to read the mind of others as indicated by art work in the time. To him, human beings increased in flexibility on social abilities.

Darwin’s Evolution Theory

His evolution theory consists of two assumptions. The first one is that all living things share the same ancestor. Second is that of natural selection, which explains why existing living things are not similar. Therefore under natural selection, differences occur through DNA mutations.

Some mutation changes to the species characteristics can result into improved reproduction. As a result, this change enables species to survive to the next generation. Species that adapt well to a certain environment are likely to undergo little change in an environment.

Mutation though is said to be progressive even in such environment, only that now the species would remain the same. On the other hand, when the environment is changing or dynamic, the evolvement of a species would be fast. Adaptations previously enjoyed in such an occurrence would cease to be of any benefit to the species. Mutations that take place in this stage would result into changes that make the species fit into the new conditions, and the new genes would be reproduced among generations (ASSS 11).

Apart from natural selection evolution is also a factor of sexual selection. Various male species compete for sexual partners by putting on show, brilliant colors, complex calls, and other physical attributes. As for the female partner, preference is on impressive males. Consequently, these are able to get more of their DNA in the next generation. As a result, some of the traits that are attractive but have little benefit for survival are distributed in a population, like the peacock tail.

Empirical Evidence for evolution

Darwin’s theory of evolution is characterized by changes and adaptation and suggests a common ancestry for all forms of life (Ridley 44). In the contemporary society, molecular biology and chemistry evidence have continued to support his argument; that is, all living things’ physical bodies are made of same basic cells and these are made up of similar molecules.

Similarities of cells between species are more than the differences that have been observed. Anatomical structure across species are said to be more similar. For instance, frogs, rabbits, lizards and birds all have a similar bone arrangement in their forelimb, in spite of the different ways they are used.

Transitional fossils also provide other evidence for evolution of species. They record changes that take place in species across lines separating one body plan to the other and across species as well.

Evidence gathered from them points that a chronology from land mammals to whales as well as dinosaur to birds took place. It has also been verified that as expected, the most primitive organism live in deepest geological layers and complexity and variety of fossil organism increases with the layer preceding the other as one progress to the earth.

Another premise held is that related species should be close to one another both in time and space and have more similarities with existing species in their specific regions as opposed to others living elsewhere. This has been found to be true although at times, fossils of a species are not found in its habitat. Evolutionary theory explains this as a result of migration to other areas, which has been verified by scientific evidence (ASSS 12).

Questioning Darwin Theory of Evolution

The first argument put against it, challenges the first hypothesis of a common ancestry. This hypothesis suggests that all forms of life have a similar origin. It relies on argument that all species have the same DNA or genetic code, to support the similar origin.

Critics of this position argue that God used a common design plan to make the various types of living things that he created. However, they also observe that by arguing so, it might be easy to believe that similarities in various species are due to the shared ancestry or relatedness (Zacharias & Geiser 45).

One of the weaknesses of this theory is that in its argument there are no transitional species. We learn that when Darwin was challenged to defend this weakness, he said that these would be discovered in the long run. However, up to date this has not happened. Instead, just a few transitional species to date have been discovered.

However, critics argue that if his theory was true, millions of these transitional animals would be discovered in the fossils records. They therefore conclude that, although DNA argument backs the common ancestry for this theory the lack of evidence in fossil records circumvents it.

The other level of criticism challenges the mutations forces of change ability to produce new species that have certain traits making them competitive in an environment. Zacharias & Geisler argue that there is no evidence that exist today that supports ability of any mechanism to produce complex living things that exists in the world today, from single celled living things (46).

They further say that the existing evidence on the rate of change, challenges this premise. By examining other work which describes the taxonomy of evolution, they conclude that this would be impossible especially because of the long process.

The second issue taken with Darwin’s theory hypothesis of natural selection is in its inability to explain the source of irreducibly complex system. This particularly takes offense, with some of the suggestions that piecemeal changes can take place. They observe that some parts of the organs would not accommodate such piecemeal changes. In addition, no scientific evidence exists to explain that this kind of piecemeal changes could have existed (Zacharias & Geisler 47).

Biblical understanding of the World

In the nineteenth century, many Europeans believed that God inspired the Bible and that it represented the truth in all respect. From this believe they proceeded to hold that, Creations was directed by God working on his own, that he was actively engaged in it, and he created each species in its original kind and form (ASSS 7).

One of the books of the Bible called Genesis claims that human beings seized a unique place in this formation because they were the last to be created, were made in God’s own image, and were given the powers to dominate the earth.

Emergence of religion

It is not definite when religion began, although evidence points that there of the religion’s main characteristics can be traced back to Upper Paleolithic Revolution. These are shamanism, ancestor worship and belief in supernatural (Rossano 3). This period is about 40,000 years ago.

In this period the cultural changes by the Homo sapiens were evident. The brain of the Homo sapiens did not change, rather it is their capacity to transmit and develop culture. As a result of this form of change these species were able to have some form of symbolism practices in the form of statutes, burial of the dead and cave art.

The earlier man used these caves for more than just aesthetic value, to other purposes like religion. In these caves, graphics of mixture of animals and human have been discovered. They focused their artistic form of worship with their practices of biological necessities that is reproduction through genes transmission and food for survival. The period that followed was Neolithic revolution or agrarian revolution. In this period, food was available in abundance due to agriculture and domestication of animals.

As a result, populations exploded and there was an improved chance for survival. Consequently there was need for more organized religion to bring some form of social order (Hoffman, 1). Diamond argued that this form of religion was important for social cohesion among individuals who otherwise would be great enemies (277). Furthering this point he argued murder was the main cause of death for hunters’ gatherers community.

Polytheism emerged, which is the belief of multiple gods. This was practice in ancient Egypt, Greece and India. In spite of it being developed by a more developed human society, it also retained many attributes of the previous religion. For instance supernatural beliefs continued with statues and cave paintings.

Both these symbolism contained either animal or human features, or both. For instance, animal gods like those of Egyptians or the Hinduism gods of elephant and cows. These gods had specific roles that they played, like war travelers and so on. This element of worshipping god for specific roles was also common in earlier religion, like for purposes of hunting. In this period there was also pantheism form of religion which involves finding peace in oneself. Its faith is based on belief that everything in the world is divine.

Belief in polytheism not only involved personification of god, but also there was belief in the enlargement of the family. That is faith could be expanded by adding on more gods in the family. In this family, some gods whose roles were not significant were demoted to a low rank in the hierarchy.

This then brings us to the question of who among the many gods was supreme. Within the polytheistic religion supreme gods can be traced such as Zeus of the ancient Greek, who was known as the god of all gods. As for Hinduism they had their Brahma who was considered as creator of universe. These trends in religion were followed by Abraham religion prophets that led to monotheism (Hoffman 1).

This new type of religion involved the worshipping of a single God. Before Abrahamic religion, monotheism existed in the form of Zoroastrianism. This was founded in 6 th century BC by a priest known as Zarathustra. He preceded Jesus and Muhammad in converting people to monotheism from polytheism religion.

According to Zoroastrianism teachings, there is only one god and he is the one who created the earth and living and non living things in it. Some of the beliefs that Abrahamic religions adopted are from this earlier form of monotheism. These include concepts of heaven and hell, as well as unchanging cod. Judaism as founded by Abraham though is the largest form f monotheism.

This new religion began in the Middle East around 2000 BC with Judaism being the first form and prophesized by Abraham. Around 33 CE Jesus brought his message of Christianity. Finally at 622 CE, the last form of monotheism, which was Islamic religion, was started by Prophet Muhammad (Hoffman 1).

These religions believed in one god and the message about this god was spread by a human being sent by him. In the new form of religion only one God is to be worshiped and this god was the creator of everything. The new god did not in any way look like human beings.

Morality and living in groups

Although morality is a unique characteristic in humans, other animals that live in groups also exhibits some forms of pre-moral sentiments. Apes for instance practice social bonding, conflict resolution and peacemaking and other forms of morality issues. To facilitate the well being of the groups social animals, are forced to give up some of their individual needs. Within these groups there is social ranking and each animal understands it place in the hierarchy.

Animals such as the chimpanzee have been found to live in these forms of social groupings. In the same line based on the type of live they lived, early men are also presumed to have lived in similar groups. Therefore to control these groups morality is also likely to have evolved to minimize conflict, social control, and for solidarity in the group. However, unlike animals human morality is more complex in that it has stiffer regulation mechanism such as rewards and punishment as well as development of reputation.

More so, human have better judgment and reasoning than animals. Some psychologists have argued that religion developed after morality, and advanced it to include other methods of examining people’s behavior like supernatural beliefs. Through the use of the supernatural powers of ancestors for instance, humans were able to develop more powerful groups that limited selfishness among individuals. In this way religion adaptability helped to improve the chance of group to survive (Rossano 146).

In Darwin’s evolutionary theory argument, making of tools and sexual selection comes out as distinct ways of differentiating humanity from animals. However, from our argument human beings are not the only animals that are known to practice social bonding or make tools. In addition, their brain development is not a factor of expansion of the skull per-se but rather an indication of changing cultural behaviors.

Religion is one such cultural behavior that has transformed for a long time in the history of mankind. Since the early man in the Neolithic times some forms of religion have been practiced by human beings. Rituals like burying of their dead and existence of some painting and statutes have been highlighted as indication of religion in these trends. In addition, human beings are the only animals that have been observed to practice religious activities. This makes emergence of religion as one of the things that differentiate humanity from animals.

Advancing Science Serving Society (ASSS). The Evolution Dialogues . nd. Web. Retrieved

Diamond, Jarred. From Egalitarian to Kleptocracy, the Evolution of Government and Religion. In Guns Germs and Steel , Chap. 14: 277. New York, Norton. 1997. Print.

Hoffman, Howard. “The Emergence and Evolution of Belief, Religion, and the Concept of God Pt II”. serendip, serendip, 15 May 2009. Web.

Mithen, Steven J. The Prehistory of the Mind: The Cognitive Origins of Art, Religion and Science . London: Thames & Hudson, 1996. Print.

Ridley, Mark. Evolution. Malden . Wiley-Blackwell. 2004. Print.

Rossano, Matt J. Supernaturalizing Social Life: Religion and the Evolution of Human Cooperation. Southeastern Louisiana University. 2007. JSTOR PDF files.

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IvyPanda. (2023, November 27). Religion - The Origin of Humanity. https://ivypanda.com/essays/religion-the-origin-of-humanity/

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Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Religion - The Origin of Humanity." November 27, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/religion-the-origin-of-humanity/.

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The 7 Types of Humanities Classes Explained

What are humanities classes.

Humanities classes explore how humans have lived in the past, how we interact with one another, and how we develop cultures and societies. These classes place high value on creativity and critical thinking . Examples of humanities classes include: the arts, history, music and theater.

Introduction

We often find the term ‘humanities’ to be somewhat vague, confusing or just foreign to us.

Hopefully this post will clear up that confusion and leave you with a clear, strong understanding of exactly:

• what counts as humanities;
• what courses are considered humanities;
• what you learn in humanities classes; and finally,
• give you some examples of humanities classes that you could choose to take at college.

You can navigate to any heading on this post using the below table of contents:

• ‘Humanities Class’ Definition
• Humanities vs Social Sciences: What’s the Difference?
• What do you learn in Humanities Classes?
• What Counts as Humanities Classes? (All 7 Types)
• Humanities Classes Electives that I Recommend
• What are the Real World Benefits of Studying Humanities?
• Careers in Humanities

No time to waste – let’s get started with a nice clear definition of ‘humanities classes’!

1. ‘Humanities Class’ Definition

The humanities are the study of humans. It’s that simple!

It’s the study of:

• The history of humans;
• How humans interact;
• All the various human cultures around the world;
• All the various human societies around the world; and
• How cultures and societies develop

Now, that ends up being a lot of stuff to study! And I’ll break it all down in the rest of this post.

But first, here’s two definitions of the humanities from two Universities:

• Stanford University defines the humanities this way: “The humanities can be described as the study of how people process and document the human experience.”
• Curtin University defines the humanities similarly: “The humanities refer to a range of disciplines that analyse the human experience and the natural world, and that encourage creativity, communication and critical thinking.”

Notice that the central part of these definitions is that we’re looking at, and talking about, humans! It’s not about studying mathematics, or science, or geography … it’s about simply studying what humans are and what it means to be human.

2. Humanities vs Social Sciences: What’s the Difference?

Humanities classes are distinct from all other major forms of analysis in universities.

Namely, Humanities is not:

• Social Sciences
• Natural Sciences
• Performing Arts

We often conflate the humanities and social sciences, and in many ways they tackle similar issues. However, humanities the have their own distinct ways of thinking and observing.

Namely, the humanities have these two distinct features .

Distinctive Features of the Humanities

• Interpretive methodologies (e.g. using critical reasoning and philosophy to contemplate ideas);
• The seeking of wisdom (e.g. a focus on generating insights into the human condition, ethics and what it means to be human)

Let’s compare that to the social sciences, for example, which is the humanities’ closest cousin. In the social sciences, you’re more likely to see the features listed below.

Distinctive features of Social Sciences

• Use of empirical methodologies (e.g. direct observation and analysis of the world)
• Explanations of observable phenomena

These distinctions certainly blur. There are many social scientists, for example, who engage in humanistic interpretive analysis to discuss observable phenomena. These social scientists might label themselves humanistic social scientists. I consider myself one of these.

Let’s zoom in on the two distinctive features of the humanities.

3. What do you learn in Humanities Classes?

While all humanities classes are different, below are two things that you’ll focus on. I’ve mentioned them above, but they’re fundamental to learning what you’ll be learning. So, let’s zoom on in!

a. You’ll learn to use Interpretive Methodologies

While in social sciences and natural sciences classes, you will do a lot of talking about things that happen in the world, you’ll spend much more time in the humanities contemplating the meaning of things.

You might ask questions like:

• What does a text, speech or play reveal about the nature of humanity?
• How can religion be applied to life in the 21 st Century?
• What do new media texts reveal about changes in the human condition?
• What are the advantages of new media for political change?

b. You’ll learn to Seeking Meaning and Wisdom in Life

Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, the humanities aim to find wisdom. Their goal is a loftier one than the sciences. Indeed, their goal is to look inwardly at the very fundamentals of what it means to be human.

You might ask questions and write essays on issues like:

• How can we live a meaningful life?
• How can we seek to be more ethical people?
• What does it mean to be human?

It’s a bit of a long explanation, but I love this quote that really sums up the spirit of the humanities:

“What the humanities offer us are the fundamental building blocks of approaching life as a human being, using the full capacities that set us aside from other creatures: the ability to reason logically and independently about our circumstances, the capacity to care and to feel compassion for others, the imagination to dream up alternative futures, and the moral compass to move us in the direction we want to go. ” (Caeton, 2012, p. 21)

4. What Counts as Humanities Classes?

The following nine courses are considered humanities courses.

These are the major ones you’d list under ‘humanities’ in most universities and colleges. Some universities may make the decision to merge humanities and social sciences courses. So, this isn’t a rock solid rule:

a. Philosophy and Religion

You might consider philosophy and religion to be the ‘original’ humanities. These two pillars of scholarship have been fundamental to human thought since Ancient Greek times, over 6000 years ago.

Philosophy and Religion are so intertwined that at times in history they were one and the same. Philosophers like Spinoza who dared use logic to stray from religious dogma were ostracized by society. Indeed, many were killed.

Now, they are two branches of the same tree.

Philosophy and religion aim to use history, tradition, logic and critical reasoning to find meaning in life.

They explore issues of ethics, morality and spirituality.

Jump to: Recommended Classes on Philosophy and Religion

b. Art and Music History

Looking at the history of music and art gives us a greater appreciation of the products of human endeavour. We can see in art and music motifs about what it means to be human, the beauty and terror we see in humanity, and the common threads that bind us.

Note that art and music courses primarily associated with design and composition are generally considered performing arts rather than humanities because their focus strays from the interpretation of art to its creation (see: Humanities Indicators ).

c. Archaeology

Archaeology involves the analysis and exploration of past cultures. By looking at past cultures (Western, Asian, Indigenous, etc.), we can learn about how they lived and how they understood the meaning of life.

The interesting parts about archaeology (to me, at least) are the parts that reveal insights about ourselves.

For example, archaeologists examine:

• How past cultures have influenced the present;
• How past cultures might have lessons for us to learn;
• How past cultures prioritized different aspects of life than us

d. Communication and Media Studies

Communication and media studies by and large tend to examine the present day impact of media on our lives (although there certainly are media scholars who look at the media of the past).

Media studies has enjoyed booming interest in recent decades. The rapid changes in the ways media have impacted our lives has opened up rich scholarly avenues of enquiry.

For example, many media scholars now study:

• How social media like twitter and Facebook have changed the ways we interact;
• How media holds up a mirror to ourselves and reveals things about is;
• How media has changed, influenced and reflected culture over the years.

I’d note that communications and media studies also sit quite well within the social sciences. This one would sit well within the overlap of a Venn Diagram between social sciences and the humanities.

e. Cultural, Race and Gender Studies

Cultural, race and gender studies have also enjoyed growing popularity in recent years.

Gender studies in particular has had a very heavy influence within academia, although race, ethnic, Black, Indigenous and disability studies have also had strong influences in the past.

Cultural, race and gender studies asks questions like:

• What does it mean to be a woman in contemporary western societies?
• How can we define gender identity? Is it fluid or fixed?
• Has the nature of life changed with post-modernity?
• How can racial justice and equality be achieved in contemporary western societies?

f. Language & Literature

The examination of literature and rhetoric has a long history in academia.

Indeed, all of us will have at some time in our lives examined one of the great pieces of historical literature that has examined the human condition.

Examples might include:

• Shakespearian plays;
• American Literature (e.g. Huckleberry Finn, The Grapes of Wrath);
• Classics (e.g. Homer’s Illyad)
• British Literature (e.g. Pride & Prejudice)

English language and literature may look at the ways different genres of written texts have shaped the world, influenced the ways we see ourselves, our cultures and our societies, and are evolving with cultural change.

g. History and Anthropology

History classes can span the ages. Students can study modern, ancient, western and new world histories to explore fundamental questions about:

• Where do we come from?
• What shaped the 20 th Century?
• How did decisions and events of the 20 th Century bring us to where we are today?
• How can we learn from the mistakes of history?
• What caused the major conflicts of the past 500 years?

These questions ask us to deeply and critically examine how we should live our lives in order to hand a better world to our own descendants.

h. Classics

The ancient Mediterranean world – including Greek and Roman societies – were great wonders of their eras. These were great (and in many ways advanced, even enlightened) societies that that were rich in cultural significance.

What an ancient Greek and Roman literature, philosophy, politics and culture teach us about democracy, what it means to be human, and the faults that lie within each of us?

Even more interestingly, I am fascinated by how relatively advanced democratic societies managed to shake at their very foundations, crumble, and fall away. War, politics and concentration of wealth and power overcame some of the greatest civilizations in history and saw them fall to dust.

What lessons can we learn from these doomed societies, and how can we prevent a similar slide away from liberalism and democracy?

Related: Are Liberal Arts Degrees Worth It?

i. Linguistics

Linguistics is the study of language and its structure.

It is believed that the structure of language shapes human thought. By learning a new language, you learn an entirely new way of thinking about the world.

Furthermore, languages can have a fundamental impact on the ways societies are structured. The gendering of objects, the ways we issue commands and requests, and the ways we go about written communication all reveal fundamental messages about who we are and how we got here.

5. Humanities Classes Electives that I Recommend

The below classes are examples of specific humanities classes that you’ll find at most major institutions.

These are the example humanities electives I think are the most awe-inspiring, motivational and mind-bending humanities classes that’ll really challenge you to change the ways you think:

• Ethics Classes: Learn how to critically reason. Ethics is not a clear-cut issue. You will often be asked to choose the best of a bunch of bad options, and defend the ethical stance you took behind your decisions. Do you base your ethics on religion, reason, or do you not see a distinction between the two?
• Philosophy: It’ll change your life. Learn how Socrates and Aristotle progressed human thought. Laugh at the hilarious ideas ancient Philosophers had about the nature of matter, and think deeply about what you believe makes a meaningful life.
• Art Appreciation: Stop feeling stupid walking around an art museum. This may seem to be an indulgent subject, but art history might also give you a greater appreciation for how some of the greatest artists who ever lived chose to represent the human condition.
• World Religion: Whether you’re a devout believer or militant atheist, it’s worth learning about religions of the world. You’ll learn to empathize with and understand people of other cultures, which will be useful for people you interact in your future multicultural workplace.
• Non-Western Culture: It doesn’t matter which culture you choose to zoom in on. But if it were me, I’d choose ancient South American cultures. Those dudes were incredible, and we don’t talk about them enough. You’ll learn to get out of your Western bubble see the world with new eyes.

6. What are the Real World Benefits of Studying Humanities?

Humanities are often criticized for having no real world benefits.

That’s a big thing to be concerned about if you’re forking our big sums of money for a Bachelor’s degree.

I’m going to be level with you: a STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) degree will be more beneficial for you in terms of finding a job.

But, there’s a ton of intrinsic value in a humanities degree for your future job .

Plus, getting a humanities degree isn’t always about workforce employability directly. Sometimes a degree is about becoming the person you’re going to become. And that has real, tangible and even intangible monetary value.

Here are just a few of the great benefits you get out of a humanities degree:

• Ability to think deeply, critically and analytically about issues. This is really important for a lot of employers. But furthermore, it’s important for you to be able to navigate your way though the world.
• Cultural and social sensitivity. If your teachers were effective, you’ll have genuinely changed the way you view the world. You’ll be able to see things from the perspective of people of various diverse backgrounds. You’ll be more capable of meeting clients’ needs, associating with people of different backgrounds to you, and befriending people across cultures.
• Understand flow-on impacts of decisions. Your background in studying historical events and how they shaped the world will enable you to navigate tough decisions. You’ll be able to lean on your knowledge to explain how decisions might impact people of different backgrounds in ways that would otherwise have been overlooked.
• Lateral Thinking . Creative, lateral thinking is a flow-on effect of your degree. You’ll have the capacity to approach challenges and problems with a deep appreciation of the ways people in the past creatively solved the problems of their times.
• Ethical Thinking. This is something in such strong demand in this world. At a time when money and utilitarianism rule the roost, there’s a need for people who have expert knowledge about the ethical implications of the actions of businesses. You could not only help your future employer avoid falling foul of the law, but you’ll be an important cog in the machinery of keeping our democracies healthy.

7. Careers in Humanities

• The skills you’ll develop in textual and information analysis in your humanities degree will put you in good stead for a career in journalism. I recommend you start early by writing for your university paper, starting a blog and seeking opportunities to write guest blogs on other sites.
• Public Relations. Humanities majors should make a big deal on their CVs about their capacity to sensitively communicate with diverse populations. Furthermore, your capacity to predict how societies and cultures will handle your company’s messaging will be an asset to your organization.
• Political and Policy Advisor. Starting in the office of a local elected official or a government bureaucracy, you can work your way up the ranks by using your critical, lateral thinking and communications skills to develop policies and campaigns of benefit to your community.
• No, not James Bond. But organizations such as the FBI, CIA (US), MI5 and MI6 (UK) need critical and lateral thinkers to work behind the scenes on issues around multicultural competencies, online reconnaissance, and intercultural communication.
• Work on legal issues within a law firm or government body. Apply your logical and lateral thinking to ensure you and your organization adhere to legal and ethical requirements.
• Community Organizer. Carve out a career in an issue you care about. Take up a position in low income, minority or immigrant communities to advocate on their behalf. Use those courses in cultural, gender and religious studies to inform your decision making and help you to communicate in intercultural contexts.
• Pass your ethical and critical thinking skills on to the next generations. Get a Masters degree in teaching to educate in high schools, or work towards a PhD to become a professor.

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Dr. Chris Drew is the founder of the Helpful Professor. He holds a PhD in education and has published over 20 articles in scholarly journals. He is the former editor of the Journal of Learning Development in Higher Education. [Image Descriptor: Photo of Chris]

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3 thoughts on “The 7 Types of Humanities Classes Explained”

This was VERY helpful. Thank you❣️

I found this page while searching the phrase “Why do we have to study humanities classes and why universities teach them? Currently, I’m almost 50 yo and decided to go back to college for an art major. And while it seems a noble path to chose –to become the person, it is with the mind’s doubts and fears that this contrasts of thinking and wishing occurs. –This page told/taught me something. Now, I think there should be an app to help you connect with someone that has traveled the path and could help ease doubt and questions like this. (Maybe for the over-thinkers).

I am a student doing a degree in Divinity. One of the electives on my course is humanities. I did not know what it was all about until I read this article. Thank you very.

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“ Stop Corporatizing My Students ,” by Beth Ann Fennelly (Opinion guest essay, nytimes.com, Nov. 15), is a heartfelt reminder that humanistic studies are critical to developing thoughtful, compassionate and functional citizens. Yes, developing skills to make a living is essential, but, as Ms. Fennelly writes, learning to “fail better” and dream must come first, “for a while anyway.”

During a time of immense technological change, war and political division, nothing is more important than having the intellectual confidence to challenge what you see, hear and read with thoughtful questions. Humanistic study provides young students with an opportunity to develop their intellectual confidence.

We should want our students to graduate intellectually and emotionally confident. That confidence is the foundation for success in the workplace. Too often, we think that skills solve problems, but, in fact, problem-solving starts by asking the right question first.

I taught undergraduates and graduate students for over 25 years, and nothing lights up a classroom more than a student who, for the first time, steps forward to address a problem with their newfound intellectual confidence.

Nao Matsukata Bethesda, Md.

As I apply for college, a constant question in my mind is whether I should major in a lucrative STEM field or in a “useless” humanities field. I want to expand my worldview, “dream, try, fail, try harder, fail better” in a humanities field, but college costs are prohibitively high.

My education should make me a better person, an educated citizen, not just a better part of some machine. We recognize that high schools should be offering a full education, yet we deny the same for expensive universities.

It cannot become the privilege of the wealthy to study the humanities and become fuller people in college.

Toby Shu Englewood, Colo.

In 1978 I graduated from college with a degree in philosophy. One might consider this a useless degree. Yes, it took me three years after graduation to figure out what I really wanted to do with my life, but I then got a master’s degree in marriage and family therapy. I have had a successful career in private practice as a psychotherapist for 40 years and have founded and run an online school for professional continuing education as well as a nonprofit organization.

I use the thinking and listening skills that I learned in my philosophy classes every single day in both my private practice and my other businesses. I learned discipline and time management by going to class every day and completing assignments in a timely manner. The writing skills that I had to develop as well have been invaluable to me and my career.

I also believe that the critical thinking skills learned in liberal arts programs protect democracy and freedom.

Christina Veselak Wayne, W.Va.

As an astrophysicist, I study distant denizens of the dark universe. Similar to Beth Ann Fennelly’s experience as a creative writing teacher, people often point out that my work is useless. I usually smile and say, “I completely agree, but some of the most useless endeavors are among the most important.”

Rebecca Oppenheimer New York The writer is a curator and a professor of astrophysics at the American Museum of Natural History.

Re “ Military Promotions Approved After Tuberville Lifts His Blockade ” (front page, Dec. 6):

There must be a collective sigh of relief within the Beltway, and most certainly at the Pentagon, now that Senator Tommy Tuberville, Republican of Alabama, has dropped his blockade of most military promotions over the policy of abortion access for military personnel.

While this senator’s action was certainly reprehensible, the Senate did not even attempt to address the real issue. It’s the Senate’s archaic rules that give an individual senator the power to put a hold on any nomination.

The real issue is why an individual senator has such dictatorial power. Interestingly, neither party is willing to open that Pandora’s box because all senators relish it. That is the real problem.

Subir Mukerjee Olympia, Wash.

Re “ It’s OK to Never ‘Get Over’ Your Grief ,” by Mikolaj Slawkowski-Rode (Opinion guest essay, Dec. 3):

For those of us who lost a parent or sibling in childhood, the idea that we should one day be over our grief is not just hurtful, but harmful as well.

I applaud this guest essay and would point out that encouraging people to move past their grief is particularly bad for kids who may blame themselves when they can’t. People who don’t understand this are usually those who have yet to live through the loss of someone they depended on for self-definition.

Dr. Slawkowski-Rode correctly blames Freud for our continued psychological approach to loss, but after Freud lost his daughter Sophie, even he changed his thinking on grief. Unfortunately, his earlier writings were already widely read and would go on to influence generations of clinicians.

For people who have grown up grieving, loss is part of who we are. We can no more “get past it” than erase ourselves.

Ann Faison Pasadena, Calif. The writer is the host of the podcast “Are We There Yet? Understanding Adolescent Grief” and is the author of “Dancing With the Midwives: A Memoir of Art and Grief.”

Re “ Outcry Follows True-Crime Deal for Wife of Gilgo Beach Suspect ” (front page, Nov. 29):

That Peacock, the streaming service owned by NBCUniversal, is paying the family of an alleged serial killer for participation in a documentary series about the murders, and had to outbid other avaricious media companies equally eager to capitalize on the public’s insatiable appetite for true-crime programming, the more salacious the better, is as disturbing as it is unsurprising.

Until very recently, true-crime stories were relegated to scripted movies and television productions, not because studios and networks had taken the moral high ground, but because documentaries historically did not garner high enough TV ratings or pull in large enough audiences to theaters to make it profitable to produce them.

Streaming has changed all that. It’s a bottomless pit, in constant need of content, the cheaper and the more likely to attract audiences the better. Unscripted programming, in particular documentaries, fits the bill perfectly.

Lost in all of this are the victims’ families, who not only stand to be retraumatized by the documentary series but will also see the family of the alleged killer, as well as their attorneys, reportedly being paid large sums of money. They also worry, with justification, that the documentary series might affect the trial.

NBCUniversal and its fellow media services should stop doing such programming out of a sense of decency, but obviously won’t. It’s up to viewers to give them a reason they’ll immediately understand: Stop tuning in.

Greg Joseph Sun City, Ariz. The writer is a retired television critic.

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4: Types of Essays

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• Page ID 165699

• Ann Inoshita, Karyl Garland, Kate Sims, Jeanne K. Tsutsui Keuma, and Tasha Williams
• University of Hawaii via University of Hawaiʻi OER

Learning Objectives

Student will be able to do the following after reading this chapter:

• Apply essay structure to various rhetorical modes.
• Provide the required components of a specific essay assignment.
• 4.1: Introduction Rhetorical modes are simply the ways in which people effectively communicate through language. Sometimes writers incorporate a variety of modes in any one essay. For example, a persuasive essay may include paragraphs showing cause and effect, description, and narrative. The rhetorical mode writers choose depends on the purpose for writing. Rhetorical modes are a set of tools that will allow students greater flexibility and effectiveness in communicating with their audience and expressing ideas.
• 4.2.1: Memoir or Personal Narrative- Learning Lessons from the Personal
• 4.2.1.1: Exploring the Past to Understand the Present
• 4.2.1.2: Trailblazer
• 4.2.1.3: Glance at Genre- Conflict, Detail, and Revelation
• 4.3: Process Analysis A process analysis essay explains how to do something or how something works. In either case, the formula for a process analysis essay remains the same. The process is articulated into clear, definitive steps. Almost everything writers do involves following a step-by-step process. From riding a bike as children to learning various jobs as adults, writers initially needed instructions to effectively execute the task.
• 4.4: Evaluation This section discusses the purpose and structure of evaluation, as many students prepare to write their own evaluative essays.
• 4.5: Comparison and Contrast
• 4.6.1: Persuasion/Argument

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Home — Essay Samples — Philosophy — Humanism — The Concept of Being a Human and the Philosophy Behind Humanism

The Concept of Being a Human and The Philosophy Behind Humanism

• Categories: Humanism

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What Makes You Human?

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• The four main types of essay | Quick guide with examples

The Four Main Types of Essay | Quick Guide with Examples

Published on September 4, 2020 by Jack Caulfield . Revised on July 23, 2023.

An essay is a focused piece of writing designed to inform or persuade. There are many different types of essay, but they are often defined in four categories: argumentative, expository, narrative, and descriptive essays.

Argumentative and expository essays are focused on conveying information and making clear points, while narrative and descriptive essays are about exercising creativity and writing in an interesting way. At university level, argumentative essays are the most common type. 

In high school and college, you will also often have to write textual analysis essays, which test your skills in close reading and interpretation.

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Table of contents

Argumentative essays, expository essays, narrative essays, descriptive essays, textual analysis essays, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about types of essays.

An argumentative essay presents an extended, evidence-based argument. It requires a strong thesis statement —a clearly defined stance on your topic. Your aim is to convince the reader of your thesis using evidence (such as quotations ) and analysis.

Argumentative essays test your ability to research and present your own position on a topic. This is the most common type of essay at college level—most papers you write will involve some kind of argumentation.

The essay is divided into an introduction, body, and conclusion:

• The introduction provides your topic and thesis statement
• The body presents your evidence and arguments
• The conclusion summarizes your argument and emphasizes its importance

The example below is a paragraph from the body of an argumentative essay about the effects of the internet on education. Mouse over it to learn more.

A common frustration for teachers is students’ use of Wikipedia as a source in their writing. Its prevalence among students is not exaggerated; a survey found that the vast majority of the students surveyed used Wikipedia (Head & Eisenberg, 2010). An article in The Guardian stresses a common objection to its use: “a reliance on Wikipedia can discourage students from engaging with genuine academic writing” (Coomer, 2013). Teachers are clearly not mistaken in viewing Wikipedia usage as ubiquitous among their students; but the claim that it discourages engagement with academic sources requires further investigation. This point is treated as self-evident by many teachers, but Wikipedia itself explicitly encourages students to look into other sources. Its articles often provide references to academic publications and include warning notes where citations are missing; the site’s own guidelines for research make clear that it should be used as a starting point, emphasizing that users should always “read the references and check whether they really do support what the article says” (“Wikipedia:Researching with Wikipedia,” 2020). Indeed, for many students, Wikipedia is their first encounter with the concepts of citation and referencing. The use of Wikipedia therefore has a positive side that merits deeper consideration than it often receives.

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An expository essay provides a clear, focused explanation of a topic. It doesn’t require an original argument, just a balanced and well-organized view of the topic.

Expository essays test your familiarity with a topic and your ability to organize and convey information. They are commonly assigned at high school or in exam questions at college level.

The introduction of an expository essay states your topic and provides some general background, the body presents the details, and the conclusion summarizes the information presented.

A typical body paragraph from an expository essay about the invention of the printing press is shown below. Mouse over it to learn more.

The invention of the printing press in 1440 changed this situation dramatically. Johannes Gutenberg, who had worked as a goldsmith, used his knowledge of metals in the design of the press. He made his type from an alloy of lead, tin, and antimony, whose durability allowed for the reliable production of high-quality books. This new technology allowed texts to be reproduced and disseminated on a much larger scale than was previously possible. The Gutenberg Bible appeared in the 1450s, and a large number of printing presses sprang up across the continent in the following decades. Gutenberg’s invention rapidly transformed cultural production in Europe; among other things, it would lead to the Protestant Reformation.

A narrative essay is one that tells a story. This is usually a story about a personal experience you had, but it may also be an imaginative exploration of something you have not experienced.

Narrative essays test your ability to build up a narrative in an engaging, well-structured way. They are much more personal and creative than other kinds of academic writing . Writing a personal statement for an application requires the same skills as a narrative essay.

A narrative essay isn’t strictly divided into introduction, body, and conclusion, but it should still begin by setting up the narrative and finish by expressing the point of the story—what you learned from your experience, or why it made an impression on you.

Mouse over the example below, a short narrative essay responding to the prompt “Write about an experience where you learned something about yourself,” to explore its structure.

Since elementary school, I have always favored subjects like science and math over the humanities. My instinct was always to think of these subjects as more solid and serious than classes like English. If there was no right answer, I thought, why bother? But recently I had an experience that taught me my academic interests are more flexible than I had thought: I took my first philosophy class.

Before I entered the classroom, I was skeptical. I waited outside with the other students and wondered what exactly philosophy would involve—I really had no idea. I imagined something pretty abstract: long, stilted conversations pondering the meaning of life. But what I got was something quite different.

A young man in jeans, Mr. Jones—“but you can call me Rob”—was far from the white-haired, buttoned-up old man I had half-expected. And rather than pulling us into pedantic arguments about obscure philosophical points, Rob engaged us on our level. To talk free will, we looked at our own choices. To talk ethics, we looked at dilemmas we had faced ourselves. By the end of class, I’d discovered that questions with no right answer can turn out to be the most interesting ones.

The experience has taught me to look at things a little more “philosophically”—and not just because it was a philosophy class! I learned that if I let go of my preconceptions, I can actually get a lot out of subjects I was previously dismissive of. The class taught me—in more ways than one—to look at things with an open mind.

A descriptive essay provides a detailed sensory description of something. Like narrative essays, they allow you to be more creative than most academic writing, but they are more tightly focused than narrative essays. You might describe a specific place or object, rather than telling a whole story.

Descriptive essays test your ability to use language creatively, making striking word choices to convey a memorable picture of what you’re describing.

A descriptive essay can be quite loosely structured, though it should usually begin by introducing the object of your description and end by drawing an overall picture of it. The important thing is to use careful word choices and figurative language to create an original description of your object.

Mouse over the example below, a response to the prompt “Describe a place you love to spend time in,” to learn more about descriptive essays.

On Sunday afternoons I like to spend my time in the garden behind my house. The garden is narrow but long, a corridor of green extending from the back of the house, and I sit on a lawn chair at the far end to read and relax. I am in my small peaceful paradise: the shade of the tree, the feel of the grass on my feet, the gentle activity of the fish in the pond beside me.

My cat crosses the garden nimbly and leaps onto the fence to survey it from above. From his perch he can watch over his little kingdom and keep an eye on the neighbours. He does this until the barking of next door’s dog scares him from his post and he bolts for the cat flap to govern from the safety of the kitchen.

With that, I am left alone with the fish, whose whole world is the pond by my feet. The fish explore the pond every day as if for the first time, prodding and inspecting every stone. I sometimes feel the same about sitting here in the garden; I know the place better than anyone, but whenever I return I still feel compelled to pay attention to all its details and novelties—a new bird perched in the tree, the growth of the grass, and the movement of the insects it shelters…

Sitting out in the garden, I feel serene. I feel at home. And yet I always feel there is more to discover. The bounds of my garden may be small, but there is a whole world contained within it, and it is one I will never get tired of inhabiting.

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Though every essay type tests your writing skills, some essays also test your ability to read carefully and critically. In a textual analysis essay, you don’t just present information on a topic, but closely analyze a text to explain how it achieves certain effects.

Rhetorical analysis

A rhetorical analysis looks at a persuasive text (e.g. a speech, an essay, a political cartoon) in terms of the rhetorical devices it uses, and evaluates their effectiveness.

The goal is not to state whether you agree with the author’s argument but to look at how they have constructed it.

The introduction of a rhetorical analysis presents the text, some background information, and your thesis statement; the body comprises the analysis itself; and the conclusion wraps up your analysis of the text, emphasizing its relevance to broader concerns.

The example below is from a rhetorical analysis of Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech . Mouse over it to learn more.

King’s speech is infused with prophetic language throughout. Even before the famous “dream” part of the speech, King’s language consistently strikes a prophetic tone. He refers to the Lincoln Memorial as a “hallowed spot” and speaks of rising “from the dark and desolate valley of segregation” to “make justice a reality for all of God’s children.” The assumption of this prophetic voice constitutes the text’s strongest ethical appeal; after linking himself with political figures like Lincoln and the Founding Fathers, King’s ethos adopts a distinctly religious tone, recalling Biblical prophets and preachers of change from across history. This adds significant force to his words; standing before an audience of hundreds of thousands, he states not just what the future should be, but what it will be: “The whirlwinds of revolt will continue to shake the foundations of our nation until the bright day of justice emerges.” This warning is almost apocalyptic in tone, though it concludes with the positive image of the “bright day of justice.” The power of King’s rhetoric thus stems not only from the pathos of his vision of a brighter future, but from the ethos of the prophetic voice he adopts in expressing this vision.

Literary analysis

A literary analysis essay presents a close reading of a work of literature—e.g. a poem or novel—to explore the choices made by the author and how they help to convey the text’s theme. It is not simply a book report or a review, but an in-depth interpretation of the text.

Literary analysis looks at things like setting, characters, themes, and figurative language. The goal is to closely analyze what the author conveys and how.

The introduction of a literary analysis essay presents the text and background, and provides your thesis statement; the body consists of close readings of the text with quotations and analysis in support of your argument; and the conclusion emphasizes what your approach tells us about the text.

Mouse over the example below, the introduction to a literary analysis essay on Frankenstein , to learn more.

Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is often read as a crude cautionary tale about the dangers of scientific advancement unrestrained by ethical considerations. In this reading, protagonist Victor Frankenstein is a stable representation of the callous ambition of modern science throughout the novel. This essay, however, argues that far from providing a stable image of the character, Shelley uses shifting narrative perspectives to portray Frankenstein in an increasingly negative light as the novel goes on. While he initially appears to be a naive but sympathetic idealist, after the creature’s narrative Frankenstein begins to resemble—even in his own telling—the thoughtlessly cruel figure the creature represents him as. This essay begins by exploring the positive portrayal of Frankenstein in the first volume, then moves on to the creature’s perception of him, and finally discusses the third volume’s narrative shift toward viewing Frankenstein as the creature views him.

If you want to know more about AI tools , college essays , or fallacies make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples or go directly to our tools!

• Ad hominem fallacy
• Post hoc fallacy
• Appeal to authority fallacy
• False cause fallacy
• Sunk cost fallacy

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• Write a Diversity Essay
• College Essay Format & Structure
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At high school and in composition classes at university, you’ll often be told to write a specific type of essay , but you might also just be given prompts.

Look for keywords in these prompts that suggest a certain approach: The word “explain” suggests you should write an expository essay , while the word “describe” implies a descriptive essay . An argumentative essay might be prompted with the word “assess” or “argue.”

The vast majority of essays written at university are some sort of argumentative essay . Almost all academic writing involves building up an argument, though other types of essay might be assigned in composition classes.

Essays can present arguments about all kinds of different topics. For example:

• In a literary analysis essay, you might make an argument for a specific interpretation of a text
• In a history essay, you might present an argument for the importance of a particular event
• In a politics essay, you might argue for the validity of a certain political theory

An argumentative essay tends to be a longer essay involving independent research, and aims to make an original argument about a topic. Its thesis statement makes a contentious claim that must be supported in an objective, evidence-based way.

An expository essay also aims to be objective, but it doesn’t have to make an original argument. Rather, it aims to explain something (e.g., a process or idea) in a clear, concise way. Expository essays are often shorter assignments and rely less on research.

The key difference is that a narrative essay is designed to tell a complete story, while a descriptive essay is meant to convey an intense description of a particular place, object, or concept.

Narrative and descriptive essays both allow you to write more personally and creatively than other kinds of essays , and similar writing skills can apply to both.

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Students Are Likely Writing Millions of Papers With AI

Students have submitted more than 22 million papers that may have used generative AI in the past year, new data released by plagiarism detection company Turnitin shows.

A year ago, Turnitin rolled out an AI writing detection tool that was trained on its trove of papers written by students as well as other AI-generated texts. Since then, more than 200 million papers have been reviewed by the detector, predominantly written by high school and college students. Turnitin found that 11 percent may contain AI-written language in 20 percent of its content, with 3 percent of the total papers reviewed getting flagged for having 80 percent or more AI writing. (Turnitin is owned by Advance, which also owns Condé Nast, publisher of WIRED.) Turnitin says its detector has a false positive rate of less than 1 percent when analyzing full documents.

ChatGPT’s launch was met with knee-jerk fears that the English class essay would die . The chatbot can synthesize information and distill it near-instantly—but that doesn’t mean it always gets it right. Generative AI has been known to hallucinate , creating its own facts and citing academic references that don’t actually exist. Generative AI chatbots have also been caught spitting out biased text on gender and race . Despite those flaws, students have used chatbots for research, organizing ideas, and as a ghostwriter . Traces of chatbots have even been found in peer-reviewed, published academic writing .

Teachers understandably want to hold students accountable for using generative AI without permission or disclosure. But that requires a reliable way to prove AI was used in a given assignment. Instructors have tried at times to find their own solutions to detecting AI in writing, using messy, untested methods to enforce rules , and distressing students. Further complicating the issue, some teachers are even using generative AI in their grading processes.

Detecting the use of gen AI is tricky. It’s not as easy as flagging plagiarism, because generated text is still original text. Plus, there’s nuance to how students use gen AI; some may ask chatbots to write their papers for them in large chunks or in full, while others may use the tools as an aid or a brainstorm partner.

Students also aren't tempted by only ChatGPT and similar large language models. So-called word spinners are another type of AI software that rewrites text, and may make it less obvious to a teacher that work was plagiarized or generated by AI. Turnitin’s AI detector has also been updated to detect word spinners, says Annie Chechitelli, the company’s chief product officer. It can also flag work that was rewritten by services like spell checker Grammarly, which now has its own generative AI tool . As familiar software increasingly adds generative AI components, what students can and can’t use becomes more muddled.

Detection tools themselves have a risk of bias. English language learners may be more likely to set them off; a 2023 study found a 61.3 percent false positive rate when evaluating Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL) exams with seven different AI detectors. The study did not examine Turnitin’s version. The company says it has trained its detector on writing from English language learners as well as native English speakers. A study published in October found that Turnitin was among the most accurate of 16 AI language detectors in a test that had the tool examine undergraduate papers and AI-generated papers.

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Schools that use Turnitin had access to the AI detection software for a free pilot period, which ended at the start of this year. Chechitelli says a majority of the service’s clients have opted to purchase the AI detection. But the risks of false positives and bias against English learners have led some universities to ditch the tools for now. Montclair State University in New Jersey announced in November that it would pause use of Turnitin’s AI detector. Vanderbilt University and Northwestern University did the same last summer.

“This is hard. I understand why people want a tool,” says Emily Isaacs, executive director of the Office of Faculty Excellence at Montclair State. But Isaacs says the university is concerned about potentially biased results from AI detectors, as well as the fact that the tools can’t provide confirmation the way they can with plagiarism. Plus, Montclair State doesn’t want to put a blanket ban on AI, which will have some place in academia. With time and more trust in the tools, the policies could change. “It’s not a forever decision, it’s a now decision,” Isaacs says.

Chechitelli says the Turnitin tool shouldn’t be the only consideration in passing or failing a student. Instead, it’s a chance for teachers to start conversations with students that touch on all of the nuance in using generative AI. “People don’t really know where that line should be,” she says.

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Mayo Clinic Minute: Dermatologist explains light therapy for skin

DeeDee Stiepan

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Dermatologists advise their patients to avoid harmful ultraviolet light, which can cause skin damage, photoaging and skin cancer. But they also may prescribe light therapy to treat certain skin conditions. Light therapy is a treatment that uses different wavelengths of light to treat various skin conditions.

In this Mayo Clinic Minute, Dr. Dawn Davis , a Mayo Clinic dermatologist, explains the different types of light therapy, what they treat, and if over-the-counter light therapy devices are safe and effective.

Watch: The Mayo Clinic Minute

Journalists: Broadcast-quality video (0:59) is in the downloads at the end of this post. Please courtesy: "Mayo Clinic News Network." Read the script .

"Every color of the rainbow has a different wavelength of light," says Dr. Davis. "And we have found, through research and dermatology, that certain visible light colors, when they are concentrated and intensified, can have some benefit to the skin."

Dr. Davis says blue light therapy done in a medical setting works to help treat acne by causing an oxidative reaction on the skin.

"Red light can have some similar anti-oxidative or oxidative properties on the skin, which can be used sometimes to treat acne and also photoaging," says Dr. Davis.

But what about light therapy outside of a dermatologist office, such as red light masks and wands sold over the counter? Dr. Davis says, before you spend your money on these products, which may not be effective or safe, talk to your dermatologist.

"If you have interest in using an over-the-counter red or pink light, or a prescription blue light from a dermatologist's office, please talk to your local dermatologist about its potential uses for you and your skin and your health," says Dr. Davis.

• Meningococcal disease on the rise in the US Mayo Clinic Minute: Creating an advance directive for your future well-being

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What is the difference between a solar eclipse and a lunar eclipse?

It almost time! Millions of Americans across the country Monday are preparing to witness the once-in-a-lifetime total solar eclipse as it passes over portions of Mexico, the United States and Canada.

It's a sight to behold and people have now long been eagerly awaiting what will be their only chance until 2044 to witness totality, whereby the moon will completely block the sun's disc, ushering in uncharacteristic darkness.

That being said, many are curious on what makes the solar eclipse special and how is it different from a lunar eclipse.

The total solar eclipse is today: Get the latest forecast and everything you need to know

What is an eclipse?

An eclipse occurs when any celestial object like a moon or a planet passes between two other bodies, obscuring the view of objects like the sun, according to NASA .

What is a solar eclipse?

A total solar eclipse occurs when the moon comes in between the Earth and the sun, blocking its light from reaching our planet, leading to a period of darkness lasting several minutes. The resulting "totality," whereby observers can see the outermost layer of the sun's atmosphere, known as the corona, presents a spectacular sight for viewers and confuses animals – causing nocturnal creatures to stir and bird and insects to fall silent.

Partial eclipses, when some part of the sun remains visible, are the most common, making total eclipses a rare sight.

What is a lunar eclipse?

A total lunar eclipse occurs when the moon and the sun are on exact opposite sides of Earth. When this happens, Earth blocks the sunlight that normally reaches the moon. Instead of that sunlight hitting the moon’s surface, Earth's shadow falls on it.

Lunar eclipses are often also referred to the "blood moon" because when the Earth's shadow covers the moon, it often produces a red color. The coloration happens because a bit of reddish sunlight still reaches the moon's surface, even though it's in Earth's shadow.

Difference between lunar eclipse and solar eclipse

The major difference between the two eclipses is in the positioning of the sun, the moon and the Earth and the longevity of the phenomenon, according to NASA.

A lunar eclipse can last for a few hours, while a solar eclipse lasts only a few minutes. Solar eclipses also rarely occur, while lunar eclipses are comparatively more frequent. While at least two partial lunar eclipses happen every year, total lunar eclipses are still rare, says NASA.

Another major difference between the two is that for lunar eclipses, no special glasses or gizmos are needed to view the spectacle and one can directly stare at the moon. However, for solar eclipses, it is pertinent to wear proper viewing glasses and take the necessary safety precautions because the powerful rays of the sun can burn and damage your retinas.

Contributing: Eric Lagatta, Doyle Rice, USA TODAY