essay knowledge

Essay on Knowledge for Students and Children

500+ words essay on knowledge.

Knowledge is understanding and awareness of something. It refers to the information, facts, skills, and wisdom acquired through learning and experiences in life. Knowledge is a very wide concept and has no end. Acquiring knowledge involves cognitive processes, communication, perception, and logic. It is also the human capacity to recognize and accept the truth. Knowledge can be used for positive as well as negative purposes. Thus knowledge can create and destroy at the same time. One may use knowledge for personal progress as well as the progress of the community, city, state, and nation. Some may use it for negative purposes that may not only harm individuals but can also harm the community.

Importance of Knowledge

* Knowledge is a success – In today’s world without education and the power of knowledge, it is not possible to succeed in life or even keep up with the fast-paced life. It is not just enough to have knowledge on a particular subject to succeed but it is also important to have knowledge about how to use it effectively to succeed. One should have knowledge about various aspects of a subject.

* Personal Development- Knowledge can last for a lifetime and it impacts our growth which influences everything in our life from relationships to work. Knowledge is important for personal growth and development . We can gain knowledge on everything that we find interesting like any dance form, art, architecture, history or just about anything for our personal development. It makes us wise enough to independently make our decisions in life. But it is important to adopt a positive mindset to become a constant learner only then it helps us progress and achieve our goals.

* Knowledge solves problems – problems in life which can be solved with the power of knowledge. Knowledge sharpens our skills like reasoning and problem-solving . A strong base of knowledge helps brains function more smoothly and effectively. We become smarter with the power of knowledge and solve problems more easily.

* Everyday Life- Knowledge is important and useful in day to day events. For example, if I have to buy air tickets online, I need to have knowledge about the various sites and their discounts, their terms & conditions or like online banking. If I don’t have knowledge then I end up paying more. So gaining knowledge is a constant process and is useful every single day.

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The process to increase knowledge

Open-Minded- We always learn something new by building on the knowledge that we have. We must always be open to accepting knowledge or information from anywhere we get. It may be from books, virtual media, friends, etc. To move on from one step to another we need to know more. Like in school we start from LKG, KG and then move on to 1st standard, 2nd standard and so on. It builds a strong base.

Reading Magazines- Reading helps to decode text and improves fluency to pronounce the speech sounds clear. Reading gives an idea about different topics and different views about them. One can get the actual global knowledge. Apart from that one can learn many new terms and phrase.

Communication- Shared knowledge allows you to communicate. Shared knowledge is important for communicating and understanding each other. When we discuss a certain topic with classmates, friends or relatives they have certain knowledge about it. So through communication, we get new ideas, facts and develops our knowledge. We can also identify what have we learned and what still we don’t know that helps us to clear our doubts later.

Watch documentaries or educational videos-  Discovery Channel, for example, provides excellent documentaries that keep you engaged. If you don’t like reading, this is an excellent alternative to getting your daily dose of knowledge while still relaxing in your couch!

The more knowledge we have the more power we possess. It is important for our personal and professional development and leads us to achieve success in life. Knowledge helps us in several ways but the best part is that it helps us understand ourselves as well as those around us better. It also helps us act wisely in different situations

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Essays About Knowledge: 5 Examples and 7 Prompts

Discover our guide with example essays about knowledge and helpful writing prompts to inspire you and assist with your next piece of writing.

Knowledge refers to information, facts, and skills acquired through education, life experience, and others. It’s critical in achieving power, wisdom, and respect as it lets us be conscious of our surroundings. Our knowledge sets us apart from others as we apply it to every aspect of our lives, such as problem-solving and skill development.

Since knowledge is a broad topic, it’s used in various writings, such as academic and personal essays . Before writing, ensure you understand the subject, know the proper format, and have the main points ready to add to your piece.

5 Essay Examples

1. long essay on knowledge by prasanna, 2. knowledge is power essay for students and children by anonymous on toppr.com, 3. importance of historical knowledge by kristopher fitzgerald, 4. knowledge is power – essay by kirti daga, 5. knowledge is a lifelong process and leads to inventions by ankita yadav, 1. what is knowledge, 2. the true meaning of knowledge is power, 3. the value of knowledge, 4. how to boost knowledge, 5. knowledge vs. wealth, 6. the effect of insufficient knowledge, 7. how does knowledge help me in my everyday life.

“If there is no knowledge or not acquiring knowledge, such a person is merely existing or surviving and not living. Because to live a life, we are bound to make decisions. An appropriate decision can be made if we have the proper knowledge to analyze the problem and decide it.”

Prasanna defines knowledge as a weapon, shield, and the key to life. It’s something that sustains our existence. She deems that apart from books, one can learn from other people, nature, and even things we think are too trivial to matter. Prasanna includes a quote from Alexander Pope to discuss the importance of having extensive knowledge.

She suggests that it’s essential to apply knowledge to enjoy all of its perks. But ultimately, Prasanna believes that while knowledge is limitless, people should prioritize filling their brains with the information they can share with others. You might also be interested in these essays about leadership .

“… We can say that true knowledge help [a] person to bloom. Also, it keeps people away from fights and corruption. Besides, knowledge brings happiness and prosperity to the nation. Above all, knowledge opens the door of success for everyone.”

In this essay, the author refers to knowledge as something that can create and destroy life and balance on the planet. Although many are educated, only a few know the importance of knowledge. The writer further lists some benefits of knowledge, such as making impossible ideas possible, avoiding repeated mistakes, and realizing the difference between good and evil. Ultimately, the author believes that knowledge makes a person richer than billionaires because, unlike money, no one can steal knowledge.  

“Understanding our past is vitally important to the present and future of our civilization. We must find out to grow from our previous successes and errors. It is humanity to make errors, however the less we make, the stronger and smarter we end up being.”

Fitzgerald explains that understanding history is essential to learning from past mistakes. He points to the results of past failures recorded in books, such as death and damages. In addition, historical knowledge improves our lifestyle through modern technologies and efforts to restore the environment.

By studying the history of the world, people can understand the differences in customs and beliefs of different religions. This knowledge gives way to acceptance and appreciation, which are critical to avoiding conflicts originating from ignorant perceptions.

“Knowledge is power because it is intangible whereas money is tangible. An individual with knowledge is better than a fool with money because money cannot buy knowledge whereas knowledge can carve a part which will ultimately help in gaining loads and loads of money.”

In her essay, Daga provides two situations demonstrating how knowledge is more valuable than money. First, she states that wealth, skills, resources, and talent are useless if one doesn’t have the proper knowledge to use them. Meanwhile, even if you have few skills but are knowledgeable enough in a particular field, you have a higher chance of succeeding financially.

The essay also contains information about general knowledge vital to achieving life goals. It incorporates ways to gain knowledge, including reading books and newspapers, watching the latest news, and networking with people. 

“The whole life we learn and gain knowledge. Knowledge increases day by day. We work on the process of learning to gain more knowledge.”

Yadav relates knowledge to something that makes life beautiful. However, unlike an ordinary ornament, knowledge isn’t easily acquired. Knowledge is a lifelong process that people get from experiences, media, books, and others. It has many benefits, such as creating new inventions that improve society and the country. Yadav concludes her essay by saying that knowledge is a valuable asset. It assists people in achieving life goals and honing their moral values.

7 Prompts for Essays About Knowledge

There are many essays that define the word “knowledge”, you can use this prompt to explain the concept of knowledge in your own words. First, explain its textbook definition briefly, then analyze it using your own words and understanding. To conclude your piece, write about how you intend to use knowledge in your life. 

“Knowledge is power” is a famous quotation from Francis Bacon in his book Neues Organon. It’s a powerful quote that sparked various interpretations. For this prompt, you can compile meanings you see online or interview people on what they think the quote means. Then, compare it with the actual intention and origin of the citation.

Tip : Remember to add your analysis and ask the readers to create their interpretation to involve them in the discussion.

Continuous learning makes us better individuals and opens more opportunities for us. When we do what we can to collect knowledge from various media, we also feel a sense of accomplishment. For this prompt, list the reasons why you want to enrich your knowledge. Use this prompt to show the good and bad sides of cultivating knowledge by including what can happen if an individual applies their knowledge to do despicable things. 

You don’t need to follow a strict program or enroll in top universities to build your knowledge. In this essay, enumerate easy ways to enhance someone’s knowledge, such as having a healthy curiosity, being a reasonable observer and listener, and attending gatherings to socialize. Write down all the possible ways and tools someone needs to acquire more knowledge. Then, explain why it’s essential never to stop learning new things.

At the start of your essay, ask your readers what they prefer: Extensive knowledge or ample wealth? Some will choose knowledge because money runs out quickly. They will argue that knowing how to handle cash will help secure and grow their finances. On the other hand, others will choose wealth and insist that they can hire people to manage their sizable assets. Share what your thoughts are on the question and answer it as well. You can look for surveys, interviews, and other research materials to gather data that can support your reasoning.

Identify the effects of having insufficient knowledge about a specific topic or in general terms. Add any negative results that can stem from this deficiency. Then, discuss why people need to get more knowledge today. For example, people automatically believe what they see on social media without fact-checking.

Tip : You can include steps the government and organizations should take to provide people with the correct information to avoid false claims.

For this essay topic, describe how knowledge assists you in your day-to-day life and enhances your experiences. Ensure to tackle how knowledge plays a part in your decision-making and your pathway in life.

For instance, you watched a documentary about greenhouse gasses and learned about light pollution. So, on bright mornings, you turn off all the lights in your house to decrease your bill and protect the environment .

If you want to use the latest grammar software for your paper, read our guide to using an AI grammar checker.

Maria Caballero is a freelance writer who has been writing since high school. She believes that to be a writer doesn't only refer to excellent syntax and semantics but also knowing how to weave words together to communicate to any reader effectively.

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Essay on Knowledge is Power: Samples in 100, 200, 300 Words

• Updated on  
• Dec 15, 2023

‘ Knowledge is power’ phrase is derived from a Latin term, which is attributed to Sir Francis Bacon, a well-known essayist of all times. Knowledge is power has been accepted widely and timelessly as it underscores the significance of knowledge in empowering people, societies and countries . 

Benjamin Franklin once said, ‘An investment in knowledge pays the best interest.’ Knowledge not only improves a person’s understanding of the world but also teaches them life lessons to develop decision-making skills and contribute to the betterment of society. Below we have discussed some essays on knowledge is power in different word limits.

Table of Contents

• 1 Essay on Knowledge is Power in 100 Words
• 2 Essay on Knowledge is Power in 200 Words
• 3 Essay on Knowledge is Power in 300 Words

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Essay on Knowledge is Power in 100 Words

‘Knowledge is power’ is a timeless truth. A person with knowledge can empower himself to make informed decisions, enhance personal growth and contribute to the development of society. Knowledge equips us with effective tools to navigate the challenges of life and achieve our goals in real-time. The pursuit of knowledge is education. A person who is educated and has the right knowledge will find success in life. 

The world we live in is driven by knowledge-based education and innovations. From agriculture to healthcare, every activity and field requires you to have proper knowledge and understanding of it. Whether it is at the individual level or global level, people who prioritize education and knowledge enjoy economic prosperity and influence.

Also Read – Essay on Yoga

Essay on Knowledge is Power in 200 Words

Knowledge is so powerful that it can reshape the entire world or destroy it, depending on the purpose for which it is used. The phrase, ‘Knowledge is Power’ was given by Sir Francis Bacon. With knowledge, one can have a profound impact on their life and the people surrounding it.

Knowledge emperors a person in various ways, from personal growth to changes at the global level. With knowledge, we gain new skills, insights and perspectives about a particular subject. This equips us to excel in our chosen field, pursue all our aspirations and fulfil our dream life.

A person with the right knowledge can make informed decisions. If you are someone who possesses broad knowledge about different subjects, it will be very easy for you to critically analyze any situation, weigh options and make choices that best suit your plans. This not only leads to better personal outcomes but also fosters a sense of autonomy and self-determination. Knowledge is considered as the driving force behind progress. Scientific discoveries, technological innovations, cultural evolution and social developments are all fueled by accumulated knowledge. A very classic example of this is the history of human civilization. We must use knowledge knowledge ethically and ensure its equitable distribution or access.

Also Read – Essay on Unity in Diversity

Essay on Knowledge is Power in 300 Words

Knowledge is deemed as the most powerful tool a human possesses. It is the cornerstone of power in our modern society. The universally acknowledged phrase ‘Knowledge is power’ highlights the profound impact knowledge has on individuals and society, and both.

The first thing to know about knowledge is that it is the key to personal development and empowerment. When a person acquires knowledge, they open doors to personal growth and development. Depending on the person’s expertise and field, this empowerment can come in various forms. I person with the right knowledge often finds himself confident, adaptable, and capable of overcoming obstacles in life.

Moreover, knowledge equips you to make informed decisions. We are living in a world which is driven by information. A person who is well-equipped with knowledge about his or her specific field can critically assess a situation, evaluate the options and make choices that best suit their individual needs and values. This not only enhances their personal lives but also fosters a sense of agency and self-determination.

Knowledge is the driving force behind progress, development and innovation. From the time of industrialization to the invention of the internet, knowledge has been the deciding factor for transformative change, improving the quality of life for countless individuals. 

The importance of knowledge is not only limited to individual benefits of scientific discoveries. It also plays a critical role in a country’s governance. It allows you to make informed political decisions, and actively participate in the democratic process. In this way, knowledge serves as a safeguard against tyranny and injustice.

At last, the phrase ‘knowledge is power’ remains a timeless truth that highlights the profound impact of knowledge on a person’s development and societal changes. With this power comes the responsibility to use knowledge ethically and ensure equal access for all, as knowledge remains a vital path to personal and collective empowerment in our ever-changing world.

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The phrase ‘knowledge itself is power’ denotes the meaning that knowing empowers your understanding of the world so that you can make informed decisions for yourself and others. In this way, knowledge is equal to power, as it can help in shaping the future of an individual to an entire country.

Knowledge is considered as an accumulation of information, skills facts and understanding acquired through deep learning, experience and observation. It represents a deep and organised awareness of the world around us, encompassing various fields of knowledge, such as culture, science and technology, history and practical know-how. Knowledge empowers individuals by providing the tools to make informed decisions, solve problems, and navigate life’s complexities. It serves as a foundation for personal growth, innovation, and societal progress, shaping our perceptions and actions. 

A person can improve their knowledge by reading informative articles, newspapers and books, enrolling in courses related to their field of study, attending workshops and seminars, engaging in discussions, etc.

For more information on such interesting topics, visit our essay writing page and follow Leverage Edu .

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With an experience of over a year, I've developed a passion for writing blogs on wide range of topics. I am mostly inspired from topics related to social and environmental fields, where you come up with a positive outcome.

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• Knowledge is Power Essay

Essay on Knowledge is Power

Knowledge means understanding of something such as facts, information, description and skills. It is the source of power to man and this distinguishes him from other creatures of the universe. Though man is physically weaker than many animals, for he cannot see as far as an eagle, nor carry heavy loads as some animals. Nevertheless he is the most powerful creature on earth. This power basically comes to him from knowledge not from physical strength. ‘Knowledge is power’ means that a man has education and a complete control on his life by using the strength of knowledge. 

The ability to acquire knowledge, preserve and pass it on to the future generation makes man powerful. It enables him to control the forces of nature and use them for his benefit. This power of knowledge, if used wisely can bring happiness to mankind. Knowledge leads to wisdom, respect and consequently power. 

Why is Knowledge Powerful?

Knowledge does not always come with power. Knowledge is the state of awareness or understanding and learning of specific information about something and it is gained from experience or study. This means a person has the resources to express his views dynamically and make intelligent decisions based on his every day situations, awareness and understanding. 

This doesn’t make a man powerful. A man is said to be powerful when he uses his knowledge to mobilize in the right direction. When a man has the ability or capacity to act or perform effectively with his knowledge then he gains Power.

Benefits of Knowledge

Knowledge is important to shape our personality and perfect our behavior and dealings with people. 

Knowledge hones thinking skills. Knowledge is necessary in order to be able to formulate an opinion or develop a line of thought.

A person gets the power to analyze and assert situations by his knowledge. 

With knowledge, a man can master the techniques of adjusting and accommodating with changes in the surroundings and life situations. 

Knowledge helps a man to face adversities and stay balanced.

It is a key to removing the darkness of ignorance.

Knowledge helps in enhancing more options in the professional career of the individuals.

Knowledge helps in boosting confidence in individuals.

Education and knowledge together can provide better governance to the country.

A nation can have true democracy when the citizens of the country are knowledgeable about both social and economic conditions.

Prospective of Knowledge

Education is a key to success and this statement holds true as being knowledgeable can lead to a successful life. Knowledge will never diminish like any physical entities. In fact, the evolution of civilization in our society has happened due to the increase in the knowledge base of humans. Progress in the medical field has been made possible by developing rational thinking through the use of knowledge. Knowledge is the foremost tool of empowerment. It is the key to success in life. Knowledge, along with the power to think and analyze, differentiate men from animals. Knowledge teaches us to be humble and compassionate. People with very humble backgrounds have risen to power and wealth, on the strength of knowledge and skill. Only this can maintain harmony in the society.

Writing the Knowledge is Power Essay

Writing the Knowledge is Power Essay can be quite easy. Before you start the essay, collect all the details about the proverb to understand its meaning. This way, you can curate a meaningful essay with all the right facts and relevant points. Moreover, you should know the correct format for writing an essay. You can refer to the Knowledge is Power Essay available on Vedantu’s website to understand the format and learn more about the topic. Here are some tips to follow while writing your own essay on Knowledge is Power: 

Gather all the information you can from textbooks to the Internet about knowledge before you begin the essay. 

Once you have collected all the details, start your essay with an insightful introduction to the topic to give the readers an idea of what they will be learning from the essay. 

While writing the main body, do not go off-topic and write irrelevant points. Everything you write should be entirely focused on the topic i.e. Knowledge is Power. 

Add a good conclusion at the end to summarize the entire essay and give your final statement about the topic i.e. Knowledge is Power. 

Once you have completed the essay, proofread it to find mistakes and rectify them immediately. 

If you have time, revise the essay and check whether you can add more powerful points to make your writing more effective.

Points to be included in the Knowledge is Power Essay

Before you start writing your Knowledge is Power Essay, you should have a clear understanding of what points to include. This will save a lot of your time and help you finish the essay in much less time. You can gather all the information regarding the topic i.e. Knowledge is Power, and then start writing. Here are the points that you can add in the essay: 

In the introduction, write mainly about that specific proverb, i.e. Knowledge is Power, to give your reader an idea of what you are reading. 

When you come to the main body, add relevant points and explain your opinions on the topic. For example, you can write about why knowledge is considered powerful or the benefits of knowledge. 

Try adding quotes related to the topic in your essay to make it more impactful. You can use these quotes before your opening statement or support the information in the main body. 

While writing your conclusion, add a broad statement that summarizes the essay. Do not add any new ideas or information in the conclusion. You only have to sum up the entire Knowledge is Power Essay at this stage.    

FAQs on Knowledge is Power Essay

1. How Do You Define Knowledge?

Knowledge means understanding of facts, information, description and skills. It refers to awareness of something gained by education or experience. Here are the three different types of knowledge: 

Explicit Knowledge: It refers to the type of knowledge that can be easily documented, stored, curated, and accessed. For example, information available in textbooks, the internet, etc. 

Implicit Knowledge: The practical application of explicit knowledge is known as implicit knowledge. For example, how to drive a car or how to swim. 

Tacit Knowledge: Any knowledge gained from personal experiences and context is known as tacit knowledge. For example, body language, leadership, humour, etc.  

2. Why is Knowledge Considered Powerful?

Knowledge is powerful because a man can mobilize his life into the right direction. Knowledge can be both creator and destructive of our society. Through knowledge only, one can differentiate between right and wrong and make an informed decision. It also helps you plan your future and takes you on the path to success. With more knowledge, you will be able to overcome your weaknesses and gain more self-confidence. It encourages a positive attitude towards life and keeps you motivated to survive and thrive in the real world.

3. Mention Two Benefits Of Knowledge.

Knowledge is something that you gain throughout your life. It comes with an infinite number of benefits and keeps you on the right track. Knowledge encourages you to act morally and help others in any way possible. Moreover, it boosts your confidence to face any difficulty without being dependent on others. The two benefits of knowledge are:

Knowledge shapes our personality and behavior with others.

Knowledge with proper education can provide better governance to a nation.

4. Why is Less Knowledge Dangerous?

Less knowledge or half knowledge is very dangerous as it leads a man to a benighted condition for the rest of his life. He will never be able to excel in any field to the fullest. Less knowledge can mislead a person into making wrong decisions that have a negative impact on his/her life. Usually, people with less knowledge are only aware of the major aspects of a subject. They do not focus on the minor aspects, which gives them an unbalanced view of that particular subject.

5. From where can I get the Knowledge is Power Essay?

You can get the Knowledge is Power Essay from Vedantu’s official website and mobile app. Vedantu provides you with the Knowledge is Power Essay without charging you anything. You can just visit our website and search for the essay to get access to it. Moreover, we offer a huge variety of study material for the English language to help students get better at the subject. You will find various topics of grammar, letter writing, speech writing, and much more only on Vedantu.com. Use all this study material to improve your writing skills and gain more knowledge about the English language.

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The Analysis of Knowledge

For any person, there are some things they know, and some things they don’t. What exactly is the difference? What does it take to know something? It’s not enough just to believe it—we don’t know the things we’re wrong about. Knowledge seems to be more like a way of getting at the truth. The analysis of knowledge concerns the attempt to articulate in what exactly this kind of “getting at the truth” consists.

More particularly, the project of analysing knowledge is to state conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for propositional knowledge, thoroughly answering the question, what does it take to know something? By “propositional knowledge”, we mean knowledge of a proposition—for example, if Susan knows that Alyssa is a musician, she has knowledge of the proposition that Alyssa is a musician. Propositional knowledge should be distinguished from knowledge of “acquaintance”, as obtains when Susan knows Alyssa. The relation between propositional knowledge and the knowledge at issue in other “knowledge” locutions in English, such as knowledge-where (“Susan knows where she is”) and especially knowledge-how (“Susan knows how to ride a bicycle”) is subject to some debate (see Stanley 2011 and his opponents discussed therein).

The propositional knowledge that is the analysandum of the analysis of knowledge literature is paradigmatically expressed in English by sentences of the form “ S knows that p ”, where “ S ” refers to the knowing subject, and “ p ” to the proposition that is known. A proposed analysis consists of a statement of the following form: S knows that p if and only if j , where j indicates the analysans: paradigmatically, a list of conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for S to have knowledge that p .

It is not enough merely to pick out the actual extension of knowledge. Even if, in actual fact, all cases of S knowing that p are cases of j , and all cases of the latter are cases of the former, j might fail as an analysis of knowledge. For example, it might be that there are possible cases of knowledge without j , or vice versa. A proper analysis of knowledge should at least be a necessary truth. Consequently, hypothetical thought experiments provide appropriate test cases for various analyses, as we shall see below.

Even a necessary biconditional linking knowledge to some state j would probably not be sufficient for an analysis of knowledge, although just what more is required is a matter of some controversy. According to some theorists, to analyze knowledge is literally to identify the components that make up knowledge—compare a chemist who analyzes a sample to learn its chemical composition. On this interpretation of the project of analyzing knowledge, the defender of a successful analysis of knowledge will be committed to something like the metaphysical claim that what it is for S to know p is for some list of conditions involving S and p to obtain. Other theorists think of the analysis of knowledge as distinctively conceptual —to analyse knowledge is to limn the structure of the concept of knowledge. On one version of this approach, the concept knowledge is literally composed of more basic concepts, linked together by something like Boolean operators. Consequently, an analysis is subject not only to extensional accuracy, but to facts about the cognitive representation of knowledge and other epistemic notions. In practice, many epistemologists engaging in the project of analyzing knowledge leave these metaphilosophical interpretive questions unresolved; attempted analyses, and counterexamples thereto, are often proposed without its being made explicit whether the claims are intended as metaphysical or conceptual ones. In many cases, this lack of specificity may be legitimate, since all parties tend to agree that an analysis of knowledge ought at least to be extensionally correct in all metaphysically possible worlds. As we shall see, many theories have been defended and, especially, refuted, on those terms.

The attempt to analyze knowledge has received a considerable amount of attention from epistemologists, particularly in the late 20 th Century, but no analysis has been widely accepted. Some contemporary epistemologists reject the assumption that knowledge is susceptible to analysis.

1.1 The Truth Condition

1.2 the belief condition, 1.3 the justification condition, 2. lightweight knowledge, 3. the gettier problem, 4. no false lemmas, 5.1 sensitivity, 5.3 relevant alternatives, 6.1 reliabilist theories of knowledge, 6.2 causal theories of knowledge, 7. is knowledge analyzable, 8. epistemic luck, 9. methodological options, 10.1 the “aaa” evaluations, 10.2 fake barn cases, 11. knowledge first, 12. pragmatic encroachment, 13. contextualism, other internet resources, related entries, 1. knowledge as justified true belief.

There are three components to the traditional (“tripartite”) analysis of knowledge. According to this analysis, justified, true belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge.

• S believes that p ;
• S is justified in believing that p .

The tripartite analysis of knowledge is often abbreviated as the “JTB” analysis, for “justified true belief”.

Much of the twentieth-century literature on the analysis of knowledge took the JTB analysis as its starting-point. It became something of a convenient fiction to suppose that this analysis was widely accepted throughout much of the history of philosophy. In fact, however, the JTB analysis was first articulated in the twentieth century by its attackers. [ 1 ] Before turning to influential twentieth-century arguments against the JTB theory, let us briefly consider the three traditional components of knowledge in turn.

Most epistemologists have found it overwhelmingly plausible that what is false cannot be known. For example, Hillary Clinton did not win the 2016 US Presidential election. Consequently, nobody knows that Hillary Clinton won the election. One can only know things that are true.

Sometimes when people are very confident of something that turns out to be wrong, we use the word “knows” to describe their situation. Many people expected Clinton to win the election. Speaking loosely, one might even say that many people “knew” that Clinton would win the election—until she lost. Hazlett (2010) argues on the basis of data like this that “knows” is not a factive verb. [ 2 ] Hazlett’s diagnosis is deeply controversial; most epistemologists will treat sentences like “I knew that Clinton was going to win” as a kind of exaggeration—as not literally true.

Something’s truth does not require that anyone can know or prove that it is true. Not all truths are established truths. If you flip a coin and never check how it landed, it may be true that it landed heads, even if nobody has any way to tell. Truth is a metaphysical , as opposed to epistemological , notion: truth is a matter of how things are , not how they can be shown to be. So when we say that only true things can be known, we’re not (yet) saying anything about how anyone can access the truth. As we’ll see, the other conditions have important roles to play here. Knowledge is a kind of relationship with the truth—to know something is to have a certain kind of access to a fact. [ 3 ]

The belief condition is only slightly more controversial than the truth condition. The general idea behind the belief condition is that you can only know what you believe. Failing to believe something precludes knowing it. “Belief” in the context of the JTB theory means full belief, or outright belief. In a weak sense, one might “believe” something by virtue of being pretty confident that it’s probably true—in this weak sense, someone who considered Clinton the favourite to win the election, even while recognizing a nontrivial possibility of her losing, might be said to have “believed” that Clinton would win. Outright belief is stronger (see, e.g., Fantl & McGrath 2009: 141; Nagel 2010: 413–4; Williamson 2005: 108; or Gibbons 2013: 201.). To believe outright that p , it isn’t enough to have a pretty high confidence in p ; it is something closer to a commitment or a being sure. [ 4 ]

Although initially it might seem obvious that knowing that p requires believing that p , a few philosophers have argued that knowledge without belief is indeed possible. Suppose Walter comes home after work to find out that his house has burned down. He says: “I don’t believe it”. Critics of the belief condition might argue that Walter knows that his house has burned down (he sees that it has), but, as his words indicate, he does not believe it. The standard response is that Walter’s avowal of disbelief is not literally true; what Walter wishes to convey by saying “I don’t believe it” is not that he really does not believe that his house has burned down, but rather that he finds it hard to come to terms with what he sees. If he genuinely didn’t believe it, some of his subsequent actions, such as phoning his insurance company, would be rather mysterious.

A more serious counterexample has been suggested by Colin Radford (1966). Suppose Albert is quizzed on English history. One of the questions is: “When did Queen Elizabeth die?” Albert doesn’t think he knows, but answers the question correctly. Moreover, he gives correct answers to many other questions to which he didn’t think he knew the answer. Let us focus on Albert’s answer to the question about Elizabeth:

• (E) Elizabeth died in 1603.

Radford makes the following two claims about this example:

• Albert does not believe (E).
• Albert knows (E).

Radford’s intuitions about cases like these do not seem to be idiosyncratic; Myers-Schutz & Schwitzgebel (2013) find evidence suggesting that many ordinary speakers tend to react in the way Radford suggests. In support of (a), Radford emphasizes that Albert thinks he doesn’t know the answer to the question. He doesn’t trust his answer because he takes it to be a mere guess. In support of (b), Radford argues that Albert’s answer is not at all just a lucky guess. The fact that he answers most of the questions correctly indicates that he has actually learned, and never forgotten, such historical facts.

Since he takes (a) and (b) to be true, Radford holds that belief is not necessary for knowledge. But either of (a) and (b) might be resisted. One might deny (a), arguing that Albert does have a tacit belief that (E), even though it’s not one that he thinks amounts to knowledge. David Rose and Jonathan Schaffer (2013) take this route. Alternatively, one might deny (b), arguing that Albert’s correct answer is not an expression of knowledge, perhaps because, given his subjective position, he does not have justification for believing (E). The justification condition is the topic of the next section.

Why is condition (iii) necessary? Why not say that knowledge is true belief? The standard answer is that to identify knowledge with true belief would be implausible because a belief might be true even though it is formed improperly. Suppose that William flips a coin, and confidently believes—on no particular basis—that it will land tails. If by chance the coin does land tails, then William’s belief was true; but a lucky guess such as this one is no knowledge. For William to know, his belief must in some epistemic sense be proper or appropriate: it must be justified . [ 5 ]

Socrates articulates the need for something like a justification condition in Plato’s Theaetetus , when he points out that “true opinion” is in general insufficient for knowledge. For example, if a lawyer employs sophistry to induce a jury into a belief that happens to be true, this belief is insufficiently well-grounded to constitute knowledge.

1.3.1 Approaches to Justification

There is considerable disagreement among epistemologists concerning what the relevant sort of justification here consists in. Internalists about justification think that whether a belief is justified depends wholly on states in some sense internal to the subject. According to one common such sense of “internal”, only those features of a subject’s experience which are directly or introspectively available count as “internal”—call this “access internalism”. According to another, only intrinsic states of the subject are “internal”—call this “state internalism”. See Feldman & Conee 2001 for the distinction.

Conee and Feldman present an example of an internalist view. They have it that S ’s belief that p is justified if and only if believing that p is the attitude towards p that best fits S ’s evidence, where the latter is understood to depend only on S ’s internal mental states. Conee and Feldman call their view “evidentialism”, and characterize this as the thesis that justification is wholly a matter of the subject’s evidence. Given their (not unsubstantial) assumption that what evidence a subject has is an internal matter, evidentialism implies internalism. [ 6 ] Externalists about justification think that factors external to the subject can be relevant for justification; for example, process reliabilists think that justified beliefs are those which are formed by a cognitive process which tends to produce a high proportion of true beliefs relative to false ones. [ 7 ] We shall return to the question of how reliabilist approaches bear on the analysis of knowledge in §6.1 .

1.3.2 Kinds of Justification

It is worth noting that one might distinguish between two importantly different notions of justification, standardly referred to as “propositional justification” and “doxastic justification”. (Sometimes “ ex ante ” justification and “ ex post ” justification, respectively.) [ 8 ] Unlike that between internalist and externalist approaches to justification, the distinction between propositional and doxastic justification does not represent a conflict to be resolved; it is a distinction between two distinct properties that are called “justification”. Propositional justification concerns whether a subject has sufficient reason to believe a given proposition; [ 9 ] doxastic justification concerns whether a given belief is held appropriately. [ 10 ] One common way of relating the two is to suggest that propositional justification is the more fundamental, and that doxastic justification is a matter of a subject’s having a belief that is appropriately responsive to or based on their propositional justification.

The precise relation between propositional and doxastic justification is subject to controversy, but it is uncontroversial that the two notions can come apart. Suppose that Ingrid ignores a great deal of excellent evidence indicating that a given neighborhood is dangerous, but superstitiously comes to believe that the neighborhood is dangerous when she sees a black cat crossing the street. Since forming beliefs on the basis of superstition is not an epistemically appropriate way of forming beliefs, Ingrid’s belief is not doxastically justified; nevertheless, she does have good reason to believe as she does, so she does have propositional justification for the proposition that the neighborhood is dangerous.

Since knowledge is a particularly successful kind of belief, doxastic justification is a stronger candidate for being closely related to knowledge; the JTB theory is typically thought to invoke doxastic justification (but see Lowy 1978).

Some epistemologists have suggested that there may be multiple senses of the term “knowledge”, and that not all of them require all three elements of the tripartite theory of knowledge. For example, some have argued that there is, in addition to the sense of “knowledge” gestured at above, another, weak sense of “knowledge”, that requires only true belief (see for example Hawthorne 2002 and Goldman & Olsson 2009; the latter contains additional relevant references). This view is sometimes motivated by the thought that, when we consider whether someone knows that p , or wonder which of a group of people know that p , often, we are not at all interested in whether the relevant subjects have beliefs that are justified; we just want to know whether they have the true belief. For example, as Hawthorne (2002: 253–54) points out, one might ask how many students know that Vienna is the capital of Austria; the correct answer, one might think, just is the number of students who offer “Vienna” as the answer to the corresponding question, irrespective of whether their beliefs are justified. Similarly, if you are planning a surprise party for Eugene and ask whether he knows about it, “yes” may be an appropriate answer merely on the grounds that Eugene believes that you are planning a party.

One could allow that there is a lightweight sense of knowledge that requires only true belief; another option is to decline to accept the intuitive sentences as true at face value. A theorist might, for instance, deny that sentences like “Eugene knows that you are planning a party”, or “eighteen students know that Vienna is the capital of Austria” are literally true in the envisaged situations, explaining away their apparent felicity as loose talk or hyperbole.

Even among those epistemologists who think that there is a lightweight sense of “knows” that does not require justification, most typically admit that there is also a stronger sense which does, and that it is this stronger state that is the main target of epistemological theorizing about knowledge. In what follows, we will set aside the lightweight sense, if indeed there be one, and focus on the stronger one.

Few contemporary epistemologists accept the adequacy of the JTB analysis. Although most agree that each element of the tripartite theory is necessary for knowledge, they do not seem collectively to be sufficient . There seem to be cases of justified true belief that still fall short of knowledge. Here is one kind of example:

Imagine that we are seeking water on a hot day. We suddenly see water, or so we think. In fact, we are not seeing water but a mirage, but when we reach the spot, we are lucky and find water right there under a rock. Can we say that we had genuine knowledge of water? The answer seems to be negative, for we were just lucky. (quoted from Dreyfus 1997: 292)

This example comes from the Indian philosopher Dharmottara, c. 770 CE. The 14 th -century Italian philosopher Peter of Mantua presented a similar case:

Let it be assumed that Plato is next to you and you know him to be running, but you mistakenly believe that he is Socrates, so that you firmly believe that Socrates is running. However, let it be so that Socrates is in fact running in Rome; however, you do not know this. (from Peter of Mantua’s De scire et dubitare , given in Boh 1985: 95)

Cases like these, in which justified true belief seems in some important sense disconnected from the fact, were made famous in Edmund Gettier’s 1963 paper, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”. Gettier presented two cases in which a true belief is inferred from a justified false belief. He observed that, intuitively, such beliefs cannot be knowledge; it is merely lucky that they are true.

In honour of his contribution to the literature, cases like these have come to be known as “Gettier cases”. Since they appear to refute the JTB analysis, many epistemologists have undertaken to repair it: how must the analysis of knowledge be modified to accommodate Gettier cases? This is what is commonly referred to as the “Gettier problem”.

Above, we noted that one role of the justification is to rule out lucky guesses as cases of knowledge. A lesson of the Gettier problem is that it appears that even true beliefs that are justified can nevertheless be epistemically lucky in a way inconsistent with knowledge.

Epistemologists who think that the JTB approach is basically on the right track must choose between two different strategies for solving the Gettier problem. The first is to strengthen the justification condition to rule out Gettier cases as cases of justified belief. This was attempted by Roderick Chisholm; [ 11 ] we will refer to this strategy again in §7 below. The other is to amend the JTB analysis with a suitable fourth condition, a condition that succeeds in preventing justified true belief from being “gettiered”. Thus amended, the JTB analysis becomes a JTB+ X account of knowledge, where the “ X ” stands for the needed fourth condition.

Let us consider an instance of this attempt to articulate a “degettiering” condition.

According to one suggestion, the following fourth condition would do the trick:

• S ’s belief that p is not inferred from any falsehood. [ 12 ]

In Gettier’s cases, the justified true belief is inferred from a justified false belief. So condition (iv) explains why it isn’t knowledge. However, this “no false lemmas” proposal is not successful in general. There are examples of Gettier cases that need involve no inference; therefore, there are possible cases of justified true belief without knowledge, even though condition (iv) is met. Suppose, for example, that James, who is relaxing on a bench in a park, observes an apparent dog in a nearby field. So he believes

• There is a dog in the field.

Suppose further that the putative dog is actually a robot dog so perfect that it could not be distinguished from an actual dog by vision alone. James does not know that such robot dogs exist; a Japanese toy manufacturer has only recently developed them, and what James sees is a prototype that is used for testing the public’s response. Given these assumptions, (d) is of course false. But suppose further that just a few feet away from the robot dog, there is a real dog, concealed from James’s view. Given this further assumption, James’s belief in (d) is true. And since this belief is based on ordinary perceptual processes, most epistemologists will agree that it is justified. But as in Gettier’s cases, James’s belief appears to be true only as a matter of luck, in a way inconsistent with knowledge. So once again, what we have before us is a justified true belief that isn’t knowledge. [ 13 ] Arguably, this belief is directly justified by a visual experience; it is not inferred from any falsehood. If so, then the JTB account, even if supplemented with (iv) , gives us the wrong result that James knows (d).

Another case illustrating that clause (iv) won’t do the job is the well-known Barn County case (Goldman 1976). Suppose there is a county in the Midwest with the following peculiar feature. The landscape next to the road leading through that county is peppered with barn-facades: structures that from the road look exactly like barns. Observation from any other viewpoint would immediately reveal these structures to be fakes: devices erected for the purpose of fooling unsuspecting motorists into believing in the presence of barns. Suppose Henry is driving along the road that leads through Barn County. Naturally, he will on numerous occasions form false beliefs in the presence of barns. Since Henry has no reason to suspect that he is the victim of organized deception, these beliefs are justified. Now suppose further that, on one of those occasions when he believes there is a barn over there, he happens to be looking at the one and only real barn in the county. This time, his belief is justified and true. But since its truth is the result of luck, it is exceedingly plausible to judge that Henry’s belief is not an instance of knowledge. Yet condition (iv) is met in this case. His belief is not the result of any inference from a falsehood. Once again, we see that (iv) does not succeed as a general solution to the Gettier problem.

5. Modal Conditions

Another candidate fourth condition on knowledge is sensitivity . Sensitivity, to a first approximation, is this counterfactual relation:

S ’s belief that p is sensitive if and only if, if p were false, S would not believe that p . [ 14 ]

A sensitivity condition on knowledge was defended by Robert Nozick (1981). Given a Lewisian (Lewis 1973) semantics for counterfactual conditionals, the sensitivity condition is equivalent to the requirement that, in the nearest possible worlds in which not- p , the subject does not believe that p .

One motivation for including a sensitivity condition in an analysis of knowledge is that there seems to be an intuitive sense in which knowledge requires not merely being correct, but tracking the truth in other possible circumstances. This approach seems to be a plausible diagnosis of what goes wrong in at least some Gettier cases. For example, in Dharmottara’s desert water case, your belief that there is water in a certain location appears to be insensitive to the fact of the water. For if there were no water there, you would have held the same belief on the same grounds— viz. , the mirage.

However, it is doubtful that a sensitivity condition can account for the phenomenon of Gettier cases in general. It does so only in cases in which, had the proposition in question been false, it would have been believed anyway. But, as Saul Kripke (2011: 167–68) has pointed out, not all Gettier cases are like this. Consider for instance the Barn County case mentioned above. Henry looks at a particular location where there happens to be a barn and believes there to be a barn there. The sensitivity condition rules out this belief as knowledge only if, were there no barn there, Henry would still have believed there was. But this counterfactual may be false, depending on how the Barn County case is set up. For instance, it is false if the particular location Henry is examining is not one that would have been suitable for the erecting of a barn façade. Relatedly, as Kripke has also indicated (2011: 186), if we suppose that barn facades are always green, but genuine barns are always red, Henry’s belief that he sees a red barn will be sensitive, even though his belief that he sees a barn will not. (We assume Henry is unaware that colour signifies anything relevant.) Since intuitively, the former belief looks to fall short of knowledge in just the same way as the latter, a sensitivity condition will only handle some of the intuitive problems deriving from Gettier cases.

Most epistemologists today reject sensitivity requirements on knowledge. The chief motivation against a sensitivity condition is that, given plausible assumptions, it leads to unacceptable implications called “abominable conjunctions”. [ 15 ] To see this, suppose first that skepticism about ordinary knowledge is false—ordinary subjects know at least many of the things we ordinarily take them to know. For example, George, who can see and use his hands perfectly well, knows that he has hands. This is of course perfectly consistent with a sensitivity condition on knowledge, since if George did not have hands—if they’d been recently chopped off, for instance—he would not believe that he had hands.

Now imagine a skeptical scenario in which George does not have hands. Suppose that George is the victim of a Cartesian demon, deceiving him into believing that he has hands. If George were in such a scenario, of course, he would falsely believe himself not to be in such a scenario. So given the sensitivity condition, George cannot know that he is not in such a scenario.

Although these two verdicts—the knowledge-attributing one about ordinary knowledge, and the knowledge-denying one about the skeptical scenario—are arguably each intuitive, it is intuitively problematic to hold them together. Their conjunction is, in DeRose’s term, abominable: “George knows that he has hands, but he doesn’t know that he’s not the handless victim of a Cartesian demon”. A sensitivity condition on knowledge, combined with the nonskeptical claim that there is ordinary knowledge, seems to imply such abominable conjunctions. [ 16 ]

Most contemporary epistemologists have taken considerations like these to be sufficient reason to reject sensitivity conditions. [ 17 ] However, see Ichikawa (2011a) for an interpretation and endorsement of the sensitivity condition according to which it may avoid commitment to abominable conjunctions.

Although few epistemologists today endorse a sensitivity condition on knowledge, the idea that knowledge requires a subject to stand in a particular modal relation to the proposition known remains a popular one. In his 1999 paper, “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore”, Ernest Sosa proposed that a safety condition ought to take the role that sensitivity was intended to play. Sosa characterized safety as the counterfactual contrapositive of sensitivity.

Sensitivity: If p were false, S would not believe that p .

Safety: If S were to believe that p , p would not be false. [ 18 ]

Although contraposition is valid for the material conditional \((A \supset B\) iff \(\mathord{\sim} B \supset \mathord{\sim}A)\), Sosa suggests that it is invalid for counterfactuals, which is why sensitivity and safety are not equivalent. An example of a safe belief that is not sensitive, according to Sosa, is the belief that a distant skeptical scenario does not obtain. If we stipulate that George, discussed above, has never been at risk of being the victim of a Cartesian demon—because, say, Cartesian demons do not exist in George’s world—then George’s belief that he is not such a victim is a safe one, even though we saw in the previous section that it could not be sensitive. Notice that although we stipulated that George is not at risk of deceit by Cartesian demons, we did not stipulate that George himself had any particular access to this fact. Unless he does, safety, like sensitivity, will be an externalist condition on knowledge in the “access” sense. It is also externalist in the “state” sense, since the truth of the relevant counterfactuals will depend on features outside the subject.

Characterizing safety in these counterfactual terms depends on substantive assumptions about the semantics of counterfactual conditionals. [ 19 ] If we were to accept, for instance, David Lewis’s or Robert Stalnaker’s treatment of counterfactuals, including a strong centering condition according to which the actual world is always uniquely closest, all true beliefs would count as safe according to the counterfactual analysis of safety. [ 20 ] Sosa intends the relevant counterfactuals to be making a stronger claim, requiring roughly that in all nearby worlds in which S believes that p , p is not false.

Rather than resting on a contentious treatment of counterfactuals, then, it may be most perspicuous to understand the safety condition more directly in these modal terms, as Sosa himself often does:

In all nearby worlds where S believes that p , p is not false.

Whether a JTB+safety analysis of knowledge could be successful is somewhat difficult to evaluate, given the vagueness of the stated “nearby” condition. The status of potential counterexamples will not always be straightforward to apply. For example, Juan Comesaña (2005) presents a case he takes to refute the requirement that knowledge be safe. In Comesaña’s example, the host of a Halloween party enlists Judy to direct guests to the party. Judy’s instructions are to give everyone the same directions, which are in fact accurate, but that if she sees Michael, the party will be moved to another location. (The host does not want Michael to find the party.) Suppose Michael never shows up. If a given guest does not, but very nearly does, decide to wear a very realistic Michael costume to the party, then his belief, based in Judy’s testimony, about the whereabouts of the party will be true, but could, Comesaña says, easily have been false. (Had he merely made a slightly different choice about his costume, he would have been deceived.) Comesaña describes the case as a counterexample to a safety condition on knowledge. However, it is open to a safety theorist to argue that the relevant skeptical scenario, though possible and in some sense nearby, is not near enough in the relevant respect to falsify the safety condition. Such a theorist would, if she wanted the safety condition to deliver clear verdicts, face the task of articulating just what the relevant notion of similarity amounts to (see also Bogardus 2014).

Not all further clarifications of a safety condition will be suitable for the use of the latter in an analysis of knowledge. In particular, if the respect of similarity that is relevant for safety is itself explicated in terms of knowledge, then an analysis of knowledge which made reference to safety would be in this respect circular. This, for instance, is how Timothy Williamson characterizes safety. He writes, in response to a challenge by Alvin Goldman:

In many cases, someone with no idea of what knowledge is would be unable to determine whether safety obtained. Although they could use the principle that safety entails truth to exclude some cases, those are not the interesting ones. Thus Goldman will be disappointed when he asks what the safety account predicts about various examples in which conflicting considerations pull in different directions. One may have to decide whether safety obtains by first deciding whether knowledge obtains, rather than vice versa. (Williamson 2009: 305)

Because safety is understood only in terms of knowledge, safety so understood cannot serve in an analysis of knowledge. Nor is it Williamson’s intent that it should do so; as we will see below, Williamson rejects the project of analyzing knowledge. This is of course consistent with claiming that safety is a necessary condition on knowledge in the straightforward sense that the latter entails the former.

A third approach to modal conditions on knowledge worthy of mention is the requirement that for a subject to know that p , she must rule out all “relevant alternatives” to p . Significant early proponents of this view include Stine 1976, Goldman 1976, and Dretske 1981. The idea behind this approach to knowledge is that for a subject to know that p , she must be able to “rule out” competing hypotheses to p —but that only some subset of all not- p possibilities are “relevant” for knowledge attributions. Consider for example, the differences between the several models that have been produced of Apple’s iPhone. To be able to know by sight that a particular phone is the 6S model, it is natural to suppose that one must be able to tell the difference between the iPhone 6S and the iPhone 7; the possibility that the phone in question is a newer model is a relevant alternative. But perhaps there are other possibilities in which the belief that there is an iPhone 6S is false that do not need to be ruled out—perhaps, for instance, the possibility that the phone is not an iPhone, but a Chinese knock-off, needn’t be considered. Likewise for the possibility that there is no phone at all, the phone-like appearances being the product of a Cartesian demon’s machinations. Notice that in these cases and many of the others that motivate the relevant-alternatives approach to knowledge, there is an intuitive sense in which the relevant alternatives tend to be more similar to actuality than irrelevant ones. As such, the relevant alternatives theory and safety-theoretic approaches are very similar, both in verdict and in spirit. As in the case of a safety theorist, the relevant alternatives theorist faces a challenge in attempting to articulate what determines which possibilities are relevant in a given situation. [ 21 ]

6. Doing Without Justification?

As we have seen, one motivation for including a justification condition in an analysis of knowledge was to prevent lucky guesses from counting as knowledge. However, the Gettier problem shows that including a justification condition does not rule out all epistemically problematic instances of luck. Consequently, some epistemologists have suggested that positing a justification condition on knowledge was a false move; perhaps it is some other condition that ought to be included along with truth and belief as components of knowledge. This kind of strategy was advanced by a number of authors from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, although there has been relatively little discussion of it since. [ 22 ] Kornblith 2008 provides a notable exception.

One candidate property for such a state is reliability . Part of what is problematic about lucky guesses is precisely that they are so lucky: such guesses are formed in a way such that it is unlikely that they should turn out true. According to a certain form of knowledge reliabilism, it is unreliability, not lack of justification, which prevents such beliefs from amounting to knowledge. Reliabilist theories of knowledge incorporate this idea into a reliability condition on knowledge. [ 23 ] Here is an example of such a view:

Simple K-Reliabilism:

S knows that p iff

• S ’s belief that p was produced by a reliable cognitive process.

Simple K-Reliabilism replaces the justification clause in the traditional tripartite theory with a reliability clause. As we have seen, reliabilists about justification think that justification for a belief consists in a genesis in a reliable cognitive process. Given this view, Simple K-Reliabilism and the JTB theory are equivalent. However, the present proposal is silent on justification. Goldman 1979 is the seminal defense of reliabilism about justification; reliabilism is extended to knowledge in Goldman 1986. See Goldman 2011 for a survey of reliabilism in general.

In the following passage, Fred Dretske articulates how an approach like K-reliabilism might be motivated:

Those who think knowledge requires something other than , or at least more than , reliably produced true belief, something (usually) in the way of justification for the belief that one’s reliably produced beliefs are being reliably produced, have, it seems to me, an obligation to say what benefits this justification is supposed to confer…. Who needs it, and why? If an animal inherits a perfectly reliable belief-generating mechanism, and it also inherits a disposition, everything being equal, to act on the basis of the beliefs so generated, what additional benefits are conferred by a justification that the beliefs are being produced in some reliable way? If there are no additional benefits, what good is this justification? Why should we insist that no one can have knowledge without it? (Dretske 1989: 95)

According to Dretske, reliable cognitive processes convey information, and thus endow not only humans, but (nonhuman) animals as well, with knowledge. He writes:

I wanted a characterization that would at least allow for the possibility that animals (a frog, rat, ape, or my dog) could know things without my having to suppose them capable of the more sophisticated intellectual operations involved in traditional analyses of knowledge. (Dretske 1985: 177)

It does seem odd to think of frogs, rats, or dogs as having justified or unjustified beliefs. Yet attributing knowledge to animals is certainly in accord with our ordinary practice of using the word “knowledge”. So if, with Dretske, we want an account of knowledge that includes animals among the knowing subjects, we might want to abandon the traditional JTB account in favor of something like K-reliabilism.

Another move in a similar spirit to K-Reliabilism replaces the justification clause in the JTB theory with a condition requiring a causal connection between the belief and the fact believed; [ 24 ] this is the approach of Goldman (1967, 1976). [ 25 ] Goldman’s own causal theory is a sophisticated one; we will not engage with its details here. See Goldman’s papers. Instead, consider a simplified causal theory of knowledge, which illustrates the main motivation behind causal theories.

Simple Causal Theory of Knowledge:

• S ’s belief that p is caused by the fact that p .

Do approaches like Simple K-Reliabilism or the Simple Causal Theory fare any better than the JTB theory with respect to Gettier cases? Although some proponents have suggested they do—see e.g., Dretske 1985: 179; Plantinga 1993: 48—many of the standard counterexamples to the JTB theory appear to refute these views as well. Consider again the case of the barn facades. Henry sees a real barn, and that’s why he believes there is a barn nearby. This belief is formed by perceptual processes, which are by-and-large reliable: only rarely do they lead him into false beliefs. So it looks like the case meets the conditions of Simple K-Reliabilism just as much as it does those of the JTB theory. It is also a counterexample to the causal theory, since the real barn Henry perceives is causally responsible for his belief. There is reason to doubt, therefore, that shifting from justification to a condition like reliability will escape the Gettier problem. [ 26 ] Gettier cases seem to pose as much of a problem for K-reliabilism and causal theories as for the JTB account. Neither theory, unless amended with a clever “degettiering” clause, succeeds in stating sufficient conditions for knowledge. [ 27 ]

Gettier’s paper launched a flurry of philosophical activity by epistemologists attempting to revise the JTB theory, usually by adding one or more conditions, to close the gap between knowledge and justified true belief. We have seen already how several of these attempts failed. When intuitive counterexamples were proposed to each theory, epistemologists often responded by amending their theories, complicating the existing conditions or adding new ones. Much of this dialectic is chronicled thoroughly by Shope 1983, to which the interested reader is directed.

After some decades of such iterations, some epistemologists began to doubt that progress was being made. In her 1994 paper, “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems”, Linda Zagzebski suggested that no analysis sufficiently similar to the JTB analysis could ever avoid the problems highlighted by Gettier’s cases. More precisely, Zagzebski argued, any analysans of the form JTB+ X , where X is a condition or list of conditions logically independent from justification, truth, and belief, would be susceptible to Gettier-style counterexamples. She offered what was in effect a recipe for constructing Gettier cases:

• (1) Start with an example of a case where a subject has a justified false belief that also meets condition X .
• (2) Modify the case so that the belief is true merely by luck.

Zagzebski suggests that the resultant case will always represent an intuitive lack of knowledge. So any non-redundant addition to the JTB theory will leave the Gettier problem unsolved. [ 28 ] We may illustrate the application of the recipe using one of Zagzebski’s own examples, refuting Alvin Plantinga’s (1996) attempt to solve the Gettier problem by appending to the JTB analysis a condition requiring that the subject’s faculties be working properly in an appropriate environment.

In step one of Zagzebski’s procedure, we imagine a case in which a subject’s faculties are working properly in an appropriate environment, but the ensuing belief, though justified, is false. Zagzebski invites us to imagine that Mary has very good eyesight—good enough for her cognitive faculties typically to yield knowledge that her husband is sitting in the living room. Such faculties, even when working properly in suitable environments, however, are not infallible—if they were, the condition would not be independent from truth—so we can imagine a case in which they go wrong. Perhaps this is an unusual instance in which Mary’s husband’s brother, who looks a lot like the husband, is in the living room, and Mary concludes, on the basis of the proper function of her visual capacity, that her husband is in the living room. This belief, since false, is certainly not knowledge.

In step two, we imagine Mary’s misidentification of the occupant of the living room as before, but add to the case that the husband is, by luck, also in the living room. Now Mary’s belief is true, but intuitively, it is no more an instance of knowledge than the false belief in the first step was.

Since the recipe is a general one, it appears to be applicable to any condition one might add to the JTB theory, so long as it does not itself entail truth. The argument generalizes against all “non-redundant” JTB+ X analyses.

One potential response to Zagzebski’s argument, and the failure of the Gettier project more generally, would be to conclude that knowledge is unanalyzable. Although it would represent a significant departure from much analytic epistemology of the late twentieth century, it is not clear that this is ultimately a particularly radical suggestion. Few concepts of interest have proved susceptible to traditional analysis (Fodor 1998). One prominent approach to knowledge in this vein is discussed in §11 below.

Another possible line is the one mentioned in §2 —to strengthen the justification condition to rule out Gettier cases as justified. In order for this strategy to prevent Zagzebski’s recipe from working, one would need to posit a justification condition that precludes the possibility of step one above—the only obvious way to do this is for justification to entail truth. If it does, then it will of course be impossible to start with a case that has justified false belief. This kind of approach is not at all mainstream, but it does have its defenders—see e.g., Sturgeon 1993 and Merricks 1995. Sutton 2007 and Littlejohn 2012 defend factive approaches to justification on other grounds.

A third avenue of response would be to consider potential analyses of knowledge that are not of the nonredundant form JTB+ X . Indeed, we have already seen some such attempts, albeit unsuccessful ones. For instance, the causal theory of knowledge includes a clause requiring that the belief that p be caused by the fact that p . This condition entails both belief and truth, and so is not susceptible to Zagzebski’s recipe. (As we’ve seen, it falls to Gettier-style cases on other grounds.) One family of strategies along these lines would build into an analysis of knowledge a prohibition on epistemic luck directly; let us consider this sort of move in more detail.

If the problem illustrated by Gettier cases is that JTB and JTB+ analyses are compatible with a degree of epistemic luck that is inconsistent with knowledge, a natural idea is to amend one’s analysis of knowledge by including an explicit “anti-luck” condition. Zagzebski herself outlines this option in her 1994 (p. 72). Unger 1968 gives an early analysis of this kind. For example:

• S ’s belief is not true merely by luck.

The first thing to note about this analysis is that it is “redundant” in the sense described in the previous section; the fourth condition entails the first two. [ 29 ] So its surface form notwithstanding, it actually represents a significant departure from the JTB+ analyses. Rather than composing knowledge from various independent components, this analysis demands instead that the epistemic states are related to one another in substantive ways.

The anti-luck condition, like the safety condition of the previous section, is vague as stated. For one thing, whether a belief is true by luck comes in degrees—just how much luck does it take to be inconsistent with knowledge? Furthermore, it seems, independently of questions about degrees of luck, we must distinguish between different kinds of luck. Not all epistemic luck is incompatible with having knowledge. Suppose someone enters a raffle and wins an encyclopedia, then reads various of its entries, correcting many of their previous misapprehensions. There is a straightforward sense in which the resultant beliefs are true only by luck—for our subject was very lucky to have won that raffle—but this is not the sort of luck, intuitively, that interferes with the possession of knowledge. [ 30 ] Furthermore, there is a sense in which our ordinary perceptual beliefs are true by luck, since it is possible for us to have been the victim of a Cartesian demon and so we are, in some sense, lucky not to be. But unless we are to capitulate to radical skepticism, it seems that this sort of luck, too, ought to be considered compatible with knowledge. [ 31 ]

Like the safety condition, then, a luck condition ends up being difficult to apply in some cases. We might try to clarify the luck condition as involving a distinctive notion of epistemic luck—but unless we were able to explicate that notion—in effect, to distinguish between the two kinds of luck mentioned above—without recourse to knowledge, it is not clear that the ensuing analysis of knowledge could be both informative and noncircular.

As our discussion so far makes clear, one standard way of evaluating attempted analyses of knowledge has given a central role to testing it against intuitions against cases. In the late twentieth century, the perceived lack of progress towards an acceptable analysis—including the considerations attributed to Zagzebski in §7 above—led some epistemologists to pursue other methodological strategies. (No doubt, a wider philosophical trend away from “conceptual analysis” more broadly also contributed to this change.) Some of the more recent attempts to analyse knowledge have been motivated in part by broader considerations about the role of knowledge, or of discourse about knowledge.

One important view of this sort is that defended by Edward Craig (1990). Craig’s entry-point into the analysis of knowledge was not intuitions about cases, but rather a focus on the role that the concept of knowledge plays for humans. In particular, Craig suggested that the point of using the category of knowledge was for people to flag reliable informants—to help people know whom to trust in matters epistemic. Craig defends an account of knowledge that is designed to fill this role, even though it is susceptible to intuitive counterexamples. The plausibility of such accounts, with a less intuitive extension but with a different kind of theoretical justification, is a matter of controversy.

Another view worth mentioning in this context is that of Hilary Kornblith (2002), which has it that knowledge is a natural kind, to be analysed the same way other scientific kinds are. Intuition has a role to play in identifying paradigms, but generalizing from there is an empirical, scientific matter, and intuitive counterexamples are to be expected.

The “knowledge first” stance is also connected to these methodological issues. See §11 below.

10. Virtue-Theoretic Approaches

The virtue-theoretic approach to knowledge is in some respects similar to the safety and anti-luck approaches. Indeed, Ernest Sosa, one of the most prominent authors of the virtue-theoretic approach, developed it from his previous work on safety. The virtue approach treats knowledge as a particularly successful or valuable form of belief, and explicates what it is to be knowledge in such terms. Like the anti-luck theory, a virtue-theoretic theory leaves behind the JTB+ project of identifying knowledge with a truth-functional combination of independent epistemic properties; knowledge, according to this approach, requires a certain non-logical relationship between belief and truth.

Sosa has often (e.g., Sosa 2007: ch. 2) made use of an analogy of a skilled archer shooting at a target; we may find it instructive as well. Here are two ways in which an archer’s shot might be evaluated:

• Was the shot successful? Did it hit its target?
• Did the shot’s execution manifest the archer’s skill? Was it produced in a way that makes it likely to succeed?

The kind of success at issue in (1), Sosa calls accuracy . The kind of skill discussed in (2), Sosa calls adroitness . A shot is adroit if it is produced skillfully. Adroit shots needn’t be accurate, as not all skilled shots succeed. And accurate shots needn’t be adroit, as some unskilled shots are lucky.

In addition to accuracy and adroitness, Sosa suggests that there is another respect in which a shot may be evaluated, relating the two. This, Sosa calls aptness .

• Did the shot’s success manifest the archer’s skill?

A shot is apt if it is accurate because adroit. Aptness entails, but requires more than, the conjunction of accuracy and adroitness, for a shot might be both successful and skillful without being apt. For example, if a skillful shot is diverted by an unexpected gust of wind, then redirected towards the target by a second lucky gust, its ultimate accuracy does not manifest the skill, but rather reflects the lucky coincidence of the wind.

Sosa suggests that this “AAA” model of evaluation is applicable quite generally for the evaluation of any action or object with a characteristic aim. In particular, it is applicable to belief with respect to its aim at truth:

• A belief is accurate if and only if it is true.
• A belief is adroit if and only if it is produced skillfully. [ 32 ]
• A belief is apt if and only if it is true in a way manifesting, or attributable to, the believer’s skill.

Sosa identifies knowledge with apt belief, so understood. [ 33 ] Knowledge entails both truth (accuracy) and justification (adroitness), on this view, but they are not merely independent components out of which knowledge is truth-functionally composed. It requires that the skill explain the success. This is in some respects similar to the anti-luck condition we have examined above, in that it legislates that the relation between justification and truth be no mere coincidence. However, insofar as Sosa’s “AAA” model is generally applicable in a way going beyond epistemology, there are perhaps better prospects for understanding the relevant notion of aptness in a way independent of understanding knowledge itself than we found for the notion of epistemic luck.

Understanding knowledge as apt belief accommodates Gettier’s traditional counterexamples to the JTB theory rather straightforwardly. When Smith believes that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, the accuracy of his belief is not attributable to his inferential skills (which the case does not call into question). Rather, unlucky circumstances (the misleading evidence about Jones’s car) have interfered with his skillful cognitive performance, just as the first diverting gust of wind interfered with the archer’s shot. Compensating for the unlucky interference, a lucky circumstance (Brown’s coincidental presence in Barcelona) renders the belief true after all, similar to the way in which the second gust of wind returns the archer’s arrow back onto the proper path towards the target.

Fake barn cases, by contrast, may be less easily accommodated by Sosa’s AAA approach. When Henry looks at the only real barn in a countryside full of barn facades, he uses a generally reliable perceptual faculty for recognizing barns, and he goes right in this instance. Suppose we say the accuracy of Henry’s belief manifests his competence as a perceiver. If so, we would have to judge that his belief is apt and therefore qualifies as an instance of knowledge. That would be a problematic outcome because the intuition the case is meant to elicit is that Henry does not have knowledge. There are three ways in which an advocate of the AAA approach might respond to this difficulty.

First, AAA advocates might argue that, although Henry has a general competence to recognize barns, he is deprived of this ability in his current environment, precisely because he is in fake barn county. According to a second, subtly different strategy, Henry retains barn-recognition competence, his current location notwithstanding, but, due to the ubiquity of fake barns, his competence does not manifest itself in his belief, since its truth is attributable more to luck than to his skill in recognizing barns. [ 34 ] Third, Sosa’s own response to the problem is to bite the bullet. Judging Henry’s belief to be apt, Sosa accepts the outcome that Henry knows there is a barn before him. He attempts to explain away the counterintuitiveness of this result by emphasizing the lack of a further epistemically valuable state, which he calls “reflective knowledge” (see Sosa 2007: 31–32).

Not every concept is analyzable into more fundamental terms. This is clear both upon reflection on examples—what analysis could be offered of hydrogen , animal , or John F. Kennedy ?—and on grounds of infinite regress. Why should we think that knowledge has an analysis? In recent work, especially his 2000 book Knowledge and Its Limits , Timothy Williamson has argued that the project of analyzing knowledge was a mistake. His reason is not that he thinks that knowledge is an uninteresting state, or that the notion of knowledge is somehow fundamentally confused. On the contrary, Williamson thinks that knowledge is among the most fundamental psychological and epistemological states there are. As such, it is a mistake to analyze knowledge in terms of other, more fundamental epistemic notions, because knowledge itself is, in at least many cases, more fundamental. As Williamson puts it, we should put “knowledge first”. Knowledge might figure into some analyses, but it will do so in the analysans, not in the analysandum. [ 35 ]

There is no very straightforward argument for this conclusion; its case consists largely in the attempted demonstration of the theoretical success of the knowledge first stance. Weighing these benefits against those of more traditional approaches to knowledge is beyond the scope of this article. [ 36 ]

Although Williamson denies that knowledge is susceptible to analysis in the sense at issue in this article, he does think that there are interesting and informative ways to characterize knowledge. For example, Williamson accepts these claims:

• Knowledge is the most general factive mental state.
• S knows that p if and only if S ’s total evidence includes the proposition that p .

Williamson is also careful to emphasize that the rejection of the project of analyzing knowledge in no way suggests that there are not interesting and informative necessary or sufficient conditions on knowledge. The traditional ideas that knowledge entails truth, belief, and justification are all consistent with the knowledge first project. And Williamson (2000: 126) is explicit in endorsement of a safety requirement on knowledge—just not one that serves as part of an analysis.

One point worth recognizing, then, is that one need not engage in the ambitious project of attempting to analyze knowledge in order to have contact with a number of interesting questions about which factors are and are not relevant for whether a subject has knowledge. In the next section, we consider an important contemporary debate about whether pragmatic factors are relevant for knowledge.

Traditional approaches to knowledge have it that knowledge has to do with factors like truth and justification. Whether knowledge requires safety, sensitivity, reliability, or independence from certain kinds of luck has proven controversial. But something that all of these potential conditions on knowledge seem to have in common is that they have some sort of intimate connection with the truth of the relevant belief. Although it is admittedly difficult to make the relevant connection precise, there is an intuitive sense in which every factor we’ve examined as a candidate for being relevant to knowledge has something to do with truth of the would-be knowledgeable beliefs.

In recent years, some epistemologists have argued that focus on such truth-relevant factors leaves something important out of our picture of knowledge. In particular, they have argued that distinctively pragmatic factors are relevant to whether a subject has knowledge. Call this thesis “pragmatic encroachment”: [ 37 ]

Pragmatic Encroachment:

A difference in pragmatic circumstances can constitute a difference in knowledge.

The constitution claim here is important; it is trivial that differences in pragmatic circumstances can cause differences in knowledge. For example, if the question of whether marijuana use is legal in Connecticut is more important to Sandra than it is to Daniel, Sandra is more likely to seek out evidence, and come to knowledge, than Daniel is. This uninteresting claim is not what is at issue. Pragmatic encroachment theorists think that the practical importance itself can make for a change in knowledge, without reliance on such downstream effects as a difference in evidence-gathering activity. Sandra and Daniel might in some sense be in the same epistemic position , where the only difference is that the question is more important to Sandra. This difference, according to pragmatic encroachment, might make it the case that Daniel knows, but Sandra does not. [ 38 ]

Pragmatic encroachment can be motivated by intuitions about cases. Jason Stanley’s 2005 book Knowledge and Practical Interests argues that it is the best explanation for pairs of cases like the following, where the contrasted cases are evidentially alike, but differ pragmatically:

Low Stakes . Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. It is not important that they do so, as they have no impending bills. But as they drive past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are on Friday afternoons. Realizing that it wasn’t very important that their paychecks are deposited right away, Hannah says, “I know the bank will be open tomorrow, since I was there just two weeks ago on Saturday morning. So we can deposit our paychecks tomorrow morning”.

High Stakes . Hannah and her wife Sarah are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. Since they have an impending bill coming due, and very little in their account, it is very important that they deposit their paychecks by Saturday. Hannah notes that she was at the bank two weeks before on a Saturday morning, and it was open. But, as Sarah points out, banks do change their hours. Hannah says, “I guess you’re right. I don’t know that the bank will be open tomorrow”. (Stanley 2005: 3–4)

Stanley argues that the moral of cases like these is that in general, the more important the question of whether p , the harder it is to know that p . Other, more broadly theoretical, arguments for pragmatic encroachment have been offered as well. Fantl & McGrath (2009) argue that encroachment follows from fallibilism and plausible principles linking knowledge and action, while Weatherson 2012 argues that the best interpretation of decision theory requires encroachment.

Pragmatic encroachment is not an analysis of knowledge; it is merely the claim that pragmatic factors are relevant for determining whether a subject’s belief constitutes knowledge. Some, but not all, pragmatic encroachment theorists will endorse a necessary biconditional that might be interpreted as an analysis of knowledge. For example, a pragmatic encroachment theorist might claim that:

S knows that p if and only if no epistemic weakness vis-á-vis p prevents S from properly using p as a reason for action.

This connection between knowledge and action is similar to ones endorsed by Fantl & McGrath (2009), but it is stronger than anything they argue for.

Pragmatic encroachment on knowledge is deeply controversial. Patrick Rysiew (2001), Jessica Brown (2006), and Mikkel Gerken (forthcoming) have argued that traditional views about the nature of knowledge are sufficient to account for the data mentioned above. Michael Blome-Tillmann (2009a) argues that it has unacceptably counterintuitive results, like the truth of such claims as S knows that p , but if it were more important, she wouldn’t know , or S knew that p until the question became important . Stanley (2005) offers strategies for accepting such consequences. Other, more theoretical arguments against encroachment have also been advanced; see for example Ichikawa, Jarvis, and Rubin (2012), who argue that pragmatic encroachment is at odds with important tenets of belief-desire psychology.

One final topic standing in need of treatment is contextualism about knowledge attributions, according to which the word “knows” and its cognates are context-sensitive. The relationship between contextualism and the analysis of knowledge is not at all straightforward. Arguably, they have different subject matters (the former a word, and the latter a mental state). Nevertheless, the methodology of theorizing about knowledge may be helpfully informed by semantic considerations about the language in which such theorizing takes place. And if contextualism is correct, then a theorist of knowledge must attend carefully to the potential for ambiguity.

It is uncontroversial that many English words are context-sensitive. The most obvious cases are indexicals, such as “I”, “you”, “here”, and “now” (David Kaplan 1977 gives the standard view of indexicals).

The word “you” refers to a different person, depending on the conversational context in which it is uttered; in particular, it depends on the person one is addressing. Other context-sensitive terms are gradable adjectives like “tall”—how tall something must be to count as “tall” depends on the conversational context—and quantifiers like “everyone”—which people count as part of “everyone” depends on the conversational context. Contextualists about “knows” think that this verb belongs on the list of context-sensitive terms. A consequence of contextualism is that sentences containing “knows” may express distinct propositions, depending on the conversational contexts in which they’re uttered. This feature allows contextualists to offer an effective, though not uncontroversial, response to skepticism. For a more thorough overview of contextualism and its bearing on skepticism, see Rysiew 2011 or Ichikawa forthcoming-b.

Contextualists have modeled this context-sensitivity in various ways. Keith DeRose 2009 has suggested that there is a context-invariant notion of “strength of epistemic position”, and that how strong a position one must be in in order to satisfy “knows” varies from context to context; this is in effect to understand the semantics of knowledge attributions much as we understand that of gradable adjectives. (How much height one must have to satisfy “tall” also varies from context to context.) Cohen 1988 adopts a contextualist treatment of “relevant alternatives” theory, according to which, in skeptical contexts, but not ordinary ones, skeptical possibilities are relevant. This aspect is retained in the view of Lewis 1996, which characterizes a contextualist approach that is more similar to quantifiers and modals. Blome-Tillmann 2009b and Ichikawa forthcoming-a defend and develop the Lewisian view in different ways.

Contextualism and pragmatic encroachment represent different strategies for addressing some of the same “shifty” patterns of intuitive data. (In fact, contextualism was generally developed first; pragmatic encroachment theorists were motivated in part by the attempt to explain some of the patterns contextualists were interested in without contextualism’s semantic commitments.) Although this represents a sense in which they tend to be rival approaches, contextualism and pragmatic encroachment are by no means inconsistent. One could think that “knows” requires the satisfaction of different standards in different contexts, and also think that the subject’s practical situation is relevant for whether a given standard is satisfied.

Like pragmatic encroachment, contextualism is deeply controversial. Critics have argued that it posits an implausible kind of semantic error in ordinary speakers who do not recognize the putative context-sensitivity—see Schiffer 1996 and Greenough & Kindermann forthcoming—and that it is at odds with plausible theoretical principles involving knowledge—see Hawthorne 2003, Williamson 2005, and Worsnip forthcoming. In addition, some of the arguments that are used to undercut the data motivating pragmatic encroachment are also taken to undermine the case for contextualism; see again Rysiew 2001 and Brown 2006.

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Acknowledgments

For the 2012 revision, we are grateful to Kurt Sylvan for extremely detailed and constructive comments on multiple drafts of this entry. Thanks also to an anonymous referee for additional helpful suggestions. For the 2017 revision, thanks to Clayton Littlejohn, Jennifer Nagel, and Scott Sturgeon for helpful and constructive feedback and suggestions. Thanks to Ben Bayer, Kenneth Ehrenberg, and Mark Young for drawing our attention to errors in the previous version.

Copyright © 2017 by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa < ichikawa @ gmail . com > Matthias Steup

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• September 22, 2011

The Knowledge Problem

Studying knowledge is one of those perennial topics—like the nature of matter in the hard sciences—that philosophy has been refining since before the time of Plato. The discipline, epistemology, comes from two Greek words episteme (επιστημη) which means knowledge and logos (λογος) which means a word or reason. Epistemology literally means to reason about knowledge. Epistemologists study what makes up knowledge, what kinds of things can we know, what are the limits to what we can know, and even if it’s possible to actually know anything at all.

Coming up with a definition of knowledge has proven difficult but we’ll take a look at a few attempts and examine the challenges we face in doing so. We’ll look at how prominent philosophers have wrestled with the topic and how postmodernists provide a different viewpoint on the problem of knowledge. We’ll also survey some modern work being done in psychology and philosophy that can help us understand the practical problems with navigating the enormous amounts of information we have at our disposal and how we can avoid problems in the way we come to know things.

Do We Know Stuff?

In order to answer that question, you probably have to have some idea what the term “know” means. If I asked, “Have you seen the flibbertijibbet at the fair today?” I’d guess you wouldn’t know how to answer. You’d probably start by asking me what a flibbertijibbet is. But most adults tend not to ask what knowledge is before they can evaluate whether they have it or not. We just claim to know stuff and most of us, I suspect, are pretty comfortable with that. There are lots of reasons for this but the most likely is that we have picked up a definition over time and have a general sense of what the term means. Many of us would probably say knowledge that something is true involves:

• Certainty – it’s hard if not impossible to deny
• Evidence – it has to based on something
• Practicality – it has to actually work in the real world
• Broad agreement – lots of people have to agree it’s true

But if you think about it, each of these has problems. For example, what would you claim to know that you would also say you are certain of? Let’s suppose you’re not intoxicated, high, or in some other way in your “right” mind and conclude that you know you’re reading an article on the internet. You might go further and claim that denying it would be crazy. Isn’t it at least possible that you’re dreaming or that you’re in something like the Matrix and everything you see is an illusion? Before you say such a thing is absurd and only those who were unable to make the varsity football team would even consider such questions, can you be sure you’re not being tricked? After all, if you are in the Matrix, the robots that created the Matrix would making be making you believe you are not in the Matrix and that you’re certain you aren’t.

What about the “broad agreement” criterion? The problem with this one is that many things we might claim to know are not, and could not be, broadly agreed upon. Suppose you are experiencing a pain in your arm. The pain is very strong and intense. You might tell your doctor that you know you’re in pain. Unfortunately though, only you can claim to know that (and as an added problem, you don’t appear to have any evidence for it either—you just feel the pain). So at least on the surface, it seems you know things that don’t have broad agreement by others.

These problems and many others are what intrigue philosophers and are what make coming up with a definition of knowledge challenging. Since it’s hard to nail down a definition, it also makes it hard to answer the question “what do you know?”

What is Knowledge?

As with many topics in philosophy, a broadly-agreed-upon definition is difficult. But philosophers have been attempting to construct one for centuries. Over the years, a trend has developed in the philosophical literature and a definition has emerged that has such wide agreement it has come to be known as the “standard definition.” While agreement with the definition isn’t universal, it can serve as a solid starting point for studying knowledge.

The definition involves three conditions and philosophers say that when a person meets these three conditions, she can say she knows something to be true. Take a statement of fact: The Seattle Mariners have never won a world series.&#160; On the standard definition, a person knows this fact if:

• The person believes the statement to be true
• The statement is in fact true
• The person is justified in believing the statement to be true

The bolded terms earmark the three conditions that must be met and because of those terms, the definition is also called the “tripartite” (three part) definition or “JTB” for short. Many many books have been written on each of the three terms so I can only briefly summarize here what is going on in each. I will say up front though that epistemologists spend most of their time on the third condition.

First, beliefs are things people have. Beliefs aren’t like rocks or rowboats where you come across them while strolling along the beach. They’re in your head and generally are viewed as just the way you hold the world (or some aspect of the world) to be. If you believe that the Mariners never won a world series, you just accept it is as true that the Mariners really never won a world series. Notice that accepting that something is true implies that what you accept could be wrong. In other words, it implies that what you think about the world may not match up with the way the world really is. This implies that there is a distinction between belief and truth . There are some philosophers—notably postmodernists and existentialists—who think such a distinction can’t be made which we’ll examine more below. But in general, philosophers claim that belief is in our heads and truth is about the way the world is. In practical terms, you can generally figure out what you or someone else believes by examining behavior. People will generally act according to what they really believe rather than what they say they believe—despite what Dylan says .

Something is true if the world really is that way. Truth is not in your head but is “out there.” The statement, “The Mariners have never won a world series” is true if the Mariners have never won a world series. The first part of that sentence is in quotes on purpose. The phrase in quotes signifies a statement we might make about the world and the second, unquoted phrase is supposed to describe the way the world actually is. The reason philosophers write truth statements this way is to give sense to the idea that a statement about the world could be wrong or, more accurately, false (philosophers refer to the part in quotes as a statement or proposition ). Perhaps you can now see why beliefs are different than truth statements. When you believe something, you hold that or accept that a statement or proposition is true. It could be false that’s why your belief may not “match up” with the way the world really is. For more on what truth is, see the Philosophy News article, “ What is Truth? ”

Justification

If the seed of knowledge is belief, what turns belief into knowledge? This is where justification (sometimes called ‘warrant’) comes in. A person knows something if they’re justified in believing it to be true (and, of course, it actually is true). There are dozens of competing theories of justification. It’s sometimes easier to describe when a belief isn’t justified than when it is. In general, philosophers agree that a person isn’t justified if their belief is:

• a product of wishful thinking (I really wish you would love me so I believe you love me)
• a product of fear or guilt (you’re terrified of death and so form the belief in an afterlife)
• formed in the wrong way (you travel to an area you know nothing about, see a white spot 500 yards away and conclude it’s a sheep)
• a product of dumb luck or guesswork (you randomly form the belief that the next person you meet will have hazel eyes and it turns out that the next person you meet has hazel eyes)

Because beliefs come in all shapes and sizes and it’s hard to find a single theory of justification that can account for everything we would want to claim to know. You might be justified in believing that the sun is roughly 93 million miles from the earth much differently than you would be justified in believing God exists or that you have a minor back pain. Even so, justification is a critical element in any theory of knowledge and is the focus of many a philosophical thought.

People-centered Knowledge

You might notice that the description above puts the focus of knowing on the individual. Philosophers talk of individual persons being justified and not the ideas or concepts themselves being justified. This means that what may count as knowledge for you may not count as knowledge for me. Suppose you study economics and you learn principles in the field to some depth. Based on what you learn, you come to believe that psychological attitudes have just as much of a role to play in economic flourishing or deprivation as the political environment that creates economic policy. Suppose also that I have not studied economics all that much but I do know that I’d like more money in my pocket. You and I may have very different beliefs about economics and our beliefs might be justified in very different ways. What you know may not be something I know even though we have the same evidence and arguments in front of us.

So the subjective nature of knowledge partly is based on the idea that beliefs are things that individuals have and those beliefs are justified or not justified. When you think about it, that makes sense. You may have more evidence or different experiences than I have and so you may believe things I don’t or may have evidence for something that I don’t have. The bottom line is that “universal knowledge” – something everybody knows—may be very hard to come by. Truth, if it exists, isn’t like this. Truth is universal. It’s our access to it that may differ widely.

Rene Descartes and the Search for Universal Knowledge

A lot of people are uncomfortable with the idea that there isn’t universal knowledge. Philosopher Rene Descartes (pronounced day-cart) was one of them. When he was a young man, he was taught a bunch of stuff by his parents, teachers, priests and other authorities. As he came of age, he, like many of us, started to discover that much of what he was taught either was false or was highly questionable. At the very least, he found he couldn’t have the certainty that many of his educators had. While many of us get that, deal with it, and move on, Descartes was deeply troubled by this.

One day, he decided to tackle the problem. He hid himself away in a cabin and attempted to doubt everything of which he could not be certain. Since it wasn’t practical to doubt every belief he had, Descartes decided that it would be sufficient to subject the foundations of his belief system to doubt and the rest of the structure will “crumble of its own accord.” He first considers the things he came to believe by way of the five senses. For most of us these are pretty stable items but Descartes found that it was rather easy to doubt their truth. The biggest problem is that sometimes the senses can be deceptive. And after all, could he be certain he wasn’t insane or dreaming when he saw that book or tasted that honey? So while they might be fairly reliable, the senses don’t provide us with certainty—which is what Descartes was after.

Unfortunately, this left Descartes with no where to turn. He found that he could be skeptical about everything and was unable to find a certain foundation for knowledge. But then he hit upon something that changed modern epistemology. He discovered that there was one thing he couldn’t doubt: the fact that he was a thinking thing. In order to doubt it, he would have to think. He reasoned that it’s not possible to doubt something without thinking about the fact that you’re doubting. If he was thinking then he must be a thinking thing and so he found that it was impossible to doubt that he was a thinking being.

This seemingly small but significant truth led to his most famous contribution to Western thought: cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am). Some mistakenly think that Descartes was implying with this idea that he thinks himself into existence. But that wasn’t his point at all. He was making a claim about knowledge. Really what Descartes was saying is: I think, therefore I know that I am.

The story doesn’t end here for Descartes but for the rest of it, I refer you to the reading list below to dig deeper. The story of Descartes is meant to illustrate the depth of the problems of epistemology and how difficult and rare certainty is, if certainty is possible—there are plenty of philosophers who think either that Descartes’ project failed or that he created a whole new set of problems that are even more intractable than the one he set out to solve.

Postmodernism and Knowledge

Postmodern epistemology is a growing area of study and is relatively new on the scene compared with definitions that have come out of the analytic tradition in philosophy. Generally, though, it means taking a specific, skeptical attitude towards certainty, and a subjective view of belief and knowledge. Postmodernists see truth as much more fluid than classical (or modernist) epistemologists. Using the terms we learned above, they reject the idea that we can ever be fully justified in holding that our beliefs line up with the way the world actually is. We can’t know that we know.

Perspective at the Center

In order to have certainty, postmodernists claim, we would need to be able to “stand outside” our own beliefs and look at our beliefs and the world without any mental lenses or perspective . It’s similar to wondering what it would be like to watch ourselves meeting someone for the first time? We can’t do it. We can watch the event of the meeting on a video but the experience of meeting can only be had by us. We have that experience only from “inside” our minds and bodies. Since its not possible to stand outside our minds, all the parts that make up our minds influence our view on what is true. Our intellectual and social background, our biases, our moods, our genetics, other beliefs we have, our likes and dislikes, our passions (we can put all these under the label of our “cognitive structure”) all influence how we perceive what is true about the world. Further, say the postmodernists, it’s not possible to set aside these influences or lenses. We can reduce the intensity here and there and come to recognize biases and adjust for them for sure. But it’s not possible to completely shed all our lenses which color our view of things and so it’s not possible to be certain that we’re getting at some truth “out there.”

Many have called out what seems to be a problem with the postmodernist approach. Notice that as soon as a postmodernist makes a claim about the truth and knowledge they seem to be making a truth statement! If all beliefs are seen through a lens, how do we know the postmodernists beliefs are “correct?” That’s a good question and the postmodernist might respond by saying, “We don’t!” But then, why believe it? Because of this obvious problem, many postmodernists attempt to simply live with postmodernist “attitudes” towards epistemology and avoid saying that they’re making claims that would fit into traditional categories. We have to change our perspective to understand the claims.

Community Agreement

To be sure, Postmodernists do tend to act like the rest of us when it comes to interacting with the world. They drive cars, fly in airplanes, make computer programs, and write books. But how is this possible if they take such a fluid view of knowledge? Postmodernists don’t eschew truth in general. They reject the idea that any one person’s beliefs about it can be certain. Rather, they claim that truth emerges through community agreement. Suppose scientists are attempting to determine whether the planet is warming and that humans are the cause. This is a complex question and a postmodernist might say that if the majority of scientists agree that the earth is warming and that humans are the cause, then that’s true. Notice that the criteria for “truth” is that scientists agree . To use the taxonomy above, this would be the “justification condition.” So we might say that postmodernists accept the first and third conditions of the tripartite view but reject the second condition: the idea that there is a truth that beliefs need to align to a truth outside our minds.&#160;

When you think about it, a lot of what we would call “facts” are determined in just this way. For many years, scientists believed in a substance called “phlogiston.” Phlogiston was stuff that existed in certain substances (like wood and metal) and when those substances were burned, more phlogiston was added to the substance. Phlogiston was believed to have negative weight, that’s why things got lighter when they burned. That theory has since been rejected and replace by more sophisticated views involving oxygen and oxidation.

So, was the phlogiston theory true? The modernist would claim it wasn’t because it has since been shown to be false. It’s false now and was false then even though scientists believed it was true. Beliefs about phlogiston didn’t line up with the way the world really is, so it was false. But the postmodernist might say that phlogiston theory was true for the scientists that believed it. We now have other theories that are true. But phlogiston theory was no less true then than oxygen theory is now. Further, they might add, how do we know that oxygen theory is really the truth ? Oxygen theory might be supplanted some day as well but that doesn’t make it any less true today.

Knowledge and the Mental Life

As you might expect, philosophers are not the only ones interested in how knowledge works. Psychologists, social scientists, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists have been interested in this topic as well and, with the growth of the field of artificial intelligence, even computer scientists have gotten into the game. In this section, we’ll look at how work being done in psychology and behavioral science can inform our understanding of how human knowing works.

Thus far, we’ve looked at the structure of knowledge once beliefs are formed. Many thinkers are interested how belief formation itself is involved our perception of what we think we know. Put another way, we may form a belief that something is true but the way our minds formed that belief has a big impact on why we think we know it. The science is uncovering that, in many cases, the process of forming the belief went wrong somewhere and our minds have actually tricked us into believing its true. These mental tricks may be based on good evolutionary principles: they are (or at least were at some point in our past) conducive to survival. But we may not be aware of this trickery and be entirely convinced that we formed the belief in the right way and so have knowledge. The broad term used for this phenomenon is “cognitive bias” and mental biases have a significant influence over how we form beliefs and our perception of the beliefs we form. 1

Wired for Bias

A cognitive bias is a typically unconscious “mental trick” our minds play that lead us to form beliefs that may be false or that are directed towards some facts and leaving out others such that these beliefs align to other things we believe, promote mental safety, or provide grounds for justifying sticking to to a set of goals that we want to achieve. Put more simply, mental biases cause us to form false beliefs about ourselves and the world. The fact that our minds do this is not necessarily intentional or malevolent and, in many cases, the outcomes of these false beliefs can be positive for the person that holds them. But epistemologists (and ethicists) argue that ends don’t always justify the means when it comes to belief formation. As a general rule, we want to form true beliefs in the “right” way.

Ernest Becker in his important Pulitzer Prize winning book The Denial of Death attempts to get at the psychology behind why we form the beliefs we do. He also explores why we may be closed off to alternative viewpoints and why we tend to become apologists (defenders) of the viewpoints we hold. One of his arguments is that we as humans build an ego ( in the Freudian sense; what he calls “character armor”) out of the beliefs we hold and those beliefs tend to give us meaning and they are strengthened when more people hold the same viewpoint. In a particularly searing passage, he writes:

Each person thinks that he has the formula for triumphing over life’s limitations and knows with authority what it means to be a man [N.B. by ‘man’ Becker means ‘human’ and uses masculine pronouns as that was common practice when he wrote the book], and he usually tries to win a following for his particular patent. Today we know that people try so hard to win converts for their point of view because it is more than merely an outlook on life: it is an immortality formula. . . in matters of immortality everyone has the same self-righteous conviction. The thing seems perverse because each diametrically opposed view is put forth with the same maddening certainty; and authorities who are equally unimpeachable hold opposite views! (Becker, Ernest. The Denial of Death, pp. 255-256. Free Press.)

In other words, being convinced that our viewpoint is correct and winning converts to that viewpoint is how we establish ourselves as persons of meaning and significance and this inclination is deeply engrained in our psychological equipment. This not only is why biases are so prevalent but why they’re difficult to detect. We are, argues Becker and others, wired towards bias. Jonathan Haidt agrees and go so far as to say that reason and logic is not only the cure but a core part of the wiring that causes the phenomenon.

Anyone who values truth should stop worshipping reason. We all need to take a cold hard look at the evidence and see reasoning for what it is. The French cognitive scientists Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber recently reviewed the vast research literature on motivated reasoning (in social psychology) and on the biases and errors of reasoning (in cognitive psychology). They concluded that most of the bizarre and depressing research findings make perfect sense once you see reasoning as having evolved not to help us find truth but to help us engage in arguments, persuasion, and manipulation in the context of discussions with other people. (Haidt, Jonathan. The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion (p. 104). Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.)

Biases and Belief Formation

Research in social science and psychology are uncovering myriad ways in which our minds play these mental tricks. For example, Daniel Kahneman discusses the impact emotional priming has on the formation of a subsequent idea. In one study, when participants were asked about happiness as it related to their romantic experiences, those that had a lot of dates in the past would report that they were happy about their life while those that had no dates reported being lonely, isolated, and rejected. But then when they subsequently were asked about their happiness in general, they imposed the context of their dating happiness to their happiness in general regardless of how good or bad the rest of their lives seemed to be going. If a person would have rated their overall happiness as “very happy” when asked questions about general happiness only, they might rate their overall happiness as “somewhat happy” if they were asked questions about their romantic happiness just prior and their romantic happiness was more negative than positive.

This type of priming can significantly impact how we view what is true. Being asked if we need more gun control or whether we should regulate fatty foods will change right after a local shooting right or after someone suffers a heart scare. The same situation will have two different responses by the same person depending on whether he or she was primed or not. Jonathan Haidt relates similar examples.

Psychologists now have file cabinets full of findings on ‘motivated reasoning,’ showing the many tricks people use to reach the conclusions they want to reach. When subjects are told that an intelligence test gave them a low score, they choose to read articles criticizing (rather than supporting) the validity of IQ tests. When people read a (fictitious) scientific study that reports a link between caffeine consumption and breast cancer, women who are heavy coffee drinkers find more flaws in the study than do men and less caffeinated women. (Haidt, p. 98)

There are many other biases that influence our thinking. When we ask the question, “what is knowledge?” this research has to be a part of how we answer the question. Biases and their influence would fall under the broad category of the justification condition we looked at earlier and the research should inform how we view how beliefs are justified. Justification is not merely the application of a philosophical formula. There are a host of psychological and social influences that are play when we seek to justify a belief and turn it into knowledge. 2 We can also see how this research lends credence to the philosophical position of postmodernists. At the very least, even if we hold that we can get past our biases and get “more nearer to the truth,” we at least have good reason to be careful about the things we assert as true and adopt a tentative stance towards the truth of our beliefs.

In a day when “fake news” is a big concern and the amount of information for which we’re responsible grows each day, how we justify the beliefs we hold becomes a even more important enterprise. I’ll use a final quote from Haidt to conclude this section:

And now that we all have access to search engines on our cell phones, we can call up a team of supportive scientists for almost any conclusion twenty-four hours a day. Whatever you want to believe about the causes of global warming or whether a fetus can feel pain, just Google your belief. You’ll find partisan websites summarizing and sometimes distorting relevant scientific studies. Science is a smorgasbord, and Google will guide you to the study that’s right for you. (Haidt, pp. 99-100)

Making Knowledge Practical

Well most of us aren’t like Descartes. We actually have lives and don’t want to spend time trying to figure out if we’re the cruel joke of some clandestine mad scientist. But we actually do actually care about this topic whether we “know” it or not. A bit of reflection exposes just how important having a solid view of knowledge actually is and spending some focused time thinking more deeply about knowledge can actually help us get better at knowing.

Really, knowledge is a the root of many (dare I say most) challenges we face in a given day. Once you get past basic survival (though even things as basic as finding enough food and shelter involves challenges related to knowledge), we’re confronted with knowledge issues on almost every front. Knowledge questions range from larger, more weighty questions like figuring out who our real friends are, what to do with our career, or how to spend our time, what politician to vote for, how to spend or invest our money, or should we be religious or not, to more mundane ones like which gear to buy for our hobby, how to solve a dispute between the kids, where to go for dinner, or which book to read in your free time. We make knowledge decisions all day, every day and some of those decisions deeply impact our lives and the lives of those around us.

So all these decisions we make about factors that effect the way we and others live are grounded in our view of knowledge—our epistemology . Unfortunately few spend enough time thinking about the root of their decisions and many make knowledge choices based on how they were raised (my mom always voted Republican so I will), what’s easiest (if I don’t believe in God, I’ll be shunned by my friends and family), or just good, old fashioned laziness. But of all the things to spend time on, it seems thinking about how we come to know things should be at the top of the list given the central role it plays in just about everything we do.

Updated January, 2018: Removed dated material and general clean up; added section on cognitive biases. Updated March, 2014: Removed reference to dated events; removed section on thought experiment; added section on Postmodernism; minor formatting changes

• While many thinkers have written on cognitive biases in one form or another, Jonathan Haidt in his book The Righteous Mind and Daniel Kahneman in his book Thinking Fast and Slow have done seminal work to systemize and provide hard data around how the mind operates when it comes to belief formation and biases. There is much more work to be done for sure but these books, part philosophy, part psychology, part social science, provide the foundation for further study in this area. The field of study already is large and growing so I can only provide a thumbnail sketch of the influence of how belief formation is influenced by our mind and other factors. I refer the reader to the source material on this topic for further study (see reading list below). ↩
• For a strategy on how we can adjust for these natural biases that our minds seem wired to create, see the Philosophy News article, “ How to Argue With People ”. I also recommend Carol Dweck’s excellent book Mindset . ↩

For Further Reading

• Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses (Elements of Philosophy) by Laurence BonJour. One of the better introductions to the theory of knowledge. Written at the college level, this book should be accessible for most readers but have a good philosophical dictionary on hand.
• Belief, Justification, and Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology (Wadsworth Basic Issues in Philosophy Series) by Robert Audi. This book has been used as a text book in college courses on epistemology so may be a bit out of range for the general reader. However, it gives a good overview of many of the issues in the theory of knowledge and is a fine primer for anyone interested in the subject.
• The Theory of Knowledge: Classic and Contemporary Readings by Louis Pojman. Still one of the best books for primary source material. The edited articles have helpful introductions and Pojman covers a range of sources so the reader will get a good overview from many sides of the question. Written mainly as a textbook.
• The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window into Human Nature &#160; by Steven Pinker. While not strictly a book about knowledge per se, Pinker’s book is fun, accessible, and a good resource for getting an overview of some contemporary work being done mainly in the hard sciences.
• The Selections From the Principles of Philosophy by René Descartes . A good place to start to hear from Descartes himself.
• Descartes’ Bones: A Skeletal History of the Conflict between Faith and Reason by Russell Shorto. This book is written as a history so it’s not strictly a philosophy tome. However, it gives the general reader some insight into what Descartes and his contemporaries were dealing with and is a fun read.
• On Bullshit by Harry Frankfurt. One get’s the sense that Frankfurt was being a bit tongue-in-cheek with the small, engaging tract. It’s more of a commentary on the social aspect of epistemology and worth reading for that reason alone. Makes a great gift!
• On Truth by Harry Frankfurt. Like On Bullshit but on truth.
• A Rulebook for Arguments by Anthony Weston. A handy reference for constructing logical arguments. This is a fine little book to have on your shelf regardless of what you do for a living.
• Warrant: The Current Debate &#160; by Alvin Plantinga. Now over 25 years old, “current” in the title may seem anachronistic. Still, many of the issues Plantinga deals with are with us today and his narrative is sure to enlighten and prime the pump for further study.
• Thinking Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman. The book to begin a study on cognitive biases.
• The Righteous Mind by Jonathan Haidt. A solid book that dabbles in cognitive biases but also in why people form and hold beliefs and how to start a conversation about them.
• The Denial of Death by Ernest Becker. A neo (or is it post?) Freudian analysis of why we do what we do. Essential reading for better understanding why we form the beliefs we do.
• Mindset: The New Psychology of Success by Carol S. Dweck. The title reads like a self-help book but the content is actually solid and helpful for developing an approach to forming and sharing ideas.

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Knowledge Is Power Essay

Knowledge is power. It can change one’s life and how one views oneself. Besides, it gives us the ability to influence what people do and how they act. This means that knowledge helps positively shape society, which benefits everyone. Education is essential for kids and can aid them greatly. When they learn, they are more likely to do well in school and life. Education is also a vital factor for children’s future. It helps them with future career planning, financial security and social connections. BYJU’S knowledge is power essay is an eye-opener for kids to understand the significance of knowledge.

Importance of Knowledge

Suggested Article: Worksheets for Kids

Benefits of Knowledge

Knowledge is an essential part of life. It provides us with opportunities like learning new things and understanding others. Knowledge can help us in our professional lives, which can sometimes be more difficult when we lack knowledge.

Knowledge comes in different forms; it can be the books we read, the speech we listen to, the informative videos we watch, etc.

Some people may think that knowing more is a disadvantage, but they are wrong. If you think about it, driving without knowing properly can be dangerous because you lack the skills required for safe driving. By increasing our knowledge, we can gain control over our life.

Potential of Knowledge

Knowledge is a powerful thing. It can enlighten, empower, and inspire people to do great things. The power of knowledge is seen through its ability to make us understand others and make positive choices for all of us.

The potential of knowledge is to know what one does not know yet. One can be in a situation where they are unsure about something and have questions about it, or it can be a problem where there is too much information, and it’s difficult to filter through. The possibility of knowledge allows people to think outside the box and make connections that others cannot.

The knowledge is power essay in English PDF explores how it can help people grow as a person and change society for good. BYJU’S essay on the topic knowledge is power is enlightening for the little ones. For more essays to improve kids’ learning experience, visit BYJU’S website.

Frequently Asked Questions on Knowledge is Power Essay

Why is knowledge essential.

Knowledge is necessary for the betterment of society and humanity’s progress in the world. It also enhances our life experience by enlightening, empowering, and inspiring people to do great things. The power of knowledge is seen through its ability to make us understand others and make positive choices for all of us.

What is the potential of knowledge?

The potential of knowledge is a term used to describe the idea that the more knowledge we gain, the more our potential increases. This concept can be applied to multiple subjects.

Why should kids refer to BYJU’S knowledge is power essay?

Kids must refer to BYJU’S knowledge is power essay because it helps them understand the importance and potential of knowledge. It also helps them to comprehend the structure and process of writing an essay.

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Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action

John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action , Oxford University Press, 2011, 401pp., $85.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780195389364.

Reviewed by Erhan Demircioglu, University of Pittsburgh

The growing and well-deserved interest in the nature and grounds of knowledge-how in recent years is crowned with this excellent collection of original essays from some of the most able philosophers working in the field. The collection is balanced in two respects: it contains essays defending opposing accounts on knowledge-how, and it also contains essays that are devoted to delineating the broad implications and applications of taking a particular stand on the topic. All essays in the book are written with admirable clarity, awaken a desire to ponder the ongoing debates, and are rich in examples. The essays cover difficult topics, but they are rewarding, as one would expect from high quality works on a topic probing the intersection of knowledge, language, mind, and action.

The book opens with a long (52 pages) state-of-the-debate essay written by the editors, John Bengson and Marc A. Moffett. The length of the essay is consistent with, and justified by, its primary goal of providing an exhaustive outline of the central philosophical positions and questions about knowledge-how. Bengson and Moffett aim, among other goals, to make explicit the core contentions of the opposing views aptly named 'intellectualism' and 'anti-intellectualism' after Ryle's (1945) and (1949).  They also identify specific instances of these generic views, rehearse the now-standard arguments for and against, and gesture at the echoes that a philosophical theory of intelligence may generate in converging areas of inquiry.

The rest of the book is divided into four parts. Part I, "Ryle's Legacy," consists of two chapters -- one by Paul Snowdon and one by Jennifer Hornsby -- that evaluate Ryle's attack on intellectualism and his alternative conception of knowledge-how. Part II, "Philosophical Considerations," includes five chapters. Three of these chapters (by Yuri Cath, Berit Brogaard, and Bengson and Moffett) focus on the question whether knowledge-how is a species or kind of knowledge-that. The remaining two attempt to identify some issues that recent discussions of knowledge-how have ignored or overlooked: Julie Annas distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge-how, and Alva Noë discusses a "third realm" that lies between the entirely subjective realm of mere taste and the entirely objective realm of the rule-governed. Part III, "Linguistic Perspectives," brings together three essays, by Jonathan Ginzburg, David Braun, and Laura A. Michaelis, on the syntax and semantics of knowledge-how constructions and their relevance to the debate between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. Part IV, "Implications and Applications," includes four chapters, by Katherine Hawley, Michael Tye, Michael Devitt, and Ian Rumfitt, discussing the significance of philosophical work on knowledge-how for ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of logic.

There is no essay in this collection that does not deserve wide notice and sustained study. Unfortunately, in a review of this length it is impossible to discuss all the essays with the depth of thought they themselves exhibit. In what follows I will examine some of the issues that I find especially interesting.

Let me start with what Snowdon calls "the central mystery of Ryle's approach" (67). The mystery is how to account for "the relation between the debate about intellectualism and the debate about the nature of know how" (67). Ryle's "Knowing How and Knowing That" opens with a preamble in which a doctrine he subsequently calls 'intellectualism' is characterized as the view that "intelligence concepts" such as "clever," "wise," "prudent," "sensible," and "skillful" are applied to practical actions in virtue of being accompanied by "internal acts of considering propositions" (Ryle 1945, 1). "What stands out is," as Snowdon observes, "that in the preamble Ryle never mentions know how" (62, emphasis original). Why is this? How does Ryle's attack on intellectualism sit with what he has to say about the relation between knowing how and knowing that?

This is not in fact much of a mystery if mysteries are supposed to be extremely resistant to a solution (or dissolution). What we have here is more like a puzzle crying for a substantial interpretation. Snowdon himself gives a brief sketch of a solution to the puzzle (67), and Bengson and Moffett provide a more detailed interpretation of how to understand how Ryle sees the bearing of his rejection of intellectualism on his thesis that knowing how cannot be defined in terms of knowing that (7-9, 19). The answer these three philosophers give to this question is basically that intellectualism is a general thesis about mind and action, a thesis which can be tested by evaluating one of its instances -- i.e., the idea that knowing how is a species of knowing that. On this approach, intelligence has many varieties, of which knowledge-how is merely an instance. If this is so, then if knowledge-how cannot be accounted for solely in terms of knowledge-that, then intellectualism fails.

An alternative approach to the puzzle would be to take Ryle as holding that having intelligence is having knowledge-how and also that intelligence concepts like "clever," "wise," and "acute," are disguised adverbs that qualify the object of knowledge-how in question. Some evidence for these two claims can be found, respectively, in the following passages:

When a person knows how to do things of a certain sort, we call him 'acute', 'shrewd', 'scrupulous' (Ryle 1945, 14).

Intelligently to do something . . . is not to do two things, one "in our heads" and the other perhaps in the outside world; it is to do one thing in a certain manner. It is somewhat like dancing gracefully (Ryle 1945, 3).

On this approach, "Michael is a wise chess player" can be read as expressing, roughly, that Michael knows how to play chess wisely, and "Michael is (now) wisely playing chess" can be read as expressing, roughly, that Mike's knowing how to play chess wisely is (now) actualized, given that on Ryle's view, knowledge-how is a disposition that may be actualized (1945, 14). I do not mean to suggest that this is the correct interpretation of how Ryle construes the relation between intelligence and knowledge-how, but only that this is one alternative interpretation.

Unfortunately, however, neither interpretation sits well with Ryle's main argument against intellectualism, namely, the famous regress argument. The problem is that the regress argument loses its spell when applied against the thesis that knowledge-how can be accounted for solely in terms of knowledge-that. Let me explain. Ryle's regress argument starts with asking the question what makes the supposedly intelligence-conferring "internal act of considering propositions" themselves intelligently performed. It seems that such an act must itself be intelligently performed because otherwise it does not appear to be capable of conferring intelligence to any practical action. However, if it is intelligently performed, then it appears that, according to intellectualism, there must be another internal act of considering a proposition which confers intelligence to the initial act in question. Since the same reasoning applies to this further internal act, a regress ensues.

Now suppose that what makes a practical action an exercise of knowledge-how (and what therefore makes it intelligent) is a piece of knowledge-that. If we attempt to apply the regress argument against this supposition, then we need to argue that the piece of knowledge-that in question must itself be "intelligently performed", which may possibly mean, for all I can see, that the belief which is a part of that piece of knowledge is justified . Now, of course, there is a good old epistemic regress problem with respect to the justification of our beliefs. But this is not a special problem for the intellectualist but a general problem for all philosophers of knowledge. If Ryle's regress argument against intellectualism reduces to a general epistemic regress problem when applied to the intellectualist-looking thesis that knowledge-how is to be accounted for solely in terms of knowledge-that, then it does not have any special force against that thesis. However, Ryle's regress argument is designed to have such a special force against intellectualism. So, what is thought to count against intellectualism cannot, by itself, be supposed to count against the thesis in question. This implies that the relation between intellectualism and the alleged intellectualist-looking thesis is harder to specify than what the above interpretations suggest. So, the puzzle appears to remain unsolved.

Let me now turn to a related topic, the question whether knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that. Jason Stanley and Timothy Willamson (2001) made a strong case for the thesis that knowledge-how is "simply a species of propositional knowledge" (441). Cath, in his essay in this collection, provides some persuasive reasons against this thesis. He argues that knowledge-that is typically or standardly taken to be subject to some conditions which knowledge-how need not satisfy, such as the anti-luck condition, the (undefeated) justification condition, and the belief condition. So, there are cases where knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart .

To get a sense of Cath's arguments, consider his "Lucky Light Bulb" case. Charlie wants to learn how to change a light bulb and consults a copy of The Idiot's Guide to Everyday Jobs . However, unbeknownst to Charlie, all the copies of the book except his are filled with misleading instructions, and Charlie is extremely lucky to have the accurate one. Charlie reads his copy and grasps the instructions therein perfectly. So, there is a way, call it 'w 1 ', such that Charlie now believes that w 1 is a way for him to change a light bulb. Intuitively, Charlie now knows how to change a light bulb but he does not know that w 1 is a way for him to change the light bulb. This is because Charlie's belief is only accidentally true: Charlie could have easily bought a copy filled with misleading instructions and thus have easily come to believe something false about ways of changing a light bulb. However, Charlie's being epistemically lucky with respect to the truth of his belief about w 1 does not seem to be a reason to think he thereby fails to possess the corresponding knowledge-how.

This is a beautiful and strong argument. I am inclined to think that it shows what it is intended to show: that knowledge-how is not subject to some constraints that are traditionally associated with knowledge-that. If that is so, then it seems that there are two options for the intellectualist: either to argue that there is a kind of knowledge-that that is not subject to the traditional constraints mentioned above and that knowledge-how is a species of this non-traditional kind of knowledge-that, or to maintain that traditional constraints hold for all cases of knowledge-that and to retreat to a somewhat weaker intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a matter of standing in an intentional relation to a proposition other than the knowledge-that relation. Cath provides a sketch for the latter, while Brogaard argues for the former in her contribution to the volume. Unfortunately for the intellectualist, neither option appears to be promising. Let me first say a couple of things about Cath's suggestion, and then I will turn to Brogaard's account.

Cath offers the following "seeming analysis" of knowledge-how:

S knows how to Φ if, and only if, there is some way w to Φ such that:

(a) S stands in the seeming relation to the proposition that w is a way to Φ, and

(b) S entertains the proposition that way w is a way to Φ under a practical mode of presentation (133).

The notion of "a practical mode of presentation" is adapted from Stanley and Willamson's proposal on knowledge-how, and let us not worry about what it is. The "seeming" relation in question is, Cath takes it, different from believing. "It can seem to one," Cath says, "that p even when one fails to believe that p" (133). Let us also not worry whether there is indeed such a propositional attitude that is considerably weaker than believing. What is striking about Cath's proposal is that nothing on the right-hand side of the biconditional appears to be capable of accounting for, or amounting to, knowledge . If knowledge-how is a form of knowledge, and if no form of knowledge can be accounted for by the relations of seeming (which is weaker than believing) and entertaining under a practical mode of presentation, then Cath's proposal appears to be inadequate. The problem is not merely that, on Cath's proposal, there is no mention of traditional conditions for knowledge such as justification and belief. After all, Cath's primary aim in his paper is to show that those conditions need not be satisfied by knowledge-how. The problem is that what is offered in place of those constraints does not even come close to being able to provide a plausible analysis of any form of knowledge, let alone, in our case, of knowledge-how.

Cath's proposal is perhaps, as Brogaard suggests, that 'know' "ambiguously denot[es] sometimes a knowledge state and sometimes an intellectual seeming state" (145). If this is the correct reading of Cath's proposal, then it is also not without problems. First, I do not think there are any convincing reasons to think that when 'know' is followed by 'that' and 'how', it turns out to have different meanings, namely, knowing and seeming, respectively. 'Know' appears to uniquely denote one kind of state, however the nature of that state is cashed out and even though the object it takes on different occasions may differ in kind (e.g., a proposition, an ability, or an individual). Notice that there are knowledge- wh constructions such as 'know why', 'know where', and 'know when', as well as constructions like 'know that' and 'know how'. Are we to say, following Cath's proposal, that 'know' denotes different states in these constructions?

Second, if 'knowledge-how' were to denote seeming (under a practical mode of presentation), then it would be impossible to have seeming without knowledge-how. But it appears that there are such cases. Consider Susan, who is an anxious driver who gets overexcited and loses control whenever she tries to parallel park her car. It is the same story each time: her car is tired of the accidents Susan has every time she tries to parallel park it. This is so despite the fact that Susan took every theoretical and practical lesson from the best drivers available in the country. Now, there appears to be some way w to parallel park Susan's car such that Susan stands in the seeming relation (under a practical mode of presentation) to the proposition that w is a way to parallel park her car. Yet, intuitively, Susan does not know how to parallel park her car (as the numerous accidents she has had bear witness). If that is so, then knowledge-how and seeming (under a practical mode of presentation) may come apart, which implies that knowledge-how is not seeming.

Let me now turn to Brogaard's account of knowledge-how, which offers a radical reconceptualization of knowledge-that. Brogaard argues that there are primitive knowledge- that states that are not belief entailing and also that some knowledge-how states are primitive non-belief entailing knowledge-that states:

If s knows how to A but does not have a belief to the effect that doing P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , . . . in S is a way for s to A, then it is plausible that s, at least at some level of information processing , has information to the effect that doing P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , . . . in S is a way for s to A" (155, emphasis mine).

The following quotation succinctly captures her main thesis:

If s is in an ability state with the content of 'doing P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , . . .,  in S is a way for s to A', and ability states are knowledge states, then there is a way w (namely, doing P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , . . . in S) such that s knows that w is a way for s to A. For example, it is plausible that my hamster Harry is in an ability state with the representational content of 'doing P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , . . . , in S is a way for me to find my food bowl.' So if ability states are knowledge states, then there is a way w such that my hamster Harry knows that w is a way for him to find his food bowl (157).

Brogaard's discussion of the relation between ability and knowledge-how is not as clear as one would like, but she appears to assume, with some plausibility, that the ability to A is to know how to A. According to Brogaard, her hamster Harry's knowledge-how can be thought of as incorporating pieces of knowledge- that even if he fails to have the relevant beliefs , insofar as he can be plausibly attributed a representational state carrying the relevant information processed at some level . Brogaard provides some arguments to the effect that such an attribution is plausible, and accordingly concludes that intellectualism buttressed with a novel conception of knowledge-that is not threatened by the possibility of knowledge-how states that are not accompanied by relevant beliefs.

There are, I think, many problems with Brogaard's overall account. I will mention only one of them that appears to me especially important. I see no reason why the anti-intellectualist as such should deny that having knowledge-how is accompanied by or even requires having an information-carrying state at some level . It seems reasonable to attribute some information-carrying states at some level to creatures with certain abilities that are not capable of having beliefs (just as, for instance, it seems reasonable to attribute some information-carrying states at some level to creatures with certain perceptual capacities that are not capable of having beliefs). Brogaard's hamster Harry's feet may be thought of as carrying the information at some level that the grass is wet; his retinas may be thought of as carrying the information at some level that his master is coming towards him; his ears may be thought of as carrying the information at some level that a cat nearby is meowing; and so on. These pieces of information are processed at a sub-personal level in that they are not access-conscious (Block 1998). But do the commitments of the anti-intellectualist include claims such as that when a subject has knowledge-how, there are no states at any level that can be plausibly thought of as carrying information?  Surely not. Or, if yes, anti-intellectualism is much stronger (and much more implausible) than what it is generally taken to be, and intellectualism comes close to being a truism.

So, anti-intellectualism is either the thesis that when a subject knows how to do something, there are no representational contents at any levels of processing, or the thesis that when a subject knows how to do something, there are no representational contents that are processed at the level of believing. The former thesis is very strong and (almost) surely false, and it cannot be what has given rise to so much controversy. However, if it is the latter thesis, then, as Brogaard acknowledges (150), Cath's Jodie case (116) appears to have devastating implications against intellectualism. So, either intellectualism is (almost) surely true but uninteresting, or it is interesting but faces serious difficulties.

On the whole, Knowing How is an excellent collection from some exceptional philosophers. This is not a book for a small group of philosophers interested in some distant and specialized field. It is a book on the very central areas of philosophy, and thus there is something thus useful for all serious philosophers. The wealth of its perspectives and accounts is not merely a blessing but also a nightmare for the reviewer. This review would deem itself successful if it managed to raise some worries and questions in a way to stimulate further discussion.

Block, N. 1998. On a confusion about a function of consciousness. In N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Guzeldere. The nature of consciousness: philosophical debates . MIT Press: 375-415.

Ryle, G. 1945. Knowing how and knowing that. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 46: 1-16.

Ryle, G. 1949. The concept of mind . Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Stanley, J., and T. Williamson. 2001. Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy , 98: 411-444.

Essay on Knowledge

“Learning gives creativity, Creativity leads to thinking, Thinking provides knowledge, and Knowledge makes you great”. These lines had been said by our former president and great scientist Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam focusing on the importance of knowledge. It is the power of knowledge that made human beings become civilized and work for their betterment from an uncivilized early man.

Short and Long Essays on Knowledge in English

Knowledge is considered to be the greatest wealth of human beings that help in attaining success which in turn makes the society and nation progress. Hope these essays will be useful for you.

Knowledge Essay 10 Lines (100 – 150 Words)

1) Knowledge is man’s greatest asset.

2) Knowledge is important to decide good and bad for ourselves.

3) Knowledge helps people to attain success.

4) Time and experience are the major sources of knowledge.

5) We need knowledge for performing every task in our life.

6) Books, education, and people help us to acquire knowledge.

7) Knowledge helps in developing a good personality.

8) Knowledgeable people are respected everywhere.

9) Knowledge is the base of invention and development.

10) Knowledge grows by sharing, so we should always make positive use of our knowledge.

Essay 1 (250 Words) – Knowledge

Introduction

Knowledge can be defined as the facts and information that a person comes to learn in his whole life. Different people have different levels of knowledge. Knowledge is mainly concerned with what we see and recognize.

What is Knowledge?

We try to know about different things and that tendency to know and learn about different things, events, or phenomenon is called knowledge. Knowledge about anything helps us in understanding things from our own perspective. The main aspect is that we should know about that thing.

Knowledge helps us in understanding the difference between right and wrong. We learn and acquire knowledge throughout our life. The knowledge acquired is based on experience. People who have lived for more years have more access to everything. They have attained the information as a result of their experience. We can judge a person’s knowledge by the way it is applied in any situation. We can be called knowledgeable if we have information about most things.

People who are having knowledge can understand the problems in a better way and further by the power of their understanding can find out the solution. Merely having knowledge about anything does not mean that we can get success in that field. It depends upon this thing that how we are applying the same. A person without knowledge is unable to understand many things. Knowledge helps us in calculations, solving puzzles, riding a bike, driving a car, etc.

Knowledge makes a person act sensibly and wisely. It helps a person in the development of his personality.

Essay 2 (400 Words) – Knowledge is a Lifelong Process and Leads to Inventions

Knowledge is like an ornament. As ornament adds beauty, the same way knowledge makes us wise and adds beauty to our personality. Knowledge is attained by experience. It depends on us whether we have the capability of learning or not. When we have information about anything then only we can further make the judgment. Debates, group interactions, people around us, and several books are different ways by which we can acquire learning and enhance our knowledge.

Knowledge is a Lifelong Process

Knowledge is not acquired at an instant. The whole life we learn and gain knowledge. Knowledge increases day by day. We work on the process of learning to gain more knowledge. We should have a good reading habit to get new ideas and information. The application of our knowledge in the right direction leads us to become successful. We must keep our senses open to perceive and learn different things from our surroundings.

Knowledge is the greatest wealth that one can have. It cannot be stolen neither it fades; instead, it increases day by day. It makes us understand different things, and therefore we can differentiate between right and wrong. Children do not know everything by birth but slowly and slowly learn different activities. Many of us have studied from different subjects but in reality, we do not have good knowledge about the subject. The people with good knowledge are successful in life as they are humble and helping in the same way as a tree overloaded with fruits bends down showing modesty and respect.

Knowledge can Lead to Inventions

The knowledge we possess is turned to the invention is applied in a better way. The different technologies, machinery, and the development we see around us are the results of the application of knowledge or ideas of human beings. We are blessed to have a brain that differentiates us from animals. We have the ability to think, speak, and remember many things in our life. Education is one of the ways to gain knowledge. The development of interest in any particular aspect makes us find more information about that thing. Further, if the information is used up by human beings wisely in a creative manner will lead to the betterment of the society and nation.

Knowledge is a valuable asset to mankind. Knowledge helps people in achieving the goal of their life along with the inculcation of moral values. The people who are learned help in the betterment of society and nation and are respected by all.

Essay 3 (500 – 600 Words) – Knowledge: Source, Advantages and Disadvantages

Knowledge is basically what one learns and understands in their daily life. Every one of us performs several activities in our daily life. We learn about those activities and understand them well, this is also the knowledge. The level of knowledge depends upon our age experience and profession. The perspective of a scientist will be different from a student and a normal person. Knowledge helps in the building of our personality and helps us in getting a good profession.

Source of Knowledge

Knowledge is not attained in one day but it is a lifelong process. People keep on learning about different things from birth until death. There are many sources from where we can get a lot of information and hence it will help us in the process of constant learning and gaining knowledge.

• The group interaction, discussion, and communication with our family members and friends will help us to get more information on different topics. Each of us thinks differently and therefore has a different perspective of learning. Therefore when different people are expressing their views and ideas on one platform we can learn many new things from them .
• The most preferred option for learning nowadays is the internet. Many students and people are dependent on the internet to get information about anything. The Internet provides updated information on any topic. People find the internet as an easy source of learning.
• Books, articles, newspapers, and magazines are also an aid to provide knowledge about different subjects. This also helps us in knowing the current affairs in chronological order.
• Teachers and parents are the ones who teach us moral values along with different subjects. Parents are the first teacher of the students and a child learns all the basic activities from their parents. In schools, the teacher is responsible for the all-round development of an individual.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Knowledge

Everything has both positive and negative effects. In the same way, knowledge has many of the better impacts but negative too. The whole thing depends upon the way it is utilized and applied. The advantages and disadvantages of knowledge are enlisted below:

• Knowledge helps us in the building of our personality. The knowledge about different things will help in becoming a better person in society.
• Knowledge helps us in identifying right and wrong. If we have knowledge then only we can figure out about anything.
• Knowledge helps us in achieving our goal. It helps us to become doctors, scientists, engineers, artists, etc, in this way we are helping in the progress of our society and nation.
• Knowledge helps in the removal of the darkness of illiteracy.
• If we have proper knowledge or information about anything, then we can talk efficiently on that topic. We can also help others in understanding the topic. This reveals that knowledge helps in building up our confidence.
• Knowledge helps in learning different skills which in turn will help us to get better employment opportunities.
• The knowledge that has been gained by continued efforts when applied positively leads to the development of the nation.

Disadvantages

• The positive application of knowledge is beneficial but if the same knowledge is used in a negative way will lead to destruction and loss. There are many people who have good knowledge about many things but they are making their ideas to work negatively which is dangerous for humanity. The manufacturing of weapons and their use for mass killing is the negative use of knowledge. This is leading to the loss of lives of innocent people.

Practice Reading to Gain Knowledge

The regular habit of reading benefits us with different ideas, facts, and information. Reading also helps in the building of our vocabulary which is also the enhancement in our knowledge. It is necessary to inculcate the habit of reading in students from a very young age. It will be beneficial to them as they will develop the capability of problem-solving and recognizing the facts from the very beginning.

Knowledge helps us in correlating things that bring in us a better understanding. Knowledge remains with us throughout our life and makes us better human beings.

FAQs: Frequently Asked Questions

Ans . Knowledge is to know or understand something by studying or experience.

Ans . The word knowledge has been derived from the Greek word Gnosis which means knowing through observation.

Ans . Epistemology is the name given to the philosophical study of knowledge.

Ans . Knowledge makes us intelligent and increases our problem-solving capability.

Ans . Knowledge applied in a negative way becomes dangerous for society and the nation.

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College Essays

If you grow up to be a professional writer, everything you write will first go through an editor before being published. This is because the process of writing is really a process of re-writing —of rethinking and reexamining your work, usually with the help of someone else. So what does this mean for your student writing? And in particular, what does it mean for very important, but nonprofessional writing like your college essay? Should you ask your parents to look at your essay? Pay for an essay service?

If you are wondering what kind of help you can, and should, get with your personal statement, you've come to the right place! In this article, I'll talk about what kind of writing help is useful, ethical, and even expected for your college admission essay . I'll also point out who would make a good editor, what the differences between editing and proofreading are, what to expect from a good editor, and how to spot and stay away from a bad one.

Table of Contents

What Kind of Help for Your Essay Can You Get?

What's Good Editing?

What should an editor do for you, what kind of editing should you avoid, proofreading, what's good proofreading, what kind of proofreading should you avoid.

What Do Colleges Think Of You Getting Help With Your Essay?

Who Can/Should Help You?

Advice for editors.

Should You Pay Money For Essay Editing?

The Bottom Line

What's next, what kind of help with your essay can you get.

Rather than talking in general terms about "help," let's first clarify the two different ways that someone else can improve your writing . There is editing, which is the more intensive kind of assistance that you can use throughout the whole process. And then there's proofreading, which is the last step of really polishing your final product.

Let me go into some more detail about editing and proofreading, and then explain how good editors and proofreaders can help you."

Editing is helping the author (in this case, you) go from a rough draft to a finished work . Editing is the process of asking questions about what you're saying, how you're saying it, and how you're organizing your ideas. But not all editing is good editing . In fact, it's very easy for an editor to cross the line from supportive to overbearing and over-involved.

Ability to clarify assignments. A good editor is usually a good writer, and certainly has to be a good reader. For example, in this case, a good editor should make sure you understand the actual essay prompt you're supposed to be answering.

Open-endedness. Good editing is all about asking questions about your ideas and work, but without providing answers. It's about letting you stick to your story and message, and doesn't alter your point of view.

Think of an editor as a great travel guide. It can show you the many different places your trip could take you. It should explain any parts of the trip that could derail your trip or confuse the traveler. But it never dictates your path, never forces you to go somewhere you don't want to go, and never ignores your interests so that the trip no longer seems like it's your own. So what should good editors do?

Help Brainstorm Topics

Sometimes it's easier to bounce thoughts off of someone else. This doesn't mean that your editor gets to come up with ideas, but they can certainly respond to the various topic options you've come up with. This way, you're less likely to write about the most boring of your ideas, or to write about something that isn't actually important to you.

If you're wondering how to come up with options for your editor to consider, check out our guide to brainstorming topics for your college essay .

Help Revise Your Drafts

Here, your editor can't upset the delicate balance of not intervening too much or too little. It's tricky, but a great way to think about it is to remember: editing is about asking questions, not giving answers .

Revision questions should point out:

• Places where more detail or more description would help the reader connect with your essay
• Places where structure and logic don't flow, losing the reader's attention
• Places where there aren't transitions between paragraphs, confusing the reader
• Moments where your narrative or the arguments you're making are unclear

But pointing to potential problems is not the same as actually rewriting—editors let authors fix the problems themselves.

Bad editing is usually very heavy-handed editing. Instead of helping you find your best voice and ideas, a bad editor changes your writing into their own vision.

You may be dealing with a bad editor if they:

• Add material (examples, descriptions) that doesn't come from you
• Use a thesaurus to make your college essay sound "more mature"
• Add meaning or insight to the essay that doesn't come from you
• Tell you what to say and how to say it
• Write sentences, phrases, and paragraphs for you
• Change your voice in the essay so it no longer sounds like it was written by a teenager

Colleges can tell the difference between a 17-year-old's writing and a 50-year-old's writing. Not only that, they have access to your SAT or ACT Writing section, so they can compare your essay to something else you wrote. Writing that's a little more polished is great and expected. But a totally different voice and style will raise questions.

Where's the Line Between Helpful Editing and Unethical Over-Editing?

Sometimes it's hard to tell whether your college essay editor is doing the right thing. Here are some guidelines for staying on the ethical side of the line.

• An editor should say that the opening paragraph is kind of boring, and explain what exactly is making it drag. But it's overstepping for an editor to tell you exactly how to change it.
• An editor should point out where your prose is unclear or vague. But it's completely inappropriate for the editor to rewrite that section of your essay.
• An editor should let you know that a section is light on detail or description. But giving you similes and metaphors to beef up that description is a no-go.

Proofreading (also called copy-editing) is checking for errors in the last draft of a written work. It happens at the end of the process and is meant as the final polishing touch. Proofreading is meticulous and detail-oriented, focusing on small corrections. It sands off all the surface rough spots that could alienate the reader.

Because proofreading is usually concerned with making fixes on the word or sentence level, this is the only process where someone else can actually add to or take away things from your essay . This is because what they are adding or taking away tends to be one or two misplaced letters.

Laser focus. Proofreading is all about the tiny details, so the ability to really concentrate on finding small slip-ups is a must.

Excellent grammar and spelling skills. Proofreaders need to dot every "i" and cross every "t." Good proofreaders should correct spelling, punctuation, capitalization, and grammar. They should put foreign words in italics and surround quotations with quotation marks. They should check that you used the correct college's name, and that you adhered to any formatting requirements (name and date at the top of the page, uniform font and size, uniform spacing).

Limited interference. A proofreader needs to make sure that you followed any word limits. But if cuts need to be made to shorten the essay, that's your job and not the proofreader's.

A bad proofreader either tries to turn into an editor, or just lacks the skills and knowledge necessary to do the job.

Some signs that you're working with a bad proofreader are:

• If they suggest making major changes to the final draft of your essay. Proofreading happens when editing is already finished.
• If they aren't particularly good at spelling, or don't know grammar, or aren't detail-oriented enough to find someone else's small mistakes.
• If they start swapping out your words for fancier-sounding synonyms, or changing the voice and sound of your essay in other ways. A proofreader is there to check for errors, not to take the 17-year-old out of your writing.

What Do Colleges Think of Your Getting Help With Your Essay?

Admissions officers agree: light editing and proofreading are good—even required ! But they also want to make sure you're the one doing the work on your essay. They want essays with stories, voice, and themes that come from you. They want to see work that reflects your actual writing ability, and that focuses on what you find important.

On the Importance of Editing

Get feedback. Have a fresh pair of eyes give you some feedback. Don't allow someone else to rewrite your essay, but do take advantage of others' edits and opinions when they seem helpful. ( Bates College )

Read your essay aloud to someone. Reading the essay out loud offers a chance to hear how your essay sounds outside your head. This exercise reveals flaws in the essay's flow, highlights grammatical errors and helps you ensure that you are communicating the exact message you intended. ( Dickinson College )

On the Value of Proofreading

Share your essays with at least one or two people who know you well—such as a parent, teacher, counselor, or friend—and ask for feedback. Remember that you ultimately have control over your essays, and your essays should retain your own voice, but others may be able to catch mistakes that you missed and help suggest areas to cut if you are over the word limit. ( Yale University )

Proofread and then ask someone else to proofread for you. Although we want substance, we also want to be able to see that you can write a paper for our professors and avoid careless mistakes that would drive them crazy. ( Oberlin College )

On Watching Out for Too Much Outside Influence

Limit the number of people who review your essay. Too much input usually means your voice is lost in the writing style. ( Carleton College )

Ask for input (but not too much). Your parents, friends, guidance counselors, coaches, and teachers are great people to bounce ideas off of for your essay. They know how unique and spectacular you are, and they can help you decide how to articulate it. Keep in mind, however, that a 45-year-old lawyer writes quite differently from an 18-year-old student, so if your dad ends up writing the bulk of your essay, we're probably going to notice. ( Vanderbilt University )

Now let's talk about some potential people to approach for your college essay editing and proofreading needs. It's best to start close to home and slowly expand outward. Not only are your family and friends more invested in your success than strangers, but they also have a better handle on your interests and personality. This knowledge is key for judging whether your essay is expressing your true self.

Parents or Close Relatives

Your family may be full of potentially excellent editors! Parents are deeply committed to your well-being, and family members know you and your life well enough to offer details or incidents that can be included in your essay. On the other hand, the rewriting process necessarily involves criticism, which is sometimes hard to hear from someone very close to you.

A parent or close family member is a great choice for an editor if you can answer "yes" to the following questions. Is your parent or close relative a good writer or reader? Do you have a relationship where editing your essay won't create conflict? Are you able to constructively listen to criticism and suggestion from the parent?

One suggestion for defusing face-to-face discussions is to try working on the essay over email. Send your parent a draft, have them write you back some comments, and then you can pick which of their suggestions you want to use and which to discard.

Teachers or Tutors

A humanities teacher that you have a good relationship with is a great choice. I am purposefully saying humanities, and not just English, because teachers of Philosophy, History, Anthropology, and any other classes where you do a lot of writing, are all used to reviewing student work.

Moreover, any teacher or tutor that has been working with you for some time, knows you very well and can vet the essay to make sure it "sounds like you."

If your teacher or tutor has some experience with what college essays are supposed to be like, ask them to be your editor. If not, then ask whether they have time to proofread your final draft.

Guidance or College Counselor at Your School

The best thing about asking your counselor to edit your work is that this is their job. This means that they have a very good sense of what colleges are looking for in an application essay.

At the same time, school counselors tend to have relationships with admissions officers in many colleges, which again gives them insight into what works and which college is focused on what aspect of the application.

Unfortunately, in many schools the guidance counselor tends to be way overextended. If your ratio is 300 students to 1 college counselor, you're unlikely to get that person's undivided attention and focus. It is still useful to ask them for general advice about your potential topics, but don't expect them to be able to stay with your essay from first draft to final version.

Friends, Siblings, or Classmates

Although they most likely don't have much experience with what colleges are hoping to see, your peers are excellent sources for checking that your essay is you .

Friends and siblings are perfect for the read-aloud edit. Read your essay to them so they can listen for words and phrases that are stilted, pompous, or phrases that just don't sound like you.

You can even trade essays and give helpful advice on each other's work.

If your editor hasn't worked with college admissions essays very much, no worries! Any astute and attentive reader can still greatly help with your process. But, as in all things, beginners do better with some preparation.

First, your editor should read our advice about how to write a college essay introduction , how to spot and fix a bad college essay , and get a sense of what other students have written by going through some admissions essays that worked .

Then, as they read your essay, they can work through the following series of questions that will help them to guide you.

Introduction Questions

• Is the first sentence a killer opening line? Why or why not?
• Does the introduction hook the reader? Does it have a colorful, detailed, and interesting narrative? Or does it propose a compelling or surprising idea?
• Can you feel the author's voice in the introduction, or is the tone dry, dull, or overly formal? Show the places where the voice comes through.

Essay Body Questions

• Does the essay have a through-line? Is it built around a central argument, thought, idea, or focus? Can you put this idea into your own words?
• How is the essay organized? By logical progression? Chronologically? Do you feel order when you read it, or are there moments where you are confused or lose the thread of the essay?
• Does the essay have both narratives about the author's life and explanations and insight into what these stories reveal about the author's character, personality, goals, or dreams? If not, which is missing?
• Does the essay flow? Are there smooth transitions/clever links between paragraphs? Between the narrative and moments of insight?

Reader Response Questions

• Does the writer's personality come through? Do we know what the speaker cares about? Do we get a sense of "who he or she is"?
• Where did you feel most connected to the essay? Which parts of the essay gave you a "you are there" sensation by invoking your senses? What moments could you picture in your head well?
• Where are the details and examples vague and not specific enough?
• Did you get an "a-ha!" feeling anywhere in the essay? Is there a moment of insight that connected all the dots for you? Is there a good reveal or "twist" anywhere in the essay?
• What are the strengths of this essay? What needs the most improvement?

Should You Pay Money for Essay Editing?

One alternative to asking someone you know to help you with your college essay is the paid editor route. There are two different ways to pay for essay help: a private essay coach or a less personal editing service , like the many proliferating on the internet.

My advice is to think of these options as a last resort rather than your go-to first choice. I'll first go through the reasons why. Then, if you do decide to go with a paid editor, I'll help you decide between a coach and a service.

When to Consider a Paid Editor

In general, I think hiring someone to work on your essay makes a lot of sense if none of the people I discussed above are a possibility for you.

If you can't ask your parents. For example, if your parents aren't good writers, or if English isn't their first language. Or if you think getting your parents to help is going create unnecessary extra conflict in your relationship with them (applying to college is stressful as it is!)

If you can't ask your teacher or tutor. Maybe you don't have a trusted teacher or tutor that has time to look over your essay with focus. Or, for instance, your favorite humanities teacher has very limited experience with college essays and so won't know what admissions officers want to see.

If you can't ask your guidance counselor. This could be because your guidance counselor is way overwhelmed with other students.

If you can't share your essay with those who know you. It might be that your essay is on a very personal topic that you're unwilling to share with parents, teachers, or peers. Just make sure it doesn't fall into one of the bad-idea topics in our article on bad college essays .

If the cost isn't a consideration. Many of these services are quite expensive, and private coaches even more so. If you have finite resources, I'd say that hiring an SAT or ACT tutor (whether it's PrepScholar or someone else) is better way to spend your money . This is because there's no guarantee that a slightly better essay will sufficiently elevate the rest of your application, but a significantly higher SAT score will definitely raise your applicant profile much more.

Should You Hire an Essay Coach?

On the plus side, essay coaches have read dozens or even hundreds of college essays, so they have experience with the format. Also, because you'll be working closely with a specific person, it's more personal than sending your essay to a service, which will know even less about you.

But, on the minus side, you'll still be bouncing ideas off of someone who doesn't know that much about you . In general, if you can adequately get the help from someone you know, there is no advantage to paying someone to help you.

If you do decide to hire a coach, ask your school counselor, or older students that have used the service for recommendations. If you can't afford the coach's fees, ask whether they can work on a sliding scale —many do. And finally, beware those who guarantee admission to your school of choice—essay coaches don't have any special magic that can back up those promises.

Should You Send Your Essay to a Service?

On the plus side, essay editing services provide a similar product to essay coaches, and they cost significantly less . If you have some assurance that you'll be working with a good editor, the lack of face-to-face interaction won't prevent great results.

On the minus side, however, it can be difficult to gauge the quality of the service before working with them . If they are churning through many application essays without getting to know the students they are helping, you could end up with an over-edited essay that sounds just like everyone else's. In the worst case scenario, an unscrupulous service could send you back a plagiarized essay.

Getting recommendations from friends or a school counselor for reputable services is key to avoiding heavy-handed editing that writes essays for you or does too much to change your essay. Including a badly-edited essay like this in your application could cause problems if there are inconsistencies. For example, in interviews it might be clear you didn't write the essay, or the skill of the essay might not be reflected in your schoolwork and test scores.

Should You Buy an Essay Written by Someone Else?

Let me elaborate. There are super sketchy places on the internet where you can simply buy a pre-written essay. Don't do this!

For one thing, you'll be lying on an official, signed document. All college applications make you sign a statement saying something like this:

I certify that all information submitted in the admission process—including the application, the personal essay, any supplements, and any other supporting materials—is my own work, factually true, and honestly presented... I understand that I may be subject to a range of possible disciplinary actions, including admission revocation, expulsion, or revocation of course credit, grades, and degree, should the information I have certified be false. (From the Common Application )

For another thing, if your academic record doesn't match the essay's quality, the admissions officer will start thinking your whole application is riddled with lies.

Admission officers have full access to your writing portion of the SAT or ACT so that they can compare work that was done in proctored conditions with that done at home. They can tell if these were written by different people. Not only that, but there are now a number of search engines that faculty and admission officers can use to see if an essay contains strings of words that have appeared in other essays—you have no guarantee that the essay you bought wasn't also bought by 50 other students.

• You should get college essay help with both editing and proofreading
• A good editor will ask questions about your idea, logic, and structure, and will point out places where clarity is needed
• A good editor will absolutely not answer these questions, give you their own ideas, or write the essay or parts of the essay for you
• A good proofreader will find typos and check your formatting
• All of them agree that getting light editing and proofreading is necessary
• Parents, teachers, guidance or college counselor, and peers or siblings
• If you can't ask any of those, you can pay for college essay help, but watch out for services or coaches who over-edit you work
• Don't buy a pre-written essay! Colleges can tell, and it'll make your whole application sound false.

Ready to start working on your essay? Check out our explanation of the point of the personal essay and the role it plays on your applications and then explore our step-by-step guide to writing a great college essay .

Using the Common Application for your college applications? We have an excellent guide to the Common App essay prompts and useful advice on how to pick the Common App prompt that's right for you . Wondering how other people tackled these prompts? Then work through our roundup of over 130 real college essay examples published by colleges .

Stressed about whether to take the SAT again before submitting your application? Let us help you decide how many times to take this test . If you choose to go for it, we have the ultimate guide to studying for the SAT to give you the ins and outs of the best ways to study.

Anna scored in the 99th percentile on her SATs in high school, and went on to major in English at Princeton and to get her doctorate in English Literature at Columbia. She is passionate about improving student access to higher education.

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