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Chapter One: THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

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On the Nature of Philosophy and Other Philosophical Essays

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CHAPTER ONE: THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

Related Papers

Bennett P Foster

“I hate everything that merely instructs me without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity.” – Goethe “To be a philosopher is not merely to have subtle thoughts, nor even to found a school…it is to solve some of the problems of life, not only theoretically, but practically.” – Thoreau Philosophy sometimes has a reputation of being an abstruse academic discipline, amounting to little more than the sum of so many unanswerable but nonetheless “interesting” questions—at least interesting to those who happen to be interested in them. Frankly, this characterization is not altogether unfair, particularly as applied to contemporary academic philosophy. But originally philosophy was, and to some still is, a way of living, a life discipline, a personal undertaking, a mode of being-in-the-world that deeply informs one’s spirit, thoughts, will, actions—the totality of one’s being—the goal of which is to achieve the highest state of human existence: wisdom. A philosopher, or “lover of wisdom,” takes on this life-project not merely by seeking knowledge or contemplation but by practicing a certain way of life, by cultivating habits conducive of human excellence, by committing to “spiritual exercises” that regulate one’s desires and transform one’s very character. To put it simply, philosophy is about living a good life. In this course, we will study philosophers who were committed to this ideal, as well as the exercises they used to achieve it. In addition, we will ourselves experiment with specific practices and ways of thinking that since ancient times have been used as methods of spiritual progress.

Dunedin Academic Press Ltd

Alistair J . Sinclair

What Philosophy is About What is philosophy? In a sense, we all can answer that question, as philosophy is meant for everyone. We may make of it as little or as much as we please. But the more we make of philosophy, the more seriously we must take it. This book is for those who want to take a serious look at philosophy without necessarily becoming serious philosophers. It will particularly interest young people and adults who want to understand the basics of philosophy and get a gist of what the well-known philosophers were saying. It provides an overview which will hopefully give beginners the confidence to take their study of philosophy further. They may discover areas of special interest to them, be inspired to read the works of the great philosophers, or to consult, for instance, online resources such as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and Wikipedia without being bemused by the choice and range of material available. Philosophy ought to appeal to all of us because it comes from our sense of wonder about the universe and our place in it. As a species, we are naturally curious about everything, and we desire to know and understand things. As individuals, we want to be wise rather than plain ignorant. Hence the word ‘philosophy’ means ‘love of wisdom’ in Greek. It originally covered all intellectual pursuits. Everyone earnestly seeking knowledge and understanding was called a philosopher. Whenever we think deeply and consistently about our ideas, concepts, principles, theories, morals, or ways of living, we are doing philosophy. How do we know what we know? What is it to be a good person? What is art? Is an electron a real or imaginary object? Is religion fantasy or reality? These are all philosophical questions, and in considering them, we are philosophers of some type or other, as listed below. Every human activity has its ‘philosophy’. We can have a philosophy of how to run a business, of playing golf, shopping, eating carefully, or whatever. It becomes a philosophy when we think seriously about it and have our reasons for doing what we do. We philosophise about it when we examine what the activity involves and how it relates to other activities similar to or different from it. Philosophy is therefore the ultimate thinking activity. It reflects what is most distinctive about us as a species, namely, our ability to think abstractly about things. Once we humans give up thinking and questioning everything, we are indeed a doomed species. Any attempt to narrow its scope threatens our freedom to think about things from new, different and unaccustomed perspectives. But that is the general view of philosophy. There is also the academic study of philosophy which has developed in western culture as a distinct subject.

Archie Articulo

Melisa Vivanco

The primary concern of philosophy is the study of ideas central to the ways we think and live. Accordingly, philosophical thinking is nothing but the quest for answers to relevant questions that have to do with our lives as individuals as well as a society. The value, however, of many of our key concepts-related to these answers-is often hidden from us. We take the ways we make sense of ourselves and the world for granted, but philosophy goes further than what is evident: Philosophy is the art of closing your eyes and opening your mind.

Philosophy By Women

Elly Vintiadis

In this essay I identify three characteristics that I think make philosophy the distinctive discipline that it is: its breadth, the fundamentality of the question it raises and its concern with the question of the difference of what appears to be the case from what is the case. I then argue that philosophy is necessary because it is at heart a very practical discipline. I end by arguing that philosophy has to a large extent lost its characteristic breadth and that it should regain it in order to be able to make a difference in the world.

The International Encyclopedia of Surrealism

Georges Sebbag

Jeffrey Bell

I lay out the general contours of the argument here, emphasizing, perhaps surprisingly, what I take to be the ethical significance of the book What is Philosophy? and philosophy more generally. I set the stage for a critique of analytic philosophy in later chapters.

Philosophy as a Way of LIfe: History, Dimensions, Directions

Matthew J Sharpe , Michael Ure

Conclusion [preprint-draft only] to Philosophy as a Way of Life: History, Dimensions, Directions (M. Sharpe & M. Ure, Bloomsbury July 2021). The opening poses the continuing metaphilosophical question of what philosophy could be, in a period where the natural and human sciences have declared their independence from their historical, disciplinary 'alma mater'. Next, we summarize our findings concerning the declines and rebirths of the ancient idea of philosophy as a way of life, and its predominant features (with reference to an account identifying ten features of this paradigm, and twelve forms of intellectual and spiritual exercises). The picture as we present it is more complex than sometimes envisaged. We then examine recurrent criticisms of the idea of philosophy as a way of life: that admitting spiritual exercises (Hadot) or technologies of the self (Foucault) means that the specificity of philosophy, as against rhetoric or 'religion', is lost; that any post-Hadotian approach leads to a relativistic historicization of philosophical discourses; that philosophical self-cultivation must be egoistic or apolitical; and that post-Socratic philosophical self-care is passion- and life-denying. We close by examining philosophy as a way of life today, and its prospects within academic settings, and beyond them in phenomena like modern Stoicism as academic philosophy continues to experience stressors and marginalization in the period of marketization.

Philosophical Writings

David E Cooper

Human Nature

Talk of human nature is a common feature of moral and political discourse among people on the street and among philosophers, political scientists and sociologists. This is largely due to the widespread assumption that true descriptive or explanatory claims making use of the concept of human nature have, or would have, considerable normative significance. Some think that human nature excludes the possibility of certain forms of social organisation—for example, that it excludes any broadly egalitarian society. Others make the stronger claim that a true normative ethical theory has to be built on prior knowledge of human nature. Still others believe that there are specific moral prohibitions concerning the alteration of, or interference in, the set of properties that make up human nature. Finally, there are those who argue that the normative significance derives from the fact that merely deploying the concept is typically, or even necessarily, pernicious.

Alongside such varying and frequently conflicting normative uses of the expression “human nature”, there are serious disagreements concerning the concept’s content and explanatory significance—the starkest being whether the expression “human nature” refers to anything at all. Some reasons given for saying there is no human nature are anthropological, grounded in views concerning the relationship between natural and cultural features of human life. Other reasons given are biological, deriving from the character of the human species as, like other species, an essentially historical product of evolution. Whether these reasons justify the claim that there is no human nature depends, at least in part, on what it is exactly that the expression is supposed to be picking out. Many contemporary proposals differ significantly in their answers to this question.

Understanding the debates around the philosophical use of the expression “human nature” requires clarity on the reasons both for (1) adopting specific adequacy conditions for the term’s use and for (2) accepting particular substantial claims made within the framework thus adopted. One obstacle to such clarity is historical: we have inherited from the beginnings of Western philosophy, via its Medieval reception, the idea that talk of human nature brings into play a number of different, but related claims. One such set of claims derives from different meanings of the Greek equivalents of the term “nature”. This bundle of claims, which can be labelled the traditional package , is a set of adequacy conditions for any substantial claim that uses the expression “human nature”. The beginnings of Western philosophy have also handed down to us a number of such substantial claims . Examples are that humans are “rational animals” or “political animals”. We can call these claims the traditional slogans . The traditional package is a set of specifications of how claims along the lines of the traditional slogans are to be understood, i.e., what it means to claim that it is “human nature” to be, for example, a rational animal.

Various developments in Western thought have cast doubt both on the coherence of the traditional package and on the possibility that the adequacy conditions for the individual claims can be fulfilled. Foremost among these developments are the Enlightenment rejection of teleological metaphysics, the Historicist emphasis on the significance of culture for understanding human action and the Darwinian introduction of history into biological kinds. This entry aims to help clarify the adequacy conditions for claims about human nature, the satisfiability of such conditions and the reasons why the truth of claims with the relevant conditions might seem important. It proceeds in five steps. Section 1 unpacks the traditional package, paying particular attention to the importance of Aristotelian themes and to the distinction between the scientific and participant perspectives from which human nature claims can be raised. Section 2 explains why evolutionary biology raises serious problems both for the coherence of this package and for the truth of its individual component claims. Sections 3 and 4 then focus on attempts to secure scientific conceptions of human nature in the face of the challenge from evolutionary biology. The entry concludes with a discussion of accounts of human nature developed from a participant perspective, in particular accounts that, in spite of the evolutionary challenge, are taken to have normative consequences.

1.1 “Humans”

1.2 unpacking the traditional package, 1.3 essentialisms, 1.4 on the status of the traditional slogan, 2.1 the nature of the species taxon, 2.2 the nature of species specimens as species specimens, 2.3 responding to the evolutionary verdict on classificatory essences, 3.1 privileging properties, 3.2 statistical normality or robust causality, 4.1 genetically based psychological adaptations, 4.2 abandoning intrinsicality, 4.3 secondary altriciality as a game-changer, 5.1. human nature from a participant perspective.

5.2.1. Sidestepping the Darwinian Challenge?
5.2.2. Human Flourishing
5.3. Reason as the Unique Structural Property
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries

1. “Humans”, Slogans and the Traditional Package

Before we begin unpacking, it should be noted that the adjective “human” is polysemous, a fact that often goes unnoticed in discussions of human nature, but makes a big difference to both the methodological tractability and truth of claims that employ the expression. The natural assumption may appear to be that we are talking about specimens of the biological species Homo sapiens , that is, organisms belonging to the taxon that split from the rest of the hominin lineage an estimated 150,000 years ago. However, certain claims seem to be best understood as at least potentially referring to organisms belonging to various older species within the subtribe Homo , with whom specimens of Homo sapiens share properties that have often been deemed significant (Sterelny 2018: 114).

On the other hand, the “nature” that is of interest often appears to be that of organisms belonging to a more restricted group. There may have been a significant time lag between the speciation of anatomically modern humans ( Homo sapiens ) and the evolution of behaviourally modern humans, i.e., human populations whose life forms involved symbol use, complex tool making, coordinated hunting and increased geographic range. Behavioural modernity’s development is often believed only to have been completed by 50,000 years ago. If, as is sometimes claimed, behavioural modernity requires psychological capacities for planning, abstract thought, innovativeness and symbolism (McBrearty & Brooks 2000: 492) and if these were not yet widely or sufficiently present for several tens of thousands of years after speciation, then it may well be behaviourally, rather than anatomically modern humans whose “nature” is of interest to many theories. Perhaps the restriction might be drawn even tighter to include only contemporary humans, that is, those specimens of the species who, since the introduction of agriculture around 12,000 years ago, evolved the skills and capacities necessary for life in large sedentary, impersonal and hierarchical groups (Kappeler, Fichtel, & van Schaik 2019: 68).

It was, after all, a Greek living less than two and a half millennia ago within such a sedentary, hierarchically organised population structure, who could have had no conception of the prehistory of the beings he called anthrôpoi , whose thoughts on their “nature” have been decisive for the history of philosophical reflection on the subject. It seems highly likely that, without the influence of Aristotle, discussions of “human nature” would not be structured as they are until today.

We can usefully distinguish four types of claim that have been traditionally made using the expression “human nature”. As a result of a particular feature of Aristotle’s philosophy, to which we will come in a moment, these four claims are associated with five different uses of the expression. Uses of the first type seem to have their origin in Plato; uses of the second, third and fourth type are Aristotelian; and, although uses of the fifth type have historically been associated with Aristotle, this association seems to derive from a misreading in the context of the religiously motivated Mediaeval reception of his philosophy.

A first , thin, contrastive use of the expression “human nature” is provided by the application of a thin, generic concept of nature to humans. In this minimal variant, nature is understood in purely contrastive or negative terms. Phusis is contrasted in Plato and Aristotle with technē , where the latter is the product of intention and a corresponding intervention of agency. If the entire cosmos is taken to be the product of divine agency, then, as Plato argued (Nadaf 2005: 1ff.), conceptualisations of the cosmos as natural in this sense are mistaken. Absent divine agency, the types of agents whose intentions are relevant for the status of anything as natural are human agents. Applied to humans, then, this concept of nature picks out human features that are not the results of human intentional action. Thus understood, human nature is the set of human features or processes that remain after subtraction of those picked out by concepts of the non-natural, concepts such as “culture”, “nurture”, or “socialisation”.

A second component in the package supplies the thin concept with substantial content that confers on it explanatory power. According to Aristotle, natural entities are those that contain in themselves the principle of their own production or development, in the way that acorns contain a blueprint for their own realisation as oak trees ( Physics 192b; Metaphysics 1014b). The “nature” of natural entities thus conceptualised is a subset of the features that make up their nature in the first sense. The human specification of this explanatory concept of nature aims to pick out human features that similarly function as blueprints for something like a fully realised form. According to Aristotle, for all animals that blueprint is “the soul”, that is, the integrated functional capacities that characterise the fully developed entity. The blueprint is realised when matter, i.e., the body, has attained the level of organisation required to instantiate the animal’s living functions (Charles 2000: 320ff.; Lennox 2009: 356).

A terminological complication is introduced here by the fact that the fully developed form of an entity is itself also frequently designated as its “nature” (Aristotle, Physics 193b; Politics 1252b). In Aristotle’s teleological metaphysics, this is the entity’s end, “that for the sake of which a thing is” ( Metaphysics 1050a; Charles 2000: 259). Thus, a human’s “nature”, like that of any other being, may be either the features in virtue of which it is disposed to develop to a certain mature form or, thirdly , the form to which it is disposed to develop.

Importantly, the particularly prominent focus on the idea of a fully developed form in Aristotle’s discussions of humans derives from its dual role. It is not only the form to the realisation of which human neonates are disposed; it is also the form that mature members of the species ought to realise ( Politics 1253a). This normative specification is the fourth component of the traditional package. The second, third and fourth uses of “nature” are all in the original package firmly anchored in a teleological metaphysics. One question for systematic claims about human nature is whether any of these components remain plausible if we reject a teleology firmly anchored in theology (Sedley 2010: 5ff.).

A fifth and last component of the package that has traditionally been taken to have been handed down from antiquity is classificatory. Here, the property or set of properties named by the expression “human nature” is that property or property set in virtue of the possession of which particular organisms belong to a particular biological taxon: what we now identify as the species taxon Homo sapiens . This is human nature typologically understood.

This, then, is the traditional package:

The sort of properties that have traditionally been taken to support the classificatory practices relevant to TP5 are intrinsic to the individual organisms in question. Moreover, they have been taken to be able to fulfil this role in virtue of being necessary and sufficient for the organism’s membership of the species, i.e., “essential” in one meaning of the term. This view of species membership, and the associated view of species themselves, has been influentially dubbed “typological thinking” (Mayr 1959 [1976: 27f.]; cf. Mayr 1982: 260) and “essentialism” (Hull 1965: 314ff.; cf. Mayr 1968 [1976: 428f.]). The former characterisation involves an epistemological focus on the classificatory procedure, the latter a metaphysical focus on the properties thus singled out. Ernst Mayr claimed that the classificatory approach originates in Plato’s theory of forms, and, as a result, involves the further assumption that the properties are unchanging. According to David Hull, its root cause is the attempt to fit the ontology of species taxa to an Aristotelian theory of definition.

The theory of definition developed in Aristotle’s logical works assigns entities to a genus and distinguishes them from other members of the genus, i.e., from other “species”, by their differentiae ( Topics 103b). The procedure is descended from the “method of division” of Plato, who provides a crude example as applied to humans, when he has the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman characterise them as featherless bipeds (266e). Hull and many scholars in his wake (Dupré 2001: 102f.) have claimed that this simple schema for picking out essential conditions for species membership had a seriously deleterious effect on biological taxonomy until Darwin (cf. Winsor 2006).

However, there is now widespread agreement that Aristotle was no taxonomic essentialist (Balme 1980: 5ff.; Mayr 1982: 150ff.; Balme 1987: 72ff.; Ereshefsky 2001: 20f; Richards 2010: 21ff.; Wilkins 2018: 9ff.). First, the distinction between genus and differentiae was for Aristotle relative to the task at hand, so that a “species” picked out in this manner could then count as the genus for further differentiation. Second, the Latin term “species”, a translation of the Greek eidos , was a logical category with no privileged relationship to biological entities; a prime example in the Topics is the species justice, distinguished within the genus virtue (143a). Third, in a key methodological passage, Parts of Animals , I.2–3 (642b–644b), Aristotle explicitly rejects the method of “dichotomous division”, which assigns entities to a genus and then seeks a single differentia, as inappropriate to the individuation of animal kinds. Instead, he claims, a multiplicity of differentiae should be brought to bear. He emphasises this point in relation to humans (644a).

According to Pierre Pellegrin and David Balme, Aristotle did not seek to establish a taxonomic system in his biological works (Pellegrin 1982 [1986: 113ff.]; Balme 1987, 72). Rather, he simply accepted the everyday common sense partitioning of the animal world (Pellegrin 1982 [1986: 120]; Richards 2010: 24; but cf. Charles 2000: 343ff.). If this is correct, Aristotle didn’t even ask after the conditions for belonging to the species Homo sapiens . So he wasn’t proposing any particular answer, and specifically not the “essentialist” answer advanced by TP5. In as far as such an answer has been employed in biological taxonomy (cf. Winsor 2003), its roots appear to lie in Neoplatonic, Catholic misinterpretations of Aristotle (Richards 2010: 34ff.; Wilkins 2018: 22ff.). Be that as it may, the fifth use of “human nature” transported by tradition—to pick out essential conditions for an organism’s belonging to the species—is of eminent interest. The systematic concern behind Mayr and Hull’s historical claims is that accounts of the form of TP5 are incompatible with evolutionary theory. We shall look at this concern in section 2 of this entry.

Because the term “essentialism” recurs with different meanings in discussions of human nature and because some of the theoretical claims thus summarised are assumed to be Aristotelian in origin, it is worth spending a moment here to register what claims can be singled out by the expression. The first , purely classificatory conception just discussed should be distinguished from a second view that is also frequently labelled “essentialist” and which goes back to Locke’s concept of “real essence” (1689: III, iii, 15). According to essentialism thus understood, an essence is the intrinsic feature or features of an entity that fulfils or fulfil a dual role: firstly, of being that in virtue of which something belongs to a kind and, secondly, of explaining why things of that kind typically have a particular set of observable features. Thus conceived, “essence” has both a classificatory and an explanatory function and is the core of a highly influential, “essentialist” theory of natural kinds, developed in the wake of Kripke’s and Putnam’s theories of reference.

An account of human nature that is essentialist in this sense would take the nature of the human natural kind to be a set of microstructural properties that have two roles: first, they constitute an organism’s membership of the species Homo sapiens . Second, they are causally responsible for the organism manifesting morphological and behavioural properties typical of species members. Paradigms of entities with such natures or essences are chemical elements. An example is the element with the atomic number 79, the microstructural feature that accounts for surface properties of gold such as yellowness. Applied to organisms, it seems that the relevant explanatory relationship will be developmental, the microstructures providing something like a blueprint for the properties of the mature individual. Kripke assumed that some such blueprint is the “internal structure” responsible for the typical development of tigers as striped, carnivorous quadrupeds (Kripke 1972 [1980: 120f.]).

As the first, pseudo-Aristotelian version of essentialism illustrates, the classificatory and explanatory components of what we might call “Kripkean essentialism” can be taken apart. Thus, “human nature” can also be understood in exclusively explanatory terms, viz. as the set of microstructural properties responsible for typical human morphological and behavioural features. In such an account, the ability to pick out the relevant organisms is simply presupposed. As we shall see in section 4 of this entry, accounts of this kind have been popular in the contemporary debate. The subtraction of the classificatory function of the properties in these conceptions has generally seemed to warrant withholding from them the label “essentialist”. However, because some authors have still seen the term as applicable (Dupré 2001: 162), we might think of such accounts as constituting a third , weak or deflationary variant of essentialism.

Such purely explanatory accounts are descendants of the second use of “human nature” in the traditional package, the difference being that they don’t usually presuppose some notion of the fully developed human form. However, where some such presupposition is made, there are stronger grounds for talking of an “essentialist” account. Elliott Sober has argued that the key to essentialism is not classification in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but the postulation of some “privileged state”, to the realisation of which specimens of a species tend, as long as no extrinsic factors “interfere” (Sober 1980: 358ff.). Such a dispositional-teleological conception, dissociated from classificatory ambitions, would be a fourth form of essentialism. Sober rightly associates such an account with Aristotle, citing Aristotle’s claims in his zoological writings that interfering forces are responsible for deviations, i.e., morphological differences, both within and between species. A contemporary account of human nature with this structure will be discussed in section 4 .

A fifth and final form of essentialism is even more clearly Aristotelian. Here, an explicitly normative status is conferred on the set of properties to the development of which human organisms tend. For normative essentialism, “the human essence” or “human nature” is a normative standard for the evaluation of organisms belonging to the species. Where the first, third and fourth uses of the expression have tended to be made with critical intent (for defensive exceptions, see Charles 2000: 348ff.; Walsh 2006; Devitt 2008; Boulter 2012), this fifth use is more often a self-ascription (e.g., Nussbaum 1992). It is intended to emphasise metaethical claims of a specific type. According to such claims, an organism’s belonging to the human species entails or in some way involves the applicability to the organism of moral norms that ground in the value of the fully developed human form. According to one version of this thought, humans ought be, or ought to be enabled to be, rational because rationality is a key feature of the fully developed human form. Such normative-teleological accounts of human nature will be the focus of section 5.2 .

We can summarise the variants of essentialism and their relationship to the components of the traditional package as follows:

Section 2 and section 5 of this entry deal with the purely classificatory and the normative teleological conceptions of human nature respectively, and with the associated types of essentialism. Section 3 discusses attempts to downgrade TP5, moving from essential to merely characteristic properties. Section 4 focuses on accounts of an explanatory human nature, both on attempts to provide a modernized version of the teleological blueprint model ( §4.1 ) and on explanatory conceptions with deflationary intent relative to the claims of TP2 and TP3 ( §4.2 and §4.3 ).

The traditional package specifies a set of conditions some or all of which substantial claims about “human nature” are supposed to meet. Before we turn to the systematic arguments central to contemporary debates on whether such conditions can be met, it will be helpful to spend a moment considering one highly influential substantial claim. Aristotle’s writings prominently contain two such claims that have been handed down in slogan form. The first is that the human being (more accurately: “man”) is an animal that is in some important sense social (“zoon politikon”, History of Animals 487b; Politics 1253a; Nicomachean Ethics 1169b). According to the second, “he” is a rational animal ( Politics 1253a, where Aristotle doesn’t actually use the traditionally ascribed slogan, “zoon logon echon”).

Aristotle makes both claims in very different theoretical contexts, on the one hand, in his zoological writings and, on the other, in his ethical and political works. This fact, together with the fact that Aristotle’s philosophy of nature and his practical philosophy are united by a teleological metaphysics, may make it appear obvious that the slogans are biological claims that provide a foundation for normative claims in ethics and politics. The slogans do indeed function as foundations in the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics respectively (on the latter, see section 5 of this entry). It is, however, unclear whether they are to be understood as biological claims. Let us focus on the slogan that has traditionally dominated discussions of human nature in Western philosophy, that humans are “rational animals”.

First, if Pellegrin and Balme are right that Aristotelian zoology is uninterested in classifying species, then ascribing the capacity for “rationality” cannot have the function of naming a biological trait that distinguishes humans from other animals. This is supported by two further sets of considerations. To begin with, Aristotle’s explicit assertion that a series of differentiae would be needed to “define” humans ( Parts of Animals 644a) is cashed out in the long list of features he takes to be their distinguishing marks, such as speech, having hair on both eyelids, blinking, having hands, upright posture, breasts in front, the largest and moistest brain, fleshy legs and buttocks (Lloyd 1983: 29ff.). Furthermore, there is in Aristotle no capacity for reason that is both exclusive to, and universal among anthropoi . One part or kind of reason, “practical intelligence” ( phronesis ), is, Aristotle claims, found in both humans and other animals, being merely superior in the former ( Parts of Animals , 687a). Now, there are other forms of reasoning of which this is not true, forms whose presence are sufficient for being human: humans are the only animals capable of deliberation ( History of Animals 488b) and reasoning ( to noein ), in as far as this extends to mathematics and first philosophy. Nevertheless, these forms of reasoning are unnecessary: slaves, who Aristotle includes among humans ( Politics 1255a), are said to have no deliberative faculty ( to bouleutikon ) at all ( Politics 1260a; cf. Richter 2011: 42ff.). Presumably, they will also be without the capacities necessary for first philosophy.

Second, these Aristotelian claims raise the question as to whether the ascription of rationality is even intended as an ascription to an individual in as far as she or he belongs to a biological kind. The answer might appear to be obviously affirmative. Aristotle uses the claim that a higher level of reason is characteristic of humans to teleologically explain other morphological features, in particular upright gait and the morphology of the hands ( Parts of Animals 686a, 687a). However, the kind of reason at issue here is practical intelligence, the kind humans and animals share, not the capacity for mathematics and metaphysics, which among animals is exercised exclusively by humans. In as far as humans are able to exercise this latter capacity in contemplation, Aristotle claims that they “partake of the divine” ( Parts of Animals 656a), a claim of which he makes extensive use when grounding his ethics in human rationality ( Nicomachean Ethics 1177b–1178b). When, in a passage to which James Lennox has drawn attention (Lennox 1999), Aristotle declares that the rational part of the soul cannot be the object of natural science ( Parts of Animals 645a), it seems to be the contemplative part of the soul that is thus excluded from biological investigation, precisely the feature that is named in the influential slogan. If it is the “something divine … present in” humans that is decisively distinctive of their kind, it seems unclear whether the relevant kind is biological.

It is not the aim of this entry to decide questions of Aristotle interpretation. What is important is that the relationship of the question of “human nature” to biology is, from the beginning of the concept’s career, not as unequivocal as is often assumed (e.g., Hull 1986: 7; Richards 2010: 217f.). This is particularly true of the slogan according to which humans are rational animals. In the history of philosophy, this slogan has frequently been detached from any attempt to provide criteria for biological classification or characterisation. When Aquinas picks up the slogan, he is concerned to emphasise that human nature involves a material, corporeal aspect. This aspect is, however, not thought of in biological terms. Humans are decisively “rational substances”, i.e., persons. As such they also belong to a kind whose members also number angels and God (three times) (Eberl 2004). Similarly, Kant is primarily, indeed almost exclusively, interested in human beings as examples of “rational nature”, “human nature” being only one way in which rational nature can be instantiated (Kant 1785, 64, 76, 85). For this reason, Kant generally talks of “rational beings”, rather than of “rational animals” (1785, 45, 95).

There is, then, a perspective on humans that is plausibly present in Aristotle, stronger in Aquinas and dominant in Kant and that involves seeing them as instances of a kind other than the “human kind”, i.e., seeing the human animal “as a rational being” (Kant 1785 [1996: 45]). According to this view, the “nature” of humans that is most worthy of philosophical interest is the one they possess not insofar as they are human, but insofar as they are rational. Where this is the relevant use of the concept of human nature, being a specimen of the biological species is unnecessary for possessing the corresponding property. Specimens of other species, as well as non-biological entities may also belong to the relevant kind. It is also insufficient, as not all humans will have the properties necessary for membership in that kind.

As both a biologist and ethicist, Aristotle is at once a detached scientist and a participant in forms of interpersonal and political interaction only available to contemporary humans living in large, sedentary subpopulations. It seems plausible that a participant perspective may have suggested a different take on what it is to be human, perhaps even a different take on the sense in which humans might be rational animals, to that of biological science. We will return to this difference in section 5 of the entry.

2. The Nature of the Evolutionary Unit Homo sapiens and its Specimens

Detailing the features in virtue of which an organism is a specimen of the species Homo sapiens is a purely biological task. Whether such specification is achievable and, if so how, is controversial. It is controversial for the same reasons for which it is controversial what conditions need to be met for an organism to be a specimen of any species. These reasons derive from the theory of evolution.

A first step to understanding these reasons involves noting a further ambiguity in the use of the expression “human nature”, this time an ambiguity specific to taxonomy. The term can be used to pick out a set of properties as an answer to two different questions. The first concerns the properties of some organism which make it the case that it belongs to the species Homo sapiens . The second concerns the properties in virtue of which a population or metapopulation is the species Homo sapiens . Correspondingly, “human nature” can pick out either the properties of organisms that constitute their partaking in the species Homo sapiens or the properties of some higher-level entity that constitute it as that species. Human nature might then either be the nature of the species or the nature of species specimens as specimens of the species.

It is evolution that confers on this distinction its particular form and importance. The variation among organismic traits, without which there would be no evolution, has its decisive effects at the level of populations. These are groups of organisms that in some way cohere at a time in spite of the variation of traits among the component organisms. It is population-level groupings, taxa, not organisms, that evolve and it is taxa, such as species, that provide the organisms that belong to them with genetic resources (Ghiselin 1987: 141). The species Homo sapiens appears to be a metapopulation that coheres at least in part because of the gene flow between its component organisms brought about by interbreeding (cf. Ereshefsky 1991: 96ff.). Hence, according to evolutionary theory, Homo sapiens is plausibly a higher-level entity—a unit of evolution—consisting of the lower-level entities that are individual human beings. The two questions phrased in terms of “human nature” thus concern the conditions for individuation of the population-level entity and the conditions under which organisms are components of that entity.

The theory of evolution transforms the way we should understand the relationship between human organisms and the species to which they belong. The taxonomic assumption of TP5 was that species are individuated by means of intrinsic properties that are individually instantiated by certain organisms. Instantiating those properties is taken to be necessary and sufficient for those organisms to belong to the species. Evolutionary theory makes it clear that species, as population-level entities, cannot be individuated by means of the properties of lower-level constituents, in our case, of individual human organisms (Sober 1980: 355).

The exclusion of this possibility grounds a decisive difference from the way natural kinds are standardly construed in the wake of Locke and Kripke. Recall that, in this Kripkean construal, lumps of matter are instances of chemical kinds because of their satisfaction of intrinsic necessary and sufficient conditions, viz. their atoms possessing a certain number of protons. The same conditions also individuate the chemical kinds themselves. Chemical kinds are thus spatiotemporally unrestricted sets. This means that there are no metaphysical barriers to the chance generation of members of the kind, independently of whether the kind is instantiated at any contiguous time or place. Nitrogen could come to exist by metaphysical happenstance, should an element with the atomic number 14 somehow come into being, even in a world in which up to that point no nitrogen has existed (Hull 1978: 349; 1984: 22).

In contrast, a species can only exist at time \(t_n\) if either it or a parent species existed at \(t_{n-1}\) and there was some relationship of spatial contiguity between component individuals of the species at \(t_n\) and the individuals belonging to either the same species or the parent species at \(t_{n-1}\). This is because of the essential role of the causal relationship of heredity. Heredity generates both the coherence across a population requisite for the existence of a species and the variability of predominant traits within the population, without which a species would not evolve.

For this reason, the species Homo sapiens , like every other species taxon, must meet a historical or genealogical condition. (For pluralistic objections to even this condition, see Kitcher 1984: 320ff.; Dupré 1993: 49f.) This condition is best expressed as a segment of a population-level phylogenetic tree, where such trees represent ancestor-descendent series (Hull 1978: 349; de Queiroz 1999: 50ff.; 2005). Species, as the point is often put, are historical entities, rather than kinds or classes (Hull 1978: 338ff.; 1984: 19). The fact that species are not only temporally, but also spatially restricted has also led to the stronger claim that they are individuals (Ghiselin 1974; 1997: 14ff.; Hull 1978: 338). If this is correct, then organisms are not members, but parts of species taxa. Independently of whether this claim is true for all biological species, Homo sapiens is a good candidate for a species that belongs to the category individual . This is because the species is characterised not only by spatiotemporal continuity, but also by causal processes that account for the coherence between its component parts. These processes plausibly include not only interbreeding, but also conspecific recognition and particular forms of communication (Richards 2010: 158ff., 218).

Importantly, the genealogical condition is only a necessary condition, as genealogy unites all the segments of one lineage. The segment of the phylogenetic tree that represents some species taxon begins with a node that represents a lineage-splitting or speciation event. Determining that node requires attention to general speciation theory, which has proposed various competing criteria (Dupré 1993: 48f.; Okasha 2002: 201; Coyne & Orr 2004). In the case of Homo sapiens , it requires attention to the specifics of the human case, which are also controversial (see Crow 2003; Cela-Conde & Ayala 2017: 11ff.). The end point of the segment is marked either by some further speciation event or, as may seem likely in the case of Homo sapiens , by the destruction of the metapopulation. Only when the temporal boundaries of the segment have become determinate would it be possible to adduce sufficient conditions for the existence of such a historical entity. Hence, if “human nature” is understood to pick out the necessary and sufficient conditions that individuate the species taxon Homo sapiens , its content is not only controversial, but epistemically unavailable to us.

If we take such a view of the individuating conditions for the species Homo sapiens , what are the consequences for the question of which organisms belong to the species? It might appear that it leaves open the possibility that speciation has resulted in some intrinsic property or set of properties establishing the cohesion specific to the taxon and that such properties count as necessary and sufficient for belonging to it (cf. Devitt 2008: 17ff.). This appearance would be deceptive. To begin with, no intrinsic property can be necessary because of the sheer empirical improbability that all species specimens grouped together by the relevant lineage segment instantiate any such candidate property. For example, there are individuals who are missing legs, inner organs or the capacity for language, but who remain biologically human (Hull 1986: 5). Evolutionary theory clarifies why this is so: variability, secured by mechanisms such as mutation and recombination, is the key to evolution, so that, should some qualitative property happen to be universal among all extant species specimens immediately after the completion of speciation, that is no guarantee that it will continue to be so throughout the lifespan of the taxon (Hull 1984: 35; Ereshefsky 2008: 101). The common thought that there must be at least some genetic property common to all human organisms is also false (R. Wilson 1999a: 190; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 7; Okasha 2002: 196f.): phenotypical properties that are shared in a population are frequently co-instantiated as a result of the complex interaction of differing gene-regulatory networks. Conversely, the same network can under different circumstances lead to differing phenotypical consequences (Walsh 2006: 437ff.). Even if it should turn out that every human organism instantiated some property, this would be a contingent, rather than a necessary fact (Sober 1980: 354; Hull 1986: 3).

Moreover, the chances of any such universal property also being sufficient are vanishingly small, as the sharing of properties by specimens of other species can result from various mechanisms, in particular from the inheritance of common genes in related species and from parallel evolution. This doesn’t entail that there may be no intrinsic properties that are sufficient belonging to the species. There are fairly good candidates for such properties, if we compare humans with other terrestrial organisms. Language use and a self-understanding as moral agents come to mind. However, whether non-terrestrial entities might possess such properties is an open question. And decisively, they are obviously hopeless as necessary conditions (cf. Samuels 2012: 9).

This leaves only the possibility that the conditions for belonging to the species are, like the individuating conditions for the species taxon, relational. Lineage-based individuation of a taxon depends on its component organisms being spatially and temporally situated in such a way that the causal processes necessary for the inheritance of traits can take place. In the human case, the key processes are those of sexual reproduction. Therefore, being an organism that belongs to the species Homo sapiens is a matter of being connected reproductively to organisms situated unequivocally on the relevant lineage segment. In other words, the key necessary condition is having been sexually reproduced by specimens of the species (Kronfeldner 2018: 100). Hull suggests that the causal condition may be disjunctive, as it could also be fulfilled by a synthetic entity created by scientists that produces offspring with humans who have been generated in the standard manner (Hull 1978: 349). Provided that the species is not in the throes of speciation, such direct descent or integration into the reproductive community, i.e., participation in the “complex network […] of mating and reproduction” (Hull 1986: 4), will also be sufficient.

The lack of a “human essence” in the sense of intrinsic necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to the species taxon Homo sapiens , has led a number of philosophers to deny that there is any such thing as human nature (Hull 1984: 19; 1986; Ghiselin 1997: 1; de Sousa 2000). As this negative claim concerns properties intrinsic both to relevant organisms and to the taxon, it is equally directed at the “nature” of the organisms as species specimens and at that of the species taxon itself. An alternative consists in retracting the condition that a classificatory essence must be intrinsic, a move which allows talk of a historical or relational essence and a corresponding relational conception of taxonomic human nature (Okasha 2002: 202).

Which of these ways of responding to the challenge from evolutionary theory appears best is likely to depend on how one takes it that the classificatory issues relate to the other matters at stake in the original human nature package. These concern the explanatory and normative questions raised by TP1–TP4. We turn to these in the following three sections of this article.

An exclusively genealogical conception of human nature is clearly not well placed to fulfil an explanatory role comparable to that envisaged in the traditional package. What might have an explanatory function are the properties of the entities from which the taxon or its specimens are descended. Human nature, genealogically understood, might serve as the conduit for explanations in terms of such properties, but will not itself explain anything. After all, integration in a network of sexual reproduction will be partly definitive of the specimens of all sexual species, whilst what is to be explained will vary enormously across taxa.

This lack of fit between classificatory and explanatory roles confronts us with a number of further theoretical possibilities. For example, one might see this incompatibility as strengthening the worries of eliminativists such as Ghiselin and Hull: even if the subtraction of intrinsicality were not on its own sufficient to justify abandoning talk of human nature, its conjunction with a lack of explanatory power, one might think, certainly is (Dupré 2003: 109f.; Lewens 2012: 473). Or one might argue that it is the classificatory ambitions associated with talk of human nature that should be abandoned. Once this is done, one might hope that certain sets of intrinsic properties can be distinguished that figure decisively in explanations and that can still justifiably be labelled “human nature” (Roughley 2011: 15; Godfrey-Smith 2014: 140).

Taking this second line in turn raises two questions: first, in what sense are the properties thus picked out specifically “human”, if they are neither universal among, nor unique to species specimens? Second, in what sense are the properties “natural”? Naturalness as independence from the effects of human intentional action is a key feature of the original package (TP1). Whether some such conception can be coherently applied to humans is a challenge for any non-classificatory account.

3. Characteristic Human Properties

The answer given by TP2 to the first question was in terms of the fully developed human form, where “form” does not refer solely to observable physical or behavioural characteristics, but also includes psychological features. This answer entails two claims: first, that there is one single such “form”, i.e., property or set of properties, that figures in explanations that range across individual human organisms. It also entails that there is a point in human development that counts as “full”, that is, as development’s goal or “telos”. These claims go hand in hand with the assumption that there is a distinction to be drawn between normal and abnormal adult specimens of the species. There is, common sense tells us, a sense in which normal adult humans have two legs, two eyes, one heart and two kidneys at specific locations in the body; they also have various dispositions, for instance, to feel pain and to feel emotions, and a set of capacities, such as for perception and for reasoning. And these, so it seems, may be missing, or under- or overdeveloped in abnormal specimens.

Sober has influentially described accounts that work with such teleological assumptions as adhering to an Aristotelian “Natural State Model” (Sober 1980: 353ff.). Such accounts work with a distinction that has no place in evolutionary biology, according to which variation of properties across populations is the key to evolution. Hence, no particular end states of organisms are privileged as “natural” or “normal” (Hull 1986: 7ff.). So any account that privileges particular morphological, behavioural or psychological human features has to provide good reasons that are both non-evolutionary and yet compatible with the evolutionary account of species. Because of the way that the notion of the normal is frequently employed to exclude and oppress, those reasons should be particularly good (Silvers 1998; Dupré 2003: 119ff.; Richter 2011: 43ff.; Kronfeldner 2018: 15ff.).

The kinds of reasons that may be advanced could either be internal to, or independent of the biological sciences. If the former, then various theoretical options may seem viable. The first grounds in the claim that, although species are not natural kinds and are thus unsuited to figuring in laws of nature (Hull 1987: 171), they do support descriptions with a significant degree of generality, some of which may be important (Hull 1984: 19). A theory of human nature developed on this basis should explain the kind of importance on the basis of which particular properties are emphasised. The second theoretical option is pluralism about the metaphysics of species: in spite of the fairly broad consensus that species are defined as units of evolution, the pluralist can deny the primacy of evolutionary dynamics, arguing that other epistemic aims allow the ecologist, the systematist or the ethologist to work with an equally legitimate concept of species that is not, or not exclusively genealogical (cf. Hull 1984: 36; Kitcher 1986: 320ff.; Hull 1987: 178–81; Dupré 1993: 43f.). The third option involves a relaxation of the concept of natural kinds, such that it no longer entails the instantiation of intrinsic, necessary, sufficient and spatiotemporally unrestricted properties, but is nevertheless able to support causal explanations. Such accounts aim to reunite taxonomic and explanatory criteria, thus allowing species taxa to count as natural kinds after all (Boyd 1999a; R. Wilson, Barker, & Brigandt 2007: 196ff.). Where, finally , the reasons advanced for privileging certain properties are independent of biology, these tend to concern features of humans’—“our”—self-understanding as participants in, rather than observers of, a particular form of life. These are likely to be connected to normative considerations. Here again, it seems that a special explanation will be required for why these privileged properties should be grouped under the rubric “human nature”.

The accounts to be described in the next subsection (3.2) of this entry are examples of the first strategy. Section 4 includes discussion of the relaxed natural kinds strategy. Section 5 focuses on accounts of human nature developed from a participant perspective and also notes the support that the pluralist metaphysical strategy might be taken to provide.

Begin, then, with the idea that to provide an account of “human nature” is to circumscribe a set of generalisations concerning humans. An approach of this sort sees the properties thus itemised as specifically “human” in as far as they are common among species specimens. So the privilege accorded to these properties is purely statistical and “normal” means statistically normal. Note that taking the set of statistically normal properties of humans as a non-teleological replacement for the fully developed human form retains from the original package the possibility of labelling as “human nature” either those properties themselves (TP3) or their developmental cause (TP2). Either approach avoids the classificatory worries dealt with in section 2 : it presupposes that those organisms whose properties are relevant are already distinguished as such specimens. What is to be explained is, then, the ways humans generally, though not universally, are. And among these ways are ways they may share with most specimens of some other species, in particular those that belong to the same order (primates) and the same class (mammals).

One should be clear what follows from this interpretation of “human”. The organisms among whom statistical frequency is sought range over those generated after speciation around 150,000 years ago to those that will exist immediately prior to the species’ extinction. On the one hand, because of the variability intrinsic to species, we are in the dark as to the properties that may or may not characterise those organisms that will turn out to be the last of the taxon. On the other hand, the time lag of around 100,000 years between the first anatomically modern humans and the general onset of behavioural modernity around the beginning of the Upper Palaeolithic means that there are likely to be many widespread psychological properties of contemporary humans that were not possessed by the majority of the species’ specimens during two thirds of the species’ history. This is true even if the practices seen as the signatures of behavioural modernity (see §1.1 ) developed sporadically, disappeared and reappeared at far removed points of time and space over tens of thousands of years before 50,000 ka (McBrearty & Brooks 2000; Sterelny 2011).

According to several authors (Machery 2008; 2018; Samuels 2012; Ramsey 2013), the expression “human nature” should be used to group properties that are the focus of much current behavioural, psychological and social science. However, as the cognitive and psychological sciences are generally interested in present-day humans, there is a mismatch between scientific focus and a grouping criterion that takes in all the properties generally or typically instantiated by specimens of the entire taxon. For this reason, the expression “human nature” is likely to refer to properties of an even more temporally restricted set of organisms belonging to the species. That restriction can be thought of in indexical terms, i.e., as a restriction to contemporary humans. However, some authors claim explicitly that their accounts entail that human nature can change (Ramsey 2013: 992; Machery 2018: 20). Human nature would then be the object of temporally indexed investigations, as is, for example, the weight of individual humans in everyday contexts. (Without temporal specification, there is no determinate answer to a question such as “How much did David Hume weigh?”) An example of Machery’s is dark skin colour. This characteristic, he claims, ceased to be a feature of human nature thus understood 7,000 years ago, if that was when skin pigmentation became polymorphic. The example indicates that the temporal range may be extremely narrow from an evolutionary point of view.

Such accounts are both compatible with evolutionary theory and coherent. However, in as far as they are mere summary or list conceptions, it is unclear what their epistemic value might be. They will tend to accord with everyday common sense, for which “human nature” may in a fairly low-key sense simply be the properties that (contemporary) humans generally tend to manifest (Roughley 2011: 16). They will also conform to one level of the expression’s use in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), which, in an attempt to provide a human “mental geography” (1748 [1970: 13]), lists a whole series of features, such as prejudice (1739–40, I,iii,13), selfishness (III,ii,5), a tendency to temporal discounting (III,ii,7) and an addiction to general rules (III,ii,9).

Accounts of this kind have been seen as similar in content to field guides for other animals (Machery 2008: 323; Godfrey-Smith 2014: 139). As Hull points out, within a restricted ecological context and a short period of evolutionary time, the ascription of readily observable morphological or behavioural characteristics to species specimens is a straightforward and unproblematic enterprise (Hull 1987: 175). However, the analogy is fairly unhelpful, as the primary function of assertions in field guides is to provide a heuristics for amateur classification. In contrast, a list conception of the statistically normal properties of contemporary humans presupposes identification of the organisms in question as humans. Moreover, such accounts certainly do not entail easy epistemic access to the properties in question, which may only be experimentally discovered. Nevertheless, there remains something correct about the analogy, as such accounts are a collection of assertions linked only by the fact that they are about the same group of organisms (Sterelny 2018: 123).

More sophisticated nature documentaries may summarise causal features of the lives of animals belonging to specific species. An analogous conception of human nature has also been proposed, according to which human nature is a set of pervasive and robust causal nexuses amongst humans. The list that picks out this set would specify causal connections between antecedent properties, such as having been exposed to benzene or subject to abuse as a child, and consequent properties, such as developing cancer or being aggressive towards one’s own children (Ramsey 2013: 988ff.). Human nature thus understood would have an explanatory component, a component internal to each item on the list. Human nature itself would, however, not be explanatory, but rather the label for a list of highly diverse causal connections.

An alternative way to integrate an explanatory component in a statistical normality account involves picking out that set of statistically common properties that have a purely evolutionary explanation (Machery 2008; 2018). This reinterpretation of the concept of naturalness that featured in the original package (TP1) involves a contrast with social learning. Processes grouped together under this latter description are taken to be alternative explanations to those provided by evolution. However, learning plays a central role, not only in the development of individual humans, but also in the iterated interaction of entire populations with environments structured and restructured through such interaction (Stotz 2010: 488ff.; Sterelny 2012: 23ff.). Hence, the proposal raises serious epistemic questions as to how the distinction is precisely to be drawn and operationalised. (For discussion, see Prinz 2012; Lewens 2012: 464ff.; Ramsey 2013: 985; Machery 2018: 15ff.; Sterelny 2018: 116; Kronfeldner 2018: 147ff.).

4. Explanatory Human Properties

The replacement of the concept of a fully developed form with a statistical notion yields a deflationary account of human nature with, at most, restricted explanatory import. The correlative, explanatory notion in the original package, that of the fully developed form’s blueprint (TP2), has to some authors seemed worth reframing in terms made possible by advances in modern biology, particularly in genetics.

Clearly, there must be explanations of why humans generally walk on two legs, speak and plan many of their actions in advance. Genealogical, or what have been called “ultimate” (Mayr) or “historical” (Kitcher) explanations can advert to the accumulation of coherence among entrenched, stable properties along a lineage. These may well have resulted from selection pressures shared by the relevant organisms (cf. Wimsatt 2003; Lewens 2009). The fact that there are exceptions to any generalisations concerning contemporary humans does not entail that there is no need for explanations of such exception-allowing generalisations. Plausibly, these general, though not universal truths will have “structural explanations”, that is, explanations in terms of underlying structures or mechanisms (Kitcher 1986: 320; Devitt 2008: 353). These structures, so seems, might to a significant degree be inscribed in humans’ DNA.

The precise details of rapidly developing empirical science will improve our understanding of the extent to which there is a determinate relationship between contemporary humans’ genome and their physical, psychological and behavioural properties. There is, however, little plausibility that the blueprint metaphor might be applicable to the way DNA is transcribed, translated and interacts with its cellular environment. Such interaction is itself subject to influence by the organism’s external environment, including its social environment (Dupré 2001: 29ff.; 2003: 111ff.; Griffiths 2011: 326; Prinz 2012: 17ff.; Griffiths & Tabery 2013: 71ff.; Griffiths & Stotz 2013: 98ff., 143ff.). For example, the feature of contemporary human life for which there must according to Aristotle be some kind of blueprint, viz. rational agency, is, as Sterelny has argued, so strongly dependent on social scaffolding that any claim to the effect that human rationality is somehow genetically programmed ignores the causal contributions of manifestly indispensable environmental factors (Sterelny 2018: 120).

Nevertheless, humans do generally develop a specific set of physiological features, such as two lungs, one stomach, one pancreas and two eyes. Moreover, having such a bodily architecture is, according to the evidence from genetics, to a significant extent the result of developmental programmes that ground in gene regulatory networks (GRNs). These are stretches of non-coding DNA that regulate gene transcription. GRNs are modular, more or less strongly entrenched structures. The most highly conserved of these tend to be the phylogenetically most archaic (Carroll 2000; Walsh 2006: 436ff.; Willmore 2012: 227ff.). The GRNs responsible for basic physiological features may be taken, in a fairly innocuous sense, to belong to an evolved human nature.

Importantly, purely morphological features have generally not been the explananda of accounts that have gone under the rubric “human nature”. What has frequently motivated explanatory accounts thus labelled is the search for underlying structures responsible for generally shared psychological features. “Evolutionary Psychologists” have built a research programme around the claim that humans share a psychological architecture that parallels that of their physiology. This, they believe, consists of a structured set of psychological “organs” or modules (Tooby & Cosmides 1990: 29f.; 1992: 38, 113). This architecture is, they claim, in turn the product of developmental programmes inscribed in humans’ DNA (1992: 45). Such generally distributed developmental programmes they label “human nature” (1990: 23).

This conception raises the question of how analogous the characteristic physical and psychological “architectures” are. For one thing, the physical properties that tend to appear in such lists are far more coarse-grained than the candidates for shared psychological properties (D. Wilson 1994: 224ff.): the claim is not just that humans tend to have perceptual, desiderative, doxastic and emotional capacities, but that the mental states that realise these capacities tend to have contents of specific types. Perhaps an architecture of the former kind—of a formal psychology—is a plausible, if relatively unexciting candidate for the mental side of what an evolved human nature should explain. Either way, any such conception needs to adduce criteria for the individuation of such “mental organs” (D. Wilson 1994: 233). Relatedly, if the most strongly entrenched developmental programmes are the most archaic, it follows that, although these will be species-typical, they will not be species-specific. Programmes for the development of body parts have been identified for higher taxa, rather than for species.

A further issue that dogs any such attempts to explicate the “human” dimension of human nature in terms of developmental programmes inscribed in human DNA concerns Evolutionary Psychologists’ assertion that the programmes are the same in every specimen of the species. This assertion goes hand in hand with the claim that what is explained by such programmes is a deep psychological structure that is common to almost all humans and underlies the surface diversity of behavioural and psychological phenomena (Tooby & Cosmides 1990: 23f.). For Evolutionary Psychologists, the (near-)universality of both developmental programmes and deep psychological structure has an ultimate explanation in evolutionary processes that mark their products as natural in the sense of TP1. Both, they claim, are adaptations. These are features that were selected for because their possession in the past conferred a fitness advantage on their possessors. Evolutionary Psychologists conceive that advantage as conferred by the fulfilment of some specific function. They summarise selection for that function as “design”, which they take to have operated equally on all species specimens since the Pleistocene. This move reintroduces the teleological idea of a fully developed form beyond mere statistical normality (TP3).

This move has been extensively criticised. First, selection pressures operate at the level of groups and hence need not lead to the same structures in all a group’s members (D. Wilson 1994: 227ff.; Griffiths 2011: 325; Sterelny 2018: 120). Second, other evolutionary mechanisms than natural selection might be explanatorily decisive. Genetic drift or mutation and recombination might, for example, also confer “naturalness” in the sense of evolutionary genesis (Buller 2000: 436). Third, as we have every reason to assume that the evolution of human psychology is ongoing, evolutionary biology provides little support for the claim that particular programmes and associated traits evolved to fixity in the Pleistocene (Buller 2000: 477ff.; Downes 2010).

Perhaps, however, there might turn out to be gene control networks that do generally structure certain features of the psychological development of contemporary humans (Walsh 2006: 440ff.). The quest for such GNRs can, then, count as the search for an explanatory nature of contemporary humans, where the explanatory function thus sought is divorced from any classificatory role.

There has, however, been a move in general philosophy of science that, if acceptable, would transform the relationship between the taxonomic and explanatory features of species. This move was influentially initiated by Richard Boyd (1999a). It begins with the claim that the attempt to define natural kinds in terms of spatiotemporally unrestricted, intrinsic, necessary and sufficient conditions is a hangover from empiricism that should be abandoned by realist metaphysics. Instead, natural kinds should be understood as kinds that support induction and explanation, where generalisations at work in such processes need not be exceptionless. Thus understood, essences of natural kinds, i.e., their “natures”, need be neither intrinsic nor be possessed by all and only members of the kinds. Instead, essences consist of property clusters integrated by stabilising mechanisms (“homeostatic property clusters”, HPCs). These are networks of causal relations such that the presence of certain properties tends to generate or uphold others and the workings of underlying mechanisms contribute to the same effect. Boyd names storms, galaxies and capitalism as plausible examples (Boyd 1999b: 82ff.). However, he takes species to be the paradigmatic HPC kinds. According to this view, the genealogical character of a species’ nature does not undermine its causal role. Rather, it helps to explain the specific way in which the properties cohere that make up the taxon’s essence. Moreover, these can include extrinsic properties, for example, properties of constructed niches (Boyd 1991: 142, 1999a: 164ff.; Griffiths 1999: 219ff.; R. Wilson et al. 2007: 202ff.).

Whether such an account can indeed adequately explain taxonomic practice for species taxa is a question that can be left open here (see Ereshefsky & Matthen 2005: 16ff.). By its own lights the account does not identify conditions for belonging to a species such as Homo sapiens (Samuels 2012: 25f.). Whether it enables the identification of factors that play the explanatory roles that the term “human nature” might be supposed to pick out is perhaps the most interesting question. Two ways in which an account of human nature might be developed from such a starting point have been sketched.

According to Richard Samuels’ proposal, human nature should be understood as the empirically discoverable proximal mechanisms responsible for psychological development and for the manifestation of psychological capacities. These will include physiological mechanisms, such as the development of the neural tube, as well as environmentally scaffolded learning procedures; they will also include the various modular systems distinguished by cognitive science, such as visual processing and memory systems (Samuels 2012: 22ff.). Like mere list conceptions (cf. §3.2 ), such an account has a precedent in Hume, for whom human nature also includes causal “principles” that structure operations of the human mind (1739–40, Intro.), for example, the mechanisms of sympathy (III,iii,1; II,ii,6). Hume, however, thought of the relevant causal principles as intrinsic.

A second proposal, advanced by Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz, explicitly suggests taking explanandum and explanans to be picked out by different uses of the expression "human nature". In both cases, the “nature” in question is that of the taxon, not of individual organisms. The former use simply refers to “what human beings are like”, where “human beings” means all species specimens. Importantly, this characterisation does not aim at shared characteristics, but is open for polymorphisms both across a population and across life stages of individual organisms. The causal conception of human nature, what explains this spectrum of similarity and difference in life histories, is equated by Griffiths and Stotz with the organism-environment system that supports human development. It thus includes all the genetic, epigenetic and environmental resources responsible for varying human life cycles (Griffiths 2011: 319; Stotz & Griffiths 2018, 66f.). It follows that explanatory human nature at one point in time can be radically different from human nature at some other point in time.

Griffiths and Stotz are clear that this account diverges significantly from traditional accounts, as it rejects assumptions that human development has a goal, that human nature is possessed by all and only specimens of the species and that it consists of intrinsic properties. They see these assumptions as features of the folk biology of human nature that is as scientifically relevant as are folk conceptions of heat for its scientific understanding (Stotz 2010: 488; Griffiths 2011: 319ff.; Stotz & Griffiths 2018: 60ff.). This raises the question as to whether such a developmental systems account should not simply advocate abandoning the term, as is suggested by Sterelny (2018) on the basis of closely related considerations. A reason for not doing so might lie in the fact that, as talk of “human nature” is often practised with normative intent or at least with normative consequences (Stotz & Griffiths 2018: 71f.), use of the term to pick out the real, complex explanatory factors at work might help to counter those normative uses that employ false, folk biological assumptions.

Explanatory accounts that emphasise developmental plasticity in the products of human DNA, in the neural architecture of the brain and in the human mind tend to reject the assumption that explanations of what humans are like should focus on intrinsic features. It should, however, be noted that such accounts can be interpreted as assigning the feature of heightened plasticity the key role in such explanations (cf. Montagu 1956: 79). Accounts that make plasticity causally central also raise the question as to whether there are not biological features that in turn explain it and should therefore be assigned a more central status in a theory of explanatory human nature.

A prime candidate for this role is what the zoologist Adolf Portmann labelled human “secondary altriciality”, a unique constellation of features of the human neonate relative to other primates: human neonates are, in their helplessness and possession of a relatively undeveloped brain, neurologically and behaviourally altricial, that is, in need of care. However they are also born with open and fully functioning sense organs, otherwise a mark of precocial species, in which neonates are able to fend for themselves (Portmann 1951: 44ff.). The facts that the human neonate brain is less than 30% of the size of the adult brain and that brain development after birth continues at the fetal rate for the first year (Walker & Ruff 1993, 227) led the anthropologist Ashley Montagu to talk of “exterogestation” (Montagu 1961: 156). With these features in mind, Portmann characterised the care structures required by prolonged infant helplessness as the “social uterus” (Portmann 1967: 330). Finally, the fact that the rapid development of the infant brain takes place during a time in which the infant’s sense organs are open and functioning places an adaptive premium on learning that is unparalleled among organisms (Gould 1977: 401; cf. Stotz & Griffiths 2018: 70).

Of course, these features are themselves contingent products of evolution that could be outlived by the species. Gould sees them as components of a general retardation of development that has characterised human evolution (Gould 1977: 365ff.), where “human” should be seen as referring to the clade—all the descendants of a common ancestor—rather than to the species. Anthropologists estimate that secondary altriciality characterised the lineage as from Homo erectus 1.5 million years ago (Rosenberg & Trevathan 1995: 167). We are, then, dealing with a set of deeply entrenched features, features that were in place long before behavioural modernity.

It is conceivable that the advent of secondary altriciality was a key transformation in generating the radical plasticity of human development beginning with early hominins. However, as Sterelny points out, there are serious difficulties with isolating any particular game changer. Secondary altriciality, or the plasticity that may in part be explained by it, would thus seem to fall victim to the same verdict as the game changers named by the traditional human nature slogans. However, maybe it is more plausible to think in terms of a matrix of traits: perhaps a game-changing constellation of properties present in the population after the split from pan can be shown to have generated forms of niche construction that fed back into and modified the original traits. These modifications may in turn have had further psychological and behavioural consequences in steps that plausibly brought selective advantages (Sterelny 2018: 115).

5. Human Nature, the Participant Perspective and Morality

In such a culture-mind coevolutionary account, there may be a place for the referents of some of the traditional philosophical slogans intended to pin down “the human essence“ or “human nature”—reason, linguistic capacity ( “ the speaking animal”, Herder 1772 [2008: 97]), a more general symbolic capacity ( animal symbolicum , Cassirer 1944: 44), freedom of the will (Pico della Mirandola 1486 [1965: 5]; Sartre 1946 [2007: 29, 47]), a specific, “political” form of sociality, or a unique type of moral motivation (Hutcheson 1730: §15). These are likely, at best, to be the (still evolving) products in contemporary humans of processes set in motion by a trait constellation that includes proto-versions of (some of) these capacities. Such a view may also be compatible with an account of “what contemporary humans are like” that abstracts from the evolutionary time scale of eons and focuses instead on the present (cf. Dupré 1993: 43), whilst neither merely cataloguing widely distributed traits ( §3.2 ) nor attempting explanations in terms of the human genome ( §4.1 ). The traditional slogans appear to be attempts to summarise some such accounts. It seems clear, though, that their aims are significantly different from those of the biologically, or otherwise scientifically orientated positions thus far surveyed.

Two features of such accounts are worth emphasising, both of which we already encountered in Aristotle’s contribution to the original package. The first involves a shift in perspective from that of the scientific observer to that of a participant in a contemporary human life form. Whereas the human—or non-human—biologist may ask what modern humans are like, just as they may ask what bonobos are like, the question that traditional philosophical accounts of human nature are plausibly attempting to answer is what it is like to live one’s life as a contemporary human. This question is likely to provoke the counter-question as to whether there is anything that it is like to live simply as a contemporary human, rather than as a human-in-a-specific-historical-and-cultural context (Habermas 1958: 32; Geertz 1973: 52f.; Dupré 2003: 110f.). For the traditional sloganeers, the answer is clearly affirmative. The second feature of such accounts is that they tend to take it that reference to the capacities named in the traditional slogans is in some sense normatively , in particular, ethically significant .

The first claim of such accounts, then, is that there is some property of contemporary humans that is in some way descriptively or causally central to participating in their form of life. The second is that such participation involves subjection to normative standards rooted in the possession of some such property. Importantly, there is a step from the first to the second form of significance, and justification of the step requires argument. Even from a participant perspective, there is no automatic move from explanatory to normative significance.

According to an “internal”, participant account of human nature, certain capacities of contemporary, perhaps modern humans unavoidably structure the way they (we) live their (our) lives. Talk of “structuring” refers to three kinds of contributions to the matrix of capacities and dispositions that both enable and constrain the ways humans live their lives. These are contributions, first, to the specific shape other features of humans lives have and, second, to the way other such features hang together (Midgley 2000: 56ff.; Roughley 2011: 16ff.). Relatedly, they also make possible a whole new set of practices. All three relations are explanatory, although their explanatory role appears not necessarily to correspond to the role corresponding features, or earlier versions of the features, might have played in the evolutionary genealogy of contemporary human psychology. Having linguistic capacities is a prime candidate for the role of such a structural property: human perception, emotion, action planning and thought are all plausibly transformed in linguistic creatures, as are the connections between perception and belief, and the myriad relationships between thought and behaviour, connections exploited and deepened in a rich set of practices unavailable to non-linguistic animals. Similar things could be claimed for other properties named by the traditional slogans.

In contrast to the ways in which such capacities have frequently been referred to in the slogan mode, particularly to the pathos that has tended to accompany it, it seems highly implausible that any one such property will stand alone as structurally significant. It is more likely that we should be picking out a constellation of properties, a constellation that may well include properties variants of which are possessed by other animals. Other properties, including capacities that may be specific to contemporary humans, such as humour, may be less plausible candidates for a structural role.

Note that the fact that such accounts aim to answer a question asked from the participant perspective does not rule out that the features in question may be illuminated in their role for human self-understanding by data from empirical science. On the contrary, it seems highly likely that disciplines such as developmental and comparative psychology, and neuroscience will contribute significantly to an understanding of the possibilities and constraints inherent in the relevant capacities and in the way they interact.

5.2. Human Nature and the Human ergon

The paradigmatic strategy for deriving ethical consequences from claims about structural features of the human life form is the Platonic and Aristotelian ergon or function argument. The first premise of Aristotle’s version ( Nicomachean Ethics 1097b–1098a) connects function and goodness: if the characteristic function of an entity of a type X is to φ, then a good entity of type X is one that φs well. Aristotle confers plausibility on the claim by using examples such as social roles and bodily organs. If the function of an eye as an exemplar of its kind is to enable seeing, then a good eye is one that enables its bearer to see well. The second premise of the argument is a claim we encountered in section 1.4 of this entry, a claim we can now see as predicating a structural property of human life, the exercise of reason. According to this claim, the function or end of individual humans as humans is, depending on interpretation (Nussbaum 1995: 113ff.), either the exercise of reason or life according to reason. If this is correct, it follows that a good human being is one whose life centrally involves the exercise of, or life in accordance with, reason.

In the light of the discussion so far, it ought to be clear that, as it stands, the second premise of this argument is incompatible with the evolutionary biology of species. It asserts that the exercise of reason is not only the key structural property of human life, but also the realization of the fully developed human form. No sense can be made of this latter notion in evolutionary terms. Nevertheless, a series of prominent contemporary ethicists—Alasdair MacIntyre (1999), Rosalind Hursthouse (1999), Philippa Foot (2001) and Martha Nussbaum (2006)—have all made variants of the ergon argument central to their ethical theories. As each of these authors advance some version of the second premise, it is instructive to examine the ways in which they aim to avoid the challenge from evolutionary biology.

Before doing so, it is first worth noting that any ethical theory or theory of value is engaged in an enterprise that has no clear place in an evolutionary analysis. If we want to know what goodness is or what “good” means, evolutionary theory is not the obvious place to look. This is particularly clear in view of the fact that evolutionary theory operates at the level of populations (Sober 1980: 370; Walsh 2006: 434), whereas ethical theory operates, at least primarily, at the level of individual agents. However, the specific conflict between evolutionary biology and neo-Aristotelian ethics results from the latter’s constructive use of the concept of species and, in particular, of a teleological conception of a fully developed form of individual members of the species “ qua members of [the] species” (MacIntyre 1999: 64, 71; cf. Thompson 2008: 29; Foot 2001: 27). The characterisation of achieving that form as fulfilling a “function”, which helps the analogy with bodily organs and social roles, is frequently replaced in contemporary discussions by talk of “flourishing” (Aristotle’s eudaimonia ). Such talk more naturally suggests comparisons with the lives of other organisms (although Aristotle himself excludes other animals from eudaimonia ; cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1009b). The concept of flourishing in turn picks out biological—etymologically: botanical—processes, but again not of a sort that play a role in evolutionary theory. It also seems primarily predicated of individual organisms. It may play a role in ecology; it is, however, most clearly at home in practical applications of biological knowledge, as in horticulture. In this respect, it is comparable to the concept of health.

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The Nature of Philosophy

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Philosophy of Science Research Paper Topics

This page provides a comprehensive list of philosophy of science research paper topics , designed to usher students into the vast realm of the interplay between philosophy and scientific inquiry. As the study of philosophy of science continues to evolve, there’s an increasing need for students to delve deeply into its multifaceted avenues, understanding not just the foundational principles but also the emerging debates and discussions. From examining the underlying assumptions that drive scientific research to scrutinizing the ethical dimensions of modern scientific practices, the philosophy of science offers a myriad of avenues for intellectual exploration. This list will serve as both a starting point for novices and a deep dive for those already familiar with some aspects of the field, ensuring that every student can find a topic tailored to their interests and academic goals.

100 Philosophy of Science Research Paper Topics

In the quest to fathom the universe and our place within it, humanity has leaned on both science and philosophy as guiding lights. The philosophy of science, as a discipline, dives deep into the analysis of scientific practice and the conceptual foundations of science. It critically examines the nature of scientific knowledge, the practice of scientific inquiry, and the interplay of science with other societal elements. For students looking to understand the broader context in which scientific theories arise, evolve, and sometimes fade away, exploring philosophy of science research paper topics offers invaluable insights.

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Logic and Scientific Reasoning.
Induction, Deduction, and Abduction in Science.
Falsifiability as a Criterion for Scientific Theory.
The Role of Observation and Experimentation.
Theory-ladenness of Observation.
The Duhem-Quine Thesis.
Confirmation and Empirical Content.
Science and Pseudoscience: Demarcation Problem.
The Underdetermination of Theories.
Models and Analogies in Science.
Presocratic Natural Philosophers.
Aristotelian Science.
The Scientific Renaissance.
Logical Positivism and Logical Empiricism.
Popper’s Critical Rationalism.
Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
Lakatos and Research Programs.
Feyerabend’s Epistemological Anarchy.
The Evolution of Scientific Explanation.
The Emergence of Quantum Mechanics and its Philosophical Implications.
The Copernican Revolution.
The Darwinian Revolution.
Einstein’s Relativity and its Impact.
Quantum Mechanics: A New Worldview.
The Double Helix and the New Biology.
Shifts in Geoscience: From Geocentrism to Plate Tectonics.
The Rise of Systems Biology.
The Cognitive Revolution in Psychology.
Big Bang Theory: A Cosmological Revolution.
The Digital Revolution and Computational Sciences.
The Debate on Scientific Realism.
Arguments for and against Anti-realism.
Instrumentalism: A Middle Path?
Structural Realism.
Entity Realism.
Theories of Truth in Science.
The No Miracles Argument.
The Pessimistic Meta-induction Argument.
Realism about Theories vs. Realism about Entities.
The Ontic and Epistemic Views of Scientific Explanation.
The Nature of Scientific Laws.
Causation in Scientific Theories.
Regularity Theories of Causal Relations.
Counterfactual Theories of Causation.
Probabilistic Causation.
The Issue of Time in Causation.
Laws Underlying Randomness and Chaos.
Reductionism and Emergent Properties.
Mechanisms in Scientific Explanation.
The Role of Mathematics in Science.
Ethics in Clinical Trials.
Dual-use Dilemma in Scientific Research.
Environmental Ethics and Science.
Neuroethics: Implications of Neuroscience.
Genetic Engineering and Moral Concerns.
Science, Technology, and Society: Ethical Interactions.
The Ethical Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence.
Responsibility in Scientific Communication.
Animal Experimentation: Ethical Pros and Cons.
Data Privacy and Bioinformatics.
The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge.
Science and Gender: Feminist Epistemology.
Ethnoscience and Traditional Knowledge Systems.
Public Understanding of Science.
Science Communication and Media.
Science Education and Cultural Context.
Science Policy and Governance.
The Role of Science in Democracy.
Scientific Consensus and Controversies.
The Relationship between Science, Industry, and Politics.
Science and Religion: Conflict or Coexistence?
Evolution vs. Creationism Debate.
Cosmology, Big Bang, and Religious Interpretations.
The Anthropic Principle and Design Arguments.
Neurotheology: The Neural Basis of Religious Experiences.
Miracles: A Philosophical Examination.
The Concept of Soul in Science and Religion.
Ethics: Secular vs. Religious Perspectives.
Natural Theology and its Critiques.
Non-Western Perspectives on Science and Spirituality.
Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics.
The Challenge of Dark Matter and Dark Energy.
Complexity and Emergence in Science.
Cognitive Science and the Nature of Consciousness.
The Problem of Measurement in Science.
Climate Science and Controversies.
Evolutionary Psychology: Promises and Pitfalls.
Neuroplasticity and the Changing Brain.
The Limits of Computability.
Theoretical Challenges in Modern Cosmology.
Futuristic Perspectives on the Philosophy of Science.
Posthumanism and the Future of Humanity.
The Singularity: Myth or Inevitable Future?
Ethics of Advanced AI and Superintelligent Machines.
The Philosophy of Virtual Realities.
Predictive Science and its Implications.
Synthetic Biology and the Creation of Life.
Space Exploration and the Search for Extraterrestrial Life.
The Future of Medicine: Personalized, Predictive, and Preventive.
The Post-Truth Era: Science in a World of Alternative Facts.
Teleportation, Time Travel, and Other Scientific Frontiers.

The world of philosophy of science is vast, dynamic, and perpetually relevant, making the selection of philosophy of science research paper topics both an exciting and daunting task for students. These topics don’t just represent isolated academic inquiries; they influence and are influenced by the way we think, act, and perceive our world. It is the fusion of science, with its empirical rigor, and philosophy, with its reflective depth, that makes these topics an indispensable part of a student’s intellectual journey. As the next generation of philosophers of science, students have an unmatched opportunity to shape the discourse on the very nature and direction of scientific endeavor.

The Range of Philosophy of Science Research Paper Topics

Introduction

Science and philosophy are two stalwarts that have guided human understanding for centuries. While science seeks empirical explanations, philosophy delves into the conceptual foundations and implications of those explanations. The philosophy of science, then, acts as a bridge, linking these two domains and providing insights into the nature, methods, and values of scientific endeavors. For the budding philosopher or scientist, exploring the intertwined relationship between science and philosophy is not only enlightening but also pivotal for holistic academic growth.

Expansive Array of Topics Within Philosophy of Science

At first glance, the philosophy of science might seem like a narrow field. However, as one delves deeper, it becomes evident that the topics within this discipline are as varied as they are profound. From understanding the nature and structure of scientific theories to examining the ethical implications of scientific practices, the range is vast. Topics like scientific realism, causation, and demarcation between science and pseudoscience challenge students to question and reflect upon the fundamental aspects of scientific knowledge.

Historical Milestones in Scientific Philosophy

Tracing the history of the philosophy of science is akin to tracing the evolution of human thought. The ancients, from Aristotle to the medieval Islamic scholars, laid the groundwork for understanding the natural world. Their ideas, although sometimes flawed from a modern perspective, set the stage for the Scientific Revolution. Thinkers like Thomas Kuhn, with his concept of paradigm shifts, or Karl Popper, emphasizing falsifiability as a cornerstone of scientific validity, revolutionized how we think about scientific progress and knowledge. The transition from a time when science was indistinguishable from philosophy to an era of specialized scientific disciplines tells a tale of human achievement and the relentless pursuit of understanding.

Philosophy of Science: The Backbone of Scientific Advancements

At the heart of every significant scientific advancement, there lies a philosophical question. For instance, the shift from Newtonian mechanics to Einstein’s theory of relativity was not just a change in equations but a profound alteration in our understanding of space, time, and reality. Philosophical scrutiny is what differentiates science from mere observation. It raises questions like: “What counts as evidence?” “Are there limits to understanding?” “How do scientific models relate to reality?” Such reflections ensure that science remains grounded, self-critical, and progressive.

Another significant contribution of the philosophy of science is its emphasis on the ethical dimensions of scientific practices. As science advances, it often ventures into territories that were once the domain of speculative fiction: genetic engineering, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing, to name a few. Philosophers of science prompt us to ask not just “Can we?” but also “Should we?” By doing so, they ensure that scientific advancements benefit humanity and respect our shared values.

Significance of Selecting the Right Research Paper Topics

For a student of philosophy or science, selecting the right research paper topic is crucial. It’s not just about academic grades but about sparking a genuine interest and passion for the subject. Engaging with the right topic can lead to profound insights and even lay the foundation for future academic or research pursuits.

Diving deep into a topic like the ethical implications of AI, for instance, might lead one to explore the realms of cognitive science, machine learning, and moral philosophy. On the other hand, exploring the philosophical challenges posed by quantum mechanics might push students to grapple with the very nature of reality and causality.

In essence, the topic chosen becomes a window to the vast expanse of knowledge and inquiry, guiding the student’s academic trajectory. It’s no exaggeration to say that a well-chosen research topic in the philosophy of science can shape the intellectual growth of the individual, pushing boundaries and illuminating uncharted territories of thought.

The philosophy of science, with its myriad research paper topics, stands as a testament to humanity’s relentless pursuit of understanding. It’s not just an academic discipline but a reflection of our collective journey through time, charting our advancements, our questions, our challenges, and our aspirations. In today’s academic landscape, where interdisciplinarity and critical thinking are prized, the philosophy of science offers a rich, varied, and ever-evolving field of study. For those ready to embark on this intellectual voyage, the topics within this discipline promise not just academic excellence but a deeper understanding of the world and our place within it.

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Teaching the Nature of Science from a Philosophical Perspective

Published: 22 July 2020
Volume 29 , pages 1417–1439, ( 2020 )

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Yvonne Lampert 1

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This paper draws attention to basic philosophical perspectives which are of theoretical and methodological interest for science education, general education and curriculum research. It focuses on potential contributions philosophy class can offer if philosophy education opens up for science and for a collaboration of teachers in the context of post-compulsory education. A central educational goal is to connect basic philosophical skills with any curricular intellectual practice. This implies the possibility of crossing disciplinary boundaries. Hence, the present paper questions the disciplinary rigidity of education and aims at bridging the artificial gap between teaching philosophy and teaching science in order to enrich the individual school subjects involved. Towards this end, this article sketches out a conceptual framework for the issue of interdisciplinarity with regard to philosophy and science in upper secondary school. This framework takes into account aspects of the nature of science (NOS), history and philosophy of science (HPS) and the critical thinking approach which have significant implications for teaching. It aims to facilitate a basic understanding of the significant positive impact philosophy could have on improving scientific literacy as well as decision-making in general. I set forth methods of cross-curricular teaching which can promote innovation in education as interdisciplinarity already does in research since there is growing appreciation of collaboration and partnership between philosophy and science.

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Philosophy of Education and Science Education: A Vital but Underdeveloped Relationship

Three Perspectives on the Science-Religion Issue in Science Education: Interdisciplinarity, Value or Ideology Orientation and Responsible Personalization

Adapting practice-based philosophy of science to teaching of science students

Sara Green, Hanne Andersen, … Henrik Kragh Sørensen

Research about the relationship between mathematics and philosophy has a long tradition. For contemporary accounts, see the philosophical and didactical approach to mathematics by François and van Bendegem ( 2011 ) which intends to give room for a philosophy of mathematics in school curricula, and, moreover, corresponds to a “movement away from an implicit philosophy of mathematics towards an explicit philosophy in mathematics” (2011, 5). However, suggestions for how to include philosophy in mathematics education had not been reflected in classroom practice consequently (cf. Prediger 2011 ).

Cf. Höttecke and Silva ( 2011 ), discussing major obstacles that prevent successful incorporation of HPS in physics education and Prediger ( 2011 , 44f.), who investigates reasons for the absence of an explicit philosophy of mathematics in mathematics classroom practice.

Project 2061 is a long-term research and development initiative that began its work in 1985. It focuses on improving science education and emphasizes the understanding of key concepts and principles of science.

An example for philosophy’s impact on science has been given by Laplane ( 2016 ); the critical examination of the concept of cancer stem cells and the philosophical analysis of the historical roots of the cancer stem cell theory showed that this theory emerged laden with conceptual ambiguities. It sheds new light on the nature of normal and malignant stem cells. On philosophy’s influence of stem cell biology and life sciences (Philosophy of Biology), see a series of articles offering philosophical perspectives: https://elifesciences.org/collections/7efbfb7a/philosophy-of-biology . On the relationship of philosophy and physics, cf. Rovelli ( 2018 ).

In this context, the term “science” is used in the very broad usage of “science” as it is represented in the German term “Wissenschaft”. It includes not only the natural sciences but also mathematics, social sciences and humanities. I focus on the nature of science in a more general sense driven by the question “what is science?”. Following this question, it is not asked for necessary and sufficient criteria of science or one essential common feature but rather for family resemblances as Wittgenstein put this idea forward in his Philosophical Investigations . We find a series of overlapping similarities, none of which is completely general.

For the understanding of philosophy (class) as a contribution to analyze concepts and grammar, to apply logic and to bridge sciences, cf. Lampert ( 2019b ). Teaching material that addresses historical, ethical and philosophical questions related to science is offered, for example, by Swinbank and Taylor ( 2007 ), Potochnik et al. ( 2019 ) and Lampert ( 2019a ).

Perspectival realism is committed to both the existence of mind-independent things and to the historical and cultural situatedness of scientific knowledge (cf. Massimi 2018 ).

Cf. Popper ( 1952 , 125): “ We are not students of subject matter but students of problems. And problems may cut right across the borders of any subject matter or discipline.”

Cf. Blachowicz ( 2009 , 310). Unfortunately, philosophers (in the context of science textbooks) are “rarely treated as epistemologists” (Blachowicz 2009 , 311).

Being interested in “aspects of scientific explanation”, Hempel ( 1965 ) distinguishes between reason-seeking why-questions and explanation-seeking why-questions.

Assessing students’ use of argument has been seen as a future challenge for science education research (Henderson et al. 2018 ) and, furthermore, is an important task in the interest of general education.

Reputable scientists agree that anthropogenic climate change is occurring (cf. Potochnik et al. 2019 , chapter 1); nevertheless, major portions of the public remain intransigent on this (at least in the “American Mind”, Ballew et al. 2019 ).

Cf. Hoyningen-Huene ( 2013 ), providing a comprehensive philosophical account of the nature of science.

Boghossian ( 2006 , 4). Boghossian states that the influence of contructivist’s ideas hold in philosophy “is actually quite weak”, “at least within the mainstream of analytic philosophy departments within the English-speaking world” (Boghossian 2006 , 7). However, anti-scientific ideas within the field of philosophy have damaged the philosophical aspiration among scientists. Their fear of relativism and modern scepticism might be one reason for tending to have a distanced stance towards philosophy.

Zemplén ( 2007 ) analyzes this textbook for TOK by Alchin thoroughly. He reminds us that “a textbook is not only a transmitter of knowledge but also a transmitter of a mode of inquiry, of questioning and of finding answers” (Zemplén 2007 , 177). Alchin’s TOK book offers a rather popular image of science and, in a way, neglects the individual critical investigation and evaluation of the students.

There is empirical evidence that indicates favourable results in the use of HPS, for instance, in the conceptual learning in physics (Teixeira et al. 2012 ). On the other hand, there is empirical evidence that indicates obstacles that prevent a successful integration of HPS into science class (Höttecke and Silva 2011 ; Henke and Höttecke 2015 ).

Viennot ( 2019 ) presents a synthesis of some investigations concerning the co-development of conceptual understanding and critical attitude in university students. The results strongly suggest that it is not fruitful to envisage conceptual and critical developments separately.

Curriculum development, team teaching, political stakes in curriculum innovation and a basis for a common conception of interdiciplinary education across the educational spectrum including integrative processes are examined in Klein ( 2002 ). Sampson and Blanchard ( 2012 ) who build their study on the work of Duschl and Osborne ( 2002 ) state that opportunities for students to participate in authentic argumentation inside the science classroom are rare even though students’ engagement in scientific argumentation can improve the teaching and learning of science. They found that teachers struggle to engage students in scientific argumentation. Erduran ( 2019 ) offers practical guidelines for teachers, curriculum developers and teacher educators being concerned with argumentation in everyday chemistry classrooms as an important process for building knowledge and understanding in the scientific community. Furthermore, the Family Resemblance Approach to NOS, proposed by philosophers of science (Irzik and Nola 2011 ) and reconceptualized by Erduran and Dagher ( 2014 ), provides an ambitious and practical vision for NOS and a more comprehensive framework (Erduran, Dagher & McDonald 2019 ).

Cf. Hand and Winstanley ( 2009 ) who cite in the beginning of their introduction to Philosophy in Schools John Humphrys from BBC Radio: “ Over the last week or so we have been asking you for ideas about what subject ought to be taught in schools but are not taught. Now, there have been many suggestions: basic conversation skills, that was one of them; how to change a plug; map-reading, could be useful for some; but the overwhelming winner – you may be surprised by this – was philosophy. (John Humpreys, Today , BBC Radio 4, broadcast on 26/08/04).” The contributors of Philosophy in Schools and other researchers believe that it is time to put philosophy in the school curriculum.

Grüne-Yanoff ( 2014 ) points out that within the European Commission’s Quality Framework a “critical understanding of theories and principles” for bachelor degrees and “critical awareness of knowledge issues in a field” for master degrees are considered to belong centrally to any scientific education (Grüne-Yanoff 2014 , 121). Bachelor degree holders are required to take “responsibility for decision-making in unpredictable work or study contexts”. Furthermore, graduates are supposed to have “critical awareness of knowledge issues ... at the interface between different fields” and “to integrate knowledge from different fields”. Grüne-Yanoff follows: “These requirements stress the need for applying knowledge and skills outside of the contexts in which they were acquired” (121). He advocates specifically designed courses of philosophy of science for science students at university.

Gurgel et al. ( 2017 ) consider the narrative to be of great interest to science education. Thought experiments have been employed in philosophy and science for educational and various other purposes (most famous are thought experiments, for instance, by Galilei, Stevin, Maxwell and Schrödinger).

Osborne and Reigh recommend a schema that classifies questions in terms of their epistemic function as “a vital tool for highlighting the importance of questions in the classroom” (Osborne and Reigh 2020 , 207).

For the characterization of laws and their ontological, epistemical and historical senses regarding chemical education, cf. Erduran ( 2007 ) and see the theories-law-model in different science domains in Erduran and Dagher 2014 , 114).

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EPA Scientists Contribute to Paper in Nature that Shows Common Household Chemicals May Disrupt Brain Development

Published April 16, 2024

Photo of primary culture from a rat neocortex showing neurons (in green), glial cells (in red), and nuclei (in blue) grown in vitro. Credit: Bill Mundy, US EPA, retired.

There are many existing chemicals that have incomplete data about their potential toxicity and effects on human health. Children are a particularly susceptible population and chemical exposure can disrupt critical periods in their development, especially brain development.

EPA scientists contributed to the development of data on over 1,800 compounds using a high-throughput developmental screen. Their research determined that quaternary compounds, a class of chemicals that are common in personal care products and disinfectants, may disrupt brain development in children. The findings were published in Nature .

High-throughput screening is a process that allows scientists to quickly test chemicals to see how they interact with a specific biological target or cell type. After screening over 1,800 compounds, researchers identified quaternary compounds as a class that may affect oligodendrocytes by impacting cell health. Oligodendrocytes are a type of cell in the central nervous system. Oligodendrocytes play an important role in neuron function and longevity and their disruption can lead to cognitive and motor disability. Additionally, some organophosphate flame retardants disrupted oligodendrocyte growth in a cell-based, in vitro model. Organophosphate flame retardants are commonly found in household items such as furniture and electronics.

While oligodendrocytes are crucial for brain development, their susceptibility to various chemicals has been studied less than other brain cells, such as neurons. This high-throughput screen is a first step in identifying chemicals that may affect oligodendrocyte development and shows how these methods can be used to identify potentially toxic chemicals quickly and efficiently.

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Published: 08 April 2024

The PARTNER trial of neoadjuvant olaparib in triple-negative breast cancer

Jean E. Abraham ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-0688-4807 1 , 2 ,
Karen Pinilla ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-2723-0805 1 , 2 ,
Alimu Dayimu 3 ,
Louise Grybowicz 4 ,
Nikolaos Demiris 5 ,
Caron Harvey 4 ,
Lynsey M. Drewett 6 ,
Rebecca Lucey ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-6226-447X 1 , 2 ,
Alexander Fulton 1 , 2 ,
Anne N. Roberts 4 ,
Joanna R. Worley 1 , 2 ,
Anita Chhabra ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-9899-8010 7 ,
Wendi Qian ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-4238-3471 8 ,
Anne-Laure Vallier 4 ,
Richard M. Hardy 4 ,
Steve Chan 9 ,
Tamas Hickish 10 ,
Devashish Tripathi 11 , 12 ,
Ramachandran Venkitaraman 13 ,
Mojca Persic 14 ,
Shahzeena Aslam 15 ,
Daniel Glassman 16 ,
Sanjay Raj 17 , 18 , 19 ,
Annabel Borley 20 ,
Jeremy P. Braybrooke 21 ,
Stephanie Sutherland 22 ,
Emma Staples 23 ,
Lucy C. Scott 24 ,
Mark Davies 25 ,
Cheryl A. Palmer 26 ,
Margaret Moody 27 ,
Mark J. Churn 28 , 29 , 30 ,
Jacqueline C. Newby 31 ,
Mukesh B. Mukesh 32 ,
Amitabha Chakrabarti 33 ,
Rebecca R. Roylance 34 ,
Philip C. Schouten 35 ,
Nicola C. Levitt 36 ,
Karen McAdam 37 ,
Anne C. Armstrong 38 ,
Ellen R. Copson 39 ,
Emma McMurtry 40 ,
Marc Tischkowitz ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-7880-0628 41 ,
Elena Provenzano 35 &
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Breast cancer
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PARTNER is a prospective, phase II-III, randomised controlled clinical trial, which recruited patients with Triple Negative Breast Cancer (TNBC) 1,2 , who were gBRCA wild type (gBRCAwt) 3 . Patients (n=559) were randomised on a 1:1 basis to neoadjuvant carboplatin with paclitaxel +/- olaparib 150mg twice daily, days 3 to 14, for 4 cycles (gap schedule olaparib, research arm) followed by 3 cycles of anthracycline chemotherapy before surgery. The primary endpoint was pathological complete response (pCR) 4 , and secondary endpoints included event-free survival (EFS), and overall survival (OS) 5 . pCR was achieved in 51% in the research arm and 52% in the control arm (p=0.753). Estimated EFS at 36 months in research and control arms were 80% and 79% (log-rank p>0.9); OS were 90% and 87.2% (log-rank p=0.8) respectively. In patients with pCR, estimated EFS at 36 months was 90%, and with non-pCR was 70% (log-rank p < 0.001) and OS was 96% and 83% (log-rank p < 0.001) respectively. Neo-adjuvant olaparib did not improve pCR rates, EFS or OS when added to carboplatin/paclitaxel and anthracycline chemotherapy in patients with TNBC (gBRCAwt). This is in marked contrast to the major benefit of olaparib (gap schedule) in those with gBRCA pathogenic variants (gBRCAm) which is reported separately (gBRCAm article). ClinicalTrials.gov ID NCT03150576

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A multicentre single arm phase 2 trial of neoadjuvant pyrotinib and letrozole plus dalpiciclib for triple-positive breast cancer

Nan Niu, Fang Qiu, … Caigang Liu

A phase II study of palbociclib plus letrozole plus trastuzumab as neoadjuvant treatment for clinical stages II and III ER+ HER2+ breast cancer (PALTAN)

Foluso O. Ademuyiwa, Donald W. Northfelt, … Cynthia X. Ma

Olaparib monotherapy for Asian patients with a germline BRCA mutation and HER2-negative metastatic breast cancer: OlympiAD randomized trial subgroup analysis

Seock-Ah Im, Binghe Xu, … Norikazu Masuda

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Rebecca R. Roylance

Department of Histopathology, Addenbrooke’s Hospital, Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, Cambridge, UK

Philip C. Schouten & Elena Provenzano

Oxford University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust, Oxford, UK

Nicola C. Levitt

Peterborough City Hospital, North West Anglia NHS Foundation Trust, Peterborough, UK

Karen McAdam

The Christie NHS Foundation Trust and Division of Cancer Sciences, Manchester, UK

Anne C. Armstrong

Cancer Sciences Academic Unit, University of Southampton, Southampton, UK

Ellen R. Copson

EMC2 Clinical Consultancy Ltd, Sale, Manchester, UK

Emma McMurtry

Department of Medical Genetics, National Institute for Health Research, Cambridge Biomedical Research Centre, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK

Marc Tischkowitz

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Correspondence to Jean E. Abraham .

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This file contains: 1. Summary from protocol; and 2. PARTNER Trial Consortium Members.

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Abraham, J.E., Pinilla, K., Dayimu, A. et al. The PARTNER trial of neoadjuvant olaparib in triple-negative breast cancer. Nature (2024). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-07384-2

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Published : 08 April 2024

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-07384-2

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The aim of this paper is to examine the nature, scope and importance of philosophy in the light of its relation to other disciplines. This work pays its focus on the various fundamental problems ...
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