Logo

Brill | Nijhoff

Brill | Wageningen Academic

Brill Germany / Austria

Böhlau

Brill | Fink

Brill | mentis

Brill | Schöningh

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

V&R unipress

Open Access

Open Access for Authors

Open Access and Research Funding

Open Access for Librarians

Open Access for Academic Societies

Discover Brill’s Open Access Content

Organization

Stay updated

Corporate Social Responsiblity

Investor Relations

Policies, rights & permissions

Review a Brill Book

Author Portal

How to publish with Brill: Files & Guides

Fonts, Scripts and Unicode

Publication Ethics & COPE Compliance

Data Sharing Policy

Brill MyBook

Ordering from Brill

Author Newsletter

Piracy Reporting Form

Sales Managers and Sales Contacts

Ordering From Brill

Titles No Longer Published by Brill

Catalogs, Flyers and Price Lists

E-Book Collections Title Lists and MARC Records

How to Manage your Online Holdings

LibLynx Access Management

Discovery Services

KBART Files

MARC Records

Online User and Order Help

Rights and Permissions

Latest Key Figures

Latest Financial Press Releases and Reports

Annual General Meeting of Shareholders

Share Information

Specialty Products

Press and Reviews

Share link with colleague or librarian

Stay informed about this journal!

  • Get New Issue Alerts
  • Get Advance Article alerts
  • Get Citation Alerts

Political Dynasties and Economic Development: Evidence using Nighttime Light in the Philippines

Political dynasties, by limiting political competition, are thought to exacerbate corruption, poverty, and abuse of power. This paper examines the economic effects of the presence of political dynasties in Philippine cities and municipalities, taking into account possible channels in the local dynastic cycle – the framework in which politicians try to balance their goals to perform well for their constituents, to divert resources for personal gain, and to continue to be in power. Due to the lack of extensive income accounts or other economic indicators in finer geographical units (i.e., city or municipality level), we use the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program-Operational Linescan System ( DMSP-OLS ) nighttime light data as our proxy for economic activity. Using a panel of Philippine municipalities and cities, we find that, in general, the relationship of political dynasties on economic performance is weak. However, we find that a higher share of economic expenditures leads to lower economic development in municipalities where the mayor, governor, and congressman belong to the same clan. We see this as an indication of weak institutions of checks and balances in localities with dynasties.

Access options

Get access to the full article by using one of the access options below.

Buy instant access (PDF download and unlimited online access):

Other access options

Institutional Login

Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials

Personal login

Log in with your brill.com account

Abinales , Patricio N. 2000 . Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-state . Quezon City : Ateneo University Press .

  • Search Google Scholar
  • Export Citation

Abinales , Patricio N. , and Donna J. , Amoroso . 2017 . State and Society in the Philippines . Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield .

Acemoglu , Daron , and James A. , Robinson . 2012 . Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty . New York : Crown Publishing Group .

Alesina , Alberto , Stelios , Michalopoulos , and Elias , Papaioannou . 2016 . “ Ethnic Inequality .” Journal of Political Economy 124 : 428 – 488 . https://doi.org/10.1086/685300 .

Aspinall , Edward , Michael W. , Davidson , Allen , Hicken , and Meredith L. , Weiss . 2016 . “ Local Machines and Vote Brokerage in the Philippines .” Contemporary Southeast Asia 38 : 191 – 196 . https://www.jstor.org/stable/24916627 .

Atienza , Maria Ela L. , 2004 . “ The Politics of Health Devolution in the Philippines: Experiences of Municipalities in a Devolved Set-up .” Philippine Political Science Journal 25 : 25 – 54 . https://doi.org/10.1080/01154451.2004.9754256 .

Besley , Timothy , and Marta , Reynal-Querol . 2017 . “ The Logic of Hereditary Rule: Theory and Evidence .” Journal of Economic Growth 22 : 123 – 144 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10887-017-9140-4 .

Bragança, Arthur, Claudio Ferraz, and Juan Rios. 2015. “Political dynasties and the quality of government.” Unpublished manuscript. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Political-Dynasties-and-the-Quality-of-Government%E2%87%A4-Bragan%C3%A7a-Ferraz/0149623678ec1e1f05a6c93acae8d6fc49e0a7dc?p2df.

Bruederle , Anna , and Roland , Hodler . 2018 . “ Nighttime Lights as a Proxy for Human Development at the Local Level .” PloS ONE 13 : e0202231. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0202231 .

Canare , Tristan A. , Ronald U. , Mendoza and Mario Antonio , Lopez . 2018 . “ An Empirical Analysis of Vote Buying among the Poor: Evidence from Elections in the Philippines .” South East Asia Research 26 : 58 – 84 . https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X17753420 .

Calvo , Ernesto , and Maria Victoria , Murillo . 2004 . “ Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market .” American Journal of Political Science 48 : 742 – 757 . https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00099.x .

Collas-Monsod , Solita , Toby C. , Monsod and Geoffrey M. , Ducanes . 2004 . “ Philippines’ Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals: Geographical and Political Correlates of Subnational Outcomes .” Journal of Human Development 5 : 121 – 149 . https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880310001660238 .

Capuno, Joseph J. 2005. “The Quality of Local Governance and Development Under Decentralization in the Philippines”. UPSE Discussion Paper No. 2005–06. https://www.econ.upd.edu.ph/dp/index.php/dp/article/view/124/122.

Capuno , Joseph J. . 2011 . “ Incumbents and Innovations Under Decentralization: an Empirical Exploration of Selected Local Governments in the Philippines .” Asian Journal of Political Science 19 : 48 – 73 . https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2011.568243 .

Capuno , Joseph J. . 2012 . “ The PIPER Forum on 20 years of Fiscal Decentralization: a Synthesis .” Philippine Review of Economics 49 : 191 – 202 .

Cruz, Cesi. 2014. “Buying One Vote at a Time or Buying in Bulk? Politician Networks and Electoral Strategies”. Mimeo. http://www.scpi.politicaldata.org/SCPIVII/Cruz.pdf .

Cruz , Cesi , Julien , Labonne and Pablo , Querubin . 2017 . “ Politician Family Networks and Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from the Philippines .” American Economic Review 107 : 3006 – 3037 . https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150343 .

Cruz , Cesi , Julien , Labonne and Pablo , Querubin . 2020 . “ Social Network Structures and the Politics of Public Goods Provision: Evidence from the Philippines .” American Political Science Review 114 : 486 – 501 . https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000789 .

Coronel , Sheila S. , Yvonne T. , Chua L. , Rimban and Booma B. , Cruz . 2004 . The Rulemakers: How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate . Quezon City : Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism .

Costinot , Arnaud , Dave , Donaldson , and Cory , Smith . 2016 . “ Evolving Comparative Advantage and the Impact of Climate Change in Agricultural markets: Evidence from 1.7 million Fields around the World .” Journal of Political Economy 124 : 205 – 248 . https://doi.org/10.1086/684719 .

Dal Bó , Ernesto , Pedro , Dal Bó , and Jason , Snyder . 2009 . “ Political Dynasties .” The Review of Economic Studies 76 : 115 – 142 . https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00519.x .

Das, Sumonkanti. 2016. “Robust Inference in Poverty Mapping”, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wollongong. https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/4822 .

Das , Sumonkanti , and Ray , Chambers . 2017 . “ Robust Mean‐squared Error Estimation for Poverty Estimates Based on the Method of Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw .” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society) 180 : 1137 – 1161 . https://doi.org/10.1111/rssa.12311 .

Das , Sumonkanti , and Stephen , Haslett . 2019 . “ A Comparison of Methods for Poverty Estimation in Developing Countries .” International Statistical Review 87 : 368 – 392 . https://doi.org/10.1111/insr.12314 .

De Dios , Emanuel S. 2007 . “ Local Politics and Local Economy .” In Dynamics of Regional Development: The Philippines in East Asia , edited by Arsenio , Balisacan and Hal , Hill 157 – 203 . Cheltenham : Edward Elgar .

De Dios , Emmanuel S. , and Ricardo D. , Ferrer . 2001 . “ Corruption in the Philippines: Framework and Context .” Public Policy 5 : 1 – 42 . https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Study-1-Corruption-in-the-Philippines-%3A-Framework-Dios-Ferrer/8d00c17199aa8c71042442363c2399c8f2b1fb48?p2df .

De Vaal , Albert , and Wouter , Ebben . 2011 . “ Institutions and the Relation Between Corruption and Economic Growth .” Review of Development Economics 15 : 108 – 123 . https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9361.2010.00596.x .

Donaldson , Dave , and Adam , Storeygard . 2016 . “ The View from Above: Applications of Satellite Data in Economics .” Journal of Economic Perspectives 30 : 171 – 198 . https://doi.org/171-98.10.1257/jep.30.4.171 .

Dridi , Mohamed . 2013 . “ Corruption and Economic Growth: the Transmission Channels .” Journal of Business Studies Quarterly 4 : 121 – 152 . https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47873/ .

Fafchamps , Marcel , and Julien , Labonne . 2017 . “ Do Politicians’ Relatives Get Better Jobs? Evidence from Municipal Elections .” The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 33 : 268 – 300 . https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewx001 .

George, Siddharth Eapen, and Dominic Ponattu. 2018. “Like Father, Like Son? The Effect of Political Dynasties on Economic Development”. Working Paper. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/siddharthgeorge/files/sid_dynasties_draft_29jan2019.pdf .

Henderson , Vernon , Adam , Storeygard , and David , Weil . 2012 . “ Measuring Economic Growth from Outer Space .” American Economic Review 102 : 994 – 1028 . https://doi.org/994-1028.10.1257/aer.102.2.994 .

Hodler , Roland , and Paul A. , Raschky . 2014 . “ Regional Favoritism .” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129 : 995 – 1033 . https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qju004 .

Hollnsteiner , Mary Racelis . 1963 . The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality . Quezon City : Community Development Research Council, University of the Philippines .

Hutchcroft , Paul D. 2012 . “ Re-slicing the Pie of Patronage: the Politics of the Internal Revenue Allotment in the Philippines, 1991–2010 .” Philippine Review of Economics 49 : 109 – 134 .

Hutchcroft , Paul D. , and Joel , Rocamora . 2003 . “ Strong Demands and Weak Institutions: The Origins and Evolution of the Democratic Deficit in the Philippines .” Journal of East Asian Studies 3 : 259 – 292 . https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800001363 .

Jiao, C., A. Calonzo and H. Dormido. 2019. “A Power Shift Is Under Way in Duterte’s Game of Thrones.” Bloomberg Report. Accessed June 7, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-philippine-political-dynasties/ .

Kulkarni, Rajendra, Kingsley E. Haynes, Roger R. Stough, and James D. Riggle. 2011. “Revisiting Night Lights as Proxy for Economic Growth: a Multi-year Light Based Growth Indicator (LBGI) for China, India and the US.” GMU School of Public Policy Research Paper 2011–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1777546 .

Labonne , Julien . 2016 . “ Local Political Business Cycles: Evidence from Philippine Municipalities .” Journal of Development Economics 121 : 56 – 62 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.03.004 .

Landé , Carl Herman . 1965 . Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine politics . New Haven : Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University .

Lingao, Ed. 2013. “The Clan Politics of ARMM: Ampatuans, Web of Kin Warp Maguindanao Polls.” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism. Accessed June 7, 2020. https://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/UNDP4/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/PCIJ-2012-Clan-Politics-of-ARMM.pdf.

Llanto , Gilberto . 2012 . “ The Assignment of Functions and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the Philippines 20 years after Decentralization .” Philippine Review of Economics 49 : 37 – 80 . https://www.econ.upd.edu.ph/pre/index.php/pre/article/view/671 .

Martinez , A. 2017 . “ Night Light Data: An Innovative Way to Track Development .” Development Asia . Accessed February 24, 2020 . https://development.asia/insight/night-light-data-innovative-way-track-development .

Mendoza, Ronald U., Jan Fredrick Cruz, I. I. Yap, and David Barua. 2014. “Political Party Switching: It’s More Fun in the Philippines.” Asian Institute of Management ( AIM ) Working Paper 14–019. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492913 .

Mendoza , Ronald U. , Edsel L. , Beja Jr , Victor S. , Venida , and David B. , Yap . 2012 . “ Inequality in Democracy: Insights from an Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress .” Philippine Political Science Journal 33 : 132 – 145 . https://doi.org/10.1080/01154451.2012.734094 .

Mendoza , Ronald U. , Edsel L. , Beja Jr , Victor S. , Venida , and David B. , Yap . 2016 . “ Political Dynasties and Poverty: Measurement and Evidence of Linkages in the Philippines .” Oxford Development Studies 44 : 189 – 201 . https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2016.1169264 .

Michalopoulos, Stelios, and Elias Papaioannou. 2014 . “ National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa .” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 129 : 151 – 213 . https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt029 .

Mo , Pak Hung . 2001 . “ Corruption and Economic Growth .” Journal of Comparative Economics 29 : 66 – 79 . https://doi.org/10.1006/jcec.2000.1703 .

Montiel , Cristina Jayme , and Victoria Marie , Chiongbian . 1991 . “ Political Psychology in the Philippines .” Political Psychology 12 : 759 – 777 . https://doi.org/10.2307/3791556 .

Olson , Mancur . 2009 . The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press .

Pabello , Aldrin . 2013 . “ An Inheritance of Power: Political Dynasties in the Philippines .” Accessed June 23, 2019 . http://www.theguidon.com/1112/main/2013/07/an-inheritance-of-power-political-dynasties-in-the-philippines/ .

Panao , Rogelio Alicor L. 2016 . “ Tried and Tested? Dynastic Persistence and Legislative Productivity at the Philippine House of Representatives .” Asian Politics & Policy 8 : 394 – 417 . https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12262 .

Purdey , Jemma , Teresa S. , Encarnacion Tadem , and Eduardo C. , Tadem . 2016 . “ Political Dynasties in the Philippines: Persistent Patterns, Perennial Problems .” South East Asia Research 24 : 328 – 340 . https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X16659730 .

Tanaka , Kiyoyasu , and Souknilanh , Keola . 2017 . “ Shedding Light on the Shadow Economy: A Nighttime Light Approach ”. Journal of Development Studies 53 : 32 – 48 . https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2016.1171845 .

Querubin, Pablo. 2012. “Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines.” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2108036 .

Querubin , Pablo . “ Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines .” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 11 : 151 – 181 . https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00014182 .

Quimpo , Nathan Gilbert . 2007 . “ The Philippines: Political Parties and Corruption .” Southeast Asian Affairs : 277 – 294 . https://www.jstor.org/stable/27913337 .

Quimpo , Nathan Gilbert . 2009 . “ The Philippines: Predatory Regime, Growing Authoritarian Features .” The Pacific Review 22 : 335 – 353 . https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740903068388 .

Ravanilla, Nico, Renard Sexton, and Dotan Haim. 2019. “Outsiders vs. Insiders: How Local Politics Drives Duterte’s War on Drugs in the Philippines.” Unpublished manuscript. http://dotanhaim.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Philippines_Drug_War_Ravanilla_Sexton_Haim.pdf .

Rodrik , Dani , Arvind , Subramanian , and Francesco , Trebbi . 2004 . “ Institutions Rule: the Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development .” Journal of Economic Growth 9 : 131 – 165 . https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JOEG.0000031425.72248.85 .

Schiavo-Campo , Salvatore , and Mary P. , Judd . 2005 . The Mindanao conflict in the Philippines: Roots, Costs, and Potential Peace Dividend . Washington, DC : World Bank . http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/701961468776746799/The-Mindanao-conflict-in-the-Philippines-roots-costs-and-potential-peace-dividend .

Sidel , John Thayer . 1989 . “ Beyond Patron-client Relations: Warlordism and Local Politics in the Philippines .” Kasarinlan 4 : 19 – 30 .

Solon , Jose Orville C. , Raul V. , Fabella , and Joseph J. , Capuno . 2009 . “ Is Local Development Good Politics? Local Development Expenditures and the Re-election of Governors in the Philippines in the 1990s .” Asian Journal of Political Science 17 : 265 – 284 . https://doi.org/10.1080/02185370903403475 .

Torres , W. M. III > . 2014 . Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao . Quezon City : Ateneo de Manila University Press .

Tusalem , Rollin F. , and Jeffrey J. , Pe–Aguirre . 2013 . “ The Effect of Political Dynasties on Effective Democratic Governance: Evidence from the Philippines .” Asian Politics & Policy 5 : 359 – 386 . https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12037 .

Wang , Wen , Hui , Cheng , and Li , Zhang . 2012 . “ Poverty Assessment using DMSP/OLS Night-time Light Satellite Imagery at a Provincial Scale in China .” Advances in Space Research 49 : 1253 – 1264 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asr.2012.01.025 .

Yu , Nilan G. . 2014 . “ Social Work in Philippine Municipalities: A Critical Organizational Study .” Human Services Organizations Management, Leadership & Governance 38 : 103 – 115 . https://doi.org/10.1080/03643107.2013.828004 .

Content Metrics

Cover Philippine Political Science Journal

Reference Works

Primary source collections

COVID-19 Collection

How to publish with Brill

Open Access Content

Contact & Info

Sales contacts

Publishing contacts

Stay Updated

Newsletters

Social Media Overview

Terms and Conditions  

Privacy Statement  

Cookie Settings  

Accessibility

Legal Notice

Terms and Conditions   |   Privacy Statement   |  Cookie Settings   |   Accessibility   |  Legal Notice

Copyright © 2016-2023

Copyright © 2016-2024

  • [66.249.64.20|185.80.148.109]
  • 185.80.148.109

Character limit 500 /500

  • Search Menu
  • Advance articles
  • Featured articles
  • Virtual Issues
  • Prize-Winning Articles
  • Browse content in A - General Economics and Teaching
  • Browse content in A1 - General Economics
  • A11 - Role of Economics; Role of Economists; Market for Economists
  • A12 - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
  • Browse content in B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches
  • Browse content in B4 - Economic Methodology
  • B41 - Economic Methodology
  • Browse content in C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
  • Browse content in C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General
  • C10 - General
  • C11 - Bayesian Analysis: General
  • C12 - Hypothesis Testing: General
  • C13 - Estimation: General
  • C14 - Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General
  • C18 - Methodological Issues: General
  • Browse content in C2 - Single Equation Models; Single Variables
  • C22 - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes
  • C23 - Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
  • C26 - Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation
  • Browse content in C3 - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables
  • C31 - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
  • C32 - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes; State Space Models
  • C33 - Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models
  • C36 - Instrumental Variables (IV) Estimation
  • Browse content in C4 - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics
  • C40 - General
  • C44 - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
  • C45 - Neural Networks and Related Topics
  • Browse content in C5 - Econometric Modeling
  • C52 - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
  • C53 - Forecasting and Prediction Methods; Simulation Methods
  • C55 - Large Data Sets: Modeling and Analysis
  • Browse content in C6 - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
  • C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
  • C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
  • C63 - Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling
  • Browse content in C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
  • C70 - General
  • C71 - Cooperative Games
  • C72 - Noncooperative Games
  • C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
  • C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
  • Browse content in C8 - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs
  • C81 - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
  • Browse content in C9 - Design of Experiments
  • C90 - General
  • C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
  • C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
  • C93 - Field Experiments
  • C99 - Other
  • Browse content in D - Microeconomics
  • Browse content in D0 - General
  • D00 - General
  • D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
  • D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
  • D03 - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
  • Browse content in D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics
  • D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory
  • D12 - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
  • D13 - Household Production and Intrahousehold Allocation
  • D14 - Household Saving; Personal Finance
  • D15 - Intertemporal Household Choice: Life Cycle Models and Saving
  • D18 - Consumer Protection
  • Browse content in D2 - Production and Organizations
  • D21 - Firm Behavior: Theory
  • D22 - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
  • D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
  • D24 - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
  • Browse content in D3 - Distribution
  • D30 - General
  • D31 - Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
  • D33 - Factor Income Distribution
  • Browse content in D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
  • D40 - General
  • D42 - Monopoly
  • D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
  • D44 - Auctions
  • D47 - Market Design
  • Browse content in D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
  • D50 - General
  • D52 - Incomplete Markets
  • Browse content in D6 - Welfare Economics
  • D60 - General
  • D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
  • D62 - Externalities
  • D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
  • D64 - Altruism; Philanthropy
  • Browse content in D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
  • D70 - General
  • D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
  • D72 - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
  • D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
  • D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
  • D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
  • Browse content in D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
  • D80 - General
  • D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
  • D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
  • D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
  • D84 - Expectations; Speculations
  • D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
  • D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
  • D87 - Neuroeconomics
  • D89 - Other
  • Browse content in D9 - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics
  • D90 - General
  • D91 - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
  • D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
  • Browse content in E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
  • Browse content in E0 - General
  • E01 - Measurement and Data on National Income and Product Accounts and Wealth; Environmental Accounts
  • E02 - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
  • E1 - General Aggregative Models
  • Browse content in E2 - Consumption, Saving, Production, Investment, Labor Markets, and Informal Economy
  • E20 - General
  • E21 - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
  • E22 - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
  • E23 - Production
  • E24 - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
  • E25 - Aggregate Factor Income Distribution
  • E26 - Informal Economy; Underground Economy
  • E27 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
  • Browse content in E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
  • E30 - General
  • E31 - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
  • E32 - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
  • E37 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
  • Browse content in E4 - Money and Interest Rates
  • E43 - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
  • E44 - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
  • Browse content in E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
  • E51 - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
  • E52 - Monetary Policy
  • E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
  • Browse content in E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
  • E61 - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
  • E62 - Fiscal Policy
  • E63 - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
  • E65 - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
  • Browse content in F - International Economics
  • Browse content in F0 - General
  • F01 - Global Outlook
  • F02 - International Economic Order and Integration
  • Browse content in F1 - Trade
  • F10 - General
  • F11 - Neoclassical Models of Trade
  • F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
  • F13 - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
  • F14 - Empirical Studies of Trade
  • F15 - Economic Integration
  • F16 - Trade and Labor Market Interactions
  • F17 - Trade Forecasting and Simulation
  • Browse content in F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business
  • F20 - General
  • F21 - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
  • F22 - International Migration
  • F23 - Multinational Firms; International Business
  • Browse content in F3 - International Finance
  • F31 - Foreign Exchange
  • F32 - Current Account Adjustment; Short-Term Capital Movements
  • F33 - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
  • F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems
  • F35 - Foreign Aid
  • Browse content in F4 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
  • F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics
  • F42 - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
  • F43 - Economic Growth of Open Economies
  • F45 - Macroeconomic Issues of Monetary Unions
  • Browse content in F5 - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
  • F50 - General
  • F51 - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
  • F52 - National Security; Economic Nationalism
  • F55 - International Institutional Arrangements
  • Browse content in F6 - Economic Impacts of Globalization
  • F60 - General
  • F61 - Microeconomic Impacts
  • F66 - Labor
  • F68 - Policy
  • Browse content in G - Financial Economics
  • Browse content in G0 - General
  • G01 - Financial Crises
  • Browse content in G1 - General Financial Markets
  • G10 - General
  • G11 - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
  • G12 - Asset Pricing; Trading volume; Bond Interest Rates
  • G15 - International Financial Markets
  • Browse content in G2 - Financial Institutions and Services
  • G20 - General
  • G21 - Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
  • G24 - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
  • G28 - Government Policy and Regulation
  • Browse content in G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance
  • G30 - General
  • G31 - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies; Capacity
  • G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
  • G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
  • G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
  • Browse content in G4 - Behavioral Finance
  • G41 - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making in Financial Markets
  • Browse content in G5 - Household Finance
  • G51 - Household Saving, Borrowing, Debt, and Wealth
  • G53 - Financial Literacy
  • Browse content in H - Public Economics
  • Browse content in H0 - General
  • H00 - General
  • Browse content in H1 - Structure and Scope of Government
  • H11 - Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
  • H12 - Crisis Management
  • Browse content in H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
  • H20 - General
  • H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
  • H22 - Incidence
  • H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
  • H24 - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies; includes inheritance and gift taxes
  • H25 - Business Taxes and Subsidies
  • H26 - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
  • Browse content in H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
  • H30 - General
  • H31 - Household
  • Browse content in H4 - Publicly Provided Goods
  • H41 - Public Goods
  • H42 - Publicly Provided Private Goods
  • H44 - Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
  • Browse content in H5 - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
  • H50 - General
  • H51 - Government Expenditures and Health
  • H52 - Government Expenditures and Education
  • H53 - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
  • H54 - Infrastructures; Other Public Investment and Capital Stock
  • H55 - Social Security and Public Pensions
  • H56 - National Security and War
  • H57 - Procurement
  • Browse content in H6 - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
  • H62 - Deficit; Surplus
  • H63 - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
  • H68 - Forecasts of Budgets, Deficits, and Debt
  • Browse content in H7 - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
  • H71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
  • H72 - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
  • H75 - State and Local Government: Health; Education; Welfare; Public Pensions
  • H76 - State and Local Government: Other Expenditure Categories
  • H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
  • Browse content in H8 - Miscellaneous Issues
  • H87 - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
  • Browse content in I - Health, Education, and Welfare
  • Browse content in I1 - Health
  • I10 - General
  • I11 - Analysis of Health Care Markets
  • I12 - Health Behavior
  • I14 - Health and Inequality
  • I15 - Health and Economic Development
  • I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
  • I19 - Other
  • Browse content in I2 - Education and Research Institutions
  • I20 - General
  • I21 - Analysis of Education
  • I22 - Educational Finance; Financial Aid
  • I23 - Higher Education; Research Institutions
  • I24 - Education and Inequality
  • I25 - Education and Economic Development
  • I26 - Returns to Education
  • I28 - Government Policy
  • Browse content in I3 - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty
  • I30 - General
  • I31 - General Welfare
  • I32 - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty
  • I38 - Government Policy; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
  • Browse content in J - Labor and Demographic Economics
  • Browse content in J0 - General
  • J00 - General
  • J01 - Labor Economics: General
  • J08 - Labor Economics Policies
  • Browse content in J1 - Demographic Economics
  • J10 - General
  • J11 - Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts
  • J12 - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
  • J13 - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
  • J14 - Economics of the Elderly; Economics of the Handicapped; Non-Labor Market Discrimination
  • J15 - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
  • J16 - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
  • J17 - Value of Life; Forgone Income
  • J18 - Public Policy
  • Browse content in J2 - Demand and Supply of Labor
  • J20 - General
  • J21 - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
  • J22 - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
  • J23 - Labor Demand
  • J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
  • J26 - Retirement; Retirement Policies
  • J28 - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
  • Browse content in J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
  • J31 - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
  • J32 - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
  • J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
  • Browse content in J4 - Particular Labor Markets
  • J42 - Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
  • J43 - Agricultural Labor Markets
  • J45 - Public Sector Labor Markets
  • J46 - Informal Labor Markets
  • J47 - Coercive Labor Markets
  • Browse content in J5 - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
  • J50 - General
  • J51 - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
  • J53 - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
  • Browse content in J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers
  • J61 - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers
  • J62 - Job, Occupational, and Intergenerational Mobility
  • J63 - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
  • J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
  • J65 - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
  • J68 - Public Policy
  • Browse content in J7 - Labor Discrimination
  • J71 - Discrimination
  • Browse content in K - Law and Economics
  • Browse content in K1 - Basic Areas of Law
  • K10 - General
  • K12 - Contract Law
  • K14 - Criminal Law
  • Browse content in K3 - Other Substantive Areas of Law
  • K36 - Family and Personal Law
  • Browse content in K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
  • K40 - General
  • K41 - Litigation Process
  • K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
  • Browse content in L - Industrial Organization
  • Browse content in L0 - General
  • L00 - General
  • Browse content in L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
  • L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
  • L12 - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
  • L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
  • L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
  • L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
  • L16 - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics: Industrial Structure and Structural Change; Industrial Price Indices
  • Browse content in L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
  • L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
  • L25 - Firm Performance: Size, Diversification, and Scope
  • L26 - Entrepreneurship
  • Browse content in L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
  • L31 - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
  • L32 - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
  • L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
  • Browse content in L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies
  • L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
  • L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
  • L44 - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprises, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
  • Browse content in L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy
  • L51 - Economics of Regulation
  • L52 - Industrial Policy; Sectoral Planning Methods
  • Browse content in L6 - Industry Studies: Manufacturing
  • L60 - General
  • L67 - Other Consumer Nondurables: Clothing, Textiles, Shoes, and Leather Goods; Household Goods; Sports Equipment
  • Browse content in L8 - Industry Studies: Services
  • L81 - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
  • L82 - Entertainment; Media
  • L83 - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism
  • L86 - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
  • Browse content in L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
  • L91 - Transportation: General
  • L94 - Electric Utilities
  • L96 - Telecommunications
  • L98 - Government Policy
  • Browse content in M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics
  • Browse content in M1 - Business Administration
  • M10 - General
  • M12 - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
  • M13 - New Firms; Startups
  • Browse content in M2 - Business Economics
  • M21 - Business Economics
  • Browse content in M3 - Marketing and Advertising
  • M30 - General
  • M31 - Marketing
  • Browse content in M5 - Personnel Economics
  • M50 - General
  • M51 - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
  • M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
  • M55 - Labor Contracting Devices
  • Browse content in N - Economic History
  • Browse content in N1 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Industrial Structure; Growth; Fluctuations
  • N10 - General, International, or Comparative
  • N12 - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
  • N13 - Europe: Pre-1913
  • N14 - Europe: 1913-
  • N15 - Asia including Middle East
  • Browse content in N2 - Financial Markets and Institutions
  • N20 - General, International, or Comparative
  • N23 - Europe: Pre-1913
  • N26 - Latin America; Caribbean
  • Browse content in N3 - Labor and Consumers, Demography, Education, Health, Welfare, Income, Wealth, Religion, and Philanthropy
  • N30 - General, International, or Comparative
  • N32 - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
  • N33 - Europe: Pre-1913
  • N34 - Europe: 1913-
  • N35 - Asia including Middle East
  • Browse content in N4 - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
  • N40 - General, International, or Comparative
  • N41 - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
  • N42 - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
  • N43 - Europe: Pre-1913
  • N44 - Europe: 1913-
  • N45 - Asia including Middle East
  • Browse content in N5 - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment, and Extractive Industries
  • N50 - General, International, or Comparative
  • N51 - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
  • N53 - Europe: Pre-1913
  • N55 - Asia including Middle East
  • N57 - Africa; Oceania
  • Browse content in N6 - Manufacturing and Construction
  • N63 - Europe: Pre-1913
  • Browse content in N7 - Transport, Trade, Energy, Technology, and Other Services
  • N70 - General, International, or Comparative
  • N71 - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
  • N72 - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
  • N73 - Europe: Pre-1913
  • N75 - Asia including Middle East
  • Browse content in N9 - Regional and Urban History
  • N90 - General, International, or Comparative
  • N92 - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
  • N94 - Europe: 1913-
  • N95 - Asia including Middle East
  • Browse content in O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth
  • Browse content in O1 - Economic Development
  • O10 - General
  • O11 - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
  • O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
  • O13 - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Other Primary Products
  • O14 - Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology
  • O15 - Human Resources; Human Development; Income Distribution; Migration
  • O16 - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
  • O17 - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
  • O18 - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
  • O19 - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
  • Browse content in O2 - Development Planning and Policy
  • O22 - Project Analysis
  • O24 - Trade Policy; Factor Movement Policy; Foreign Exchange Policy
  • O25 - Industrial Policy
  • Browse content in O3 - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights
  • O30 - General
  • O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
  • O32 - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
  • O33 - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
  • O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
  • O38 - Government Policy
  • O39 - Other
  • Browse content in O4 - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity
  • O40 - General
  • O41 - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
  • O43 - Institutions and Growth
  • O44 - Environment and Growth
  • O47 - Empirical Studies of Economic Growth; Aggregate Productivity; Cross-Country Output Convergence
  • Browse content in O5 - Economywide Country Studies
  • O50 - General
  • O52 - Europe
  • O53 - Asia including Middle East
  • O55 - Africa
  • Browse content in P - Economic Systems
  • Browse content in P0 - General
  • P00 - General
  • Browse content in P1 - Capitalist Systems
  • P14 - Property Rights
  • P16 - Political Economy
  • Browse content in P2 - Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies
  • P26 - Political Economy; Property Rights
  • Browse content in P3 - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions
  • P39 - Other
  • Browse content in P4 - Other Economic Systems
  • P48 - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
  • Browse content in P5 - Comparative Economic Systems
  • P50 - General
  • P51 - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
  • Browse content in Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics
  • Browse content in Q1 - Agriculture
  • Q12 - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
  • Q14 - Agricultural Finance
  • Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
  • Q16 - R&D; Agricultural Technology; Biofuels; Agricultural Extension Services
  • Q17 - Agriculture in International Trade
  • Q18 - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
  • Browse content in Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation
  • Q23 - Forestry
  • Q28 - Government Policy
  • Browse content in Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
  • Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
  • Q33 - Resource Booms
  • Browse content in Q4 - Energy
  • Q41 - Demand and Supply; Prices
  • Q48 - Government Policy
  • Browse content in Q5 - Environmental Economics
  • Q51 - Valuation of Environmental Effects
  • Q52 - Pollution Control Adoption Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
  • Q53 - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
  • Q54 - Climate; Natural Disasters; Global Warming
  • Q55 - Technological Innovation
  • Q56 - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
  • Q58 - Government Policy
  • Browse content in R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics
  • Browse content in R1 - General Regional Economics
  • R10 - General
  • R11 - Regional Economic Activity: Growth, Development, Environmental Issues, and Changes
  • R12 - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity
  • R13 - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies
  • R15 - Econometric and Input-Output Models; Other Models
  • Browse content in R2 - Household Analysis
  • R21 - Housing Demand
  • R23 - Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population; Neighborhood Characteristics
  • Browse content in R3 - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location
  • R30 - General
  • R31 - Housing Supply and Markets
  • Browse content in R4 - Transportation Economics
  • R41 - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion; Travel Time; Safety and Accidents; Transportation Noise
  • Browse content in R5 - Regional Government Analysis
  • R52 - Land Use and Other Regulations
  • Browse content in Z - Other Special Topics
  • Browse content in Z1 - Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology
  • Z10 - General
  • Z12 - Religion
  • Z13 - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
  • Z19 - Other
  • Browse content in Z2 - Sports Economics
  • Z20 - General
  • Author Guidelines
  • Submission Site
  • Open Access
  • Self-Archiving Policy
  • About The Economic Journal
  • About the Royal Economic Society
  • Editorial Board
  • Advertising and Corporate Services
  • Journals on Oxford Academic
  • Books on Oxford Academic
  • < Previous

Political Dynasties in Democracies: Causes, Consequences and Remaining Puzzles

  • Article contents
  • Figures & tables
  • Supplementary Data

Benny Geys, Daniel M. Smith, Political Dynasties in Democracies: Causes, Consequences and Remaining Puzzles, The Economic Journal , Volume 127, Issue 605, October 2017, Pages F446–F454, https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12442

  • Permissions Icon Permissions

Kinship often continues to play an important role in determining the ruling class even under modern democratic elections in a wide range of countries. In recent years, academic interest in the causes and consequences of such dynasties has been rapidly expanding. In this introduction to the Feature, we review existing work on political dynasties’ formation and potential implications for socio‐economic outcomes (such as economic growth, distributive policy, and gender representation), and outline a number of questions and challenges that remain important avenues for future research.

Email alerts

Citing articles via.

  • Recommend to your Librarian

Affiliations

  • Online ISSN 1468-0297
  • Print ISSN 0013-0133
  • Copyright © 2024 Royal Economic Society
  • About Oxford Academic
  • Publish journals with us
  • University press partners
  • What we publish
  • New features  
  • Open access
  • Institutional account management
  • Rights and permissions
  • Get help with access
  • Accessibility
  • Advertising
  • Media enquiries
  • Oxford University Press
  • Oxford Languages
  • University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

  • Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
  • Cookie settings
  • Cookie policy
  • Privacy policy
  • Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to  upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

  • We're Hiring!
  • Help Center

paper cover thumbnail

AN ANALYSIS ON POLITICAL DYNASTIES IN THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE

Profile image of Agatha Ana Jumelle Servida

This paper examines the general nature of the current political dynasties in Cavite and its influence on the electorates decision. This paper also gives a closer look on political families on a provincial level and how these dynastic political families continue to run for a public office and how they convince people to continue vote for them. The study aims to be relevant not only in the province of Cavite but also to other cities and provinces in the Philippines that was also having the same experiences. The result of the studies shows how the term political dynasty is defined, the well-known family clans in Cavite and the factors that prolong their stay in the public office.

Related Papers

Eduardo C . Tadem

The results of the 2013 Philippine mid-term elections highlighted the dominance of political dynasties in the country. With all 80 provinces littered with political families, 74 percent of the elected members of the House of Representatives came from such dynastic groups. Despite overwhelming recognition that political dynasties breed patronage politics and corruption, no substantial steps have been undertaken to address this issue. This article examines the general nature of Philippine political dynasties, the reasons for their continuing existence and their adverse impact on the country. This problem emanates basically from three factors: (1) the political and socioeconomic foundations upon which political dynasties are built; 2) the inability to effectively implement Philippine constitutional provisions by enacting an enabling law; and 3) the weakness of potential countervailing forces that would challenge political dynasties.

political dynasty research paper

Reiner Gallardo

A crude analysis of the composition of the Philippine government would show that Philippine politics is dominated by various political clans. The involvement of families in the politics of the Philippines and the concurrence of the lack of an efficient party system resulted to the rise of dynastic clans that dominate elections. Some authors argue that this results from natural tendency of incumbent politicians to bypass institutional constraints by introducing bench-warmer candidates. Tests on the results of the 2010 and 2013 senatorial elections conducted in this paper prove, however, that it is not merely a fact of utilizing institutional “loopholes”, but rather, an evident intention of political dynasties to dominate the political arena. As argued in this paper, political dynasties behave like political parties in the sense that political dynasties also have vote-seeking and office-seeking tendencies. As opposed to political parties, however, political dynasties treat policy-influence as a means to achieving office and electoral success rather than an objective in itself. The quantitative tests in this paper prove that dynastic term duration and policy adherence to the dynastic objectives have significant effects on a candidate’s chances of electoral success. Likewise, data reflects that incumbent dynastic members and dynastic term duration significantly affects the rank of a candidate in the national senatorial elections. It is also apparent in this study that dynasties are mainly concentrated in the local government.

Asia Pacific Journal of Multidisciplinary Research

Research and Statistics Center

This is a qualitative study which described the existence of political dynasties in Cebu, Philippines. The prevailing issues on political equality and perennial rule of political families were also investigated unfolding the Cebuanos' perceptions of political dynasty and its impact on Cebuano bureaucracy. The method of data analysis used in the study was narrative inquiry where storytelling among the selected key informants served as data collection technique. Purposive sampling was used in the selection of key informant politicians while random sampling for key informant voters was determined. The instruments used in data gathering were interviews and observations. The study revealed the true meaning of political dynasty, its advantages and drawbacks to its constituents. Varied rejoinders and call for democracy motivated the selected key informant politicians to continue serving the citizenry. This study recommends that an anti-individualistic voting preferences campaign be promoted by the government, education and youth sectors in transforming intelligent Filipino voters.

SSRN Electronic Journal

Victor 'Bobing' Venida

Khristine Mariele Patiak

Philippine Political Science Journal

Maria Ariebelle Santos

Political Dynasty has been present in our country for a long period of time already and it seems like not much people are well informed about the factors involving this issue. Political Dynasty turns the Philippines into a political enterprise. This issue flaws the Philippine voting system as voting for someone who has a bigger name rather than someone who is skilled or talented. This paper aims to show that the political dynasty is currently still prevalent in our country, as well as its effects. This paper also enumerates some of the political families that are still active in country. In addition to this, it also tackles the possible solutions to stop political dynasty.

Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philippines

Julio Teehankee

This chapter discusses the strategies of elite reproduction in the Philippine legislature. It identifies the traditional, new, emerging clans in the post- Marcos House of Representatives. Specifically, it elaborates the mechanisms by which political clans acquire, sustain, and reproduce power. Moreover, the chapter also underscores the persistence of political dynasties and failed attempts to regulate them.

Julius Trajano II

Emmanuel Caliwan, J.D.

RELATED PAPERS

South African Family Practice

Joseph Fadare

Journal of the Korean Chemical Society

Myung-Hoon Kim

Dimensi: Journal of Architecture and Built Environment

Jimmy Priatman

Chemie Ingenieur Technik

Aileen Ionescu-Somers

Journal of Vascular Surgery

Michael Suarez Marin

Hinnerk Albert

Marco Aurelio Cabral Pinto

La Cuenca Oriente: Geología y petróleo

Frédéric Christophoul

Clinical and Experimental Dermatology

cher-wei Liang

Contemporary Clinical Trials Communications

Kakarla Prasad

Indian Journal of Psychiatry

amresh srivastava

Head &amp; Neck

eduardo encarnacion

Swandari Paramita

Journal of Agriculture, Food Systems, and Community Development

Christopher Murakami

Anil Rajput

Journal of the Operational Research Society

Michel Gendreau

Nepalese Journal of Zoology

Indra Subedi

Angewandte Chemie

M. Esther Garcia

Gaetano Aloise

Jörgen Weibull

Journal of Neuroscience Methods

Robert Rennaker

SAINS TANAH - Journal of Soil Science and Agroclimatology

Md. Mahedy Alam

BENTHAM SCIENCE PUBLISHERS eBooks

See More Documents Like This

RELATED TOPICS

  •   We're Hiring!
  •   Help Center
  • Find new research papers in:
  • Health Sciences
  • Earth Sciences
  • Cognitive Science
  • Mathematics
  • Computer Science
  • Academia ©2024

IMAGES

  1. POLITICAL DYNASTY.docx

    political dynasty research paper

  2. Political Dynasty, Is It Acceptable or Not? (400 Words)

    political dynasty research paper

  3. 282968595-Political-Dynasty-Thesis.docx

    political dynasty research paper

  4. (PDF) Political Dynasties: Philippines' de Facto Party System

    political dynasty research paper

  5. (PDF) Political Dynasty in Public Governance: A Close Encounter with

    political dynasty research paper

  6. (PDF) Political dynasties in the Philippines: Persistent patterns

    political dynasty research paper

VIDEO

  1. Are they a political dynasty? #podcast #politics #politicalnews

  2. American Democracy March 14, 2019 Lecture

  3. Democracy?

  4. Chapter 7 How Democracy Die?

  5. The Case Against Democracy

  6. China invented paper during the Han dynasty... #china #handynasty

COMMENTS

  1. (PDF) The Rise of Political Dynasties in a Democratic Society

    Additionally, this paper examines dynastic variations within a democracy, i.e., why some families are able to build political dynasty, while others fail. This paper argues that, the determinants ...

  2. PDF Like Father, Like Son? How Political Dynasties Affect Economic Development

    Political dynasties are ubiquitous in democratic countries, even though many countries democratised to ... for research assistance. We are grateful to Alberto Alesina, Robert Bates, Tim Besley, Kirill Borusyak, Laurent Bouton, Felipe Campante, Moya ... Our paper is also related to a large literature in economics on family firms, which ...

  3. Political dynasties, business, and poverty in the Philippines

    Table 1 features the summary statistics for the above variables. On average, poverty incidence seems to be higher in non-Luzon provinces compared to provinces in Luzon. While the overlap between economic and political elites is relatively the same across regions, Luzon provinces appear to have a much more active business sector compared to non-Luzon provinces and receive higher amounts of IRA.

  4. Political Dynasties and Economic Development: Evidence using ...

    Abstract Political dynasties, by limiting political competition, are thought to exacerbate corruption, poverty, and abuse of power. This paper examines the economic effects of the presence of political dynasties in Philippine cities and municipalities, taking into account possible channels in the local dynastic cycle - the framework in which politicians try to balance their goals to perform ...

  5. PDF POLITICAL DYNASTIES http://www.nber.org/papers/w13122 NATIONAL BUREAU

    Political Dynasties Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó, and Jason Snyder NBER Working Paper No. 13122 May 2007 JEL No. D70,J45,N41,N42 ABSTRACT We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent

  6. Political Dynasties in Democracies: Causes, Consequences and Remaining

    The designation of Herman Van Rompuy as a dynastic politician thus depends on how broadly one defines political activity. Political dynasties as a research agenda received relatively little attention until recent years (notable exceptions in English include Hess, 1966; Clubok et al., 1969; Laband and Lentz, 1985; Ishibashi and Reed, 1992).

  7. Political Dynasties

    Political Dynasties. Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó & Jason Snyder. Working Paper 13122. DOI 10.3386/w13122. Issue Date May 2007. We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent of dynastic ...

  8. PDF Political Dynasties

    In this paper, we show that political power in the U.S. is self-perpetuating and that the presence of political dynasties does not merely reflect differences in ability across families. We define self-perpetuation as a power-treatment effect, whereby holding political power for longer

  9. PDF Political Dynasties, Term Limits and Female Political Empowerment

    In parallel, a growing body of research has focused on how policies such as gender quotas (Krook, 2009; Pande and Ford, 2012; O'Brien and Rickne, 2016) or political reser-vations (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Bhavnani, 2009; Cassan and Vandewalle, 2017) shape female political representation both substantively and descriptively.

  10. Political dynasties in the Philippines: South East Asia Research: Vol

    The results of the 2013 Philippine mid-term elections highlighted the dominance of political dynasties in the country. With all 80 provinces littered with political families, 74 percent of the elected members of the House of Representatives came from such dynastic groups. Despite overwhelming recognition that political dynasties breed patronage ...

  11. Political dynasties in the Philippines: Persistent patterns, perennial

    This problem emanates basically from three factors: (1) the political and socio-economic foundations upon which political dynasties are built; 2) the inability to effectively implement Philippine constitutional provisions by enacting an enabling law; and 3) the weakness of potential countervailing forces that would challenge political dynasties.

  12. PDF Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political

    Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines Pablo Querubiny March, 2013 Abstract Research in political economy emphasizes the tendency of elites to persist and re-produce their power over time, potentially undermining the e ectiveness of institutional reforms.

  13. PDF The Rise of Political Dynasties in a Democratic Society

    Arryman Fellow Research Paper 3 pre-modern political systems and authoritarian regimes.6 In some countries, the emergence of political dynasties can be observed clearly at the subnational level.7 The existence of political dynasties in democratic societies, particularly in a consolidating

  14. (PDF) Political Dynasty in Public Governance: A Close Encounter with

    This paper develops metrics to analyze the extent to which political dynasties in the 15th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines are linked to different social and economic outcomes in the ...

  15. PDF Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines: Unpacking the Links

    Political Dynasties in the Philippines Political dynasties have existed even before the introduction of term limits (Simbulan, 1965, 2005; Sidel, 1997). However, new political dynasties emerged, and many old political dynasties re-emerged during the post-Marcos era (Teehankee, 2001). Here, the imposed term limits might have encouraged the rise

  16. Political dynasties and poverty: measurement and evidence of linkages

    The impact of political dynasties on socioeconomic outcomes such as poverty is an important empirical question (do political dynasties exacerbate poverty?), and this paper presents some evidence. The analysis of data from the Philippines finds a worsening effect of political dynasties on poverty in provinces outside Luzon.

  17. Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political

    Research in political economy emphasizes the tendency of elites to persist and reproduce their power over time, potentially undermining the effectiveness of institutional reforms. One particular form of elite persistence is illustrated by the existence of political dynasties.

  18. From Fat to Obese: Political Dynasties after the 2019 Midterm ...

    How did political dynasties fare in the 2019 midterm elections? This paper extends and analyzes the Ateneo Policy Center's political dynasties dataset, covering the period from 1988 to 2019. It finds evidence that over the past 30 years (or 10 election periods), political dynasties have become fatter.

  19. [PDF] Political dynasties in the Philippines

    Political dynasties in the Philippines. Jemma Purdey, T. Tadem, E. Tadem. Published 22 July 2016. Political Science. South East Asia Research. The results of the 2013 Philippine mid-term elections highlighted the dominance of political dynasties in the country. With all 80 provinces littered with political families, 74 percent of the elected ...

  20. (PDF) Political Dynasties in the Philippine Congress

    This paper develops metrics to analyze the extent to which political dynasties in the 15th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines are linked to different social and economic outcomes in the ...

  21. (DOC) The Causes and Impacts of the Political Dynasties in the

    Causes, Impacts of Political Dynasty 1 The Causes and Impacts of the Political Dynasties in the Political Sphere of the Philippines A Research Paper Presented to Professor Edward Jay M. Quinto Mapúa Institute of Technology in partial fulfillment of the requirements in English for Academic Purposes 2 (ENG11) by Raymond M. Rozario Reynan C ...

  22. Political dynasties Research Papers

    The interplay between bureaucracy and political dynasties is an interesting topic in the study of public administration and governance. For one, the parallel development of bureaucratic expansion and political dynasty entrenchment share an identical timeline in history, demanding fuller understanding and critical analysis of the implications that bureaucracy and political dynasties, or vice ...

  23. AN ANALYSIS ON POLITICAL DYNASTIES IN THE PROVINCE OF CAVITE

    As argued in this paper, political dynasties behave like political parties in the sense that political dynasties also have vote-seeking and office-seeking tendencies. ... /28- the continuous support since the first day we years-and-still-hoping-anti-political- began working on our research paper and for dynasty-law the constant guidance and ...