case study on strategic leadership

About Stanford GSB

• The Leadership
• Dean’s Updates
• School News & History
• Commencement
• Business, Government & Society
• Centers & Institutes
• Center for Entrepreneurial Studies
• Center for Social Innovation
• Stanford Seed

About the Experience

• Learning at Stanford GSB
• Experiential Learning
• Guest Speakers
• Entrepreneurship
• Social Innovation
• Communication
• Life at Stanford GSB
• Collaborative Environment
• Activities & Organizations
• Student Services
• Housing Options
• International Students

Full-Time Degree Programs

• Why Stanford MBA
• Academic Experience
• Financial Aid
• Why Stanford MSx
• Research Fellows Program
• See All Programs

Non-Degree & Certificate Programs

• Executive Education
• Stanford Executive Program
• Programs for Organizations
• The Difference
• Online Programs
• Stanford LEAD
• Seed Transformation Program
• Aspire Program
• Seed Spark Program
• Faculty Profiles
• Academic Areas
• Awards & Honors
• Conferences

Faculty Research

• Publications
• Working Papers
• Case Studies

Research Hub

• Research Labs & Initiatives
• Business Library
• Data, Analytics & Research Computing
• Behavioral Lab

Research Labs

• Cities, Housing & Society Lab
• Golub Capital Social Impact Lab

Research Initiatives

• Corporate Governance Research Initiative
• Corporations and Society Initiative
• Policy and Innovation Initiative
• Rapid Decarbonization Initiative
• Stanford Latino Entrepreneurship Initiative
• Value Chain Innovation Initiative
• Venture Capital Initiative
• Career & Success
• Climate & Sustainability
• Corporate Governance
• Culture & Society
• Finance & Investing
• Government & Politics
• Leadership & Management
• Markets & Trade
• Operations & Logistics
• Opportunity & Access
• Organizational Behavior
• Political Economy
• Social Impact
• Technology & AI
• Opinion & Analysis
• Email Newsletter

Welcome, Alumni

• Communities
• Digital Communities & Tools
• Regional Chapters
• Women’s Programs
• Identity Chapters
• Find Your Reunion
• Career Resources
• Job Search Resources
• Career & Life Transitions
• Programs & Services
• Career Video Library
• Alumni Education
• Research Resources
• Volunteering
• Alumni News
• Class Notes
• Alumni Voices
• Contact Alumni Relations
• Upcoming Events

Admission Events & Information Sessions

• MBA Program
• MSx Program
• PhD Program
• Alumni Events
• All Other Events
• Databases & Datasets
• Research Guides
• Consultations
• Research Workshops
• Career Research
• Research Data Services
• Course Reserves
• Course Research Guides
• Material Loan Periods
• Fines & Other Charges
• Document Delivery
• Interlibrary Loan
• Equipment Checkout
• Print & Scan
• MBA & MSx Students
• PhD Students
• Other Stanford Students
• Faculty Assistants
• Research Assistants
• Stanford GSB Alumni
• Telling Our Story
• Staff Directory
• Research Support
• Stanford GSB Archive

Explore case studies from Stanford GSB and from other institutions.

Stanford GSB Case Studies

Other case studies.

• Priorities for the GSB's Future
• See the Current DEI Report
• Supporting Data
• Research & Insights
• Share Your Thoughts
• Search Fund Primer
• Teaching & Curriculum
• Affiliated Faculty
• Faculty Advisors
• Louis W. Foster Resource Center
• Defining Social Innovation
• Impact Compass
• Global Health Innovation Insights
• Faculty Affiliates
• Student Awards & Certificates
• Changemakers
• Dean Jonathan Levin
• Dean Garth Saloner
• Dean Robert Joss
• Dean Michael Spence
• Dean Robert Jaedicke
• Dean Rene McPherson
• Dean Arjay Miller
• Dean Ernest Arbuckle
• Dean Jacob Hugh Jackson
• Dean Willard Hotchkiss
• Faculty in Memoriam
• Stanford GSB Firsts
• Certificate & Award Recipients
• Teaching Approach
• Analysis and Measurement of Impact
• The Corporate Entrepreneur: Startup in a Grown-Up Enterprise
• Data-Driven Impact
• Designing Experiments for Impact
• Digital Business Transformation
• The Founder’s Right Hand
• Marketing for Measurable Change
• Product Management
• Public Policy Lab: Financial Challenges Facing US Cities
• Public Policy Lab: Homelessness in California
• Lab Features
• Curricular Integration
• View From The Top
• Formation of New Ventures
• Managing Growing Enterprises
• Startup Garage
• Explore Beyond the Classroom
• Stanford Venture Studio
• Summer Program
• Workshops & Events
• The Five Lenses of Entrepreneurship
• Leadership Labs
• Executive Challenge
• Arbuckle Leadership Fellows Program
• Selection Process
• Training Schedule
• Time Commitment
• Learning Expectations
• Post-Training Opportunities
• Who Should Apply
• Introductory T-Groups
• Leadership for Society Program
• Certificate
• 2023 Awardees
• 2022 Awardees
• 2021 Awardees
• 2020 Awardees
• 2019 Awardees
• 2018 Awardees
• Social Management Immersion Fund
• Stanford Impact Founder Fellowships and Prizes
• Stanford Impact Leader Prizes
• Social Entrepreneurship
• Stanford GSB Impact Fund
• Economic Development
• Energy & Environment
• Stanford GSB Residences
• Environmental Leadership
• Stanford GSB Artwork
• A Closer Look
• California & the Bay Area
• Voices of Stanford GSB
• Business & Beneficial Technology
• Business & Sustainability
• Business & Free Markets
• Business, Government, and Society Forum
• Get Involved
• Second Year
• Global Experiences
• JD/MBA Joint Degree
• MA Education/MBA Joint Degree
• MD/MBA Dual Degree
• MPP/MBA Joint Degree
• MS Computer Science/MBA Joint Degree
• MS Electrical Engineering/MBA Joint Degree
• MS Environment and Resources (E-IPER)/MBA Joint Degree
• Academic Calendar
• Clubs & Activities
• LGBTQ+ Students
• Military Veterans
• Minorities & People of Color
• Partners & Families
• Students with Disabilities
• Student Support
• Residential Life
• Student Voices
• MBA Alumni Voices
• A Week in the Life
• Career Support
• Employment Outcomes
• Cost of Attendance
• Knight-Hennessy Scholars Program
• Yellow Ribbon Program
• BOLD Fellows Fund
• Application Process
• Loan Forgiveness
• Contact the Financial Aid Office
• Evaluation Criteria
• GMAT & GRE
• English Language Proficiency
• Personal Information, Activities & Awards
• Professional Experience
• Letters of Recommendation
• Optional Short Answer Questions
• Application Fee
• Reapplication
• Deferred Enrollment
• Joint & Dual Degrees
• Entering Class Profile
• Event Schedule
• Ambassadors
• New & Noteworthy
• Ask a Question
• See Why Stanford MSx
• Is MSx Right for You?
• MSx Stories
• Leadership Development
• Career Advancement
• Career Change
• How You Will Learn
• Admission Events
• Personal Information
• Information for Recommenders
• GMAT, GRE & EA
• English Proficiency Tests
• After You’re Admitted
• Daycare, Schools & Camps
• U.S. Citizens and Permanent Residents
• Requirements
• Requirements: Behavioral
• Requirements: Quantitative
• Requirements: Macro
• Requirements: Micro
• Annual Evaluations
• Field Examination
• Research Activities
• Research Papers
• Dissertation
• Oral Examination
• Current Students
• Education & CV
• International Applicants
• Statement of Purpose
• Reapplicants
• Application Fee Waiver
• Deadline & Decisions
• Job Market Candidates
• Academic Placements
• Stay in Touch
• Faculty Mentors
• Current Fellows
• Standard Track
• Fellowship & Benefits
• Group Enrollment
• Program Formats
• Developing a Program
• Diversity & Inclusion
• Strategic Transformation
• Program Experience
• Contact Client Services
• Campus Experience
• Live Online Experience
• Silicon Valley & Bay Area
• Digital Credentials
• Faculty Spotlights
• Participant Spotlights
• Eligibility
• International Participants
• Stanford Ignite
• Frequently Asked Questions
• Operations, Information & Technology
• Classical Liberalism
• The Eddie Lunch
• Accounting Summer Camp
• Videos, Code & Data
• California Econometrics Conference
• California Quantitative Marketing PhD Conference
• California School Conference
• China India Insights Conference
• Homo economicus, Evolving
• Political Economics (2023–24)
• Scaling Geologic Storage of CO2 (2023–24)
• A Resilient Pacific: Building Connections, Envisioning Solutions
• Adaptation and Innovation
• Changing Climate
• Civil Society
• Climate Impact Summit
• Climate Science
• Corporate Carbon Disclosures
• Earth’s Seafloor
• Environmental Justice
• Operations and Information Technology
• Organizations
• Sustainability Reporting and Control
• Taking the Pulse of the Planet
• Urban Infrastructure
• Watershed Restoration
• Junior Faculty Workshop on Financial Regulation and Banking
• Ken Singleton Celebration
• Marketing Camp
• Quantitative Marketing PhD Alumni Conference
• Presentations
• Theory and Inference in Accounting Research
• Stanford Closer Look Series
• Quick Guides
• Core Concepts
• Journal Articles
• Glossary of Terms
• Faculty & Staff
• Researchers & Students
• Research Approach
• Charitable Giving
• Financial Health
• Government Services
• Workers & Careers
• Short Course
• Adaptive & Iterative Experimentation
• Incentive Design
• Social Sciences & Behavioral Nudges
• Bandit Experiment Application
• Conferences & Events
• Reading Materials
• Energy Entrepreneurship
• Faculty & Affiliates
• SOLE Report
• Responsible Supply Chains
• Current Study Usage
• Pre-Registration Information
• Participate in a Study
• Founding Donors
• Location Information
• Participant Profile
• Network Membership
• Program Impact
• Collaborators
• Entrepreneur Profiles
• Company Spotlights
• Seed Transformation Network
• Responsibilities
• Current Coaches
• How to Apply
• Meet the Consultants
• Meet the Interns
• Intern Profiles
• Collaborate
• Research Library
• News & Insights
• Program Contacts
• Site Registration
• Alumni Directory
• Alumni Email
• Privacy Settings & My Profile
• Success Stories
• The Story of Circles
• Support Women’s Circles
• Stanford Women on Boards Initiative
• Alumnae Spotlights
• Insights & Research
• Industry & Professional
• Entrepreneurial Commitment Group
• Recent Alumni
• Half-Century Club
• Fall Reunions
• Spring Reunions
• MBA 25th Reunion
• Half-Century Club Reunion
• Faculty Lectures
• Ernest C. Arbuckle Award
• Alison Elliott Exceptional Achievement Award
• ENCORE Award
• Excellence in Leadership Award
• John W. Gardner Volunteer Leadership Award
• Robert K. Jaedicke Faculty Award
• Jack McDonald Military Service Appreciation Award
• Jerry I. Porras Latino Leadership Award
• Tapestry Award
• Student & Alumni Events
• Executive Recruiters
• Interviewing
• Land the Perfect Job with LinkedIn
• Negotiating
• Elevator Pitch
• Email Best Practices
• Resumes & Cover Letters
• Self-Assessment
• Whitney Birdwell Ball
• Margaret Brooks
• Bryn Panee Burkhart
• Margaret Chan
• Ricki Frankel
• Peter Gandolfo
• Cindy W. Greig
• Natalie Guillen
• Carly Janson
• Sloan Klein
• Sherri Appel Lassila
• Stuart Meyer
• Tanisha Parrish
• Virginia Roberson
• Philippe Taieb
• Michael Takagawa
• Terra Winston
• Johanna Wise
• Debbie Wolter
• Rebecca Zucker
• Complimentary Coaching
• Changing Careers
• Work-Life Integration
• Career Breaks
• Flexible Work
• Encore Careers
• D&B Hoovers
• Data Axle (ReferenceUSA)
• EBSCO Business Source
• Global Newsstream
• Market Share Reporter
• ProQuest One Business
• Student Clubs
• Entrepreneurial Students
• Stanford GSB Trust
• Alumni Community
• How to Volunteer
• Springboard Sessions
• Consulting Projects
• 2020 – 2029
• 2010 – 2019
• 2000 – 2009
• 1990 – 1999
• 1980 – 1989
• 1970 – 1979
• 1960 – 1969
• 1950 – 1959
• 1940 – 1949
• Service Areas
• ACT History
• ACT Awards Celebration
• ACT Governance Structure
• Building Leadership for ACT
• Individual Leadership Positions
• Leadership Role Overview
• Purpose of the ACT Management Board
• Contact ACT
• Business & Nonprofit Communities
• Reunion Volunteers
• Ways to Give
• Fiscal Year Report
• Business School Fund Leadership Council
• Planned Giving Options
• Planned Giving Benefits
• Planned Gifts and Reunions
• Legacy Partners
• Giving News & Stories
• Giving Deadlines
• Development Staff
• Submit Class Notes
• Class Secretaries
• Board of Directors
• Health Care
• Sustainability
• Class Takeaways
• All Else Equal: Making Better Decisions
• If/Then: Business, Leadership, Society
• Grit & Growth
• Think Fast, Talk Smart
• Spring 2022
• Spring 2021
• Autumn 2020
• Summer 2020
• Winter 2020
• In the Media
• For Journalists
• DCI Fellows
• Other Auditors
• Academic Calendar & Deadlines
• Course Materials
• Entrepreneurial Resources
• Campus Drive Grove
• Campus Drive Lawn
• CEMEX Auditorium
• King Community Court
• Seawell Family Boardroom
• Stanford GSB Bowl
• Stanford Investors Common
• Town Square
• Vidalakis Courtyard
• Vidalakis Dining Hall
• Catering Services
• Policies & Guidelines
• Reservations
• Contact Faculty Recruiting
• Lecturer Positions
• Postdoctoral Positions
• Accommodations
• CMC-Managed Interviews
• Recruiter-Managed Interviews
• Virtual Interviews
• Campus & Virtual
• Search for Candidates
• Think Globally
• Recruiting Calendar
• Recruiting Policies
• Full-Time Employment
• Summer Employment
• Entrepreneurial Summer Program
• Global Management Immersion Experience
• Social-Purpose Summer Internships
• Process Overview
• Project Types
• Client Eligibility Criteria
• Client Screening
• ACT Leadership
• Social Innovation & Nonprofit Management Resources
• Develop Your Organization’s Talent
• Centers & Initiatives
• Student Fellowships

• Browse All Articles
• Newsletter Sign-Up

Leadership →

• 26 Mar 2024
• Cold Call Podcast

How Do Great Leaders Overcome Adversity?

In the spring of 2021, Raymond Jefferson (MBA 2000) applied for a job in President Joseph Biden’s administration. Ten years earlier, false allegations were used to force him to resign from his prior US government position as assistant secretary of labor for veterans’ employment and training in the Department of Labor. Two employees had accused him of ethical violations in hiring and procurement decisions, including pressuring subordinates into extending contracts to his alleged personal associates. The Deputy Secretary of Labor gave Jefferson four hours to resign or be terminated. Jefferson filed a federal lawsuit against the US government to clear his name, which he pursued for eight years at the expense of his entire life savings. Why, after such a traumatic and debilitating experience, would Jefferson want to pursue a career in government again? Harvard Business School Senior Lecturer Anthony Mayo explores Jefferson’s personal and professional journey from upstate New York to West Point to the Obama administration, how he faced adversity at several junctures in his life, and how resilience and vulnerability shaped his leadership style in the case, "Raymond Jefferson: Trial by Fire."

• 24 Jan 2024

Why Boeing’s Problems with the 737 MAX Began More Than 25 Years Ago

Aggressive cost cutting and rocky leadership changes have eroded the culture at Boeing, a company once admired for its engineering rigor, says Bill George. What will it take to repair the reputational damage wrought by years of crises involving its 737 MAX?

• 02 Jan 2024
• What Do You Think?

Do Boomerang CEOs Get a Bad Rap?

Several companies have brought back formerly successful CEOs in hopes of breathing new life into their organizations—with mixed results. But are we even measuring the boomerang CEOs' performance properly? asks James Heskett. Open for comment; 0 Comments.

• Research & Ideas

10 Trends to Watch in 2024

Employees may seek new approaches to balance, even as leaders consider whether to bring more teams back to offices or make hybrid work even more flexible. These are just a few trends that Harvard Business School faculty members will be following during a year when staffing, climate, and inclusion will likely remain top of mind.

• 12 Dec 2023

Can Sustainability Drive Innovation at Ferrari?

When Ferrari, the Italian luxury sports car manufacturer, committed to achieving carbon neutrality and to electrifying a large part of its car fleet, investors and employees applauded the new strategy. But among the company’s suppliers, the reaction was mixed. Many were nervous about how this shift would affect their bottom lines. Professor Raffaella Sadun and Ferrari CEO Benedetto Vigna discuss how Ferrari collaborated with suppliers to work toward achieving the company’s goal. They also explore how sustainability can be a catalyst for innovation in the case, “Ferrari: Shifting to Carbon Neutrality.” This episode was recorded live December 4, 2023 in front of a remote studio audience in the Live Online Classroom at Harvard Business School.

• 05 Dec 2023

Lessons in Decision-Making: Confident People Aren't Always Correct (Except When They Are)

A study of 70,000 decisions by Thomas Graeber and Benjamin Enke finds that self-assurance doesn't necessarily reflect skill. Shrewd decision-making often comes down to how well a person understands the limits of their knowledge. How can managers identify and elevate their best decision-makers?

• 21 Nov 2023

The Beauty Industry: Products for a Healthy Glow or a Compact for Harm?

Many cosmetics and skincare companies present an image of social consciousness and transformative potential, while profiting from insecurity and excluding broad swaths of people. Geoffrey Jones examines the unsightly reality of the beauty industry.

• 14 Nov 2023

Do We Underestimate the Importance of Generosity in Leadership?

Management experts applaud leaders who are, among other things, determined, humble, and frugal, but rarely consider whether they are generous. However, executives who share their time, talent, and ideas often give rise to legendary organizations. Does generosity merit further consideration? asks James Heskett. Open for comment; 0 Comments.

• 24 Oct 2023

From P.T. Barnum to Mary Kay: Lessons From 5 Leaders Who Changed the World

What do Steve Jobs and Sarah Breedlove have in common? Through a series of case studies, Robert Simons explores the unique qualities of visionary leaders and what today's managers can learn from their journeys.

• 06 Oct 2023

Yes, You Can Radically Change Your Organization in One Week

Skip the committees and the multi-year roadmap. With the right conditions, leaders can confront even complex organizational problems in one week. Frances Frei and Anne Morriss explain how in their book Move Fast and Fix Things.

• 26 Sep 2023

The PGA Tour and LIV Golf Merger: Competition vs. Cooperation

On June 9, 2022, the first LIV Golf event teed off outside of London. The new tour offered players larger prizes, more flexibility, and ambitions to attract new fans to the sport. Immediately following the official start of that tournament, the PGA Tour announced that all 17 PGA Tour players participating in the LIV Golf event were suspended and ineligible to compete in PGA Tour events. Tensions between the two golf entities continued to rise, as more players “defected” to LIV. Eventually LIV Golf filed an antitrust lawsuit accusing the PGA Tour of anticompetitive practices, and the Department of Justice launched an investigation. Then, in a dramatic turn of events, LIV Golf and the PGA Tour announced that they were merging. Harvard Business School assistant professor Alexander MacKay discusses the competitive, antitrust, and regulatory issues at stake and whether or not the PGA Tour took the right actions in response to LIV Golf’s entry in his case, “LIV Golf.”

• 01 Aug 2023

As Leaders, Why Do We Continue to Reward A, While Hoping for B?

Companies often encourage the bad behavior that executives publicly rebuke—usually in pursuit of short-term performance. What keeps leaders from truly aligning incentives and goals? asks James Heskett. Open for comment; 0 Comments.

• 05 Jul 2023

What Kind of Leader Are You? How Three Action Orientations Can Help You Meet the Moment

Executives who confront new challenges with old formulas often fail. The best leaders tailor their approach, recalibrating their "action orientation" to address the problem at hand, says Ryan Raffaelli. He details three action orientations and how leaders can harness them.

How Are Middle Managers Falling Down Most Often on Employee Inclusion?

Companies are struggling to retain employees from underrepresented groups, many of whom don't feel heard in the workplace. What do managers need to do to build truly inclusive teams? asks James Heskett. Open for comment; 0 Comments.

• 14 Jun 2023

Every Company Should Have These Leaders—or Develop Them if They Don't

Companies need T-shaped leaders, those who can share knowledge across the organization while focusing on their business units, but they should be a mix of visionaries and tacticians. Hise Gibson breaks down the nuances of each leader and how companies can cultivate this talent among their ranks.

Four Steps to Building the Psychological Safety That High-Performing Teams Need

Struggling to spark strategic risk-taking and creative thinking? In the post-pandemic workplace, teams need psychological safety more than ever, and a new analysis by Amy Edmondson highlights the best ways to nurture it.

• 31 May 2023

From Prison Cell to Nike’s C-Suite: The Journey of Larry Miller

VIDEO: Before leading one of the world’s largest brands, Nike executive Larry Miller served time in prison for murder. In this interview, Miller shares how education helped him escape a life of crime and why employers should give the formerly incarcerated a second chance. Inspired by a Harvard Business School case study.

• 23 May 2023

The Entrepreneurial Journey of China’s First Private Mental Health Hospital

The city of Wenzhou in southeastern China is home to the country’s largest privately owned mental health hospital group, the Wenzhou Kangning Hospital Co, Ltd. It’s an example of the extraordinary entrepreneurship happening in China’s healthcare space. But after its successful initial public offering (IPO), how will the hospital grow in the future? Harvard Professor of China Studies William C. Kirby highlights the challenges of China’s mental health sector and the means company founder Guan Weili employed to address them in his case, Wenzhou Kangning Hospital: Changing Mental Healthcare in China.

• 09 May 2023

Can Robin Williams’ Son Help Other Families Heal Addiction and Depression?

Zak Pym Williams, son of comedian and actor Robin Williams, had seen how mental health challenges, such as addiction and depression, had affected past generations of his family. Williams was diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) as a young adult and he wanted to break the cycle for his children. Although his children were still quite young, he began considering proactive strategies that could help his family’s mental health, and he wanted to share that knowledge with other families. But how can Williams help people actually take advantage of those mental health strategies and services? Professor Lauren Cohen discusses his case, “Weapons of Self Destruction: Zak Pym Williams and the Cultivation of Mental Wellness.”

• 11 Apr 2023

The First 90 Hours: What New CEOs Should—and Shouldn't—Do to Set the Right Tone

New leaders no longer have the luxury of a 90-day listening tour to get to know an organization, says John Quelch. He offers seven steps to prepare CEOs for a successful start, and three missteps to avoid.

Strategic Leadership for Business Value Creation

Principles and Case Studies

• © 2021
• Don Argus 0 ,
• Danny Samson 1

Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Australia Advisory Board, Melbourne, Australia

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Melbourne, Carlton, Australia

• Provides insights and wisdom on leadership and strategy that create value when they are executed effectively
• Is targeted at business executives who want to develop and mature towards being successful value creators
• Develops and illustrates core concepts, and relates them to the two major case studies of NAB and BHP

25k Accesses

3 Citations

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this book

• Available as EPUB and PDF
• Read on any device
• Instant download
• Own it forever
• Compact, lightweight edition
• Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
• Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access

Licence this eBook for your library

Institutional subscriptions

Table of contents (19 chapters)

Front matter.

• Don Argus, Danny Samson

Organisational (Business) Strategy

Organisational governance, corporate social responsibility, leaders of the future, nab (a): banking and financial services , 1960–2020, nab (b): nab’s acquisition strategy, nab (c): banking in australia , nab’s track record and trajectory, bhp (a): ‘the big australian’ overview and strategic roots, bhp (b): steel, bhp (c): minerals, bhp (d): petroleum, bhp(e): rejuvenation and renovation towards a new century, bhp(f): mergers and acquisitions, bhp(g): global strategy and the foreign investment review board (firb), bhp(h): industrial relations, bhp(i): environment.

• Business strategy
• Leadership factors
• Strategic leadership for value creation
• Corporate governance success for value creation
• Sustainable development strategies for value creation
• Operational Excellence development
• Strategy implementation through operations
• Executive development leadership factors
• BHP Case study
• NAB Case study
• National Australia Bank

About this book

Authors and affiliations.

Danny Samson

About the authors

Bibliographic information.

Book Title : Strategic Leadership for Business Value Creation

Book Subtitle : Principles and Case Studies

Authors : Don Argus, Danny Samson

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9430-4

Publisher : Palgrave Macmillan Singapore

eBook Packages : Business and Management , Business and Management (R0)

Copyright Information : The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021

Softcover ISBN : 978-981-15-9429-8 Published: 14 January 2021

eBook ISBN : 978-981-15-9430-4 Published: 13 January 2021

Edition Number : 1

Number of Pages : XXV, 495

Number of Illustrations : 24 b/w illustrations

Topics : Business Strategy/Leadership , Corporate Governance , Management , Business and Management, general

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research

• Back to All Programs /

Strategic Leadership

Enhance your ability to creatively problem-solve for the demands of working in ‘the new normal'.

All Start Dates

8:30 AM – 4:30 PM ET

3 consecutive days

Registration Deadline

August 18, 2024

December 1, 2024

What You'll Learn

Senior leaders face an unprecedented number of challenges in today’s rapidly-changing business environment, from an evolving workforce to complex strategic issues. To succeed in this dynamic business environment, strategic leadership involves asking better questions, leveraging a diverse workforce, and addressing the complex problems our organizations face in new ways.

During this interactive 3-day program, you will build upon your proven leadership skills with new insights, frameworks and tools to inspire yourself and better lead your team and organization. Reflective exercises, a leadership assessment instrument (Hogan), application activities, and case studies will help you work through modern-day dilemmas and solve problems using both critical and creative thinking. Small and large group discussions will focus on addressing the paradoxes of effective leadership at the executive level.

Program Benefits

• Examine what in organizational leadership is evolving — and what is remaining the same — and develop insight into how to address new and emerging senior leadership challenges
• Understand the multipliers and diminishers of effective leadership, and how to evolve as senior leaders
• Build and sustain greater levels of motivation and trust through more strategic leadership
• Earn a Certificate of Participation from the Harvard Division of Continuing Education

Topics Covered

• Leadership in today’s business world: what’s similar, what’s different, and why the stakes are higher
• Inspiring and motivating a diverse talent team
• Solving complex problems using both critical and creative thinking
• Managing modern-day dilemmas
• Addressing the tradeoffs, tensions, and dilemmas we face as senior leaders
• Future-proofing our organizations and ourselves

Who Should Enroll

This program is intended for senior managers with at least 10 years of management experience and proven leadership skills who want to enhance their capabilities to lead at higher levels in the organization.

Considering this program?

Send yourself the details.

Related Programs

• Emotional Intelligence in Leadership Training Program
• Agile Leadership: Transforming Mindsets and Capabilities in Your Organization
• Executive Leadership Coaching: Mastery Session

August Schedule

• The New World of Work and Leading In the ‘New Normal’
• Strategic Self-Leadership – Part I
• Strategic Self-Leadership – Part II
• Strategic People and Organizational Leadership
• Strategic Problem-Solving
• Strategic Leadership for the Future – Ourselves, Others, Organizations

December Schedule

Margaret andrews, certificates of leadership excellence.

The Certificates of Leadership Excellence (CLE) are designed for leaders with the desire to enhance their business acumen, challenge current thinking, and expand their leadership skills.

This program is one of several CLE qualifying programs. Register today and get started earning your certificate.

Harvard Division of Continuing Education

The Division of Continuing Education (DCE) at Harvard University is dedicated to bringing rigorous academics and innovative teaching capabilities to those seeking to improve their lives through education. We make Harvard education accessible to lifelong learners from high school to retirement.

Drivers and consequences of strategic leader indecision: an exploratory study in a complex case

Leadership & Organization Development Journal

ISSN : 0143-7739

Article publication date: 8 June 2023

Issue publication date: 29 June 2023

The research explores indecision of strategic leaders in a complex case organization. This research offers new insights into the drivers of indecision of upper echelons decision-makers and explores the perceived consequences of the decision-makers' indecision.

Design/methodology/approach

Following a review of literature on upper echelons theory and strategic decision-making, indecision and the antecedents and consequences of indecision, the research follows a qualitative exploratory design. Semi-structured interviews were conducted among 20 upper echelons decision-makers with responsibility across 19 Sub-Saharan African countries in a case company. Thematic analysis was used to analyze the data.

The findings reveal that specific organizational, interpersonal and personal factors work together to drive strategic leader indecision in a complex organization. Strategic leader indecision brings about several negative organizational consequences and demotivates team members.

Research limitations/implications

The findings are based on a single-case exploratory design but represent geographical diversity.

Practical implications

The research cautions organizations to deal with the drivers of strategic leader indecision to help avoid potential negative consequences of stifled organizational performance and team demotivation.

Originality/value

The study offers previously unknown insights into strategic leader indecision. This study builds on current literature on the antecedents and consequences of indecision and has a new research setting of strategic leader indecision in a complex organization.

• Strategic leader indecision
• Upper echelons
• Strategic decision-making

Motloung, M. and Lew, C. (2023), "Drivers and consequences of strategic leader indecision: an exploratory study in a complex case", Leadership & Organization Development Journal , Vol. 44 No. 4, pp. 453-473. https://doi.org/10.1108/LODJ-10-2021-0457

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2023, Musa Motloung and Charlene Lew

Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode

Introduction

Decision-making is a central component of the leadership function ( Kokkoris et al. , 2019 ; Samimi et al. , 2019 ) and determines whether organizations succeed in competitive environments ( Gottfredson and Reina, 2020 ). Strategic leaders influence organizational outcomes through their decisions ( Hambrick and Mason, 1984 ). They need to make long-term, intuitive and holistic decisions ( Matsuo, 2019 ) that enable organizational success ( Gottfredson and Reina, 2020 ). Consequently, indecision puts the organization's sustainability at risk. Indecision refers to the tendency to unduly delay or delegate decisions ( Elaydi, 2006 ).

Even though there is a large body of knowledge on leadership decision-making, research into indecision of strategic leaders remains sparse ( Brooks, 2011 ; Samimi et al. , 2019 ). Most literature on indecision deals with career indecision (e.g., Lent et al. , 2019 ), or personal traits and indecision (e.g., Ferrari et al. , 2018 ), but very few studies focus on the indecision of leaders and especially upper echelon leaders. A better understanding of the drivers of indecision can shed light on existing models of strategic decision-making ( Kokkoris et al. , 2019 ; Aboramadan, 2021 ). The context of strategic decision-making differs from managerial decision-making. At the core, strategic decisions are ad hoc, non-routine, complex and consequential for both individual leaders and the organization ( Kauppila et al. , 2018 ). The fast-paced and uncertain nature of the business environment can therefore exacerbate indecision ( Wowak et al. , 2016 ). Moreover, strategic leaders compete for scarce resources during decision-making ( Pettigrew, 1973 ). It is for this reason that strategic decisions, such as decisions to implement large-scale innovations, mergers and acquisitions, corporate restructuring, or new market entries, bring about political behavior in the top team ( Friedman et al. , 2016 ). The high-stakes, complex and political context of strategic decision-making suggests the need for a study focused on the indecision of strategic leaders.

Scholarly research shows that personal variables, such as fear of commitment, self-consciousness, perfectionism and negative self-conceptions, generally lead to indecision ( Elaydi, 2006 ). More recent literature offers clues on the causes of indecision in management. It shows that job anxiety ( Wowak et al. , 2016 ), fear of the potential organizational impact of poor decision-making ( Samimi et al. , 2019 ) and avoidance of accountability ( Shortland et al. , 2023 ) can lead to risk aversion and indecision among senior managers. This indicates that there may be further personal drivers of strategic leader indecision that need to be explored.

Studies also show that strategic decision-making is influenced by several social variables, such as the strength of the coalition of the team members, or how actively the chief executive officer (CEO) engages with the top team ( Liu et al. , 2022 ). This study therefore broadens the investigation to understand not only personal, but also interpersonal and organizational factors that may bring about the indecision of strategic leaders.

Moreover, given the significant impact of strategic decisions on organizational outcomes ( Gottfredson and Reina, 2020 ), there is a need to understand the consequences of strategic leader indecision. Studies show that the political behavior of the top team members can influence firm performance ( Shepherd et al. , 2020 ), including financial and non-financial outcomes of organizations ( Samimi et al. , 2019 ). Shortland et al. (2023) therefore stress the current need to examine the organizational and environmental outcomes of the indecision of leaders.

Therefore, this study explores the drivers and consequences of the indecision of strategic leaders in a complex organization. It contributes to an understanding of decision-making of strategic leadership within upper echelons theory ( Bromiley and Rau, 2016 ). The research offers insights on the psychological, social and organizational antecedents and implications of indecision to offer practical guidelines on how to strengthen strategic leader decision-making. A better understanding of indecision in the top management team can lead to more effective leaders, senior teams and organizations.

Literature review

Upper echelons theory and strategic leadership.

In order to evaluate the role of indecision in top management teams, we examine the literature on the significance of the top management team, their role in strategic decision-making and the importance of the collective strategic leadership team. We know from upper echelons theory that the background of senior leaders, such as their life experiences, values and personalities influence how they interpret and respond to situations for which they need to make decisions. Social, behavioral and cognitive functioning of upper echelon leaders therefore influence their decisions ( Bromiley and Rau, 2016 ), Moreover, from observing the characteristics of strategic leaders, such as their backgrounds, educational levels, ages and years of experience, one may predict how they will make decisions ( Aboramadan, 2021 ). Subsequently, their choices impact organizational performance ( Hambrick and Mason, 1984 ; Friedman et al. , 2016 ; Aboramadan, 2021 ).

Strategic leadership refers to the activities, including decision-making, of upper echelon leaders ( Hambrick and Mason, 1984 ). As part of their functional roles, which involve setting and communicating the vision, developing core competencies, attracting and retaining human capital, committing resources to new technologies and engaging in valuable strategies linked to global opportunities, upper echelon leaders are accountable for strategic decision-making ( Hitt et al. , 2010 ). Their functional roles also require that they manage conflicting demands and engage with external stakeholders while making strategic decisions ( Samimi et al. , 2019 ). They are responsible for creating an enabling organizational culture to succeed in a competitive environment ( Gottfredson and Reina, 2020 ). Therefore, strategic decision-making is a central task of upper echelon leaders to shape the future, results, relationships and culture of the organization. Their decisions have greater scope, influence and long-term impact than the rest of the organization ( Goldman and Casey, 2010 ).

Strategic decisions are not made by individual managers, but by the collective strategic leadership team. Strategic leaders that are part of a team that has educational, functional and tenure-related diversity enable the continued growth of the organization over more than one period ( Chen et al. , 2019 ). Cultural, age-related and gender-based diversity in the top management team also lead to greater strategic change and long-term organizational performance ( Wu et al. , 2019 ). The collective actions of these leaders determine organizational outcomes ( Georgakakis et al. , 2019 ). Their social processes in strategic decision-making result in the capability of taking advantage of an opportunity or addressing specific challenges ( Kauppila et al. , 2018 ). Moreover, the past experience of senior leaders determines how they form affiliations, the patterns of their decisions and ultimately which acquisitions they pursue ( Zhang and Greve, 2019 ).

The specific formal and informal structures of roles in the top management team determine the team's behavior, strategic decisions and organizational legitimacy. These in turn drive organizational performance ( Ma et al. , 2021 ). Moreover, it is the varying top management team interfaces and dominant coalitions that constitute strategic leadership and that determine organizational outcomes ( Van Doorn et al. , 2022 ). For instance, organizational performance is often dependent on the influence of the CEO and the comprehensiveness of the decision process ( Friedman and Carmeli, 2022 ). Organizations need interfaces between the CEO and the top management team that allow them to balance the rigor that comes from debate, diverse ideas and decision-making speed ( Bartkus et al. , 2022 ).

A recent review of upper echelons literature shows that there is a need for more comprehensive research on the relational mechanisms in top management teams, the impact thereof on organizational performance and the role of context in this relationship ( Neely et al. , 2020 ).

Given the importance of configurations of upper echelons decision-making in organizational outcomes, we can infer that strategic leader indecision directly impacts the strategic leadership function. However, it is not yet clear how the interpersonal relationships in top management teams influence strategic leader indecision. It is therefore important to first understand what the literature says about indecision.

In ordinary language, indecision refers to “the state of being unable to make a choice”, or “wavering between two or more possible courses of action” ( Merriam-Webster, n.d. ). Although Kokkoris et al. (2019) differentiated between the persistent trait of indecisiveness, operationalized as decision inability across different life domains and indecision, Cheek and Goebel (2020) demonstrated that indecision is similar to decision difficulty. Indecision leads to prolonged decision-making processes, attempts to delay or avoid decisions and anxiety or emotional concern once the decision has been made ( Cheek and Goebel, 2020 ). We adopt a definition of indecision that includes indecisiveness and decision difficulty ( Barkley-Levenson and Fox, 2016 ). Indecisiveness is a form of procrastination where the decision-maker, instead of delaying the start or completion of tasks, experiences anxiety for delaying the decision-making thought processes ( Tibbett and Ferrari, 2015 ). Indecision is accompanied by feelings of ineffectiveness, apprehension, worry and regret ( Taillefer et al. , 2016 ; Bavolar, 2018 ; Bernheim and Bodoh-Creed, 2020 ). In contrast, decisiveness refers to making timely decisions notwithstanding any prevailing uncertainty ( Bernheim and Bodoh-Creed, 2020 ).

Antecedent of indecision

There are multiple and diverse viewpoints on the antecedents of indecision in literature. From psychology literature, we know that low future and present orientation predict indecision and that the desire for complex and engaging cognitive tasks inversely predicts indecision ( Díaz-Morales et al. , 2008 ). Because strategic leaders need to be future-oriented and work with complex challenges ( Kouzes and Posner, 1996 ; Schoemaker et al. , 2018 ) understanding strategic leader indecision is important.

The collective and collaborative nature of strategic decision-making may result in a network of indecision. Cumulative events, the presence of a constant risk of reversal, re-orientation and project expansion may worsen leader indecision ( Denis et al. , 2011 ). According to Denis et al. (2011) , indecision escalates when constraints in the environment cause leaders to pre-maturely concretize a decision and when divergent views lead to strategic ambiguity. These processes escalate to increase decision complexity. Tasselli and Kilduff (2018) concur that collaboration and trust in friendship networks may overcome indecision or decision paralysis. The importance of trust in decision-making raises the question as to which other interpersonal and organizational factors lead to indecision in top management.

According to Brooks (2011) , the primary antecedents of indecision are the decision context, systemic biases and potential traits. The context plays a role in indecision when decision-makers have no clear or attractive alternatives, or when decision options are too similar ( Feldman et al. , 2014 ). Alternatively, decision biases, such as status quo bias, may explain the cognitive processes that lead to indecision. Status quo bias, for example, offers decision-makers opportunity to escape potential regret, the need to justify the chosen direction, or to take accountability ( Tarka, 2017 ). For others, the trait of indecision is more enduring. Characteristic cognitive processes may underpin indecision, such as self-critical and defeating thoughts, perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty ( McGarity-Palmer et al. , 2019 ). In contrast, a sense of self-awareness with the belief in free will leads to greater decisiveness ( Kokkoris et al. , 2019 ).

Aspects of the decision itself may also lie at the heart of indecision, such as the lack of information or high uncertainty of outcomes ( Rassin, 2007 ; Germeijs and De Boeck, 2003 ). Strategic leaders often have to make decisions in the context of uncertainty ( Schoemaker et al. , 2018 ) and, therefore, understanding indecision in the upper echelons is required.

The subjective experience of the decision-making process itself ( Brooks, 2011 ), post-decision negativity ( Kim and Miller, 2017 ) or regret ( Sautau, 2017 ) may also support indecision. Furthermore, Steinbach et al. (2019) argue that executives need construal or mental flexibility to better assess specific situational demands in strategic decisions.

From the literature reviewed, it appears that scholars do not yet have a comprehensive framework of the antecedents of indecision. The known antecedents of indecision include uncertain decision contexts, cognitive, affective and personal factors (including traits) and decision-specific factors. Furthermore, the interpersonal dimension of collective decision-making, typical of upper echelon processes, may appear as an additional driver of indecision. Thus, indecision results from decision-specific, intrapersonal, interpersonal and contextual drivers. We therefore need to study indecision in specific contexts and propose that the uncertainty and complexity of upper echelon decision-making contexts may reveal further drivers of indecision that this research will explore.

Consequences of strategic leader indecision

The upper echelon context offers an important setting to understand the consequence of decision-making, especially indecision. Currently, the consequences of indecision are poorly understood.

From a psychological perspective, literature shows that adult indecision is a trait that may affect personal circumstances such as living conditions ( Ferrari et al. , 2018 ). Indecision may also have a negative impact on organizations. Brooks (2011) speculates that indecision may result in the foregoing of good options when decision-makers seek optimal options before they decide. Charan (2001) argues that a culture of indecision in an organization results in poor strategic execution. From an economics perspective, Gomes et al. (2012) found that government policy indecision negatively impacts citizen welfare.

Apart from these and similar isolated and dated arguments on the consequences of indecision, literature is silent on the outcomes of indecision. It is therefore important to explore the perceived consequences of indecision in senior teams.

Considering the degree to which strategic leaders impact organizational outcomes, Hambrick (2007) stated that strategic leader decisions may result in positive or negative outcomes. As strategic decisions determine organizational competitiveness ( Elbanna et al. , 2020 ), it is understandable that indecision impacts organizational level outcomes. In line with this, Samimi et al. (2019) found that indecision negatively impacts competitive advantage, growth and performance and it increases performance volatility. Indecisive leaders are not suitable for leadership positions ( Brooks, 2011 ; Taillefer et al. , 2016 ). Thus, indecision has consequences not only for organizational performance, but also for the collective and individual strategic leaders. However, not much is known about the experienced consequences of indecision among strategic leaders. We do not yet know how indecision impacts organizational level outcomes or how indecision affects strategic teams.

What are the drivers of indecision at the strategic leadership level of a complex organization?

What are the perceived consequences of indecision at the upper echelons?

Research approach and philosophy

The research employed a qualitative and exploratory research design ( Creswell and Creswell, 2018 ), following an interpretivist philosophy ( Rubin and Rubin, 2012 ) to gain emerging perspectives of real-world leaders. We made use of a single-case design in order to account for the strategic decision network effects in strategic leader indecision and the unit of analysis was the upper echelon decision-makers in the organization. We focused on gaining in-depth insights into the specific causes and consequences of indecision in the complex organization, making use of inductive logic to develop new theoretical insights ( Thorpe and Holt, 2008 ) and following a phenomenological approach ( Creswell, 2012 ) due to limited theory on indecision.

Participants

The chosen population for the study was leaders from the upper echelons of a complex organization. We confined the research setting to a debt-constrained organization facing poor economic growth. The case met the criteria of a complex environment, characterized by the multiplicity, interdependence and heterogeneity of the elements of the system ( Sargut and McGrath, 2011 ). The complexity of the organization in terms of the multiple regulatory environments and geographies offered heterogeneity in the sample ( Suzuki et al ., 2007 ). The population represented various client segments, functional areas and regions across sub-Saharan Africa, ensuring client, functional and geographic diversification in the sample.

Through homogenous purposive sampling ( Yin, 2016 ) and criterion sampling ( Suri, 2011 ), the sample frame included strategic leaders with more than ten years of experience within a given client segment, functional area, or geography and with executive committee level accountability. The sample of upper echelon decision-makers encompassed business unit leaders, country executive leaders and direct reports of business unit and country heads for greater data legitimacy. This enabled the gathering of rich data which may be applicable to other regulated and complex organizations in the financial services industry. The sample size was determined when data saturation and data richness ( Gentles et al. , 2015 ) were attained at fifteen interviews and data gathering continued to the twentieth interview.

Table 1 presents the profile of the interviewees.

Data gathering and analysis

The study made use of a semi-structured interview guide that offered rich insights into how strategic leaders experience the phenomenon of indecision ( Silverman, 2011 ) and contained open-ended and non-leading questions ( Josselson, 2013 ). Participants were asked about their experience of indecision in the organization, why strategic leaders in the organization delay or delegate decisions and what they perceived the implications of indecision, delayed and delegated decisions were. The interviewer prompted the participants to give examples.

Interviews were conducted one-on-one and via face-to-face or online platforms. All participants offered prior consent to the recording of interviews. The interviews were conducted over a period of 10 weeks, as many of the participants were elite informants with busy diaries ( Solarino and Aguinis, 2021 ). The data were transcribed, and all data were stored and reported without identifiers. The interviews constituted 153,747 words.

We employed thematic analysis ( Braun and Clarke, 2006 ) of the data, making use of Atlas.ti coding software. This included the six steps of reading the transcripts to gain familiarity with the data, assigning inductive codes to the data line-by-line, searching for categories within the themes of the drivers of consequences of indecision and making sense of and naming the categories before producing the reports. Thus, the first step of the analysis process was iterative through open coding, including the reading of the transcripts, coding and generation of descriptions, followed by axial coding to generate categories ( Farmer and Farmer, 2021 ).

While conducting open coding, the first author consulted with the second author on codes and categories. The first order codes were categorized according to two themes, namely drivers and consequences of strategic indecision according to the research questions ( Grodal et al. , 2021 ). During the axial coding phase, subcategories were created from the codes for these two nested analytical categories ( Saldaña, 2015 ). During the categorization process, the authors compared categories while continually asking questions about where best to position the codes under categories of consequences and drivers of indecision. Finally, the categories were merged to create similar layers of drivers and consequences and the questioning process continued to ensure that the sub-category titles represented the codes well. We then sequenced the categories logically in the presentation of results ( Grodal et al. , 2021 ).

To ensure the trustworthiness of the data analysis process, both authors compared the codes and categories and reviewed the findings several times ( Strauss and Corbin, 1998 ). The researchers practiced reflexivity during the coding process ( May and Perry, 2017 ).

The responses yielded organizational, interpersonal and intrapersonal categories of drivers of indecision and organizational and interpersonal categories of the consequences of indecision, confirmed through the authors' investigator triangulation ( Fusch et al. , 2018 ) to enhance the dependability of the analysis ( Farmer and Farmer, 2021 ).

The sampling frame incorporating the top three layers of upper echelon decision-making supported the legitimacy and credibility of the data ( Yin, 2016 ). The research process was dependable and confirmable as we followed standard data gathering and analysis processes ( Morse et al. , 2002 ). The research also adhered to the university's ethical clearance processes, which included assurance of confidentiality and anonymity of results.

The findings are presented in Figure 1 and Table 2 , according to the two central themes of the study, namely drivers and outcomes of strategic leader indecision.

Antecedents of strategic leader indecision

The results yielded specific organizational, interpersonal and intrapersonal experiences as drivers of strategic leader indecision, as can be seen in the categories and illustrative quotations in this section.

Organizational drivers

The codes yielded four categories of organizational drivers of indecision, namely hierarchy, complexity, geographical jurisdictions, and operational constraints (specifically, budgets). These contextual categories of indecision expand on the environmental constraints previously shown to drive indecision ( Denis et al. , 2011 ).

Context and geographical reach

The fact that we are slow in decision-making ourselves as [an] organisation in East Africa, [is] because the ultimate decision-makers don’t reside in this jurisdiction. (P9)

… you’re going to get in-country chief executive in Kenya saying ‘nah, but that doesn’t work for me’, you know? Or an in-country chief executive in Botswana saying ‘our case is completely different’. (P5)

Yet, when it comes to driving Africa’s growth, we then tend to hesitate on who we support because we are then marking them against global giants. (P7)

I can’t go and talk about multinationals in South Sudan. There are no big multinationals. (P9)

There was a lot of this animosity between the organization in London and operations and all the teams on this side [Johannesburg], and we were trying to figure out who makes what calls and, you know, how do we manage this thing? (P6)

Organizational hierarchical structure

But as soon as I start waiting for a meeting with [the] Chief Executive and he has to go and see this one. And that one will then take the message across to someone else. It can take forever. […] It’s not because of those people. It’s just the organizational structure. (P15)

So, you can see, for me, it attributed to [the fact that] you’re so concerned and so consumed by the hierarchy and what the hierarchy thinks. […] so that it ends up stifling decision-making. (P9)

We’ve created for ourselves in [the] organization, considerable complexity in this time. But, it is a matter of survival for us, and it is unavoidable that we have to do this in that we’ve launched a massive preservation program in the organization while we all are operating in a very complex context. (P19)

I think one of the big areas of moving towards being decisive as a collective, because for me, let me answer the question in a way that says we are, as I said ‘We are not indecisive as individuals. We are indecisive as a collective’. (P5)

These quotes illustrate several reasons why indecisiveness had emerged, from competing interests and animosity, structural complexity and a collective culture of indecisiveness.

Operational budget constraints and competitiveness

So, I think, I think we still do have turf protection, which we would call ‘the silos’. So, it’s sort of, there’s this mentality, ‘my turf, my budget, my bonus’, and, you know, those three are interlinked. (P20)

From these findings it appears that complex organizations have regional, structural and procedural characteristics that can lead to strategic leader indecision.

Interpersonal drivers

We know from the literature that trust is required to overcome indecision ( Tasselli and Kilduff, 2018 ). However, the analysis revealed several negative interpersonal drivers of strategic leader indecision, namely power influences, lack of peer support, lack of trust and the need to avoid conflict. This is significant because organizational performance is dependent on the combined efforts of the top management team ( Georgakakis et al. , 2019 ).

Interpersonal dynamics: power influences

And if there’s a bit of resistance from this informal structure, unfortunately, this informal structure is quite strong, quite strong, in the sense that it can sabotage any decision or any process within the system because it takes things beyond the organisation itself. […] A lot of guys within the [formal] system still consult the informal structures. There’s a lot of stuff that happens over ‘braais’ and over weekends in South Africa that influence a lot of the decisions that are made. (P1)

People in [unit 2] would be very angry with that person. You know, if they favored [unit 1], the [unit 2] people would be up in arms. So, I think for me, the reasons for the delay in that project were mainly political. (P20)

Interpersonal dynamics: lack of peer support

And then I understood I had the chief executive’s backing and others. Suddenly, I was able to stand on my own two feet and physically make decisions and make decisions that were unpopular that went against the grain. (P8)

You need to be very confident in your solution and in your mandate and in some of these instances that the backing of your boss to make progress. (P14)

Interpersonal reactions: lack of trust

I think a lot of the time where we are not making decisions or have indecision is due to a lack of trust. (P2)

It’s because of the people’s lack of trust in the leadership. Because, if they see you being indecisive, it makes them trust you less. (P3)

But it’s almost impossible to get agreement. And that leads to long delays in getting to answers and agreeing to stuff, lobbying beforehand, lobbying afterward. And I think that flies in the face of the notion of empowerment and trust, and then that those delays, those things make people question, you know. They lose confidence. They wonder if there’s credibility. (P14)

I think unit one couldn’t trust unit two to go and launch a similar product and not try and cannibalize the business, and unit two probably couldn’t trust unit one to make the right decision for the organization, which was actually a favorable decision for unit one’s customers, at that point. (P20)

Interpersonal reactions: conflict avoidance

There are always people that like to avoid conflict and they would just avoid it and they would avoid it in one way or other by being rolled over or simply by avoiding the problem and putting their head in the sand. And hoping that the problem goes away. (P5)

These findings provide new evidence of the drivers of indecision. This stands in contrast to a sense of safety to debate and integrate diverse views in order to attain fast and rigorous decision-making ( Bartkus et al. , 2022 ).

Personal drivers

Apart from the organizational and interpersonal factors of indecision revealed, the research also uncovered personal drivers of indecision in the upper echelons. Previous findings have shown that indecision may result from personal drivers such as enduring traits ( McGarity-Palmer et al. , 2019 ), present-mindedness ( Díaz-Morales et al. , 2008 ), or status quo bias ( Tarka, 2017 ). Our findings begin to unveil the impact of fear on indecision in the upper echelons. The primary personal drivers of indecision for these strategic leaders were fear of failure and fear of accountability.

Fear of failure

I guess at [this organization,] for me, that drive is fear. Okay. So, [it’s] people’s fear around making the incorrect decision. (P9)

The spotlight is on. You have big mandates, siyasaba [we are scared (Zulu)] to fail. (P8)

You know, it’s a very interesting one because I would think, there’s a lot of insecurity around decision-making in today’s world. I think the insecurity among strategic leaders is coming from a fear of failure, you know. (P20)

So, the one thing is, it’s [lack of] confidence [and] insecurity. And I think the fear factor, of failing. I think they’re still too fearful, and we’re fearful, partly because of, I think it’s in our DNA. (P6)

And I think that’s probably another thing that I think scares us or makes us not make a decision as [an] organization – fear of failure. I think it all comes up from ‘if we fail, what do we do?’. I think that’s probably why they were too afraid to fail – that we’re failing in small bits day by day. (P3)

You don’t want to make big decisions anymore, because when you don’t make big decisions, you can’t get big things wrong. (P17)

Fear of accountability

We are fearful of being called out on something as standing up for something. (P5).

In my world, the pressure and the spotlight are not on me. So, I can make that decision right there on a lot of other things. There’s a lot of space and freedom for me to hide behind others. (P19).

And nobody takes responsibility for anything. And we end up having decisions that don’t reflect what the real thought processes are, because everybody’s hiding behind everybody to come up to the point of decision-making. (P3)

Further reasons cited for fear of accountability included the belief that others in the team may be smarter and more suitable to make decisions and fear of being singled out as the decision-maker.

From these intrapersonal drivers of indecision, we may infer organizational context may result in fears of making mistakes, of not knowing and of being held accountable should they fail and this may be increased in a culture where fear of failure, interpersonal distrust and power dynamics are at play. The findings expand on previous research on indecision in organizations ( Denis et al. , 2011 ), by offering new insights on the role of culture in driving fear-based indecision in the top management team.

Overall, the findings on the antecedents of strategic leader indecision in a complex organization show a new interrelated dynamic between characteristics of the complex organization in which power dynamics and lack of trust in relations among strategic leaders translate into fear of failure and failure to take accountability at the individual level. Together these dynamics may drive strategic leader indecision in an organization.

Research has shown that indecision can impact organizational performance ( Samimi et al. , 2019 ). Our findings show why indecision impacts organizational performance. Moreover, the findings now reveal team-based consequences that may impact the effectiveness of the top management team. As per Figure 1 and Table 3 , we found organizational, interpersonal and personal consequences and implications of strategic leader indecision.

Organizational consequences

The organizational consequences of strategic leader indecision included both diminished competitive advantage and consequences for the resources of the organization. Previous literature argues that indecision may lead to missed decision opportunities ( Brooks, 2011 ), and a lack of strategy execution ( Charan, 2001 ). Our analysis demonstrated that the strategic leaders perceived the organizational consequences of indecision to include the loss of resources, revenue loss and missed opportunities, while giving competitors an advantage. The findings thus offer reasons for why strategic leaders' indecision impacts organizational outcomes. There was a view that the longer that the decision-making process lasts, the greater the potential business loss becomes.

Diminished competitiveness: competitor advantage

Indecisiveness and when our strategic leaders avoid making decisions decisively means that our competitors will become stronger relative to us. (P14)

Consequences of not making the right decision are immediate and they’re real. (P1)

Diminished competitiveness: opportunity loss

What are the implications, you know? I suppose the question could be, it should be ‘Where could we have been?’ Those organizations that positioned themselves to be ecosystems or platforms are reaping a multiplier, in terms of, earnings and profitability compared to those who are not. (P11)

So, to talk to your point of implications is, if we continue the pace of decision-making that requires long-term consultation and consensus, I think we were going to lose some opportunities. So, we begin to stagnate. (P20)

I think indecision is the real cost to the business, which is difficult to quantify because it just means things take long. (P4)

Resource-based consequences: loss of resources

There are many implications, you lose staff. A lot of staff will go to institutions that can take decisions. (P3)

I think it’s got an impact, indecision leads to loss of confidence, loss of money, loss of good quality clients. And it’s like a negative cycle of delayed implementation and no impact. (P14)

Resource-based consequences: financial loss

Years later, you know, a Chief Executive is crying on our shoulders because he doesn’t have anything with which to compete in the market. (P18)

So, the implications of indecision for an organization is quite varied, right? From a shareholder point of view, it leads to reduced revenue and headline earnings, because you’re not going to be able to connect at the right time to take advantage of opportunities. (P17)

I thought, the first implication is, our client franchise stagnates. So, I’d say we lose momentum, and our competitors become stronger. (P20)

From these various perspectives, it is evident that the effect of strategic leader indecision manifests in multiple forms of loss and ultimately affects the competitive advantage of an organization. The losses include depletion of staff, confidence, money, clients and growth opportunities. Therefore, it appears that upper echelon indecision affects the competitiveness of the organization. From upper echelons theory, we expect that the top management team would enable positive organizational performance ( Aboramadan, 2021 ; Neely et al. , 2020 ). The findings however show that in the context of indecision, the opposite outcome may occur.

Interpersonal consequences

In recent literature, there has been growing awareness of the importance of the interfaces of the top management team to enable strategic decisions for positive organizational outcomes ( Ma et al. , 2021 ; Van Doorn et al. , 2022 ). The second category of consequences of indecision that the participants raised showed the effect of indecision on these interpersonal connections.

Influence on culture: inaction and blame-shifting

I think if indecision happens at a senior level, you can break the whole organization because if there is […] a second layer that is a very strong layer of people, they can really move your organization forward. But if there is indecision just above [them], that creates uncertainty […] Further, I think, you know, that layer goes into freeze mode […] a blame culture inevitably becomes fortified […] and you just feel a ripple effect throughout the whole organization. (P6)

Influence on the team: poor team focus

I think indecision is the real cost to the business, which is difficult to quantify because it just means things take long, it means that teams, instead of being focusing on doing the right thing, you know, they get caught up in this, and that, what is going to happen, and they, you know, they are not focusing on the right things. (P4)

Influence on the team: loss of trust

I think those are some of the implications I’ve seen, for the team around you: if you are not making decisions quickly or helping them, they might begin to lose confidence and trust. And it could be ‘I don’t trust them. I don’t know what I’m doing’. (P13)

The staff morale goes down. So, there’s a real cost to it. […] It means that teams, instead of being focusing on doing the right thing, you know, they get caught up in this ‘What’s going to happen?’ [mindset], and they, you know, they’re not focusing on the right things. (P4)

Personal consequences

I guess this is leadership fatigue, and more like just being indifferent. It is like, ‘oh, we have had this before’. […] Even on something well-meaning, probably very important, but, because of our history [of delays or inaction] or just not implementing properly, it just makes leaders not criticize, to not do anything, to just live through the emotion and not do anything [with an attitude of] ‘this too shall pass’. (P10)

I think there is one of the implications of delaying decisions because they have been waiting for something and then the organization can’t make the decision. (P20)

These findings explain how decision opportunities may be wasted ( Brooks, 2011 ) due to interpersonal and personal consequences of senior leader indecision.

Overall, these results show a circular relationship between a complex context, the culture of indecisiveness and personal fears that have an impact on interpersonal relations and ultimately the strategic performance of the organization. The results hold several implications for organizational design, culture development and leadership development.

Although much has been written about upper echelon decision-making ( Samimi et al. , 2019 ), up to now little is known about indecision in top management teams in complex organizations. This study provides new insights into how organizational, interpersonal and intrapersonal factors play a role in senior leader indecision. The findings show several organizational drivers of indecision, namely the organizational hierarchical structure, the complexity of an organization, geographical jurisdictions and budgetary constraints. Previously, Denis et al. (2011) have shown how ambiguity in projects may lead to indecision. Our research is the first to explore senior leader indecision in complexity.

We also found several interpersonal drivers of top management indecision, including informal power relationships, lack of peer support, lack of trust and conflict avoidance. This begins to address the call for more research on the relational mechanisms in upper echelons ( Neely et al. , 2020 ) by showing how poor relationships and culture may negatively impact organizational performance.

Further, we found personal drivers of indecision, namely fear of failure and fear of taking accountability for decisions. Because upper echelon decisions hold direct implications for organizational performance ( Georgakakis et al. , 2019 ), the research contributes by revealing further consequences of indecision. We found that at the organizational level, consequences of indecision include the depletion of resources, revenue, opportunities and competitive advantage.

In terms of the interpersonal consequences of indecision ( Neely et al. , 2020 ), we found that the senior team members become distrustful and weary, that team members become unfocused and that a culture of blame-shifting develops. A personal consequence of indecision is that leaders developed decision-making fatigue.

Theoretical implications

This research extends the understanding within upper echelons theory that strategic leaders collectively ( Georgakakis et al. , 2019 ) impact organizational performance in the long term ( Goldman and Casey, 2010 ). It also builds on the understanding of the dynamic interaction between constraining environment and resultant ambiguity that leads to indecision ( Denis et al. , 2011 ).

While we know that indecision may occur when there are divergent views ( Denis et al. , 2011 ) and lack of trust ( Tasselli and Kilduff, 2018 ), the findings confirm the presence of a lack of trust, coupled with power influence and conflict avoidance strategies that manifest in indecision. This finding is significant given the role of strategic leaders in influencing strategy execution ( Barstardoz and Van Vugt, 2019 ). Furthermore, the research exposes cultural drivers of indecision, showing a negative impact on strategic decision-making ( Hambrick, 2007 ).

Finally, previous research has found personal antecedents of indecision such as personality traits ( Brooks, 2011 ), decision biases ( Tarka, 2017 ), or dysfunctional thinking patterns ( McGarity-Palmer et al. , 2019 ). Although our research did not unpack traits, biases and thinking fallacies, it did find a manifestation of fear of accountability that Tarka (2017) ascribes to status quo bias and that Shortland et al. (2023) ascribes to having power in a context of uncertainty.

In terms of consequences, previous research has shown that indecision reduces competitive advantage, growth and performance and drives performance volatility ( Samimi et al. , 2019 ). Our research reveals that strategic leader indecision also leads to loss of resources, revenue and opportunity, team demotivation and decision fatigue.

Overall, the findings reveal a multi-level dynamic in complex organizations that drive strategic leader indecision. Interplay between personal, interpersonal and organizational factors enables a culture of indecision.

Given the negative effects of strategic leader indecision, complex organizations should ensure diversity in the top management teams ( Wu et al. , 2019 ) and create flexible matrix structures ( Egelhoff, 2020 ) to facilitate strategic decisions and avoid cultivating a culture of indecision. Organizational processes and systems should be developed to build peer support, trust and tolerance of diverse ideas among senior team members. Organizations should also encourage information sharing ( Dayeh and Morrison, 2020 ), CEO humility and an ethical culture, which may be facilitated through the decentralization of top management decision-making ( Cortes-Mejia et al. , 2022 ).

Strategic leaders should be made aware of the long-term consequences of indecision to counter fears of failure and accountability. This requires the development of the teams' collective efficacy or belief in their joint capabilities and trust ( Luo and Lin, 2022 ).

Limitations and direction for future research

Although this research offers new insights into the drivers of strategic leader indecision, it only begins to explain the phenomenon. The exploratory study has limitations of qualitative research and was confined to a single organization and included predominantly male participants.

It offers avenues for future research to empirically evaluate the relationships between strategic leader indecision and different organizational outcomes. Future research also needs to explore the organizational cultural variables that keep indecision in place in the upper echelons. Similar research needs to be conducted in multi-case contexts and in stable environments and over longer periods of time. In-depth studies of the power dynamics among upper echelon team members can shed more light on the interpersonal dimension of strategic leader indecision. There is also a need for more in-depth research into the decision-making and thinking fallacies specific to senior leader indecision.

The research explored the drivers and consequences of indecision at the upper echelons in a complex organization. Being aware of the importance of strategic leader indecision for organizational performance ( Hambrick and Mason, 1984 ; Georgakakis et al. , 2019 ), the notion of strategic leadership indecision almost seemed improbable. However, the research shows that strategic leader indecision can appear when a complex structure, hierarchy and geographical diversity, coupled with organizational constraints, inhibit decision-making. Accordingly, a culture, characterized by power play, lack of peer support and trust and conflict avoidant behaviors, develops. Thereupon, strategic leaders may develop fears of failure and accountability that drive further indecision.

Strategic leaders are aware that their indecision may bring about loss of resources, opportunities and revenue and can leave the team demotivated and distrustful.

The findings hold implications for organizational design and interpersonal and cultural interventions to facilitate the decision process, sharing information and building trust and relationships. It also calls for further research that examines the organizational, interpersonal and personal drivers and outcomes of strategic leader indecision.

Themes of perceived drivers and consequences of strategic leader indecision in a complex organization

Demographics of interviewees

Source(s): Authors work

Aboramadan , M. ( 2021 ), “ Top management teams characteristics and firms performance: literature review and avenues for future research ”, International Journal of Organizational Analysis , Vol.  29 No.  3 , pp.  603 - 628 .

Barkley-Levenson , E.E. and Fox , C.R. ( 2016 ), “ The surprising relationship between indecisiveness and impulsivity ”, Personality and Individual Differences , Vol.  90 , pp.  1 - 6 .

Barstardoz , N. and Van Vugt , M. ( 2019 ), “ The nature of followership: evolutionary analysis and review ”, The Leadership Quarterly , Vol.  30 No.  1 , pp.  81 - 95 .

Bartkus , V.O. , Mannor , M.J. and Campbell , J.T. ( 2022 ), “ Fast and rigorous: configurational determinants of strategic decision-making balance ”, Long Range Planning , Vol.  55 No.  3 , p. 102142 .

Bavolar , J. ( 2018 ), “ Psychometric characteristics of two forms of the Slovak version of the Indecisiveness Scale ”, Judgment and Decision Making , Vol.  13 No.  3 , pp.  287 - 296 .

Bernheim , B.D. and Bodoh-Creed , A.L. ( 2020 ), “ A theory of decisive leadership ”, Games and Economic Behavior , Vol.  121 C , pp.  146 - 168 .

Braun , V. and Clarke , V. ( 2006 ), “ Using thematic analysis in psychology ”, Qualitative Research in Psychology , Vol.  3 No.  2 , pp.  77 - 101 .

Bromiley , P. and Rau , D. ( 2016 ), “ Operations management and the resource-based view: another view ”, Journal of Operations Management , Vol.  41 , pp.  95 - 106 .

Brooks , M.E. ( 2011 ), “ Management indecision ”, Management Decision , Vol.  49 No.  5 , pp.  683 - 693 .

Charan , R. ( 2001 ), “ Conquering a culture of indecision ”, Harvard Business Review , Vol.  79 No.  4 , pp.  74 - 82 .

Cheek , N.N. and Goebel , J. ( 2020 ), “ What does it mean to maximize? ‘Decision difficulty,’ indecisiveness, and the jingle-jangle fallacies in the measurement of maximizing ”, Judgment and Decision Making , Vol.  15 No.  1 , pp.  7 - 24 .

Chen , W.-H. , Kang , M.-P. and Butler , B. ( 2019 ), “ How does top management team composition matter for continual growth? Reinvestigating Penrose's growth theory through the lens of upper echelons theory ”, Management Decision , Vol.  57 No.  1 , pp.  41 - 70 .

Cortes-Mejia , S. , Cortes , A.F. and Herrmann , P. ( 2022 ), “ Sharing strategic decisions: CEO humility, TMT decentralization, and ethical culture ”, Journal of Business Ethics , Vol.  178 No.  1 , pp.  241 - 260 .

Creswell , J. ( 2012 ), Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches , 3rd ed. , Sage , Thousand Oaks, CA .

Creswell , J.W. and Creswell , J.D. ( 2018 ), Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches , 5th ed. , SAGE Publications , CA .

Dayeh , V. and Morrison , B.W. ( 2020 ), “ The effect of perceived competence and competitive environment on team decision-making in the hidden-profile paradigm ”, Group Decision and Negotiation , Vol.  29 No.  6 , pp.  1181 - 1205 .

Denis , J.L. , Dompierre , G. , Langley , A. and Rouleau , L. ( 2011 ), “ Escalating indecision: between reification and strategic ambiguity ”, Organization Science , Vol.  22 No.  1 , pp.  225 - 244 .

Díaz-Morales , J.F. , Ferrari , J.R. and Cohen , J.R. ( 2008 ), “ Indecision and avoidant procrastination: the role of morningness-eveningness and time perspective in chronic delay lifestyles ”, Journal of General Psychology , Vol.  135 No.  3 , pp.  228 - 240 .

Egelhoff , W.G. ( 2020 ), “ How a flexible matrix structure could create ambidexterity at the macro level of large, complex organizations like MNCs ”, Management International Review , Vol.  60 No.  3 , pp.  459 - 484 .

Elaydi , R. ( 2006 ), “ Construct development and measurement of indecisiveness ”, Management Decision , Vol.  44 No.  10 , pp.  1363 - 1376 .

Elbanna , S. , Bakheet , A.K. and Colak , M. ( 2020 ), “ The harder firms practice strategic management, the better they are ”, Strategic Change , Vol.  29 No.  5 , pp.  561 - 569 .

Farmer , A. and Farmer , G. ( 2021 ), “ Qualitative data analysis ”, Research Methods for Social Work , SAGE Publications , Thousand Oaks, California , pp. 325 - 344 .

Feldman , G. , Baumeister , R.F. and Wong , K.F.E. ( 2014 ), “ Free will is about choosing: the link between choice and the belief in free will ”, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , Vol.  55 , pp.  239 - 245 .

Ferrari , J.R. , Crum , K.P. and Pardo , M.A. ( 2018 ), “ Decisional procrastination: assessing characterological and contextual variables around indecision ”, Current Psychology , Vol.  37 No.  2 , pp.  436 - 440 .

Friedman , Y. and Carmeli , A. ( 2022 ), “ CEOs driving decision making toward higher performance: strategic micro-foundations of small-sized family firms ”, Journal of Applied Behavioral Science , Vol.  58 No.  2 , pp.  256 - 280 .

Friedman , Y. , Carmeli , A. , Tishler , A. and Shimizu , K. ( 2016 ), “ Untangling micro-behavioral sources of failure in mergers and acquisitions: a theoretical integration and extension ”, The International Journal of Human Resource Management , Vol.  27 No.  20 , pp.  2339 - 2369 .

Fusch , P. , Fusch , G.E. and Ness , L.R. ( 2018 ), “ Denzin's paradigm shift: revisiting triangulation in qualitative research ”, Journal of Social Change , Vol.  10 No.  1 , pp.  19 - 33 .

Gentles , S.J. , Charles , C. , Ploeg , J. and McKibbon , K.A. ( 2015 ), “ Sampling in qualitative research: insights from an overview of the methods literature ”, The Qualitative Report , Vol.  20 No.  11 , pp.  1772 - 1789 .

Georgakakis , D. , Heyden , M.L. , Oehmichen , J.D. and Ekanayake , U.I. ( 2019 ), “ Four decades of CEO–TMT interface research: a review inspired by role theory ”, The Leadership Quarterly , Vol.  33 No.  3 , 101354 .

Germeijs , V. and De Boeck , P. ( 2003 ), “ Career indecision: three factors from decision theory ”, Journal of Vocational Behavior , Vol.  62 No.  1 , pp.  11 - 25 .

Goldman , E.F. and Casey , A. ( 2010 ), “ Building a culture that encourages strategic thinking ”, Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies , Vol.  17 No.  2 , pp.  119 - 128 .

Gomes , F.J. , Kotlikoff , L.J. and Viceira , L.M. ( 2012 ), “ The excess burden of government indecision ”, Tax Policy and the Economy , Vol.  26 No.  1 , pp.  125 - 164 .

Gottfredson , R.K. and Reina , C.S. ( 2020 ), “ Exploring why leaders do what they do: an integrative review of the situation-trait approach and situation-encoding schemas ”, The Leadership Quarterly , Vol.  31 No.  1 , 101373 .

Grodal , S. , Anteby , M. and Holm , A.L. ( 2021 ), “ Achieving rigor in qualitative analysis: the role of active categorization in theory building ”, Academy of Management Review , Vol.  46 No.  3 , pp. 591 - 612 .

Hambrick , D.C. ( 2007 ), “ Upper echelons theory: an update ”, Academy of Management Review , Vol.  32 No.  2 , pp.  334 - 343 .

Hambrick , D.C. and Mason , P.A. ( 1984 ), “ Upper echelons: the organization as a reflection of its top managers ”, Academy of Management Review , Vol.  9 No.  2 , pp.  193 - 206 .

Hitt , M.A. , Haynes , K.T. and Serpa , R. ( 2010 ), “ Strategic leadership for the twenty-first century ”, Business Horizons , Vol.  53 , pp.  437 - 444 .

Josselson , R. ( 2013 ), Interviewing for Qualitative Inquiry: A Relational Approach , Guilford Press , New York, NY .

Kauppila , O.P. , Bizzi , L. and Obstfeld , D. ( 2018 ), “ Connecting and creating: tertius iungens, individual creativity, and strategic decision processes ”, Strategic Management Journal , Vol.  39 No.  3 , pp.  697 - 719 .

Kim , K. and Miller , E.G. ( 2017 ), “ Vulnerable maximizers: the role of decision difficulty ”, Judgment and Decision Making , Vol.  12 No.  5 , pp.  516 - 526 .

Kokkoris , M.D. , Baumeister , R.F. and Kühnen , U. ( 2019 ), “ Freeing or freezing decisions? Belief in free will and indecisiveness ”, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes , Vol.  154 , pp.  49 - 61 .

Kouzes , J.M. and Posner , B.Z. ( 1996 ), “ Envisioning your future: imagining ideal scenarios ”, Futurist , Vol.  30 No.  3 , p. 14 .

Lent , R.W. , Wang , R.J. , Morris , T.R. , Ireland , G.W. and Penn , L.T. ( 2019 ), “ Viewing the career indecision profile within a theoretical context: application of the social cognitive career self-management model ”, Journal of Counseling Psychology , Vol.  66 No.  6 , pp.  690 - 700 .

Liu , F. , Jarrett , M. and Maitlis , S. ( 2022 ), “ Top management team constellations and their implications for strategic decision making ”, Leadership Quarterly , Vol.  33 No.  3 , pp. 1 - 20 .

Luo , S. and Lin , H.-C. ( 2022 ), “ How do TMT shared cognitions shape firm performance? The roles of collective efficacy, trust, and competitive aggressiveness ”, Asia Pacific Journal of Management , Vol.  39 No.  1 , pp.  295 - 318 .

Ma , S. , Kor , Y.Y. and Seidl , D. ( 2021 ), “ Top management team role structure: a vantage point for advancing upper echelons research ”, Strategic Management Journal , Vol.  43 No.  8 , pp. 1 - 28 .

Matsuo , M. ( 2019 ), “ The unlearning of managerial skills: a qualitative study of executive officers ”, European Management Review , Vol.  16 No.  2 , pp.  303 - 315 .

May , T. and Perry , B. ( 2017 ), Reflexivity: The Essential Guide , SAGE Publications , Thousand Oaks, California .

McGarity-Palmer , R. , Excell , S. and Ferrari , J.R. ( 2019 ), “ I can't decide, and it upsets me’: assessing self-critical cognition, indecision, and hope among young adults ”, Current Issues in Personality Psychology , Vol.  7 No.  1 , pp.  8 - 14 .

Merriam-Webster Dictionary ( n.d ), “ Citation. In merriam-webster.com/dictionary/indecision ”, available at: https://www.https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/indecision ( accessed 8 October 2021 ).

Morse , J.M. , Barrett , M. , Mayan , M. , Olson , K. and Spiers , J. ( 2002 ), “ Verification strategies for establishing reliability and validity in qualitative research ”, International Journal of Qualitative Methods , Vol.  1 No.  2 , pp. 13 - 22 .

Neely , B.H. , Jr , Lovelace , J.B. , Cowen , A.P. and Hiller , N.J. ( 2020 ), “ Metacritiques of upper echelons theory: verdicts and recommendations for future research ”, Journal of Management , Vol.  46 No.  6 , pp.  1029 - 1062 .

Pettigrew , A.M. ( 1973 ), “ Occupational specialization as an emergent process ”, The Sociological Review , Vol.  21 No.  2 , pp.  255 - 278 .

Rassin , E. ( 2007 ), “ A psychological theory of indecisiveness ”, Netherlands Journal of Psychology , Vol.  63 No.  1 , pp.  1 - 11 .

Rubin , H. and Rubin , I. ( 2012 ), Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data , 3rd ed ., Sage Publications , Thousand Oaks, CA .

Saldaña , J. ( 2015 ), The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers , Sage Publications , Thousand Oaks, CA .

Samimi , M. , Cortes , A.F. , Anderson , M.H. and Herrmann , P. ( 2019 ), “ What is strategic leadership? Developing a framework for future research ”, The Leadership Quarterly , Vol.  33 No.  3 , 101353 .

Sargut , G. and McGrath , R.G. ( 2011 ), “ Learning to live with complexity ”, Harvard Business Review , Vol.  89 No.  9 , pp.  68 - 76 .

Sautau , S.I. ( 2017 ), “ Does uncertainty cause inertia in decision-making? An experimental study of the role of regret aversion and indecisiveness ”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization , Vol.  136 , pp.  1 - 14 .

Schoemaker , P.J.H. , Heaton , S. and Teece , D. ( 2018 ), “ Innovation, dynamic capabilities, and leadership ”, California Management Review , Vol.  61 No.  1 , pp.  15 - 42 .

Shepherd , N.G. , Hodgkinson , G.P. , Mooi , E.A. , Elbanna , S. and Rudd , J.M. ( 2020 ), “ Political behavior does not (always) undermine strategic decision making: theory and evidence ”, Long Range Planning , Vol.  53 No.  5 , p. N.PAG .

Shortland , N.D. , McCusker , M.E. , Alison , L. , Blacksmith , N. , Crayne , M.P. , Thompson , L. , Gonzales , J. , McGarry , P. and Stevens , C. ( 2023 ), “ Avoidant authority: the effect of organizational power on decision-making in high-uncertainty situations ”, Frontiers in Psychology , Vol.  13 , pp. 1 - 12 .

Silverman , D. ( 2011 ), Interpreting Qualitative Data: A Guide to the Principles of Qualitative Research , 4th ed. , Sage , London .

Solarino , A.M. and Aguinis , H. ( 2021 ), “ Challenges and best‐practice recommendations for designing and conducting interviews with elite informants ”, Journal of Management Studies , Vol.  58 No.  3 , pp.  649 - 672 .

Steinbach , A.L. , Gamache , D.L. and Johnson , R.E. ( 2019 ), “ Don't get it misconstrued: executive construal-level shifts and flexibility in the upper echelons ”, Academy of Management Review , Vol.  44 No.  4 , pp.  871 - 895 .

Strauss , A. and Corbin , J. ( 1998 ), Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory , Sage Publications , Newbury Park, CA .

Suri , H. ( 2011 ), “ Purposeful sampling in qualitative research synthesis ”, Qualitative Research Journal , Vol.  11 No.  2 , pp.  63 - 75 .

Suzuki , L.A. , Ahluwalia , M.K. , Arora , A.K. and Mattis , J.S. ( 2007 ), “ The pond you fish in determines the fish you catch: exploring strategies for qualitative data collection ”, The Counseling Psychologist , Vol.  35 No.  2 , pp.  295 - 327 .

Taillefer , S.E. , Liu , J. , Ornstein , T.J. and Vickers , K. ( 2016 ), “ Indecisiveness as a predictor of quality of life in individuals with obsessive and compulsive traits ”, Journal of Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders , Vol.  10 , pp.  91 - 98 .

Tarka , P. ( 2017 ), “ Managers' beliefs about marketing research and information use in decisions in context of the bounded-rationality theory ”, Management Decision , Vol.  55 No.  5 , pp.  987 - 1005 .

Tasselli , S. and Kilduff , M. ( 2018 ), “ When brokerage between friendship cliques endangers trust: a personality–network fit perspective ”, Academy of Management Journal , Vol.  61 No.  3 , pp.  802 - 825 .

Thorpe , R. and Holt , R. ( 2008 ), “ Inductive analysis ”, The SAGE Dictionary of Qualitative Management Research , Vol.  1 , pp.  113 - 115 .

Tibbett , T.P. and Ferrari , J.R. ( 2015 ), “ The portrait of the procrastinator: risk factors and results of an indecisive personality ”, Personality and Individual Differences , Vol.  82 , pp.  175 - 184 .

Van Doorn , S. , Heyden , M.L.M. , Reimer , M. , Buyl , T. and Volberda , H.W. ( 2022 ), “ Internal and external interfaces of the executive suite: advancing research on the porous bounds of strategic leadership ”, Long Range Planning , Vol.  55 No.  3 , p. 102214 .

Wowak , A.J. , Mannor , M.J. , Arrfelt , M. and McNamara , G. ( 2016 ), “ Earthquake or glacier? How CEO charisma manifests in firm strategy over time ”, Strategic Management Journal , Vol.  37 No.  3 , pp.  586 - 603 .

Wu , J. , Richard , O.C. , Zhang , X. , Macaulay , C. , Combs , G.M. , Milosevic , I. and Bilimoria , D. ( 2019 ), “ Top management team surface-level diversity, strategic change, and long-term firm performance: a mediated model investigation ”, Journal of Leadership and Organizational Studies , Vol.  23 No.  3 , pp.  304 - 318 .

Yin , R.K. ( 2016 ), Qualitative Research from Start to Finish , Guilford Press , New York .

Zhang , C.M. and Greve , H.R. ( 2019 ), “ Dominant coalitions directing acquisitions: different decision makers, different decisions ”, Academy of Management Journal , Vol.  62 No.  1 , pp.  44 - 65 .

Acknowledgements

The authors express their sincere gratitude to the leaders of the case company for sharing experiences and perceptions.

Funding: The research project did not receive any funding.

Corresponding author

Related articles, we’re listening — tell us what you think, something didn’t work….

Report bugs here

All feedback is valuable

Please share your general feedback

Join us on our journey

Platform update page.

Visit emeraldpublishing.com/platformupdate to discover the latest news and updates

Questions & More Information

Answers to the most commonly asked questions here

• : Banking & Financial Services

Delivering Results: Connecting Strategy & Leader Development

Client Profile & Challenge

Barclaycard, a global payment business, faced dual challenges: Internally, it was driving a renewed focus on customer needs and customer experience through greater collaboration, innovation, and operational excellence. Externally, the financial sector was experiencing significant turmoil and rapid change.

The company needed leaders with the skills to manage in that difficult external environment while transforming the business. Its previous leadership development programs had been segmented within business units, but the firm needed a unified leadership development strategy that connected to its business strategy.

Particularly important, were a group of about 125 “managers of managers” who were responsible for developing and implementing operational plans to carry out the business strategy and deliver on stretch goals. Though these executives were strong and capable leaders, they had some gaps in critical areas.

To be successful these leaders needed to:

• Collaborate,
• Influence without authority,
• Drive innovation,
• Coach others,
• Build and maintain relationships,
• Gain global awareness,
• Translate strategy into action, and
• Enact principles of connected leadership.

Solution & Results

Barclaycard worked with CCL and Ashbridge Business School to structure a program that would combine big-picture organizational strategy with individual leader development. The program was structured as 2 3-day sessions held 6 weeks apart.

The objectives of the leadership development initiative were to:

• Build the leadership culture;
• Connect strategy and leadership;
• Align knowledge, skills, and action;
• Improve ability to work across boundaries; and
• Encourage ownership and engagement.

Coaching and action learning projects helped participants integrate lessons learned into their personal development, create practical plans for converting strategy to operations, and build stronger relationships within their departments and across the company. The leadership components were informed by our expansive expertise in leadership development, tailored to Barclaycard’s needs. This included our 360 by Design assessment and other personality measurement tools to help participants gain insights into their individual strengths, challenges, and behavior patterns. Participants learned strategies for giving and receiving feedback, influencing, communicating, and leveraging social capital as a leadership asset.

Over 2 years, 120 managers participated in the initiative.

Managers who went through the experience, as well as their bosses and their direct reports, reported strong outcomes. In particular, the participants made significant improvements in leadership effectiveness, collaboration, and influence. In the teams those participants led, 80% felt more empowered to do their work and 70% felt more engaged.

BY THE NUMBERS

• 100% of participants felt they had become more effective leaders,
• 92% of participants’ direct reports said their managers had become more effective leaders, and
• 92% of direct reports  said their managers had improved their ability to “establish strong, collaborative relationships.”

Participants Say

“We had been a very high-performing organization and our managers had great experience and expertise. But new realities and our ambitious agenda require greater innovation in what we do and how we work. Our leadership development strategy had to acknowledge and address this so we would have the capacity we need in the future.”

James Prior

Head of Executive Development Barclaycard

“We are seeing the initiative people are taking to connect with others across functions, geography, and levels in the organization. They are not just staying connected with their colleagues from the course, but reaching out to other parts of the organization. They see the value that multiple perspectives can add to their work and their personal development.”

Head of Barclaycard Academy

“After the course, I felt lifted above the daily challenges of my role to a broader and more strategic level supported by the peer group with whom I attended the course. It was one of the best executive development courses I have attended.”

Participant

Barclaycard Executing the Programme

Partner With Us

Achieving business success requires a common leadership language and consistent feedback process. We can partner with you to design a leadership development program tailored to your unique needs using our research-based  360-degree assessments .

| What to Explore Next

Maximizing the Impact of 360 Assessments

| related solutions.

Benchmarks® 360 Degree Assessments

Leadership in Financial Services

Sign Up for Newsletters

Don’t miss a single insight! Get our latest cutting-edge, research-based leadership content sent directly to your inbox.

Related Content

CCL has partnered with The Financial Academy to further develop leadership effectiveness in the financial sector of Saudi Arabia.

We’ve once again been named a top provider of leadership training on Training Industry.com’s global Top 20 Leadership Training Companies list.

CCL researchers are presenting on several topics at this year’s Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology (SIOP) annual conference.

Case Studies

Since its acquisition by BMW Group, MINI has retained a strong independent sense of brand identity. MINI Plant Oxford wanted to create a strong leadership culture that built on the mix of heritage, was aligned to BMW Group, but was also uniquely their own. MINI Plant Oxford now faced several challenges.

See the case study to view these challenges in details and our collaborate approach to solving these and the fabulous results obtained.

GLOBAL PHARMA & DIAGNOSTICS

About 500 managers within an organisation that is a global player in the Pharma/Diagnostics industry were the target audience. These Technical Product Managers (TPMs) are highly educated, qualified specialists, who have to juggle technical content and stakeholder relationships as well as leading project teams. Therefore, they face increasing non-technical responsibilities and challenges like financial pressure and shrinking R&D budgets. Because of the complex organisational matrix and the international nature of the environment in which they operate, TPMs need to constantly gain more skills to keep up with the pace of change. They need to improve worldwide collaboration and at the same time still ensure high service quality expectations – holding a technical qualification alone is not enough. Non-product-related soft skills increasingly need to be improved and enhanced for long-term business and career success.

As a result of this pressing need, Strategic Leadership designed an intense development programme known as the TPM Academy. See the case study to view our collaborate approach the results obtained.

• Facts and Figures
• Undergraduate Admissions
• Graduate Admissions
• Non-traditional Admissions
• Pay Deposit
• Undergraduate Majors
• Graduate Programs
• Honors College
• Study Abroad
• Professional & Continuing
• Online Programs
• Career Planning
• Living on Campus
• Clubs & Organizations
• Spirit & Traditions
• About Harrisonburg
• Pay Your Deposit
• Office of Financial Aid
• Freshman Scholarships

• James Madison University -->
• Ph.D. in Strategic Leadership Studies
• Why a Ph.D. in Strategic Leadership Studies?
• Curriculum and Degree Requirements
• Admission Requirements
• Resources for Students
• New Students
• Registration Guide
• Scholarly & Professional Development Opportunities
• Funding Opportunities
• Research & Scholarship Travel Grants
• Forms & Policies
• Faculty and Staff
• Current Students
• Advisory Board
• Newsletters
• Scholarly Activity
• Donate to SSLS
• College of Business Home

Alumni Dissertations

The Relationship between Leader Composure and Career Derailment Potential, and the Moderating Effect of Race, James D. Krauss, Ph.D.

Promoting Attainment: Examining the Impact of Institutional Expenditure Patterns on Graduation Rates, Matthew Lovesky, Ph.D.

The "New" Normal" A Mixed Methods Study of the Effect of the COVID-19 Pandemic on College Student Sense of Belonging, Hunter Swanson, Ph.D.

Systems Leadership on Seamless and Transparent National-Level Transfer Credit System: A Mixed Methods Study , Sevinj Iskandaraova, Ph.D.

An Entrepreneurial Mindset: Not Just For Entrepreneurs   Lindsay M. King, Ph.D.

An exploration of knowledge type and firm performance: A study in the MLB, Adam Lindberg, Ph.D.

Post-Application Factors Affecting Community College Enrollment,  Kyle McCarrell, Ph.D.

Experiencing the Pull and Push: Influences on Independent Contractor Motivation and Job Satisfaction , Andy Miller, Ph.D.

Transformational Leadership: The Role of Leader’s Education and Professional Training ,  Ahmet Shala, Ph.D. 

Using Grit Scale Scores to Predict Retention and Persistence ,  Kristen Sowden, Ph.D.

Analysis of Alumni Giving at a Public Tier 1 Post-secondary Institution Based on Student Activity Involvement: Multivariate Logistic Regression Modeling for Alumni Giving Six to Nine Years from Graduation , Michael Speight, Ph.D.

First class teachers, second class citizens: A mixed methods investigation of the predictors of organizational commitment among non-tenure track faculty , Melissa Altman, Ph.D.

An integrated developmental model and measure of intercultural competence , N. Simone DuMerville, Ph.D.

Making work-life policies and perceptions public: An examination of corporate websites and employee ratings of work-life balance , Alyse Scicluna Lehrke, Ph.D.

Predicting attrition of new Student Affairs professionals through perceptions of work-related quality of life, synergistic supervision, and executive servant leadership , Wendy Lushbaugh, Ph.D.

Examining the Corrosive Effects of Government Corruption on Social Capital in Afghanistan: A Mixed Methods Study , Samiullah Nuristani, Ph.D.

Religiosity and national political leadership as essential conjoined social determinants of volunteerism: Implications for international non-governmental organization leaders , Theresa L Koepfler Reimbold, Ph.D.

Determining faculty capacity for transdisciplinary instruction , Nick Swayne, Ph.D.

Influence of remaining unmet financial need on the persistence behaviors of students enrolled at a small, liberal arts institution of higher education , Zachary Yoder, Ph.D.

Failure to launch?: Advancing the case for financial literacy interventions in postsecondary education , Cathleen Snyder, Ph.D.

Leading from the Field: Funded international nongovernmental organizations and the participatory development of long-term impact assessments , Geary A. Cox II, Ph.D.

Theatre as an intervention for empathy development among undergraduate students , Jonathan Stewart, Ph.D.

Perceived principal servant leadership and teacher stress , Donald "Greg" Harris, Ph.D.

Examining the impact of transformational and transactional leadership style on work attitudes, motivation, and work outcomes in nonprofit organizations , Kim Hartzler-Weakley, Ph.D. 

The influence of engaging centralized student support on the academic achievement of student veterans , Paul Morgan, Ph.D. 

Organizational factors associated with quality perinatal care , Lisa H. Akers, Ph.D.

Beyond beneficiaries of corporate philanthropy: The practice of corporate social responsibility in nonprofit firms , Roxann Allen, Ph.D.

Cultural influences on nonprofit servant leadership , Sungil "Calvin" Chung, Ph.D.

Developmental evaluation: Complexity leadership theory in practice-A mixed methods study , Terrence S. Fernsler, Ph.D.

The power of feedback: An indicator of mentor effectiveness during student teaching , Dara M. Hall, Ph.D.

Buying equal student achievement opportunities , Abbott W. Keesee, Ph.D. 

Argument education in higher education: A validation study , Paul E. Mabrey III, Ph.D. 

Clicks, likes, and shares: Using the theory of planned behavior, self-efficacy, and impression management to predict digital activism activities , Aaron Noland, Ph.D.

Leader self-efficacy in youth leader development: A mixed methods study , Christopher J. Rehm, Ph.D.

The impact of student leadership engagement on meaning in life and work during college , Heather Janel Strine-Patterson, Ph.D.

The achievement gap and students living in poverty: The role of core self-evaluation and transformational leadership in teachers , India Harris, Ph.D.

Predictors of private school sustainability using IRS form 990 , Paul G. Leaman, Ph.D.

Leadership, empowerment, and social capital in a civil society mental health program population in El Salvador , Samuel V. Nickels, Ph.D. 

Exploring nonprofits in the social economy: The social enterprise phenomena , Kofi S. Adimado, Ph.D.

The congruence of the social and conventional entrepreneur: An examination of goal split distribution, emergence by age, and antecedent model congruence , Eric M. Korn, Ph.D.

The impact of college leadership experiences on long term well-being , Kevin Meaney, Ph.D.

Nonprofit leadership: A study of governance changes over time , Daisha M. Merritt, Ph.D.

A mixed-methods study of Head Start Family Service worker qualifications and Family Services utilization: Implications for policy and leadership , Laura H. Trull, Ph.D. 

Transformational leadership and resilience, African-American women nonprofit leaders: A mixed-methods study , Donovan Branche, Ph.D.

The effects of academic libraries’ resource, expenditure, and service decisions on library use: An analysis of ACRL and NCES data , Jody C. Fagan, Ph.D.

Combating occupational apartheid plaguing internationally trained professionals: A mixed methods description of activist entrepreneurship in cross-sector partnerships , Stephen Wayne Lambert, Ph.D.

Influence of entrepreneurship education on entrepreneurship development in post-secondary education , Kenneth Newbold, Ph.D.

Engaged citizenship: A longitudinal study of student engagement and early adulthood , Jennifer Rau, Ph.D.

Predictive modeling of alumni donors: An engagement model for fundraising in postsecondary education , Nicholas Rau, Ph.D. 

Changes in leadership self-efficacy, leader identity, capacity for socially responsible leadership, and curiosity due to a structured leader development program , Lori K. Pyle, Ph.D. 

Back to Top

• Expenditures
• Accessibility
• Social Media

The ghosts of ‘Wintel’: What leaders can learn from the diverging paths that made Microsoft a $3 trillion powerhouse and flatlined Intel

Steve Jobs wasn’t accustomed to hearing “no.” But that was the answer from Paul Otellini, CEO of Intel . 

It was 2006, and Intel, the global king of computer chips, was bringing in record revenue and profits by dominating the kinds of chips in hottest demand—for personal computers and data centers. Now Jobs wanted Intel to make a different type of chip for a product that didn’t even exist, which would be called the iPhone.

Otellini knew chips for phones and tablets were the next big thing, but Intel had to devote substantial capital and its best minds to the fabulously profitable business it already possessed. Besides, “no one knew what the iPhone would do,” he told The Atlantic seven years later, just before he stepped down as CEO. “There was a chip that they were interested in, that they wanted to pay a certain price for and not a nickel more, and that price was below our forecasted cost. I couldn’t see it.”

Otellini, who died in 2017, was a highly successful CEO by many measures. But if that decision had gone the other way, Intel might have become a chip titan of the post-PC era.  Instead, it gave up on phone chips in 2016 after losing billions trying to become a significant player. As he left the company, Otellini seemed to grasp the magnitude of his decision: “The world would have been a lot different if we’d done it.”

Meantime, some 800 miles north, in Seattle, Microsoft was struggling to find its role in a tech world dominated by the internet, mobile devices, social media, and search. Investors were not impressed by its efforts. No one could have foreseen that years later, a few key decisions would set the company up as an AI powerhouse and send its stock soaring. There was a time not so long ago that Microsoft and Intel were both atop the tech world. They were neither competitors nor significant customers of each other, but what New York University’s Adam Brandenburger and Yale’s Barry Nalebuff deemed “complementors.” Microsoft built its hugely profitable Windows operating system over the years to work on computers that used Intel’s chips, and Intel designed new chips to run Windows (hence “Wintel”). The system fueled the leading tech product of the 1990s, the personal computer. Microsoft’s Bill Gates became a celebrity wonk billionaire, and Intel CEO Andy Grove was Time ’s 1997 Man of the Year.

Since then their paths have diverged sharply. Microsoft in 2000 was the world’s most valuable company, and after losing that distinction for many years, it’s No. 1 again. Intel was the world’s sixth most valuable company in 2000 and the largest maker of semiconductors; today it’s No. 69 by value and No. 2 in semiconductors by revenue, far behind No. 1 TSMC (and in some years also behind Samsung ).

A Fortune 500 CEO makes thousands of decisions in a career, a few of which will turn out to be momentous. What’s easy to explain in hindsight—that Microsoft would be at the forefront of AI, that Google would become a behemoth, that Blockbuster would fade into obscurity—is never preordained. Often the fateful decisions are identifiable only in retrospect. Nothing more vividly illustrates this than the parallel stories of Microsoft and Intel. The case study of what went right and wrong at those two giant corporations offers a master class in business strategy not just for today’s front-runners at the likes of Google, Open AI, Amazon , and elsewhere—but also for any Fortune 500 leader hoping to survive and thrive in the coming decade.

Wintel’s origin story

The two companies were founded a mere seven years apart. Intel’s founders in 1968 included Robert Noyce, coinventor of the computer chip, and Gordon Moore, who had written the seminal article observing that the number of transistors on a chip doubled every year, which he later revised to two years—Moore’s law, as others later called it. Andy Grove was employee No. 3. All three are still regarded as giants of the industry.

Bill Gates famously dropped out of Harvard to cofound Microsoft with Paul Allen, a childhood friend. They were excited by the prospects of creating software for a new concept, the personal computer, also called a microcomputer. They launched Microsoft in 1975. 

The two companies’ paths crossed when IBM decided in 1980 to produce a PC and wanted to move fast by using existing chips and an existing operating system developed by others. It chose Intel’s chips and Microsoft’s operating system, profoundly transforming both companies and the people who ran them. IBM’s size and prestige made its design the industry standard, so that virtually all PCs, regardless of manufacturer, used the same Intel chips and Microsoft operating system for decades thereafter. As PCs swept America and the world, Intel and Microsoft became symbols of technology triumphant, glamour, success, and the historic bull market of 1982 to 2000.

Then everything changed.

The reign of Gates and Grove peters out

In October, 2000, Fortune ran an article with an illustration depicting Gates and Grove as monumental Egyptian sphinxes. The headline: “Their Reign Is Over.”

The reasoning: “Gates and Grove attained hegemony by exploiting a couple of key choke points in computer architecture—the operating system and the PC microprocessor,” the article explained. “But in the new, more diverse IT world wired together by universal internet protocols, there are no such obvious choke points to commandeer.”

Thus began a multiyear identity crisis for both companies. Intel’s PC chips and Microsoft’s PC operating system and applications remained bountifully profitable businesses, but both companies and their investors knew those were not the future. So what was? And who would lead this new era?

In January of 2000, Gates stepped down as CEO after 25 years, and Steve Ballmer, Microsoft’s president and a college friend of Gates, took his place; Gates remained chairman. Two days later, Microsoft’s stock rocket ran out of fuel. On that day the company’s market value hit $619 billion, a level it would not reach again for almost 18 years.

Grove was no longer Intel’s CEO in 2000, having handed the job to Craig Barrett, a longtime company executive, in 1998. But as Intel’s visionary and most successful CEO, Grove remained an important presence as chairman of the board. His health was becoming an issue; he had been diagnosed with prostate cancer in 1995, and in 2000 he was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease. Intel’s stock roared until August, when the company’s market value peaked at $500 billion. It has never reached that level since.

But most significantly, 2000 was the year that the internet began to seem like it just might make Wintel irrelevant. 

At Intel, Barrett responded with acquisitions, many of which were in telecommunications and wireless technology. In concept, that made great sense. Cell phones were going mainstream, and they required new kinds of chips. “Craig tried to very aggressively diversify Intel by acquiring his way into new businesses,” says David Yoffie, a Harvard Business School professor who was on Intel’s board of directors at the time. “I would say that was not his skill set, and 100% of those acquisitions failed. We spent $12 billion, and the return was zero or negative.”

In the lean years after the dotcom balloon popped, Barrett continued to invest billions in new chip factories, known as fabs, and in new production technologies, so Intel would be well positioned when demand rebounded. That is a hint to one of the most important lessons of the Wintel saga and beyond: Protecting the incumbent business, even in a time of transition, is almost impossible to resist. That course usually sounds reasonable, but it holds the danger of starving the company’s future. As the great management writer Peter Drucker said: “If leaders are unable to slough off yesterday, to abandon yesterday, they simply will not be able to create tomorrow.” 

‘We screwed it up’

At Microsoft in the 2000s, “it was not at all obvious what would happen with the shape and volume of PCs, with operating system margins, or the future of applications like Word or Excel,” says Ray Ozzie, a top-level Microsoft executive from 2005 to 2010. “There was significant internal debate at Microsoft and in the industry on whether, in the future, the PC was dead, or if it would continue to grow and thrive.” Maybe Word, Excel, and those other applications that resided on your hard drive would move to the internet, like Google Docs, introduced in early 2006. In that case Microsoft would need a new business model. Should it develop one? Some executives thought so. But no one knew for sure.

During this period, Microsoft was hardly a model of corporate innovation, and succumbed to what often happens when successful companies are disrupted. Ozzie explains: “When you are rolling in resources and there are multiple existential threats, the most natural action to protect the business is to create parallel efforts. It’s more difficult to make a hard opinionated choice and go all in. Unfortunately, by creating parallel efforts, you create silos and internal conflict, which can be dysfunctional.”

As competing teams fought for primacy, Microsoft missed the two most supremely profitable businesses since the PC era: search and cell phones. Those misses were not fatal because Microsoft still had two reliable, highly profitable businesses: the Windows operating system and the Office suite of apps. But in Drucker’s terms, those were yesterday businesses. Investors didn’t see substantial tomorrow businesses, which is why the stock price went essentially nowhere for years. Missing search and cell phones didn’t threaten Microsoft’s existence, but it threatened Microsoft’s relevance and importance in a changing world, which could eventually damage the company’s appeal among investors and the world’s best employees. The reasons for those crucial misses are instructive.

In 2000 Google was an insignificant internet search startup with no clear business model, but it had an inkling that selling advertising could be profitable. We know how that turned out: Google’s 2023 ad revenue was $238 billion. The model was entirely foreign to Microsoft, which made tons of money by creating software and selling it at high prices. Charging users nothing? Selling ads? Microsoft had never run a business at all like Google’s. By the time Google’s model had proved itself, Microsoft was hopelessly far behind. Today its Bing search engine has a 3% market share across all platforms worldwide, says the StatCounter web-traffic analysis firm. Google’s share is 92%.

Microsoft’s failure in cell phones was, in a large sense, similar—the company didn’t fully grasp the structure of the business until it was too late. The company assumed the cell phone industry would develop much like the PC industry, in which sellers like Dell combined Intel’s chips and Microsoft’s software in a final product. But Apple’s starkly different iPhone business model, in which it designs its own chips and writes its own software, was an enormous hit. The other big winner in the industry, Google’s Android smartphone operating system, likewise ignored the PC model. Instead of selling its operating system, Google gives it away to phone makers like Samsung and Motorola. Google makes money by putting its search engine on every phone and by charging app makers a fee when users buy apps.

Bill Gates acknowledges that Microsoft’s miss in cell phones was life-changing for the company. Looking back on his career in 2020, he said: “It’s the biggest mistake I made in terms of something that was clearly within our skill set.”

Intel also lost the mammoth cell phone opportunity, and in a similar way. It couldn’t adapt. Intel understood the opportunity and was supplying chips for the highly popular BlackBerry phone in the early 2000s. The trouble was, Intel hadn’t designed the chips. They were designed by Arm, a British firm that designs chips but doesn’t manufacture them. Arm had developed a chip architecture that used less power than other chips, a critical feature in a cell phone. Intel was manufacturing the chips and paying a royalty to Arm.

Understandably, Intel preferred to make phone chips with its own architecture, known as x86. Paul Otellini decided to stop making Arm chips and to create an x86 chip for cell phones—in retrospect, “a major strategic error,” says Yoffie. “The plan was that we would have a competitive product within a year, and we ended up not having a competitive product within a decade,” he recalls. “It wasn’t that we missed it. It was that we screwed it up.”

Groping for a megatrend

Just as 2000 was a turning point for Intel and Microsoft, so was 2013. Broadly they were in the same fix: still raking in money from the businesses that made them great; getting into the next big opportunities too late or unsuccessfully; groping for a megatrend they could dominate. Their stock prices had more or less flatlined for at least a decade. Then, in May 2013, Paul Otellini stepped down as Intel’s CEO. In August, Steve Ballmer announced he would step down as Microsoft’s CEO.

Succession is the board of directors’ No. 1 job, more important than all its other jobs combined. The stakes are always high. How the Intel and Microsoft boards handled their successions, nine months apart, largely explains why the two companies’ storylines have diverged so dramatically.

Under Otellini’s successor, Brian Krzanich, Intel kept missing new-chip deadlines—ironically failing to keep up with Moore’s law even as competitors did so—and lost market share. The company gave up on smartphone chips. After five years as CEO, Krzanich resigned abruptly when an investigation found he had had a consensual relationship with an employee. CFO Bob Swan stepped in as CEO, and the production troubles continued until, by 2021, for the first time in Intel’s existence, its chips were two generations behind competitors’. Those competitors were Taiwan’s TSMC and South Korea’s Samsung.

In crisis mode, Intel’s board brought back Pat Gelsinger, an engineer who had spent 30 years at Intel before leaving for 11 years to be a high-level executive at EMC and then CEO of VMware . As Intel’s CEO he has announced an extraordinarily ambitious and expensive plan to reclaim the company’s stature as the world leader in chip technology.

Microsoft’s board spent almost six months finding Ballmer’s successor under worldwide scrutiny. At least 17 candidates were publicly speculated upon. British and Las Vegas bookies offered odds on the eventual winner; Satya Nadella, who recently marked 10 years as CEO, was a 14-to-1 long shot. 

Nadella has arguably been the best corporate succession choice, regardless of industry, in years or perhaps decades. Under his leadership the stock finally broke out of its 14-year trading range and shot upward, rising over 1,000%. Microsoft again became the world’s most valuable company, recently worth $3.1 trillion. Gelsinger, with just over three years in the job, can’t be fully evaluated; industry experts wonder if he’ll be Intel’s Nadella. But both CEOs offer useful examples of how to move a company from the past to the future.

Nadella orchestrated Microsoft’s dramatic turnaround by taking an outsider’s look at the company and making big changes with little drama. He began by making Office apps (Word, Excel) compatible with Apple iPhones and iPads—heresy at Microsoft, which regarded Apple as an archenemy. But Nadella realized the two companies competed very little, and why not let millions more people rely on Office apps? The move sent a message to the company and the world: The Microsoft culture’s endemic arrogance would be dialed down considerably. Interoperating with other companies could now be okay.

That was largely a new business model at the company, with many more to follow. For example, Nadella bought LinkedIn , a player in social media, which Microsoft had entirely missed, and later bought GitHub, a repository of open-source code, which Microsoft had previously despised. Both deals and several others have been standout successes. 

More broadly, Nadella brought a new leadership style for a new environment. In a company known for vicious infighting that could paralyze action, he settled long-running debates over major projects. For example, in 2016 he sold the Nokia cell phone business that Microsoft had bought a year before he became CEO, acknowledging that the company had lost the battle for phones. “People don’t quite grok why things have blossomed under Satya,” says a former executive. “His superpower is to make a choice, eliminate conflict, and let the business blossom.”

At Intel, Gelsinger also introduced culture-defying changes. The company had risen to dominance by designing leading-edge chips and manufacturing them with industry-leading skill. Amid that intense pride, the idea of creating a separate foundry business—manufacturing chips designed by others—was anathema. Yet under Gelsinger, Intel has created a new foundry business while also relying more on other foundries, including TSMC, the world’s largest chipmaker, for some of its own chips—a double shock to the culture. 

Getting a long-established company with a titanium-strength culture to adopt seemingly strange business models as Nadella and Gelsinger did can be painfully hard. Often only a new CEO can bring the openness necessary to make it happen. The same problem arises when a company needs to update its corporate strategy. Microsoft had been seeking and debating the next big thing for years, but Nadella saw that the company didn’t need to find a potentially huge new future-facing business. It already had one: Azure, its cloud computing service. Amazon Web Services was and is the industry leader, but Azure has grown to a strong No. 2 because Nadella has given it abundant capital and some of the company’s brightest workers. He also made an unorthodox investment in OpenAI, creator of ChatGPT, commiting $13 billion to the company starting before it was famous. Now Azure offers its customers OpenAI technology. In Drucker’s terms, it’s a big, thriving tomorrow business. 

Gelsinger changed Intel’s strategy even more radically. He bet heavily and successfully on billions of dollars from the U.S. government. Via the CHIPS and Science Act, Intel could receive up to $44 billion in aid for new U.S. chip factories the company is building in coming years. “As I like to joke, no one has spent more shoe leather on the CHIPS Act than yours truly,” he tells Fortune. “I saw an awful lot of senators, House members, caucuses in the different states. It’s a lot to bring it across the line.” 

A key insight is that for a major company with a history of success, like Microsoft and Intel, moving beyond an outmoded strategy and fully embracing a new one is traumatically difficult and sometimes impossible. For years both companies tried and failed to do it. A related insight: Doing it is easier for Nadella and Gelsinger because they have the advantage of being “insider outsiders,” leaders with deep knowledge of their organization but without heavy investment in its strategy; Nadella was working on Azure, not the Windows operating system or Office apps, long before he became CEO, and Gelsinger’s 11-year absence from Intel gave him license to rethink everything.

A larger lesson is that, in the stories of these two great companies, succession is the most important factor. Considering that Microsoft on the whole has fared better than Intel over the past 24 years, it’s significant that over that period, Microsoft has had only two CEOs and Intel has had five. Most people study the CEO when explaining a company’s performance, but they should first examine those who choose the CEO, the board of directors.

Looking back at these stories, asking “what if” is irresistible. What if Paul Otellini had said yes to Steve Jobs? What if any of Intel’s or Microsoft’s CEOs had been someone else? What if Intel, under a different CEO, had developed a successful GPU, the kind of chip that powers today’s AI engines (it tried)—would you ever have heard of Nvidia? Bill Gates said in 2019, “We missed being the dominant mobile operating system by a very tiny amount.” What if that tiny amount had shifted slightly? Whose phone would you be using today? 

It’s all endlessly tantalizing but of course unknowable. The value of looking back and asking “what if,” is to remind us that every day leaders are creating the future—and neglecting their duty if they don’t learn from the past.

5 lessons from the Wintel case study:

1. Success can be a company’s worst enemy. The great management writer Peter Drucker said every company must “abandon yesterday” before it can “create tomorrow.” But in a successful company, every incentive pushes leaders to protect yesterday. Intel and Microsoft struggled for years to create their tomorrows. 2. Leaders must be open to business models that seem strange. Whether giving away software or manufacturing chips designed by others as a separate business, both Microsoft and Intel faced competitors doing things differently.  3. Get everyone on the same page. Debate is healthy up to a point, but at Microsoft it continued far too long until Nadella became CEO and set clear priorities. At Intel a series of CEOs backed differing solutions to its declining business, which prolonged a muddled strategy.  4. Succession is the board’s No. 1 job, more important than all its other jobs combined. Everyone knows it, but some boards still do their job poorly. If they make a mistake, none of the other lessons matter. Considering that Microsoft has come through the past 24 years better than Intel, it may be significant that Microsoft has had only two CEOs in that period while Intel has had five. 5. Failure isn’t fatal. The Wintel story is a pointed reminder that all companies, including the best, suffer failures and fall into crises. There are no exceptions. The leaders of any company, even the grandest, must always be ready to engage the skills of organizational rescue, and know that even that can be part of greatness.

Latest in Leadership

• 0 minutes ago

The FTC noncompete ban means companies need to totally rethink their people strategy: ‘You’ve got to convince employees to stay’

The FTC’s ban on noncompete agreements will send companies scrambling for other ways to control their workforce

Walmart CEO started his career unloading trailers at the warehouse—he says he got promotion after promotion by raising his hand when his boss was out of town

The financial services gender pay gap in Europe is so large that fewer than one in 10 of the 2,000 highest-earning bankers are female

FCC brings back net neutrality—’broadband is a necessity, not a luxury,’ chair says

An athletic director used AI to fake a high school principal’s racist tirade, and police say state laws need to catch up

Most popular.

‘Americans just work harder’ than Europeans, says CEO of Norway’s $1.6 trillion oil fund, because they have a higher ‘general level of ambition’

On a crucial earnings call, Musk reminds the world Tesla is a tech company. ‘Even if I’m kidnapped by aliens tomorrow, Tesla will solve autonomy’

Ryanair CEO dishes advice to Boeing on managing its crises: ‘Never put a pilot in charge of an airline’

A 60-year-old worker in Texas says she’s dependent on apps that let her get paid early: ‘They get you hooked on having that money’

Amazon should be forced to disclose how Jeff Bezos and others were instructed to use the Signal disappearing-message app, FTC says

How to watch the 2024 NFL Draft for free—and without cable

• SUGGESTED TOPICS
• The Magazine
• Newsletters
• Managing Yourself
• Managing Teams
• Work-life Balance
• The Big Idea
• Data & Visuals
• Reading Lists
• Case Selections
• HBR Learning
• Topic Feeds
• Account Settings
• Email Preferences

Share Podcast

Crisis Leadership Lessons from Polar Explorer Ernest Shackleton

Discover lessons in building a team, learning from bad bosses, and cultivating empathy.

• Apple Podcasts

In early 1915, polar explorer Ernest Shackleton’s ship became trapped in ice, north of Antarctica. For almost two years, he and his crew braved those frozen expanses. Then, in December 1916, Shackleton led them all to safety.

Not a single life was lost, and Shackleton’s leadership has become one of the most famous case studies of all time.

In this episode, Harvard Business School professor and historian Nancy Koehn analyzes Shackleton’s leadership during those two fateful years that he and his men struggled to survive.

She explains how Shackleton carefully assembled a team capable of weathering a crisis and the important role empathy played in his day-to-day leadership. Koehn also shares the survival lessons that Shackleton learned from weak leaders he encountered early in his own career.

Key episode topics include: leadership, crisis management, motivating people, managing people.

HBR On Leadership curates the best case studies and conversations with the world’s top business and management experts, to help you unlock the best in those around you. New episodes every week.

• Listen to the original HBR IdeaCast episode: Real Leaders: Ernest Shackleton Leads a Harrowing Expedition (2020)
• Find more episodes of HBR IdeaCast
• Discover 100 years of Harvard Business Review articles, case studies, podcasts, and more at HBR.org .

HANNAH BATES: Welcome to HBR on Leadership , case studies and conversations with the world’s top business and management experts, hand-selected to help you unlock the best in those around you.

In early 1915, polar explorer Ernest Shackleton’s ship became trapped in ice, north of Antarctica. For almost two years, he and his crew braved those frozen expanses until Shackleton led them to safety in December 1916. Not a single life was lost, and Shackleton’s leadership has become one of the most famous case studies of all time.

In this episode, Harvard Business School professor and historian Nancy Koehn analyzes Shackleton’s leadership during those two fateful  years that he and his men struggled to survive.

You’ll learn how to assemble a team capable of weathering  a crisis, the lessons that Shackleton learned from bad leaders in his early career, and the important role empathy played in his own, leadership.  

This episode originally aired on HBR IdeaCast in March 2020. Here it is.

ADI IGNATIUS: Welcome to the HBR IdeaCast from Harvard Business Review. I’m Adi Ignatius. This is Real Leaders , a special series that examines the lives of some of the world’s most compelling and effective leaders, past and present and offers lessons to all of us today.

NANCY KOEHN: Wanted, men for hazardous journey, small wages, bitter cold, long months of complete darkness, constant danger, safe return doubtful, honor and recognition in case of success.

ADI IGNATIUS: Legend has it that that’s the job and Ernest Shackleton used to recruit the crew for his expedition to Antarctica in 1914. If you know this story you know that Shackleton and his crew never set foot on that continent. Instead, their ship got trapped in ice. But it’s what happened when their original mission failed that has made Shackleton’s remarkable story of survival, one of the most famous case studies in leadership history. I’m Adi Ignatius, Editor in Chief of Harvard Business Review and I’m joined by historian and Harvard Business School Professor Nancy Koehn. Nancy’s case study about Ernest Shackleton is a classic and her book, Forged in Crisis , is a great account of Shackleton’s story. Nancy welcome.

NANCY KOEHN: Thank you, Adi. It’s a pleasure to be here.

ADI IGNATIUS: We’re starting this series with Ernest Shackleton, one of the great explorers in the age of polar exploration in the early 20th Century. To set the context in the U.S., Teddy Roosevelt is President. Ford Motor Company has just produced its first car and the race to discover the South Pole is on. So, to understand the context even more, Nancy, is this kind of the equivalent of the Space Race of the 1960s?

NANCY KOEHN: Absolutely. It’s a great analogy. It was a time when nations and patriotism were duking it out at some level in an international race, along exploration lines.

ADI IGNATIUS: So, Shackleton’s first expedition to Antarctica takes place in 1902. So, Nancy, what happened in that?

NANCY KOEHN: So, his first expedition which happens in the very first few years of the 20th Century, is an expedition under the command of a Naval Officer named Robert Falcon Scott. They’re trying to be the first to the Pole and that expedition goes terribly awry and Scott is forced to turn around and go back and they almost die on the way back for a number of reasons, primarily the most important of which is the temperatures and food supplies.

ADI IGNATIUS: OK. So, this fails, but Shackleton wants more. He goes back.

NANCY KOEHN: He wants more. When Scott publishes an account of the expedition that’s scathing toward Shackleton, that gets his dander up and he immediately begins planning for his own expedition. Having learned a lot of things from Scott that he thinks he won’t do.

ADI IGNATIUS: OK. So, here’s lesson number one. What do you do when you have a bad boss? I mean, to what extent does he learn lessons from an initial foray gone badly?

NANCY KOEHN: Extremely important lessons. One, make your decisions and stick with them. That’s something Scott has a lot of trouble with. And a lot of those decisions in leadership involve displeasing or not making everyone happy. That’s a second related lesson. Third lesson: make sure you have adequate food supplies and transport that you can depend on. He wasn’t a very good process engineer and planner. And so Shackleton learns from that and says I’m going to be very good about that. I’m never going to be in charge of an expedition that runs short on food supplies. Again, almost in intentional opposition to Scott. So, what’s important I think here for our time and for all of us that have worked for bad bosses or people we don’t agree with or people we feel frustrated by is what can I learn from this person about how I will not act as a manager and a leader.

ADI IGNATIUS: So Shackleton leads his own expedition to the South Pole in 1907. That fails to reach the South Pole. So, 1914 he returns to Antarctica for his third mission and this is the one that becomes so famous. So it’s interesting to think about Shackleton almost as an entrepreneur. He takes on some of the tasks that are at once both profound, but also mundane. Hiring a team, raising money. I think particularly the way in which he built his team is remarkable and weird and instructive.

NANCY KOEHN: That is exactly, that’s a great set of descriptives. So Shackleton didn’t use this language, but here’s what he did and I’ll say a word about how. He hired for attitude and trained for skill. That’s the essence of what he did. So, less about what have you got on your resume that makes you look like you’d be a good polar scientist, or a good polar navigator and more about what’s your attitude and how, what has that attitude affect your ability to deal with these very high-risk situations? So, the way he gets to attitude in the hiring process is he asks people to do things like sing a song. Do a dance. He tries to get at their underlying default kind of character, am I pessimistic, am I optimistic? How do I deal with different kinds of situations?

ADI IGNATIUS: So, was he hiring people who pleased him, or do you think he really was thinking at that high level about these attributes?

NANCY KOEHN: Absolutely the latter. Absolutely thinking about what have I got here? What have I got in this scientist? What have I got in this doctor? What have I got in this enlisted man? What kind of attitudes do I have? How are they suited to the environment that I know well in Antarctica? He’s knows it, he’s been there with good and bad and less good results. And very importantly, not just what attitudes, what collection of attitudes do I have, but how do they fit together? He was a brilliant kind of conductor if you will, of teams. Because teams aren’t just kind of set of resumes you’ve got. They’re the people and their attitudes and their experience, and how they work together. So, he was very careful about choosing his ensemble.

ADI IGNATIUS: When I interview people should I have them tell me a joke and sing a little song and just get a sense of their ability to respond to a weird request?

NANCY KOEHN: Absolutely. That’s exactly what he’s doing. That’s a very good way of characterizing it. You can also ask them, you know, when you hire people about what was their most confusing? What was their most, what was their greatest moment of self-doubt? Shackleton got that kind of thing as well. And he understood it long before we were writing about it here at places like the Harvard Business School.

ADI IGNATIUS: So, by now Shackleton has his team for the Endurance mission assembled. Now what happens first?

NANCY KOEHN: So, he sets off in August 1914 almost exactly at the time that World War I breaks out. And he has to ask the Assistant Lord of the Navy, Winston Churchill if he can go ahead and go or if they need the ship and the men for military service, and Churchill says, “Proceed.”  And Shackleton hightails it out of Dodge and gets himself down, first to South America to take on supplies and then they head south and east to a small whaling station, this is their last outpost before they get to Antarctica, the continent. And the whalers say to Shackleton, “The icebergs are very far north this year and you’re going to have trouble getting through the jigsaw puzzle ice going down there.”

ADI IGNATIUS: Remember we’re heading south.

NANCY KOEHN: We’re heading south. And Shackleton waits a month, waiting for the ice to kind of clear and it doesn’t, and he sets off. He was arguably reckless, or a little bit cavalier. Maybe a little bit more than a little, but he heads south. They make their way through these, and there’s astounding pictures of this, through this jigsaw puzzle of ice to the coast of Antarctica. And in January. So, they left in August. In January, late January, just as they see the coast of Antarctica, but as they’re still 80 miles away, icebergs lock the ship in a vice. Tons and tons and tons of ice locking it in place. No one knows where they are. The radio doesn’t work. After a month or so it’s really clear that they’re not going to break free of the ice. They have to wait for it to melt, and if the ship survives being held in a vice that long, there’s very, if it survives they may get back to the coast, but he thinks increasingly as the days becomes weeks and the weeks become months into 1915, that their expedition is over. So very interesting leadership moment. I can’t get to my original goal. What in the heck do I do? And that is a very interesting pivot moment for Shackleton.

ADI IGNATIUS: We’re talking months and months locked in the ice, freezing temperature, no light at times. I mean it’s sort of unfathomable. It doesn’t even kind of register in today’s terms.

ADI IGNATIUS: It doesn’t. So, the ship is locked in January of 1915. They will live on the ice for almost two years. About 20 months all told. Most of that time they will be living in tents because the ship sinks. The ice crushes the ship and sinks it in November, 10 months after they’re first stuck. The ship is battered into pieces and the men live for the rest of the time in tents with lifeboats on the ice. So, it’s a tremendously long, as you said, unfathomable period that they are living in this high stakes situation. But he now has another issue, and this is really important for leaders today. How do you manage the energy of yourself and your team when the stakes suddenly get high, the volatility, your uncertainty increases, and there’s suddenly a new worst case scenario that people can keep on running as a movie in their heads. That, all those things are his enemies. Right? If his men start doubting that they will survive, if they start fighting among themselves, if their anxiety becomes its own actor on the stage, other things can kill them than just the temperature and food supplies. So, what is so interesting about Shackleton in this moment is how he quickly pivots into I gotta manage their energy. I gotta create stability for them. I gotta give them the sense that they can do harder, better things together and under my command than they could do on their own. And that is what he proceeds to do.

ADI IGNATIUS: Coming up after the break we will learn exactly how Shackleton did that.

ADI IGNATIUS: Welcome back to Real Leaders , a special series of the HBR IdeaCast. I’m Adi Ignatius with Nancy Koehn.

NANCY KOEHN: Hey there.

ADI IGNATIUS: All right, let’s get back to the story. So, Ernest Shackleton and his crew of 27 men are stranded on an ice floe near Antarctica with no idea when or how or if they will ever be able to get home. What I want to know is how in the world does Shackleton keep his crew motivated for all this time?

NANCY KOEHN: He shows up every day in terms of his mission. So, we are rarely taught as leaders, managers, parents, teachers that how you get through your day, how a leader shows up, what your body language is, are you looking at your phone as you sit down in a meeting immediately with everyone around you. If you’re doing that everyone else will be doing that. Shackleton understands that. He looks confident. He carries himself carefully. We know from his diaries that he was nervous. He didn’t always know the answer, but he is not showing up with his team saying, “Hey guys, I didn’t sleep well. Can anyone help me get right with this anxiety?”  He never does that. He has someone, his first mate Frank Wild, that he can talk to, but he is consistently showing up as a man who cares about his men and who believes that they together will get home safely. That’s the first thing. Really important lesson today as volatility, pace of change increases. Second thing he does is he understands something that all parents come to understand, which is that routine is incredibly important to creating stability and confidence and belief in self for human beings. So, he has, all the way through this story, has the men on routines. On the ship, and then when the ship goes down, is crushed by the ice in November of 1915, he has a routine for the men on the ice. He has a duty roster. Everyone has a job every day. Everyone is responsible for walking three miles around the ice so they get their exercise. They don’t have Fitbits, but he knows that exercise is good for the men. He tells them its mental medicine, is what he called it. There was forced socialization, so no one was allowed to retreat their cabins when they were on the ship after dinner, on in the case of their tents, no one was allowed to be alone in their tent after dinner. They mixed. There were games. There were presentations. There were plays. So this idea that routine and camaraderie prevents doubt and disillusionment and it’s relative despair and then discord among the team, he understands very well and he acts to prevent that. And the third thing I think that he does that’s incredibly important, just as important as these other two things, is he has this great sense of empathy. So when he sees a man’s, for example, energy flagging and this happened a number of times, over the course of the time that they were stranded, he will order up hot milk for everyone. But he does it for everyone so that the man who he sees flagging isn’t embarrassed, isn’t called out, isn’t singled out. He does it, and the idea is energy, food, feeding and watering is something that bolsters your spirits. Gives you more confidence. Can help you combat doubt or despair, or ennui. And so he does that all the time. These small things that without making a person embarrassed, give them more confidence, give them more strength, give them more resilience.

ADI IGNATIUS: So, a few points. One, you’re certainly making the case that it’s good to hire people who can sing a song and dance a jig if you have a year of nights to somehow spend together, but also delivering hot milk to everyone when there’s one person who’s flagging. I think it avoids the embarrassment. I guess it also avoids signaling to somebody that we’re worried that you’re circling the drain.

NANCY KOEHN: Exactly. Exactly. There’s a moment when the men are so miserable and he’s so worried about as he called it, morale, that he says, order up double rations for four days. Needed to improve morale. And like the men’s diaries, most of them kept diaries, say things like, “feeling much better. Full as a tick.”  So, he understands in this empathic intuitive way that my most important resource is my men’s self-belief and their belief in their group ability to get home safely.

ADI IGNATIUS: So Shackleton clearly has this enormous reservoir empathy. To what extent is that just his personality and to what extent is that calculated.

NANCY KOEHN: I think most of what he does is calculated. Once he’s on the ice and the ship goes down, and the mission of walking across the Antarctica is over, everything he does in this very high-stakes situation, when he’s talking about keeping his men alive, is calculated. That’s what’s so interesting. And I mean calculation with a great deal of admiration and pragmatism when I say that. This is someone who says, “I have to keep them alive. I’m going to be very thoughtful and serious about what I do and very aware.”  And so, it’s calculated empathy that he’s using and he’s very careful to think about how he distributes it, so no one feels left out and it’s done in the interest of what he sees now as the, you know, as an extremely important goal. I’m responsible for these people. I must bring them home alive.

ADI IGNATIUS: And is that goal, that mission selfless or selfish?

NANCY KOEHN: I think it’s got parts of both if you will. I mean he really cares about bringing them home alive. It is he in a sense rising into how service to others can make us our best selves, make us our strongest. Unlock and unleash our superpowers. So, there’s that piece. But this is a man who’s been thirsting for fame and glory for all his life in some sense, or since he first decided to join the heroic age of Antarctic exploration. So, there’s an element of not I. I’m not going to be the man who sees 27 men and myself die on the ice. So, there’s a real self-interested piece too. But I think the most important piece is what he discovers inside himself, which is, “I owe it to these men. I owe it to my command to bring them home alive.”  And I think that is primarily what powers him through his own moments of doubt.

ADI IGNATIUS: It’s this incredible flexibility of realizing OK, the mission going to the South Pole. This is long over, but we’re not retreating with our tail between our legs. And by the way, this is the hardest thing in the world to try to get us all back, but this is the greatest mission of my life.

NANCY KOEHN: Exactly. Exactly. And the ability to say, the flexibility, the adaptability, the ability to say that’s no longer our mission. I’m turning to the future, the new mission, and I’m not going to look back on stalling. So, what he doesn’t do with his men or himself is keep saying, “how did this happen? This is terrible.”  Let’s do a court and a tribunal to uncover why this thing didn’t work and why we got stuck. He doesn’t do any of that. And that’s so important for leaders in a transforming organization or a very volatile time. Howard Schultz came to my HBS classroom. He was then CEO of Starbucks, to talk about the company’s transformation and his own kind of really difficult moment when the company was about to go under in 2007 and 2008. And someone asked him about what he did with the mistakes that he made and what they were. And he said, “that’s a great question. I tried to learn quickly from them, but I couldn’t allow myself the luxury of looking backward for very long, or very often. We had too much work to do. I had to face forward.”  So, that’s a really important lesson as well. I think for lots of high achieving, highly controlling, highly successful people.

ADI IGNATIUS: But what about owning them? I mean we, I think we demand that our leaders own their mistakes. You know it was Shackleton, he disregarded advice, like maybe you shouldn’t go so far south because of the ice floes. So, I guess like today we would say well you have to own it. I’m not sure he did that. It seems like more he —

NANCY KOEHN: He didn’t own it publicly. There was no, you know, it’s my fault, or I take responsibility. There was no Johnson & Johnson kind of moment with Jim Burke the CEO –

ADI IGNATIUS: The Tylenol moment.

NANCY KOEHN: Right. This is our problem. We own it. We’ll make it right. And yet, he owned it completely. I can’t help, but think some of the resilience and the determination, and the extraordinary improvisation of this story, which just gets more and more and more and more difficult for almost two years. Some of that that he harnessed or accessed and honed it himself was partly about the guilt that he felt that under my watch with my decision making, we got into this place. I think that was part of the story too. I think Howard Schultz would tell you that was part of his motivation for using all his powers, and he worked incredibly hard to save Starbucks, because he felt responsible. So that piece, he did own it. He didn’t own it publicly, but he didn’t have the luxury because he had to keep the men’s faith in him, and a public admission, a public confession, at that moment in the naval hierarchy of early 20th Century, British seaman and scientists would not have worked.

ADI IGNATIUS: Better to just hand out some warm milk.

NANCY KOEHN: Hand out warm milk and show the men that you are, you are on it.

ADI IGNATIUS: I guess what’s remarkable is that the group didn’t turn on him. It’s hard to imagine, I don’t know a parallel situation. A company, let’s say, that isn’t succeeding, it isn’t producing for month after month after month and just trying to survive and at some point people saying, “This isn’t working. Let’s try plan B.”

ADI IGNATIUS: They do, and there’s one moment, one real moment when mutiny becomes a possibility. And Shackleton quells it. One of the important things he does is say, in violation of Maritime Law, to the troublemaker, the person who wants to mutiny, he says, “Look, I know the ship went down and my Maritime Law you’re not allowed to be paid. I don’t have to pay you from the moment the ship goes down.”  He says, “I’m going to pay you out of my own pocket. You’ll get paid when we pull in to the, you know, into London on the Thames.”  So that quells a lot. That does a lot to appease the doubting Thomas’s because it says something about what he cares for and what he’s willing to do for his men. But in any event, here’s the secret sauce on the mutiny. Years after this expedition the BBC went back in the early 30s and interviewed, the radio interviewed all the survivors. And they asked them, “How did you do this?”  And all of them, all the men, two or one said, “the boss,” which was their nickname for Shackleton, “made us believe that we could each do it.”  So, there was something incredibly sustaining about that definition of leaders from David Foster Wallace, that leaders help us do things. Better, more important things. Harder, better things than we can get ourselves to do on our own, that Shackleton tapped into which each of those men. That 20 years after this happened they would say, “he, his faith in me made me believe I could do it. And that was the most important thing.”

ADI IGNATIUS: And what do we know about how he did that? I mean part of it was his own posture and continence, but how did he connect with the people that they believed that about themselves?

NANCY KOEHN: A combination, I think of again, frequent Town Hall meetings with the group. That he talked to them as a group every other day or so about what was happening, what he thought was happening, weather, navigate, longitude, latitude. Partly as important through this individual one on one stuff. Now he had 27 men, so it was a lot easier to do than if you’re in a company of 100s or thousands of people. But he made a point with each person on a regular basis to connect with them, in a very intimate way. Sometimes he talked about poetry. Sometimes we talked about stamp collecting. Sometimes we just talked about the seal meat that cook just made. But that combination of we can do this. I got your back, and “Oh, Chris, or oh, Randolph, or [Thomas] Orde-Lees, we got it right.”  So that was incredibly important. The personal and the large-scale leadership that he evidenced over and over again. And, as you just said. He’s showing up. They believe, he believes. And that was incredibly important.

ADI IGNATIUS: That to me is one of the biggest takeaways for anytime that, you know, there’re plenty of people who rise to the top, get the top job and then they’re not present. They can’t sustain it. And really that’s a great contrast that Shackleton was present. He was a leader every single day, whether it was giving orders or more kind of soft power things, but just being present. You don’t walk into the office and sit at your computer and —

NANCY KOEHN: Shut your door.

ADI IGNATIUS: Shut your door.

NANCY KOEHN: Absolutely. And I think the personal piece is important as well. It was personal. I think all great leaders have a big element of what they do that’s very personal to them. It’s part of who they are. And it’s part of their identity and that’s part of what fuels them.

ADI IGNATIUS: The rest of the story is like something out of an adventure movie. Shackleton and his crew drift on the ice for almost two years. Finally, they spot an island in the distance. They have three lifeboats that they’d taken off the ship before it sank. So, they decide to set off and try to sail to that island.

NANCY KOEHN: And it is a hellacious journey. The seas are really rough. The boats risk getting lost from each other, so they have to anchor them together. The men get terrible diarrhea. Shackleton worries by the end of the third day that some of his men are going to die en route.

ADI IGNATIUS: But they make it to Elephant Island. They’re on dry land again. But they’re not going to be rescued there. Way too remote. So, Shackleton decides to make an even more dangerous journey by boat. To head back to the whaling station where they had warned Shackleton about the ice being too thick. This is South Georgia Island. It is 800 miles away. So Shackleton and five men head out in a lifeboat that they have sort of converted into sailboat. Everybody else stays behind on Elephant Island.

NANCY KOEHN: And this is as dreadful as the open boat journey was to get to Elephant Island. This is worse. They’re going to try and traverse these incredibly difficult seas. Seas that even the most experienced mariner would tell you are almost impossible to sail through. At one point, close to the end of the journey a huge storm erupts in that part of the South Atlantic. It’s such a big storm that it sinks a ship with over 500 people on it in nearby waters, although the expedition doesn’t know that. So they’re going to face these huge weather obstacles. Everything seems stacked against their success. But somehow, they make it to South Georgia Island. The other side of the island from the whaling station and because the boat is damaged they can’t sail around. They have to dock there.

ADI IGNATIUS: So, they make it. I mean these guys never get to do the victory dance. They have to walk across the entire island. It’s uncharted territory. Mountains, rough terrain, but they do finally get to the whaling station. But even now it’s not exactly story over.

NANCY KOEHN: No, it’s not. Shackleton now has to get a ship capable of getting back across those 800 miles of difficult ocean to pick up the 22 remaining men on Elephant Island. He gets a boat pretty quickly after they arrive at South Georgia, but the boat goes only a certain distance before again, those terrible icebergs threaten to grab it and lock it in the ice, so he has to turn back. That happens not once, not twice, but thrice in the coming months. So, May becomes June. June becomes July. July becomes August, and Shackleton still doesn’t have a boat. He is worried. He is going grey. He is starting to drink. On August 31st, 1916, in a Chilean tugboat he finally makes it. And the men who see the ship on the island come pouring out of this little overturned lifeboat, in which they were having lunch. That is what they were living in. And he starts counting them as the run to the shore, and he sees that all 22 are alive. And the man with, him Tom Crean, one of the crew members who stayed with him, said the years just fell off his face and he looked so incredibly happy.

ADI IGNATIUS: So, they all make it.

NANCY KOEHN: They all make it. They all make it home, where they are met by a world completely different than the one they left. You know, millions have been killed. Because the war’s still going on. It’s 1916. Tragically two of the men on the expedition die within months of getting home on the battlefields of Europe. And the war ends and Shackleton is heavily in debt from the expedition, and he travels to America and gets on the speaking circuit, where he has some acclaim and interest by virtue of the story. And then comes back to England and starts hatching plans to go again. Of all the interesting pieces of the story, this part is just as interesting. I think we’ll go again. You know it was such a great experience this last time.

ADI IGNATIUS: That was so fun.

NANCY KOEHN: We had such a success. It was so enjoyable, let’s go again. And beginning in 1920, he puts the call out to his old crew, and they’re scattered. They’re in four corners. Some of them are in Asia and whatnot. One’s in Russia. And he puts the call out and says, you know, “My lads, let’s go again.”  And amazingly about 12 come right back to London to join the boss. I mean talk about the power of leadership and individual lives. Like, the boss calls, we’re there.

ADI IGNATIUS: Amazing. So, what point then does, so you said Shackleton wrote a book and it was something. But at a certain point his story really becomes a big deal. That people realized that this was an expedition that failed miserably and yet is one of the greatest examples of leadership that we know. And how does that happen?

NANCY KOEHN: So, beginning in the 1980s, there’s this kind of ground swell of interest, not just in England but around the world, in Shackleton. There’s Shackleton societies. There are Shackleton conventions. There have been a spate of movies, documentaries, books, cases. I mean this is by far and away the most — I’m a Historian. People don’t buy Harvard Business School cases to sell you history. But of all the cases I’ve ever written in a long time at the school, this is the most popular. He’s incredibly interesting to people today and I think a lot of it has to do with who he became in a very turbulent situation. The way he made himself better in very dire circumstances and how that self-making. Right? Great leaders are made, not born. How that self-making affected all these other people. Those are tremendously important issues today. And he, in the stark white surroundings of that story in Antarctica, teaches us, you know, with great clarity their importance and how they can be used and accessed.

ADI IGNATIUS: I don’t want to blow by that. Great leaders are made, not born. And I know you believe that and I know you —

NANCY KOEHN: I don’t believe it. I know it because I’ve been studying it for 25 years.

HANNAH BATES: That was Harvard Business School historian Nancy Koehn – in conversation with HBR editor-in-chief Adi Ignatius on the HBR IdeaCast. Koehn is the author of the book, Forged in Crisis: The Making of Five Courageous Leaders .

We’ll be back next Wednesday with another hand-picked conversation about leadership from Harvard Business Review. If you found this episode helpful, share it with your friends and colleagues, and follow our show on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. While you’re there, be sure to leave us a review.

When you’re ready for more podcasts, articles, case studies, books, and videos with the world’s top business and management experts, find it all at HBR dot org.

This episode was produced by Curt Nickisch, Anne Saini, and me, Hannah Bates. Ian Fox is our editor. Music by Coma Media. Special thanks to Maureen Hoch, Erica Truxler, Nicole Smith, Ramsey Khabbaz, Anne Bartholomew, and you – our listener. See you next week.

• Subscribe On:

Latest in this series

This article is about leadership.

• Managing people
• Crisis management
• Motivating people

Partner Center