speech on corruption in nigeria

Nigeria says it has recovered at least $750 mln linked to corruption

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President Buhari’s Speech at the 4th National Summit on Diminishing Corruption in the Public Sector

ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY, MUHAMMADU BUHARI PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, AT THE FOURTH NATIONAL SUMMIT ON DIMINISHING CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR HELD AT THE STATE HOUSE, ABUJA

4 TH OCTOBER, 2022

I am pleased to deliver this address on the fourth successive National Summit on Diminishing Corruption in the Public Sector that has been organized during this administration. Incidentally, it is also my last as President.

2. The theme of this year’s summit: “Corruption and the Education Sector” is apt as corruption in any sector effects development.

3. From inception, this administration has consistently made the fight against corruption a cardinal pillar of its comprehensive commitments and agenda to reform the nation.

4. We signed up to the Open Government Partnership and adopted the Open Government Declaration under which we committed to have robust anticorruption policies, mechanisms and practices that ensure transparency in the management of public finances and procurement, and to strengthen the rule of law.

5. We have tried in the last seven years to keep faith with these commitments. I am pleased to have participated in each of the previous summits organized by the current Board of the ICPC under the leadership of Prof. Bolaji Owasanoye, SAN, in collaboration with the Office of the Secretary to the Government of the Federation, targeting different aspects of our administration’s commitment to fight corruption.

6. This year’s summit will mirror how corruption undermines educational policies, investments and create an unfriendly learning environment for our youths.

7. Incessant strikes especially by unions in the tertiary education often imply that government is grossly underfunding education, but I must say that corruption in the education system from basic level to the tertiary level has been undermining our investment in the sector and those who go on prolonged strikes on flimsy reasons are no less complicit.

8. The 1999 Constitution places a premium on education by placing it on the Concurrent List, thereby laying the responsibilities of budgeting and underwriting qualitative education on both the Federal and State Governments.

9. The total education budget for each year is therefore a reflection of both federal and state budgets and should be viewed with other financial commitments in their totality.

10. The allocation to education in the federal budget should not be considered via allocation to the Federal Ministry of Education and also academic institutions alone, but should include allocation to the Universal Basic Education, transfers to TETFUND and refund from the Education Tax Pool Account to TETFUND etc.

12. I am aware that the aggregate education budget in all the 36 states of the Federation and that of the Federal Government, combined with the internally generated revenues of the educational institutions themselves are also a subject that requires the attention of critics of government funding of education.

13. In line with the National Policy on Education, this administration has been implementing the Home-Grown School Feeding Programme to provide a free balanced meal per day for each child that attends public primary school in order to encourage school enrolment and facilitate accesses to universal basic education.

14. To mitigate the impact of security challenges on our schools, I signed the Safe Schools Declaration ratification document in December 2019. The Federal Ministry of Education followed up and developed the Minimum Standard for Safe Schools document in 2021, all part of the Safe Schools Initiative. The Safe Schools Initiative is an expression of government’s commitment to continue to work towards the protection of students, teachers and the school environments.

15. Government and stakeholders in the educational sector are concerned about the manifestation of various forms of corruption in the education sector. I am aware that students in our universities for example, use different terminologies to describe different forms of corruption they experience on our campuses.

16. There is sorting or cash for marks/grades, sex for marks, sex for grade alterations, examination malpractice, and so on.

17. Sexual harassment has assumed an alarming proportion. Other forms of corruption include pay-roll padding or ghost workers, lecturers taking up full time appointments in more than one academic institution, including private institutions, lecturers writing seminar papers, projects and dissertations for students for a fee, and admission racketeering, to mention only the most glaring corrupt practices.

18. I am happy to note that ICPC is investigating and prosecuting sexual harassment as abuse of power in our educational institutions. I approve and encourage them to continue to do so.

19. Government will continue to fund education within realistically available revenue but stakeholders, including the media should equally advocate for transparency in the amount generated as internally generated revenue by educational institutions and how such funds are expended.

20. Corruption in the expenditure of internally generated revenue of tertiary institutions is a matter that has strangely not received the attention of stakeholders in tertiary education, including unions.

21. I call on stakeholders to demand accountability in the administration of academic institutions and for unions to interrogate the bloated personnel and recurrent expenditure of their institutions. Let me also implore the Unions to work with government to put faces and identities to names on the payroll.

22. I believe that the role of government in education is to guarantee access and establish minimum benchmarks for quality education. Due to declining resources, government cannot bear the cost of funding education alone. I task our academics to attract endowments, research and other grants to universities, polytechnics and colleges of education similar to what obtains in other countries.

23. About two weeks ago, I participated in the 77 th United Nations General Assembly, in New York. One of the key events was Transforming Education Summit Leaders Day, titled: Transforming Education to Transform the World:

Learning to Live Together Sustainably.

24. Nigeria joined other countries in committing “to the vision of Education for Sustainable Development and to the objectives of the Greening Education Partnership” and building “education systems that foster ethical and socially responsible global citizens” who actively contribute to the Sustainable Development Goals.

25. That is a vision which we will continue to aspire and build.

26. I congratulate the sole winner of this year’s Public Service Integrity

Award, SUPERINTENDENT DANIEL ITSE AMAH.

27. I also commend the Chairman, ICPC, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation and the Registrar of JAMB, for organizing this summit and bringing together the three arms of Government, MDAs and other stakeholders to deliberate on corruption in the educational sector of Nigeria.

28. I therefore look forward to the outcomes and recommendations of this summit. I am sure that the ICPC and OSGF will bring forward the recommendations for appropriate action.

29. It is my singular honour and privilege to declare this summit open.

Thank you and God Bless the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

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• Monitoring and Fighting Corruption in Nigeria: A Year of Impact with TransparencIT

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Systemic corruption is a major obstacle to stability and economic development in Nigeria. Estimates show that in the 60 years since independence, corruption has cost the Nigerian economy more than $550 billion . The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission of Nigeria recovered at least $750 million in local and foreign currency linked to corruption and fraud in 2021. The country’s endemic corruption also contributes to its overall weak rule of law as measured by the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index , which ranked Nigeria 120 out of 140 countries surveyed on absence of corruption in 2022. Corrupt practices in the justice system often lead to slow and ineffective dispensation of justice. 

To address the gaps in Nigeria’s fight against corruption, Transparency Information Technology Initiative (TransparencIT) launched the Trial Monitoring of Corruption Cases project in 2016. The project’s objective is to foster courtroom openness and galvanize citizen participation in judicial processes to promote accountability and advance the rule of law. It does this by tracking and evaluating corruption cases in Nigerian courts to drive compliance with the law and push cases towards a speedy conclusion. Based on these analyses, TransparencIT submits recommendations to the National Judicial Council to address violations by judicial officers and challenges delaying trials. Since its inception, the project has contributed to reducing the average duration of a corruption case from eight years to three to four years. It also led the chief justice of Nigeria to direct all heads of courts to designate special anti-corruption courts to exclusively try corruption and other financial crimes cases. Abbas Inuwa, the founder, and executive director of TransparencIT, believes that this measure has reduced the time span of corruption cases in the country. Within the first six months, the special courts reported an increase in the conclusion of corruption cases.  

In their efforts to promote open government and accountability, TransparencIT also launched Nigeria’s first central online and open source Corruption Cases Database which has tracked over 4,500 cases and provides live updates of more than 2,000 cases for use by policymakers and researchers. The database has also become a resource for individuals to conduct due diligence and collect information on prospective business associates who might be charged with corruption or fraud. According to Inuwa, this has helped prevent numerous cases of cybercrime and fraud in Nigeria.    TransparencIT’s achievement in fighting corruption in Nigeria was recognized at the 2022 World Justice Challenge where it won the award in the Anti-Corruption and Open Government category. The World Justice Challenge is a global competition to identify, recognize and promote effective and innovative initiatives to protect and advance the rule of law.  

In a recent webinar hosted by the World Justice Project, Inuwa and his team discussed how their efforts have advanced during the past year and the ongoing challenges to fighting corruption and monitoring other criminal cases in Nigeria. This webinar was part of a series which featured the five winning projects from the 2022 competition and highlighted their progress on advancing the rule of law during the past year.  

During the webinar, Inuwa shared that the project has made great strides since winning the 2022 Challenge.  

“We have added six more states, eight additional courts, 12 additional trackers, 1,000-plus cases on the online database, [and] published three monitoring reports through our work since last year,” he said.  

The project now covers 27 out of 36 states and 60 designated anti-corruption courts in Nigeria. Due to its success in advancing transparency and accountability, this initiative was also chosen as a module in the Open Justice course at New York University’s GovLab . 

Inuwa acknowledged that winning last year’s Challenge has played a key role in expanding TransparencIT’s initiatives on monitoring other criminal cases in Nigeria.  

“We have been able to initiate a human rights project t o monitor the arrest, detention and criminal trial of journalists and bloggers in Nigeria during and after the 2023 elections,” he told webinar attendees. “This has been a result of winning the World Justice Challenge which has given us more visibility and connected us to donors and partners like the American Bar Association’s Center for Human Rights, which is supporting this project.” 

They have also partnered with 23 civil society and media organizations to engage and sensitize law enforcement agencies on the protection of fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and opinion. Going forward, the organization intends to expand the scope of the project to monitor other facets of civic space and document human rights abuse trials in Nigeria.  

Watch the full webinar now: 

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As part of a multidimensional project funded by the Canadian Embassy in Mexico, WJP has produced a new report that seeks to increase the visibility of Indigenous mediation programs. It comes as a growing number of governments, donors, and communities are embracing a paradigm shift to people-centered justice. That global movement prioritizes identifying people’s legal needs and fostering accessible solutions to address them, rather than primarily investing in established institutions that are missing the mark. 

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Remarks by World Bank Group President David Malpass at the 2022 International Anti-Corruption Conference

Let me start by thanking Transparency International and the International Anti-Corruption Conference for continuing to attack the scourge of corruption.

Corruption presents a major threat to economic growth and democratic stability around the globe. It steals from the poor and erodes progress. It affects almost all countries and brings with it a pernicious effect on investment and governance. It drains scarce resources and undermines public trust.

Corruption doesn’t just add to the cost of a project – it changes the choice of projects and their design and undercuts their effectiveness. Corruption scandals also misallocate public resources to the pockets of people in power. Concrete instances were disclosed in the Panama Papers, the Lava Jato Odebrecht Scandal, and the Pandora Papers among others.

Crises often provide fertile ground. In response to the pandemic, many governments relaxed standards, waived guardrails, and increased spending and debt, creating opportunities for political and commercial corruption.

Now, with prices and interest rates suddenly rising, people in developing countries are paying for the distortions from arbitrary price controls, subsidies, and currency depreciations; and for the corruption related to dual and multiple exchange rates and capital controls.

Almost a quarter of firms surveyed in the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys expected to give gifts to secure government contracts. And 30 percent of firms say corruption is a major constraint for doing business.

Former World Bank President Wolfensohn notably called this “the cancer of corruption.” His efforts at the World Bank introduced new anti-corruption policies that debarred contractors found guilty of corrupt activity. By the end of Mr. Wolfensohn’s term, similar mechanisms had been instituted across several multilateral development banks. The measures would also de-bar any company on a fellow agency’s list. This cross-debarment was a breakthrough and still plays a large role in improving accountability and transparency across development finance institutions.

At the World Bank, this mechanism has been strengthened, expanded, and vested in the Integrity Vice-Presidency, now led by Mohamadou Diagne. In FY22, the World Bank sanctioned 35 firms and individuals, of which 32 were debarred. An additional 72 firms were recognized for cross-debarments from other MDBs, and over 300 new external preliminary investigations were launched.

Fighting corruption in MDB contracts has been difficult, but let me describe progress in transparency, data, and regulation.

First, transparency is a cornerstone in the fight against corruption. Contract transparency is at the center of our efforts toward sustainability of public debt. We’re confronting debt contracts and debt-like instruments that are unsustainable due to non-disclosure clauses and to unsupportable collateralization and escrow requirements. IDA’s new Sustainable Development Finance Policy (SDFP) prioritizes debt transparency and incentivizes IDA countries to make their debts transparent, including through disclosure of loan contract terms and payment schedules.

To fight corruption in vaccines and PPE during COVID-19, we strongly advocated transparency in vaccine production, contracts, options, donations, and prices.

To fight greenwashing and lay the groundwork for high-quality carbon credit markets, we need transparent, verifiable delivery of actual reductions in greenhouse gas emissions over a long period of years. Our new SCALE trust fund takes on this challenge.

Second, evidence and data are essential in the fight against corruption.

In addition to increasing the amount and quality of data available to the public, the World Bank supports GovTech and CivicTech innovations in our partner countries to enhance individuals’ voices and participation in public life.

Harnessing the power of data in the anticorruption fight, the World Bank has bought together procurement data to develop a common platform called ProACT, which stands for Procurement Anticorruption and Transparency. ProACT enables the analysis of data related to over 21 million contracts across 120 countries. It is a tool for civil society to use to hold governments accountable and therefore improve the use of public resources.

This year marks the 15 th anniversary of StAR, the Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative. In partnership with the United Nations, this initiative assists countries to achieve accountability, recover stolen public assets, and repair the damage from corruption.

• In 2021 alone, 18 countries received StAR assistance, 5 countries adopted new laws or amendments related to asset recovery, and over 1,800 people were trained by the initiative.

And third, let me underline the importance of a strong rule of law. While an increasing number of governments have adopted anticorruption laws and regulations, inconsistency in their application and enforcement weakens the public’s trust and the capacity of judicial systems to provide protection for basic rights. The patchwork of varying anticorruption legal frameworks increases free-riding and distorts business opportunities. This can end up discouraging the efforts of people in countries with the most stringent anti-corruption enforcement; and instead shifting business to entities and individuals facing weaker penalties or less enforcement.  The result is a migration of business activity toward corruption rather than away from it.

The inconsistent regulatory patchwork also challenges the compliance capacity of poorer countries. As global regulatory mechanisms are strengthened to combat money laundering and terrorism finance, we have stepped up our work with regional FATFs, or Financial Action Task Forces, and with country regulatory authorities to improve practices and capacity.

I was very pleased to meet yesterday with the World Bank’s Governance practice, headed by Arturo Herrera. The large practice works in over 100 countries to help improve governance and procurement practices and fight corruption.

One of our biggest challenges is the tradeoff between our goal of achieving good development outcomes, often through direct support to people in developing countries, and the recognition that corruption is a frequent obstacle. I mentioned earlier the corruption often evident in multiple exchange rate systems. As an example, if we transfer funds through the official exchange rate when there is a materially weaker parallel market rate, the transfer may provide much of the benefits to the narrow group who has access to the foreign exchange at the official rate.

Let me reiterate and emphasize that the World Bank is making every effort to combat corruption, strengthen good governance, and build a solid foundation of trust and accountability. We will not tolerate corruption in the projects that we support.

I’d like to particularly acknowledge our joint efforts with UNODC, the Open Government Partnership, our work with USAID and UNDP in many countries, and U.S. leadership this year in hosting the IACC.

We welcome working with all of you here today in the frontline fight against corruption.

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Full Text of Buhari’s Speech At The Anti-Corruption Summit In London

Originally posted on Nigeria News

Read full speech of President Buhari’s speech at the ongoing Anti-Corruption Summit In London:

Fellow Heads of State & Government,

Ø The Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, the Rt. Honourable Patricia Scotland, QC,

Ø Business Leaders,

Ø Representatives of Civil Society Organizations,

Ø Your Excellencies,

Ø Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am delighted to be invited to this event to exchange views with you my fellow invited guests representing Governments, the Private Sector Governments are working to open private sector practices as well — including through beneficial ownership transparency, open contracting, and regulating environmental standards. Technical specificat... More and Civil Society Organizations. I thank you Your Excellency, the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, for asking me to speak at this gathering.

2. Corruption is a hydra-headed monster and a cankerworm that undermines the fabric of all societies. It does not differentiate between developed and developing countries. It constitutes a serious threat to good governance, rule of law, peace and security, as well as development programmes aimed at tackling poverty and economic backwardness. These considerations informed my decision to attend this event as well as the Anti-Corruption Summit organized by Prime Minister Rt. Hon. David Cameron that will be held tomorrow. I expect that today’s event would feed into the discussions that will be held tomorrow at Lancaster House.

3. In 2003, when the world came together to sign the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) that entered into force in 2005, it was with a view to tackling the growing threat that corruption had become to many nations. Little did we know that eleven years since then, the problem would still continue unabated, but even become more intractable and cancerous.

Excellencies,

4. Permit me to share with you our national experience in combating corruption. I intend to do this by placing the fight against corruption in Nigeria within the context of the three priority programmes of our Administration. On assumption of office on 29th May 2015, we identified as our main focus three key priority programmes. They are, combating insecurity, tackling corruption and job creation through re-structuring the declining national economy.

5. Our starting point as an Administration was to amply demonstrate zero tolerance for corrupt practices as this vice is largely responsible for the social and economic problems our country faces today. The endemic and systemic nature of corruption in our country demanded our strong resolve to fight it. We are demonstrating our commitment OGP commitments are promises for reform co-created by governments and civil society and submitted as part of an action plan. Commitments typically include a description of the problem, concrete action... to this effort by bringing integrity to governance and showing leadership by example.

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen

6. Tackling the menace of corruption is not an easy task, but it is possible even if many feathers have to be ruffled. Our Government’s dogged commitment to tackling corruption is also evident in the freedom and support granted to national anti-corruption agencies to enable them to carry out their respective mandates without interference or hindrance from any quarter including the government.

7. Today, our frontline anti-corruption agencies, namely, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related Offences Commission (ICPC), the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) and the Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT), have become revitalised and more proactive in the pursuit of perpetrators of corrupt practices, irrespective of their social status and political persuasion. This is a radical departure from the past.

8. We have implemented the Treasury Single Account (TSA) whereby all Federal government revenue goes into one account. This measure would make it impossible for public officers to divert public funds to private accounts as was the practice before. Through the effective application of TSA and the Bank Verification Number (BVN), we have been able to remove 23,000 ghost workers from our pay roll, thereby saving billions that would have been stolen.

9. We are also reviewing our anti-corruption laws and have developed a national anti-corruption strategy document that will guide our policies in the next three years, and possibly beyond.

10. I am not unaware of the challenges of fighting corruption in a manner consistent with respect for human rights An essential part of open government includes protecting the sacred freedoms and rights of all citizens, including the most vulnerable groups, and holding those who violate human rights accountable. T... and the rule of law. As a country that came out of prolonged military rule only sixteen years ago, it will clearly take time to change the mentality and psychology of law enforcement officers. I am committed to applying the rule of law and to respecting human rights. I also require our security agencies to do the same.

11. I admit that there are a few cases where apparently stringent rules have been applied as a result of threats to national security and the likelihood that certain persons may escape from the country or seek to undermine the stability of Nigeria. It is for this reason that we are seeking the support of many countries for the prosecution of certain individuals residing in their jurisdictions. Of course we will provide the necessary legal documents and whatever mutual assistance is required to secure conviction of such individuals, as well as facilitate the repatriation of our stolen assets.

12. Unfortunately, our experience has been that repatriation of corrupt proceeds is very tedious, time consuming, costly and entails more than just the signing of bilateral or multilateral agreements. This should not be the case as there are provisions in the appropriate United Nations Convention that require countries to return assets to countries from where it is proven that they were illegitimately acquired.

13. Further, we are favourably disposed to forging strategic partnerships with governments, civil society organizations, organized private sector and international organizations to combat corruption. Our sad national experience had been that domestic perpetrators of corrupt practices do often work hand-in-hand with international criminal cartels.

14. This evil practice is manifested in the plundering and stealing of public funds, which are then transferred abroad into secret accounts. I therefore, call for the establishment of an international anti-corruption infrastructure that will monitor, trace and facilitate the return of such assets to their countries of origin. It is important to stress that the repatriation of identified stolen funds should be done without delay or preconditions.

15. In addition to the looting of public funds, Nigeria is also confronted with illegal activities in the oil sector, the mainstay of our export economy. That this industry has been enmeshed in corruption with the participation of the staff of some of the oil companies is well established. Their participation enabled oil theft to take place on a massive scale.

16. Some of us in this hall may be familiar with the Report released by Chatham House, here in London, in 2013, titled “Nigeria’s Criminal Crude: International Options to Combat the Export of Stolen Oil.” The important findings of the Chatham House document are illuminating and troubling. Part of the Report concluded that:

a) Nigerian crude oil is being stolen on an industrial scale and exported, with the proceeds laundered through world financial centres by transnational organized criminals.

b) Oil theft is a species of organized crime that is almost totally off the international community’s radar, as Nigeria’s trade and diplomatic partners have taken no real action.

c) Nigeria could not stop the trade single-handedly, and there is limited value in countries going it alone.

17. It is clear therefore, that the menace of oil theft, put at over 150,000 barrels per day, is a criminal enterprise involving internal and external perpetrators. Illicit oil cargoes and their proceeds move across international borders. Opaque and murky as these illegal transactions may be, they are certainly traceable and can be acted upon, if all governments show the required political will. This will has been the missing link in the international efforts hitherto. Now in London, we can turn a new page by creating a multi-state and multi-stakeholder partnership to address this menace.

18. We, therefore, call on the international community to designate oil theft as an international crime similar to the trade in “blood diamonds”, as it constitutes an imminent and credible threat to the economy and stability of oil-producing countries like Nigeria. The critical stakeholders here present can lead the charge in this regard.

19. By the end of our summit tomorrow, we should be able to agree on a rules-based architecture to combat corruption in all its forms and manifestations. I agree fully with the Commonwealth Secretary-General that anti-corruption is a shared agenda for civil society, business and government, requiring commitment from companies, creating a space for civil society and governments providing support for whistle-blowers.

20. A main component of this anti-corruption partnership is that governments must demonstrate unquestionable political will and commitment to the fight. The private sector must come clean and be transparent, and civil society, while keeping a watch on all stakeholders, must act and report with a sense of responsibility and objectivity.

21. For our part, Nigeria is committed to signing the Open Government Partnership The Open Government Partnership (OGP) is a multi-stakeholder initiative focused on improving government transparency, ensuring opportunities for citizen participation in public matters, and strengthen... More initiatives alongside Prime Minister Cameron during the Summit tomorrow.

22. In conclusion, may I commend the Commonwealth Secretary-General and her team for hosting this important event. This is a very encouraging way to start your tenure. We wish you the very best as you guide the affairs of the Commonwealth family in the years to come.

23. I thank you.

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IFRA-Nigeria

French institute for research in africa, nigeria | institut français de recherche en afrique, nigeria, anti-corruption campaign in nigeria (1999-2007).

Introduction: Corruption in Nigeria—A historical challenge

Texte intégral, introduction.

• 1 Nigeria’s anti-corruption legislation provides straightforward definitions of the twin concepts of (...)

1 On 29 May 1999, Nigeria concluded a successful transition to civil democratic rule with the inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo as the country’s second popularly elected president. The election of President Obasanjo, himself a former military dictator, came after sixteen years of uninterrupted military rule, during which corruption and financial crimes 1 were more or less installed as state policies (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1977, 1978, 1980, 1987, 1990, 1994 & 1999). Although corruption is a major challenge for several other developing states (Haarhuis 2005; Nadiz 2004), very few countries have been so ravaged by graft as Nigeria. This fact was duly underlined by the voting of Nigeria as the world’s most corrupt nation in 1999, just weeks before Obasanjo was elected.

2 This conclusion, produced by Transparency International (TI), the global corruption watchdog (1999), could itself be corroborated not only by the findings of dozens of official inquiries set up by successive Nigerian governments before and after 1999 (see Annex I), but also by several academic studies. These research studies have been unanimous in their conclusion that in Nigeria corruption has become the norm (Odekunle 1986; Joseph 1987; Daloz 2002; Lewis 1996; Bayart 1989, 1997; Erubami & Young 2003).

3 It would be difficult to estimate exactly how much Nigeria has lost to corruption since its independence from Britain in 1960. One source has estimated the loss to be in the region of $400 billion for the period 1966 to 1999 ( The Economist , October 21, 2006). This would of course consist of income from Nigeria’s vast oil resources—but also international aid. The looting of billions of dollars by General Sani Abacha, who ruled Nigeria between 1993 and 1998, is perhaps the best illustration of this corruption. Investigations launched by Abacha’s successors have so far led to the recovery of $2 billion from the Abacha family alone, while another $2 billion remains frozen in Western countries such as Switzerland, Luxemburg, and Liechtenstein (Daniel 2004: 102).

• 2 Personal discussion with Professor Stephen Ellis took place on 9 October 2009 during a meeting at (...)

4 Yet corruption has a much longer history in Nigeria. If Abacha’s record can be considered appalling, his criminal path had been nurtured to a large extent by the actions of his predecessors, both civilians and military dictators, who were no less culpable. As the eminent historian Stephen Ellis has argued, political corruption in Nigeria was incubated during the colonial era, especially in the crucial 1940s and 1950s, when the then emerging Nigerian political elites were thrust into positions of political power without any independent financial base with which to finance their political careers. The British colonial policy of discouraging indigenous private entrepreneurship ensured that there were very few entrepreneurs. State coffers were the only available source of funds, and so these elites had little choice but to grab them. 2

5 Numerous commissions of inquiry established in the late 1950s and early 1960s after Nigeria secured independence from Britain have confirmed the long history of corruption in the country. In 1962, a commission of inquiry, popularly known as the Justice Coker Commission, showed vividly how politicians in Nigeria’s Western Region used the then marketing boards to divert millions of pounds into their political party, the Action Group (AG), while deploying the same funds for their personal use (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1962). Earlier, similar official inquiries had established that such corrupt practices had become widespread in the Eastern Region, governed by the National Congress for Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1956; 1957). Widespread mismanagement, rampant corruption, tribalism, and nepotism were some of the reasons cited by the leaders of a coup which overthrew this set of civilian leaders on 15 January 1966 (Dudley 1982).

• 3 The report of this audit (Pius Okigbo Report) has never been published officially, but many aspect (...)

6 All the regimes that followed saw a much higher level of corruption and mismanagement. According to the reports of some panels of inquiry established following the overthrow of the Yakubu Gowon regime in 1976, senior members of the Gowon regime indulged in a massive diversion of state resources (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1977, 1978; Dent 1978; Apter 2005). Subsequent governments, particularly the civilian regime of President Shehu Shagari (1979-83) (Odekunle 1986; Joseph 1987) and the military governments of Generals Ibrahim Babangida (1985-93) (Lewis 1996; Erubami 2003), Sani Abacha (1993-8), and Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-99), took corruption to higher levels. Immediately after the Shagari regime collapsed, following a 31 December 1983 military coup, a tribunal was set up to try some of the worst offenders and recover their ill-gotten wealth. At least 51 public office holders were convicted of embezzlement and other abuse of public office on a grand scale (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1986). Elsewhere, an audit inquiry instituted into the finances of the Nigerian Central Bank in 1994 3 indicted Babangida and his administration of filtering away some $12 billion of ‘excess’ oil revenue which accrued to the nation during the first Gulf War (Agbese 2005). In 2000, an official inquiry, commonly known as the Christopher Kolade Panel, set up in 1999 following return to democratic rule, also indicted the preceding military regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998-99), for “massively inflating and flagrantly awarding contracts, licences, awards, etc., usually to firms in which top members of the regime had substantial interests, often at very exorbitant prices, thereby causing a sharp drop in the country’s external reserves” (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999b).

• 4 According to figures published by the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2000, Nigeria’s external debt was (...)

7 This level of corruption explains much of Nigeria’s other social and economic problems, weak economic growth, decaying public infrastructures, endemic poverty, and chronic political instability and violence. This is in spite of its abundant natural resources, including petroleum and gas reserves estimated at some 36.6 billion barrels and 1840.6 billion cubic feet respectively ( Africa Confidential , 25 June 2004), and its large and talented population. The extent of its socioeconomic challenges has been documented in several official reports. In a 2004 report on socio-economic conditions, for instance, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) estimated that the country was the worst affected by capital flight in sub-Saharan Africa, with over $100 billion in private capital held overseas in 1999, representing around 70% of total private capital ( The Punch , 24 July 2004). This amount excludes some $63 billion in non-monetary assets held by Nigerians abroad ( ThisDay , 20 October 2003). Until recently, Nigeria was a large debtor nation and attempted to be considered one of the ‘highly indebted poor countries’ deserving of debt cancellation. In 2006, after accumulating $36 billion in external debts, 4 she managed to secure a favourable treatment from the Paris Club, which wrote off $18 billion. This pardon, however, came after she paid a colossal $12.4 billion and agreed to continue a broad range of economic and anti-corruption reform policies ( The Guardian , 23 March 2005).

8 Endemic corruption in Nigeria has also nurtured widespread poverty and low human development indices. In 1999, when Nigeria transitioned from military to civil rule, an independent estimation of poverty—that is, the percentage of those living on less than a dollar a day—stood at 70% (Xavier & Subramanian 2008). Although the figures are now much lower, standing at 54.4% in 2004, this is still very high compared with past figures. The poverty rate was only 27.2% in 1980, 46.3% in 1985, and 42.7% in 1992 (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2005). Poor governance also translated into a largely illiterate population. According to official sources, the national literacy level for men in Nigeria, as recently as 2004, was only 50.6%. The percentage is even worse for women: 37.7% ( ibid . 100). Other indices of human development follow similar trends. According to the World Bank, per capita income in Nigeria stood at $390 in 2004, well below the African average ($600) in the same period and even Nigeria’s per capita income in 1980 ($1,000). Life expectancy at birth did not fare any better: Only 47 years in 2000 (World Bank 2004).

9 The impact of endemic corruption on public order is another area that has attracted considerable attention. According to a 2005 World Bank report, Nigeria figures among 25 countries classified as ‘Low-Income Country Under Stress’ (LICUS). A LICUS is a state characterised by ‘weak security, fractured societal relations, corruption, breakdown in the rule of law, and lack of mechanisms for generating legitimate power and authority’ (World Bank 2006b). Ethno-religious conflicts were particularly widespread, as politicians frequently exploit mass ignorance and poverty as well as ethnic and religious differences for political gains. These conflicts often left thousands dead or displaced, engendering a general atmosphere of social insecurity and disorder (HRW, April 2006). Official and reliable data on victims of violence are rarely published in Nigeria. However, a 2005 study by the Human Rights Watch suggests that Nigeria may have lost up to 10,000 citizens between 1999 and 2005. The figure for displaced persons hovers around 500,000, according to an aide to President Olusegun Obasanjo, Moremi Soyinka-Onijala, who was in charge of migrations and humanitarian affairs (ThisDay, 27 April 2006).

10 It would probably be disingenuous to claim that corruption is the sole cause of all Nigeria’s development problems. However, this ailment, fostered by a mixture of surviving traditional norms and colonial legacies and subsequently lubricated by the influx of massive petroleum resources and persistent authoritarian rule, has hardly been a blessing in Nigeria (Ndih 2003).

The Fourth Republic: A new era of reform?

11 As soon as President Obasanjo was sworn into office as President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, a series of reform measures were rolled out in quick succession in a bid to tackle the cancer of corruption which has tarnished the image of Nigeria and undermined socio-economic and political development. During his inauguration on 29 May 1999, Obasanjo, a longstanding critic of corrupt military regimes and founding member of Transparency International (TI), the global anti-corruption watchdog, promised that “corruption, the greatest single bane of our society today, will be tackled head-on … There will be no sacred cows … Nobody, no matter who and where, will be allowed to get away with the breach or perpetration of corruption and evil” (Oko 2002). Indeed, this campaign remained Obasanjo’s number-one policy priority throughout the eight years he was in office. The campaign was pursued through different methods and directed at achieving a number of objectives, three of which are most perceptible.

12 The first was to bring about a sharp drop in the incidence of corruption, through the speedy arrest and prosecution of corrupt public officials. This was to be achieved through the establishment of new anti-corruption agencies, the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), inaugurated in 2000 and 2003 respectively. Previous experience has shown that such institutions, which have produced relative successes in some countries, were not easily adaptable to Africa—never mind to Nigeria specifically, where the necessary administrative capacity (adequate funds, quality manpower, strong laws, and efficient judicial systems) and strong political support are often lacking, and prevailing political logic tends to favour the abuse of office and misappropriation of public resources.

13 The second objective was to reduce or remove incentives for corruption among public officials, via a comprehensive reform of the public sector (including the judiciary). Specifically, the reforms aimed at the following: eliminating monopoly, by privatisation and deregulation; reducing discretion, by the streamlining of functions and reinforcement of controls; and removing administrative opacity, by the increasing of transparency and accountability, particularly in public revenue collection and expenditure. The aggressive implementation of these policies, it was hoped, would reduce the opportunities for corruption among public officials. Some aspects of these reforms—privatisation, reform of the management of public finance, and the adoption of a new policy on employment and compensation (also known as ‘professionalisation’ and ‘rightsizing’) in the public service—were pursued with considerable vigour. But their cumulative effect on corruption has proved difficult to see.

14 The third objective was to redress some of the worst consequences of past corruption on the economy and improve the financial health of the nation. This goal was to be achieved through the identification of some of the offshore bank accounts and assets—landed properties, companies, shares, and so on—owned by corrupt Nigerians and ensure they were duly confiscated and the proceeds repatriated. The corollary to this well-publicised campaign was a well-coordinated diplomatic offensive directed at persuading the (usually Western) governments whose financial institutions are key instruments of this fraud to also initiate reforms to help check the practice. Obasanjo’s effort led to the recovery of only a fraction (less that $1 billion) of Nigeria’s $300 to $400 billion of stolen assets, although it appeared to have had some effect on the behaviour of office holders in Nigeria as well as leading to the adoption of several international anti-money-laundering initiatives.

15 Why was the Obasanjo government interested in pursuing such an ambitious anti-corruption war in a country where the privatisation of public resources has been the norm among the political elite and where all previous anti-corruption projects had failed so woefully? Did the strategies announced by the Obasanjo government truly help reduce corruption in Nigeria? Was President Obasanjo’s campaign against corruption a genuine anti-corruption crusade or mere political grandstanding? If indeed it was genuine, was the President able to muster the necessary political will and support to implement his war against corruption?

16 In 2005, President Obasanjo provided some clear insight into the considerations that informed his administration’s anti-corruption policy. During one of his numerous speeches dwelling on transparency and accountability in government, the President revealed:

Our avowed zero-tolerance for the scourge of corruption derives from our conviction that countering corruption and promoting public integrity are critical to economic rebirth and sustained development … The globalized world in which we live today has become hostile to corrupt nations and their citizens. The first consideration in receiving support or assistance from the international community today is the level of corruption in that country. The implication is that we have no choice but to change our ways. ( The Punch , 6 September 2005)

17 This statement by President Obasanjo raises two key aspects of the motivation for launching a campaign against corruption. The first is that Obasanjo and those who worked with him were patriotic and rational leaders who wanted to see their country develop. These leaders correctly diagnosed the cause of their country’s underdevelopment and were determined to remove what they perceived as the major obstacle to achieving that goal: Corruption. The second issue raised by Obasanjo is the fact that the decision to embrace anti-corruption reforms was partly, if not entirely, driven by the need to escape international sanction or isolation.

Anti-corruption campaign and the logic of rational leaders

18 At face value, Obasanjo’s comments would seem to confirm the validity of the ‘rational choice theory’, according to which public policy makers act on the basis of cost-benefit calculation (Downs 1958; Elster 1986). Two major inferences can be drawn from this perspective. The first holds that decision makers are rational people guided by national or public interest, who can and are willing to select the best solutions to society’s problems among several competing alternative courses of action. The second suggests that these decision makers also act to preserve their own narrow, selfish interest—that is, to become ‘boundedly rational’ (Simon 1982)—in an attempt to escape political sanctions, whether from voters (in advanced liberal democracies, for instance) or from the international community (donors to countries largely dependent on foreign aid). Thus, when decision makers act, it is because sanctions will presumably be put in place if they do not embrace reforms (Haarhuis 2005: 177). How true are these assumptions?

19 The first argument has not been supported by recent events in many Africa countries, notably Nigeria. Many studies, including our reading of Nigeria’s history, show that anti-corruption campaigns have not been motivated by public interest alone (Médard 1986). In fact, very often they have been motivated by the personal political interests of political leaders, who, for instance, instrumentalise the struggle to legitimise their regime, gain access to power, eliminate their political rivals, and reconstruct a crumbling political hegemony. Indeed, despite being credited with exceptional personal political will during the early days of his government—a fact which was largely informed by his long-standing opposition to corrupt military regimes, involvement in some international anti-corruption NGOs, and adoption of a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy on assumption of office—Obasanjo’s anti-corruption fight itself, as we will soon discover, became a vital instrument for targeting political rivals.

20 The second argument appears even less compelling, to say the least. First, the prevailing political context in Africa in general, and in Nigeria particularly, is largely unfavourable to any serious democratic exercise of power as suggested above. Elections and voters are for now ineffective tools for controlling African political leaders. Similarly, donor pressures have little meaning for countries such as Nigeria that receive little or no foreign aid (World Bank 2005, 2006), just as the huge debt write-off the country won in April 2005 did not lead to the abandonment of the anti-corruption policy, contrary to expectations. Indeed, as K. Haarhuis has argued, there is no evidence that African leaders who receive aid will implement measures against corruption imposed from outside, particularly if their implementation has potential to undermine their strategic interests. African governments have tended to busy themselves with paper reforms, aimed principally at satisfying the demands of voters, but more especially the international community (Haarhuis 2005: 162). During the period under review (1999-2007), for example, political elites in Nigeria successfully resisted several reform measures, pushed by civil society and the international community, which they considered potentially dangerous: Strong anti-corruption agencies, public declaration of assets by public officers, and privatisation of the larger and more lucrative public corporations, such as the Nigerian Electric Power Authority (NEPA), the oil refineries, and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). On the other hand, reforms and measures perceived as less risky or aimed at individuals outside the political class received a more enthusiastic reception.

21 It could be reasoned that the effectiveness of domestic (voter) and international (donor) pressure for a cleaner government will ultimately depend on the specificity of each country and/or region; that is to say, the adoption of reforms will depend both on whether the electorate is perceived to be prepared to move against the political regime if pressures for reforms are ignored and on the extent to which donors are prepared to go to force reforms on recipients of aid (Knack 2000; Tavares 2003; Burnside & Dollar 2000; Alesina & Weder 1999; Rodrik 1996; Dollar & Pritchett 1998). While these conditions are difficult to apply in the case of Nigeria because the country has been largely free from voter and donor pressure, other external and internal factors were as important in shaping Obasanjo’s anti-corruption campaign. The adoption of an anti-corruption policy in 1999 and its implementation were influenced by some recent dramatic international changes (which are still affecting the global attitude towards corruption), as well as by the history of the country, which points to the necessity of embracing some forms of campaign against corruption to stave off unpalatable consequences (such as a military coup).

Historical dynamics of anti-corruption reforms in Nigeria

• 5 These laws included the Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunal Act Cap. 389), Laws (...)

22 The analysis and understanding of recent anti-corruption measures in Nigeria require a study of the country’s history and internal socio-political dynamics. This will help us understand the extent to which the anti-corruption drive is path-dependent in this country (Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000). The crusade against corruption proposed by President Obasanjo at the hour of his election in 1999 may be the first under a civilian or democratic government in Nigeria. It can also be described as the most ambitious ever seen in the country. Nevertheless, it is far from being the first in its history. Corruption and anti-corruption fights have been at the heart of national political discourse and actions in Nigeria since independence in October 1960. Almost all the regimes that have come to power in Nigeria strongly denounced corruption, without any form of external pressure, while also proposing measures against it. It is true that most of these measures (inauguration of commissions of inquiry to probe specific allegations and suggest remedies, adoption of new anti-corruption laws (Kolajo 2002) and even the setting up of anti-corruption agencies) did not yield positive results. 5 It is also true that regimes with radical anti-corruption agenda have been overthrown after only a few months in office: Murtala (1975-76) and Buhari (1983-85). Yet, it is also a well-known fact that many regimes, including the two previous civilian regimes—Balewa (1960-66) and Shagari (1979-83)—fell largely because they failed to take action to check corruption in their governments. But in what way did these past experiences really influence the decision to launch an anti-corruption war in 1999? In our view there are at least two ways in which historical antecedents influenced President Obasanjo’s decision to launch the current anti-corruption war.

• 6 With respect to application of sanctions against corrupt officials, the Murtala Mohammed (July 197 (...)

23 The first way obviously was through ‘imitation’ or ‘cloning’. This occurs when newly arrived regimes attempt to understudy how their predecessors profited from their anti-corruption projects, in order to do better in this regard. It is a well-known fact that despite the many catastrophic consequences of corruption on Nigeria’s development, very few regimes in Nigeria have been interested in fighting it. 6 Several popular measures offered by these regimes—such as dismissal of some corrupt officials, confiscation of illicitly acquired assets, establishment of commissions of inquiry, adoption of anti-corruption laws and agencies, and even ad hoc tribunals set up to try offenders—all failed to produce tangible results, largely because they were driven by ulterior motives. These motives usually involved the legitimisation of unpopular military dictatorships and the need to deal with political rivals in a country where struggle for political power is usually intense, if not violent.

24 Secondly, and more importantly, past governments in Nigeria have, through massive looting of the public treasury, promoted abject poverty among an overwhelming majority of the population, while also widening the gap between the rich and the poor. The Babangida (1985-93) and Abacha (1993-98) regimes, under which corruption became almost a state policy, are arguably the most culpable. The behaviour of these military regimes changed Nigerian political economy in two ways. The first way was somewhat direct, in the sense that appointment to public offices, especially the more lucrative ones, became transformed into a vast system of patronage guaranteeing the maximisation of political support for whatever regime was in power (Gboyega 1996). The second consequence was more indirect, to the extent that the grand corruption of political leaders and top functionaries led to the impoverishment of lower-level officials, who now embraced the same practices without any fear of sanctions. Consequently, the spread of corruption clogged almost all the machinery of public administration, making basic social services almost inaccessible to the poor. In this context, popular pressure and demand for more anti-corruption measures cannot but increase under a popularly elected government.

Anti-corruption reform and the new global good governance agenda

25 Despite the huge negative impact of corruption on the socio-economic and political development of many Africa countries, notably Nigeria, anti-corruption projects in the continent had initially received little or no attention from the international community, who considered it the internal affair of relevant sovereign states. Since the second half of the 1990s, however, anti-corruption reforms have been increasingly supported by the international community, which now considers it as a major preoccupation to be promoted under the framework of the global push for ‘good governance’ and poverty reduction (Galtung & Pope 1999; Hadjadji 2002). Everyone in this context, including researchers, international financial institutions (notably the World Bank and the IMF), development agencies, donors, NGOs, and national governments, have now adopted the fight against corruption as a battle cry. What explains such a dramatic change? And what has been its impact in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular?

26 The first explanation for the dramatic change in the orientation of the international community and the emergence of the ‘global coalition against corruption’ which followed it comes from the collapse of the Soviet Union, which signalled the demise of the Eastern Bloc and accelerated the processes of globalisation. The end of the Cold War, at the beginning of the 1990s, brought an unimaginable amount of diplomatic pressure to bear on countries or governments perceived as corrupt and repressive (Bresson 1998). Secondly, the interest shown by the international community in corruption has also been raised by ‘global corruption eruption’, that is the growing revelation of serious cases of fraud and bribery involving senior public officials around the world. These corrupt acts have often occurred with the complicity of the largest commercial enterprises, who in the face of rising competition resorted to corruption. Thirdly, this global corruption eruption then led to an increased academic interest in the study and analysis of corruption. The outcome of these studies revealed that despite billions of dollars provided as development aid, the effects of corruption, especially on poor countries, were growing and could no longer be ignored by decision makers (Keefer & Knack 1995; Brunetti et al. 1997; Clarke & Xu 2002; Mauro 1995, 1997).

27 The interaction of these three factors culminated in the proliferation of anticorruption programmes in Africa and other parts of the developing world, most of them imposed and supervised by the major international financial institutions (notably the IMF and the World Bank), the United Nations (UN) or its agencies (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)), and Western donor agencies. These programmes initially centred on neo-liberal economic reform policies such as privatisation and deregulation. Better known in Africa as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP), these policies were presented as necessary solutions to the economic crises which rocked many African states in the 1980s and early 1990s, but more importantly as conditions for future international development aid. In the mid-1990s, a second type of anti-corruption policy, rooted in neo-institutional theories, appeared on the stage. These policies called for the reform of the administrative apparatus of the state and the creation and strengthening of democratic institutions, including institutions of civil society (Haarhuis 2005). The presence and proper functioning of these institutions, referred to as ‘indicators of good governance’, would also qualify a country for foreign aid, cooperation, and support from the international community ( ibid . 21).

28 The impact of international involvement in the war against corruption has been very noticeable in Africa, where corruption is considered endemic (Kempe 2000; Coolidge & Rose-Ackerman 1997). The first evidence of this is perhaps the continent’s prominent position in virtually all international prescriptions against corruption. The second is the actual spread of reform measures, such as anti-corruption agencies, in many African states. But what has been the effect of these changes on Africa? If these reform agencies have in some instances helped stave off growing local activism and external pressures, there is hardly any evidence that they have changed the behaviour of public officials in Africa in any significant way. With very few exceptions—notably Botswana—the inauguration of anti-corruption agencies and other forms of anti-corruption reform have clearly not been accompanied by an effective war against corruption in Africa.

29 Some scholars have argued that this failure is occurring owing to the fact that anti-corruption reforms are often designed and imposed by foreign institutions on unwilling recipients (Hadjadji et al . 2002: 30; Fjeldstadt 2002); that is to say, the failure of international anti-corruption programmes in Africa is principally due to the absence, at the helm of affairs, of political leaders who favour reforms (Fjeldstadt 2002; Kpundeh 1998). Robin Theobald formulates this thesis more clearly: “reforms require reformers” (Theobald 1986: 258). In other words, successful reforms require the presence of strong and courageous leaders—what Peters & Savoie (1998: 5) called a “political champion” , in apparent allusion to Britain under the reformist Margaret Thatcher regime. It is perhaps for this reason that the arrival of President Olusegun Obasanjo, who was widely portrayed as a ‘reformist leader’, raised unprecedented interest and hope.

Anti-corruption war: The role of reformers

30 The return to democratic rule on 29 May 1999, and its ‘consolidation’ four years later with the national elections in April 2003, offered Nigerians a new opportunity, not only to elect a reform-minded government but also to exercise some pressure on those they elected to institute effective anti-corruption measures. The election of President Obasanjo seemed to reflect this logic, given that corruption was a dominant theme during his election campaigns. Although Obasanjo had promised an all-out war against corruption if elected, as had other candidates, many Nigerians reasoned that his anti-corruption credentials were far more solid than those of his rivals. Aside from his past record as a founding member of Transparency International, Obasanjo was a long-standing critic of corrupt military regimes. President Obasanjo himself even acknowledged the role of corruption in his election. During his first post-election speech, he noted that he considered “this election as a mandate from the people of Nigeria and a command from God Almighty that I should spare no effort in rebuilding this nation. I understand the clear message of the Nigerian people. In giving me their mandate, they have asked me to … restore our dignity … they want me to alleviate their poverty and reduce corruption” ( ThisDay , 9 May 1999). In other words, his election was largely due to the public perception that he was the candidate most capable of fighting corruption.

31 Once elected, Obasanjo moved to justify his reputation as a reformist by rolling out a number of anti-corruption initiatives, including the adoption of an anticorruption law and institution of a specialised anti-corruption agency, retirement of military officers who had held political appointments, review of several projects initiated by past regimes and believed to be tainted with corruption, and inauguration of dozens of inquiries into the activities of public institutions (see Annex I) (Bello-Imam 2005). Initially, during his first tenure, the President was largely isolated in this fight, having filled his cabinet with the old political guard (a move that was widely believed to be compensation for their roles in his electoral victory in the February 1999 elections). But following his re-election in 2003, several individuals regarded as ‘committed reformists’ with solid international reputations were appointed to his government to head key institutions. These individuals included Dora Akuyili (National Agency For Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC)), Obi Ezekwesili (Budget and Price Monitoring Intelligence Unit (BPMIU)), Nuhu Ribadu (Economic and Financial Crimes Commissions (EFCC)), Nasir El-Rufai (Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE)), Charles Soludo (Chief Economic Adviser to the President, later Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)), and Ngozi Okonjo-Iwalla (Minister of Finance and Head of Obasanjo’s economic reform team until 2006). One common feature shared by these personalities charged with driving the reforms was that they were all technocrats with no previous political affiliation, mainly educated abroad, and/or with substantial ties to major international institutions. Although such foreign connections occasionally raised some eyebrows in Nigeria, these concerns were brushed aside by Obasanjo, who provided these technocrats with political shielding. In the years that followed, Obasanjo’s anticorruption programme benefitted from the presence and initiatives of these personalities.

32 The Western background of these technocrats or reformers led to a major ideological shift in Obasanjo’s anti-corruption war. Unlike the situation that had obtained in the past, when corruption was viewed as a personal moral failure of political leaders and public officials, corruption was now considered as a systemic and structural crisis, resulting from “excessive state intervention in economic and commercial domains” and a “failure of governance”. The new thinking now was that corruption required the adoption of a multi-dimensional strategy, including the deregulation of the national economy and privatisation of public enterprises, reform of the civil service (downsizing and review of recruitment, remuneration, and procurement policies), and legal and institutional reform (including the enactment of new laws and creation of new regulatory agencies and the strengthening of existing institutions, such as public services, the judiciary, the parliament, and civil society). At the same time, it was recognised that this multi-dimensional struggle did not exclude public reorientation via public enlightenment and punitive measures such as arrest, confiscation of illegally acquired assets, and criminal proceedings.

33 This strategy draws from two of the most dominant approaches or perspectives in contemporary literature on anti-corruption: The market and neo-institutionalist approaches. The former, which is rooted in neo-liberal economic theories, views corruption as largely resulting from excessive intervention of the state in economic and commercial domains (Toye 1987; Grindle 1991; Evans 1995). According to this view, this state involvement breeds unlimited opportunities for corruption by public officials. The solution to this malaise must, therefore, include structural economic reforms that eliminate state monopolies, discretion, and opacity and that increase transparency in the management of public resources (Klitgaard 1995, 1996; Rose-Ackerman 1997; Kaufmann & Siegelbaum 1997; Ades & Di Tella 2000; Mbaku 2002). The latter, that is the neo-institutional theory, underlines weakness or failure of governance and state institutions as causes of corruption. This is why it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of exiting institutions and to put in place new institutions to complement existing ones.

34 The reasons behind the adoption of an anti-corruption campaign will most likely continue to be a question of intense political debate (Holmes 2003). What is clear, however, is that the Obasanjo campaign against corruption in Nigeria was substantially influenced by domestic and external political dynamics, and to some extent by Obasanjo’s own personal vision and past anti-corruption commitments. These past commitments are indeed rarely found in Nigeria, so that not surprisingly Obasanjo’s anti-corruption policy was greeted with widespread approbation instead of suspicion as was the case in the past. Public support is usually regarded as an essential precondition for the success of public policies. So, how much success did Obasanjo’s anti-corruption campaign register in the end? Did the reforms address the key issues? What were the major highlights of this campaign? To what extent did the elevation of anti-corruption struggle into a major policy priority and the groundswell of local and international support translate into success in Nigeria’s anti-corruption drive? In other words, what factors have influenced the outcome of the Nigerian campaign against corruption? There are other logical questions that are bound to follow the announcement and implementation of any anti-corruption policy or strategy anywhere in the world. For instance, how prepared was the Nigerian political class, and indeed civil society, for a genuine struggle against corruption? Given the plethora of failed anticorruption programmes around the world, what factors could have led to the success of the anti-corruption battle in Nigeria? The above are some of the questions addressed in the following chapters that make up this book.

1 Nigeria’s anti-corruption legislation provides straightforward definitions of the twin concepts of corruption and economic crimes. To begin with, the ICPC Act defines corruption to include “bribery, fraud and other related offences”. The word bribery is used interchangeably with gratification, which the Act defines, under Section 8, to mean “money, donation, gift, loan, fee, reward, valuable security, property or interest in property being property of any description whether movable or immovable, or any other similar advantage, given or promised to any person with intent to influence such a person in the performance or non-performance of his duties”. According to Section 46 of the EFCC Act, “economic crime means the non-violent criminal and illicit activity committed with the objective of earning wealth illegally either individually or in a group or organized manner thereby violating existing legislation governing the economic activities of government and its administration and includes any form of fraud, narcotic drug trafficking, money laundering, embezzlement, bribery, looting and any form of corrupt practices, illegal arms deal, smuggling, human trafficking and child labour, oil bunkering and illegal mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange malpractices including counterfeiting of currency, theft of intellectual property and piracy, open market abuse, dumping of toxic wastes and prohibited goods, etc.” (Federal Republic of Nigeria: Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission Act 2000a, Economic and Financial Crimes (Establishment) Act 2004). For more details on available definitions and theories of corruption, see Heidenheimer (1989) and Andvig & Fjeldstadt (2001).

2 Personal discussion with Professor Stephen Ellis took place on 9 October 2009 during a meeting at the African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands.

3 The report of this audit (Pius Okigbo Report) has never been published officially, but many aspects of it have been published by the local media (Alli 2005) and internet sources: https://dawodu.com/okigboreport1.htm [ archive ].

4 According to figures published by the Central Bank of Nigeria in 2000, Nigeria’s external debt was only $2.2 billion in 1978, before rising to $13.1 billion in 1982 and then $33.1 billion in 1990. (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999-2007a).

5 These laws included the Recovery of Public Property (Special Military Tribunal Act Cap. 389), Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990 (as amended in 1999), Failed Banks (Recovery of Debts and Financial Malpractices in Banks), Decree 1994 (as amended in 1999), Criminal Code (applicable in southern Nigeria), Penal Code (applicable in the north), and the Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act, Cap. 56 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 1990. Some of the anti-corruption agencies established in the past included the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, proposed by the Murtala Mohammed administration in 1975, and the Code of Conduct Bureau, established in 1979 by the Second Republic Constitution left behind by the Obasanjo military regime.

6 With respect to application of sanctions against corrupt officials, the Murtala Mohammed (July 1975-February 1976) and Mohammadu Buhari (December 1983-August 1985) regimes were rare exceptions, although tendencies toward the instrumentalisation of the anti-corruption war to punish rival political factions were also observed.

Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence CC BY-SA 4.0 . Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.

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The politics of a failed reform

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Political corruption responsible for leadership failure in Nigeria — Don

A lecturer with the Department of Chemistry, University of Abuja, Dr Isaacs Ochi, has said that political corruption remains a significant challenge in Nigeria, with politicians and public officials often using their positions for personal enrichment rather than serving the public interest.

Ochi made this assertion as guest speaker during the weekend at the Merit Time International 2023/2024 award ceremony and public lecture held in Abuja. He delivered the public lecture entitled: “The Challenges of Leadership in Nigeria”.

At the event, a number of philanthropic Nigerians were conferred with the Merit Time Interdenominational awards for their humanitarian services and outstanding contributions to the development of the country.

Dr. Ochi condemned the use of powers by government officials for illegitimate private gain, saying this has eroded public trust in leadership and governance process in Nigeria.

He called on Presiden Bola Ahmed Tinubu-led administration to make candid efforts in achieving a more equitable distribution of resources and decentralisation power to help address grievances and foster national cohesion.

He said because of this entrenched corruption in public places, scarce public resources meant for infrastructure development, healthcare, education, and social welfare are siphoned through corrupt practices, depriving the populace of essential services and perpetuating cycles of poverty.

Ochi noted that the consequences of corruption were far-reaching and profound, impeding Nigeria’s development trajectory and increasing socio-economic inequalities.

“The abuse of power, electoral fraud, and impunity for corrupt acts undermine the integrity of democratic institutions and erode public confidence in the political process.

“Access to quality healthcare remains a privilege rather than a right for many Nigerians, particularly those in rural and underserved areas. The healthcare system is plagued by a lack of infrastructure, medical personnel, and essential supplies, contributing to preventable diseases, maternal mortality, and poor health outcomes.

“The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the vulnerabilities of Nigeria’s healthcare infrastructure, highlighting the urgent need for investment and reform in this critical sector.

“Moreover, corruption undermines investor confidence, stifles innovation, and deters foreign investment, hindering economic growth and job creation,” he added.

While proffering a solution to corruption in Nigeria, Dr Ochi called on the Federal Government to ensure implementation of robust anti-corruption measures, such as enhancing transparency in government operations, strengthening accountability mechanisms, empowering anti-corruption agencies, and promoting a culture of integrity and ethical leadership.

He added that there was the need to foster public awareness, civic engagement, and collaboration between government, civil society, and the private sector which are essential in combatting corruption effectively.

According to him, a comprehensive solution to Nigeria’s political challenges and governance issues lies in strengthening institutions to enhance transparency and effectiveness, promoting accountability to combat corruption, fostering inclusivity to bridge ethno-religious divides, and investing in education and awareness to empower citizens among others.

He also spoke on the prevailing security situation in the country posing formidable challenges to effective leadership and governance, stressing that the security threats, including terrorism, insurgency, communal violence, and organized crime, have continued to undermine peace, stability, and socio-economic development.

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Challenging Corruption in Africa: Beyond the Bleak Projections

Nuhu Ribadu is a prosecutor and police officer by training. Until 2007, he served as Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in Nigeria, which he helped establish in 2003. In this essay, he reflects on his experience as the head of the EFCC and the international work needed to challenge corruption in Africa.

From the essay:

Corruption is one of many serious challenges which undermine the effectiveness of institutions and entire governments in many African countries. It seems to be appropriate to hold it responsible for impeding investor confidence and depriving citizens of true governance, democracy, and development. The former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, described it perfectly when he said, “Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately by diverting funds intended for development, undermining a government’s ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouraging foreign investment and aid.”

Despite the immense size of the problem, corruption can be defeated. My own experience at the EFCC in Nigeria taught me that change is possible, yet difficult. With the right political atmosphere, we secured an unprecedented number of convictions of those previously regarded as untouchable. Unfortunately, we proved that while it was possible to punish some of the guilty, it was a much larger task to tackle a culture so rich with corruption. Anticorruption offices need help and support from agencies from around the world, particularly the United States. With a strong internal and external base, anticorruption movements have the potential to conquer this cancer on society.

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Office on drugs and crime, from violence to victory: how sports gave gnima faye her freedom back.

Sports can have a powerful influence on the creation of peaceful and safe communities and help reduce violence and prevent crime among youth. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) sat down with Gnima Faye, a professional track-and-field star from Senegal – and supporter of the “Sport against Crime: Outreach, Resilience, Empowerment of at-risk youth” (SC:ORE) programme – to discuss the impact of sports on her life and in her country.  

Gnima Faye, gold medalist in the 100 metre hurdles at the 2012 African Championships, was tired of the cultural pressure to be submissive.  

“When you are a girl in Senegal, you are taught to be submissive, to not speak loudly, to lower your eyes,” she says.  

“It’s hard to explain, but we experience violence every day in our society,” she adds, referring to women and girls. “Being surrounded by powerful men, when you can’t open your mouth, when a man tells you to ‘shut up, you have no right to express yourself’ – these are all forms of violence.” 

Gnima admits that she herself has experienced terrifying violence firsthand but says that she does not want to re-live the ordeal by discussing it. 

Suffice to say, she continues, that “today, I am able to say no to what I could not say no to before.” 

“When I practice sports, I feel free” 

Gnima credits sports with giving her the power to move past her trauma and “see life differently.” 

Her older brother, Ibou Faye, was also an African champion in the 400 metres hurdles. He made it all the way to the 1996 and 2000 Olympics, inspiring Gnima to also choose running as her sport of choice. 

In addition to winning gold at the 2012 African Games, she won silver at the 2015 Games and the 2013 Jeux de la Francophonie.  

Without running, Gnima adds, “I would probably just be a married woman like everyone else – a shy, polite girl who doesn’t say anything to anyone.” 

Gnima doesn’t think her story is unique. “Sports can save our lives in so many areas,” she says. “For example, in the suburbs, most girls stop studying very early [to get married].” 

“But if they practiced sports, it could prevent them from having these early marriages. They could go to training, have another vision of what their lives could be.” 

Changing the SC:ORE 

The SC:ORE initiative , jointly led by UNODC and the International Olympic Committee (IOC), aims to bring the life-transforming power of sports to more young people like Gnima.  

SC:ORE works to prevent and combat violence and crime through sports-based learning, mentoring support, and skills training to build more peaceful and safe communities and promote social inclusion.  

It is based on the principle that participation in targeted sport programmes can prevent youth from being victimized. By offering youth a safe and conducive learning environment in which to grow and creating pathways to education, employability and social networks, sports can help them fulfil their potentials as agent of positive change in their communities and prevent their engagement in violence and crime. 

Gnima was motivated to join the SC:ORE campaign in order to let people “know the struggles we are facing today in our society. And to convey the message to young people that there are people they can talk to and ask for help.” 

Gnima wants sports programmes to be included in all neighbourhoods, which she thinks will be an effective way to reduce rape, robbery, attacks, and more. 

“Today, we will do everything so that young people do not suffer the things we suffered.” 

“Just enjoy!” 

But although sports can have far-ranging impacts on lives, Gnima says she would tell young girls one thing first and foremost: “Enjoy sports, it’s a pleasure above all! 

“It’s your life – so take advantage of it.” 

Further information

SC:ORE builds on the UNODC  Youth Crime Prevention through Sport initiative , including the  Line Up Live Up  programme, as well as the IOC’s  Olympic Education Values Programme (OVEP) . The project contributes to the realization of strategic priorities set in the  Olympism365  strategy and  UNODC Strategy 2021-2025 , aimed at strengthening the role of sport as enabler of sustainable development and placing the realisation of the sustainable development goals and the welfare of people with local communities at the centre.  

To learn more about SC:ORE, click  here .  

For more information contact Georgia Dimitropoulou   [email protected]    UNODC/ DTA/Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Section.  

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Africa’s Youngest President Takes Office, Promising ‘Systemic Change’

Senegal’s new president, Bassirou Diomaye Faye, took the oath of office in Tuesday’s ceremony. Close behind him sat the popular opposition leader who had clinched the win.

By Ruth Maclean

Reporting from Diamniadio, Senegal.

Still reeling from a whirlwind campaign, young people in Senegal threw jackets over their worn election T-shirts on Tuesday to attend the inauguration of an opposition politician who went from political prisoner to president in less than three weeks.

Their new leader, Bassirou Diomaye Faye — at 44, Africa’s youngest elected president — took the oath of office promising “systemic change,” and paying homage to the many people killed, injured, and imprisoned in the yearslong lead-up to the West African country’s election.

“I will always keep in mind the heavy sacrifices made so as to never disappoint you,” Mr. Faye said, addressing a vast auditorium in which African heads of state and dignitaries sat at the front. From the back, hundreds of supporters of Mr. Faye and his powerful backer, the opposition leader Ousmane Sonko, shouted for joy.

Hours later, Mr. Faye appointed Mr. Sonko prime minister in the new government, according to a post on the president’s official account on X.

It was the culmination of months of drama, after the former president, Macky Sall, canceled the election with just weeks to go, citing irregularities at the constitutional council — and then, under intense domestic and international pressure, agreed to hold it after all.

Mr. Sall’s handpicked candidate was resoundingly beaten by Mr. Faye, a tax inspector and political rookie who got more than 54 percent of the vote, despite having only 10 days of freedom in which to campaign . He had been jailed on charges of defamation and contempt of court, and was awaiting trial when Mr. Sall announced the adoption of an amnesty law and was released.

“You’re Senegal’s uncontested and dazzling choice,” said the president of the constitutional council, Mamadou Badio Camara, presiding over the inauguration.

But Mr. Faye was not the only politician that Senegal had effectively endorsed. Mr. Sonko, the man whose support helped get Mr. Faye elected, was sitting in the second row.

“Thank you, Sonko, thank you,” yelled his supporters at key moments in Tuesday’s ceremony.

Mr. Sonko, until now Senegal’s foremost opposition leader, was also in jail until three weeks ago, barred from running for president himself after convictions on charges of defamation and “corruption of youth” in relation to accusations brought by a young massage parlor employee .

When he was released, he immediately went on the campaign trail with Mr. Faye, telling his supporters that a vote for Mr. Faye was a vote for him.

Mr. Faye made no mention in his speech of Mr. Sonko, who cut a low profile in a black hat and tunic. But Mr. Sonko was a constant presence. He hobnobbed with the African presidents who waited for the ceremony to begin in an antechamber of a conference center in Diamniadio, a new city still under construction and a pet project of Mr. Sall.

Then, in the hangar-like room where Mr. Faye would take his oath, Mr. Sonko took his place in the second row, just behind the two first ladies — wives of the polygamous new president. And Mr. Sonko got the biggest cheers of the day, every time his face appeared on the large screens at the front of the auditorium.

Much cheering also rang out for the military president of Guinea, and the representatives of Mali and Burkina Faso, three West African countries whose governments were overthrown in coups in recent years and are now ruled by juntas. The rhetoric of those juntas — focused on sovereignty from France, the former colonial power perceived by many West Africans as continuing to meddle in their affairs — mirrors that of Mr. Sonko and Mr. Faye.

“The youth of Senegal is connecting with the youth of those countries, over these issues of sovereignty,” the president’s uncle, also named Diomaye Faye, said in an interview on Tuesday.

Mr. Faye and Mr. Sonko have pledged to drop or change the terms of the CFA, the regional currency backed by France, and renegotiate Senegal’s contracts with foreign-owned companies to extract newly discovered oil and gas.

In his speech, Mr. Faye stressed that Senegal would remain open to relations with other countries that are “respectful of our sovereignty, consistent with our people’s aspirations, and in a mutually winning partnership.”

After the swearing-in, a motorcade carried him to the presidential palace. Last week, Mr. Sall had welcomed him and Mr. Sonko, his former archrivals, in a stiff but determinedly friendly meeting — official photographs of which were later given to the media.

On Tuesday, Mr. Sall, a two-term president who had served for 12 years, welcomed Mr. Faye once more, who arrived this time with a presidential guard.

After sitting chatting for a while and handing over the important documents, Mr. Sall climbed into a Toyota, pulling out of the palace gates and leaving for good.

Ruth Maclean is the West Africa bureau chief for The Times, covering 25 countries including Nigeria, Congo, the countries in the Sahel region as well as Central Africa. More about Ruth Maclean