what is virtue theory essay

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Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “Do unto others as you would be done by” and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent.

This is not to say that only virtue ethicists attend to virtues, any more than it is to say that only consequentialists attend to consequences or only deontologists to rules. Each of the above-mentioned approaches can make room for virtues, consequences, and rules. Indeed, any plausible normative ethical theory will have something to say about all three. What distinguishes virtue ethics from consequentialism or deontology is the centrality of virtue within the theory (Watson 1990; Kawall 2009). Whereas consequentialists will define virtues as traits that yield good consequences and deontologists will define them as traits possessed by those who reliably fulfil their duties, virtue ethicists will resist the attempt to define virtues in terms of some other concept that is taken to be more fundamental. Rather, virtues and vices will be foundational for virtue ethical theories and other normative notions will be grounded in them.

We begin by discussing two concepts that are central to all forms of virtue ethics, namely, virtue and practical wisdom. Then we note some of the features that distinguish different virtue ethical theories from one another before turning to objections that have been raised against virtue ethics and responses offered on its behalf. We conclude with a look at some of the directions in which future research might develop.

1.2 Practical Wisdom

2.1 eudaimonist virtue ethics, 2.2 agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, 2.3 target-centered virtue ethics, 2.4 platonistic virtue ethics, 3. objections to virtue ethics, 4. future directions, other internet resources, related entries, 1. preliminaries.

In the West, virtue ethics’ founding fathers are Plato and Aristotle, and in the East it can be traced back to Mencius and Confucius. It persisted as the dominant approach in Western moral philosophy until at least the Enlightenment, suffered a momentary eclipse during the nineteenth century, but re-emerged in Anglo-American philosophy in the late 1950s. It was heralded by Anscombe’s famous article “Modern Moral Philosophy” (Anscombe 1958) which crystallized an increasing dissatisfaction with the forms of deontology and utilitarianism then prevailing. Neither of them, at that time, paid attention to a number of topics that had always figured in the virtue ethics tradition—virtues and vices, motives and moral character, moral education, moral wisdom or discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of happiness, the role of the emotions in our moral life and the fundamentally important questions of what sorts of persons we should be and how we should live.

Its re-emergence had an invigorating effect on the other two approaches, many of whose proponents then began to address these topics in the terms of their favoured theory. (One consequence of this has been that it is now necessary to distinguish “virtue ethics” (the third approach) from “virtue theory”, a term which includes accounts of virtue within the other approaches.) Interest in Kant’s virtue theory has redirected philosophers’ attention to Kant’s long neglected Doctrine of Virtue , and utilitarians have developed consequentialist virtue theories (Driver 2001; Hurka 2001). It has also generated virtue ethical readings of philosophers other than Plato and Aristotle, such as Martineau, Hume and Nietzsche, and thereby different forms of virtue ethics have developed (Slote 2001; Swanton 2003, 2011a).

Although modern virtue ethics does not have to take a “neo-Aristotelian” or eudaimonist form (see section 2), almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it. These are arête (excellence or virtue), phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) and eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness or flourishing). (See Annas 2011 for a short, clear, and authoritative account of all three.) We discuss the first two in the remainder of this section. Eudaimonia is discussed in connection with eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics in the next.

A virtue is an excellent trait of character. It is a disposition, well entrenched in its possessor—something that, as we say, goes all the way down, unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker—to notice, expect, value, feel, desire, choose, act, and react in certain characteristic ways. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. A significant aspect of this mindset is the wholehearted acceptance of a distinctive range of considerations as reasons for action. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, practices honest dealing and does not cheat. If such actions are done merely because the agent thinks that honesty is the best policy, or because they fear being caught out, rather than through recognising “To do otherwise would be dishonest” as the relevant reason, they are not the actions of an honest person. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, tells the truth because it is the truth, for one can have the virtue of honesty without being tactless or indiscreet. The honest person recognises “That would be a lie” as a strong (though perhaps not overriding) reason for not making certain statements in certain circumstances, and gives due, but not overriding, weight to “That would be the truth” as a reason for making them.

An honest person’s reasons and choices with respect to honest and dishonest actions reflect her views about honesty, truth, and deception—but of course such views manifest themselves with respect to other actions, and to emotional reactions as well. Valuing honesty as she does, she chooses, where possible to work with honest people, to have honest friends, to bring up her children to be honest. She disapproves of, dislikes, deplores dishonesty, is not amused by certain tales of chicanery, despises or pities those who succeed through deception rather than thinking they have been clever, is unsurprised, or pleased (as appropriate) when honesty triumphs, is shocked or distressed when those near and dear to her do what is dishonest and so on. Given that a virtue is such a multi-track disposition, it would obviously be reckless to attribute one to an agent on the basis of a single observed action or even a series of similar actions, especially if you don’t know the agent’s reasons for doing as she did (Sreenivasan 2002).

Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree. To possess such a disposition fully is to possess full or perfect virtue, which is rare, and there are a number of ways of falling short of this ideal (Athanassoulis 2000). Most people who can truly be described as fairly virtuous, and certainly markedly better than those who can truly be described as dishonest, self-centred and greedy, still have their blind spots—little areas where they do not act for the reasons one would expect. So someone honest or kind in most situations, and notably so in demanding ones, may nevertheless be trivially tainted by snobbery, inclined to be disingenuous about their forebears and less than kind to strangers with the wrong accent.

Further, it is not easy to get one’s emotions in harmony with one’s rational recognition of certain reasons for action. I may be honest enough to recognise that I must own up to a mistake because it would be dishonest not to do so without my acceptance being so wholehearted that I can own up easily, with no inner conflict. Following (and adapting) Aristotle, virtue ethicists draw a distinction between full or perfect virtue and “continence”, or strength of will. The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise.

Describing the continent as “falling short” of perfect virtue appears to go against the intuition that there is something particularly admirable about people who manage to act well when it is especially hard for them to do so, but the plausibility of this depends on exactly what “makes it hard” (Foot 1978: 11–14). If it is the circumstances in which the agent acts—say that she is very poor when she sees someone drop a full purse or that she is in deep grief when someone visits seeking help—then indeed it is particularly admirable of her to restore the purse or give the help when it is hard for her to do so. But if what makes it hard is an imperfection in her character—the temptation to keep what is not hers, or a callous indifference to the suffering of others—then it is not.

Another way in which one can easily fall short of full virtue is through lacking phronesis —moral or practical wisdom.

The concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor good: a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent or admirable person who acts and feels as she should. These are commonly accepted truisms. But it is equally common, in relation to particular (putative) examples of virtues to give these truisms up. We may say of someone that he is generous or honest “to a fault”. It is commonly asserted that someone’s compassion might lead them to act wrongly, to tell a lie they should not have told, for example, in their desire to prevent someone else’s hurt feelings. It is also said that courage, in a desperado, enables him to do far more wicked things than he would have been able to do if he were timid. So it would appear that generosity, honesty, compassion and courage despite being virtues, are sometimes faults. Someone who is generous, honest, compassionate, and courageous might not be a morally good person—or, if it is still held to be a truism that they are, then morally good people may be led by what makes them morally good to act wrongly! How have we arrived at such an odd conclusion?

The answer lies in too ready an acceptance of ordinary usage, which permits a fairly wide-ranging application of many of the virtue terms, combined, perhaps, with a modern readiness to suppose that the virtuous agent is motivated by emotion or inclination, not by rational choice. If one thinks of generosity or honesty as the disposition to be moved to action by generous or honest impulses such as the desire to give or to speak the truth, if one thinks of compassion as the disposition to be moved by the sufferings of others and to act on that emotion, if one thinks of courage as mere fearlessness or the willingness to face danger, then it will indeed seem obvious that these are all dispositions that can lead to their possessor’s acting wrongly. But it is also obvious, as soon as it is stated, that these are dispositions that can be possessed by children, and although children thus endowed (bar the “courageous” disposition) would undoubtedly be very nice children, we would not say that they were morally virtuous or admirable people. The ordinary usage, or the reliance on motivation by inclination, gives us what Aristotle calls “natural virtue”—a proto version of full virtue awaiting perfection by phronesis or practical wisdom.

Aristotle makes a number of specific remarks about phronesis that are the subject of much scholarly debate, but the (related) modern concept is best understood by thinking of what the virtuous morally mature adult has that nice children, including nice adolescents, lack. Both the virtuous adult and the nice child have good intentions, but the child is much more prone to mess things up because he is ignorant of what he needs to know in order to do what he intends. A virtuous adult is not, of course, infallible and may also, on occasion, fail to do what she intended to do through lack of knowledge, but only on those occasions on which the lack of knowledge is not culpable. So, for example, children and adolescents often harm those they intend to benefit either because they do not know how to set about securing the benefit or because their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is limited and often mistaken. Such ignorance in small children is rarely, if ever culpable. Adults, on the other hand, are culpable if they mess things up by being thoughtless, insensitive, reckless, impulsive, shortsighted, and by assuming that what suits them will suit everyone instead of taking a more objective viewpoint. They are also culpable if their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is mistaken. It is part of practical wisdom to know how to secure real benefits effectively; those who have practical wisdom will not make the mistake of concealing the hurtful truth from the person who really needs to know it in the belief that they are benefiting him.

Quite generally, given that good intentions are intentions to act well or “do the right thing”, we may say that practical wisdom is the knowledge or understanding that enables its possessor, unlike the nice adolescents, to do just that, in any given situation. The detailed specification of what is involved in such knowledge or understanding has not yet appeared in the literature, but some aspects of it are becoming well known. Even many deontologists now stress the point that their action-guiding rules cannot, reliably, be applied without practical wisdom, because correct application requires situational appreciation—the capacity to recognise, in any particular situation, those features of it that are morally salient. This brings out two aspects of practical wisdom.

One is that it characteristically comes only with experience of life. Amongst the morally relevant features of a situation may be the likely consequences, for the people involved, of a certain action, and this is something that adolescents are notoriously clueless about precisely because they are inexperienced. It is part of practical wisdom to be wise about human beings and human life. (It should go without saying that the virtuous are mindful of the consequences of possible actions. How could they fail to be reckless, thoughtless and short-sighted if they were not?)

The second is the practically wise agent’s capacity to recognise some features of a situation as more important than others, or indeed, in that situation, as the only relevant ones. The wise do not see things in the same way as the nice adolescents who, with their under-developed virtues, still tend to see the personally disadvantageous nature of a certain action as competing in importance with its honesty or benevolence or justice.

These aspects coalesce in the description of the practically wise as those who understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly advantageous in life, who know, in short, how to live well.

2. Forms of Virtue Ethics

While all forms of virtue ethics agree that virtue is central and practical wisdom required, they differ in how they combine these and other concepts to illuminate what we should do in particular contexts and how we should live our lives as a whole. In what follows we sketch four distinct forms taken by contemporary virtue ethics, namely, a) eudaimonist virtue ethics, b) agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, c) target-centered virtue ethics, and d) Platonistic virtue ethics.

The distinctive feature of eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics is that they define virtues in terms of their relationship to eudaimonia . A virtue is a trait that contributes to or is a constituent of eudaimonia and we ought to develop virtues, the eudaimonist claims, precisely because they contribute to eudaimonia .

The concept of eudaimonia , a key term in ancient Greek moral philosophy, is standardly translated as “happiness” or “flourishing” and occasionally as “well-being.” Each translation has its disadvantages. The trouble with “flourishing” is that animals and even plants can flourish but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings. The trouble with “happiness” is that in ordinary conversation it connotes something subjectively determined. It is for me, not for you, to pronounce on whether I am happy. If I think I am happy then I am—it is not something I can be wrong about (barring advanced cases of self-deception). Contrast my being healthy or flourishing. Here we have no difficulty in recognizing that I might think I was healthy, either physically or psychologically, or think that I was flourishing but be wrong. In this respect, “flourishing” is a better translation than “happiness”. It is all too easy to be mistaken about whether one’s life is eudaimon (the adjective from eudaimonia ) not simply because it is easy to deceive oneself, but because it is easy to have a mistaken conception of eudaimonia , or of what it is to live well as a human being, believing it to consist largely in physical pleasure or luxury for example.

Eudaimonia is, avowedly, a moralized or value-laden concept of happiness, something like “true” or “real” happiness or “the sort of happiness worth seeking or having.” It is thereby the sort of concept about which there can be substantial disagreement between people with different views about human life that cannot be resolved by appeal to some external standard on which, despite their different views, the parties to the disagreement concur (Hursthouse 1999: 188–189).

Most versions of virtue ethics agree that living a life in accordance with virtue is necessary for eudaimonia. This supreme good is not conceived of as an independently defined state (made up of, say, a list of non-moral goods that does not include virtuous activity) which exercise of the virtues might be thought to promote. It is, within virtue ethics, already conceived of as something of which virtuous activity is at least partially constitutive (Kraut 1989). Thereby virtue ethicists claim that a human life devoted to physical pleasure or the acquisition of wealth is not eudaimon , but a wasted life.

But although all standard versions of virtue ethics insist on that conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia , further links are matters of dispute and generate different versions. For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient—what is also needed are external goods which are a matter of luck. For Plato and the Stoics, virtue is both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia (Annas 1993).

According to eudaimonist virtue ethics, the good life is the eudaimon life, and the virtues are what enable a human being to be eudaimon because the virtues just are those character traits that benefit their possessor in that way, barring bad luck. So there is a link between eudaimonia and what confers virtue status on a character trait. (For a discussion of the differences between eudaimonists see Baril 2014. For recent defenses of eudaimonism see Annas 2011; LeBar 2013b; Badhwar 2014; and Bloomfield 2014.)

Rather than deriving the normativity of virtue from the value of eudaimonia , agent-based virtue ethicists argue that other forms of normativity—including the value of eudaimonia —are traced back to and ultimately explained in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents.

It is unclear how many other forms of normativity must be explained in terms of the qualities of agents in order for a theory to count as agent-based. The two best-known agent-based theorists, Michael Slote and Linda Zagzebski, trace a wide range of normative qualities back to the qualities of agents. For example, Slote defines rightness and wrongness in terms of agents’ motivations: “[A]gent-based virtue ethics … understands rightness in terms of good motivations and wrongness in terms of the having of bad (or insufficiently good) motives” (2001: 14). Similarly, he explains the goodness of an action, the value of eudaimonia , the justice of a law or social institution, and the normativity of practical rationality in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents (2001: 99–100, 154, 2000). Zagzebski likewise defines right and wrong actions by reference to the emotions, motives, and dispositions of virtuous and vicious agents. For example, “A wrong act = an act that the phronimos characteristically would not do, and he would feel guilty if he did = an act such that it is not the case that he might do it = an act that expresses a vice = an act that is against a requirement of virtue (the virtuous self)” (Zagzebski 2004: 160). Her definitions of duties, good and bad ends, and good and bad states of affairs are similarly grounded in the motivational and dispositional states of exemplary agents (1998, 2004, 2010).

However, there could also be less ambitious agent-based approaches to virtue ethics (see Slote 1997). At the very least, an agent-based approach must be committed to explaining what one should do by reference to the motivational and dispositional states of agents. But this is not yet a sufficient condition for counting as an agent-based approach, since the same condition will be met by every virtue ethical account. For a theory to count as an agent-based form of virtue ethics it must also be the case that the normative properties of motivations and dispositions cannot be explained in terms of the normative properties of something else (such as eudaimonia or states of affairs) which is taken to be more fundamental.

Beyond this basic commitment, there is room for agent-based theories to be developed in a number of different directions. The most important distinguishing factor has to do with how motivations and dispositions are taken to matter for the purposes of explaining other normative qualities. For Slote what matters are this particular agent’s actual motives and dispositions . The goodness of action A, for example, is derived from the agent’s motives when she performs A. If those motives are good then the action is good, if not then not. On Zagzebski’s account, by contrast, a good or bad, right or wrong action is defined not by this agent’s actual motives but rather by whether this is the sort of action a virtuously motivated agent would perform (Zagzebski 2004: 160). Appeal to the virtuous agent’s hypothetical motives and dispositions enables Zagzebski to distinguish between performing the right action and doing so for the right reasons (a distinction that, as Brady (2004) observes, Slote has trouble drawing).

Another point on which agent-based forms of virtue ethics might differ concerns how one identifies virtuous motivations and dispositions. According to Zagzebski’s exemplarist account, “We do not have criteria for goodness in advance of identifying the exemplars of goodness” (Zagzebski 2004: 41). As we observe the people around us, we find ourselves wanting to be like some of them (in at least some respects) and not wanting to be like others. The former provide us with positive exemplars and the latter with negative ones. Our understanding of better and worse motivations and virtuous and vicious dispositions is grounded in these primitive responses to exemplars (2004: 53). This is not to say that every time we act we stop and ask ourselves what one of our exemplars would do in this situations. Our moral concepts become more refined over time as we encounter a wider variety of exemplars and begin to draw systematic connections between them, noting what they have in common, how they differ, and which of these commonalities and differences matter, morally speaking. Recognizable motivational profiles emerge and come to be labeled as virtues or vices, and these, in turn, shape our understanding of the obligations we have and the ends we should pursue. However, even though the systematising of moral thought can travel a long way from our starting point, according to the exemplarist it never reaches a stage where reference to exemplars is replaced by the recognition of something more fundamental. At the end of the day, according to the exemplarist, our moral system still rests on our basic propensity to take a liking (or disliking) to exemplars. Nevertheless, one could be an agent-based theorist without advancing the exemplarist’s account of the origins or reference conditions for judgments of good and bad, virtuous and vicious.

The touchstone for eudaimonist virtue ethicists is a flourishing human life. For agent-based virtue ethicists it is an exemplary agent’s motivations. The target-centered view developed by Christine Swanton (2003), by contrast, begins with our existing conceptions of the virtues. We already have a passable idea of which traits are virtues and what they involve. Of course, this untutored understanding can be clarified and improved, and it is one of the tasks of the virtue ethicist to help us do precisely that. But rather than stripping things back to something as basic as the motivations we want to imitate or building it up to something as elaborate as an entire flourishing life, the target-centered view begins where most ethics students find themselves, namely, with the idea that generosity, courage, self-discipline, compassion, and the like get a tick of approval. It then examines what these traits involve.

A complete account of virtue will map out 1) its field , 2) its mode of responsiveness, 3) its basis of moral acknowledgment, and 4) its target . Different virtues are concerned with different fields . Courage, for example, is concerned with what might harm us, whereas generosity is concerned with the sharing of time, talent, and property. The basis of acknowledgment of a virtue is the feature within the virtue’s field to which it responds. To continue with our previous examples, generosity is attentive to the benefits that others might enjoy through one’s agency, and courage responds to threats to value, status, or the bonds that exist between oneself and particular others, and the fear such threats might generate. A virtue’s mode has to do with how it responds to the bases of acknowledgment within its field. Generosity promotes a good, namely, another’s benefit, whereas courage defends a value, bond, or status. Finally, a virtue’s target is that at which it is aimed. Courage aims to control fear and handle danger, while generosity aims to share time, talents, or possessions with others in ways that benefit them.

A virtue , on a target-centered account, “is a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way” (Swanton 2003: 19). A virtuous act is an act that hits the target of a virtue, which is to say that it succeeds in responding to items in its field in the specified way (233). Providing a target-centered definition of a right action requires us to move beyond the analysis of a single virtue and the actions that follow from it. This is because a single action context may involve a number of different, overlapping fields. Determination might lead me to persist in trying to complete a difficult task even if doing so requires a singleness of purpose. But love for my family might make a different use of my time and attention. In order to define right action a target-centered view must explain how we handle different virtues’ conflicting claims on our resources. There are at least three different ways to address this challenge. A perfectionist target-centered account would stipulate, “An act is right if and only if it is overall virtuous, and that entails that it is the, or a, best action possible in the circumstances” (239–240). A more permissive target-centered account would not identify ‘right’ with ‘best’, but would allow an action to count as right provided “it is good enough even if not the (or a) best action” (240). A minimalist target-centered account would not even require an action to be good in order to be right. On such a view, “An act is right if and only if it is not overall vicious” (240). (For further discussion of target-centered virtue ethics see Van Zyl 2014; and Smith 2016).

The fourth form a virtue ethic might adopt takes its inspiration from Plato. The Socrates of Plato’s dialogues devotes a great deal of time to asking his fellow Athenians to explain the nature of virtues like justice, courage, piety, and wisdom. So it is clear that Plato counts as a virtue theorist. But it is a matter of some debate whether he should be read as a virtue ethicist (White 2015). What is not open to debate is whether Plato has had an important influence on the contemporary revival of interest in virtue ethics. A number of those who have contributed to the revival have done so as Plato scholars (e.g., Prior 1991; Kamtekar 1998; Annas 1999; and Reshotko 2006). However, often they have ended up championing a eudaimonist version of virtue ethics (see Prior 2001 and Annas 2011), rather than a version that would warrant a separate classification. Nevertheless, there are two variants that call for distinct treatment.

Timothy Chappell takes the defining feature of Platonistic virtue ethics to be that “Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good” (2014). Chappell follows Iris Murdoch in arguing that “In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego” (Murdoch 1971: 51). Constantly attending to our needs, our desires, our passions, and our thoughts skews our perspective on what the world is actually like and blinds us to the goods around us. Contemplating the goodness of something we encounter—which is to say, carefully attending to it “for its own sake, in order to understand it” (Chappell 2014: 300)—breaks this natural tendency by drawing our attention away from ourselves. Contemplating such goodness with regularity makes room for new habits of thought that focus more readily and more honestly on things other than the self. It alters the quality of our consciousness. And “anything which alters consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity, and realism is to be connected with virtue” (Murdoch 1971: 82). The virtues get defined, then, in terms of qualities that help one “pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is” (91). And good agency is defined by the possession and exercise of such virtues. Within Chappell’s and Murdoch’s framework, then, not all normative properties get defined in terms of virtue. Goodness, in particular, is not so defined. But the kind of goodness which is possible for creatures like us is defined by virtue, and any answer to the question of what one should do or how one should live will appeal to the virtues.

Another Platonistic variant of virtue ethics is exemplified by Robert Merrihew Adams. Unlike Murdoch and Chappell, his starting point is not a set of claims about our consciousness of goodness. Rather, he begins with an account of the metaphysics of goodness. Like Murdoch and others influenced by Platonism, Adams’s account of goodness is built around a conception of a supremely perfect good. And like Augustine, Adams takes that perfect good to be God. God is both the exemplification and the source of all goodness. Other things are good, he suggests, to the extent that they resemble God (Adams 1999).

The resemblance requirement identifies a necessary condition for being good, but it does not yet give us a sufficient condition. This is because there are ways in which finite creatures might resemble God that would not be suitable to the type of creature they are. For example, if God were all-knowing, then the belief, “I am all-knowing,” would be a suitable belief for God to have. In God, such a belief—because true—would be part of God’s perfection. However, as neither you nor I are all-knowing, the belief, “I am all-knowing,” in one of us would not be good. To rule out such cases we need to introduce another factor. That factor is the fitting response to goodness, which Adams suggests is love. Adams uses love to weed out problematic resemblances: “being excellent in the way that a finite thing can be consists in resembling God in a way that could serve God as a reason for loving the thing” (Adams 1999: 36).

Virtues come into the account as one of the ways in which some things (namely, persons) could resemble God. “[M]ost of the excellences that are most important to us, and of whose value we are most confident, are excellences of persons or of qualities or actions or works or lives or stories of persons” (1999: 42). This is one of the reasons Adams offers for conceiving of the ideal of perfection as a personal God, rather than an impersonal form of the Good. Many of the excellences of persons of which we are most confident are virtues such as love, wisdom, justice, patience, and generosity. And within many theistic traditions, including Adams’s own Christian tradition, such virtues are commonly attributed to divine agents.

A Platonistic account like the one Adams puts forward in Finite and Infinite Goods clearly does not derive all other normative properties from the virtues (for a discussion of the relationship between this view and the one he puts forward in A Theory of Virtue (2006) see Pettigrove 2014). Goodness provides the normative foundation. Virtues are not built on that foundation; rather, as one of the varieties of goodness of whose value we are most confident, virtues form part of the foundation. Obligations, by contrast, come into the account at a different level. Moral obligations, Adams argues, are determined by the expectations and demands that “arise in a relationship or system of relationships that is good or valuable” (1999: 244). Other things being equal, the more virtuous the parties to the relationship, the more binding the obligation. Thus, within Adams’s account, the good (which includes virtue) is prior to the right. However, once good relationships have given rise to obligations, those obligations take on a life of their own. Their bindingness is not traced directly to considerations of goodness. Rather, they are determined by the expectations of the parties and the demands of the relationship.

A number of objections have been raised against virtue ethics, some of which bear more directly on one form of virtue ethics than on others. In this section we consider eight objections, namely, the a) application, b) adequacy, c) relativism, d) conflict, e) self-effacement, f) justification, g) egoism, and h) situationist problems.

a) In the early days of virtue ethics’ revival, the approach was associated with an “anti-codifiability” thesis about ethics, directed against the prevailing pretensions of normative theory. At the time, utilitarians and deontologists commonly (though not universally) held that the task of ethical theory was to come up with a code consisting of universal rules or principles (possibly only one, as in the case of act-utilitarianism) which would have two significant features: i) the rule(s) would amount to a decision procedure for determining what the right action was in any particular case; ii) the rule(s) would be stated in such terms that any non-virtuous person could understand and apply it (them) correctly.

Virtue ethicists maintained, contrary to these two claims, that it was quite unrealistic to imagine that there could be such a code (see, in particular, McDowell 1979). The results of attempts to produce and employ such a code, in the heady days of the 1960s and 1970s, when medical and then bioethics boomed and bloomed, tended to support the virtue ethicists’ claim. More and more utilitarians and deontologists found themselves agreed on their general rules but on opposite sides of the controversial moral issues in contemporary discussion. It came to be recognised that moral sensitivity, perception, imagination, and judgement informed by experience— phronesis in short—is needed to apply rules or principles correctly. Hence many (though by no means all) utilitarians and deontologists have explicitly abandoned (ii) and much less emphasis is placed on (i).

Nevertheless, the complaint that virtue ethics does not produce codifiable principles is still a commonly voiced criticism of the approach, expressed as the objection that it is, in principle, unable to provide action-guidance.

Initially, the objection was based on a misunderstanding. Blinkered by slogans that described virtue ethics as “concerned with Being rather than Doing,” as addressing “What sort of person should I be?” but not “What should I do?” as being “agent-centered rather than act-centered,” its critics maintained that it was unable to provide action-guidance. Hence, rather than being a normative rival to utilitarian and deontological ethics, it could claim to be no more than a valuable supplement to them. The rather odd idea was that all virtue ethics could offer was, “Identify a moral exemplar and do what he would do,” as though the university student trying to decide whether to study music (her preference) or engineering (her parents’ preference) was supposed to ask herself, “What would Socrates study if he were in my circumstances?”

But the objection failed to take note of Anscombe’s hint that a great deal of specific action guidance could be found in rules employing the virtue and vice terms (“v-rules”) such as “Do what is honest/charitable; do not do what is dishonest/uncharitable” (Hursthouse 1999). (It is a noteworthy feature of our virtue and vice vocabulary that, although our list of generally recognised virtue terms is comparatively short, our list of vice terms is remarkably, and usefully, long, far exceeding anything that anyone who thinks in terms of standard deontological rules has ever come up with. Much invaluable action guidance comes from avoiding courses of action that would be irresponsible, feckless, lazy, inconsiderate, uncooperative, harsh, intolerant, selfish, mercenary, indiscreet, tactless, arrogant, unsympathetic, cold, incautious, unenterprising, pusillanimous, feeble, presumptuous, rude, hypocritical, self-indulgent, materialistic, grasping, short-sighted, vindictive, calculating, ungrateful, grudging, brutal, profligate, disloyal, and on and on.)

(b) A closely related objection has to do with whether virtue ethics can provide an adequate account of right action. This worry can take two forms. (i) One might think a virtue ethical account of right action is extensionally inadequate. It is possible to perform a right action without being virtuous and a virtuous person can occasionally perform the wrong action without that calling her virtue into question. If virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for right action, one might wonder whether the relationship between rightness/wrongness and virtue/vice is close enough for the former to be identified in terms of the latter. (ii) Alternatively, even if one thought it possible to produce a virtue ethical account that picked out all (and only) right actions, one might still think that at least in some cases virtue is not what explains rightness (Adams 2006:6–8).

Some virtue ethicists respond to the adequacy objection by rejecting the assumption that virtue ethics ought to be in the business of providing an account of right action in the first place. Following in the footsteps of Anscombe (1958) and MacIntyre (1985), Talbot Brewer (2009) argues that to work with the categories of rightness and wrongness is already to get off on the wrong foot. Contemporary conceptions of right and wrong action, built as they are around a notion of moral duty that presupposes a framework of divine (or moral) law or around a conception of obligation that is defined in contrast to self-interest, carry baggage the virtue ethicist is better off without. Virtue ethics can address the questions of how one should live, what kind of person one should become, and even what one should do without that committing it to providing an account of ‘right action’. One might choose, instead, to work with aretaic concepts (defined in terms of virtues and vices) and axiological concepts (defined in terms of good and bad, better and worse) and leave out deontic notions (like right/wrong action, duty, and obligation) altogether.

Other virtue ethicists wish to retain the concept of right action but note that in the current philosophical discussion a number of distinct qualities march under that banner. In some contexts, ‘right action’ identifies the best action an agent might perform in the circumstances. In others, it designates an action that is commendable (even if not the best possible). In still others, it picks out actions that are not blameworthy (even if not commendable). A virtue ethicist might choose to define one of these—for example, the best action—in terms of virtues and vices, but appeal to other normative concepts—such as legitimate expectations—when defining other conceptions of right action.

As we observed in section 2, a virtue ethical account need not attempt to reduce all other normative concepts to virtues and vices. What is required is simply (i) that virtue is not reduced to some other normative concept that is taken to be more fundamental and (ii) that some other normative concepts are explained in terms of virtue and vice. This takes the sting out of the adequacy objection, which is most compelling against versions of virtue ethics that attempt to define all of the senses of ‘right action’ in terms of virtues. Appealing to virtues and vices makes it much easier to achieve extensional adequacy. Making room for normative concepts that are not taken to be reducible to virtue and vice concepts makes it even easier to generate a theory that is both extensionally and explanatorily adequate. Whether one needs other concepts and, if so, how many, is still a matter of debate among virtue ethicists, as is the question of whether virtue ethics even ought to be offering an account of right action. Either way virtue ethicists have resources available to them to address the adequacy objection.

Insofar as the different versions of virtue ethics all retain an emphasis on the virtues, they are open to the familiar problem of (c) the charge of cultural relativity. Is it not the case that different cultures embody different virtues, (MacIntyre 1985) and hence that the v-rules will pick out actions as right or wrong only relative to a particular culture? Different replies have been made to this charge. One—the tu quoque , or “partners in crime” response—exhibits a quite familiar pattern in virtue ethicists’ defensive strategy (Solomon 1988). They admit that, for them, cultural relativism is a challenge, but point out that it is just as much a problem for the other two approaches. The (putative) cultural variation in character traits regarded as virtues is no greater—indeed markedly less—than the cultural variation in rules of conduct, and different cultures have different ideas about what constitutes happiness or welfare. That cultural relativity should be a problem common to all three approaches is hardly surprising. It is related, after all, to the “justification problem” ( see below ) the quite general metaethical problem of justifying one’s moral beliefs to those who disagree, whether they be moral sceptics, pluralists or from another culture.

A bolder strategy involves claiming that virtue ethics has less difficulty with cultural relativity than the other two approaches. Much cultural disagreement arises, it may be claimed, from local understandings of the virtues, but the virtues themselves are not relative to culture (Nussbaum 1993).

Another objection to which the tu quoque response is partially appropriate is (d) “the conflict problem.” What does virtue ethics have to say about dilemmas—cases in which, apparently, the requirements of different virtues conflict because they point in opposed directions? Charity prompts me to kill the person who would be better off dead, but justice forbids it. Honesty points to telling the hurtful truth, kindness and compassion to remaining silent or even lying. What shall I do? Of course, the same sorts of dilemmas are generated by conflicts between deontological rules. Deontology and virtue ethics share the conflict problem (and are happy to take it on board rather than follow some of the utilitarians in their consequentialist resolutions of such dilemmas) and in fact their strategies for responding to it are parallel. Both aim to resolve a number of dilemmas by arguing that the conflict is merely apparent; a discriminating understanding of the virtues or rules in question, possessed only by those with practical wisdom, will perceive that, in this particular case, the virtues do not make opposing demands or that one rule outranks another, or has a certain exception clause built into it. Whether this is all there is to it depends on whether there are any irresolvable dilemmas. If there are, proponents of either normative approach may point out reasonably that it could only be a mistake to offer a resolution of what is, ex hypothesi , irresolvable.

Another problem arguably shared by all three approaches is (e), that of being self-effacing. An ethical theory is self-effacing if, roughly, whatever it claims justifies a particular action, or makes it right, had better not be the agent’s motive for doing it. Michael Stocker (1976) originally introduced it as a problem for deontology and consequentialism. He pointed out that the agent who, rightly, visits a friend in hospital will rather lessen the impact of his visit on her if he tells her either that he is doing it because it is his duty or because he thought it would maximize the general happiness. But as Simon Keller observes, she won’t be any better pleased if he tells her that he is visiting her because it is what a virtuous agent would do, so virtue ethics would appear to have the problem too (Keller 2007). However, virtue ethics’ defenders have argued that not all forms of virtue ethics are subject to this objection (Pettigrove 2011) and those that are are not seriously undermined by the problem (Martinez 2011).

Another problem for virtue ethics, which is shared by both utilitarianism and deontology, is (f) “the justification problem.” Abstractly conceived, this is the problem of how we justify or ground our ethical beliefs, an issue that is hotly debated at the level of metaethics. In its particular versions, for deontology there is the question of how to justify its claims that certain moral rules are the correct ones, and for utilitarianism of how to justify its claim that all that really matters morally are consequences for happiness or well-being. For virtue ethics, the problem concerns the question of which character traits are the virtues.

In the metaethical debate, there is widespread disagreement about the possibility of providing an external foundation for ethics—“external” in the sense of being external to ethical beliefs—and the same disagreement is found amongst deontologists and utilitarians. Some believe that their normative ethics can be placed on a secure basis, resistant to any form of scepticism, such as what anyone rationally desires, or would accept or agree on, regardless of their ethical outlook; others that it cannot.

Virtue ethicists have eschewed any attempt to ground virtue ethics in an external foundation while continuing to maintain that their claims can be validated. Some follow a form of Rawls’s coherentist approach (Slote 2001; Swanton 2003); neo-Aristotelians a form of ethical naturalism.

A misunderstanding of eudaimonia as an unmoralized concept leads some critics to suppose that the neo-Aristotelians are attempting to ground their claims in a scientific account of human nature and what counts, for a human being, as flourishing. Others assume that, if this is not what they are doing, they cannot be validating their claims that, for example, justice, charity, courage, and generosity are virtues. Either they are illegitimately helping themselves to Aristotle’s discredited natural teleology (Williams 1985) or producing mere rationalizations of their own personal or culturally inculcated values. But McDowell, Foot, MacIntyre and Hursthouse have all outlined versions of a third way between these two extremes. Eudaimonia in virtue ethics, is indeed a moralized concept, but it is not only that. Claims about what constitutes flourishing for human beings no more float free of scientific facts about what human beings are like than ethological claims about what constitutes flourishing for elephants. In both cases, the truth of the claims depends in part on what kind of animal they are and what capacities, desires and interests the humans or elephants have.

The best available science today (including evolutionary theory and psychology) supports rather than undermines the ancient Greek assumption that we are social animals, like elephants and wolves and unlike polar bears. No rationalizing explanation in terms of anything like a social contract is needed to explain why we choose to live together, subjugating our egoistic desires in order to secure the advantages of co-operation. Like other social animals, our natural impulses are not solely directed towards our own pleasures and preservation, but include altruistic and cooperative ones.

This basic fact about us should make more comprehensible the claim that the virtues are at least partially constitutive of human flourishing and also undercut the objection that virtue ethics is, in some sense, egoistic.

(g) The egoism objection has a number of sources. One is a simple confusion. Once it is understood that the fully virtuous agent characteristically does what she should without inner conflict, it is triumphantly asserted that “she is only doing what she wants to do and hence is being selfish.” So when the generous person gives gladly, as the generous are wont to do, it turns out she is not generous and unselfish after all, or at least not as generous as the one who greedily wants to hang on to everything she has but forces herself to give because she thinks she should! A related version ascribes bizarre reasons to the virtuous agent, unjustifiably assuming that she acts as she does because she believes that acting thus on this occasion will help her to achieve eudaimonia. But “the virtuous agent” is just “the agent with the virtues” and it is part of our ordinary understanding of the virtue terms that each carries with it its own typical range of reasons for acting. The virtuous agent acts as she does because she believes that someone’s suffering will be averted, or someone benefited, or the truth established, or a debt repaid, or … thereby.

It is the exercise of the virtues during one’s life that is held to be at least partially constitutive of eudaimonia , and this is consistent with recognising that bad luck may land the virtuous agent in circumstances that require her to give up her life. Given the sorts of considerations that courageous, honest, loyal, charitable people wholeheartedly recognise as reasons for action, they may find themselves compelled to face danger for a worthwhile end, to speak out in someone’s defence, or refuse to reveal the names of their comrades, even when they know that this will inevitably lead to their execution, to share their last crust and face starvation. On the view that the exercise of the virtues is necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia , such cases are described as those in which the virtuous agent sees that, as things have unfortunately turned out, eudaimonia is not possible for them (Foot 2001, 95). On the Stoical view that it is both necessary and sufficient, a eudaimon life is a life that has been successfully lived (where “success” of course is not to be understood in a materialistic way) and such people die knowing not only that they have made a success of their lives but that they have also brought their lives to a markedly successful completion. Either way, such heroic acts can hardly be regarded as egoistic.

A lingering suggestion of egoism may be found in the misconceived distinction between so-called “self-regarding” and “other-regarding” virtues. Those who have been insulated from the ancient tradition tend to regard justice and benevolence as real virtues, which benefit others but not their possessor, and prudence, fortitude and providence (the virtue whose opposite is “improvidence” or being a spendthrift) as not real virtues at all because they benefit only their possessor. This is a mistake on two counts. Firstly, justice and benevolence do, in general, benefit their possessors, since without them eudaimonia is not possible. Secondly, given that we live together, as social animals, the “self-regarding” virtues do benefit others—those who lack them are a great drain on, and sometimes grief to, those who are close to them (as parents with improvident or imprudent adult offspring know only too well).

The most recent objection (h) to virtue ethics claims that work in “situationist” social psychology shows that there are no such things as character traits and thereby no such things as virtues for virtue ethics to be about (Doris 1998; Harman 1999). In reply, some virtue ethicists have argued that the social psychologists’ studies are irrelevant to the multi-track disposition (see above) that a virtue is supposed to be (Sreenivasan 2002; Kamtekar 2004). Mindful of just how multi-track it is, they agree that it would be reckless in the extreme to ascribe a demanding virtue such as charity to people of whom they know no more than that they have exhibited conventional decency; this would indeed be “a fundamental attribution error.” Others have worked to develop alternative, empirically grounded conceptions of character traits (Snow 2010; Miller 2013 and 2014; however see Upton 2016 for objections to Miller). There have been other responses as well (summarized helpfully in Prinz 2009 and Miller 2014). Notable among these is a response by Adams (2006, echoing Merritt 2000) who steers a middle road between “no character traits at all” and the exacting standard of the Aristotelian conception of virtue which, because of its emphasis on phronesis, requires a high level of character integration. On his conception, character traits may be “frail and fragmentary” but still virtues, and not uncommon. But giving up the idea that practical wisdom is the heart of all the virtues, as Adams has to do, is a substantial sacrifice, as Russell (2009) and Kamtekar (2010) argue.

Even though the “situationist challenge” has left traditional virtue ethicists unmoved, it has generated a healthy engagement with empirical psychological literature, which has also been fuelled by the growing literature on Foot’s Natural Goodness and, quite independently, an upsurge of interest in character education (see below).

Over the past thirty-five years most of those contributing to the revival of virtue ethics have worked within a neo-Aristotelian, eudaimonist framework. However, as noted in section 2, other forms of virtue ethics have begun to emerge. Theorists have begun to turn to philosophers like Hutcheson, Hume, Nietzsche, Martineau, and Heidegger for resources they might use to develop alternatives (see Russell 2006; Swanton 2013 and 2015; Taylor 2015; and Harcourt 2015). Others have turned their attention eastward, exploring Confucian, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions (Yu 2007; Slingerland 2011; Finnigan and Tanaka 2011; McRae 2012; Angle and Slote 2013; Davis 2014; Flanagan 2015; Perrett and Pettigrove 2015; and Sim 2015). These explorations promise to open up new avenues for the development of virtue ethics.

Although virtue ethics has grown remarkably in the last thirty-five years, it is still very much in the minority, particularly in the area of applied ethics. Many editors of big textbook collections on “moral problems” or “applied ethics” now try to include articles representative of each of the three normative approaches but are often unable to find a virtue ethics article addressing a particular issue. This is sometimes, no doubt, because “the” issue has been set up as a deontologicial/utilitarian debate, but it is often simply because no virtue ethicist has yet written on the topic. However, the last decade has seen an increase in the amount of attention applied virtue ethics has received (Walker and Ivanhoe 2007; Hartman 2013; Austin 2014; Van Hooft 2014; and Annas 2015). This area can certainly be expected to grow in the future, and it looks as though applying virtue ethics in the field of environmental ethics may prove particularly fruitful (Sandler 2007; Hursthouse 2007, 2011; Zwolinski and Schmidtz 2013; Cafaro 2015).

Whether virtue ethics can be expected to grow into “virtue politics”—i.e. to extend from moral philosophy into political philosophy—is not so clear. Gisela Striker (2006) has argued that Aristotle’s ethics cannot be understood adequately without attending to its place in his politics. That suggests that at least those virtue ethicists who take their inspiration from Aristotle should have resources to offer for the development of virtue politics. But, while Plato and Aristotle can be great inspirations as far as virtue ethics is concerned, neither, on the face of it, are attractive sources of insight where politics is concerned. However, recent work suggests that Aristotelian ideas can, after all, generate a satisfyingly liberal political philosophy (Nussbaum 2006; LeBar 2013a). Moreover, as noted above, virtue ethics does not have to be neo-Aristotelian. It may be that the virtue ethics of Hutcheson and Hume can be naturally extended into a modern political philosophy (Hursthouse 1990–91; Slote 1993).

Following Plato and Aristotle, modern virtue ethics has always emphasised the importance of moral education, not as the inculcation of rules but as the training of character. There is now a growing movement towards virtues education, amongst both academics (Carr 1999; Athanassoulis 2014; Curren 2015) and teachers in the classroom. One exciting thing about research in this area is its engagement with other academic disciplines, including psychology, educational theory, and theology (see Cline 2015; and Snow 2015).

Finally, one of the more productive developments of virtue ethics has come through the study of particular virtues and vices. There are now a number of careful studies of the cardinal virtues and capital vices (Pieper 1966; Taylor 2006; Curzer 2012; Timpe and Boyd 2014). Others have explored less widely discussed virtues or vices, such as civility, decency, truthfulness, ambition, and meekness (Calhoun 2000; Kekes 2002; Williams 2002; and Pettigrove 2007 and 2012). One of the questions these studies raise is “How many virtues are there?” A second is, “How are these virtues related to one another?” Some virtue ethicists have been happy to work on the assumption that there is no principled reason for limiting the number of virtues and plenty of reason for positing a plurality of them (Swanton 2003; Battaly 2015). Others have been concerned that such an open-handed approach to the virtues will make it difficult for virtue ethicists to come up with an adequate account of right action or deal with the conflict problem discussed above. Dan Russell has proposed cardinality and a version of the unity thesis as a solution to what he calls “the enumeration problem” (the problem of too many virtues). The apparent proliferation of virtues can be significantly reduced if we group virtues together with some being cardinal and others subordinate extensions of those cardinal virtues. Possible conflicts between the remaining virtues can then be managed if they are tied together in some way as part of a unified whole (Russell 2009). This highlights two important avenues for future research, one of which explores individual virtues and the other of which analyses how they might be related to one another.

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Aristotle | character, moral | character, moral: empirical approaches | consequentialism | ethics: deontological | moral dilemmas

Acknowledgments

Parts of the introductory material above repeat what was said in the Introduction and first chapter of On Virtue Ethics (Hursthouse 1999).

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1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology

Philosophy, One Thousand Words at a Time

Virtue Ethics

Author: David Merry Category: Ethics , Historical Philosophy Word Count: 1000

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Think of the (morally) best person you know. It could be a friend, parent, teacher, religious leader, thinker, or activist.

The person you thought of is probably kind, brave, and wise. They are probably not greedy, cruel, or foolish.

The first list of ‘character traits’ ( kind, brave, etc.) are virtues, and the second list ( arrogant, greedy, etc.) are vices . Virtues are ways in which people are good; vices are ways in which people are bad.

This essay presents virtue ethics, a theory that sees virtues and vices as central to understanding who we should be, and what we should do.

1. Virtue and Happiness

Virtues are excellent traits of character. [1] They shape how we act, think, and feel. They make us who we are. Virtues are acquired through good habits, over a long period of time.

1.1. Eudaimonia

According to Aristotle (384-322 BCE) virtues are those, and only those, character traits we need to be happy. [2] Many virtue ethicists today agree. [3] These virtue ethicists are called eudaimonists, after the Greek word eudaimonia, usually translated as “happiness,” “flourishing,” or “well-being . ” [4]

For eudaimonists, happiness is more than a feeling: it involves living well with others and pursuing worthwhile goals. This includes cultivating strong relationships, and succeeding at such projects as raising a family, fighting for justice, and (moderate yet enthusiastic) enjoyment of pleasure. [5]

Eudaimonists believe our happiness is not easily separated from that of other people. Many would consider the happiness of their friends and family as part of their own. Eudaimonists may extend this to complete strangers, and non-human animals. Similarly for causes or ideals: eudaimonists believe complicity in injustice and deceit reduces a person’s happiness. , [6]

If eudaimonists are right about happiness, then it is plausible that we need virtues such as honesty, kindness, gratitude and justice to be happy. This is not to say that the virtues will guarantee happiness. But eudaimonists believe we cannot be truly happy without them.

One concern is that vicious people often seem happy. For example, dictators live in palaces, apparently rather pleasantly. Eudaimonists may not think this amounts to happiness, but many would disagree. And if dictators can be happy, then we certainly can be happy without the virtues. Answering this objection is an ongoing project for eudaimonists. [7]

1.2. Emotion, Intelligence, and Developing Virtue

Eudaimonists believe emotions are essential to happiness, and that our emotions are shaped by our habits. Good emotional habits are a question of balance.

For example, eudaimonists argue that honest people habitually want to and enjoy telling the truth, but not so much that they will ignore all other considerations–a habit of enjoying pointing out other people’s shortcomings will leave us friendless, and so is not part of honesty. [8]

Because virtue requires balancing competing considerations, such as telling the truth and considering other people’s feelings, virtue also requires experience in making moral decisions. Virtue ethicists call this intellectual ability practical intelligence, or wisdom. [9]

2. Virtue and Right Action

Virtue ethicists believe we can use virtue to understand how we should act, or what makes actions right.

According to some virtue ethicists, an action is right if, and only if, it is what a virtuous person would characteristically do under the circumstances. [10] On rare occasions, virtuous people do the wrong thing. But this is not acting characteristically.

2.1. Being Specific

“Do what virtuous people would do” is not very specific, and we may be left wondering what the theory is actually saying we should do.

One way to make it more specific is to generate rules for each of the virtues and vices, called “v-rules.” Two examples of v-rules are: be kind, don’t be cruel. The v-rules give specific guidance in many cases: writing an email just to hurt someone’s feelings is cruel, so don’t do it. [11]

Unfortunately, the virtues can conflict: if a friend asks whether we like their new partner, it may be more honest to say we do not , but kinder to say we do. In this case it is hard to say what the virtuous person would do.

Virtue ethicists might respond that other ethical theories will also struggle to give clear guidance in hard cases. [12]

Second, they might try to understand how a virtuous person would think about the situation. Remember that virtuous people have practical intelligence, and habitually care about other people’s happiness and telling the truth. So they may consider a lot of particular details, including how close the friendship is, how bad the partner is, how gently the friend may be told. [13]

This may not provide a specific answer, but virtue ethicists hope they can at least provide a helpful model for thinking about hard cases. [14]

2.2. Explaining Why

We have seen how virtue ethics tells us what to do. But we also want to know why we should do it.

Virtue ethicists point out that if we ask virtuous people, they will explain why they did what they did. [15] Their reasoning results from their excellent emotional habits and practical intelligence–that is, from their virtue. And if we want to be happy, we need to cultivate virtue. So these should be our reasons too.

But in explaining their decision, the virtuous person won’t necessarily mention virtue. They might, for example, say, “I wanted to avoid hurting their feelings, so I told the truth gently.” [16]

It might then seem that something other than virtue–in our example, the importance of other people’s feelings–explains why the action is right . But then this other thing should be central to ethical theory, instead of virtue.

Virtue ethicists may respond that the moral weight of this other thing depends on which character traits are virtues. Accordingly, if kindness were not a virtue, there may be no moral reason to care about others’ feelings. [17]

3. Conclusion

Virtue ethicists recommend reflecting on the character traits we need to be happy. They hope this will help us make better moral decisions. Virtue ethics may not always yield clear answers, but perhaps acknowledging moral uncertainty is not a vice.

[1] Others may define virtue as admirable or merely good traits of character. For additional definitions of virtue and understandings of virtue ethics, see Hursthouse and Pettigrove’s “Virtue Ethics.”

[2] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , Book One, Chapter 9, Lines 1099b25-29. For this interpretation, see Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, p. 6.

[3] Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics , pp. 165-169, “Virtue Theory and Abortion”, p. 226, Foot, Natural Goodness , pp. 99-116.

There are many other accounts of virtue worth considering. One major alternative is sentimentalist accounts, such as that of Hume and Zagbzebski, who define virtues as those character traits that attract love or admiration. Some scholars argue that Confucian ethics is a virtue ethic, though this is debated: see Wong, “Chinese Ethics.” Also see John Ramsey’s Mengzi’s Moral Psychology, Part 1: The Four Moral Sprouts . For an African understanding of virtue, see Thaddeus Metz’s The African Ethic of Ubuntu .

[4] Hursthouse has a detailed and accessible discussion of the merits of different translations of eudaimonia in On Virtue Ethics, pp. 9-10.

[5] Some people find this account of virtue surprising because they think virtue must involve sacrificing one’s own happiness for the sake of other people, and living like a saint, a monk, or just being a really boring and miserable person. In this case it may be more helpful to think in terms of ‘good character’ than ‘virtue’. David Hume amusingly argued that some alleged virtues, such as humility, celibacy, silence, and solitude, were vices. See his Enquiry 9.1.

[6] The idea that injustice erodes everybody’s happiness is not to deny that it especially harms people who are treated unjustly. However, eudaimonists consider being unjust, or deceiving others to be bad for us.

[7] For a compelling discussion of this objection to eudaimonism, see Blackburn, Being Good, pp. 112-118 . Eudaimonists have been trying to answer this objection for a long time. Indeed, arguing that it is more beneficial to be just than unjust is one of the major themes of Plato’s Republic. For more recent attempts to make the case, see Hursthouse’s On Virtue Ethics, Chapter 8, or Foot, Natural Goodness, especially Chapter 7. See also Kiki Berk’s Happiness .

[8] The idea that the virtues involve finding a balance is called ‘the doctrine of the mean.’ See Nicomachean Ethics, Book II, Chapter 6, lines 1106b30-1107a5. For one contemporary account of the emotional aspects of virtue, see Hursthouse’s On Virtue Ethics, pp.108-121.

[9] Aristotle discusses practical intelligence in Nicomachean Ethics Book 6. For a contemporary account see Hursthouse’s On Virtue Ethics, pp. 59-62.

[10] Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 28-29. This is sometimes called a qualified-agent account. For some alternatives, see van Zyl’s “Virtue Ethics and Right Action”.

[11] Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 28-29.

[12] For other moral theories, see Deontology: Kantian Ethics by Andrew Chapman and Introduction to Consequentialism by Shane Gronholz. When reading, you might consider whether these theories would give you clearer guidance about your friend’s partner.

[13] See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, chapter 9, lines 1109a25-30. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics pp. 128-129.

[14] For two examples of how virtue ethics may be helpfully applied to tough moral decisions, see Hursthouse’s “Virtue Theory and Abortion”, and Foot’s “Euthanasia”.

[15] Hursthouse, “Virtue Ethics and Abortion”, especially p. 227, pp. 234-237. “Do what a virtuous person would do” is only supposed to tell us what we should do, not how we should think .

[16] This objection is discussed in Shafer-Landau’s The Fundamentals of Ethics, pp. 272-274.

[17] On this connection between facts about morality on facts about virtue and human happiness, see Hursthouse “Virtue Theory and Abortion”, pp. 236-238.

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics . C. 355-322 BCE. Trans. Roger Crisp. Cambridge UP. 2014.

Blackburn, S. Being Good. Oxford UP. 2001.

Boxill, B. “How Injustice Pays.” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 9(4): 359-371. 1980.

Foot, P. Natural Goodness. Oxford UP. 2001.

Foot, P. “Euthanasia”. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6(2): 85–112. 1977.

Foot, P. “Moral Beliefs.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 59: 83-104. 1958.

Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. 1777.      

Hursthouse, R. “Virtue Theory and Abortion.” Philosophy & Public Affairs . 20(3): 223-246. 1991.

Hursthouse, R. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford UP. 1999.

Hursthouse, Rosalind and Glen Pettigrove, “Virtue Ethics”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Zalta, E.N (ed.). 2018,

Nussbaum, M. The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge UP. 2nd Edition, 2001.

van Zyl, L. “Virtue Ethics and Right Action”. In Russell, D. C (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics. Cambridge UP. 2013.

Plato. Republic. C. 375 BCE. Trans. Paul Shorey. Harvard UP. 1969.

Shafer-Landau, R. The Fundamentals of Ethics . Fourth Edition. Oxford UP. 2017.

Wong, D. “Chinese Ethics”. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2021 Edition) . Zalta, E.N (ed). 2021.

Zagzebski, L.T. Exemplarist Moral Theory. Oxford UP. 2017.

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Why be Moral? Plato’s ‘Ring of Gyges’ Thought Experiment  by Spencer Case

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About the Author

David Merry’s research is mostly about ethics and dialectic in ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, although he also occasionally works on contemporary ethics and philosophy of medicine. He received a Ph.D. from the Humboldt University of Berlin, and an M.A in philosophy from the University of Auckland. He is co-editor of Essays on Argumentation in Antiquity . He offers interactive, discussion-based online philosophy classes and maintains a blog at Kayepos.com .

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PHIL103: Moral and Political Philosophy

Major Ethical Perspectives

Read this description of Utilitarianism in relation to other ethical theories. After reading, be sure you are able to define deontology, describe social contract theory, and discuss the role of virtue in ethical matters.

Aristotle and Virtue Theory

Virtue theory, or virtue ethics, has received increasing attention over the past twenty years, particularly in contrast to utilitarian and deontological approaches to ethics. Virtue theory emphasizes the value of virtuous qualities rather than formal rules or useful results. Aristotle is often recognized as the first philosopher to advocate the ethical value of certain qualities, or virtues, in a person's character. As LaRue Hosmer has noted, Aristotle saw the goal of human existence as the active, rational search for excellence, and excellence requires the personal virtues of honesty, truthfulness, courage, temperance, generosity, and high-mindedness. This pursuit is also termed "knowledge of the good" in Greek philosophy .

Aristotle believed that all activity was aimed at some goal or perceived good and that there must be some ranking that we do among those goals or goods. Happiness may be our ultimate goal, but what does that mean, exactly? Aristotle rejected wealth, pleasure, and fame and embraced reason as the distinguishing feature of humans, as opposed to other species. And since a human is a reasoning animal, happiness must be associated with reason. Thus happiness is living according to the active (rather than passive) use of reason. The use of reason leads to excellence, and so happiness can be defined as the active, rational pursuit of personal excellence, or virtue.

Aristotle named fourteen virtues: (1) courage, particularly in battle; (2) temperance, or moderation in eating and drinking; (3) liberality, or spending money well; (4) magnificence, or living well; (5) pride, or taking pleasure in accomplishments and stature; (6) high-mindedness, or concern with the noble rather than the petty; (7) unnamed virtue, which is halfway between ambition and total lack of effort; (8) gentleness, or concern for others; (9) truthfulness; (10) wit, or pleasure in group discussions; (11) friendliness, or pleasure in personal conduct; (12) modesty, or pleasure in personal conduct; (13) righteous indignation, or getting angry at the right things and in the right amounts; and (14) justice.

From a modern perspective, some of these virtues seem old-fashioned or even odd. Magnificence, for example, is not something we commonly speak of. Three issues emerge: (1) How do we know what a virtue is these days? (2) How useful is a list of agreed-upon virtues anyway? (3) What do virtues have to do with companies, particularly large ones where various groups and individuals may have little or no contact with other parts of the organization?

As to the third question, whether corporations can "have" virtues or values is a matter of lively debate. A corporation is obviously not the same as an individual. But there seems to be growing agreement that organizations do differ in their practices and that these practices are value driven. If all a company cares about is the bottom line, other values will diminish or disappear. Quite a few books have been written in the past twenty years that emphasize the need for businesses to define their values in order to be competitive in today's global economy.

As to the first two questions regarding virtues, a look at Michael Josephson's core values may prove helpful.

9.4 Virtue Ethics

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

• Identify the central principles of virtue ethics.
• Distinguish the major features of Confucianism.
• Evaluate Aristotle’s moral theory.

Virtue ethics takes a character-centered approach to morality. Whereas Mohists and utilitarians look to consequences to determine the rightness of an action and deontologists maintain that a right action is the one that conforms to moral rules and norms, virtue ethicists argue that right action flows from good character traits or dispositions. We become a good person, then, through the cultivation of character, self-reflection, and self-perfection.

There is often a connection between the virtuous life and the good life in virtue ethics because of its emphasis on character and self-cultivation. Through virtuous development, we realize and perfect ourselves, laying the foundation for a good life. In Justice as a Virtue , for example, Mark LeBar (2020) notes that “on the Greek eudaimonist views (including here Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicurus) our reasons for action arise from our interest in [ eudaimonia , or] a happy life.” The ancient Greeks thought the aim of life was eudaimonia . Though eudaimonia is often translated as “happiness,” it means something closer to “a flourishing life.” Confucianism , with its strong emphasis on repairing the fractured social world, connects the promotion of virtuous development and social order. Confucians believe virtuous action is informed by social roles and relationships, such that promoting virtuous development also promotes social order.

Confucianism

As discussed earlier, the Warring States period in ancient China (ca. 475–221 BCE) was a period marked by warfare, social unrest, and suffering. Warfare during this period was common because China was comprised of small states that were not politically unified. New philosophical approaches were developed to promote social harmony, peace, and a better life. This period in China’s history is also sometimes referred to as the era of the “Hundred Schools of Thought” because the development of new philosophical approaches led to cultural expansion and intellectual development. Mohism, Daoism, and Confucianism developed in ancient China during this period. Daoism and Confucianism would later spread to Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, where they would be adopted and changed in response to local social and cultural circumstances.

Confucius (551–479 BCE) rose from lowly positions to become a minister in the government of a province in eastern China. After a political conflict with the hereditary aristocracy, Confucius resigned his position and began traveling to other kingdoms and teaching. Confucius’s teachings centered on virtue, veering into practical subjects such as social obligations, ritual performance, and governance. During his lifetime, Confucius despaired that his advice to rulers fell on deaf ears: “How can I be like a bitter gourd that hangs from the end of a string and can not be eaten?” (Analects 17:7). He did not foresee that his work and ideas would influence society, politics, and culture in East Asia for over 2000 years.

Confucius is credited with authoring or editing the classical texts that became the curriculum of the imperial exams, which applicants had to pass to obtain positions in government. His words, sayings, and exchanges with rulers and his disciples were written down and recorded in the Lun Yu , or the Analects of Confucius , which has heavily influenced the moral and social practice in China and elsewhere.

Relational Aspect of Virtue

Like Mohism, Confucianism aimed to restore social order and harmony by establishing moral and social norms. Confucius believed the way to achieve this was through an ordered, hierarchical society in which people know their place in relationship to other people. Confucius said, “There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son” (Analects, 7:11). In Confucianism, relationships and social roles shape moral responsibilities and structure moral life.

A cornerstone of Confucian virtue is filial piety . Confucius felt that the role of the father was to care for and educate his son, but the duty of the son must be to respect his father by obediently abiding by his wishes. “While a man's father is alive, look at the bent of his will; when his father is dead, look at his conduct. If for three years he does not alter from the way of his father, he may be called filial” (Analects, 1:11). Indeed, when the Duke of Sheh informed Confucius that his subjects were so truthful that if their father stole a sheep, they would bear witness to it, Confucius replied, “Among us, in our part of the country, those who are upright are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this.” The devotion of the son to the father is more important than what Kant would call the universal moral law of truth telling.

There is therefore an important relational aspect of virtue that a moral person must understand. The virtuous person must not only be aware of and care for others but must understand the “human dance,” or the complex practices and relationships that we participate in and that define social life (Wong 2021). The more we begin to understand the “human dance,” the more we grasp how we relate to one another and how social roles and relationships must be accounted for to act virtuously.

Ritual and Ren

Important to both early and late Confucian ethics is the concept of li (ritual and practice). Li plays an important role in the transformation of character. These rituals are a guide or become a means by which we develop and start to understand our moral responsibilities. Sacrificial offerings to parents and other ancestors after their death, for example, cultivate filial piety. By carrying out rituals, we transform our character and become more sensitive to the complexities of human interaction and social life.

In later Confucian thought, the concept of li takes on a broader role and denotes the customs and practices that are a blueprint for many kinds of respectful behavior (Wong 2021). In this way, it relates to ren , a concept that refers to someone with complete virtue or specific virtues needed to achieve moral excellence. Confucians maintain that it is possible to perfect human nature through personal development and transformation. They believe society will improve if people abide by moral and social norms and focus on perfecting themselves. The aim is to live according to the dao . The word dao means “way” in the sense of a road or path of virtue.

Junzi and Self-Perfection

Confucius used the term junzi to refer to an exemplary figure who lives according to the dao . This figure is an ethical ideal that reminds us that self-perfection can be achieved through practice, self-transformation, and a deep understanding of social relationships and norms. A junzi knows what is right and chooses it, taking into account social roles and norms, while serving as a role model. Whenever we act, our actions are observed by others. If we act morally and strive to embody the ethical ideal, we can become an example for others to follow, someone they can look to and emulate.

The Ethical Ruler

Any person of any status can become a junzi . Yet, it was particularly important that rulers strive toward this ideal because their subjects would then follow this ideal. When the ruler Chi K’ang consulted with Confucius about what to do about the number of thieves in his domain, Confucius responded, “If you, sir, were not covetous, although you should reward them to do it, they would not steal” (Analects, 7:18).

Confucius thought social problems were rooted in the elite’s behavior and, in particular, in their pursuit of their own benefit to the detriment of the people. Hence, government officials must model personal integrity, understand the needs of the communities over which they exercised authority, and place the welfare of the people over and above their own (Koller 2007, 204).

In adherence to the ethical code, a ruler’s subjects must show obedience to honorable people and emulate those higher up in the social hierarchy. Chi K’ang, responding to Confucius’s suggestion regarding thievery, asked Confucius, “What do you say to killing the unprincipled for the good of the principled?” Confucius replied that there was no need to kill at all. “Let your evinced desires be for what is good, and the people will be good.” Confucius believed that the relationship between rulers and their subjects is and should be like that between the wind and the grass. “The grass must bend, when the wind blows across it” (Analects, 7:19).

Japanese Confucianism

Although Confucianism was initially developed in China, it spread to Japan in the mid-sixth century, via Korea, and developed its own unique attributes. Confucianism is one of the dominant philosophical teachings in Japan. As in China, Japanese Confucianism focuses on teaching individual perfection and moral development, fostering harmonious and healthy familial relations, and promoting a functioning and prosperous society. In Japan, Confucianism has been changed and transformed in response to local social and cultural factors. For example, Confucianism and Buddhism were introduced around the same time in Japan. It is therefore not uncommon to find variations of Japanese Confucianism that integrate ideas and beliefs from Buddhism. Some neo-Confucian philosophers like Zhu Xi, for example, developed “Confucian thinking after earlier study and practice of Chan Buddhism” (Tucker 2018).

Aristotelianism

Aristotle (384–322 BCE) was a preeminent ancient Greek philosopher. He studied with Plato (ca. 429–347 BCE) at the Academy , a fraternal organization where participants pursued knowledge and self-development. After Plato’s death, Aristotle traveled, tutored the boy who would later become Alexander the Great, and among other things, established his own place of learning, dedicated to the god Apollo (Shields 2020).

Aristotle spent his life in the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom. His extant works today represent only a portion of his total life’s work, much of which was lost to history. During his life, Aristotle was, for example, principal to the creation of logic, created the first system of classification for animals, and wrote on diverse topics of philosophical interest. Along with his teacher, Plato, Aristotle is considered one of the pillars of Western philosophy.

Human Flourishing as the Goal of Human Action

In the first line of Book I of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , he observes that “[every] art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1094a). If everything we do aims at some good, he argues, then there must be a final or highest good that is the end of all action (life’s telos ), which is eudaimonia , the flourishing life (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1097a34–b25). Everything else we pursue is pursued for the sake of this end.

Connections

See the chapter on epistemology for more on the topic of eudaimonia .

Nicomachean Ethics is a practical exploration of the flourishing life and how to live it. Aristotle, like other ancient Greek and Roman philosophers (e.g., Plato and the Stoics), asserts that virtuous development is central to human flourishing. Virtue (or aretê ) means “excellence. We determine something’s virtue, Aristotle argued, by identifying its peculiar function or purpose because “the good and the ‘well’ is thought to reside in the function” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1097b25–1098a15). We might reasonably say, for example, that a knife’s function is to cut. A sharp knife that cuts extremely well is an excellent (or virtuous) knife. The sharp knife realizes its function and embodies excellence (or it is an excellent representation of knife-ness).

Aristotle assumed our rational capacity makes us distinct from other (living) things. He identifies rationality as the unique function of human beings and says that human virtue, or excellence, is therefore realized through the development or perfection of reason. For Aristotle, virtuous development is the transformation and perfection of character in accordance with reason. While most thinkers (like Aristotle and Kant) assign similar significance to reason, it is interesting to note how they arrive at such different theories.

Deliberation, Practical Wisdom, and Character

To exercise or possess virtue is to demonstrate excellent character. For ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, the pursuit of intentional, directed self-development to cultivate virtues is the pursuit of excellence. Someone with a virtuous character is consistent, firm, self-controlled, and well-off. Aristotle characterized the virtuous character state as the mean between two vice states, deficiency and excess. He thought each person naturally tends toward one of the extreme (or vice) states. We cultivate virtue when we bring our character into alignment with the “mean or intermediate state with regard to” feelings and actions, and in doing so we become “well off in relation to our feelings and actions” (Homiak 2019).

Being virtuous requires more than simply developing a habit or character trait. An individual must voluntarily choose the right action, the virtuous state; know why they chose it; and do so from a consistent, firm character. To voluntarily choose virtue requires reflection, self-awareness, and deliberation. Virtuous actions, Aristotle claims, should “accord with the correct reason” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1103b30). The virtuous person chooses what is right after deliberation that is informed by practical wisdom and experience. Through a deliberative process we identify the choice that is consistent with the mean state.

The Role of Habit

Aristotle proposed that humans “are made perfect by habit” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1103a10–33). Habit therefore plays an important role in our virtuous development. When we practice doing what’s right, we get better at choosing the right action in different circumstances. Through habituation we gain practice and familiarity, we bring about dispositions or tendencies, and we gain the requisite practical experience to identify the reasons why a certain action should be chosen in diverse situations. Habit, in short, allows us to gain important practical experience and a certain familiarity with choosing and doing the right thing. The more we reinforce doing the right thing, the more we grow accustomed to recognizing what’s right in different circumstances. Through habit we become more aware of which action is supported by reason and why, and get better at choosing it.

Habit and repetition develop dispositions. In Nicomachean Ethics , for example, Aristotle reminds us of the importance of upbringing. A good upbringing will promote the formation of positive dispositions, making one’s tendencies closer to the mean state. A bad upbringing, in contrast, will promote the formation of negative dispositions, making one’s tendencies farther from the mean state (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1095b5).

Read Like a Philosopher

Artistotle on virtue.

Read this passage from from Book II of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics , considering what Aristotle means when he states that moral virtues come about as a result of habit. How should individuals make use of the two types of virtue to become virtuous?

Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethike) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance, the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit. Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyreplayers by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts. This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one. Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyreplayers are produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the differences between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference.

Social Relationships and Friendship

Aristotle was careful to note in Nicomachean Ethics that virtuous development alone does not make a flourishing life, though it is central to it. In addition to virtuous development, Aristotle thought things like success, friendships, and other external goods contributed to eudaimonia .

In Nicomachean Ethics , Aristotle points out that humans are social (or political) beings (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1097b10). It’s not surprising, then, that, like Confucius, Aristotle thinks social relations are important for our rational and virtuous development.

When we interact with others who have common goals and interests, we are more likely to progress and realize our rational powers. Social relations afford us opportunities to learn, practice, and engage in rational pursuits with other people. The ancient Greek schools (e.g., Plato’s Academy, Aristotle’s Lyceum , and Epicurus’s Gardens) exemplify the ways individuals benefit from social relations. These ancient schools offered a meeting place where those interested in knowledge and the pursuit of wisdom could participate in these activities together.

Through social relations, we also develop an important sense of community and take an interest in the flourishing of others. We see ourselves as connected to others, and through our interactions we develop social virtues like generosity and friendliness (Homiak 2019). Moreover, as we develop social virtues and gain a deeper understanding of the reasons why what is right, is right, we realize that an individual’s ability to flourish and thrive is improved when the community flourishes. Social relations and political friendships are useful for increasing the amount of good we can do for the community (Kraut 2018).

The important role Aristotle assigns to friendship in a flourishing life is evidenced by the fact that he devotes two out of the ten books of Nicomachean Ethics (Books VIII and IX) to a discussion of it. He notes that it would be odd, “when one assigns all good things to the happy man, not to assign friends, who are thought the greatest of external goods” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1169a35–b20). Aristotle distinguishes between incidental friendships and perfect friendships . Incidental friendships are based on and defined by either utility or pleasure. Such friendships are casual relationships where each person participates only because they get something (utility or pleasure) from it. These friendships neither contribute to our happiness nor do they foster virtuous development.

Unlike incidental friendships, perfect friendships are relationships that foster and strengthen our virtuous development. The love that binds a perfect friendship is based on the good or on the goodness of the characters of the individuals involved. Aristotle believed that perfect friends wish each other well simply because they love each other and want each other to do well, not because they expect something (utility or pleasure) from the other. He points out that “those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1156a27–b17). Aristotle argues that the happy man needs (true) friends because such friendships make it possible for them to “contemplate worthy [or virtuous] actions and actions that are [their] own” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1169b20–1170a6). This affords the good individual the opportunity to contemplate worthy actions that are not their own (i.e., they are their friend’s) while still thinking of these actions as in some sense being their own because their friend is another self. On Aristotle’s account, we see a true friend as another self because we are truly invested in our friend’s life and “we ought to wish what is good for his sake” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1155b17–1156a5).

Perfect friendships afford us opportunities to grow and develop, to better ourselves—something we do not get from other relationships. Aristotle therefore argues that a “certain training in virtue arises also from the company of the good” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1170a6–30). Our perfect friend provides perspective that helps us in our development and contributes to our happiness because we get to participate in and experience our friend’s happiness as our own. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that Aristotle considered true friends “the greatest of external goods” (Aristotle [350 BCE] 1998, 1169a35–b20).

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Virtue ethics is a philosophical theory that examines what it means to live a good life. It is an ancient tradition of philosophical thought that has been developed and refined over centuries by the likes of Plato, Aristotle, and Confucius. The theory is based on the idea that being virtuous is the key to living an ethical life. This article will explore the history and development of virtue ethics, as well as its modern relevance and implications. At its core, virtue ethics is based on the idea that moral behavior must be based on an understanding of one’s own character, as well as an understanding of external values.

It focuses on cultivating virtuous behavior through developing one’s character. The emphasis of the theory is on developing good habits and traits to be virtuous, rather than following rules or laws. It also emphasizes the need for individuals to have good judgment in order to act ethically. This article will provide an in-depth exploration of virtue ethics, beginning with its historical roots and then moving on to discuss its modern applications and implications.

We will look at how it has evolved over time, as well as what it can teach us about morality and ethical behavior in our own lives. The main principles of virtue ethics are that a person should be honest, kind, and generous, rather than pursuing their own selfish interests. Virtue ethics is based on the idea that being a good person leads to happiness and a meaningful life. Aristotle was one of the first philosophers to develop the concept of virtue ethics. He argued that humans should strive for excellence by developing virtues such as courage, temperance, justice, and wisdom.

In the modern day, virtue ethics has been adapted to include a wider range of virtues, such as humility, integrity, resilience, and respect. These virtues are seen as important for developing strong character traits and behaving ethically. Virtue ethics can be applied in a variety of contexts. It can be used to guide decision making in business settings, to foster positive relationships in personal settings, and to inform ethical decisions in public life. For example, if faced with a difficult decision in business, a person might ask themselves: “What would a virtuous person do in this situation?” Virtue ethics can also be used to create positive habits and behaviors.

Applying Virtue Ethics

Are we being courageous? Are we acting with integrity? Are we demonstrating compassion? These are important questions to consider when making moral decisions. In relationships, virtue ethics emphasizes the importance of cultivating a strong moral character. We should strive to be generous, honest, and loyal. This can help us build strong and meaningful relationships with those around us.

The History of Virtue Ethics

This approach placed an emphasis on character development and virtuous behavior. Since then, virtue ethics has been discussed, debated, and adapted over the centuries. During the Renaissance, Nicolo Machiavelli's works popularized the idea of using vice to achieve a greater good. In the 19th century, Immanuel Kant's deontological ethics emphasized the importance of moral duties, while John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism focused on creating the greatest good for the greatest number of people. In modern times, virtue ethics is still widely discussed. Contemporary philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre argue that it provides a more holistic approach to ethics than other theories.

The Benefits of Virtue Ethics

The idea behind virtue ethics is that by understanding and developing the virtues of courage, wisdom, temperance, justice, faithfulness, and kindness, we can develop better habits and behaviors. This helps to build our character and encourages us to make thoughtful decisions that align with our values. With these virtues in mind, we can become more aware of our actions and how they affect others. We can learn to be more compassionate and understanding of others, which can lead to meaningful relationships and a more fulfilling life.

By practicing virtue ethics, we can also become more self-aware and conscientious of our actions. We can learn to be mindful of how our words and actions may affect those around us, and strive to make decisions based on what is right and just. We can also strive to be honest with ourselves and those around us, which can lead to greater trust and respect. Ultimately, practicing virtue ethics can help us create a better version of ourselves by developing better habits and behaviors. Virtue ethics is an important philosophical theory that has been around for centuries, and it can provide us with invaluable guidance as we strive to make ethical decisions and cultivate strong character traits.

By understanding the history and principles of virtue ethics, we can apply its wisdom in our daily lives and strive for excellence and a meaningful life. The benefits of virtue ethics are numerous, from providing us with a framework for making ethical decisions to helping us become better people. It can be applied in many situations in our lives, from making decisions at work to developing relationships with friends and family. By taking the time to understand and apply virtue ethics, we can strive to lead a more meaningful life.

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Introduction: Virtues and Arguments

• Published: 03 February 2016
• Volume 35 , pages 339–343, ( 2016 )

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• Andrew Aberdein 1 &
• Daniel H. Cohen 2  

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It has been a decade since the phrase virtue argumentation was introduced, Footnote 1 and while it would be an exaggeration to say that it burst onto the scene, it would be just as much of an understatement to say that it has gone unnoticed. Trying to strike the virtuous mean between the extremes of hyperbole and litotes, then, we can fairly characterize it as a way of thinking about arguments and argumentation that has steadily attracted more and more attention from argumentation theorists. The online bibliography (Aberdein 2015 ) gives evidence that the gathering momentum of papers, workshops, themed conferences, and, self-referentially, special issues of journals has long since passed the critical mass needed to sustain a vital programme. We hope it is neither too late for an introduction to the field nor too soon for some retrospective assessment of where things stand.

Virtue argumentation theory, VAT, emerged from the confluence of several developments in philosophy and brings a myriad of interdisciplinary perspectives on argumentation to bear. Its most immediate and salient predecessor is virtue epistemology with its emphasis on how the role of intellectual character in the production of beliefs is relevant for the justification of beliefs. In order to take the same “Aretaic Turn” in argumentation theory, the insight that an agent-based approach provides had to be transplanted into the soil of argumentation theory (Cohen 2007 ; Aberdein 2010 ). The result has been far more fruitful than was foreseen. The seed took root because the conceptual environment of argumentation theory proved especially hospitable. Argumentation theory is actually more congenial to a virtues approach than epistemology in significant ways. For starters, arguments’ status as dynamic events contrasts with the comparatively static state of beliefs, so reference to character traits as dispositions is meet. In addition, the shadow of voluntarism, the dubious idea that we choose our beliefs, is much less of a problem when dealing with arguments because of the manifest agency of arguers. And since arguing typically includes multiple agents, the Aristotelian model of the virtues for ethics has a natural application to argumentation. Arguments are dynamic, multi-agent events; beliefs are not.

Virtue theories of argumentation have more distant precursors in argumentation theory itself. Indeed, Aristotle’s focus on virtue permeated much of his work; in his work on argumentation it may be most conspicuous in the Rhetoric (Aristotle 1991 ). Modern writers on rhetoric have also paid attention to virtue. While some of this work is grounded in the exegesis of Aristotle (Johnstone 1980 ; Rowland and Womack 1985 ) or other ancient traditions (Ding 2007 ; Cohen 2013a ), many studies are contemporary in focus (Herrick 1992 ; Katz 1992 ). More indirectly, some of the pioneers of the study of argument in communication theory were well aware of the importance of agents to the normative evaluation of arguments (Ehninger 1968 ; Brockriede 1972 ). Virtue argumentation has a more direct relationship to critical thinking, which has long recognized the centrality of dispositions; since virtues are a type of disposition, this is clearly at least a parallel development to virtue argumentation, as the similarities between lists of argumentational virtues and critical thinking virtues attests (Ennis 1996 ; Siegel 1999 ; Facione 2000 ; Nieto and Valenzuela 2012 ). More explicit treatments of the connection between critical thinking and virtue epistemology also antedate the inception of VAT (Paul 2000 ; Bailin 2003 ; Hyslop-Margison 2003 ). Critical thinking also addresses an important question for any virtue theory: the nature of the difference between a virtue and a skill—indeed, whether there is a distinction, or whether skills are not themselves virtues (Missimer 1990 ; Siegel 1993 ; Hample 2003 ). There are several other fields closely related to, or intersecting with, argumentation theory in which virtue-based accounts have been defended. Thus several authors have analysed the virtues of deliberation (Tiberius 2002 ; Weiss and Shanteau 2003 ; Aikin and Clanton 2010 ); of debate (Strait and Wallace 2008 ); of semantics (Tsai 2008 ); and, within the broader context of virtue jurisprudence, of advocates or of judges (Duff 2003 ; Solum 2003 ; Cassidy 2006 ). More broadly, the avoidance of bias and the mitigation of existing biases, or ‘debiasing’, are significant goals for any practical account of reasoning. This reflects a wider interest in recognizing and responding to argumentative injustice, or the role of epistemic privilege within argument (Bondy 2010 ; Kotzee 2010 ; Linker 2011 , 2014 ; Yap 2013 , 2015 ). A virtue approach has been applied to these questions too (Correia 2012 ).

A distinctive feature of the aretaic turn in the study of argumentation is its focus on agents: arguers, rather than (just) arguments. This was a perspective on the field that had been widely, but not entirely ignored (Brockriede 1972 ; Hample 2007 ). It also explains the close focus on the ad hominem fallacy, which is conspicuous in many accounts of the relation of the virtues to argumentation theory, as discussed further below (Johnson 2009 ; Battaly 2010 ; Jason 2011 ; Bowell and Kingsbury 2013 ; Aberdein 2014 ; Bondy 2015 ; Leibowitz 2016 ). More recently, it has been suggested that an undue focus on ad hominem may distract from virtue argumentation theory’s strengths—and from some of its other problems (Paglieri 2015 ). The latter include the ‘incompleteness problem’, of explaining why virtues are worthwhile (MacPherson 2014 ); the question of whether there are virtues specific to argumentation (Goddu 2015 ); and the issue of how (or whether) the conflict of virtues may be resolved. One solution to the last issue is to subordinate all other virtues to one central virtue, for example willingness to inquire (Hamby 2015 ; see also Watson 2015 ). Determining which virtues are salient and how they are related are important issues for any virtue theory, hence virtue argumentation theory can benefit from earlier studies of the structure of the intellectual virtues (McCloskey 1998 ; Morin 2014 ; Bowell and Kingsbury 2015 ). In particular, most virtue argumentation theorists recognize open-mindedness as an important virtue (Cohen 2009 ), thereby building on a substantial body of recent work in virtue epistemology (Riggs 2010 ; Baehr 2011 ; Tiberius 2012 ) and the philosophy of education (Hare 1985 , 2003 , 2009 ; Hare and McLaughlin 1998 ; Higgins 2009 ; Siegel 2009 ). Lastly, the virtue argumentation programme is now sufficiently mature to have produced overviews, whether positive (Cohen 2013b ; Aberdein 2014 ), negative (Bowell and Kingsbury 2013 ; Bondy 2015 ), or studiously even-handed (Paglieri 2015 ).

The papers in this volume are organized along three research branches sharing a root in virtue theory:

The idea of an argumentative virtue provides impetus for research programmes on such questions as what a virtue is, what the virtues are, and how they relate to one another as well as to moral, intellectual, and other families of virtues.

How are argumentative virtues, as standing dispositional character traits of arguers, related to the sequences of propositions of speech acts that constitute individual arguments? Why and how are properties of arguers relevant to the project of evaluating their arguments?

More generally, how is the theory of argumentation informed by practice? What does that tell us about how what we learn about arguments can be used to form or reform how we argue? The practice and pedagogy of logic and critical thinking are intertwined with its theory in ways that distinguish it from other academic endeavours. The Aretaic Turn has opened whole new vistas.

These three branches have flourished in large measure because they share the common root in virtue theory.

While we have organized the papers in this volume along these three branches, they also provide glimpses into the relevance of VAT for a much broader range of issues in argumentation theory. They run the gamut from highly abstract theoretical considerations to nuts-and-bolts practical applications. Along the way, these papers demonstrate, in both theory and practice, that theory and practice are intimately intertwined. We begin with the third branch where this is most acutely evident. David Godden gets us started by raising two serious problems about, appropriately enough, getting started. Getting started, he concludes, is something that a “pure” virtue theory cannot do! Virtue theories, he argues, cannot satisfactorily sort out questions of conceptual priority and cannot deliver on the promise of using virtues to build a sufficient basis for defining the full array of evaluative concepts that argumentation theory needs. In sum, his archeological search for the conceptual foundations of virtues-based approaches to argumentation concludes that it is a castle built on shifting sands.

Ultimately, the problem may be with the insistent demand for an account of the theory’s foundations, rather than, say, for an account of its coherence or practicality. Even if our concepts of argumentative virtues and virtuous arguers must cede some kind of priority to the concepts of good argument and rationality, that priority arguably cannot entail either a one-way dependence or complete independence. None of the relevant concepts can be treated in isolation. They have to be understood, Juli Thorson argues, as “thick” concepts whose descriptive and normative components are inextricably intertwined. The pursuit of a virtuous character is not irrelevant to the project of trying to act virtuously. In order to become a more virtuous arguer, in the sense of someone who argues virtuously, one needs insights into what it is to be a virtuous arguer. Theory is no more separable from practice than practical wisdom is from knowledge-that.

In the section’s closing contribution, Sharon Bailin and Mark Battersby pose a pedagogically informed challenge to virtue argumentation theory. Considerations from both the theory and practice of teaching critical thinking lead them to suggest that virtue argumentation might be aiming at the wrong target. Argumentation needs to be understood in the context of the larger project of inquiry. Thus, students are better served by acquiring general “virtues of inquiry” which requires active participation in the practice. The ideal classroom for fostering the virtues, then, needs to be a “community of inquiry.” It is only by modelling inquiry in the classroom, rather than trying to teach discrete skills that the “transfer problem” can be overcome because theory is no more separable from practice than learning is from doing.

According to the Corpus Areopagiticum, that remarkable collection of writings attributed to a 5th–6th century mystic theologian now known as the Pseudo-Dionysius, Virtues are to be found at the exact centre of the Celestial Hierarchy. Footnote 2 On Earth as it is in Heaven, so we have given over the centre section of this issue to the chorus of virtues themselves, as species within the genus Virtue.

But what insures that when the virtues are brought together, the chorus does not create cacophony? How is it that arguers can be genuinely open to opposing viewpoints while both aggressively criticizing those views and tenaciously defending their own views? Katharina Stevens argues that the apparent conflicts between argumentative virtues can be explained by reference to the different roles that arguers have in arguments. Stevens’ explanation emphasizes the dynamic dimension to argumentation, the plurality of roles that arguers have to fill, the different virtues and skill sets appropriate for those different roles, and the need for arguers to move into different roles in different stages of an argument—all brought together under the single overarching telos of argumentation: bettering our belief systems.

Can argumentative virtues also be brought into harmony with other virtues? Beginning with Aristotle’s distinction between moral and intellectual virtues, Iovan Drehe explores how these sets of virtues intersect, diverge, and complement one another. Argumentative virtues are more like intellectual virtues in their instrumental value but more like moral virtues in their normative efficacy. He reaches the further, intriguing conclusion that the specific concept of incontinence, which plays an especially important role in Aristotle’s moral psychology, can be fruitfully adapted for use by VAT, and that “argumentational incontinence” is the key notion for understanding a range of fallacies.

The final two articles in this section address the centrality of specific virtues in relation to the others. Ian Kidd focuses on the value of intellectual humility in the narrow context of argumentation, as well as in the broader context of all of our intellectual projects, and even in the all-encompassing context of our lives as moral agents. The contexts, Kidd argues, are not independent: notably, the humility that enables an arguer to participate well in and benefit from philosophical argumentation can (but, alas, does not always) make us better as moral agents, too. Humility, then, is a sine qua non for certain kinds of argumentative success; but confidence is a sine qua non for others.

No discussion of argumentative virtues would be complete without a discussion of open-mindedness. There is, as noted above, a healthy body of literature on the topic. Inevitably, there is also a lot of confusion. Jack Kwong’s aim is to sort things out regarding this essential virtue. In particular Kwong takes Cohen ( 2009 ), Hare ( 1985 ), Riggs ( 2010 ), and other authors to task for being insufficiently sensitive to the different ways that open-mindedness plays out as a virtue in arguments and as a virtue in the pursuit of knowledge. There is a single virtue at work, so any conflict has to result from vagueness, inconsistency, or ambiguity in the operative understanding of what it is to have an open mind. The solution: focus more selectively on the aspect of open-mindedness that impacts how we initially receive ideas in order to explain the subsequent unfolding of its various manifestations.

The final grouping of articles enters the labyrinth of argument evaluation. The opportunities for VAT to contribute to the field are almost limitless, as is the potential for those contributions to be game-changing in their significance. The first foray into fallacy theory from the perspective of virtue argumentation theory comes from Andrew Aberdein. His painstaking attention to specifics might mask the ambition behind his project: he begins with a blueprint for a programmatic account of arguments’ failings in terms of vices; he follows that up by laying down a foundation for building such a theoretical edifice; and then he puts the first beams into place by putting it all to the test in a case study of ad misericordiam argumentation. This paper opens the door to an entire research programme.

But why are some arguments fallacious? That is the question Andrew Ball asks. It requires a nuanced answer because not all errors in argumentation are intentional, as Aberdein had noted with reference to the classic distinction between sophisms and paralogisms. Vices are commonly understood as something more than the absence of a virtue; and virtues can be attributed to arguers, their arguments, or to the acts of arguing. Ball effectively stresses the motivational component in virtues (and vices), bringing out resonances between VAT accounts and, say, Zagzebski’s ( 1996 ) understanding of virtues in virtue epistemology. The research programme on virtues and fallacies is already under way!

Scott Aikin and John Casey showcase the value of thinking in terms of virtues to unravel some conceptual knots in our thinking about straw man fallacies. Aikin and Casey deftly distinguish several kinds of straw man arguments, noting that as is the case with other arguments traditionally classified as fallacies, there are both fallacious and cogent instances of each. Moreover, the same possibilities for fallacious and non-fallacious instances appear in what they call “iron man” arguments: distortions of an opponent’s position to strengthen it. However, unlike many other fallacies, neither the straw man nor the iron man fits comfortably into standard argument schemes. Bringing in arguers’ virtues allows them to identify and explain what goes wrong in the fallacious instances within a common schema.

As remarked above, a charge that has been levelled against VAT, e.g., by Adler ( 2007 ) and more recently by Bowell and Kingsbury ( 2013 ), is that by focusing on arguers rather than on the content of their arguments, virtue theorists are themselves guilty of ad hominem argumentation, rendering the entire exploration of arguers’ virtues irrelevant. While other authors have provided VAT with a vigorous defence by parsing the kinds, contexts, and scopes for legitimate ad hominem reasoning (Aberdein 2014 ), José Ángel Gascón responds by accepting the premise but denying the conclusion: even apart from any role in argument appraisal, VAT’s role in argumentation theory is secured by what it contributes to appraising arguers and arguing. Understanding what it is to be a good arguer arguing well cannot but help us become worthy of that description.

The final essay starts down the main road of fallacy theory by asking what can go wrong in arguments. But Daniel Cohen and George Miller make two idiosyncratic turns. First, making the aretaic turn, they conclude that sometimes it is the arguer’s fault when an argument goes bad—but sometimes it is the arguers’ fault. (Read that carefully!) Because argumentation is a cooperative endeavour that includes contributions (and harms) from multiple parties, its value is not always simply the sum of its parts. The second turn is to flip the initial question around, asking now what can go right in arguments. The target is identifying the arguers’ virtues, both individually and collectively, that enable arguments to be more than the sum of their parts. They nominate “compathy” as the special kind of harmony in argumentation that makes it possible.

Tradition bids us ask: Where do we go from here? The authors have certainly done sterling work in providing directions for future scholarship, questions to answer, and, of course, provocative theses with which to argue. But we can also ask a different question: What can go right in virtue argumentation theory? On the basis of the papers here, we are confident that all the requisite virtues are in place for some very productive arguments.

Aberdein replying to (Cohen 2005 ) at OSSA, and then in print as (Aberdein 2007 , 2010 ).

According to the Pseudo-Dionysius, whom we take to be an Authoritative Source on the subject, the Celestial Hierarchy is constituted by this Trinity of Trinities: \(\{\langle\) Seraphim, Cherubim, Thrones \(\rangle , \langle\) Dominations, Virtues, Powers \(\rangle , \langle\) Principalities, Archangels, Angels \(\rangle \}\) .

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Acknowledgments

This issue would have been impossible without the assistance of the many scholars who agreed to act as anonymous referees. We are indebted to them for their help. We should also like to thank the general editor of Topoi , Fabio Paglieri, for his support and encouragement and for the invitation to edit this issue.

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Virtue's Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons

Noell Birondo and S. Stewart Braun (eds.), Virtue's Reasons: New Essays on Virtue, Character, and Reasons , Routledge, 2017, 210pp., $150.00 (hbk), ISBN 9781138231733.

Reviewed by Jason Kawall, Colgate University

According to the editors, Noell Birondo and S. Stewart Braun,

The main aims of this book are . . . to foster a greater appreciation for the multiplicity of reasons surrounding the concept of the virtues and to shed light on what is presumably the paradigm case, of an individual agent responding to an array of potential reasons, often in diverse circumstances and contexts. (2-3)

While the virtues are often treated as allowing agents to recognize and respond appropriately to reasons, Birondo and Braun note that there are broader connections and questions concerning the relationship between reasons and the virtues that warrant examination: for example, are there distinctive kinds of reasons to become a certain kind of person, rather than simply reasons to act or respond in certain ways? Upon what reasons can agents act appropriately while developing the virtues, and can we simply will to act upon some reasons and not others?

The current volume consists of ten chapters intended to explore the relationship(s) between virtues and reasons, divided into three parts, with a short introductory essay by Birondo and Braun. As they note in their introduction, the volume is very wide-ranging, and

By addressing a diverse set of questions on the connections between virtues and reasons, the papers here do not offer a sustained treatment of one or two core issues; instead, the papers that we have collected here form, together, a kind of kaleidoscope of issues surrounding the notion of virtue's reasons. (2)

While each of the chapters mentions reasons, and some include extended discussion of such (in varying contexts), it is virtue theory and character that truly serve to unify the volume. With respect to reasons, there is significant discussion of work by John McDowell and Robert Audi, but little overall engagement with the broader, extensive recent literature on the topic. That said, however, the chapters in this volume tend to be of a very high quality -- and some are truly excellent, with the potential to shape future discussion in the area. Given that the chapters in this volume are so diverse, with widely varying topics and approaches, I will focus on providing overviews of each, rather than attempting to provide a unified, thematic discussion.

Part I, "Reasons, Character, and Agency", consists of four papers. While there are few connections linking them, each chapter is strong and raises interesting issues in its own right. Garrett Cullity's "Moral Virtues and Responsiveness for Reasons" is extremely dense and detailed; to be honest, I've read this chapter several times and remain uncertain whether I entirely grasp all of it. In the first part of the chapter Cullity provides criteria for the application of various aretaic terms to traits and dispositions, but also to actions and other entities. These criteria vary quite significantly -- for example, whether an action is honest depends solely on the aim of the action, whereas whether an action is kind depends on its aim, but also its motive, and the manner in which it is performed. In the later parts of his paper Cullity develops a unique taxonomy of the virtues. Moral virtues are characterized by responding appropriately to morally relevant reasons, and for each response there is the reason for the response, the object of the response, and the response itself. Cullity proposes a corresponding threefold set of categories of virtue: those characterized by good responsiveness to particular reasons , those involving responding well to particular objects , and those that involve responding well to a variety of different objects or reasons; Cullity distinguishes further subcategories of each. This is the barest sketch of Cullity's chapter, and omits a great deal -- the chapter rewards multiple readings. Still, I worry that the tremendous detail, including many qualifications and exceptions to his various proposals might limit the use of Cullity's taxonomy by others.

Justin Oakley's "Remote Scenarios and Warranted Virtue Attributions" is a thoughtful, lucid paper addressing the following issue: how does the behaviour (actual or counterfactual) of agents in unlikely or remote scenarios affect our epistemic justification for attributing virtues or vices to them? For example, how would an agent's counterfactual behaviour when caught on-board a ship during a severe storm affect our justification in attributing courage to her? A highly demanding answer would hold that all such remote circumstances are relevant -- if a person would act poorly under extreme conditions, then we should not attribute courage (or other relevant virtues) to her. Robert Adams defends what Oakley refers to as a 'probabilistic' approach, where the relevance of behaviour in remote situations is a function of how likely an agent is to find herself in such circumstances. Similarly, in a given remote situation, the more likely an agent is to act well compared to a second agent, the more justified we are in attributing the relevant virtue to her. Oakley argues, plausibly, that we need to further qualify the probabilistic approach in at least two ways. First, the reason(s) why an agent is likely to act in a certain way (in a given scenario) are relevant -- is it the result of training and reflection, or mere luck? Second, we need to consider whether the agent (in actual circumstances) would approve of her actions and the reasons for them in remote scenarios. A committed utilitarian might, under extreme circumstances, leave his spouse to assist an aid group instead. While such circumstances might be unlikely, if the utilitarian would now approve of his reasons and actions under the extreme conditions, this would be relevant to our attributions of such virtues as loyalty.

In "Vice, Reasons, and Wrongdoing", Damian Cox defends a form of 'vice ethics'. Where virtue ethics defines right action in terms of virtues, vice ethics defines wrongness -- and rightness -- in terms of vices. Cox argues that reasons to avoid vicious action are typically pro tanto while reasons to perform virtuous actions are typically only prima facie . He further suggests that we can treat actions as supererogatory (most virtuous actions), merely permissible (actions that are neither virtuous nor vicious), or wrong (most vicious actions). And more precisely, with respect to right action, Cox suggests

(R) An action is right iff it is the least vicious of available actions.

(W) An action is wrong iff it is not the least vicious of available actions. (55)

Often there will be multiple actions available to an agent that are equally free of vice; all would be right. Cox develops the proposal effectively, and it certainly warrants discussion in the literature. Still, some questions arise. Consider two agents in similar circumstances making charitable donations. One merely gives five dollars without any vicious motives, while the other gives several thousand dollars, almost entirely out of generosity, but also with the hint of a vain desire to impress some friends; the generosity would have been sufficient to motivate the action. On Cox's proposal, the agent merely giving five dollars acts rightly, while the far more generous donation is wrong because of the incidental vicious motive; it would not be among the least vicious actions available. As such, trace amounts of vice could implausibly render otherwise excellent actions wrong.

"Can Virtue Be Codified? An Inquiry on the Basis of Four Conceptions of Virtue" by Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu is the final paper of part I. Tsu argues against McDowell's well-known "uncodifiability thesis", according to which the requirements and reasons of the virtues cannot be codified into rules. After drawing attention to the complexity and ambiguity of the uncodifiability thesis (e.g. what counts as a rule?), Tsu presents four conceptions of the relationship between virtues and rules. On the particularist conception, there are not even broad generalizations that hold between virtues and rules; on the prima facie conception, any rules would only roughly capture the basic content of virtues, and would have many exceptions. According to the pro tanto conception, pro tanto rules determine what a virtuous agent should do, while "in cases of moral conflicts . . . it takes practical wisdom or judgment to determine which rule 'outweighs' which" (80). Finally, according to the absolute conception, virtuous agents act in accordance with a (or a set of) absolute, exceptionless moral principle(s); this need not involve mechanical rule-following -- we can demonstrate judgment in applying the principle(s). Tsu argues that McDowell focuses on the first two conceptions, but that the absolute and pro tanto conceptions would allow for the codifiability of the reasons of virtue, and are in fact more attractive than the rival conceptions. This is another strong chapter -- though many of the objections raised by Tsu to particularist and prima facia conceptions rely on particular features of McDowell's view that need not be embraced by all those endorsing the uncodifiability thesis.

Part II, "Reasons and Virtues in Development", is the most unified section of the volume, consisting of three chapters addressing how non-virtuous agents can develop the virtues. Ramon Das considers how such agents can act rightly despite lacking the virtues. Emer O'Hagan addresses how agents might effectively and appropriately aim at developing their own virtues. And Audi addresses the nature and place of role-modeling in the development of the virtues.

In "Virtue, Reason, and Will" Das argues that two tempting positions for virtue ethicists -- holding that right action either requires acting from good motives or reasons, or (more strongly) requires acting from firm, stable virtues -- are implausibly demanding. After all, both would seem beyond the ability of anyone who is not already virtuous -- we can't simply will ourselves to have good motives. Das suggests that we need to more carefully distinguish good motives and good reasons. Broadly, Das sees motives as (paradigmatically) desires that are involuntary, while normative reasons are cognitive and capable of producing motives. Das argues that an agent might recognize a normative reason to help a person and as a result choose to help her (voluntarily) despite the lack of an antecedent desire or motive to do so. Das provides some admittedly brief remarks in defence of this view, and in turn argues that we would be best to move away from distinctively virtue-ethical approaches to right action requiring good motives or virtues. Das concludes by arguing against Dan Russell's proposal that we sharply distinguish between right action (a form of action evaluation) and what an agent ought to do (a matter of action guidance); this proposal would undermine concerns that ordinary people cannot act rightly given standard virtue ethics. Das's critique of Russell's proposal is compelling -- particularly in arguing that if we sharply distinguish between right action and what an agent ought to do, the normative significance of rightness becomes highly unclear. This is a strong chapter, developing Das's previous, influential critiques of virtue ethics in new ways.

In her "Self-Knowledge and the Development of Virtue" O'Hagan carefully explores how agents might intentionally develop the virtues, focusing on the ways in which a morally refined self-knowledge could shape their sensitivity to virtuous reasons. O'Hagan begins by noting constraints upon the reasons for which agents might act while developing the virtues. For example, they cannot (typically) perform an action because it would be the kind thing to do and would improve their character. Rather, they would need to perform the action out of a concern for the well-being of the person they would help. The latter reflects a nascent kindness; the former a potentially problematic concern with their own virtue. O'Hagan then considers how we might shape the reasons upon which we act. She agrees with Audi that we cannot directly will ourselves to act (or not) on a given reason or set of reasons. But O'Hagan argues that our ability to direct our attention through self-knowledge and self-awareness provides us with rich indirect control over the reasons for which we act; there is no need to see ourselves as limited in this regard. For example, we might learn that people tend to overlook morally salient reasons when they are in a great hurry. This knowledge could ground a concern to reflect and pay greater attention when feeling time-pressured, allowing us to recognize reasons we might otherwise miss, and providing an important form of control over the reasons for which we act.

The final paper of Part II is Audi's insightful and wide-ranging "Aretaic Role Modeling, Justificatory Reasons, and the Diversity of the Virtues". Audi first explores the nature of role-modeling of both moral and intellectual virtues, drawing attention to often-overlooked issues (e.g. distinguishing between role-modeling as such and providing commentary upon what one is doing to a learner). He then turns to arguing that reasons are explanatorily prior to virtues -- actions from virtue must be performed for an appropriate reason (132), and role-modeling virtues requires an appreciation or responsiveness to reasons on the part of both the agent and a learner (133). If there were not prior reasons to which virtuous agents were responsive, what would explain and justify their actions? In the second half of his paper, Audi explores a wide range of virtues, with an eye towards shedding light on both intellectual and moral virtues, as well as 'cross-over' virtues that are both (such as sensitivity and consistency). Audi draws attention to the rich breadth and variety of virtues, which in turn impacts how these virtues can be successfully role-modeled. I cannot do justice here to the full range of issues addressed by Audi in this paper; there is a tremendous amount of substance and insightful reflection concerning the virtues and their development.

The final section, Part III, "Specific Virtues for Finite Rational Agents", consists of three chapters. Here again, the individual chapters are rich and rewarding, even while there are not strong thematic connections between them.

Reasons pluralists argue that there are rationally incomparable, and thereby incommensurable, kinds of reasons. A familiar worry for such views is that we would too frequently lack practical rational guidance because we so often face incomparable sets of reasons. In his "Practical Wisdom: A Virtue for Resolving Conflicts among Practical Reasons", Andrés Luco defends reasons pluralism by proposing an "Override Principle" that can apply in (many) such cases of conflict. Luco's override principle states that when we face sets of incomparable reasons, then set A overrides set B if (i) a certain action is necessary for promoting some good associated with set A, and (ii) not acting on set B would not result in the loss of any goods associated with set B (153). We would thus have a principle of practical reason that could allow us, in a wide range of cases, to rationally endorse an action, even when faced with incomparable kinds of reasons. The majority of the chapter involves Luco considering how the override principle might be applied to such decisions as whether to pursue a career in philosophy (largely grounded in self-regarding reasons) or instead to pursue a career that would help others as much as possible, as recommended by effective altruists (grounded in impartial reasons). Luco's discussion is compelling as he notes the complexities of applying the override principle. Still, while Luco arrives at plausible answers for various test scenarios, it is perhaps unclear to what extent the override principle is in fact driving these answers, and to what extent Luco is instead appealing to other factors and intuitions and then "applying" the override principle in an ad hoc fashion to capture the desired results.

The final two chapters are by the volume's editors. Braun's chapter on "The Virtue of Modesty and the Egalitarian Ethos" provides an attractive, irenic account of modesty. He first distinguishes three broad approaches to modesty in the literature: Julia Driver's influential 'ignorance' view (that requires an underestimate of the agent's own talents and achievements), perspectival views (that require seeing one's accomplishments from some particular perspective -- perhaps recognizing the roles of luck or opportunity), and de-emphasis views (that require downplaying or directing attention away from one's accomplishments). Braun's engagement with these approaches leads to his own "Egalitarian" account: "A modest agent is an agent that is disposed to act in a manner consistent with attempts to avoid establishing or endorsing distinctions in social or civic standing, ranking, or respect, which are applicable to herself, both at an institutional level and at a local community level" (176-7). As Braun notes, modesty seems to involve an unwillingness to treat oneself as more worthy than others; the egalitarian account captures this unwillingness, and the embrace of social equality could explain why modesty is a moral virtue. Certain questions do arise -- for example, if a rejection of distinctions in social ranking underlies modesty, wouldn't activism and social protest against hierarchies count as paradigmatic instances of modesty? If not, why not? Still Braun's approach seems very promising and worthy of further development.

The volume closes with Birondo's "Virtue and Prejudice: Giving and Taking Reasons". Birondo addresses a familiar worry for eudaimonistic virtue ethics: that their foundational appeal to human nature (in determining what constitutes flourishing) is bound to be problematic. Birondo focuses his attention on a recent version of the worry presented by Jesse Prinz. Broadly, Prinz argues that if eudaimonists hold that a proper understanding of eudaimonia can only be achieved by those who are themselves virtuous, problematic circularities will arise. On the other hand, if eudaimonists embrace an external standard of eudaimonia that can be identified without possession of the virtues, this standard cannot be justified -- there is too much cultural variation in conceptions of flourishing and there is no non-question-begging way of determining which of these conceptions are superior to others; we cannot justify any antecedent, universal human nature that could ground eudaimonia and the virtues. In replying to Prinz, Birondo draws stark attention to the ways in which critics of virtue ethics often ignore relevant literature and responses by virtue ethicists. According to Birondo's own response to Prinz, we must recognize that our understandings of human nature and eudaimonia are works in progress across different cultures. Birondo argues for an internalist account of eudaimonia, where the nature of eudaimonia is determined by the virtuous, but where ordinary folk can still understand this conception. He further stresses that we need to be open to both taking and giving reasons across cultures to improve and refine our conceptions of virtue and eudaimonia over time; there is no foundational appeal to an antecedently identified human nature. This is a sharp paper that effectively defends a plausible, pluralist form of eudaimonism.

Overall, this is a strong collection of insightful and often thought-provoking papers. There are, of course, some limitations; most prominently, while there are suggestive and interesting contributions to understanding the connections between reasons and virtues, the chapters vary significantly in the depth of their engagement with such issues. But understood as a wide-ranging contribution to the leading-edge literature on virtue theory and character, the volume stands up very well.

For Iris Murdoch, selfishness is a fault that can be solved by reframing the world

Love and friendship

After his son’s terrorist attack, Azdyne seeks healing – and his granddaughter

Human rights and justice

‘I know that change is possible’ – a Deaf prison chaplain’s gospel of hope

Virtues and vices

Be what you hope for

In the face of global challenges, Augustine offers a way between the despair of pessimism and the presumption of optimism

Michael Lamb

Mood and emotion

The joy of sulk

Full of implicit rules and paradoxes, sulking is a marvellous example of intense communication without clear declaration

Rebecca Roache

In praise of irritation

Unlike anger, irritation has neither glamour nor radicalism on its side. Yet it might just be the mood we need right now

The virtue of discretion

When the rules break down, you must judge what to do on your own. Discretion is necessary for navigating the muddle of life

Lorraine Daston

Mental health

Secrets hurt their holders

Holding back the truth can take a huge toll on your relationships and your mental health. Why? And is there a better way?

Michael Slepian

From violent criminal to loving parent – a son’s story of his father’s transformation

The delights of mischief

Mischievousness requires humour, wit and a playful humaneness: qualities that make for a particular kind of virtue

Look on the dark side

We must keep the flame of pessimism burning: it is a virtue for our deeply troubled times, when crude optimism is a vice

Mara van der Lugt

Is virtue signalling a vice?

Proclaiming one’s own goodness is deeply annoying. Yet signalling theory explains why it’s a peculiarly powerful manoeuvre

Tadeg Quillien

Forget morality

Moral philosophy is bogus, a mere substitute for God that licenses ugly emotions. Here are five reasons to reject it

Ronnie de Sousa

Lies and honest mistakes

Our crisis of public knowledge is an ethical crisis. Rewarding ‘truthfulness’ above ‘truth’ is a step towards a solution

Richard V Reeves

Cognition and intelligence

How to be a genius

I travelled the world and trawled the archive to unearth the hidden lessons from history’s most brilliant people

Craig Wright

Stories and literature

The living Mahabharata

Immorality, sexism, politics, war: the polychromatic Indian epic pulses with relevance to the present day

Audrey Truschke

Personality

Eight men reflect on their paths to prison – and imagine their alternative lives

Global history

From vice to crime

European empires were addicted to opium smoking. Then their own agents launched a moral crusade to prohibit it

Diana S Kim

Vice dressed as virtue

Cruelty and morality seem like polar opposites – until they join forces. Beware those who persecute in the name of principle

Paul Russell

If all our actions are shaped by luck, are we still agents?

Jake Wojtowicz

Boredom is but a window to a sunny day beyond the gloom

Neel Burton

Psychiatry and psychotherapy

Humility and self-doubt are hallmarks of a good therapist

Helene A Nissen-Lie

Modesty means more, not less

True modesty is not to be timid or meek but a way of being in the world that means you don’t get in the way of your life

Nicolas Bommarito

Is virtue signalling a perversion of morality?

Virtue Theory, Utilitarianism and Deontological Ethics Essay

Introduction.

Virtue theory, utilitarianism, and deontological theory have both similarities and differences. The foundation of utilitarianism theory is in the principle of utility. This principle emphasizes the need to rely on reason and not metaphysics. Furthermore, the law of greatest happiness is the main ideology behind this theory. Human beings seek to decrease suffering and maximize happiness. Hence, an action that is correct morally must lead to the greatest possible pleasure.

On the other hand, the theory of deontology embraces the concept of duty. According to the proponents of deontology, actions should fulfill moral duties without caring whether they make people happy, or not. In other words, the theory of deontology holds that duties define right actions, regardless of their consequences.

Therefore, both deontology and utilitarianism have different approaches to what is morally right. Proponents of deontology embrace moral duties while those of utilitarianism embrace the greatest happiness. Nevertheless, both theories are similar in that they focus on moral actions. Utilitarianism judges actions depending on their consequences while deontology judges actions depending on whether they carry out some set duties.

Virtual ethics is another theory that explains moral actions. Aristotle came up with this theory. The theory describes the meaning of living well, for humankind. It considers the result of human existence as eudaimonia. The meaning of eudaimonia is flourishing. That is, human beings wish to live well. However, this theory does not refer to physical happiness, but that of the mind and soul. Aristotle divides virtues into the intellectual and moral virtues, which correspond to the happiness of the mind and soul. He considers virtue as a moral tendency of the mind, which occurs as voluntary action.

Moral virtue controls the actions of the emotional part. On the other hand, intellectual virtue determines suitable actions for particular feelings. According to the theory, the greatest happiness can only come from philosophical reflection.

Virtue theory resembles the theory of utilitarianism as both theories mention moral action and happiness. However, the two theories differ whereby utilitarianism theory refers to physical happiness as virtual theory refers to the happiness of the mind and soul. The key similarity among all the three theories is that they try to explain morally right actions.

A personal Incident to Explain the Relationship between the Three Theories

As I grew up, I took care of my younger siblings, since I was the firstborn in a family of five. Two of my siblings were girls while two were boys. My mother who was a nurse instructed me to make sure my two brothers got more food than my two sisters, who were older. Both of my sisters were in their teenage years while my brothers’ ages were 9 and 11 years. Every time during meal times, I served food as per the instructions, but my two sisters always seemed unhappy. I always felt that this was not right as their bodies were developing, but my mother would not change her mind. We lived in a society where women were less valued and men were highly esteemed.

The theory of deontology can explain this situation, as I followed rules despite them having undesirable consequences. I practiced the virtue of obedience, while I went against my values about equality for both men and women. Thus, I did what was morally right, but betrayed my values.

• Chicago (A-D)
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IvyPanda. (2023, October 31). Virtue Theory, Utilitarianism and Deontological Ethics. https://ivypanda.com/essays/virtue-theory-utilitarianism-and-deontological-ethics/

"Virtue Theory, Utilitarianism and Deontological Ethics." IvyPanda , 31 Oct. 2023, ivypanda.com/essays/virtue-theory-utilitarianism-and-deontological-ethics/.

IvyPanda . (2023) 'Virtue Theory, Utilitarianism and Deontological Ethics'. 31 October.

IvyPanda . 2023. "Virtue Theory, Utilitarianism and Deontological Ethics." October 31, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/virtue-theory-utilitarianism-and-deontological-ethics/.

1. IvyPanda . "Virtue Theory, Utilitarianism and Deontological Ethics." October 31, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/virtue-theory-utilitarianism-and-deontological-ethics/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Virtue Theory, Utilitarianism and Deontological Ethics." October 31, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/virtue-theory-utilitarianism-and-deontological-ethics/.

• Ethics and Moral Reasoning
• Philosophers on Ethics: Lectures on Ethics
• Virtue Ethics, Utilitarianism, and Deontology
• Difference Between Social Contract, Utilitarianism, Virtue and Deontology
• Humanity Theories: Utilitarianism
• Ethical Theories in Works Great Thinkers
• Teleological vs. Deontological Ethics
• Ethics of Divorce: Deontology and Utilitarianism
• Utilitarian and Deontological Reasoning
• Aristotle’s Account of Pleasure
• Normative Theories of Professional Ethics
• Torture: Various Issues and Aspects
• Morality in Kohlberg's and Piaget's Views
• Personal Values and Beliefs in Ethical Issues
• Professional Decisions in Healthcare

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35 Virtue Ethics: Strengths & Weaknesses

Radford University, Radford University Core Handbook, https://lcubbison.pressbooks.com/

The Strengths of Virtue Ethics

Thinkers who embrace virtue ethics emphasize that the sort of person we choose to be constitutes the heart of our ethical being. If you want to behave virtuously, become a virtuous person.

Certain traits—for instance, honesty, compassion, generosity, courage—seem to be universally admired. These strengths of character are virtues. To acquire these virtues, follow the example of persons who possess them. Once acquired, these virtues may be trusted to guide our decisions about how to act, even in difficult situations. A person might think of a religious figure, virtuous relative, or even a favorite comic book superhero, and use that person as a role model for how to behave.

Virtue ethicists think that the main question in ethical reasoning should be not “How should I now act?” but “What kind of person do I want to be?” Developing virtues that we admire in others and avoiding actions that we recognize as vicious develops our moral sensitivity: our awareness of how our actions affect others. Virtuous persons are able to empathize, to imagine themselves in another person’s shoes, and to look at an issue from other people’s perspectives.

Virtuous individuals are also thought to be able to draw upon willpower not possessed by those who compromise their moral principles in favor of fame, money, sex, or power.

Virtue ethics focuses more on a person’s approach to living than on particular choices and actions and so has less to say about specific courses of action or public policies. Instead, this ethical approach posed broader questions such as these:

• How should I live?
• What is the good life?
• Are ethical virtue and genuine happiness compatible?
• What are proper family, civic, and cosmopolitan virtues?

Because of the broad nature of the questions posed by virtue ethics, ethicists sometimes disagree as to whether this theory actually offers an alternative to the utilitarian and deontological approaches to ethical reasoning. How does someone who follows virtue ethics determine what the virtues are without applying some yardstick such as those provided by utilitarian and deontological ethics?

Utilitarianism and deontology are hard-universalist theories, each claiming that one ethical principle is binding on all people regardless of time or place. Virtue ethics does not make this claim. Those who favor this theory may hold that certain virtues like compassion, honesty, and integrity transcend time and culture. But they do not aim to identify universal principles that can be applied in all moral situations. Instead they accept that many things described as virtues and vices are cultural and that some of our primary ethical obligations are based on our emotional relationships and what we owe to people we care about. In the end, though, virtue ethicists will always ask themselves, “What would a good person do?” Someone employing virtue ethics will consider what action will most help her become a better person. Virtue ethics arguments will discuss ideals as the motivation for acting.

The Weaknesses of Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics may seem to avoid some of the apparent flaws of duty-based ethics and of utilitarianism. A person guided by virtue ethics would not be bound by strict rules or the duty to abide by a state’s legal code. Presumably, then, an individual who has cultivated a compassionate personality consistent with virtue ethics would not easily surrender a friend’s hiding place in order to avoid having to tell a lie, as would seem to be required by duty ethics. Nor would a person guided by virtue ethics be bound by the ‘tyranny of the (happy) majority’ that appears to be an aspect of utilitarianism.

On the other hand, some thinkers argue that virtue ethics provides vague and ambiguous advice. Because of its emphasis on the imprecise and highly contextual nature of ethics, virtue ethics is often criticized as insufficient as a guide to taking specific action

This work ( Virtue Ethics: Strengths & Weaknesses by Radford University, Radford University Core Handbook, https://lcubbison.pressbooks.com/) is free of known copyright restrictions.

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2 Virtue Ethics and Criminal Punishment

• Published: February 2016
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Virtue theory provides a unique perspective to critique certain contemporary punishment practices. To be a moral agent one must be able to act such that his or her actions deserve praise or blame; virtue theory thus demands that moral agents engage in rational choice-making as a means to develop and exercise the character traits from which culpable action issues. With respect to criminal offenders, virtue theory indicates the state is obligated to recognize offenders’ right to form their own moral character via rational choice-making, even while under state supervision. Punishment practices should limit choice-making only to the extent necessary to achieve the functions of punishment: whenever possible, punishment should preserve opportunities for the rational exercise of character and development of virtue.

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What Is Virtue Ethics? - Definition, Examples & Theory

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Virtue ethics is a way in which an individual can look at ethics whereby it pushes him or her to emphasize on their character as the most vital element of ethical thinking, rather than what is stated by both Deontology and Consequentialism theory. 

In this theory, the virtuous character is believed to lead one in making virtuous decisions. Other theories believe what is termed as action-based theories where they rely on actions that should be taken which are a contrast of what virtue ethics propagates. For instance, an individual who is trustworthy is expected to make trustworthy decisions in his or her life. If the person is in an employment position, the boss tends to trust him or her more than the other employees since the individual is expected to make trustworthy decisions if the situation demands it. The individual displays trustworthiness in all areas and therefore is a trusted employee in the organization. The trust is entirely derived from the character that the individual displays. 

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The “Golden Mean” can be defined as moral behavior mean in which ethical decisions and judgment are found by moderately finding the position between two extremes. This moral behavior mean is between two extremes where one end can be excess, and the other is deficient. 

Virtues of virtue ethics are divided into two; 1) the traditional list of cardinal virtues which are prudence, bravely, justice and temperance. 2) The modern theologian James F Keenan virtues are; justice where it is determined by impartial and equal treatment of human beings. Fidelity is also another virtue determined by how closer people are and with special care. Self-care is another virtue determined by our collective responsibility to care for ourselves spiritually, mentally, physically and affectionately. Prudence is another virtue that is determined by how people look at opportunities and take a chance on them. 

Strengths of virtue ethics are that it focuses ethics on the person and what it means to be human and include a person’s whole life, while the weaknesses of virtue ethics are that it has no clear guidance on what one should do in moral dilemma cases. Also, there is no agreement on what are the virtues and if any of the virtues listed are drawn relative to their culture. 

This is a good theory however due to its limitations or its weaknesses it would work best if combined with other theories by application of both theories when determining or making decisions and thus there will be good decision making. Use of the theory in combination with other theories seals the loopholes that it has and therefore becomes better accepted for general use. 

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Virtue Theory Essay Example

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• Published: November 29, 2017
• Type: Essay

Virtue Theory The Virtue Theory is one of the three main theories in normative ethics, which emphasizes virtues in determining moral character and what is good. It focuses on what makes a good person, rather than what makes a good action. In other words, The Virtue Theory is an agent-based approach to ethics, which asks this question about being good: “What kind of person should I be? ” This is in contrast to the other two approaches, Utilitarianism and Kantanism, which ask this question concerning being good: “What should I do? These two theories are act-based and are concerned with duties or rules, and the consequences of actions respectively, and not defining the proper telos, or purpose of man, such as The Virtue Theory. According to Aristotle, who founded the Virtue Theory, the question of “What kind

of person should I be? ” is answered by defining the function of man. Therefore, the function of man is defined as living a rational life with excellence in a well-reasoned way (Aristotle 251).

Aristotle also states that the telos of man, or end/purpose, is to achieve eudaimonia, or happiness, fulfillment, and a complete life (Aristotle 252).In order to achieve this function one must live a virtuous life or a life of excellence. Virtue then, is a disposition needed in order to excel at one’s function. It is more or less a state of character, which is the balance point or mean between extremes.

Four cardinal or classical virtues exist: wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. It is important to note that Aristotle asserts that virtue is not a feeling or a capacity, but a state of character (Aristotl

254). Virtue is not a feeling because we are not praised or punished for having feelings.It is also not a capacity because simply having the capability to feel a certain way does not make it good or bad (Aristotle 254). Therefore, Aristotle states, “every virtue causes its possessors to be in a good state and to perform their functions well” (Aristotle 254). For example, courage is considered a virtue because it is the middle point between the extremes of courage.

Courage is the right amount or mean, and to achieve that balance is to be virtuous in courage. One extreme of courage would be cowardice, which is the lack or deficiency of courage, and one who is a coward would be considered deficient in courage.The other extreme, foolhardiness, is the excess or state of having too much courage. Both extremes, either the deficiency or excess of courage are vices because the right amount of courage is not achieved.

In considering what is virtuous or not, Aristotle makes a distinction that the mean between two vices, excess and deficiency, is relative to us (Aristotle 255-256). He uses an example stating that even though ten pounds of food is a lot for someone to eat and two pounds is too little, the mean of six pounds may still be too much or too little depending on the individual (Aristotle 255).Also, Aristotle stresses that in order to reach the virtues, one must practice and develop habits especially at a young age. He states that, for one to become courageous, one must perform courageous acts.

We are born with the potential to become courageous, but only through action will

we actually hone our development and become virtuous in courage. Aristotle offers practical advice on ways to achieve the mean. He states that sometimes one extreme is more opposed than the other extreme in relation to the mean. Basically, that of the two extremes one is the “lesser of two evils” (Aristotle 258).In addition, he relates that we have a tendency to be more inclined toward one of the extremes and in order to hit the mean or virtue, we must counteract that tendency to achieve balance (Aristotle 259). Lastly, Aristotle states, “there are many ways to be in error…but there is only one way to be correct.

” This means that finding the mean is difficult and achieving thus should be praised and honored (Aristotle 255). David Norton makes mention of Urmson’s “Saints and Heroes” to call attention to and rectify the problem of supererogatory acts in relation to The Virtue Theory.A hero would be someone who exhibits exceptional courage and a saint someone who exhibits exceptional tolerance. As far as a hero is concerned, having exceptional courage seems to be having more courage than what is prescribed and thus in relation to The Virtue Theory, would be considered an excess of courage, and therefore a vice, not a virtue. This however is not the case because a hero is praised for “going above and beyond the call of duty” by performing these supererogatory acts. Norton seeks to resolve this conflict by stating that a hero regards his actions as his duty and herefore having exceptional courage is just considered the right amount of courage according to the hero (Norton 303).

This would seem

to fit in with Aristotle’s view that the balance point between extremes is relative to us. Norton also states that moral development and social roles allow for duty to grow in regard to The Virtue Theory. In other words, what is the norm at later stages of moral development will seem supererogatory with respect to prior stages of moral development, and that the distinction between duty and supererogatory changes through moral development (Norton 304).In conclusion, The Virtue Theory of ethics can be accepted because it takes into account what aspects of one’s life need to be fulfilled in order to be moral.

In my opinion, it better solves the dilemma of how to live a moral life by seeking to answer the question of what kind of person one should be, rather than merely what actions they should take. The Virtue Theory seeks to have us live lives of excellence by finding the mean of various states of character, which are virtues such as wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice.By following this approach to ethics, one will fulfill one’s telos, which is happiness, fulfillment, and complete life, or eudaimonia. Works Cited Aristotle. “Virtue Ethics.

” Moral Philosophy, A Reader, Third Edition. Ed. Louis P. Pojman. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2003. 249-259 Norton, David L.

“Moral Minimalism and the Development of Moral Character. ” Moral Philosophy, A Reader, Third Edition. Ed. Louis P. Pojman.

Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2003. 296-307

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