research paper about political dynasty in the philippines

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Political Dynasties and Economic Development: Evidence using Nighttime Light in the Philippines

Political dynasties, by limiting political competition, are thought to exacerbate corruption, poverty, and abuse of power. This paper examines the economic effects of the presence of political dynasties in Philippine cities and municipalities, taking into account possible channels in the local dynastic cycle – the framework in which politicians try to balance their goals to perform well for their constituents, to divert resources for personal gain, and to continue to be in power. Due to the lack of extensive income accounts or other economic indicators in finer geographical units (i.e., city or municipality level), we use the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program-Operational Linescan System ( DMSP-OLS ) nighttime light data as our proxy for economic activity. Using a panel of Philippine municipalities and cities, we find that, in general, the relationship of political dynasties on economic performance is weak. However, we find that a higher share of economic expenditures leads to lower economic development in municipalities where the mayor, governor, and congressman belong to the same clan. We see this as an indication of weak institutions of checks and balances in localities with dynasties.

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A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW OF POLITICAL DYNASTIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

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This article explains how colonial and indigenous influences have shaped local power structure in the Philippines by looking at features of colonial and governing systems that have developed over time. The following periodisation is referred to: Spanish Colonisation (1521–1896); the Revolutionary Government (1896–1902) including the Filipino-American War (1898–1902); American Colonisation (1902–1935); Philippine Commonwealth (1935–1945) including Japanese occupation during World War II (1941–1945); the Independent Republic (1946–1972); Dictatorship (1972–1981); and Redemocratisation (1986–1991). Throughout the history of the Philippines, power structure inequality has characterised the political process, preserving the interests of the elite. Patterns of inquality, traditionally based on ownership and accumulation of land, can be traced to Spanish colonial rule when control over farmlands was concentrated within the principalia. Moreover, elite domination of electoral office had historically been assured through limiting suffrage to the educated and landowners. With monetisation of the economy in urban centers, patronage systems have been eroded but elites now use other tools, including coercion, to secure their place. Even in contemporary times, patterns of elite domination persist through democratisation efforts, effecting the rule of what could be considered an “elite” democracy in the country to

Even before the coming and colonization of Spaniards to the Philippines there was already the presence of elites and ruling classes, they were called "Maharlikas", and the chief was called "Datu". When the Spaniards colonized the Philippines in 1565, they used the maharlikas and converted them into privilege classes or principalia. The barangays were

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Political Dynasties persist All phenomena have an origin on a particular length of time when it occurred and a specific location where it began. The Philippines already had a rigorous hierarchical rule, as per Dr. Dante Simbulan's dissertation, even prior conquest by the Spaniards, Americans, and Japanese, where authority generally originated from a family of affluence or was

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Family and politics: Dynastic persistence in the philippines

Research output : Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

In many democracies a small subset of individuals enjoys a de facto electoral advantage. The existence of political dynasties, where individuals from a narrow set of families obtain larger vote shares and are more likely to access office, illustrates this phenomenon. In this paper, I study political dynasties in the Philippines and provide evidence of dynastic persistence. More precisely, I provide evidence that incumbency has a causal effect on the probability of having future relatives in office. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close elections, I find that candidates who barely win their first election by a small margin are around 5 times more likely to have a relative in office in the future than individuals who barely lose their first election and never serve. I discuss alternative channels that may explain dynastic persistence in the Philippines. I argue that access to office and public resources - important in clientelistic democracies like the Philippines - allows incumbents to give relatives an electoral advantage if they first run while they are still in office. Occupational choice, while plausibly important, is less likely to be the main driver of dynastic persistence.

• Elite persistence
• Political dynasties

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• Sociology and Political Science
• Political Science and International Relations

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• Philippines Social Sciences 100%
• persistence Social Sciences 91%
• election Social Sciences 75%
• politics Social Sciences 57%
• democracy Social Sciences 46%
• occupational choice Social Sciences 46%
• large family Social Sciences 42%
• evidence Social Sciences 28%

T1 - Family and politics

T2 - Dynastic persistence in the philippines

AU - Querubin, Pablo

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © 2016 P. Querubin.

N2 - In many democracies a small subset of individuals enjoys a de facto electoral advantage. The existence of political dynasties, where individuals from a narrow set of families obtain larger vote shares and are more likely to access office, illustrates this phenomenon. In this paper, I study political dynasties in the Philippines and provide evidence of dynastic persistence. More precisely, I provide evidence that incumbency has a causal effect on the probability of having future relatives in office. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close elections, I find that candidates who barely win their first election by a small margin are around 5 times more likely to have a relative in office in the future than individuals who barely lose their first election and never serve. I discuss alternative channels that may explain dynastic persistence in the Philippines. I argue that access to office and public resources - important in clientelistic democracies like the Philippines - allows incumbents to give relatives an electoral advantage if they first run while they are still in office. Occupational choice, while plausibly important, is less likely to be the main driver of dynastic persistence.

AB - In many democracies a small subset of individuals enjoys a de facto electoral advantage. The existence of political dynasties, where individuals from a narrow set of families obtain larger vote shares and are more likely to access office, illustrates this phenomenon. In this paper, I study political dynasties in the Philippines and provide evidence of dynastic persistence. More precisely, I provide evidence that incumbency has a causal effect on the probability of having future relatives in office. Using a regression discontinuity design based on close elections, I find that candidates who barely win their first election by a small margin are around 5 times more likely to have a relative in office in the future than individuals who barely lose their first election and never serve. I discuss alternative channels that may explain dynastic persistence in the Philippines. I argue that access to office and public resources - important in clientelistic democracies like the Philippines - allows incumbents to give relatives an electoral advantage if they first run while they are still in office. Occupational choice, while plausibly important, is less likely to be the main driver of dynastic persistence.

KW - Elections

KW - Elite persistence

KW - Political dynasties

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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84962561262&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1561/100.00014182

DO - 10.1561/100.00014182

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84962561262

SN - 1554-0626

JO - Quarterly Journal of Political Science

JF - Quarterly Journal of Political Science

Corruption risk and political dynasties: exploring the links using public procurement data in the Philippines

• Original Paper
• Published: 27 December 2023
• Volume 25 , pages 81–109, ( 2024 )

Cite this article

• Daniel Bruno Davis 1 ,
• Ronald U. Mendoza   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-2683-7303 2 &
• Jurel K. Yap   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-3413-347X 2  

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Corruption plays a central role in underdevelopment in the Philippines, yet there is no reliable, non-aggregate, and periodic measurement for corruption in the country. This study demonstrates the use of statistical techniques to synthesize information from public procurement contracts into one indicator to measure corruption risk for each province in the Philippines from 2004 to 2018. The results show corruption risk decreased from the 2004 term to 2013, and increased to an all-time high in 2016. Regression analysis also shows that two measures of political power concentration among clans—a Hirschman–Herfindahl Index applied to the political sphere (Political HHI), and the Size of the Largest Dynasty per Province—is significantly and positively linked to the corruption risk indicator at least at the 5% significance level. This result coheres with emerging literature on political dynasties, suggesting that these debilitate checks and balances and increase the risk of impunity and malgovernance at the local level, particularly in the Philippines. This study highlights the importance of studying corruption vis-à-vis the evolving issue of political dynasties amassing power, and provides further evidence that reforms are required in this area to promote development in democracies.

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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the Ateneo de Manila University for supporting our project. We also thank Daniel Gingerich and the University of Virginia Quantitative Collaborative for providing valuable feedback to an earlier draft of the study. We would also like to thank the reviewers for their valuable feedback to the current draft. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Ateneo de Manila University.

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DBD: Conceptualization, Writing—Original Draft, Writing—Review and Editing, Methodology, Software, Formal Analysis, Data Curation. RUM: Conceptualization, Writing—Original Draft, Writing—Review and Editing, Supervision. JKY: Methodology, Software, Formal Analysis, Data Curation, Writing—Original Draft, Writing—Review and Editing, Visualization.

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Correspondence to Jurel K. Yap .

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Scree Plot of the IRT Model.

IRT Curve for Procurement Mode.

7 and Table 

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Davis, D.B., Mendoza, R.U. & Yap, J.K. Corruption risk and political dynasties: exploring the links using public procurement data in the Philippines. Econ Gov 25 , 81–109 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-023-00306-4

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Received : 18 March 2021

Accepted : 16 November 2023

Published : 27 December 2023

Issue Date : March 2024

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-023-00306-4

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