orangi pilot project case study

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Pakistan – A Case Study of the Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi

This research paper documenting the project based in Orangi Town, an administrative unit of Karachi, to overcome the problems that arise due to poverty, and are difficult to solve due to the excessive costs. This document mainly focuses on Orangi Pilot Project-Research and Training institute (OPP-RTI), detailing its goals to enable low income families deal with issues like sanitation, health, education and employment through community participation and local resource mobilization. The solution models developed by the OPP-RTI are also being used to develop similar solutions for other towns, with appropriate modifications, to achieve the positive results observed in Orangi Town.

Article contents

What has emerged from 30 years of the orangi pilot project.

Arif Hasan Arif Hasan Urban Resource Center, Research and Planning
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190632366.013.150
Published online: 31 March 2020

The causes of what has emerged from 30 years of the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) can only be understood through understanding the factors that have shaped its evolution. The OPP was established by Akhtar Hameed Khan whose experience-based thinking and theorization has shaped the project philosophy and methodology. Situated in Orangi Town in Karachi, Pakistan, the project has motivated local communities to finance and build their own neighborhood infrastructure while encouraging the local government to build the off-site infrastructure such as trunk sewers and treatment plants. The project expanded to other areas of Pakistan with the OPP’s Research and Training Institute, training local communities in surveying, estimating materials and labor required for construction works, and motivating communities in building their sanitation systems and negotiating with local government to build the off-site infrastructure. The project methodology has been adopted by local governments and bilateral and international development agencies. The philosophy and methodology have also become a part of universities’ and bureaucratic training institutions’ curriculum. So far, households on over 15,560 lanes all over Pakistan have built their sanitation systems by investing 412 million rupees (Rs). According to the OPP 153rd quarterly report in 2018, the total number of households in these lanes is 272,506. The model shaped the sanitation policy of the government of Pakistan and also influenced policies on housing and informal development, which has results in the upgrade in a much greater number of households in urban areas such as Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Kasur, Narowal, Sargodha, Nowshera, Hyderabad, Sukkur, Rawalpindi, Muzaffargarh, Swat, Lodhran, Kehror Pakka, Dunyapur, Khanpur, Bahawalpur, Khairpur, Jalah Arain, Yazman, Vehari, Uchh, Multan, Alipur, Gujranwala, Jampur, Sanghar, Amanullah, Parhoon, Mithi, and Sinjhoro, as well as 128 villages.

The project suffered a major blow with the assassination of its director and one of its workers and an attempt on the life of its deputy director in 2013. Due to the resulting insecurity, project programs and various linkages with government and international agencies and nongovernmental organizations suffered. However, due to the OPP’s reputation of capability and its roots within the community, the project has survived (against all predictions) and is in the process of expanding its work and expertise.

urban planning
participatory development
settlement upgrading
Orangi Pilot Project

The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) was established in February 1980 through an understanding between Akhtar Hameed Khan, a renowned South Asian social scientist, and Agha Hasan Abidi, the president of the BCCI foundation, a Pakistan charity. Agha Hasan Abidi wanted Akhtar Hameed Khan to do “social work” for the refugees from East Pakistan who were living in Orangi, a Karachi township consisting of a large number of informal settlements. Akhtar Hameed Khan disagreed with the concept as he did not wish to do “charity work” and also did not want to work for a particular community. However, he proposed that he would study the situation in Orangi and come up with community-based solutions for the improvement of the physical and social conditions in the settlements.

This was agreed upon, as was the idea that the project would be open ended; it would have no timelines but would provide regular quarterly reports on its progress, as well as submit detailed financial accounts with those reports.

The Political Context of Karachi and Orangi

Karachi, apart from Gawadar, is Pakistan’s only port. In the last census before independence, its population was 425,000. The mother tongue of 73% of this population was one of the local provincial languages (Sindhi, Balochi, and Gujrati). Only 6% regarded Urdu or Hindi as their mother tongue, and 8% spoke Punjabi. No Pashto speakers were recorded in the city at that time. By 1998 , only 14% of the residents spoke local languages as their mother tongues, 49% spoke Urdu, 14% spoke Punjabi, and 11% spoke Pashto (GOP Census Reports). This change was due to several factors, including a huge influx of Urdu-speaking immigrants from India in 1947 and the following years; the continuous migration of Pashto speakers from Khyberpakhtunkhwa since the 1960s; and the arrival of Punjabi professionals, businessmen, and artisans to service the city’s expanding services sector. These migrations have changed the demography of Sindh as a whole as the Sindhi and local languages speaking population of the province declined from 96% in 1941 to 63% in 1998 (GOP Census Reports). Thus Karachi (population 14,910,352 with an additional 2 million “aliens” according to the 2017 housing and population census) became a non-Sindhi-speaking capital of a Sindhi-speaking province.

Karachi houses 32% of the country’s total industrial base and generates 15% of the national gross domestic product, 25% of federal revenues, and 62% of income tax (Master Plan Group of Offices, 2007 ). There are also powerful federal government institutions in the city in the form of the Karachi Port Trust, Port Qasim, Cantonments, and the Civil Aviation Authority. Their interests often clash with those of the city and provincial government.

The city contains 62% of Sindh’s urban population, 30% of its total population, and 22% of Pakistan’s urban population. In addition, the city produces 75% of the province’s total industrial output (Master Plan Group of Offices, 2007 ). It also contains Sindh’s premier health and education-related institutions and is the center of the media industry in Pakistan. The city’s location as an outlet to the sea for Afghanistan and Central Asia has dragged it into various Afghan conflicts since the 1980s.

The Sindhi speakers are represented by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Urdu speakers are represented by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). The PPP, which is in a majority in the provincial assembly, cannot control Karachi’s enormous wealth except through a highly centralized administrative structure while the MQM, which holds the majority of seats from Karachi, cannot control it except through a highly decentralized system of local government. This has been the cause of continuous conflict since 1987 . The Afghan war has also played into this conflict, and the city has been home since the 1980s to various regional proxies, which has resulted in the rise of criminal gangs who have become a part of some of these proxies and of political parties. This has compromised law enforcement and development agencies. Meanwhile, no satisfactory consensus on how Karachi should be governed has emerged.

It was estimated in 2006 that 62% of Karachiites live in katchi abadis (literally: unbaked settlements, a term used for informal settlements; Hasan, 2008 ). One such katchi abadi is Orangi which is one of the 18 towns of Karachi and is situated in the western district. The township began as a plot scheme of the government for accommodating refugee populations who were living in squatter settlements within the city. The government plan consisted of 590 hectares and was initiated in the mid 1960s. Katchi abadis developed around this plot scheme. Families who moved to Orangi built their own homes with the help of informal contractors, and the state provided them with water through tanker trucks. These informal settlements received a large influx of refugees from Bangladesh after its separation from Pakistan in 1972 .

The population of Orangi according to the 2017 census is 2.5 million (Zaheer, 2009 ). Most of the Pashto-speaking settlements in the western district border with Orangi, and as such conflict between Pashto speakers and Urdu speakers has been a regular feature of Orangi politics. This conflict has taken many forms, which include targeted killings of important activists and leaders, forced closure of shops, extraction of money from shops and businesses, and large-scale rigging in the elections. Heavy arms have also been used in this conflict, especially during 1986 (Aziz, 2016 ) when more than 100 people died. The progressive left-wing Pakhtoons who belonged to the Awami National Party were targeted and killed by the religious groups, who, it is claimed, had support of the Taliban. The influx of Chinese goods has also affected small engineering workshops in Orangi and the leather industry.

Since the OPP began its work in 1980 , socioeconomic change has also taken place in Orangi. Women now work in the formal sector industry and in white-collar jobs. They also own and operate beauty parlors. Men have also been absorbed into the formal services sector and along with the women they are schoolteachers, bank managers, representatives of travel agencies, and staff at internet/information technology firms. The Orangi leadership has also changed from nonliterate elders to a younger generation that is literate and at home in the Karachi physical and social environment. The Orangi katchi abadis have been marked for regularization but, based on the author’s observations, it is estimated that no more than 20% households have applied for a 99 year land lease.

Akhtar Hameed Khan

To understand the evolution of the OPP, it is also necessary to understand Akhtar Hameed Khan’s life and work. He was born in 1914 in Agra. He completed his education in 1930 at the Agra College where he studied English literature and history. He worked as a lecturer at Meerut College. His family came from Uttar Pradesh in India, and he was educated at the Aligarh Muslim University in Aligarh, which is also located in Uttar Pradesh and at Cambridge. In 1936 he was inducted into the Indian Civil Service (ICS), the most prestigious governance-related institution of British India. As part of the ICS training, he was sent to Cambridge. During his ICS career, he was a collector of the Revenue Department, which gave him an understanding of the rural economy of Bengal and the problems of its peasants. In 1945 , he resigned from the ICS because his conscience could not permit him to implement the “denial policy,” which was creating famine in Bengal. During World War II, when the British Indian army and their British counterparts were fighting against the Japanese, the army required rations, and these were provided by compulsory surrender of rice to the government so that it could be sent to the troops in the Far East, causing the famine in Bengal. Akhtar Hameed Khan then worked for a few years as a locksmith in Aligarh. He did this because he wanted to understand how common people felt and thought. In 1947 , he became a teacher at the Jamia Millia in Delhi, where he studied Persian, Arabic, and Pali and became a scholar of these languages and their philosophies. In 1950 , he migrated to Karachi to teach at the Islamia College. In the same year, he was asked by the government of Pakistan to take charge at Victoria College in Comilla in East Pakistan. While in Comilla, he noticed that there was massive waterlogging in the rural areas around Comilla which was making the land nonproductive. On investigation, he discovered that the land was not being drained as it used to be before the Hindu landlord left East Pakistan. Previously the landlords had arranged this drainage by mobilizing their peasants for this work. At that early stage, Akhtar Hameed Khan was convinced that if the peasants could be organized into cooperatives of some sort, they could collectively manage to drain the fields.

He promoted this concept with bureaucrats and politicians, and he was listened to as he had been an ICS officer. In 1958 , he went to Michigan State University to better understand rural development. During this period, he wrote extensively and lectured both at first-world and third-world universities. In addition, he published widely. While at Michigan, he was able to pursue his attachment to sufic thought and morals, which became an important part of his life and were reflected in the relationship he was able to establish with the working class and the lower-middle income groups. He returned to Pakistan in 1959 and established the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development at Comilla and was appointed as its founding director. He also laid the foundation for the Comilla Cooperative Pilot Project in the same year in East Pakistan, which became a model for rural development both in the North and the South. In 1963 he received the Ramon Magsaysay Award for his services in rural development, and in 1964 he was awarded an honorary doctorate of law by Michigan State University. When Bangladesh became a separate country, he moved to Pakistan. In Pakistan he tried to implement the Comilla model in the rural areas of the North West Frontier Province, now KP. He also worked as a research fellow at the University of Agriculture in Faisalabad from 1971 to 1972 . At the Academy for Rural Development in Peshawar he worked on the Dawoodzai Integrated Rural Development Programme. In 1980 , he moved to Karachi and laid the foundations of the OPP.

Akhtar Hameed Khan believed that people are living in a period of physical and social dislocation because of which old systems of community governance no longer functioned. He felt if new forms of community organization were created, then both social and physical conditions would improve. He also believed that if communities could raise money and use it to improve their conditions successfully, they would be empowered to move on to taking control of their lives and their relationship with state agencies would change for the better. The creation of such communities was his priority (Hasan, 1999 ). In his personal life, he was austere, and in his professional life he shunned any form of extravagance. This was also appreciated by the working classes with whom he worked.

For the promotion of his concepts and work, Akhtar Hameed Khan felt that it was essential to create an informed public and to develop mutual trust and knowledge sharing with policymakers and government institutions. For his work and dedication to rural development, he is considered a guru, and his ideas are reflected in the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme, the National Rural Support Programme, and USAID programmes.

The Development of a Model

For the first six months, Akhtar Hameed Khan roamed Orangi, in a jeep supplied by the BCCI foundation. He spoke to politicians, activists, community leaders, shopkeepers’ organizations, and local counselors. He analyzed their relationships with the process of lobbying for services in Orangi and came to the conclusion that for the people of Orangi, the most important social and physical development issue was sanitation and that a community-based program could be built around it. He observed that people were already building their underground sewage systems but the scale was too small and the quality of work was so bad that most of the systems clogged up in a few months. The other issue related to this was that the only disposal point for sewage was the natural drainage system, which in many cases was very far from most of the houses. He also noted that there was an absence of trust among residents in Orangi, and as such large community organizations were difficult, if not impossible, to build. He also observed that there were many activists in Orangi who were constantly lobbying politicians for the provision of services. Very little came out of this except that politicians were invited to visit the settlements, receptions were arranged for them, and they made grand promises which were never realized.

Akhtar Hameed Khan felt that if the cost of sanitation could be made affordable and the people could get together at the level of the lane (a unit consisting of 20–40 houses), they could finance and manage the construction of a sewage line. The lane as a unit of organization was small, and, because all the residents of the households knew each other, the problem of mistrust was minimized.

Akhtar Hameed Khan noted four barriers in achieving what he was proposing. One was a psychological barrier; people felt that this was not their job but that of the government’s. For laying a lane sewer, they had to be convinced that the street also belonged to them. Second was the social barrier; in a climate of mistrust, the people had to come together to build a lane sewer. For this they had to be motivated, and this motivation would only come from people they trusted and who knew their problems. Third was a technical barrier; people did not have the knowledge of building a proper underground sewage system nor did they have the tools for doing so. To overcome this, they had to be provided with tools, technical advice, and managerial guidance. The fourth was an economic barrier; the cost of conventional sanitation technology was beyond the affordability of low-income homes. It would need to be considerably modified to be made affordable (Khan, 1994 ).

The concept of the four barriers is still used throughout Pakistan by international agencies, government of Pakistan projects, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) working on development projects.

First Attempts

Akhtar Hameed Khan contacted well-known sanitation engineers and architects to help him design a community-financed and -managed sanitation system. He abandoned those efforts because their solutions were far too expensive and sophisticated for the community to finance and build. Subsequently, he sought the help of an instructor at the OPP to design and implement a system in the Hanifabad neighborhood in Orangi, which had agreed to follow the OPP model and finance underground sewers in their lanes (Hasan, 2010 ). Within a year, the system had clogged up and the residents were unhappy.

At this stage Akhtar Hameed Khan identified a Karachi architect, Arif Hasan (author of this article, referred to as AH) and in 1981 appointed him as principal consultant to this project. The principal consultant in his initial note stated that new technical standards were required with cheaper methods of pipe jointing and manhole making along with appropriate tools if costs were to be reduced. He also identified that the reason the Hanifabad system clogged was because there was not sufficient water in Orangi to make an underground sewage system function. He designed a simple one-chamber septic tank to be placed between the latrine and the sewer to prevent solids from entering the system so that the system could function with the limited quantity of water that was available. The tank must be emptied every year if grease, dust from sweeping the house, and hair do not enter the tank. The size of the tank was determined by the cost that the people were willing to pay for it. Many OPP replication projects follow this principle of first determining what is affordable before preparing the design and implementation process.

Conflicts With Engineers

Since all developments in Orangi were closely monitored by the engineering profession, technical personnel in the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB), the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC), and elected local counselors, the proposals made by AH came under attack, for technical and social reasons. In 1982 , this criticism received considerable support from the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS) appointed chief technical advisor (CTA) to the project. There were disagreements around six main issues:

The CTA claimed that the office of the OPP was in a rundown building in a noisy Orangi locality. It was not conducive to serious work: people came in and out of it without appointment and it was not air-conditioned, so serious professionals could not work there. Akhtar Hameed Khan disagreed. He believed the office should reflect the culture of the Orangi communities and air-conditioning was perhaps the last thing that was required as it would alienate people.

The detractors felt that there should be a pilot area. Akhtar Hameed Khan disagreed. He felt that it would limit the programme, and many lanes that wished to finance and develop their sanitation would not be able to do it. He argued that such a decision would be counterproductive. Meanwhile, AH felt that a scattered system could be brought together provided there was a map of the natural drainage system of Orangi. Planning and bringing together a scattered system would require decentralization of design and implementation and miniaturization of technology. Akhtar Hameed Khan responded to the CTA’s letter to the BCCI (Hasan, 2010 ), rejecting the model proposed by the CTA.

There was strong opposition to the sewage being disposed into the natural drainage system from the engineers’ lobby as it was against “engineering ethics.” AH responded that if all of Karachi’s sewage is planned to flow into the natural drainage system, why should Orangi be an exception? And there would eventually be a solution that tackled the problem at the city level. Suggestions were also made that the project should adopt the soak pit as an alternative to overcome the disposal problem. This was suggested by Qurratulain Bakhtiari in December 1981 , then director of the Baldia Soak Pit project. This was supported by the CTA. However, the people of Orangi were unwilling to pay for anything other than an underground sewage system. If the elite could have it, they argued, why not they?

Engineers also felt that the standards that had been developed as rules of thumb by AH were not suitable to producing a long-lasting sewage system. Special criticism was made of the one chamber septic tank, not only by local but also by foreign experts, and it was predicted that it would not save the system from clogging (Abbott, 1985 ).

Akhtar Hameed Khan appointed the local Orangi activists as social organizers of the OPP program. He came across them in his exploration of Orangi and was greatly impressed by their community links and organizational skills. The detractors felt that the local graduates who had studied subjects such as sociology and social work should be the social organizers within the OPP. Akhtar Hameed Khan disagreed. He felt that the graduates would never be able to understand the intricacies of social relations in Orangi and hence would not be able to respond to them.

The next issue on which there were major disagreements was the mapping of Orangi. The chief technical advisor was of the opinion that a survey firm should be employed to prepare a map of Orangi. However, AH felt that the survey should be carried out by university students; thereby, the universities would be introduced to the OPP and vice versa. Also, if 40 students moved through Orangi, mapping the system, the people of Orangi would become a part of the mapping process and would understand the reasons for why it was taking place (Hasan, 2010 ).

Today, the OPP Research Training Institute (RTI) design standards and the one chamber septic tank are used in all OPP-RTI replication projects, both in the public and NGO sector. Also, the concept of having the lane as a unit of organization for sanitation projects has been used in more than 6,459 lanes in more than 651 urban locations outside of Orangi where communities have invested Rs 206 million in internal development. The total number of households in these settlements is 77,859. In addition, it has been used in 1,821 lanes in villages containing 14,011 households at a cost of Rs 378 million and in 7,280 lanes in Orangi containing 180,636 houses, where people have invested Rs 168 million for internal development. Almost all social organizers in all the OPP-RTI advice projects have been activists from the community.

All of the objections of the detractors and the CTA were dismissed by Akhtar Hameed Khan and the project went ahead. After four months in Orangi, the CTA wrote (Hasan, 2010 ) to the BCCI “clearly there are two apparently irreconcilable approaches to project execution. One, open ended, exploratory, and evolutionary with emphasis on sociological particularities, unconstrained by time and cost—and the other, target-oriented, with a professional and technical focus.” The CTA also stated that there should be no doubt that the UNCHS was uniquely equipped “to provide specialized support in undertaking large scale projects in low income urban areas.” As a result, Orangi was divided into two sections: one where the UNCHS project, named the Community Development Project (CDP), would be carried out under UNCH’s administrative control and the other where the OPP would function under Akhtar Hameed Khan.

In 1989 , after six years, the CDP had developed 36 lanes, whereas in the same period, the OPP was able to develop sanitation in over 4,000 lanes covering 70,000 houses. This achievement was noted by government policymakers, the media, and academia and had a profound impact on their thinking (to be discussed later), which survives to this day.

The Component-Sharing Model and Its Advocacy

By 1983 the OPP had clearly established a conception of its sanitation model. It stated that sanitation consisted of four levels:

Sanitary latrine in the home.

An underground sewer in the lane.

A collector sewer in the neighborhood connecting the system to a disposal point.

These three on-site items were termed “internal development” by the OPP, and they were to be built and financed by the lane residents themselves with advice from the OPP.

Long collector sewers, trunk sewers, and treatment plants were the responsibility of the government. The OPP termed this work external development, which was to be financed by the government.

This model, which has come to be known as the component-sharing model, as opposed to the cost-sharing model, has been adopted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), by United Nations agencies, government organizations, the federal government’s sanitation policy, and various NGO and private-sector projects.

Between 1983 and 1987 , OPP’s work expanded not only within Orangi but also supported community organizations outside of Orangi. Many linkages were formed as a result. AH was a visiting teacher at the department of architecture and planning at Dawood University, and he was able to formally involve his students with the work in Orangi. In 1983 , Perween Rehman (future director of the OPP) joined the organization and also started to teach at Dawood University. This created a number of professionals who, in the early 21st century , have become important in the development and academic fields in Pakistan and promote OPP principles. 1

Linkages with the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) where government officials are trained were also created and regular lectures were delivered to them by Akhtar Hameed Khan and AH. The pupils at NIPA were also required to visit Orangi, see the work, and talk to the residents. Later on, a number of these bureaucrats supported OPP programs both in Orangi and in other locations in Pakistan. 2

Journalists were invited to visit Orangi and encouraged to write on conditions in katchi abadis . Akhtar Hameed Khan and AH also visited newspaper editors to explain how relevant the OPP methodology was to the Pakistan situation. Experts from multilateral and bilateral development agencies also visited the project, as did academics from other countries along with their students. 3

During this period, the OPP also launched a housing and health program and a development plan for Karachi’s rural areas. It also had a rehabilitation and conflict resolution program for healing the wounds of ethnic riots that had taken place in Orangi between the Pathans and the “Mahajirs” in 1986 . Because of these initiatives, the OPP’s links within Orangi and government institutions strengthened, and this helped the OPP to expand more quickly than it would have otherwise. A program of helping to build cooperatives of entrepreneurs, workers, and producers was also initiated and was covered by the media. This led to linking up Orangi’s small-scale manufacturers, especially in the textile industry, with high-end garment designers and manufacturers.

As a result, the OPP became an important source of information for students, journalists, researchers, and local body organizations regarding political and social conditions in katchi abadis and for studying political trends and economic conditions.

In 1988 , the OPP was upgraded into five independent institutions: (a) the OPP-RTI, which deals with sanitation, housing, education, training, research, documentation, and advocacy; (b) the Orangi Charitable Trust (OCT), which operates a micro-credit programme; (c) Karachi Health and Social Development Association, which runs a health programme in Orangi; (d) the Rural Development Foundation, which carries out agriculture-related research and extension; and (e) the OPP Society, which channelizes the funds received from the Infaq Foundation to these organizations. This article covers the work of the OPP-RTI.

Replication With Communities (1988–2010)

Initially, OPP-RTI attempted to support communities by doing most of the technical and supervision work by itself. It soon realized that this was not possible unless it opened an office in every project site. As a result, it was decided to train communities to map, estimate, and supervise their own projects. The method followed is given in Table 1 .

Table 1. Strategy for CBO/NGO Support for Sanitation Projects

Note. CBO = community-based organization; NGO = nongovernmental organization; OPP-RTI = Orangi Pilot Project Research Training Institute.

Source . Hasan ( 2015 ).

What helped the expansion of the programme was the establishment of the Community Development Network in 2002 , which consists of all the member organizations working with the OPP-RTI and the Orangi Charitable Trust. It also contains groups working with the OPP partner organizations. The network meets every three months at a different project location, and strong ties have developed between them that are independent of the RTI.

After Akhtar Hameed Khan’s death in 1999 , an annual Akhtar Hameed Khan forum was also initiated. This forum is held in Karachi, and its participants include groups from all over Pakistan. Here they are able to meet public and local body representatives from their own areas and establish working relationships with them.

In 2006 , AH was asked by the government of Pakistan to prepare a sanitation policy for the federal government. In the policy, the component-sharing model was adopted both for formal and informal settlements. During this period, AH was also involved in the formulation of the Pakistan government’s housing policy and was the chair of the federal government’s Task Force on Urban Development. The OPP model has been promoted in both documents. The model has been adopted mainly in the Punjab in the Changa Paani project (Good Water project), and in Bahiwal town, and Islamabad, the federal capital. There have been no other adoptions.

Small funds for support to partner organizations for administrative and logistical overheads were provided by Water Aid from 1995 until 2016 . See Appendix 1: List of Water Aid Partners for details about these organizations. The OPP-RTI also developed a mapping unit whose documentation of Karachi’s katchi abadis and natural drainage system laid the basis for the Local Government’s S-3 sanitation project for the whole of Karachi. The S-3 model consists of converting Karachi’s natural storm drain into which sewage discharges into box trunks with treatment plants at the end. This is being implemented in Karachi and has been adopted in other cities in Pakistan as well.

Meanwhile, the OPP model of component-sharing was accepted by a number of government and international agency programs. A list of these is given in Table 2 .

Table 2. Government/International Agency Projects That Adopted the Component Sharing Model with the OPP as Trainer/Advisor

Note. ADB = Asian Development Bank; OPP-RTI = Orangi Pilot Project Research Training Institute; UNDP = United Nations Development Program.

Source . Hasan ( 2010 ).

The OPP-RTI model resulted in reducing costs in comparison with formal planning, and its work with the KWSB and KMC on the ADB-funded katchi abadi development programme showed that development could take place without foreign funding, as shown in Table 3 .

Table 3. Baldia–Orangi Comparison

The ADB-funded Water and Sanitation Project PAK-794 was also implemented in Baldia and Orangi. In Baldia, the conventional pattern of development was followed whereas in Orangi the OPP’s component-sharing model was followed. The difference in cost showed that Akhtar Hameed Khan’s belief that development could take place without foreign loans was possible.

Perween Rehman as Director

After Akhtar Hameed Khan’s death in 1999 , Perween Rehman became the director of the OPP-RTI, and there was a shift in certain aspects of culture at the OPP-RTI.

Perween Rehman was born and grew up in East Pakistan until the establishment of Bangladesh. During the civil war, her family was rendered homeless and was separated from each other. Perween’s learning came from experience and observation. She graduated as an architect from Dawood University in 1983 . When she joined the OPP in 1983 , English was the only language she could read and write. However, she was determined to work with the poor and use her skills as an architect for the improvement of their settlements. Between 1983 and 1987 , she evolved very quickly and became friendly with the activists of Orangi and the OPP staff.

Akhtar Hameed Khan was a father figure, dictatorial in many ways as a teacher. Perween Rehman was young and always tried to establish a consensus in decision-making, involving everyone in the OPP-RTI. She was also very close to the personal issues of the people with whom she worked. Her charisma attracted young people, especially women, from all over Pakistan. She felt very deeply for the sufferings of the low-income groups with whom she worked. She also disliked the pomp and show of donor agencies and NGOs and their projects. She was reluctant to travel abroad unless the OPP-RTI could gain something from it. In short, Akhtar Hameed Khan’s legacy of frugality and austerity was kept alive.

Perween Rehman initiated two programs that shifted the priorities from Orangi to other areas. The first of these programs was the Secure Housing Support Programme. In the neighborhood of Orangi, old goths (villages) were being bulldozed by land-hungry formal and informal developers, and residents’ lands were being confiscated. Through the mapping unit she had developed, the OPP-RTI identified that there were 2,173 goths in Karachi and that there was a programme through which they could be regularized. RTI also identified that 1,195 goths had actually become urbanized (Hasan, 2010 ).

The requirements for being regularized were complex and required maps and various documents that the goth population could not develop. This work was undertaken by the OPP-RTI, and facilitating the process of regularization was supported by a Karachi senator belonging to the ruling PPP. Once a goth was regularized, the OPP-RTI developed external sewage and water infrastructure proposals, which were then funded by local government agencies. Other OPP-RTI programmes were also introduced. As a result, according to Anwar Rashid, the director of the OCT, 156 goths were regularized and the regularization of 77 was in process in 2013 when Perween Rehman was assassinated. According to media reports, after her assassination, the remaining 77 goths were not regularized.

The other programme that she initiated was the flood rehabilitation programme. Floods had a major influence on her thinking. She saw the terrible poverty of the rural areas and came to the conclusion that the people of Orangi were living in a paradise, and that the real fight had to be against rural poverty. As a result, a major programme was launched to provide roofs, hand pumps, and medicines and initiate schools in the flood-affected rural areas. A programme provided support to 45 existing partners in two cities and 33 towns and roofing to 30,324 homes in 2,215 villages. Thirty-two schools were also established in villages. The scale was enormous.

The director also decided that the OPP-RTI would not attend any international agency’s or government of Pakistan’s seminars unless they were of relevance to OPP-RTI work. As such, the OPP-RTI disappeared from many events that it had participated in previously. The director also decided that there would be no media coverage for publicity purposes but only for advocacy backed by lower income groups that OPP-RTI had organized. Work in Orangi continued on a routine basis, and no major new initiatives were taken. However, post-flood she did undertake two extremely important reports that exposed the myths that the media and government agencies had woven about water in Karachi. In this connection, she wrote an important paper on water, and in another paper she identified the role of a mafia-like informal water supply process. During her research on the water mafia, she was also threatened by them.

The shift was also accompanied by a programme for establishing village development organizations (VDOs) in the area where flood relief and rehabilitation had taken place. The VDO programme did not function very well, and very few VDOs survived, so the Deh Development Programme was initiated. This consisted of bringing together 50 villages under a deh (a unit of the revenue department usually containing 10 to 12 villages). Under this programme, 50 villages were chosen and their assets, land ownership, nature of tenure, livelihood, and physical and social infrastructure were all documented. The plan was to develop water, sanitation, economic improvement, and environmental sustainability. Both the OPP-RTI and the OCT worked together on this programme. For health, education, and related programmes, it was decided to link up with NGOs who had this expertise.

In March 2013 , Perween Rehman was assassinated, and as a result, major changes took place in the OPP institutions, which put pressure on the OPP-RTI to close down its operations.

Perween Rehman’s Assassination and Its Repercussions

Perween Rehman’s assassination was followed by the assassination of a community activist who worked closely with the OPP-RTI and also with the OCT. An attempt on the life of Saleem Aleemuddin, then acting director of the OPP-RTI, was also made. As a result, it was decided to move the OPP-RTI out of Orangi in November 2014 and establish it in the city center in part of the offices of OPP’s partner organization, the Urban Resource Center.

The board members of the OPP-RTI and its staff who were pursuing Perween Rehman’s assassination case in court were also threatened. A lead role to keep the OPP intact at this time was played by Perween Rehman’s sister, Aquila Ismail, and she also became a source of strength to the members of the organization.

The OPP-OCT refused to move out of the Orangi offices because they were of the opinion that if they moved, the OPP would never be able to come back to its base in Orangi. The assassination of Perween had many repercussions on the functioning and culture of the OPP, including

The staff lost a sense of belonging to the organization.

Consensus-making became difficult.

There was a feeling of physical insecurity and also insecurity about the future.

Work suffered because of the distance between the new offices and Orangi and the logistics that had to be managed, as much of the staff lived in Orangi.

The Deh Development Programme could not be pursued.

The mapping for the secure housing programme, which tried to map the larger developments in Karachi, became limited to mapping the goth from where an application was received.

Partners and students stopped coming to Orangi for security reasons, as did representatives of international agencies.

OPP-RTI relations with the Orangi communities started to be adversely affected.

In January 2016 , the OPP-RTI returned to its Orangi offices, but fear persisted. Anwar Rashid, the head of the OCT, who had worked with the OPP since 1983 , and Perween’s sister, who was pursuing Perween’s assassination case in the Supreme Court, were able to overcome the insecurity over a short period of time. Contacts with the government were reinitiated and links with partners reestablished. However, during this period of uncertainty, the Akhtar Hameed Forums were held and so were the CDN meetings, although with much less participation from groups and communities.

OPP-RTI—Post-Perween Rehman’s Assassination

If one looks at the work of the OPP and as envisaged by Akhtar Hameed Khan, a number of principles emerge:

Populist bias: For Akhtar Hameed Khan, populist bias meant not only giving precedent to the needs of low-income communities but also granting their thinking more importance than that of government agencies and professionals. It also meant that project offices and the manner of documentation should reflect the culture of the low-income groups with whom one was working. This bias still exists in the function of all OPP institutions. It is deeply ingrained and is also a part of the culture of OPP’s partner organizations, even though some of them have emerged out of government and/or bilateral and multilateral development agencies such as the ADB-funded water and sanitation project, Pak-794, in Baldia and Orangi; the local government S-3 sanitation project for Karachi; the UNCHS Urban Basic Services programme for Sukkur; the World Bank-Swiss Development Cooperation Water and Sanitation programme in Hyderabad; the ADB-supported Southern Punjab Basic Urban Services Programme; and the UNDP Programme for the Improvement of Livelihoods in Urban Settlements (Punjab).

Informed public: The creation of an informed public was created through contacts with the media, academia, civil society contacts, and people and organizations who were interested in development work. They were requested to participate in OPP’s various events and, similarly, OPP participated in their events. Based on the author’s conversation with OCT Director Anwar Rashid, these linkages suffered after Perween’s assassination but have been reestablished.

Affordable technology: This was developed in 1981 and is still used. No new research into this has been undertaken except for the development of innovative disposal systems for sewage in the last 10 years.

Linkages with policymakers and bureaucrats: These have been reduced considerably. The OPP-RTI staff and board members no longer lecture at the Staff College or the National Institute of Public Administration as they used to do previously, except for AH, who is officially no longer a part of the OPP-RTI. However, the Orangi model remains a part of the curriculum of these institutions, and the students have to visit the OPP during their course. The visits have become hurried and very short, and the OPP staff thinks that with the time given to them, they are not worth the effort. Linkages with government officials and policymakers have led to the inclusion of the OPP model in the government’s five-year plans and short- and long-term vision for Pakistan. It has also led to the OPP model being made a part of the sanitation policy of the federal government. In addition, OPP-RTI’s link with the Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) were also the result of linkages with an important bureaucrat and other politicians.

Being a part of the global debate on development: This was something that Akhtar Hameed Khan considered important, because without being a part of it, he felt that the OPP would suffocate with narcissism. Experts and academics from abroad continuously visited Orangi, sometimes with their students, because Orangi was discussed in academic journals through articles written by those researchers who had visited and also by Akhtat Hameed Khan and AH. This link had become nonexistent. However, it has been revived by a film made by the OPP. This film, titled The Rebel Optimist (Omar, 2016 ), is on the life and work of Perween Rahman and has been exhibited at various universities, workshops, and conferences in the West and also locally. In 2018 , it was shown in workshops at three universities in Norway. The film has been a source of great inspiration to the younger generation both locally and abroad.

These problems are being tackled, and a vision for the future based very much on the aforementioned principles is being envisioned. Close working relationships have been established with academic institutions whose students not only visit but also intern with the OPP institutions. Their number is increasing. A sense of security has been restored, and except for three persons the entire staff of the OPP institutions has continued working with the OPP-RTI. Work on the revival of the Deh Development Programme has been initiated, and the Secure Housing Support Programme is continuing, although the state’s interest in regularizing goths has declined, perhaps due to pressure from the real estate lobby. A large union council of 1,430 homes in Islamabad is partnering with OPP-RTI for building its sewage and water-supply system. This partnership began in March 2018 . The new government wants the OPP-RTI to develop 18 Islamabad informal settlements on the OPP-RTI component-sharing model. If this works out, given its reputation of transparency and honesty, the knowledge and expertise that it possesses, and the partners that it has all over Pakistan (in spite of the pressures it faces after Perween’s murder), the OPP-RTI’s work will continue.

The OPP’s Impact on Development Concepts and Practices

Given the OPP institution’s reputation of transparency and honesty along with the tested knowledge and expertise that it possesses and the partners it has all over Pakistan, the OPP-RTI is on its way to recovery. The OPP-RTI has had a major impact on the theory and practice of development in Pakistan:

Public awareness: The OPP put the katchi abadis on the development map of Pakistan. Before that the katchi abadis were considered as problem areas of crime and violence. Today, they are looked upon as consisting of human beings who are indispensable to the city’s economic and social life and who need better living conditions. The OPP-RTI’s mapping of the settlements; development and analysis of statistics; and development of profiles of activists, entrepreneurs, and schoolteachers have all fed into the electronic media as special programmes and have influenced the dramas on TV channels. As a result of the OPP work, a very strong anti-eviction lobby has also emerged, making evictions increasingly difficult.

On policy: In five-year plan documents, housing policy, sanitation policy, and katchi abadi policies (in the formation of which the OPP was involved), the OPP-RTI model of development has been proposed and is also being practiced through various government programmes such as Saaf Paani in the Punjab and by the katchi abadi directorate in the Punjab and the SKAA in Sindh. Many government officials who have associated with the OPP have gone on to develop and/or support programmes that use the OPP principles and methodology.

On academia: AH and Perween Rehman both have taught at Dawood University, NED University, and Karachi University; more recently, AH has taught at Sir Syed University. Dawood University students of the 1980s and 1990s are today important professionals and academics, and they promote the OPP model, its principles, and the culture that those principles promote. At NED University, almost the entire faculty of the department of architecture and planning and of the development studies department are the product of the Dawood University alumni of the 1980s and 1990s. Saleem Aleemuddin, director of the OPP’s sanitation program, teaches at NED University and links his teaching with the OPP programmes. Similarly, Younus Baloch, director of the Urban Resource Center, which was created by Dawood University and OPP members, also teaches at NED University. So the culture and the development methodology of the OPP continues to be taught.

OPP partners: OPP-RTI has over 50 partners spread over Pakistan, and contacts with them have been maintained. Linkages had weakened because of security reasons, but they are in the process of being strengthened. Some organizations have evolved to a level where they have also become trainers for other organizations and government initiatives that follow the OPP-RTI model. Examples of these are the Hafeez Arain Motivational and Empowerment Trust, the Soan Valley Development Project, and the Uch Community Development Support Programme.

There are other organizations that have branched off into other work, which they are doing very successfully following the OPP culture of austerity and openness. They have helped develop their own partners whom they support with technical help and managerial guidance. Examples of these are the Akhtar Hameed Khan Memorial Trust, Rawalpindi, and the Anjuman-e-samaji-Behbood Faisalabad.

Foreign experts: The World Bank, ADB, and foreign experts have made a comeback with the return of security. Their demand is for all the mapping of katchi abadis that the OPP-RTI has carried out and desire for its participation in their work. The OPP-RTI has kept the old principle alive that they will support the work but as advisors and will not charge for it.

New institutions: The OPP has helped create a number of new institutions at the city level that have played a very important role in the development-related problems of Karachi. Without the links created between professionals and communities, this very important work would never have been accomplished. This work included dealing with environmental issues related to development, equity, social justice, and the burden of foreign loans. At the same time, the OPP-RTI has also helped create Orangi-based organizations related to providing services for mapping, surveying, house improvement, house construction, and training to young people in computer related programmes on development. These organizations have become financially sustainable and have assisted the OPP in its work. A few of the prominent ones are the Urban Resource Center, Karachi (research and advocacy); the Water and Sanitation Network, Karachi (monitoring Karachi projects and their foreign loans); NGO-CBO Network, Karachi (meetings to exchange information and develop strategies to influence programmes and projects and strengthen negotiating power); the Citizens Forum on Mass Transit, Karachi (monitoring and proposing environmental alternatives).

OPP-RTI’s clients: OPP-RTI’s clients are the families in Orangi and in partner organizations the OPP-RTI works with. These are low-income families, and association of the OPP has meant an increase in their knowledge and skills (in surveying, documentation, OPP-RTI sanitation technology, and community mobilization), involvement of women in the development process, renewal of a confidence that with maps and statistics they can negotiate with government, and, above all, establishment of a vision of a future that they feel they can implement. These partner organizations are the Technical Training Resource Center (TTRC), Orangi, Karachi, and the People’s Mapping Center, Orangi, Karachi. These organizations train young people in mapping, surveying, design, and supervision of buildings. Because of them, house construction and infrastructure has improved. The TTRC has also helped the OPP in surveying and supervision of its work outside of Karachi.

The OPP’s Impact on the Housing Sector of Orangi

In 1982 , the lanes that had constructed their underground sewage system requested the OPP to initiate a housing programme through which they could improve their homes. The OPP launched the programme in 1986 . The OPP observed that over 70,000 housing units had been developed in Orangi without any assistance from the government. Most of these houses were of poor construction and design, but it was obvious that a process for their construction was in place.

The OPP felt that before developing any housing programme this process should be understood. The housing program followed a similar process of research and extension as the sanitation programme. In this case, research was done to better understand the major housing issues faced by residents, with the goal of being able to offer them a package of advice that would make construction cheaper yet improve the quality of their houses.

OPP’s research identified that the manually manufactured cement blocks, the major construction element made at the local thalla , were substandard and could not carry an extra floor. Walls had cracks in them, roofs sagged, and rising dampness, and poor ventilation created health problems.

Through this research, it was also discovered that 93% of households turned to their local thalla for everything from supplies to design and construction services and credit. Given the key role the thallas played in the housing production process, it was decided that OPP’s initial intervention would be to upgrade a thalla , mechanize its block manufacturing, introduce prefab roofing materials, and train masons in the manufacturing and use of the new technologies. This upgraded thalla became a demonstration for other thallas (Hasan, 2010 ).

Given the research findings on housing defects, the OPP team came up with new technologies that would not only result in better quality products but also achieve the overall goal of reducing cost. As part of the extension package, OPP-RTI invited thallewalas to visit the thalla who was working with the OPP. As a result, a number of thallewalas became acquainted with the OPP’s housing program, its technology, and its methodology and within one year, 75 thallas had adopted the OPP model. As a result, Orangi is a major exporter of quality cement blocks to the rest of Karachi.

In addition, in 1990 OPP-RTI began to train young community members to serve as para-architects, to help fill the gap of professional advice available to the residents during construction (Hasan, 2010 ). In 1999 , two community members who were trained as para-architects founded the Technical Training Resource Center, providing design advice, complete with drawings and estimates to Orangi residents. The Center also provides design advice for schools, clinics, and house improvements. Between 1987 and February 2008 , four OPP-RTI-supported thallas had produced 39 million blocks worth Rs 179 million, 60% of which were sold outside of Orangi (Hasan, 2010 ). In Orangi itself, about 2,500 houses benefited every year from the use of improved building components (OPP, 2018 ).

In order to empower the residents and improve their experience during the construction process, OPP also created extension posters and flyers, with the goal of improving the residents’ knowledge about building techniques and what to expect from the thallewalas . Para-architects were also deployed, when necessary, to monitor the work of the thallewalas to see that blocks and building components were not substandard in quality. OPP’s advice on ventilation and light has also been followed by a lot of house builders, improving environmental conditions within their homes.

The most important conclusion that emerges from the history of the OPP is that its success owes a lot to the stature and reputation of its founder, Akhtar Hameed Khan. For him, all doors in government and academic institutions were open. He could also dictate his terms and get his financers to accept that the OPP would be an open-ended project. Orangi has changed since 1981 when OPP began. A new generation has emerged which is literate and in search of jobs. It has middle-class aspirations as a result of which young people are increasingly acquiring white-collar jobs. Single- and double-story homes are becoming four to five stories in height, and as such infrastructure requirements have changed considerably. The ethnic and political conflicts have also taken their toll and reduced government involvement in the provision of infrastructure and its management.

The OPP-RTI is fully aware of these changes and is adapting to them by expanding its training programme for young people and helping them to create local-level institutions (such as the TTRC), which could not only generate jobs but also help in designing a better physical environment.

The manner in which the leadership of the OPP is related to the Orangi staff and communities has varied depending on the person involved. However, throughout, the OPP has remained true to its founding culture of austerity and of looking at development from the eyes and perceptions of the community. In the initial stages (between 1980 and 1987 ), the OPP reached out to government agencies and relevant bureaucrats and explained its model. However, today it is government and international agencies who reach out to the OPP-RTI. This is because the OPP-RTI has considerable material in the shape of maps and literature, not only about Orangi but the whole of Karachi. It also has links with local communities. Such maps, literature, and links are not available anywhere except the OPP-RTI. Whenever a change in government takes place, new plans are developed for Karachi and at that moment, the government approaches the OPP-RTI for advice and documents. This happened again after the formation of the new government in August 2018 .

From the very beginning, Akhtar Hameed Khan was sure that the OPP would involve itself in other issues beyond sanitation. He had identified four concerns: sanitation, housing, health, and education. However, he waited for the right moment to introduce these programmes, which he identified intuitively.

The OPP has survived the onslaught it faced. One of the major reasons for its survival is that the staff did not abandon it because they had been taught to feel that the organization belonged to them. In addition, they had developed at the OPP from unskilled to skilled technicians, surveyors, and documenters, almost all of them belonging to Orangi. The survival also had a lot to do with Anwar Rashid, the OCT director, who was not willing to see his 30-year work and involvement be washed out in spite of a constant threat to his life. A major factor in the survival of the OPP was also the pursuing of the Perween Rehman assassination case, which was done by her sister Aquila. This kept the OPP alive in the press and kept the interest of the public in the media. What also kept it alive was its reputation, both internationally and nationally, and the support it received not only from the media but also from civil society organizations and prominent citizens of Karachi. The OPP’s reputation was a result of the involvement of the media, academia, and civil society through visits to the project and the presentation of its work at various meetings, seminars, and conferences.

The concept of the component-sharing model is well established and has been adopted by the ADB for its Southern Punjab projects and the Changa Paani project in Lahore. In Karachi, the city government and the KWSB have also adopted the model of converting nalas into box trunks.

Appendix 1. List of Water Aid Partners

Community Development Support Programme, Uch Sharif

Organization Plan Environment, Gujranwala

Hafeez Arain Memorial Empowerment Trust, Bahawalpur

Seher Development Organization, Gujranwala

Organization for Health and Development, Jampur

Nawan Sojhlan Foundation, Jampur

Sanghar Welfare Development Support Organization, Sanghar

Rural Area Welfare Development Organization, Sanghar

Watan Welfare Organization, Nawabshah

Sindh Rural Development Organization, Umerkot

Zehra Humanitarian Organization, Sanghar

Bhagwan Development Organization, Battagram

Technical Training Resource Center, Karachi

Tameer Technical Center, Karachi

Peoples Mapping Center, Karachi

Anjuman e Samaaji Behbood, Dhuddiwala

Akhtar Hameed Khan Memorial Trust, Rawalpindi

Environmental Protection Society, Swat

Organization for Participatory Development, Gujranwala

Lodhran Pilot Project, Lodhran

Research and Awareness for Community Empowerment, Lodhran/Kehror

Gender Unity for Integrated Development, Multan/Basti Malook

Society for Health and Environment Development, Yazman

Youth Commission for Human Rights, Lahore

1. Some of them are Dr. Noman Ahmed, dean of NED University, Karachi; Fazal Noor, head of the Department of Architecture and Planning, Sir Syed University, Karachi; Rabia Siddiqui, head of the Department of Architecture and Planning, Dawood University, Karachi; Iftikhar Kaimkhani, director of the Masterplan Group of Offices, Karachi Development Authority; Mohammed Younus, director of the Urban Resource Center, Karachi.

2. Some of these bureaucrats are Tasneem Siddiqui, father of the Incremental Housing Programme (Khuda Ki Basti) whose infrastructure development followed the OPP model, and Dr. Shujaat Ali, DC Fasialabad in 1994, who supported the OPP partner Anjuman-e-Falah-o-Behbood and later on the important NGO project, Changa Pani. Currently, he is the dean of the National Institute of Planning where mid-level and senior bureaucrats are trained. He has made the study and experience of the OPP model compulsory. Irfan Ali, DC West in Orangi, Karachi in 1992–1996, helped the OPP in working with the ADB and supporting the OPP model during that period.

3. Prominent among them are Professor John Pickford, professor emeritus, University of Laughborough; David Sattherwaite and Diana Mitlin of the International Institute for Environment and Development, U.K.; Jorge Anzorina of Selavip; Kirtee Shah, director Ahmedabad Study Action Group; Somsook Boonyabancha, president of the Asian Coalition for Housing Rights.

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ORGANIZATION

Orangi pilot project (opp) as an ngo began work in orangi town in 1980. orangi situated in the periphery of karachi is a cluster of 113 low income settlements* with a population of 1.5 million. on the success of its five basic programs of low cost sanitation, housing, health, education and credit for micro enterprise, in 1988 opp was upgraded into three autonomous institutions..

In Pakistan, poor peoples housing (known as Katchi Abadis – the unofficial sector) are everywhere. In Karachi, a port city and commercial center of Pakistan, about 60 % of the total population of 23 million, live in these abadis. Here land is purchased from a middle man (the land supplier) who subdivides government and some private land and sells it to the poor, in the process, paying bribes of cash and choice plots to the government functionaries. Presently 72% of these abadies have been notified i.e. accepted by the government, while more then 50% of the houses have been provided land title- remaining are under process. This has been mainly due to the peoples consistent efforts. Provision of a housing unit is not a problem. People build their houses incrementally, with building component manufacturing yards in the settlements providing building materials and components on credit. Initially the land supplier (who is a resourceful person having links with politicians, government departments and the private operators) arranges the supply of water through water tankers and transportation (i.e. bus routes). As the settlement expands and consolidates, need for water supply, sewage disposal, schools and clinics arises. For livelihood, people set up micro enterprises in their homes. People lobby with government for facilities but due to lack of or adhoc government response, they soon undertake self help initiatives. In 1980 when OPP started work in Orangi, it observed peoples initiatives in provision of sewage disposal, water supply, schools and clinics, as well as the limitations of the response from the government. OPP decided to strengthen people’s initiatives with social and technical guidance. It is demonstrated through the programs that at the neighborhood level people can finance, manage and maintain facilities like sewerage, water supply, schools, clinics, solid waste disposal and security. Government's role is to compliment people's work with larger facilities like trunk sewers and treatment plants, water mains and water, colleges/universities, hospitals, main solid waste disposals and land fill sites. The component-sharing concept clearly shows that where government partners with the people, sustainable development can be managed through local resources.

OPP-Research and Training Institute (OPP-RTI) manages the low cost sanitation, housing/secure housing support program, education program, the now evolving water supply and the women’s savings programs as well as the related research and training programs. Earthquake and the flood rehabilitation works are also undertaken.

OPP-Orangi Charitable Trust (OPP-OCT) manages the micro enterprise credit program.

OPP-Karachi Health and Social Development Association (OPP-KHASDA) manages the health program. Each institution has its separate board of directors and mobilizes its own funds. Development is self financed by the people. OPP institutions provide social and technical guidance and credit for micro enterprise. For replication OPP institutions strengthen the partner Non Government Organizations (NGOs)/ Community Based Organizations (CBOs) and Government agencies (instead of setting up their own offices). *The settlements began as katchi abadies , between 1986 to 1992 most settlements were notified i.e officially accepted by the government.

APPROACH AND STRATEGY

The approach is to encourage and strengthen community initiatives (with social, technical guidance and credit for micro enterprise) and evolve partnerships with the government for development based on local resource. The methodology is action research and extension. That is analyzing outstanding problems of the area, people’s initiatives, the bottlenecks in the initiatives, then through a process of action research and extension education evolving viable solutions promoting participatory action. In short developing low cost package of advice, guiding and facilitating community organizations for self help and partnership with the government.

INSTITUTIONS & PROGRAMS

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, Akhtar Hameed Khan , Orangi Pilot Project , Orangi Town , Towns in Karachi
Case Studies on the Orangi Pilot Project (Sanitation)

Case Studies on the Orangi Pilot Project (Sanitation)

Whose Public Action? Analysing Inter-sectoral Collaboration for Service Delivery

Pakistan Sanitation Case Study: Orangi Pilot Project-Research Training Institute’s (OPP-RTI’s) relationship with government agencies

Dr Masooda Bano

Islamabad, Pakistan

February 2008

Published: February 2008 (c) International Development Department (IDD) / Masooda Bano ISBN: 0704426692 9780704426696

This research is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council under the ESRC Non- Governmental Public Action Programme. The ESRC is the UK’s leading research and training agency addressing economic and social concerns. ESRC aims to provide high- quality research on issues of importance to business, the public sector and Government.

2 1. Introduction This report provides an understanding of the evolution and nature of the relationship between OPP and the Karachi City Government (KCG) and the Karachi Water and Sewage Board (KWSB) to improve access to sanitation facilities for poor communities. The report attempts to identify the key factors shaping the relationship and whether and how the relationship has influenced the working or agendas of the participating organisations.

1.1. Methodology The information and analysis provided in this report is based on documentary evidence, in-depth interviews with staff within the NSP and the relevant government agencies and the observation of the realities witnessed during the fieldwork conducted with the NSP and the relevant state agencies during November 2006 to September 2007. The report also draws upon analysis of the evolution of the state-NSP relationship in Pakistan and the programme analysis for each sector conducted during stage 2 of this research project. Drawing on those reports was important to identify the over all conditioning factors shaping the relationship under study.

In developing an account of the conditioning factors the report draws upon government policy documents, Five Year Development Plans, interviews with prominent civil society members who have seen the NSPs evolve, academics, and senior officials within the ministry of education, health, and social welfare. The analysis also drew upon the country strategy plans of the multilateral and bilateral donors based in Islamabad to understand their role in the evolution of state and NSP relations in Pakistan. Most of these interviews were conducted during stage 2 of the research project. At the first stage of the fieldwork, the obvious players within each sector were identified. These in particular included the government, the leading NGOs working within education, health, and water and sanitation, and international donor community. Interviews were initially conducted with the main focal point/ ministry spokesmen within each ministry to help identify those government programmes within which there are some obvious relationships with the NSPs. These exploratory interviews were followed up with in-depth interviews with the heads or senior officials of the relevant programmes. Interviews were also conducted with many NSP providers in all the three sectors especially those, which are involved in some form of relationship with the state in service provision. Some big NSPs, with a national or regional presence, which were not involved in a relationship with the state, were also interviewed to get a critical perspective on the partnership programmes. At the same time, interviews were conducted with sector specialists in leading development agencies, including the multilateral and bilateral organizations like the World Bank and DFID.

This was in recognition of the fact that the government development plans and sector strategy papers, as well as initial interviews with the government and non- profit providers, made it clear very early on that the international donor agencies were often key players behind initiation of many of these partnerships. The international literature on partnerships had also suggested the likelihood of finding

3 a strong donor influence on them– ‘partnerships’ being a key objective of the millennium development goals. Reports of independent research think-tanks on each of the three sectors were also consulted. Where possible, a few seminars and conferences on the related subjects were attended. For example, the Second South Asian Conference on Sanitation (SACOSAN) provided a valuable opportunity to identify the programmes within water and sanitation and to verify the information gathered from different sources. Similarly, a workshop organised by an INGO in Islamabad with leading education NGOs from across the country was utilised to help identify the various types of relationships/programmes that exist among them and the state in the provision of education services. The country strategy plans of the bigger donors were also consulted. All these stages of the fieldwork helped identify the broader conditioning factors shaping state-NSP relations in each sector and the key programmes and prominent cases to pursue for in-depth investigation.

The next stage of the fieldwork focused specifically on the chosen case-study. During the time spent on the specific case, it was felt important to get perspective of not just the leadership of the NSP and the government departments but also those of the middle and field level staff and of any actors in the wider network who influence the relationship. Thus, in addition to the NSP leaders, staff members, and government officials, interviews were conducted with the community and the representatives of the NGO networks if they had a role in the shaping of the relationship.

1.2. Selection of OPP

Given that the case under study was selected after extensive exploration of the possible programme and case options, it might be useful to recall the reasons for selecting OPP as the case study. Out of the four potential programmes (1. Involvement of the Rural Support Programmes (RSPs) in Water and Sanitation, 2. Municipal Collaboration with Non-State Providers in Jaranwala, 3. Replication of Orangi Pilot Project approaches, 4. Collaboration of Water Vending Services in Orangi, Karachi) the reason for focusing on OPP model of low cost-sanitation was that it is a much older programme, presents multiple levels of interaction with the state, and is also being replicated by other NSPs in other provinces. In terms of case selection, the reason for choosing OPP over Lodhran Pilot project (LPP) was that OPP engages with the government at multiple levels and is much bigger organization than LPP thus providing an opportunity to analyze the relationship at multiple levels. OPP operates in Karachi, the largest city of Pakistan, while LPP was based in Lodhran a small town. This also made OPP a better case as being based in a big city it faces many more challenges. Finally and most importantly, being the parent organization OPP had a much longer history and had evolved gradually as opposed to LPP where political influence of Jehangir Tareen has played a key role in its sudden rise.

In selecting OPP, the only concern was that the programme had already been studied a lot. But, it was felt that it has not been analysed so far from the angle of

4 this study –the focus on government-NSP relations. It is true that it has received more attention than any other sanitation programme in Pakistan but, as for proper analysis, the model has been studied mainly as an effective tool for mobilising community participation for effective sanitation services. There is still scope to study how it has (successfully) managed to involve the government. Focusing on OPP also had the advantage that this programme has had a large impact and is constantly in negotiation with the government about extending its programmes as well as its core project. OPP-RTI is now the Karachi City Government’s team member for developing the cities main sewage disposal and drainage channels. Karachi Water and Sewerage Board too has lately accepted OPP-RTI proposals. They are currently also advising the Karachi government on how to deal with floods caused by recent rains. OPP has also been approached to contribute to National Sanitation Policy, which is dealt by the federal government. So, the collaboration is on-going at multiple levels.

5 2. Organizational profiles & factors shaping them

This part of the report elaborates on how the NSP and the relevant government authorities are structured to pursue their visions of or commitments to public action. It further tries to identify the diverse interests of the actors within these organization and their motives for engaging in public action.

2.1 The organization today

OPP-RTI is one of the three main units of Orangi Pilot Project and is focused on water and sanitation. On the government side, it deals with the Karachi City government as well as the Karachi Water and Sewage Board.

Structure Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) is an NGO that began its work in Orangi in 1980. Situated in the periphery of Karachi, Orangi is a low-income settlement with a population of one million. OPP’s role has been to support community initiatives for development, mobilize local resources and build partnership between people and government. In the process it aims to strengthen government’s capacity for delivery of infrastructure. Over the years, OPP has developed projects in multiple sectors: low cost sanitation, housing, education, health, and credit for micro enterprise. In 1988, these programmes were divided into three independent institutions of which one is Orangi Pilot Project-Research and Training Institute (OPP-RTI); Orangi’s sanitation work comes under OPP-RTI.

Model The low cost sanitation programme, which is central to OPP’s partnership with the government, began with providing social and technical support to residents in Orangi to lay self-help lane and secondary sewers. This model has now expanded all over the city, and has been replicated in 12 other cities and a number of villages. This model has come to be known as component sharing model within development. The latrine in the homes, the lane sewers and secondary sewers known as ‘internal development’ are financed, managed and maintained by the people, while the trunk sewers and treatment plants known as ‘external development’ remains the responsibility of the government.

Successes Through the programme 1,45,466 houses have invested Rs 191.5million (US$3.2 million) in latrines in the homes and lane sewers with government investing more then Rs 276 million (US$4.6 million) on trunk mains. In 1992 the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation accepted the OPP model for its Asian Development Bank (financed sewerage project for a part of Orangi). In 1994 Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority, the provincial government agency responsible for provision of land title and upgrading of Katchi Abadis (informal settlements), adopted the OPP approach. In 2003 the Punjab Katchi Abadi and Urban Improvement Directorate too accepted the model; replication is underway. OPP-RTI is now the Karachi City Government’s team member for developing the cities main sewage disposal and

6 drainage channels. The City government has lately allocated Rs 2.15 billion (US$ 36 million) for the work. Karachi Water & Sewerage Board (KWSB) too has lately accepted OPP-RTI proposals. In addition, the National Sanitation Policy (NSP) that has lately been approved by the President includes OPP-RTI’s model of component sharing to be adopted nationwide. OPP is assisting the government in preparing the procedures and rules.

Current activities OPP continues to expand its work of low cost sanitation within Orangi with cooperation of the government. In addition, it continues to expand its services across the city level. The KWSB has requested OPP-RTI support for the provision of water supply and sewage disposal for Karachi’s katchi abadis. During 2004, the city government made OPP-RTI a member of its focal group for the development of nalas/drainage channels in Karachi. OPP-RTI has been identifying, prioritizing, designing, and estimating major drainage channels for Karachi. During 2005, Karachi Water and Sewage Board, which for a long time was a strong supporter of mega projects and foreign loans has also started to support OPP-RTI’s low cost model. Parveen Rehman, Director of OPP adds: ‘We are now making a water plan with Karachi Water and Sewage Board. It is a water supply plan to the city. We will put it to the government, politicians, and NGOs. For every issue we try to provide a situation analysis, list the issues, and provide solutions.’

For these interventions, OPP interacts with the government at multiple levels. Parveen Rehman, the head of OPP, meets the Director of City government and the Karachi Water and Sewage Board fortnightly. In addition, the government field staff interact with the OPP field staff on daily basis. OPP office based staff also hold a meeting with the government field staff every Tuesday of the week. The purpose of the meetings is to discuss problems being faced in current programmes as well as to help the government officials develop new programmes to meet the sanitation needs in the area.

Replications Since 1994, the OPP-RTI partner NGOs/CBOs that started replication are now expanding work beyond their towns and cities. They are constantly negotiating project and policy changes in partnership with the people and government. The replication partners are: Anjuman-e-Samaji Behbood (ASB) in Faisalabad and Jaranwala; Lodhran Pilot Project (LPP) in Lodhran, Khanpur and surrounding villages; Conservation and Rehabilitation Centre (CRC) in Uch Sharif, Ahmedpur Shariqa and Alipur; Akhtar Hameed Khan Memorial Trust (AKHMT) in Rawalpindi; Organization Pan environment (OPE) and Al-Watan Forum (AWF) in Gujrawala; Muawin in Lahore and Shahpur Chakar Welfare Society (SCWS) in Sanghar. ASB, LPP, CRC, AHKMT and Muawin are now mature partners replicating work at city level and partnering with government agencies.

During the interview, Perween Rehman, the Director of OPP explained that the replication process started in late 1980s to early 1990s but the process was not smooth: ‘The first replication attempts were failures. Out of seven, five failed.

7 Initially, we were excited at any attempt at replication and were ready to support it. Some people also abused it as OPP’s approval meant that many donors were willing to give large sums of money. After some bad experiences we became more careful in replication attempts. Overtime, we have had some very good experiences.’ She explained that OPP has some quite mature partners in Punjab. However, within Sindh the replication process has only expanded now. The nature of replication is also different in Sindh as here often three to four NGOs come together with a request while in case of Punjab requests were normally from individual organizations.

Ironically, Akhtar Hameed Khan’s death contributed to the dramatic expansion of OPP’s influence in the last couple of years. ‘When Dr sahib expired it was also a turning point in terms of expansion. A lot of people who had been inspired by him said that they will now put in effort to take his ideas and work forward. This gave a new boost to the organisation and led to new replications and extending OPP’s influence to Karachi city government level and now the national level. Currently, two things are taking a lot of our time: new replications and strengthening our partners,’ explains Perween.

Website OPP launched its website (www.oppinstitutions.org) in 2000. It has already completed the computerisation of the mapping system as far as Karachi city is concerned. The entire mapping of Karachi is computerised now and uploaded on the website. The hard copy mapping and its forwarding to the government officials concerned when done manually was a very time consuming process. Therefore, OPP moved to computerization of the mapping system as ‘it saves so much time.’ Mr. Ashraf Hussain, in charge of computerisation of the mapping system and developing the web-links explained ‘Technology makes life easier. Before that too much time was consumed on the mapping. Hard copy work was taking months. So we digitized it.’

Computerisation has made sketching, free hand mapping, drafting and verification of the mapping of any Katchi Abadi easier. Before computerisation, OPP was focused on manual site surveys, public demands surveys, sketching, mappings and its verifications. Now, OPP staff search internet through google (Google Earth) and digitise mapping from there. Before computerisation, they were unable to get the real proportion of the map. Now according to Mr Hussain, they have 100 per cent accurate information because of the computerization. At present, the OPP is busy in preparing computerised mapping of Nullahs (rains and flood drains). It is getting the exact location/direction of the drains. They are also being able to do it at very low cost. According to Mr Hussain, ‘If any MNC (Multi National Company) does this (computerised mapping) it will be very costly.’

OPP has already done the mapping of the drainage system of Karachi and has uploaded these maps onto their website. It is now trying to upload maps for the 200 Katchi Abadis in Karachi. The plans are ambitious where they want to computerise mapping of Sindh province and then the entire Pakistan. There are 18

8 towns in Karachi and 18 Town Nazims are working under CDGK (City District Government of Karachi ).

On the government side, the organizational structure is relatively more complicated for water and sanitation than the other two sectors. There is no federal ministry for water and sanitation as a consequence multiple government agencies share this role. Plus the co-existence of formal and informal settlements and use of natural channels for sewage disposal in many areas have led to confusion over responsibilities between different government agencies. Officially the main divides are as follows: storm drains and natural channels (nalas) are taken care of by the city, town and Union Council governments, while the sewerage system has been outsourced to the semi autonomous Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB). Thus, City District Government Karachi (CDGK) Department of Works and Services and KWSB are the two main authorities carrying out the water and sanitation responsibilities in Karachi and with which OPP has to work closely. The CDGK is mainly responsible for planning, development and maintenance of storm drains, and special development programmes. The KWSB is a semi-autonomous body under the CDG and is responsible for construction, improvement, maintenance, and operation of sewage works and industrial waste disposal systems in Karachi. The agency is divided into a sewerage maintenance wing and a sewerage development wing. The maintenance wing’s budget is generated through service delivery charges and a subsidy from CDGK.

Until 2000, development wing financed its operations mainly through IFI-funded projects. KWSB for long was an advocate of mega projects and foreign loans. Refusing to build on what exists, preferring high cost technical solutions depending on pumping, while negating low cost gravity flow systems-the nalas/drainage channels as the main disposals. Most ADB and World Bank funded sewerage projects for Karachi worth more then Rs. 4 billion including, those specially for Katchi Abadis (K.A.) have been a waste (OPP-RTI, partner URC and ADBs audit reports document these). In 1999 due to citizens advocacy supported by OPP-RTI’s technical design a US $ 100 million Korangi sewerage project for a part of Karachi was cancelled by the Govt. Since then citizens lobby and similar views within a number of KWSB’s senior team has brought about a process of change in the mindset and so the flexibility in planning. Now it is mainly funded through grants from the provincial and federal government.

2. History and conditioning factors

2.2.1 Political climate OPP started work in the 1980s, when a military led government was in power. This was also a time when much was happening: Afghan Jihad, the weakening of the Soviet Union, rising international influence of neo-liberal thinking through the Bretton Woods Institutions, and the influx of international development aid to non-governmental organizations as opposed to the state in the developing countries. All these factors played an important role in shaping the voluntary

9 sector in Pakistan. It is in the early eighties that Pakistan registered the birth of NGOs as a specific form of NSP, and a dramatic shift of prominent leftist workers to this platform. What this new term represented was a new way of funding social or voluntary organisations, where these organisations could apply for development aid. Many people of the left being persecuted by the military government found their shelter within the NGOs.

OPP was thus established during a period at a time when the NGO culture was budding in Pakistan. It also attracted many of the people from the left. Dr Shameem Zainuddin who heads the health programme of OPP explained how some of the senior staff members of OPP were political activists who worked in Orangi area and who Dr Akhter Hameed Khan convinced over time to work with OPP. The motivation in their case was never the monetary aspect but a sense of bringing a change. As Dr Shameem Zainuddin explains, we joined only due to our respect for the intellect and personal commitment of Dr AHK.

Anwar Rashid himself has a very political background and along with Perveen represents the current leadership of OPP. Before coming to OPP, he was a lecturer in Karachi University. Before that he had spent seven years in the politics of the left. ‘We got this training from there day and night. The main issue is that how do you look at things. I joined the left because there are two kinds of people: one is the man with the briefcase who runs after a lot of things; the other category is that looks at things in his own way. I came from Bengal and when I came the material things became very meaningless for me,’ he argues. According to Anwar Rashid, incidents do have an impact on life. He was in his 20s when he joined Awami League despite the fact that none of the non-Bengalis used to join it and that his father was against this. But, he left his family and came to Karachi and took an independent decision. Then he started studying in the Karachi University and later taught in development economics. Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan used to come and teach there too and Anwar Rahid was impressed by the way he talked. ‘He was my teacher. He was also a very good historian,’ elaborates Anwar Rashid. Then in Zia period, orders were given to prepare list of all those people in universities who were against the Islamic thought. Anwar Rashid was against the university being interfered in that manner by the government and questioned. So, it became impossible to stay within the university and this made him join Dr AHK. By this time Ahktar Hameed Khan had already involved him in the work in OPP especially because he had political links within the communities. Dr AHK gave him only Rs 600/= as salary but said that “here you will have the freedom to do what you feel is right. He said that you sit in the library and read books and then discuss them with me.” Thus, the political climate of Pakistan, where the left was persecuted under the military government, played a role in pushing leftist workers into NGOs, including OPP. Therefore, the independence of thought and the desire to fight for ones ideals has remained critical to OPP work.

2.2.2 Characteristics of the leader Despite being born in the period when many other prominent NGOs in Pakistan were established, OPP has been able to retain a very distinct identity from the

10 broader NGO community. The general reputation of OPP within the NGO sector matches these claims. It is well known about OPP that it has never taken to the NGO culture – where offices are normally located in posh localities, salaries are high, and four-wheel drives is considered a necessity. Dr Akhter Hameed Khan is widely respected for living a very simply life despite the fact that he could have chosen a very luxurious lifestyle. As Mr Aliuddin from OPP-RTI explained: ‘Akhtar Hameed Khan always said that you cannot work with the community and win their confidence if you have salaries 5-10 times higher than what they get.’

By his personal example, Akhter Hameed Khan was able to set the incentive structure with the organization in such a way that monetary compensation was never allowed to be the primary motive for the work of the senior management. Perween also explained: ‘Personally, I don’t feel the temptation for higher salaries because we have our reward in terms of a very good team spirit. It eventually depends on what you want in life. Dr AHK developed in us all a sense of responsibility for our work and a team spirit. The freedom that we have had in OPP has kept us here.’

Elaborating on his experience, Anwar Rashid further elaborates this point: “World Bank has offered me to come but why should I go to World Bank and do “chakari” (a slang for job for the sake of money alone). Perveen can also very easily get Rs 200,000/= per month but she wont do it. Working in the World Bank will take all our thought away. If I was in charge of Sindh area could I have said go ahead and produce this documentary and undertake action.”

Anwar Rashid is also critical of the general NGO culture: “Micro-finance has become a mafia now. They are out to make money. I criticize them openly in meetings and they now say that I should not come to these meetings. I have told all members of Pakistan Poverty Fund that why they have made all partners of this platform beggars.”

The feeling that they are not driven by money has also been important in forming the relationship with the government. Perween highlighted how OPP-RTI does not take any money for the work done for the government. They do not charge any fee for the consultancy work they do for the government. The feel that if they take money they will lose the power to influence the government. ‘By not taking money for our services we are able to have a bigger influence on the policies, which is our main purpose,’ explains Perween. The government officials interviewed also mentioned how OPP-RTI helps them even design the TOR of the consultants without taking any fee. It also raises the issue of how in fact OPP-RTI is providing a supporting role to the government officials by taking on some of their workload rather than acting as a rival.

2.2.3 Obvious need: rise of slums in Karachi The city of Karachi has seen massive rural to urban migration from the very beginning. The current population is estimated to be above 13 million. The rapid influx of rural migrants led to increasing housing demands within the city. The

11 failure of the state to respond to this demand led to a complex system of informal housing referred to as katchi abadis ( slum dwellings) where the land is occupied by professional land grabbers and then sold in small plots to low income households without the legal paperwork. This leads to sprawling illegal housing colonies where the state shoulders little responsibility for social service provision given that they do not fall in its official planning area. These unplanned urban areas - katchi abadis - today accommodate approximately 6 million people, a little under half the population of Karachi. In 1975, a policy of katchi abadi regularisation was adopted, which led to the establishment of the Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA) to regularize the illegal settlements but the process has been very slow with only 1.5 per cent of katchi abadis being regularised per year. The desperate living conditions in these slums were a key reason motivating Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan, who had acquired much reputation in the Comilla Pilot Project in Bangladesh , to establish OPP when Aga Hasan Abedi, the founder of one of the biggest Pakistani banks BCCI, offered funds to initiate a pilot project drawing upon the lessons from Comilla.

The following excerpt from Akhtar Hameed Khan’s book feels explain how the conditions within the slums shaped formation and working of OPP itself:

Orangi is Karachi’s biggest katchi abadi. It is not an inner-city slum, but a new suburban settlement which began twenty-five years ago. Its population is estimated to be about one million persons, consisting of mohajirs (old Indian immigrants), Biharis (immigrants from Bangladesh), Pathans (immigrants from the Northern Areas), Punjabis, Sindhis, and Balochis. It is proudly called a mini Pakistan. The majority belong to the working classes. A survey made in 1989 shows that there were 110 mohallas or sectors, 6,347 lanes or streets, and 94,122 houses. More immigrants are coming and building more houses every year. The people are fully aware of their vote power and street power. There are anjumans and associations everywhere; lobbyism is very popular; demands are pressed and complaints made about deprivation ceaselessly.

The official agencies have neither the resources nor the competence to satisfy the demands. The facilities which they have provided are grossly inadequate. OPP as an NGO could not aspire to improve the ability or capacity of officials, and there was no need for OPP to engage in lobbying, of which there was more than enough. OPP found a new role.

Research revealed that the people of Orangi were doing most things for themselves:

• Ninety-five thousand houses were built without any help from the Development Authority or the House Building Corporation; • 509 private schools and 646 private clinics had been set up. Transport was almost entirely under private management, • More than eleven thousand shops, workshops, and micro-enterprises were providing employment to thousands of families.

12 To improve the quality and expand the scope of people’s own efforts, OPP became a supporting institution with a small staff of technicians and social organizers, who gave social and technical guidance. Later a Trust was registered for giving loans.

OPP followed a research and extension approach. First it thoroughly analysed the problems and the popular methods of solving them. Then it tried to develop a better package of advice and offer it to the people.

2.2.4 Choosing donors without strings One reason that OPP has been able to maintain a different culture than other NGOs, which started at the same time, is that OPP was very selective in its donors and maintains very low organizational costs to stay independent of dependence on donors. This has enabled it to ensure consistency in its philosophy as well as the geographical focus. OPP was sponsored by Aga Hasan Abedi and began work on 1st April 1980. OPP model is low-cost sanitation where the emphasis is on achieving results with minimum of input. As Perveen Rehman explained, ‘you have to remember that our annual running costs are quite low.’ OPP has been building reserves and its management claims to have reserves that can help it last 10 years. For an organization of OPP-RTI’s scale, the annual budget of Rs.60 hundred thousand per annum reflects its low-cost policy. The model is such that the government and the community are expected to contribute the financial resources; OPP provides the technical expertise.

The running cost of OPP comes from its seed money and some select donors. In the first instance, OPP does not take money from any donor. OPP remains very selective in accepting donor funds. Its core funds come from the seed endowment given a Pakistani bank at the time of establishment of OPP. OPP does not take money from international financial institutions and even the UN. According to Perween, ‘Initially, we did not know much about them so we engaged with these institutions like World Bank, ADB, and the UN agencies. But our experiences with them did not prove good so we decided not to work with them in future. Even with the UN we do not enter formal programmes. We feel it is a waste of time so we do not work with them. They can, however, take our trainings where they are free to send their staff members and we charge them the training fee. But, we do not enter into any agreement or contract with them.’

If a donor approaches OPP, the leadership asks them to just come and see OPP’s work. If they find a mutually agreed goal then they consider collaborating further. ‘The issue is not the money. Our current donors, like Water Aid and Homeless International, have been our friends for a long time and money has come in only recently’, explains Perween. She further adds: ‘Our philosophy is that if someone comes to you, we have to see them but we don’t have to go to their meetings unless we feel they fit our work ethics. For example, ADB and WB always get time when they want to come to Orangi but we have a policy not to take on their consultancy work,’ she adds.

13 OPP is currently trying to develop a new model with Messero where it is trying to develop its own endowment funds to fund smaller organizations. “We have Rs 30 Lakhs for it. With another 70 lakhs we will have an annual income of around Rs 10 lakhs which will support 5 organisations. We are saying to donors that you can get the basic donation back in 3 years as we will only be working out of the interest money’, explains Perween.

2.2.5 Staff The OPP staff is mostly from within the community and their salary bracket is not very high. The emphasis is on motivating the staff through mentoring, inspiration, and team building rather than purely material incentives. Anwar Rashid summed up OPP’s staff policy in these words: ‘Our staff profile is very different. Many leave only after death. You won’t get trained people. You have to make people; you have to invest in them. When you will make people, and you will train them then they will get moulded the way you want them. What the employee value is flexibility, freedom, respect, and decisions are all made by consensus. Our view is that we will take those who do not know anything and we will make them. We bring them to that level that they can do work. Then we pay them at the market level.’

He further adds, ‘The human relations are critical here. These are our children. We motivate them by ‘behavioural culture’ rather than ‘material incentives’. The behavioural culture is based on respect and recognition. No one likes to be lost in the ‘Hajoom’ (crowd). We give them that individual recognition for their contributions. When you recognize them and their work, they stay happy. The real thing is the human relations. If you connect at the basis of these relations they will not go anywhere.’

Perween placed similar emphasis on building relationship in motivating the staff. ‘There is also a difference in our working methodology. It is teamwork not just leadership. The ‘humanness of relationship’ is very important to the relationship.’ She recollected similar relationship with Akhtar Hameed Khan. ‘Dr Sahib used to order a lot but no one used to listen. In our relationship there was a lot of love, so we can fight with each other. Similarly, we are very close to Arif Hasan and call him ‘Guru’.’

The importance of this philosophy in building the staff was clear in interviews with the junior staff members. Mr. Javaid Ali/head of field operations explained, ‘The personalities of Ms Perween Rehman, Mr. Anwar Rashid and Mr. Salim Aliuddin are very motivating. They involve us in decision-making. They inspire us to keep working with the organization. We play multiple roles in OPP.’ He further added, ‘I live in Orangi because of the relationship with the community, I'm glued to the OPP. I've freedom here, this is the motivation. Madam (Ms Parveen Rehman) has made every one independent. I'm with the OPP since 1982 and I'm not going anywhere. Ah! Yes, I'm satisfied with my salary.’

14 Mr. Ashraf Hussain, In charge of computerisation of the mapping system and developing the web-links, was similarly very proud of his association with OPP. He did B-Tech from a private university (from Karachi) and then joined OPP because it offered him a fellowship in 1996. He left OPP in 1999 and rejoined two years later in 2001. He explained, ‘I came here as a student. I got a chance in (an) MNC (Multi National Company), where I worked for two years on GIS (Geographic Information System). It was a two-year work contract. When it ended they (the Multi National Company) offered me extension. I refused and rejoined the OPP. We started computerisation of the mapping (system) two years ago. This is our third year.’

From my observations during visits to OPP, it seems that OPP also has a strong emphasis on self-regulation and flexibility for the staff. Many of the staff members came after 10.30. Also, Dr Shameem Zainuddin mentioned that I had told Dr AKH that I will work for very little but what I want in return is my independence to carry on doing other work. One of the field staff interviewed also mentioned that she has been working with OPP for the last sixteen years, as the management is very understanding. She was allowed to have flexible working hours during the years she had small children. Thus, the organizational philosophy has shaped a flexible working culture where the staff feel strong ownership of the organization.

OPP has also constantly tried to provide new opportunities to people who train with it. Sirajuddin who now runs an independent organization with the name of TTRC was trained in Orangi for some years before he was encouraged to start an organization of his own which trains youth from within Orangi in basic mapping skills. During 1994-1998 he took training at OPP. Working since 2001, TTRC has given mapping training to over 10 organizations. Sirajuddin explains: ‘First I was in Korangi. My bigger brother was working with OPP. 4 years ago, Homeless International gave us Rs 5 lakhs, which was placed in an endowment. The boys who come from the area for training get free training. We give the boys training and then also try to get them jobs. We try that they work for the community. We also train young girls.’

Discussing TTRC’s case, Perween elaborates: “We had to push him out by Dhaka (push). A lot of this we don’t plan. We continuously see and adjust. We saw the potential in him so we encouraged it. At the beginning we did not know that it will do so well.” Now most OPP replications within Sindh are being done with TTRC, which gives training to organizations within different areas to do local mapping and replicate Orangi’s low cost model. By the time OPP expanded in Punjab, TTRC was already doing very well within Sindh.

Interviews with junior staff also show that the nature of the work is also an important motivating factor. As Mr. Javaid Ali/head of field operations elaborates his work as follows: ‘This is a hard nut to crack. It is social work. It immensely requires passion for work. I've been working here for last 25 years. I've seen riots, ethnic and sectarian killings, bullet-riddled bodies, dead bodies in gunny bags (jute bags). There is no payment (reward) for this for you from anyone and vice-a-versa.

15 It is very easy for the one who is willing to do this but very difficult for one who is not motivated. There were several organisations...now no more here (he meant a number of organisations closed down because of the political/sectarian instability of the city during the long span of 25 years).’

2.2.6 Embeddedness within the community OPP is very integrated within the community. Its office is physically based within the Orangi area. The staff members mostly come from the local area too and represent a nice gender balance. Thus within OPP, it is really the community’s interests that are most clearly demonstrated and this has greater shaped the organisational culture and method of work. A strong team spirit and mutual respect is the driving force behind the working of the organisation.

The close ties that OPP maintains with the community have been evident during visits to OPP and interviews with the staff members. From the senior management staff there is evidently a lot of consideration for the junior staff where the seniors see their roles more as mentors. During one of the interviews, the head of one of the local organization that OPP had supported over time had come in to meet Anwar Rashid and had sat down with us. Anwar introduced him as: “This guy is our Dost (friend) and Shagird (student).” The visitor in turn responded: “Whenever I come here I learn something from him (Anwar Rashid). I am just a very small shagird (student) of his. When we come we come prepared that we will be scolded on many things.” Also reflective of the way he looks at the junior staff and trainees was Anwar’s statement: “People have both good and bad within them. One needs teachers to motivate the good part.”

2.2.7 Process of involving the community Orangi Town consists of two localities i.e., legal and illegal/encroached/non-leased. For legal Abadi (settlement), OPP expects the community to give OPP a two-line written application seeking the OPP's help. For illegal/encroached/non-leased settlements, everything depends on the community. OPP gives presentation to the community. It uses projector for explaining to them the problems and the low-cost solution for it. The field staff of OPP convince them that it is for their interest, for their betterment, for their health, and for their kids. They tell them about what OPP has done in their neighbourhood and tell them about the low cost and the quality of work. OPP holds two informal meetings with the committee on a weekly basis, which finally leads to implementation process. When it sees 50 per cent of the community is willing to go for self financing, it start weekly meetings with them. “We chat with them. Tell them about repercussions of not having the proper sanitation” explains Mr. Javaid Ali/head of field operations.

OPP also involves its lane managers to persuade the community. When 80 per cent of the community agree to sanitation work, OPP asks the lane managers to bring the construction material at the site such as sand and gravel, iron rods and bars, cement, contractor and construction machines, etc. When people see it, particularly the standard of the material, almost entire community reportedly joins the work. OPP persuades CBOs (Community Based Organisations such as Mohalla

16 Committees) to tap Town Nazims' office. ‘We have been partnering with the government for last 15 years, now we have enough experience to guide the community to get their work done by the city government,’ adds Javaid Ali.

As for their mobilization strategies, Mr. Javaid Ali/head of field operations elaborates: “We ask people to believe in something is better than nothing. We ask them to pool Rs 25,000 (Pakistani Rupees) - less than 500 US dollars. This much amount is nothing. We tell people if the government does the same work it will cost Rs 400,000 to 500,000. We ask them to visit the neighbourhood and see themselves the work, which had been done at a very low cost through our help. I've never witnessed 100 per cent community participation as it is a very poor area of the city. There are widows, orphans, mentally retarded persons, and disabled individuals. The community ignores them as such people cannot contribute genuinely or excusably. You can safely say 80 to 90 per cent of the community goes for self-financing,’ he adds.

2.2.8 Relations with activists within the community As part of its relations with the community, OPP also places great emphasis on working alongside the local activist organisations to facilitate their efforts to build pressure on the government. Shamsuddin Sahib, a local activist who has worked with OPP for a long time, elaborated his community work as follows: “This community work only a ‘paghal’ (crazy) can do. When there is a problem people get together. In Katchi abadis, people know about each other and they know about each other till the time that they face a common problem. When these people sit in the evening they talk and discuss the problems. When there is no electricity there is also no star TV. When there is no star plus so where will people sit. They will sit together and share things.’

Before coming to Oragni, Shamsuddin was in Korangi. He came to Orangi in 1980 after living in Korangi for two years. In 1984, after meeting a lot of people, as every one was new for each other, he mobilized the people to make an organization and work together. So Ghaziabad Welfare Tanzeem (GWT) was established, which works very closely with OPP. After having around 20 meetings the members of GWT decided to approach the councillor with their requests.

Initially, the councillor refused to come arguing that he did not get votes from this area but the community promised him future votes. ‘This way we started inviting elected people. We had two demands: arrange a system for taking away dirty water from the area; and provide a water tanker. By 1986 we were able to win these concessions. In 1987, on people’s recommendations, I also fought the councillor’s election but lost,” elaborates Shamsuddin.

The reason for giving the above details is to highlight that OPP is very keen on engaging in this indigenous process of lobbying where the community undergoes the internal mobilization rather than being artificially mobilised by the NGOs. It also tries to strengthen them in everyway possible without taking over this indigenous mobilisation process. The main support it provides is to give the

17 community the technical solutions to their problems so that they can then make specific demands on the government. “Our relationship with OPP is that we look at it as our ‘darsgah’ (place of learning). You can come and learn here and understand. From OPP we have been able to learn their mapping skills. The mapping, costing and estimating skills are very important. They don’t give any support of material kind,” adds Shamsuddin. He further argues that the difference is that OPP is not inside the community while he is inside the community. He adds: ‘I am union council, while OPP is city council. OPP is a Bank where people from different communities come and leave their problems as well as their ideas. This way they spread their message to other people.’ Thus, OPP’s close connectedness with the community and responsiveness to its needs has been critical to the shaping the working philosophy of the organization and its relationship with the state.

This critical role of community in shaping OPP is summed in Akhtar Hameed Khan’s own words: “In one respect the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) was very different from the Comilla Academy….But, in another respect OPP and the Comilla Academy were very similar: both followed the same research and extension principles— first learning, then teaching,” (Khan, 1996, pp 42).

“I acknowledged my total ignorance. I had never lived in Karachi; I was a newcomer. The megalopolis was very different from Comilla. So I first educated myself. For several months I wondered around Orangi in my battered jeep, looking at the lanes, talking with the people, the officers, the councillors, lobbyists, chairmen of associations and clubs. Fortunately, I was a free agent, not sent by a boss, with plans or targets. Gradually I learnt what sort of people were living in Orangi, what their problems were, what they thought of these problems what was being done for them, and what they were doing for themselves,” (Khan, 1996, pp 42).

2.3. OPP’s vision of public action

As the organization has evolved so has its vision of public action. OPP has a very clear vision of public action, which is based on a very strong sense of confidence in the ability of the community to address its own needs. It believes that the community, which faces the given problem, also often has a good solution for it but the problem is that they often don’t have the technical skills to put it across to the government convincingly. OPP tries to bridge that gap by tapping on the community’s own knowledge and documenting it in technically rigours ways so that it helps the community to convince the government of that solution. OPP’s approach is that the community has to defend for itself and is very capable of doing so all it requires is a bit of mobilization and technical support.

The philosophy of OPP is captured well in interviews with the senior leadership of OPP. Anwar Rashid, head of OPP Micro Credit Programme and along with Parween Rehman the key figure within OPP elaborates on the organisational philosophy in the following manner:

“Basically there are three rules that we follow: working with the people, organizing the people and facilitating the people. We aim to organize them to use their important capacity and resources. Why? Because that is the way they get confidence in themselves. This is the way to make them confident. And they love it. Once they have confidence they lobby with the government effectively.

We want to see a partnership between people, technicians, and politicians. The government officials are competent. They have technical expertise but the problem is that there are no working ethics in the department. The question is how to utilize this technical capacity? Once people, government, organizations like us come together, it develops understanding on how to utilize each party’s capabilities to the maximum. This is the way of developing a partnership in development.”

He further adds: “We are facilitators. We are not helping them; we are not implementing the project. We are catalysts. We are like psycho-therapists. We are not the implementers; we are not there to solve people’s problems. All we do is to provide the linkages between different organizations. Our view is that people themselves have to take responsibility of their problems. If they are not willing to come out then let them die.” OPP vision of public action is thus very clearly about unleashing the energies of the people and letting them take responsibility of their actions rather than leading them.

In terms of the government side, the two main interest groups within the government are the bureaucracy and the elected leadership. The bureaucracy is responsible for the actual administration of the delivery of the service, while the elected representative is more responsible for the over all policy and planning. The two at times have differing interests as the elected elite often thinks in terms of policy which will get is popular support, while the bureaucracy which has the real power to implement the programme is often also concerned with how the policy is going to impact their own power and authority. The bureaucrats within the Karachi District Government as well as the KWSB and district and union level elected representatives are thus the two main groups whose interests are involved in the government structure.

From the government side, the vision seems to be that the government should tap on knowledge and skills of non-state providers, which have a genuine knowledge of the problem and are able to provide good technical support, which the government either cannot have or can have at a much higher cost than what the NSP is able to provide. At the same time, it is clear in the interviews with the government officials that they are clear that the primary provider in the area of water and sanitation is the state, the NGOs can provide limited contributions only and for that they are to be welcomed.

In terms of actual interaction, OPP takes the responsibility for mapping the area, developing low cost solution in collaboration with the government field staff and engineers, and for mobilising the communities to put in their share of the financial

19 and labour contributions. The government on the other hand is required to take responsibility for undertaking the major infrastructure development including building the big sewers and covering the nalas. Also, by now OPP has also built enough of a moral clout that it is expected that the government officials will take OPP’s concerns about any existing or future planned projects seriously.

3. Factors conditioning the partnership

3.1 Organizations and their agendas: the proximate factors

The Water and Sanitation sector in Pakistan presents relatively less diversity of relationships between the state and non-state providers. The most quoted nation- wide survey of Pakistani NGOs conducted by SPDC under a non-profit sector research project supervised by John Hopkins University does not even provide a category of NGOs working within water and sanitation, while it maintains a distinct category for education and health (Ghaus-Pasha et. Al 2002). Therefore, it is difficult to come up even with vague estimates of the number of NSPs working in water and sanitation. However, the signs are that there is a growing emphasis of the government and donors on this sector since the 1990s. With the allocation of more funds to be spent through NSPs, more NGOs are coming into this sector. Even on the government side, water and sanitation have traditionally not had a clear focus. Unlike the other two sectors, there is no one ministry devoted to this sector, though increasingly the Ministry of Environment is being given a bigger role. According to the Local Government Ordinance of 2001, planning and implementation of sanitation and related development programme is a responsibility of the Tluka/Tehsil/Town Municipal Administrations (TMAs), or city government in the case of larger cities. At the federal level, the Ministry of Environment is the lead agency in the sanitation sector. Other ministries, which deal with sanitation related matters include Health, Planning and Development, Local Government and Rural Development , and Housing and Works. At the provincial level, water and sanitation are dealt with by a number of departments including Local Government and Rural Development, Works and Services, and the Public Health Engineering Department.

According to the Pakistan country brief presented at the SACOSAN-2 conference held in Islamabad during September 2006, the first policy statement of the government for the comprehensive combined water and sanitation initiative did not come about till 1988. This also took place after a donor-supported sanitation sector review and follow-up conference that supported the preparation of a strategic investment plan and project preparation for rural water supply and sanitation. This new-found emphasis was actually put into practice under SAP, where sanitation received high funding throughout the 1990s (MoEnv 2006). One of the key objectives of SAP within the water and sanitation sector was to involve communities in the operation and management of small water and sanitation facilities. Rural sanitation was especially emphasised.

20 Since 1999, under the present government, the language of PPP is equally emphasised within the water and sanitation sector. The World Bank and the government officials are actively talking about PPPs within water and sanitation. At the SACOSAN conference in Islamabad, a whole session was devoted to the Community Led Total Sanitation Programme in Bangladesh, and the World Bank specialist for Water and Sanitation present at the occasion highlighted how the Bank is helping encourage the Pakistani government to adopt this model. It was also highlighted that the Government of NWFP had already initiated this model and a relatively successful replication had started in Mardan.

Also, it is stated in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper that “The government is encouraging the local communities and NGOs to actively participate in planning, designing, implementing, operating and maintaining water supply and sanitation schemes,” (p. 80, GoP 2003). Grants for NGOs and communities to establish community managed water and sanitation schemes are also available through the federally administered Khushali Bank and the Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF). The beneficiary communities are required to contribute 20 per cent of the capital cost of such projects.

In addition to these overall conditioning factors where donor intervention and a growing recognition on the part of the state about its inability to provide the services to all on its own has led to government opening up to NSP and the private sector, the factor that has been important in conditioning the OPP and government relationship is the large presence of slum dwellings in Pakistan. The development of massive slum dwelling around Karachi starting from 1970s with government’s complete inability to respond to the problems of the area was critical to the rise of Orangi. The main conditioning factor for the initiation of the partnership was that it was not possible to resolve the sanitation problem without engaging the government to shoulder part of the responsibility.

The donor intervention in sanitation programmes in Pakistan has also played a role in opening space for OPP within the government officials in an indirect way. The big loans for sanitation projects given by World Bank and Asian Development Bank and their failure were critical in making OPP sell its model to the government. Thus, though the relationship between OPP and the government did not get shaped with the help of any donor but the donor intervention in the sector did influence the way the relationship evolved. Also, the fact that the project became very popular with the development agencies and it got much appreciation internationally increased its appeal for the government too.

4. The shaping of the relationship

4.1 Formation of the relationship

The relationship developed very slowly and gradually over a long period of time with constant effort on the part of the OPP management to cultivate the

21 relationship. It was only with time when OPP was able to demonstrate its ability to provide low cost sanitation solutions and was able to establish strong roots within the community that the government officials started to engage with it seriously. The interviews with OPP-RTI and the government officials show that now there is not only a strong interaction between OPP-RTI and the Works and Services Department of the Karachi City Government and the Karachi Water and Sewage Board, but also that the concerned government officials are quite positive about this relationship.

During the interview, Mr Rasheed Mughal, District Officer/Chief Engineer, Union Council Programme, Works and Services Department, City Government Karachi explained that “Perween visits me on regular basis. We discuss various developments in the city in our meetings. OPP also help us develop reports and TORs for consultants.” Similarly, while I was waiting for Mr Mughal to get back from another appointment, his Personal Assistant, Abdul Salam explained to me that “Yes, we have very good contacts with OPP. We can easily find any map through them. We are in regular contact with them. We remember all their phone numbers.”

4.2. Purposes and motives of the relationship

The OPP’s philosophy is that the government collects taxes to provide basic facilities to the public and it should deliver it responsibilities. Anwar Rashid explains the reasons for evolving a model of collaboration as follows: ‘In development world the problem is that NGOs think that they can solve the problem, Rubbish they cannot. In history of development this has to be the role of the government without this the problem cannot be solved. We have to take the government, get them involved in the development process. Peoples’ solutions should be integrated in government policies. The fellows facing the problems also have a solution in the mind. Technically, they may be wrong; they might not be able to articulate it. They cannot do the work of the engineer professional. It is work of the technical professional to present that idea in a technically viable way where it can be implemented. We give government taxes to do this technical work and get it implemented.’

4.3. Individuals and factors shaping the relationship

OPP-RTI’s experience with government shows that it was not easy to win government cooperation. Perween Rehman explained that initially when Akhtar Hameed Khan (AHK, who initiated OPP) used to go and visit the city officials they entertained him with cup of tea and then would send him off. They did not take him seriously. The only option that was left with OPP was to go the community. It became clear to OPP that if it wants to work it will have to focus on mobilization of the community and improving its technical expertise. From 1980 to 1987 there was therefore hardly any cooperation with the government. It was in 1987 when the union council system was being introduced that the union councilors started to engage with them. But OPP got through to the government in

22 a serious way in 1992 when ADB tried to promote a heavy loan for sanitation in Karachi. It was at this time that OPP undertook heavy lobbying. By this time OPP had been working in Orangi for almost a decade and the team had developed the technical expertise as well as community mobilization abilities. In particular, its mapping process had dramatically progressed and this really increased its bargaining power with the government. The government officials had also seen by now that they have stayed the course and had developed good and low-cost responses to local needs. At this time OPP challenged the ADB consultants and provided much cheaper alternatives to what was being proposed.

The government officials interviewed similarly emphasized the gradual evolution of this relationship. Mr Mughal from the city government added: I have known OPP since 1992 when I was posted in Orangi area. OPP has involved local councilors to support their work and we were also in touch with them so we learnt about OPP through them. OPP did make mistakes initially but kept working and overtime developed a good system. Once I got posted at this position, I was asked to look at the drainage system. I approached OPP and they helped us develop the plan. Initially, they had resistance from our lower staff. But over time they have also won their cooperation. They invite our field-staff in Orangi area over to their office for a meeting every week. We have asked our field staff to attend their meetings.

Dr Saleem, KWSB, also similarly mentioned how he has seen the relationship between OPP and KWSB evolve over time. ‘It was in 1990 that we started formal partnership with OPP. There has been a growing realization that the government alone cannot address the sanitation needs of the entire population. So there is scope for the private sector and the NGOs to come in. OPP had been working in the area for a long time so we engaged with them in 1990. Now we are following the policy of component sharing in all the katchi abadis and slum areas in Karachi,’ he explained.

4.3.1 Technical expertise and mapping skills Interviews with the OPP-RTI staff and the government officials make it very clear that technical competence which led to introduction of efficient low-cost alternatives to government models has been critical in winning government cooperation. The basis of these low-cost but efficient alternatives has been OPP’s philosophy to draw upon local knowledge. For example, OPP was able to change the government design of digging extra depth for the sewers, which decreased costs.

Within technical expertise the importance of detailed mapping system was most clear. Perween explained: mapping is very important to mobilise community and winning government cooperation. We have mapped all the drainage points in Karachi. When I joined OPP in 1982 we spend so much of our initial time just mapping the area. Once the map was ready it helped the community as well as the government visually see the problem and our solutions seemed much more realistic to them then.

23 Similarly, Rasheed Mughal from district government highlighted that OPP’s mapping system and paper work is very good and they have a very well designed documentation system. So we often ask them for documents or maps as within the government system it is often difficult to locate them on short notice.

Perween explained, ‘Our first step was demonstration of our technical skills. When we started mapping it took us 10 years. People are now themselves coming. The first month I came, it was clear that we need maps. Dr Sahib was trained as a social scientist. We were engineers we could map things. We came with technical skills and we started doing it.’

Interesting even in case of Lodhran Pilot Projects, Interviews showed that like in the case of OPP-RTI, detailed mapping was critical in winning the cooperation of the municipal authority. Khalid Warriach, the field operations officer at LPP who has been the focal point for LPP since the start explained that once they mapped the drainage system it was much easier to convince the government officers that LPP was proposing realistic solutions. With the map in front everyone can see the problem and its roots. Also, it gives the higher officials a feeling that we are serious and know the subject. He further added: Akhtar Hameed Khan taught us that often the resistance from the government side is psychological rather than financial. Therefore, one important factor in winning government support has been to present options. ‘We showed new options to undertake the sanitation work in the area, which were financially also very economical and this helped win over the concerned government staff. To get to know the option thus in itself is a big step towards establishing a relationship.’ He further argued that the fact that the solution being proposed was also low cost further added to its appeal for the government officials. ‘The estimates get easily approved when they are low cost. Corruption can only take place when there are high profit margins as then there is a surplus amount, which is available to be distributed among interested parties. In government project the officials give very high estimates so that there is a higher margin for corruption. As opposed to government estimates, we were proposing very low-cost alternatives in which there were clearly no corruption margins. So, it was then easier to convince the top ranks within the municipal authority to support the project.’

On the other hand, Shazadi Uzma Noreen, LPP’s Social Mobilizer, highlighted how low cost of the project is also critical in mobilizing the community to cooperate. She explained: ‘When we mobilize the people, the most effective tool is to highlight the low cost of the project as compared to the benefits they will get. We brief them about our project and tell them that if they invest this small amount of money in building this sanitation facility they can save so much extra cost that they incur in terms of medical costs. We also tell them about other monetary benefits of making this investment. For example, we explain to them that if they invest in developing this drainage system then the value of their property will rise.’

4.3.2 Engaging in broader advocacy

24 OPP-RTI’s interaction with the state agencies also shows that sometime engagement in broader advocacy issues helps facilitate an NSP’s relationship with the state in service delivery. OPP-RTI has been very persistent in advocacy against ADB initiated sanitation project loans in Karachi since 1992. Perween explains: Initially ADB thought that OPP were putting up this resistance just to get some money out of it. But OPP leadership kept persistent and then USAID and World Bank also came in to support OPP. The ADB had in the past carried out a sanitation project in the same area, which had been a complete failure so OPP really brought out details of that failed project to convince everyone that the currently proposed project is too expensive and not designed to respond to local needs. OPP highlighted the problems with that project and provided its low-cost alternative. At that time Farooq Sattar was the Mayor of Karachi. He was eventually convinced with OPPs’ arguments and refused to go ahead with the ADB project. ‘After this experience we realized that it is no point trying to influence the development agencies as they don’t listen; all they are interested in is dishing out the loans. If we want change it has to be through the government as eventually the project was stopped because we were able to convince the government. At the same time, from then on the city sanitation authorities started to engage us regularly. In 1994, we were also asked to become advisors to Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority. They agreed to copy our model to all the Katchi Abadis’, explains Perween. Here again OPP realized the importance of direct advocacy by the community. Perween adds, ‘We encourage the associations to undertake their direct advocacy with the government functionaries. We then go in to support them with technical expertise. We have realized that just doing advocacy does not work; you have to provide concrete suggestions and estimates. We don’t go in as leaders; we go in as technical experts’.

4.3.3 Constant innovation, improvement and responsiveness to community needs Interviews also show that the partnership with the government was a result of constant innovation and improvement of the OPP-RTI model over time in response to community needs. Perween explains, it has to be remembered that we did not start the work with component sharing model. Initially, we ourselves had no clue of how exactly should the sanitation problem be solved. It was only through involving the community and through trial and error that we developed this model, which involved contributions from the community as well as the government. It was only after 1997 that we started talking about this model in terms of component sharing.

Also a lot of OPP’s expansion has happened in response to public demands rather than due to planned activities. For example, OPP has now gotten involved in resisting eviction of people from certain areas on the pretext of sanitation planning. OPP gets involved into this because it gets complaints from the people. OPP is now developing mechanisms to check land grabbing of prime areas again on pretext of sanitation expansion plans. ‘So the point is that in case of OPP at the point of starting the work we often do not know how far we might end up going. A lot of our achievements, which today are seen as phenomenal started as simple responses

25 to immediate community needs, which gradually evolved as we tried to address those needs,’ elaborates OPP.

The Lodhran Pilot project also highlighted the importance of involving the community for multiple reasons. It appears that LPP’s ability to mobilize the community to take part in this programme also helps convince the elected representatives to take their work seriously. Asghar Ali Shah, Tehsil Nazim Lodhran, added: ‘I feel LPP has been very good at mobilizing the community which is very useful. This way the people get to develop a sense of responsibility in providing social services for themselves. He also added that the community itself acts as a monitor of LPP. They come to me and tell me what rates LPP is asking them to contribute to the project. This helps me keep an eye on LPP activities. At the same time when I give a positive response to people questions and approve of the rates LPP is asking for they are more willing to engage in the scheme.’ Amjad Mahmood, TMO, also appreciated that LPP is able to mobilize the community to participate in the work. He argued that this is very important for sustaining the work.

4.4 Formal rules governing the relationship

4.4.1 Form of agreement OPP does not maintain any formal contract with the government. The main argument is that formal contracts often bind organisations to specific targets and take away the flexibility to adapt to changing requirements so that at the end meeting the contract targets rather than addressing the actual objectives becomes more important. Parveen Rehman explains, ‘In the beginning we had some formal tripart agreements between the UNICEF and government but later we decided that this does not work. We had few pages of agreement. MOU is only needed when they give us money. We feel that just taking money does not build a partnership. There are many aspects of each work, and it is not possible to include them all in an MOU. Not having a formal agreement is much more powerful. It gives us more room to negotiate and to establish trust.’

When OPP entered formal agreements it found that they got bound to delivering certain things, which eventually were not important, and this disrupted their real emphasis on the project. ‘MOUs are more about delivery organizations. Our working relationship with the government is spread over a long time, so we do not need an MOU. We want to do things that excite us rather than things that we are bound to do by the contract. We have an understanding so we don’t need an MOU to state it. Just like we don’t have contracts with the community and the other organizations that we work with’, adds Perween.

4.4.2 Building relations across teams and not individuals Interviews also show that an important success factor has been that OPP believes in building relationship with officials at different layers within the concerned

26 government offices rather than just the top official. This has been critical as people at lower government ranks are the ones who implement the policies and if they are not convinced of an idea they can create many hurdles. Perween also emphasized this: ‘Now over the years we have cultivated good relations with people at different layers across all the concerned offices. Many of the government officials who we initially started engaging with as junior officers are now at top positions. They have seen us work for a long time and are very cooperative.’ She elaborated that this way change of one officer does not make a difference to OPP as overtime they have come to work with the whole team and not just the top person. The actual work has to be done by people in lower ranks; unless they are also convinced they can create a lot of hurdles, she adds. Therefore, OPP-RTI holds weekly meeting with the government field officers in Orangi in addition to having regular meetings at the district government level.

Dr Saleem in KWSA also supported this. He explained: ‘OPP has built relationship with staff at different levels in this office so cooperation with them is not contingent on my presence alone. The working relation is very good.’ However, he did note that there are continued tensions especially on issue of loans. ‘We agree with them that many development loans are unnecessary and often result in failed projects. However, at the same time we do genuinely need loans for other projects. OPP is very rigid when it comes to this issue and it does create some tension. But, overtime, we have learnt to negotiate over it,’ he added. He explained that they had recently hosted a seminar where they got OPP and a few other NGOs who were critical of KWSB current plans to take an ADB loan for sanitation work together and explained to them why we are taking this loan. We also involved them in designing that project and in developing the TORs of the consultants. So, they can now see why we are taking the loan. Mr Mashqoor, Chief Engineer, who had joined this interview towards the middle also emphasized this point.

4.4.3 Expanding advocacy networks Another way of making the government engage with OPP has been to expand its advocacy networks. The advocacy networks are very important. Now documentation is very important and web is very important for mobilizing people and building pressure. Perween comments: ‘These communities don’t know how to send the right message. We can bring their problems on the map. ‘Nara Lagana’ (slogan shouting) is important but there should also be a concrete solution. The relationship with the community is based on a lot of trust and friendship.’

The Urban Resource Centre (URC) runs a water and sanitation network and Orangi is an important member of this network. This network is also very important for Organi to advance various issues. Yunas Baloch, a senior official at URC himself worked with Orangi for two to three years beginning in 1991. He explains, ‘Orangi has been able to establish its credibility because it has been working in the area for many years. Normally, NGOs do not work so consistently in an area. The NGOs’ reputation is very negative. If you introduce yourself as an NGO people think you must be in it for the money. People take salaries of Rs

27 200,000 within NGOs and drive Parados. You can’t hide these things from the community for long. OPP is very different in this respect and this has definitely helped build its credibility within the government as well as the community.’

In his view the advocacy work is critical to Orangi’s work strategy and that is why it actively works with the network. ‘Advocacy is required to get the government to agree to change its practices but also to get the approved policies implemented. It therefore requires a consistent effort’, he explained.

He further explained that to get a policy approved is just the beginning; you need to carry on the advocacy to ensure that the policy is also implemented. Given that the top government officials are frequently moved around, advocacy is also important to keep the new appointments informed of the previous decisions. URC have also actively lobbied alongside Orangi to stop some of the ADB funded sanitation programmes, which would have caused more trouble than solving the problem.

Baloch further elaborates: ‘OPP adds a lot of strength to the network due to its strong roots within the community. The best part about OPP is that it is very open to sharing credit for any work and unlike ordinary NGOs allows us to take credit for the mobilization that it undertakes. It is not actively pursuing credit for itself but is more interested in getting the work done. This makes a lot of difference given that typically NGOs are very difficult about letting anyone else take the credit of their work.’

I don’t see any threat to Orangi’s partnership with government in coming years as OPP has now even overcome the political challenges. Initially, PPP’s government used to think that maybe OPP is with MQM (a Karachi based political party). When MQM used to come to power, it used to view OPP as a PPP’s supporter. However, over the years, both parties have realized that OPP is a neutral player and is solely concerned with improving the conditions in the area irrespective of who is in power so it has acceptance within both the parties now.

Another important aspect of OPP’s work has been its constant evolution. According to Perween: ‘We don’t see the end; all we do is to support people in their actions. Some things are thought through. For example, a big media campaign. But, like TTRC we never thought that he would become an organization. One overarching factor in our work is that whenever we see an opportunity we get more devoted and concentrated on it whether it is within the government or the community. Where we see an opportunity we put in maximum effort for that time. This flexibility is critical to our work style. We were never able to foresee what mapping and digitalization will do. Whenever you have to give prints, they are expensive and time consuming to produce. Colour prints are especially very expensive. So you can’t spread them around easily. Now we give a CD or have it placed on our website. Due to high demand for these prints, we are setting up a separate office in central Karachi where people can easily access and purchase this digitalized information.’

5. The relationship in practice

At the time of the fieldwork, OPP’s relationship with the government is going very strong. In recent years, the partnership has expanded from Orangi town to Karachi city level where OPP-RTI is working with the city government to develop plans for water drainage around natural ‘nalas’. There is evidence of close collaboration with the officials with the city government as well as the Karachi Water and Sewage Board. Also, the partnership involves working with the entire tier of government officials within the organisation starting from the Executive Officer to fieldworker level.

It is a very balanced relationship where neither party feels that the other is dictating. The two sides engage on regular basis to discuss current or future problems in the area of services and explore the possibilities. This, however, does not mean that there are no challenges. Many of the OPP’s activities actually involve stopping projects, which government officials are initiating because they are hopeful of getting some kickbacks and cuts in them. This means that through OPP’s action interests of some of the officials within the system are affected. But, OPP’s approach is to build the pressure on the government through advocacy that it undertakes through broader NGO networks, engagement with the media, and through supporting the community activists to take up the issue. It does not enter into direct confrontation with the government as they think this would block all channels of communication and then nothing will get done. The approach is to work consistently and to use advocacy intelligently to build the pressure on the government to engage and then to identity the better officials within the government who are less driven by material interests.

5.1 The relationship in practice: day-to-day routine and critical incidents

In order to see the difference between what was stated in the contract and what happened in reality, this section of the report first captures the expressions of the community about the effectiveness of the programme. Then it captures the views of the government officials about the programme as it helps see how they saw the relationship as opposed to what PRSP claimed. Then it documents the level and type of interaction witnessed between the NSP and government officials. And, finally, it tries to explore some critical points that help highlight the key dimensions of the relationship in practice.

5.1.1 Views of community members There is overwhelming evidence that OPP is deeply embedded within the community. It has deep respect for its work within the community members, it has very strong links with the local activists and oragnisations within the community, and most of its staff comes from within the community. All of this has been discussed in detail in the Section 2 (please refer back to section 2.5).

29 5.1.2 Views of government officials The views of governmental officials have all been on the whole very positive about OPP. Mr Bhatti (government field staff) Additional Executive Engineer, District Authority, Works and Services Division explained: I have engaged with OPP-RTI since October 2002. Working with OPP has been very useful as OPP greatly facilitates our work. The weekly meeting that is held with OPP every Tuesday is very useful. We discuss the various problems confronted in the field or new sanitation problems requiring attention in the area’ He said that OPP is very good with mapping the drainage systems and in preparing cost estimates. He explained that he has recently prepared a PC1 (term used for government projects) worth Rs. 11 million for work on 9 major nalas (natural water flows) within Karachi with support from Parveen Rehman and OPP’s field team. It is because of OPP’s efforts that 30 percent nalas in Karachi have been covered, he argued. In his view, OPP’s strength is that it is very strongly rooted within the community so it knows the area much better than the government. It is therefore very useful to work with them. ‘I would like them to now also initiate some work on improving the road networks and water supply within the katchi abadis,’ he said.

Syed Riffat Hasan, Executive Engineer, Works and Services Department, shared similar views: ‘Whatever project OPP develops, it is very well worked out. I have been impressed with their work. We also hold weekly meetings with them on Tuesday at the OPP office.’ He was of the view that their roots in the community are much stronger than the government. He said that they discuss day to day issues with the OPP’s field staff on daily basis. ‘We exchange information, discuss the possible solutions to any challenges we are facing in implementing a project and discuss any new problems being created due to rain or other natural developments,’ he added.

5.1.2 Level and type of interaction There is regular contact between the OPP and the Karachi City Government Works and Services Department and KWSB. Perween Rehman pays fortnightly visits to the top officials within these organisations. Plus there is frequent contact on the phone too. The OPP field staffers meet with executive engineers, civil engineers, work contractor, work mason, XCNs, EDO, DDO, assistant engineers and KW&SB officials on regular basis in the field. Likewise, OPP field staffers meet with site supervisors, site engineers, UC and town Nazims. XCN is the top authority for the project. EDO and DDO monitor entire project, revise and expand the project as well as EDO and DDO do transfers and postings of the government staff. EDO, DDO report to the XCN.

5.3. Who dominates and how?

There seems to be no dominant partner in the relationship. Both sides engage voluntarily without any compulsion of an external donor or higher government authority. The bureaucrats sitting within the Karachi City Government Works and Services Department and KWSB have voluntarily moved towards working with

30 OPP over time without having pressure of some political figure to under this partnership.

5.4. Changes in the relationship: disputes or turning points

There have been disputes and tension during the relations but never a direct confrontation as OPP’s philosophy is to work with the government and not confront it. OPP is very clear not to confront the government officials. Its policy is that it has to work within the system so it cannot confront. ‘We have to find ways to work around the system. What we have to do is find people within the government who are less corrupt. And there are some people in the system who do want to get things done. We do not pin point any one individual for the corruption. Rather we show them that in this particular situation there has been corruption. For example, the government currently got a project for lying down lanes which were already there. So we showed the community, government, and media that the lanes were already there. But, we did not pin point any one as responsible for this. We don’t blame people we blame the system,’ explains Perween.

This approach was also visible in the way OPP build its resistance against ADB funded big sanitation projects, which has perhaps been the most critical point in the development of government and OPP relationship. A critical point showing OPP’s strength was when in 1992 accepting the OPP-RTI low cost alternative (also promoted by a number of NGOs/CBOs) an ADB loan of US $100 million for the Korangi sewerage project in Karachi was cancelled by the government so work could be undertaken with local resources. In the process evolved a citywide network of NGOs, CBOs and citizens advocating alternatives to the mega projects in Karachi, while promoting the use of local resources and the need to build on what exists. In dropping this project, personal interests of many officials were at stake but the reason OPP succeeded in getting the loan cancelled and in the process developing a very close relationship with the government was mainly to do with its skillful approach in dealing with government officials.

Perween explained that even with Arif Hasan they say that don’t go on media and criticize the government as they will then not engage with him. OPP’s leadership does not go on media with their views. ‘We project the issue but we don’t project ourselves or our views,’ explains Perween. She add, ‘The government will not link with you or engage with you if you criticize them on the media. If we make the tension very public then they will not engage with us or give us any information. We want to push the issue on the TV rather than ourselves. So we don’t go on TV. Dr Sahib never went on TV. Then government and secretary don’t call him to events. Be ready then that there won’t be a dialogue.’

Instead directly confronting the officials, OPP lobbies the concerned officials with the help of its broader NGO networks, community activists, and the media to highlight the need for the given activity so that the government itself feels the pressure to undertake that work. The OPP field wokers also emphasized the same

31 approach. As head of field operation narrated: Government field officials co- operate with OPP field staffers on many issues but at times their own interests are threatened by our actions so we have bitter and sweet relationships with government field officials. But, generally, the government field officials do appreciate OPP field staffers. I will say it all depends on personal inter-action. To be more precise friendship matters the most as the two go side by side through out the years. How we don't accept substandard work from government officials and if we arrive at the threshold of collision we withdraw.’ He was however of the view that the OPP field officers and government field staff interact over such a long period of time and the day in day out chit-chat turn them into acquaintances with closer ties with the result that the tension never gets out of control.

Also he highlighted that in case of any difference of opinion, OPP field workers have to provide solid evidence to support their claims. ‘We always show them proof of sub-standard work; we take photos and get laboratory test done. We work very hard on them. So eventually they cooperate. They never co-operate only because of the order from the higher officials; it takes us six months to one year in establishing the friendship then they co-operate.’

Lodhran Pilot project experience also showed the benefits of this approach. During the field visits, Amjad Mahmood, TMO, also highlighted that the fact that LPP is supporting rather than rivaling the work of Tehsil Municipal authority makes him appreciate their work. He explained: ‘LPP is focusing at the village level. This is complimenting our efforts as our primary focus is on city level. So their work expands the sanitation services to a broader community. We feel that they are sharing our burden, which is very useful. We want people to join hands to help expand the sanitation services.’

Similarly, even in LPP, the staff was clear that it was very important to the partnership to let the government officials take credit for the work. Imtiaz Ahmed, head of a small NGO in Baratiwala village whose organization did the social mobilization work for LPP in that village explained: ‘The main resistance from the Village or Tehseel Nazim is generally linked to the fear of creating opposing political forces through this work. So we go to great pains to assure them that we do not have any political ambitions. For example, we have given stamp paper to some nazims stating that we are not going to come into politics.’

The Tehsil Nazim also acknowledged the same fact when he said: ‘LPP is very good in convincing people to cooperate in their schemes. At the same time they don’t give an impression that they have any political agenda so it is easier to trust them. They have not kept their role parallel to the government rather they have always played the role of assisting the government department.’

Mr Warriach similarly, added: ‘We must remember that the Nazim and DCO also need people who can work. If you are willing to help them do their work and are not challenging their authority then in our experience they are willing to

32 cooperate. So, we also keep ourselves in the background and let them take the credit for this work.’

6. The effects of the relationship on the organizations

6.1 Changes to organizational agendas or working

OPP has been able to hold on to its original mission very well. It has a very focused approach and is expanding its services in a systematic way, where it builds on its prior work rather than moving into completely different areas of work or geographical setting every few years. This clarity of vision/philosophy is central to its stable relationship with the government as well as the community. The strength of this partnership is that it is genuinely engaging and the NSP has been able to build inroads and win respect across the tiers of the relevant government departments. In my view, this model has no obvious weakness and in many ways is the ideal type. However, it is a very demanding model for the NSP as it requires commitment to certain core value and a lot of self-discipline and ability to say no to material benefits including tempting donor projects and consultancies. Given that a lot of NSPs are focused on short-term projects, this ideal type partnership while most desirable from the angle of sustainable development might not be practically the most feasible for the NSPs and their donors structurally conditioned to work on short term projects.

6.2 Impact of relationship on NGPA As discussed in this section, the research shows that OPP has been very effective in shaping the government’s notion of public action by successfully manoeuvring increased space within government circles to influence policy and planning.

6.2.1 Views about current experiences For OPP, the relationship has over the years matured into a very reliable level of interaction. With OPP there is never the feeling that they want to get some things done by the government officials rather the focus is always on working on the government officials to best serve the community needs. Thus, in many ways OPP supports in fulfilment of the needs that become apparent by the interaction with the community and state agencies. In OPP’s view the relationship was currently working smoothly but they have to constantly work on lobbying as well as developing technical solutions to remain relevant for the government as well as the community.

6.2.2 Ideal relationships In case of OPP, the notion of an ideal relationship rests on building a sustained relationship with the government based on in-depth experience of one community context and then coordinating with other organisations to share that learning in other regions while retaining its focus on the original community. Here the vision of ideal type relationship with the state is that the NSP becomes a supporting arm of the state agencies in meeting the demands of the community without directly

33 confronting the state officials. But, through this support, it also makes the state adapt to OPP’s philosophy. It is a model where the NSP starts small with humble ambitions but its commitment, hard work and consequent successes make it a very influential partner in the relationship.

6.2.3 Conditions for effective relationships The experience of OPP shows that eventually the most important factor in shaping an effective relationship is the approach of the NSP towards engagement with the state rather than any other factor. OPP started at a time when PPP was still not actively being promoted by the donor agencies nor was it so explicitly stated in the government policies as it is now. Yet, OPP was able to cultivate a willingness within the bureaucracy to engage with it in a regular manner. What this shows is that often the most important conditioning factor for shaping an effective relationship is the approach of the NSP rather than external factors or state policies.

7. Conclusions

In the case of OPP’s relationship with the government, we have a case of an NSP, which does not suffer from the weakness of over dependence on donor agencies. It is a strong independent NSP which has been able to retain its core values over 27 years of its operation. Rather what we see is that it has been able to influence the state agencies into alternating their philosophy of work and public action: from complete rejection of the OPP’s model, the KWSB today uses OPP’s low cost sanitation model of component sharing as a key strategy for tackling sanitation problems in slum settlements across Karachi.

The key feature of the relationship is no written contract but a clear working understanding developed over 27 years of interaction and regular contact. It is voluntary relationship with no compulsion from the donors or political elite. This is in many way the ideal partnership in terms of shared responsibility as neither one of the two parties dictates the relationship rather both engage, deliberate, and plan the activities by mutual consent. There do not seem to be any special conditioning factors that have helped this relationship. What seems critical in building the relationship is the nature of the NSP rather than the state.

The case shows that a leadership which was committed to certain ideals rather than material incentives, was embedded within the community, and was willing to let the community take lead in finding the solutions, and at the same time had good technical expertise to convert community’s local knowledge into technical solutions was able to develop a genuine demand for its work within the government agencies. The relationship also shows that for a strong relationship to emerge it is important that the NSP never directly confronts the NSP but always stays in the supporting role as while for the NSP there will always be a willingness to influence the government, the government officials have no incentive to engage

34 unless they feel they will be strengthened by cooperating with the NSP. For more specific analysis of the conclusions please see the comparative report.

Arshad, M. 2006. Three days Training Workshop for Village Sanitation Committee Sardar Pur Jhandeer. August 29-Oct 1 2006. Lodhran: Lodhran Pilot Project.

Hasan, A.1999a. Planning for Karachi: An agenda for citizen and NGOs. OPP- RTI.

------.1999b. The Development In Pakistan and the Economic and Social Changes Associated With It. OPP-RTI: Lecture Forum Series 1.

------. 2000. Scaling up of the Orangi Pilot Project Programmes: Successes, failure and potential. OPP-RTI.

Khalid, M. 2006. Participatory Rural Sanitation in the Southern Punjab: A Case Study of the Lodhran Pilot Project. Unpublished Master’s Thesis. Allama Iqbal Open University Islamabad.

Khan, H. K. 1998. Orangi Pilot Project: Reminiscences and Reflections. Karachi: Oxford University Press .

LPP. 2005. LPP Times. Vol. 1, Issue 1. April-June 2005.

------. 2005. LPP Times. Vol. 2, Issue 2. July-September 2005.

------.2005. LPP Times. Oct-Dec 2005.

------. 2006. LPP Times. Vol. 1, Issue 4. Jan-March 2006.

------. 2006. LPP Times. April-June 2006.

OPP-RTI. 2000. Sewerage, drainage and treatment plants: responsibilities, finances, issues, and policy changes needed. For the Task Force on Municipal Services.

------. 2004. OPP-RTI Update November 2004. Karachi:OPP-RTI.

------.2005. OPP-RTI Update November 2005. Karachi: OPP-RTI.

------. 2006. OPP-RTI Update November 2006. Karachi: OPP-RTI.

------. 2006. Orangi Pilot Project: Institutions and programmes: 107 Quarterly Report- July-September 2006.

35 Rahman, P. 2004. Katchi Abadis of Karachi: A survey of 334 Katchi Abadis. OPP- RTI.

------. 2006. Social Processes Strengthen the Negotiations for Change: Low Cost Sanitation Program of the OPP-RTI and Partners— Pakistan. Paper presented at Second South Asian Conference for Sanitation (SACOSAN-2) 20-21 September 2006, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Welle, K. 2006. WaterAid Learning for Advocacy and Good Practice: Water and Sanitation Mapping in Pakistan. WaterAid & ODI.

World Bank. 2006. Participatory Rural Sanitation in Southern Punjab: Sanitation for All in Rural Areas: Pollution— a Challenge Dead On. Lodhran Pilot Project. Japan Social Development Fund.

Zaidi, A. 2001. From the Lane to the City: The Impact of the Orangi Pilot Project’s Low Cost Sanitation Model. WaterAid.

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Orangi Low-cost Housing and Sanitation Programme

Winner 2001 | pakistan, full details.

The Orangi Pilot Project – Research and Training Institute (OPP-RTI) initiated the community self-help programme that has transformed the sanitation and housing of the Orangi shanty settlement of Karachi in Pakistan over the last twenty years. Simultaneously it has helped to bring dignity, self-respect and hope to the lives of many thousands of men, women and children. Improvements in the quality of locally produced building materials, the training of local people as masons and barefoot architects and the development of simple new-build and renovation designs have enabled 2,500 homes to be built and improved annually. All improvement costs are met by the residents and it is estimated that over 1.5 million people have benefited from the replication of this approach in other cities and countries.

Aims and Objectives

Work in partnership with the communities to develop strategies where people can manage, finance and build better homes for themselves and in the process make the people/government relationship more equitable. Orangi Township in Karachi is a massive squatter settlement with a population of 1.2 million. The infrastructure of the city dated back to 1960s when government agencies only constructing roads, basic water supply systems, electricity lines and schools and hospitals. Until 1980s, most households had no access to sanitation facilities and used bucket latrines and soakpits for the disposal of human waste and open sewers for the disposal of waste, resulting in a high rate of water-borne diseases.

The Orangi pilot project was initiated in 1980 by the renowned social scientist Dr Akhtar Hameed Khan. He established the project as a research institution whose objective was to analyse the problems of the Orangi settlement and then through action research and extension education to discover viable solutions. Its strategy has always been to help local people achieve their own development needs rather than rely on external sources of aid.

The methods used include identifying local activists, providing training in community organisation and technical support, providing on-going support and guidance for the actual improvement work and simplifying designs so that they are affordable. The emphasis is on encouraging professionals and governments to support the people’s initiatives. To date, local communities involved with the OPP-RTI programme have built indoor toilets for 99,097 dwellings and installed 1,647,000 feet of underground piped sanitation. Once the streets have been made clean and wholesome with the introduction of piped underground sanitation, local people are prepared to invest their own resources in improving their housing conditions and it is estimated that Rs 100,000 ($1,750) is spent by each family on their home once the environmental improvement works have been completed. Over the lifetime of the programme the residents of Orangi have invested $1.3 million. To date, the project has been extended to 245 settlements and 17cities covering a population of more then 1.5 million in Pakistan. Plans are currently underway to extend the project to 21 more towns and 100 new villages.

In 1986, having seen the success of the sanitation project, OPP-RTI initiated a housing project using the same research and action approach. Research was carried out in conjunction with the University of Karachi and the Dawood College and this established that almost all of the houses in the Orangi squatter settlement were substandard. This was due to a variety of factors, including:

The poor quality of building materials used in construction. The hand-made concrete blocks which were the traditional main components of the walls and foundations were substandard due to the use of poor quality materials and construction methods.
Severe cracks had therefore developed in the main structural components of the dwellings. Building skills were inadequate.
Faulty construction techniques were used due to ignorance, as well as the quick-fix attitude of masons and residents.
The inequitable relationship between contractor and mason and the house owner.
Poor ventilation in the houses.

Having spent two years researching the housing problems and their causes, OPP- RTI developed an action research project to develop pilot solutions, which included:

Upgrading the building component manufacturing yards in the Orangi settlement of Karachi to improve the quality of the concrete blocks available for construction and by introducing the manufacture of alternative roofing components.
Evolving standard construction designs and techniques and training masons to use them, as well as providing accurate plans and estimates.
Preparing standardised steel shuttering and lending these and other tools and equipment to local communities.

Preparing audio-visual aids, manuals and instruction sheets that can be easily understood by the local population.

Owners of building component yards were persuaded to participate in the research and development of improved building materials and to manufacture the improved quality bricks using a simple machine. An improved ratio of concrete mix was identified and the compaction, vibration, curing and drying process was streamlined. This has enabled the blocks to be four times stronger than previously, without any increase in price. This is due to the increased production from mechanisation (on average from 750 blocks to 2,500 blocks a day). The initial research was carried out in 1987 in four yards with OPP-RTI providing a loan and technical support. All 57 building component yards in the Orangi area have adopted these methods and Orangi has now become a centre for the production of mechanised blocks in Karachi. Overall employment in the block producing sector has increased and earnings have increased by at least 50 per cent and in some cases by 200 per cent. 30 to 40 per cent of the blocks now being made in Orangi are exported to neighbouring areas.

173 local masons have been trained in the improved design and construction techniques and the better use of tools. Accurate plans and estimates have been provided for the masons and tools and shutterings were lent to carry out the work. A new load bearing technology for construction has been developed that is only one third of the cost of the reinforced concrete construction. It includes in-situ foundations for a minimum of ground floor plus first floor, six inch load-bearing walls of machine made blocks, batten-tile or T-girder roofing and proper fixing methods, a pre-cast staircase, proper orientation and ventilation. Over 2,500 houses are built annually with these improved blocks and construction systems.

Local young people have been trained as para-architects to provide technical support and advice to local households, community builders and small building contractors, since existing architectural practices were unwilling to undertake this work. The first team of two para-architects has established an office in Orangi and have developed a substantial clientele. Young people from the community are also being trained in surveying and mapping at OPP-RTI and will be able to help neighbourhoods in the mapping of their settlements when the time comes for regularisation of their area by the local government. A Technical Training Resource Centre (TTRC) has been set up by the young people of the housing and survey mapping unit where to date, a total of 33 courses have been conducted for 94 participants.

The project also supports the position of women in the communities by encouraging their participation in the community development process and has established an education project and supported the health and micro-credit projects. Loans are made available through the Orangi Charitable Trust and approximately 18 per cent of these have been made to women entrepreneurs to expand training and income generating activities such as stitching centres, provisions shops, informal schools, embroidery workshops, dairy cattle operations, clinics and beauty parlours. A health programme was initiated to promote the issues of modern hygiene and prevention of diseases to the illiterate and semi-illiterate women. As a result, there has been a marked improvement in the health of the residents, a substantial reduction in infant mortality rates and an increase in disposable income.

OPP-RTI has also supported the setting up of 340 small schools, of which, 322 are currently operating and have become formal institutions. The schools are attended by over 26,000 (male and female) students, in almost equal numbers.

The OPP-RTI community-based approach to sanitation, environmental and housing improvement developed in Orangi has been used in many other slum settlements of Karachi and in seven other cities of Pakistan. Training is provided to NGO staff, CBO activists and their government counterparts at the OPP-RTI office in Karachi and OPP-RTI staff carry out site visits and monitor the work. These CBOs are now taking the initiative in additional activities dealing with solid waste management and education.

Work in Karachi is expanding rapidly and OPP-RTI is supporting the City government wih all technical mapping, design work, costing and on-site supervision. The government agency responsible for sewerage infrastructure development in Karachi, the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB) is now in agreement with the OPP-RTI proposals for sewage disposal. KWSB agree that developing the existing drainage channels provides a realistic and cost effective plan of action towards developing sanitation facilities in Karachi. The KWSB has also requested OPP-RTI support for the provision of water supply and sewage disposal for Karachi’s Katchi Abadis. OPP-RTI is involved in preparing the National Sanitation Policy (NSP). This is an opportunity to influence the policy at the national level.

Funding for core administration costs of the organisation is met by a Pakistani Foundation, with additional funds provided for additional training and education projects provided by international donors. All costs are kept to a minimum. The costs of carrying out the sanitation improvements are met by the communities, with local community leaders organising all the financing for the collective works. Approximately Rs 92 million ($1.55 million) has been invested by the local communities in the sanitation improvements with the government investing Rs. 77 million ($1.3 million). Individual households meet the cost of improving their own dwellings.

Why is it innovative?

Adopting a holistic approach to sanitation;
Technological innovation in the method by which the drains and sewers are constructed.
Making ‘community participation’ a key aspect of the project;
Creating income generating activities for women and young people;
Encouraging and supporting the replication of the OPP-RTI techniques in Pakistan as well as the other parts of the world.

What is the environmental impact?

The improved sanitation, housing conditions and better waste management techniques have resulted in saving of vital local resources and improved environmental standards. Tree planting programmes have resulted in large scale planting in the Orangi lanes and streets.

Is it financially sustainable?

Whilst the OPP-RTI is financed by various national and international agencies, the costs for improving the sanitation systems are met by the local communities. Any cost for improving the dwelling is also met by the individual households. The income generating activities add to individual household income that helps to pay for better education, health and housing.

What is the social impact?

The holistic approach adopted by the project has created many additional benefits for the communities involved, especially women and young people. Through community involvement, the project creates a sense of ownership and gives control of maintaining the established systems back to its users. This ensures the continuity of the project in a cost-effective manner whilst improving general health and social standards of the people.

Over 1.5 million people have benefited from the replication of the process. The national government has agreed to support the OPP-RTI model and is increasingly supportive of the approach, which is also being widely used by international agencies and donor organisations.

There are increasing requests from CBOs/NGO’s for support for replication of the OPP-RTI sanitation program. For expansion of work in the villages and towns of interior Sindh, a program of training of youths on mapping and documentation has been initiated. This can also evolve into a process leading to the youths setting up technical support units.

The OPP-RTI mapping and documentation methodology has been further transferred to partner CBOs and NGOs across Pakistan, and to local government agencies. The training received from OPP-RTI is transferred as neighbouring settlements, villages and towns contact the CBO/NGO about replicating the program.

In Faisalabad, satellite mapping expertise was acquired and passed on to Jaranwala Town and Chiniot Town. The plane-table survey techniques learnt by CBOs in Lodhran Town were extended to 5 nearby towns and 12 villages. The OPP-RTI mapping methodology has been transferred to a Punjab government agency, and on to the CBOs and NGOs working with it. Further plans to digitize the increasing number of maps acquired by OPP-RTI are underway, and this will provide easy access to a valuable resource.

The OPP-RTI approach has also been widely used elsewhere in the world with training provided to persons from Nepal, Cambodia, Vietnam, Central Asia, South Africa and Sri Lanka.

Partnership

NGO, local community, local government

Project contact details

Orangi Pilot Project and Research and Training Institute (OPP-RTI)

Website: http://www.urckarachi.org Tel: +92 21 665 8021

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COMMENTS

Pakistan
Pakistan - A Case Study of the Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi. by admin July 26, 2016. ... This document mainly focuses on Orangi Pilot Project-Research and Training institute (OPP-RTI), detailing its goals to enable low income families deal with issues like sanitation, health, education and employment through community participation and local ...
PDF A Case Study of The Orangi Pilot Project- Research and Training
Localizing Habitat Agenda Research Project A CASE STUDY OF THE ORANGI PILOT PROJECT-RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE, KARACHI, PAKISTAN 1. 1INTRODUCTION Pakistan is a poor country. According to the UNDP Human Development Report 2002, its Human Development Index (HDI) rank is 138 out of 173 countries. Poverty is also increasing in Pakistan.
PDF Meaningful Mapping and Urban Development: The Orangi Pilot Project
This paper delves into the relationships between community-based mapping, environmental literacy,2 and environmental health using the Orangi Pilot Project-Research and Training Institute (OPP-RTI)3 in Karachi, Pakistan, as a case study. Since 1980, the OPP-RTI has been providing technical assistance to Orangi residents to help.
What Has Emerged From 30 Years of the Orangi Pilot Project
Origins. The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) was established in February 1980 through an understanding between Akhtar Hameed Khan, a renowned South Asian social scientist, and Agha Hasan Abidi, the president of the BCCI foundation, a Pakistan charity. Agha Hasan Abidi wanted Akhtar Hameed Khan to do "social work" for the refugees from East Pakistan who were living in Orangi, a Karachi township ...
PDF 6. Key documents on the Orangi Pilot Project
15) Khan, A.H. (1992), Case Study of Orangi and Orangi Pilot Project. 16) Khan, A.H. (undated), Presentation on Orangi and OPP given to the President of the World Bank. 17) Khan, A.H. (1986), Community Participation for Mobilising Local Resources - A Case Study of a Low-Cost Sanitation Program in Orangi.
Orangi Pilot Project: the expansion of work beyond Orangi and the
good governance; the case of the Lyari expressway in Karachi", Environment & Urbanization Vol 17, No 2, October, pages 127-142. 452 FIGURE 1 An example of the mix of lane and secondary sewers in a ... ORANGI PILOT PROJECT. and, Pilot Project-Research and Training Institute, ...
Prassanna Raman
The Orangi Pilot Project. 4.213J/11.308J / Urban Nature and City Design / Fall 2012 Professor: Anne Whiston Spirn. Abstract. ... (OPP) in Karachi, Pakistan, as a case study in community-based mapping and environmental health. What is the relationship between community mapping processes, environmental literacy, and sustainable infrastructure in ...
Orangi Pilot Project
The Orangi Pilot Project (Urdu: اورنگی پائلٹ پراجیکٹ; abbreviated OPP) collectively designates three Pakistani non-governmental organisations working together, having emerged from a socially innovative project carried out in 1980s in the squatter areas of Orangi, Karachi, Pakistan.It was initiated by Akhtar Hameed Khan and implemented by Perween Rahman.
Orangi Pilot Project
For further information: Orangi Pilot Project Research and Training Institute (OPP-RTI) 1-D, 26 Daulat House, Orangi Town, Karachi, Pakistan. tel.: 665-2297 fax: 9221-435704. Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan. [email protected]. Objectives. Through research and extension, OPP implements sustainable solutions to local development problems.
(PDF) Transforming Urban Settlements, The Orangi Pilot Project's Low
The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Karachi was established in 1980 to upgrade the informal settlements in Orangi Township. Its first program was in sanitation. A component‐sharing model was ...
6. Key documents on the Orangi Pilot Project from Lessons from ...
Key documents on the Orangi Pilot Project from Lessons from Karachi:: the role of demonstration, documentation, mapping and relationship building in advocacy for improved urban sanitation and water services on JSTOR. JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary sources.
Scaling Up of the Orangi Pilot Project Programmes: Successes, Failures
This paper, after briefly describing the OPP experience will try and present the problems, success, failures and their causes in the scaling up of the OPP programmes. 2. THE PAKISTAN CONTEXT. Pakistan requires about 500,000 housing units per year for its urban population 1. Not even one-third of this is provided through formal process.
PDF Assessing the impact of a micro-finance programme: Orangi Pilot Project
the programme running, to repay the loan. The programmes of Orangi Pilot Project started in the low income area of Orangi, Karachi in 1980. This chapter is adapted from an impact study (Reference of Akbar Zaidi Study) carried out for the micro-finance programme of OPP's Orangi Charitable Trust (OCT) established in 1987.
Orangi Pilot Project: the expansion of work beyond Orangi and the
This paper describes the work of the Pakistan NGO, Orangi Pilot Project-Research and Training Institute ... Enabling participatory planning with GIS: a case study of settlement m... Go to citation Crossref Google Scholar. An ontology of slums for image-based classification.
Orangi Pilot Project
Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) as an NGO began work in Orangi town in 1980. Orangi situated in the periphery of Karachi is a cluster of 113 low income settlements* with a population of 1.5 million. On the success of its five basic programs of low cost sanitation, housing, health, education and credit for micro enterprise, in 1988 OPP was upgraded ...
Orangi Pilot Project: the expansion of work beyond Orangi and the
The work of the Pakistan NGO, OPP-RTI, in supporting improved provision for sanitation and other services in Orangi and other informal settlements in Karachi, and in other cities and smaller urban centres in Pakistan, includes greatly reducing or removing the need for international loans to finance such investments. This paper describes the work of the Pakistan NGO, Orangi Pilot Project ...
PDF What Has Emerged From 30 Years of the Orangi Pilot Project
The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) was established in February 1980 through an understanding between Akhtar Hameed Khan, a renowned South Asian social scientist, and Agha Hasan ... study the situation in Orangi and come up with community-based solutions for the improvement of the physical and social conditions in the settlements.
Case Studies on the Orangi Pilot Project (Sanitation)
Pakistan Sanitation Case Study: Orangi Pilot Project-Research Training Institute's (OPP-RTI's) relationship with government agencies. Dr Masooda Bano. Islamabad, Pakistan. February 2008. Published: February 2008 (c) International Development Department (IDD) / Masooda Bano ISBN: 0704426692 9780704426696.
Orangi Pilot Project
Orangi is a Karachi town consisting of an agglomeration of katchi abadis and has a population of 1.2 million. The OPP was established in 1980 to overcome the constraints faced by the government in regularising and improving katchi abadis. This objective of the Project was to: - Understand the problems of Orangi and their causes.
Orangi Low-cost Housing and Sanitation Programme
The Orangi Pilot Project - Research and Training Institute (OPP-RTI) initiated the community self-help programme that has transformed the sanitation and housing of the Orangi shanty settlement of Karachi in Pakistan over the last twenty years. Simultaneously it has helped to bring dignity, self-respect and hope to the lives of many thousands of men, women and children. Improvements in the ...
PDF Orangi Pilot Project Models
l.Orangi Pilot'Project (OPP) OPP was sponsored by BCCI Foundation.lt has been working in Orangi since April 1980.It publishes a quarterly progress report which contains financial statements and quarterly and cumulative tables of work.The 42 report has come out in July 1990.Besides numerous case studies and monographs have also been published ...
Akhtar Hameed Khan and the Orangi Pilot Project
Akhtar Hameed Khan and the Orangi Pilot Project. Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan, father of the Comilla Cooperatives and the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), both internationally renowned development models, died in the United States on October 08, 1999. To carry on his life's work and to further develop it, he has left behind three remarkable institutions ...
A Case Study Of Orangi Pilot Project And Ellen Ostrom's Ideas
Topic: Case Study, Political Culture, Project. Pages: 2 (936 words) Views: 1873. Grade: 4.8. Download. Orangi is a city in Pakistan where the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) was initiated. This city is renowned for its success pertaining to the fact that the community involvement in the project showed that Ostom's theories can be successfully ...