justification of hypothesis

Justifying the Justification Hypothesis: scientific-humanism, Equilintegration (EI) Theory, and the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory (BEVI)

Affiliation.

• 1 James Madison University, Harrisonburg, VA 22807, USA. [email protected]
• PMID: 15558624
• DOI: 10.1002/jclp.20092

The Justification Hypothesis (JH; Henriques, 2003) is a basic, general, and macro-level construct that is highly compelling. However, it needs greater specification (i.e., justification) regarding what it is, how it might be operationalized and measured, and what it does and does not predict in the real world. In the present analysis, the act of "justification" is conceptualized as the ongoing attempt to convince self and/or others that one's beliefs and values, which is to say one's "version of reality" or VOR, is correct, defensible, and good. In addressing these issues, this paper is divided into two complementary parts: (a) consideration of justification dynamics and exemplars from a scientific-humanist perspective and (b) an examination of how justification systems and processes have been studied vis-a-vis research and theory on beliefs and values as well as an extant model--Equilintegration (EI) Theory--and method--the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory (BEVI).

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Methodology

• How to Write a Strong Hypothesis | Steps & Examples

How to Write a Strong Hypothesis | Steps & Examples

Published on May 6, 2022 by Shona McCombes . Revised on November 20, 2023.

A hypothesis is a statement that can be tested by scientific research. If you want to test a relationship between two or more variables, you need to write hypotheses before you start your experiment or data collection .

Example: Hypothesis

Daily apple consumption leads to fewer doctor’s visits.

Table of contents

What is a hypothesis, developing a hypothesis (with example), hypothesis examples, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about writing hypotheses.

A hypothesis states your predictions about what your research will find. It is a tentative answer to your research question that has not yet been tested. For some research projects, you might have to write several hypotheses that address different aspects of your research question.

A hypothesis is not just a guess – it should be based on existing theories and knowledge. It also has to be testable, which means you can support or refute it through scientific research methods (such as experiments, observations and statistical analysis of data).

Variables in hypotheses

Hypotheses propose a relationship between two or more types of variables .

• An independent variable is something the researcher changes or controls.
• A dependent variable is something the researcher observes and measures.

If there are any control variables , extraneous variables , or confounding variables , be sure to jot those down as you go to minimize the chances that research bias  will affect your results.

In this example, the independent variable is exposure to the sun – the assumed cause . The dependent variable is the level of happiness – the assumed effect .

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Step 1. Ask a question

Writing a hypothesis begins with a research question that you want to answer. The question should be focused, specific, and researchable within the constraints of your project.

Step 2. Do some preliminary research

Your initial answer to the question should be based on what is already known about the topic. Look for theories and previous studies to help you form educated assumptions about what your research will find.

At this stage, you might construct a conceptual framework to ensure that you’re embarking on a relevant topic . This can also help you identify which variables you will study and what you think the relationships are between them. Sometimes, you’ll have to operationalize more complex constructs.

Step 3. Formulate your hypothesis

Now you should have some idea of what you expect to find. Write your initial answer to the question in a clear, concise sentence.

4. Refine your hypothesis

You need to make sure your hypothesis is specific and testable. There are various ways of phrasing a hypothesis, but all the terms you use should have clear definitions, and the hypothesis should contain:

• The relevant variables
• The specific group being studied
• The predicted outcome of the experiment or analysis

5. Phrase your hypothesis in three ways

To identify the variables, you can write a simple prediction in  if…then form. The first part of the sentence states the independent variable and the second part states the dependent variable.

In academic research, hypotheses are more commonly phrased in terms of correlations or effects, where you directly state the predicted relationship between variables.

If you are comparing two groups, the hypothesis can state what difference you expect to find between them.

6. Write a null hypothesis

If your research involves statistical hypothesis testing , you will also have to write a null hypothesis . The null hypothesis is the default position that there is no association between the variables. The null hypothesis is written as H 0 , while the alternative hypothesis is H 1 or H a .

• H 0 : The number of lectures attended by first-year students has no effect on their final exam scores.
• H 1 : The number of lectures attended by first-year students has a positive effect on their final exam scores.

If you want to know more about the research process , methodology , research bias , or statistics , make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples.

• Sampling methods
• Simple random sampling
• Stratified sampling
• Cluster sampling
• Likert scales
• Reproducibility

 Statistics

• Null hypothesis
• Statistical power
• Probability distribution
• Effect size
• Poisson distribution

Research bias

• Optimism bias
• Cognitive bias
• Implicit bias
• Hawthorne effect
• Anchoring bias
• Explicit bias

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A hypothesis is not just a guess — it should be based on existing theories and knowledge. It also has to be testable, which means you can support or refute it through scientific research methods (such as experiments, observations and statistical analysis of data).

Null and alternative hypotheses are used in statistical hypothesis testing . The null hypothesis of a test always predicts no effect or no relationship between variables, while the alternative hypothesis states your research prediction of an effect or relationship.

Hypothesis testing is a formal procedure for investigating our ideas about the world using statistics. It is used by scientists to test specific predictions, called hypotheses , by calculating how likely it is that a pattern or relationship between variables could have arisen by chance.

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6 Theories of Justification

Richard Fumerton is F. Wendell Miller Professor of Philosophy at the University of Iowa.

• Published: 02 September 2009
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The task of explaining and evaluating theories of justification is daunting. There are not only a host of different theories of justification, there are also radical differences among epistemologists concerning how they understand what it is to offer such a theory. This article offers an overview of several prominent positions on the nature of justification. It begins by isolating epistemic justification from nonepistemic justification. It also distinguishes between “having justification for a belief” and “having a justified belief,” arguing that the former is conceptually more fundamental. It then addresses the possibility that justification is a normative matter, suggesting that this possibility has little to offer a concept of epistemic justification. It also critically examines more specific attempts to capture the structure and content of epistemic justification. These include traditional foundationalism and variants thereof, externalist versions of foundationalism; contextualism; coherentism; and “mixed” theories which combine aspects of coherentism and foundationalism.

The concept of justification may be the most fundamental in epistemology. On what became the dominant view in the twentieth century, knowledge is to be understood, at least in part, through our understanding of justification. Part of the answer many offer to Plato's question in the Theaetetus , “What must be added to true belief in order to get knowledge?” is justification. Furthermore, on many accounts of knowledge and justification, it is tempting to conclude that the only responsibility we are competent to carry out qua philosophers is to conform our beliefs to what is justified. Whether or not the world cooperates so as to turn those justified beliefs into knowledge is out of our hands.

The task of explaining and evaluating theories of justification, however, is daunting. There are not only a host of different theories of justification, there are also radical differences among epistemologists concerning how they understand what it is to offer such a theory. Some epistemologists are trying to identify the properties that constitute having justification while others are trying to identify properties upon which justification supervenes. Some philosophers take the product of their analyses to be analytic truths; others claim to be engaged in some sort of empirical investigation. In addition to the fact that there are these meta‐philosophical and methodological controversies lurking in the background, there are serious questions as to whether epistemologists have even agreed on the target of their analyses. Let us begin with this last question.

Epistemic vs. Nonepistemic Justification

The first distinction an epistemologist should emphasize before putting forth a theory of justification is that between epistemic justification and other sorts of justification. If I ask whether S's belief is justified or rational, I might be concerned, for example, with prudential justification. It seems to be a fact that a patient's believing that she will get well often increases the chances of her recovery (even if the resulting probability remains very low). In such a situation there is surely some sense in which the patient would be justified in having (or at least trying to get) the optimistic belief. But even if we allow that there is a sense in which the belief is justified or rational, we don't want to allow that it is epistemically justified or rational. Or consider the person who is becoming paralyzed by fear of death. If believing that there is an afterlife will alleviate that fear and allow the person to live a normal life, then there is again a sense in which it would be perfectly reasonable for that person to try to bring about the belief that has this effect. Prudential reasons for believing (if they exist) have something to do with the efficacy with which believing will or might achieve certain goals or ends.

There may be other nonepistemic reasons for believing or failing to believe a given proposition. It is not wildly implausible to suppose, for example, that a husband has a special moral obligation, and with it a moral reason , to believe that his wife is faithful even in the face of rather powerful epistemic reasons for believing otherwise. One could even imagine a kind of “ 1984 culture” in which one has legal obligations, and legal reasons, to have certain beliefs that are, nevertheless, epistemically irrational.

Can we find a way of characterizing epistemic justification that is relatively neutral with respect to opposing analyses of the concept? As a first stab we might suggest that whatever else epistemic justification for believing some proposition is, it must make probable the truth of the proposition believed. 1 The patient with prudential reasons for believing in a recovery was more likely to get that recovery as a result of her beliefs, but the prudential reasons possessed did not increase the probability of the proposition believed—it was the belief for which the person had prudential reasons that resulted in the increased probability. Epistemic reasons make likely the truth of what is supported by those reasons, and, although it is controversial, it is tempting to suggest that the relation of making likely is not to be understood in causal terms.

Our preliminary characterization of justification as that which makes probable the truth of a proposition may not in the end be all that neutral. As we shall see in a moment, there are those who stress an alleged normative feature of epistemic justification that may call into question the conceptual primacy of probability as a key to distinguishing epistemic reasons from other sorts of reasons. Furthermore, as we shall also see, if one understands the relation of making probable in terms of a frequency conception of probability, one will inevitably beg the question with respect to certain internalist/externalist debates over the nature of justification.

Having Justification for a Belief and Having a Justified Belief

Another preliminary, but important, distinction to stress is that between having justification for a belief and having a justified belief. There seems to be a perfectly clear sense in which there may be enormously strong epistemic reasons for me to believe a given proposition even though I don't end up believing it. In such a situation we can say that there was justification for me to believe the proposition even though I didn't, of course, have a justified belief (or a belief at all) in the relevant proposition. 2 It is tempting to suppose that we can employ the concept of having justification for believing P to define what it is for a person to justifiably believe P. Specifically, one might suggest that a person justifiably believes P when that person believes P and does so based on justification that the person possesses. The analysis of the basing relation is a matter of much controversy. One might hope to analyze it in causal terms. If there is justification J for S to believe P, then S believes P justifiably just in case S's belief is caused by the fact that there is justification for him to believe P. When one presents causal analyses of any concept, however, one should immediately be on guard against counterexamples that rely on “deviant” causal chains. If I possess justification J for believing P, and that causes the hypnotist at the party to hypnotize me into believing P when I hear a doorbell ring, it is not at all clear that I have based the resulting belief on the justification I possess. There may be some relatively straightforward way to revise a causal account of basing to take care of such problems (by, for example, insisting that the causal connection has to be in some sense direct) but we won't explore this issue further here.

If the distinction between possessing justification and having a justified belief is legitimate, which if either of these concepts is more fundamental? If the suggestion made above were plausible, then clearly having justification would be conceptually more fundamental than having a justified belief. We are defining the latter in terms of the former. Furthermore, if we understand the basing relation in causal terms, we should beware of philosophers speculating about which beliefs are or are not justified. One needs empirical evidence to support a causal hypothesis, and it strikes me that philosophers are rarely in possession of the empirical evidence they would need in order to support a psychological claim about what is or is not causing a given belief. Although epistemologists have often supposed that they are trying to determine which beliefs are justified and which are not, I would suggest that if they are to restrict themselves to questions they are competent to answer, qua philosophers, they ought to concern themselves only with the question of whether there is justification for us to believe this or that proposition. Depending on one's analysis of justification, this question may itself end up being an empirical question that philosophers are not particularly competent to address, but this is an issue to which we shall return.

Justification and Normativity

A surprising number of philosophers, with radically different theories of justification, seem to agree that justification is a normative concept. Unfortunately, it is not at all clear what philosophers have in mind by characterizing a concept as normative. We might begin by suggesting that normative terms are those whose meaning can be explicated using paradigm normative expressions, and we might simply list that which is paradigmatically normative. The list might be long or short depending on whether or not we think that all normative expressions can be defined in terms of a relatively few fundamental normative notions. So one might include among the paradigmatically normative such terms as “good,” “ought,” should,” “right,” “permissible,” obligatory,” and their opposites.

If we proceed in this fashion it seems undeniable that the concept of epistemic justification looks suspiciously like a normative concept. As Plantinga ( 1992 ) has effectively reminded us, the etymology of the word “justification” certainly suggests that we are dealing with a value term. And epistemologists often seem quite comfortable interchanging questions about whether or not evidence E justifies one in believing P with questions about whether or not one should believe P on the basis of E. In what is often taken to be an early statement of a justified true belief account of knowledge, Ayer ( 1956 ) described knowledge as true conviction where one has the right to be sure. So again the idea that the concept of justification is normative is at least prima facie plausible. But we must proceed cautiously. We have already seen that we must distinguish epistemic reasons from other sorts of reasons. If we can translate talk about justified belief into talk about what we ought to believe, these same considerations suggest that we must distinguish different senses of “ought.” In the prudential sense of “ought,” perhaps the patient ought to believe she will get better. In the moral sense of “ought,” perhaps the husband ought to believe in his spouse's innocence. But the epistemologist is concerned with what one epistemically ought to believe, and we still need to be convinced that there is some interesting sense in which all of these different “ought” 's express normative concepts.

If we take as our paradigm of a normative “ought” the moral “ought,” then I suppose the question of whether the epistemic “ought” expresses a normative concept reduces to the question of whether there are interesting connections between it and the moral “ought.” The problem now is that moral philosophers have radically different views about what makes moral “ought” judgments normative. Some try to distinguish the normative from the nonnormative by contrasting prescriptive judgements with descriptive judgments. But if this is supposed to be the normative/nonnormative distinction, it is far from clear that the epistemologist should accept the claim that justification is a normative concept. I suspect that most epistemologists take a belief 's being justified to be a fact that admits of description just as straightforwardly as a belief 's having a certain causal history. (Indeed, on some theories of justification a belief 's being justified just is a matter of its causal history.)

Richard Foley ( 1987 ) has suggested that we might understand epistemic justification in terms of what one ought to believe, and he goes on to understand the difference between the epistemic “ought” and other “oughts” 's as differences between species of a common genera. Crudely put, Foley's idea is that normative judgments all assess the efficacy of achieving goals or ends. There are different kinds of normative judgments concerning what we ought to do and what we ought to believe because there are different goals or ends that we are concerned to emphasize. Thus when we are talking about morally justified action, the relevant goal might be something like creating good and avoiding evil. When we are concerned with what prudence dictates, the relevant goals or ends change, perhaps to include everything that is desired intrinsically, for example. What one legally ought to do is a function of the extent to which an action satisfies the goal of following the law. To fit the epistemic “ought” into this framework (and thus classify usefully the kind of normativity that epistemic judgments have) all one needs to do is specify the distinctive goals or ends that define what one epistemically ought to believe. And the obvious candidates are the dual goals of believing what is true and avoiding belief in what is false.

Suggestive as this account might seem, it faces enormous difficulties. It must be immediately qualified to accommodate certain obvious counterexamples. Let's return to our paradigm of a nonepistemic reason, the reason the patient had for believing that she would get well. By forming the relevant belief, the patient might produce for herself a long life which she could devote to scientific and philosophical investigation, investigation that results in an enormous number of true beliefs. Despite accomplishing the goal of believing what is true, our patient (by hypothesis) had no epistemic reason for believing that she would get well. The obvious solution to this problem (one Foley suggests) is to restrict the relevant epistemic goal to that of now believing what is true and now avoiding belief in what is false. But such a revision doesn't really address the problem. Suppose there is an all powerful being who will immediately cause me to believe massive falsehood now unless I accept the epistemically irrational conclusion that there are mermaids. It would seem that to accomplish the goal of believing what is true and avoiding belief in what is false now I must again adopt an epistemically irrational belief.

In desperation one might try restricting the relevant epistemic goal to that of believing what is true now with respect to a given proposition. But now we are in danger of collapsing the distinction between true belief and justified belief. Trivially, the only way to accomplish the goal of believing what is true with respect to P is to believe P when P is true. The problem is that one really wants to identify the content of the epistemic “ought” with what one is justified in believing will accomplish the goal of now believing what is true with respect to a given proposition. But with this revision our “goal” oriented account of epistemic justification becomes pathetically circular. 3

There are, of course, other ways to try to understand the alleged normative character of epistemic justification, but I'm not sure any are illuminating. One might suppose that when one characterizes a belief as justified one is indicating that it is not an appropriate subject for criticism. When one says of a belief that it is unjustified, one is criticizing the belief. For the view to gain even initial credibility, it would be important to distinguish the criticism of a belief from the criticism of the subject who holds the belief. It is simply false that we would always criticize a person for holding a belief we judge to be epistemically irrational. We might, for example, suppose that the person is just too stupid to be able to evaluate properly the relevant evidence and we might, as a result, seldom criticize him for the many wildly irrational beliefs he holds. But even if one makes clear that in characterizing a belief as unjustified one is criticizing the belief not the believer, I'm not sure that one can successfully argue that a person would be guilty of contradiction if, in the grips of some rebellious “anti‐reason” movement, that person criticizes beliefs that conform to the dictates of epistemic rationality.

Once one clearly distinguishes the epistemic “ought” from others it is not in the end clear that one gets much understanding of the concept of justification from the suggestion that epistemic judgements are in some sense normative. 4

Foundationalism

It is tempting to think that one can leave the question of how to understand epistemic justification aside and distinguish different theories of justification in terms of how they understand the structure of epistemic justification. Perhaps the most famous theory of epistemic justification is foundationalism —the very term for the view employs a structural metaphor. But as we shall see, foundationalism is probably best understood not just as a view about the structure of justification. Properly understood, different versions of foundationalism also give an account of the content of epistemic judgements.

Traditional versions of foundationalism have fallen on hard times, but given the present popularity of its externalist cousins, it is still probably the received view in epistemology. Put crudely, the foundationalist believes that all justified beliefs rest ultimately on a foundation of noninferentially justified beliefs. One gets radically different versions of foundationalism depending on how the foundationalist understands noninferential justification.

A little reflection suggests that the vast majority of the propositions for which we have justification have that status only because we justifiably believe other different propositions. So, for example, I justifiably believe that Hitler killed himself, but only because I justifiably believe (among other things) that various generally reliable historical texts describe the event. Foundationalists want to contrast my inferential justification for this belief about Hitler with a kind of justification that is not constituted , in whole or in part, by the having of other justified beliefs. But why should we suppose that there is a kind of justification that is in this way different from inferential justification?

The Regress Arguments for Foundationalism

Suppose I tell you as you approach your fiftieth birthday that you will shortly go insane. I offer as my evidence that you have a genetic defect that, like a time bomb, goes off at the age of 50. Naturally alarmed, you ask me what reason I have for concluding that you have the gene. I respond that it is just a hunch on my part. As soon as you discover that I have no epistemic justification at all for believing that you have the gene, you will immediately conclude that my bizarre conclusion about your impending insanity is wildly irrational. Generalizing from examples like this, one might suggest the following principle:

To be justified in believing P on the basis of E one must be justified in believing E

Now consider another example. Suppose I claim to be justified in believing that Fred will die shortly and offer as my justification that a certain line across his palm (the infamous “lifeline”) is short. Rightly skeptical you wonder this time what reason I have for believing that palm lines have anything whatsoever to do with length of life. As soon as you become satisfied that I have no justification for supposing that there is any kind of probabilistic connection between the character of this line and Fred's life, you will again reject my claim to have a justified belief about Fred's impending demise. 5 That suggests that we might expand our Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ) to include a second clause:

To have justification for believing P on the basis of E one must not only have (1) justification for believing E, but (2) justification for believing that E makes probable P.

The Epistemic Regress Argument

With PIJ one can present a relatively straightforward epistemic regress argument for foundationalism. If all justification were inferential then for someone S to have justification for believing some proposition P, S must be in a position to legitimately infer it from some other proposition E1. But E1 could justify S in believing P only if S were justified in believing E1, and if all justification were inferential, the only way for S to be justified in believing E1 would be to infer it from some other proposition E2 justifiably believed, a proposition which in turn would have to be inferred from some other proposition E3, which is justifiably believed, and so on, ad infinitum. But finite beings cannot complete an infinitely long chain of reasoning and so, if all justification were inferential, no‐one would be justified in believing anything at all to any extent whatsoever. This most radical of all skepticisms is absurd (it entails that one couldn't even be justified in believing it) and so there must be a kind of justification that is not inferential, that is, there must be noninferentially justified beliefs which terminate regresses of justification.

If we accept the more controversial second clause of PIJ, the looming regresses proliferate. Not only must S above be justified in believing E1, S must also be justified in believing that E1 makes probable P, a proposition that would have to be inferred (if there are no foundations) from some other proposition F1, which would have to be inferred from F2, and so on ad infinitum. But S would also need to be justified in believing that F1 does in fact make likely that E1 makes likely P, a proposition he would need to infer from some other proposition G1, which he would need to infer from some other proposition G2… . And he would need to infer that G1 does indeed make likely that F1 makes likely that E1 makes likely P… . Without noninferential justification, it would seem that we would need to complete an infinite number of infinitely long chains of reasoning in order to be justified in believing anything!

Peter Klein ( 1999 ) has recently defended a view he calls infinitism . The infinitist refuses to accept the existence of noninferential justification, acknowledges that with the availability of only inferential justification, justified belief would require us to be able to come up with infinitely many arguments for infinitely many premises, but argues that finite beings might very well have the capacity to do just that. There is nothing absurd in the supposition that people have an infinite number of justified beliefs (most of which are not, of course, conscious at any given time). You believe justifiably that 2>1, that 3>1, that 4>1, and so on, ad infinitum. While you cannot, of course, complete an infinitely long chain of reasoning, you might be such that you could offer an argument for every proposition you believe. And there is nothing absurd about the suggestion that your ability to do just that is necessary for each of your beliefs being justified.

There seems to be something very odd about the idea that I need arguments to support some of my beliefs, for example, the belief that I'm in pain now, or the belief that I exist now. But even if the availability of an infinite number of dispositional beliefs weakens the foundationalists' claim that without noninferential justification we inevitably face skepticism, it's not clear that the infinitist has a rejoinder to a second regress argument for foundationalism.

The Conceptual Regress Argument

The epistemic regress argument discussed above relies on the unacceptability of a vicious epistemic regress. But one might also argue, more fundamentally, that without a concept of noninferential justification, one faces a vicious conceptual regress. What precisely is our understanding of inferential justification? What makes PIJ true (with or without its controversial second clause). It is at least tempting to answer that PIJ is analytic (true by definition). Part of what it means to claim that someone has inferential justification for believing some proposition P is that his justification consists in his ability to infer P from some other proposition E1 that is justifiably believed. But if anything like this is a plausible analysis of the concept of inferential justification, we face a potentially vicious conceptual regress. Our understanding of inferential justification presupposes an understanding of justification. We need to introduce a concept of noninferential justification in terms of which we can then ultimately define inferential justification.

Consider an analogy. Suppose a philosopher introduces the notion of instrumental goodness (something's being good as a means). That philosopher offers the following crude analysis of what it is for something to be instrumentally good: X is instrumentally good when X leads to something Y, which is good. Even if we were to accept this analysis of instrumental goodness, it is clear that we haven't yet located the conceptual source of goodness. Our analysis of instrumental goodness presupposes an understanding of what it is for something to be good and ultimately presupposes an understanding of what it is for something to be intrinsically good. The conceptual regress argument for foundationalism puts forth the thesis that inferential justification stands to noninferential justification as instrumental goodness stands to intrinsic goodness.

Noninferential Justification

If there is a conceptual regress argument for foundationalism, then one hasn't completed one's foundationalist account of epistemic justification until one gives an account of noninferential justification, an account that itself employs no epistemic concepts. Those who continue to insist that epistemic justification is a normative concept, who reject naturalistic accounts of value, and who further claim that fundamental normative concepts cannot be defined, might claim that an account of noninferential justification consists in an identification of the properties of a belief or a believer upon which noninferential justification supervenes (Goldman 1979 ). The term “supervenience” is a piece of philosophical jargon upon which many these days rely. To say that Y supervenes upon X is usually just to claim that there is some sort of necessary connection between X and Y where one can distinguish as many species of supervenience as one can distinguish kinds of necessary connections. In what follows, I'm going to discuss different accounts of noninferential justification in terms of the conditions with which the proponent of the view identifies having noninferential justification. If one is nervous about identity claims one can translate the views into the language of supervenience.

Noninferential Justification as Infallible Belief

Descartes may be the most well‐known foundationalist. Although he almost never talked about justification (his concern was with knowledge), it seems clear that he embraced the idea that there is a way of knowing that does not rely on what we have called inferential justification. On the most natural interpretation of his views, Descartes identified foundational knowledge with infallible belief. Famously, Descartes found his “first” truth in knowledge of his own existence. What distinguished Descartes's belief about his own existence from other beliefs is that the mere fact that he believed that he existed entailed that he did. Shall we understand noninferential justification in Cartesian terms? Shall we say that S's belief that P is noninferentially justified at t when S's believing P at t entails that P is true?

There are relatively few Cartesian foundationalists around these days. The view is plagued with difficulties. As Lehrer ( 1974 ) and others have pointed out, it is far from clear that this concept of infallible belief has much relevance to our fundamental understanding of noninferential justification. Consider just one technical problem. Every necessary truth is trivially entailed by all propositions (P entails Q when it is impossible for P to be true while Q is false, but if it is impossible for Q to be false then it is entailed by everything). So given the above way of understanding infallible belief, all belief in necessary truth would have noninferential justification. But this just seems wrong. If I whimsically believe some proposition whose necessity is far too complicated for me to grasp, it hardly seems plausible to maintain that the belief would have noninferential justification.

Even if we can find a way of solving the above problem, most contemporary epistemologists are convinced that foundational justification restricted to what can be infallibly believed allows far too insubstantial a foundation to support the complex edifice of what we take ourselves to be justified in believing. There may be a few contingent propositions that are trivially entailed by the fact that they are believed—my belief that I exist, that I have beliefs, that I am conscious—but once we get past propositions whose very subject matter encompasses the fact that they are believed, it's hard to come up with uncontroversial examples of infallible beliefs. As Ayer ( 1956 , 19) argued, as long as the belief that P is one state of affairs and P's being the case is an entirely different state of affairs, it's hard to see how it can be impossible for the former to occur without the latter.

Infallible Justification

Rather than try to identify noninferential justification with some intrinsic feature of a belief that renders the belief infallible, one might instead look for a kind of justification that can accompany a belief and eliminate the possibility of error. Let us say that S's belief that P is infallibly justified at t when S's justification for believing P at t contains as a constituent the very truth‐maker for P. But how can the justification for a belief be identified with a state of affairs that includes as a constituent something that makes true the belief?

Some traditional foundationalists have held that beliefs about experiences are justified by the very experiences that are the subject matter of the beliefs. Thus, for example, it might seem initially plausible to suppose that when I am in pain, it is the pain itself that justifies me in believing that I am in pain. On such a view, the noninferential justification I have for believing that I'm in pain—the experience of pain—trivially guarantees the truth of what I believe. But such a view clearly cries out for some further account of what distinguishes the experience of pain from, say, Caesar's assassination. The above foundationalist wants to claim that while the fact that I'm in pain can justify me in believing that I'm in pain, the fact that Caesar was assassinated cannot justify my belief that Caesar was assassinated. But what is the relevant difference between the two facts that makes it implausible to claim that one is a noninferential justifier, while the other is not? It won't do to call attention to the fact that the pain is an experience of mine. My body is undergoing all sorts of changes right now, the vast majority of which don't justify me in believing that they are occurring. So we still need a principled account of what distinguishes those states of mine that can justify beliefs about them from those states of mine that cannot.

It is tempting to suppose that the foundationalist is better off appealing to some special relation that I have to my pain that makes it unnecessary to look to other beliefs in order to justify my belief that I'm in pain. It's not my pain that justifies me in believing that I'm in pain. It is, rather, the fact that I have a kind of access to my pain that no‐one else has that makes my belief noninferentially justified (while others must rely on inference in order to discover that I'm in this state). The sort of access this foundationalist appeals to is not, of course, justified belief. We need an understanding of noninferential justification that does not rely on an understanding of justified belief. Bertrand Russell ( 1959 and 1984 ) contrasted acquaintance with properties and facts with propositional knowledge. Acquaintance is a sui generis relation that a subject bears to certain facts in virtue of which the subject gets a kind of justification for believing the propositions made true by those facts. A slightly more complicated version of the view maintains that one is noninferentially justified in believing a proposition P when one is directly acquainted with not only the fact that P but also with a relation of correspondence between the thought that P and the fact that P (where the correspondence between a thought and a fact is the essence of a thought's being true). Since acquaintance is a relation that requires the existence of its relata, there is a trivial sense in which one can't possess this sort of justification for believing a proposition while the proposition is false. 6

The acquaintance theory might have one interesting advantage over alternative theories in that it has the potential to offer a unified account of noninferential justification. According to most traditional foundationalists, two of the best candidates for noninferentially justified beliefs are empirical beliefs about the current contents of one's mind and a priori beliefs about relatively straightforward necessary truths. On the acquaintance theory, both direct knowledge of necessary truths and direct knowledge of contingent truths about one's current consciousness would have the same source of justification—acquaintance with facts. The difference between the two kinds of knowledge is not so much a difference in the sources of the knowledge but in the contents of the knowledge. The objects of acquaintance in the case of direct knowledge of mental states are states of affairs whose occurrence is not eternal—the objects of acquaintance in the case of direct knowledge of necessary truths are eternal states of affairs.

Objections to Traditional Foundationalism

In one of the most influential arguments against foundationalism, Wilfrid Sellars ( 1963 , 131–132) argued that the idea of foundational justification as something's being “given” to one in consciousness (something's being an object of direct acquaintance) contains irreconcilable tensions. On the one hand, to ensure that something's being given does not involve any other beliefs, proponents of the view want noninferential justification to be untainted by the application of concepts. On the other hand, the whole point of foundationalism is to end a regress of justification, to give us secure foundational justification for the rest of what we justifiably infer from those foundations. But to make sense of inferences from our foundations, we must ensure that what is given to us in consciousness has a truth value . The kind of thing that has a truth value, however, involves the application of concepts. But to apply a concept is to make a judgment about class membership, and to make a judgment about class membership always involves relating the thing about which the judgment is made to other paradigm members of the class. These judgments of relevant similarity will minimally involve beliefs about the past and thus be inferential in character (assuming that we can have no “direct” access to facts about the past).

The above objection obviously relies on a host of controversial presuppositions. In order to deflect the force of the objection, a traditional acquaintance foundationalist will no doubt emphasize the following. Being directly acquainted with a fact is not, by itself, to have a justified belief in some proposition. It is only acquaintance with a fact conjoined with awareness of a thought's corresponding to a fact that constitutes having noninferential justification. There may well be all kinds of creatures who have acquaintance with facts but no justification for believing anything precisely because they lack the capacity to form thoughts. Secondly, the classical foundationalist will, or at least should, reject the suggestion that to apply a concept is to relate the thing to which one applies the concept to other entities that fall under the concept. Such a view simply invites a vicious regress of the sort that the foundationalist is trying so desperately to avoid. After all, my judgement that X is similar to Y itself involves applying the concept of similarity to the pair X/Y. In doing so am I comparing the pair X/Y to other things that are similar to each other? In fact, I can judge something to be pain without having any recollection whatsoever of any other experience that I have had.

The direct acquaintance theorist does presuppose the intelligibility of acquaintance with facts and in doing so presupposes the intelligibility of a world that has “structure” independently of any structure imposed by the mind. Certain radical versions of “antirealism” reject that commitment to a strong “correspondence” conception of truth and with it the intelligibility of a thought/world fit of which we can be directly aware. 7 While there is some plausibility to the claim that there are, in some sense, alternative conceptual frameworks that we can impose on the world, it is surely absurd to suppose that it is even in principle possible for a mind to force a structure on a literally unstructured world. There are indefinitely many ways to sort the books in a library and some are just as useful as others, but there would be no way to begin sorting books were books undifferentiated. If we couldn't take notice of differences in the world with which we are acquainted, it's not clear how we could “choose” conceptual frameworks with which to make sense of our experience.

Laurence BonJour ( 1985 ) raised another highly influential objection to all forms of classical foundationalism (an objection raised before he himself joined the ranks of the traditional foundationalists). The objection presupposed a strong form of what we might call access internalism. Put superficially, the access internalist argues that a feature of a belief or epistemic situation that makes a belief noninferentially justified must be a feature to which we have actual or potential access. Moreover, we must have access to the fact that the feature in question makes probable the truth of what we believe. So suppose some foundationalist offers an account of noninferential justification according to which a belief is noninferentially justified if it has some characteristic X (where X can stand for any sort of property including complex relational properties). BonJour then argues that the mere fact that the belief has X could not, even in principle, justify the believer in holding the belief. The believer would also need access to (justified belief that!) the belief in question has X and that beliefs of this sort (X beliefs) are likely to be true. At least one of these propositions could only be known through inference, and thus the putative noninferential justification is destroyed.

One must be careful in one's commitment to access requirements for justification lest the view become unintelligible. One can hardly expect an epistemologist to concede that any attempt to identify the conditions X that constitute justification will fail unless one supplements the account with conditions referring to actual or potential access to X. It is immediately clear that one couldn't even in principle satisfy this access internalist. If one tries to supplement X with a believer's having access to X, one simply creates a new condition Y (X plus access) which, according to the view, would itself need to be supplemented by the addition of access requirements to Y. But Y plus access (call it Z) will also be insufficient for justification—we will need to add access conditions to Z, and so on, ad infinitum. The most the access internalist could coherently assert is some sort of necessary connection between having justification and having actual or potential access to justification, where the access in question is not constitutive of the justification. But however one qualifies one's access requirements for justification, access internalism seems far too demanding a theory of epistemic justification. It seems to require of epistemic agents the capacity to form ever more complex justified metabeliefs about the justificatory status of beliefs below.

Traditional Foundationalism and Skepticism

The dissatisfaction with traditional foundationalism probably has as much to do with the threat of skepticism as with any more technical problem facing the view. If we understand noninferential justification in terms of infallible belief or acquaintance with a thought/world fit, on most versions of the traditional view there isn't much we are noninferentially justified in believing. If acquaintance is a real relation, it seems implausible, for example, to suppose that one is directly acquainted with facts about the past or the external world. The following sort of argument seems at least initially powerful:

It's possible that we seem to remember having done something X without having actually done it.

The justification we have for believing that we did X when we have a vivid “hallucinatory” memory would be the same as the justification we have for believing that we did X were we to veridically remember doing X.

The justification we have for believing that we did X when we have vivid “false” memory experience is not direct acquaintance with our having done X (acquaintance is a relation that requires the existence of its relata).

The justification we have for believing that we did X when we have a veridical memory experience is not direct acquaintance with our having done X.

An exactly parallel argument is available with respect to justification for believing propositions about the external world. Such justification never gets any better than the “evidence of our senses.” But,

The justification S has for believing some proposition about the physical world when suffering a vivid hallucinatory experience is the same as the justification S has for believing that proposition were S to have a phenomenologically indistinguishable veridical experience.

The justification S has when hallucinating is obviously not direct acquaintance with some feature of the physical world.

The justification S has in veridical experience is not direct acquaintance with some feature of the physical world.

If the above arguments are sound (they are certainly controversial), it is not entirely clear what will be left in the foundations of empirical justification. The classic empiricist view is that we have noninferentially justified empirical beliefs only about present conscious states. But it has been more than a little difficult to figure out how one can legitimately infer the rest of what we think we are justified in believing from such a limited set of premises. The problem is particularly acute if we accept the second clause of the principle of inferential justification. Given that clause, to advance beyond the foundations of justified belief we would inevitably need to employ nondeductive reasoning and, according to PIJ, that would ultimately require us to have noninferential justification for believing propositions describing probability connections between evidence and conclusions. As long as the relation of making probable is not defined in terms of frequency, as long as making probable is construed as a kind of “quasi‐logical relation” analogous to, but different from entailment, it may not be absurd to suppose that one can have noninferential a priori justification for believing that one set of propositions makes probable another. It is, however, an understatement to suggest that the view is problematic. 8

There is another source of dissatisfaction with the classic empiricist's suggestion that we identify noninferentially justified beliefs with beliefs about the character of present experience. Many would argue, on phenomenological grounds, that we rarely consider propositions describing the intrinsic character of experience. In sense experience our thought is almost always directed out of ourselves and on the existence of an external reality. It requires, the argument goes, considerable effort to turn “inward” to focus on appearance rather than external reality. If most people don't even have the beliefs that the traditional view regards as the only candidates for noninferentially justified beliefs, it seems that once again one faces an unpalatable, fairly extreme, skepticism.

Externalist Versions of Foundationalism

Contemporary externalists offer a refreshingly undemanding account of both non‐inferential and inferential justification. Just about all externalists reject the second clause of the principle of inferential justification. Moreover, noninferential justification is often understood in such a way as to allow for the possibility of a much broader foundation. Consider, for example, the best known version of externalism, Goldman's reliabilism (first set forth in Goldman 1979 ).

The fundamental idea behind reliabilism is strikingly simple. Justified beliefs are reliably produced beliefs. Justified beliefs are worth having because justified beliefs are probably true. The view is a version of foundationalism because it allows us to distinguish two importantly different sorts of justified beliefs—those that result from belief‐independent processes and those that result from belief‐dependent processes. The former are beliefs that are produced by “software” of the brain that takes as its “input” stimuli other than beliefs; the latter are beliefs produced by processes that take as their input at least some other beliefs. So, for example, it is possible that we have evolved in such a way that when prompted with certain sensory input, we immediately and unreflectively reach conclusions about external objects. And we may live in a world in which beliefs produced in such a way are usually true. Crude versions of reliabilism will regard such beliefs as noninferentially justified. Many of our beliefs, of course, result, at least in part, from prior beliefs we hold. We deduce and nondeductively infer a host of propositions describing the world in which we live. Again, on the crudest version of reliabilism, these belief‐dependent processes are reliable when the “output” beliefs are usually true provided that the input beliefs are true.

There are a host of questions that a reliabilist must answer in developing the details of the view. In the crude summary provided above we characterized the reliability of a belief‐independent process in terms of the frequency with which its output beliefs are true. But it takes little imagination to construct counterexamples to this naive a version of the view. Temporary paranoia might cause me to form two, and only two, beliefs about the malicious intentions of my friends, both of which happen to be true. But it hardly seems plausible to suppose that this coincidence makes for a 100 percent reliable belief‐forming process. Minimally, the reliabilist will turn to counterfactuals about the frequency with which output beliefs would be true were the process to produce indefinitely many of them. 9

If we settle the question of how to define reliability, we still need to determine whether the relevant concept of reliability should be relativized to circumstances. It seems obvious that a belief‐forming process might be entirely reliable in one environment, quite unreliable in another. Intuitively, even if the process nets us a majority of true beliefs, we don't want to concede that its operation in the “wrong” environment will result in justified beliefs. The obvious solution would be to define noninferential justification for a given believer in a given environment: S is noninferentially justified in believing P in C at t when S's belief that P in C at t is produced by a belief‐independent process that is reliable in C at t.

While perhaps the most influential, reliabilism is only one version of the externalist alternatives to traditional foundationalism. Armstrong ( 1973 ), for example, suggests the closely related view that some beliefs are noninferentially justified (basic) when they register accurately their subject matter the way an effective thermometer registers accurately the temperature. Although he would resent the suggestion that he is offering a theory of epistemic justification at all, Plantinga ( 1993 ) defines a concept of warrant in terms of beliefs produced by a cognitive apparatus that is properly functioning. He has his own distinctive theistic suggestion for how to understand proper function, but invites allies to try to define the notion in naturalistic terms (for example, in terms of evolutionary history). Plantinga's view is also a version of foundationalism because he holds that properly functioning belief‐producing mechanisms need not involve inference from justified belief.

The most striking feature of most versions of externalism is the way in which they open the door to the possibility of a vastly expanded class of noninferentially justified beliefs. According to the reliabilist, for example, it is never impossible for any belief to acquire noninferential justification. No matter what I believe, it is always in principle possible that the belief is produced by a reliable belief‐independent process. There might be a God who unbeknownst to me causes me to believe with complete conviction a host of true propositions and never causes me to believe a proposition that is false. Such divine inspiration would be a paradigm of a reliable belief‐forming process and the resulting beliefs would all be noninferentially justified. According to the reliabilist, whether or not a given belief is justified depends entirely on whether we are fortunate enough to live in a world in which our cognitive mechanisms produce in us beliefs that are largely successful in getting at the truth.

It is tempting to suppose that externalist versions of foundationalism only delay skeptical problems. Many externalists themselves seem to allow that one can legitimately worry that one has justification for believing that first‐level beliefs are justified. But it is another interesting (some would argue odd) feature of views like reliabilism that there really is no greater problem securing second‐level justification than there is for securing first‐level justification. If, for example, beliefs about the past produced by memory result from reliable belief‐independent processes, then the view implies that beliefs about the past are noninferentially justified. But if beliefs about the past are noninferentially justified then I can easily justify my belief that they are justified. All I need to do is remember that certain beliefs about the past turned out to be true when I relied on memory and employ a standard inductive argument to generalize that beliefs produced in this way are usually true. Of course the classic foundationalist will shudder at this shocking indifference to begging the question. They will protest that one cannot use memory to justify one's belief that memory is reliable! But if reliability really is the essence of justification, it's not clear why one can't study memory using memory to get justified beliefs about its reliability. The investigation into which belief‐forming processes are or are not reliable seems more a task for the cognitive psychologist than for the philosopher, but then perhaps this is why some contemporary epistemologists attempt to straddle the boundary between philosophy and empirical science.

Criticisms of Externalist Foundationalism

If classical foundationalism seemed to require too much in order for us to secure justified beliefs, externalist foundationalism strikes many as requiring too little. At least in a philosophical context, we are interested in having justification because we are interested in gaining a certain sort of assurance of truth. If we start to wonder whether our beliefs about external reality accurately represent that reality, it doesn't seem particularly useful to be told that we may have perfectly justified beliefs provided that they are produced in such a way that they usually accurately represent reality! The justification the philosopher seeks must be such that when one possesses it one's philosophical curiosity is satisfied.

If the primary dissatisfaction with externalism is the feeling that the traditional epistemological questions that have so interested philosophers have simply been redefined in such a way as to change the subject, there are also more technical objections that have been raised to the view. Perhaps the most striking involves a variation on a thought experiment used for a different purpose by Descartes. We'll illustrate the objection focusing again on reliabilism, but variations on the theme affect most externalist analyses of epistemic justification.

Consider a possible world (a kind of Matrix world) in which people are consistently and massively deceived with respect to external reality by a very powerful being. It seems intuitively plausible to suppose that the victims of demonic machination would have precisely the same sort of justification we have for believing (falsely as it turns out) what they do about the world around them. But by hypothesis the demon's victims' beliefs result from unreliable processes, while, we may suppose for the argument, our beliefs result from reliable processes. If the justificatory status of the demon‐world beliefs is the same as those of our world, then it just seems wrong to suppose that reliability is the essence of justification. Since his original paper advocating reliabilism, Goldman himself has struggled with how to respond to the intuitive force of this (and related) objections. After flirting (1986) with the idea of identifying the relevant reliability that defines justification as reliability in “normal” worlds (roughly, worlds in which certain fundamental beliefs we have about this world are true—whether or not they are true in the actual world!), Goldman ( 1988 ) eventually acknowledges two quite distinct concepts of justification: strong (defined by a hard‐core reliabilism in which we simply refuse to acknowledge that demon‐world inhabitants have epistemic justification) and weak (a less demanding concept of epistemic justification roughly defined in terms of meeting “community standards”).

Evidential Externalism

If one is convinced by the externalist that the traditional foundationalist has a concept of justification so demanding that it implies the implausible conclusion that the vast majority of our beliefs are unjustified, one might develop a kind of compromise. One might retain traditional foundationalism, replete with the principle of inferential justification, as capturing a kind of ideal epistemic justification that philosophers seek to attain, but which most people (and most philosophers, for that matter) fail to gain. To soften the blow, one might acknowledge a less demanding concept of epistemic justification that one might be able to satisfy through a kind of nonpropositional analogue of inference. Suppose, for example, that many of our beliefs about the external world are caused by the fact that we have had and are having certain sensations (together with a host of justified background beliefs, most of which remain dispositional). Suppose further that we rarely form beliefs about the character of these sensations, have long since forgotten many of the relevant past experiences (that nevertheless still exert their causal influence), and, of course, rarely, if ever, consciously construct some argument for the ordinary beliefs and expectations we constantly form about the world around us. The facts about sensations that causally contribute to our beliefs about the world are also truth‐makers for propositions (whether we entertain the propositions or not) and it might be the case that the conjunction of propositions made true by the causes of our belief, together with the enormous structure of propositions dispositionally believed that form our epistemic “background,” do make probable (via some sort of legitimate reasoning the epistemologist struggles, usually in vain, to uncover) common‐sense, everyday beliefs. Perhaps we can acknowledge a kind of “unreflective” epistemic justification that we might possess provided that our internal states (including dispositional beliefs and noncognitive states like sensation) satisfy the conditions described above.

Susan Haack ( 1993 ) develops a version of this view but takes a very liberal attitude with respect to what proposition we can employ as the propositional counterpart to sensation. She seems to suggest that we can take the relevant proposition describing a sensation to be one that describes it as the sensation usually produced by a certain physical object under certain conditions. Even if the skeptic allows us a less demanding concept of epistemic justification, that skeptic will no doubt balk at the suggestion that we can take evidential connections between propositions formed this way to be the truth‐makers for claims about epistemic justification. One does need criteria for choosing the propositional counterparts of sensations playing their causal role, but if it is facts that are both causes and truth‐makers for propositions, one can identify the relevant evidential proposition that corresponds to a sensation as the one made true by the fact about the sensation that is causally efficacious in producing the belief in whose epistemic status we are interested.

The above account might seem to be only a minor variation on the concept of epistemic justification defined by reliabilism. Whether this is so depends on how one understands evidential connections. If making probable is a kind of quasi‐logical relation holding between propositions (perhaps even holding necessarily) then the concept of unreflective justification sketched above will be able to resolve the demon‐world objection to reliabilism. The internal causes of belief in the demon world are, by hypothesis, the same as the internal causes of belief in “normal” worlds. The evidential propositional counterparts to the sensory states will be the same, and the justificatory status of the resulting beliefs will be the same. Of course, there may (relative to what we know reflectively) be no evidential connections between the propositions that form our justified background beliefs, the propositions made true by sensation, and the propositions that constitute the conclusions of our common‐sense beliefs, but should that be the case, skepticism wins the day both with respect to demanding and undemanding concepts of epistemic justification.

Contextualism

While the evidential externalist I discussed above is prepared to distinguish more and less demanding standards of justification, the contextualist , for example, Annis ( 1978 ), allows for standards to “float” where the requirements for justified belief are determined in part by the context of inquiry. Recent versions of the view are most often accounts of knowledge. So, for example, Lewis ( 1996 ) suggests that S knows that P when S has a true belief that P where S's evidence eliminates all relevant alternatives to P. What makes the view contextualist is that relevancy is determined by context, including such subjective factors as whether or not the believer is taking seriously the possibility of an alternative. The view is supposed to have the virtue of accommodating both common sense and skepticism—knowledge claims in ordinary contexts will remain true, while in philosophical contexts the skeptic is likely to win the day by forcing us to consider (and thus make relevant) various skeptical scenarios. An analogous view about requirements for justification might allow that one only needs justification for believing certain premises crucial to our reaching conclusions when these background beliefs come under challenge. In ordinary contexts where everyone is happy to allow the truth of our premises and the legitimacy of our reasoning, we can get justified beliefs without having to do what would be necessary were these to come under skeptical challenge.

There is, no doubt, a grain of truth in the contextualist's account of our ordinary, everyday assessments of justification and knowledge. In the context of assessing the justification available for accepting a scientific theory, one simply doesn't worry about the justification we have for believing in the existence of a past or an external world. We assume in the context of such a discussion that we have certain knowledge and that certain forms of reasoning are legitimate, and go on to ask whether on these assumptions, we can legitimately infer the truth of the theory in which we are interested. Philosophers themselves often raise certain objections to common sense beliefs in one philosophical context, only to assume the truth of those very beliefs in a different philosophical context. 10 Monks debating some esoteric proposition concerning the details of their theology may well take for granted the reliability of the Old Testament as a source of truth, presumably knowing full well that should they end up debating an atheist they would need to take a quite different approach.

None of this seems to provide any real support for an interesting form of contextualism, either about knowledge or justification. That we will often “bracket” one set of issues in the context of addressing another, that we will often be interested in seeing what follows from a given set of assumptions, setting aside our ability to “satisfy reason” with respect to those assumptions, is perfectly compatible with our recognizing that in the end our reasons for accepting our conclusions are never really any better than our reasons for accepting the host of background assumptions that remain in the background until we decide to focus our attention upon them. 11

Coherentism

Despite the radical differences among the traditional foundationalists and their more recent externalist counterparts, members of both camps typically share a common conception of the foundational structure of epistemic justification—they are common allies in the fight against coherence theories of epistemic justification.

The coherence theorist rejects the foundationalist's conception of justification as linear . Convinced that there is no escape from the “circle of beliefs”, the coherence theorist argues that we must understand the epistemic justification for a belief in terms of the way in which the proposition believed coheres with other propositions believed. We can distinguish pure and impure coherence theories of justification. A pure coherence theory takes the justification of every belief to be a matter of coherence. An impure theory restricts the thesis to a subclass of beliefs. BonJour ( 1985 ), for example, defended a coherence theory of epistemic justification for empirical beliefs only, but there is nothing in principle to prevent a coherence theorist from restricting the theory to an even more narrow subclass of beliefs.

The vast majority of philosophers who support a coherence theory of justification take the relevant beliefs with which a given justified belief must cohere to be those present in a single individual. What justifies S in believing P is that P coheres with some set of propositions that S occurrently or dispositionally believes (or would believe were S to reflect in a certain way). What justifies you in believing P is P's coherence with other propositions you do or would believe. But while epistemic justification relativized to an individual's belief system is the norm for coherence theories, one finds at least some interest in what we might call a social coherence theory. Roughly, the idea is that what justifies S in believing P is a matter not just of what S believes, but of what others in the community believe. A very crude social coherence theory of epistemic justification might hold that S is justified in believing P only if P coheres with the propositions believed by all or most members of S's community. Because one can distinguish as many different communities as one likes, epistemic justification on this view must always be relativized to a given community. For simplicity, we will focus on the kind of coherence theories that relativize epistemic justification to an individual's belief system, but most of what we say will apply mutatis mutandis to other versions of the view.

Once we are clear about which beliefs a given belief must cohere with in order to be epistemically justified, we'll need more information from the coherence theorist about what constitutes coherence. Often the coherence theorist will begin by claiming that coherence must minimally involve logical consistency, but go on to concede that consistency is far too weak a requirement to constitute the mainstay of coherence. One can imagine a person with a thousand beliefs, none of which have anything to do with any of the others but where each proposition believed is consistent with the conjunction of the others. Such a belief system hardly seems a paradigm of coherence, and we would be reluctant to concede that each has epistemic justification.

In an interesting argument, Foley ( 1979 ) has argued persuasively that consistency among the propositions one believes is not even a necessary condition for the beliefs' being justified. Focusing on lottery‐type situations, Foley argues that we can easily think of a set of inconsistent beliefs each of which is perfectly justified. If there are a thousand people in a lottery that I know to be fair, I can justifiably believe of each participant that he or she will lose and also justifiably believe that not all of them will lose. None of these beliefs is logically consistent with the conjunction of the rest, but each is justified. So the coherence theorist is wrong to tell us that a belief of ours is epistemically justified only if it is consistent with the rest of what we believe. A closely related problem concerns the possibility of admitting into one's belief system a necessary falsehood F. If one believes even one necessary falsehood, then none of one's beliefs will be consistent with the rest of what one believes; the conjunction of a necessary falsehood with any other proposition is itself a necessary falsehood. It seems more than a little harsh, however, to let one philosophical or mathematical error of this sort destroy the possibility of there being any epistemic justification for believing any proposition.

Coherence theorists are wary of requiring too much for the coherence of a belief system. So, for example, one might initially suppose that a model of a coherent belief system might be one in which each proposition believed is entailed by the conjunction of the rest. But one might also worry that such a requirement is far too difficult to come by. In one sense, however, the worry is misplaced. It is actually extremely easy to satisfy the requirement. Indeed, if we include dispositional beliefs, I can confidently claim to have a belief system in which each of my beliefs is entailed by the rest of what I believe. And the same is, or should be, true of everyone who has taken and remembers a course in elementary logic. One of the truth‐functional connectives we all learned was material implication. As long as we know its truth functional definition, we know that if P is true and Q is true then it is true that P materially implies Q and true that Q materially implies P. Consequently, I assume that if we believe P and believe Q, we will also believe (at least dispositionally) that P materially implies Q and that Q materially implies P. But then for any two propositions P and Q that I happen to believe, there will be in my belief system propositions entailing each. P will be entailed by (Q and Q materially implies P) and Q will be entailed by (P and P materially implies Q). The coherence theorist will no doubt be tempted to reply that the belief in the conditionals is entirely parasitic upon the prior beliefs in P and Q, but once one abandons a linear conception of justification, it's not clear what sort of epistemic priority P and Q are supposed to have just because they may have preceded the belief that P is true if and only if Q is true.

Ironically, perhaps probabilistic connections provide a stronger “glue” for coherence than logical relations. So a coherence theorist is likely to claim that a system of beliefs increases its coherence the more the propositions believed stand in probabilistic connections with each other. Explanatory coherence theorists emphasize the importance of having a belief system in which one maximizes the number of propositions believed where one has within one's belief system propositions that can explain the propositions believed. It's difficult, however, to regard entailment as anything other than the limit of making probable, and if it is too easy to come by a belief system in which each proposition believed is entailed by the rest, it's hard to see how one can avoid the problem by emphasizing probability.

There are enough powerful arguments against coherence theories of justification that one need not turn to more problematic concerns. And some objections to a coherence theory do seem to miss the mark. So, for example, some seem to be concerned with the fact that the coherence theorist embraces a radical relativization of justification. But any plausible account of epistemic justification will acknowledge that one person S can be justified in believing P, while another R is justified in believing not‐P. The traditional foundationalist will no doubt trace the difference between the justificatory status of S and R's beliefs to differences in their memories of past experiences, but it is still the case that radical relativization of justification should be embraced as much by traditional foundationalists as by coherentists.

There is, perhaps, the vague concern that a coherence theory of justification makes one's choice of what to believe far too subjective. I want to know what to believe and the coherence theorist tells me to come up with a coherent set of beliefs. But for every coherent set of propositions I entertain, I can think of another set inconsistent with the first but just as internally coherent. Won't this make the epistemic choice of what to believe implausibly arbitrary? If a theory of justification is to give one guidance, and if one were to somehow start one's deliberations about what to believe with no beliefs at all, then it would seem that the coherence theorist gives one no advice at all concerning what to believe. But we are no doubt simply caused to believe firmly certain propositions, and given that we find ourselves with certain beliefs and are trying to determine whether or not to hold still others, it's not clear that the coherence theorist leaves us with no guidance.

A similar response can be made to those who worry that the coherence theorist cuts us off from the world that makes true or false our beliefs. Nothing in the theory, however, precludes the possibility of our beliefs being caused by features of a belief‐independent world. The epistemological coherence theory holds only that whatever the cause of our beliefs, their epistemic status is a function solely of coherence. 12

Perhaps the most devastating criticism of coherence theories was, ironically, put forth by BonJour in the course of defending the view. Earlier we talked about differences between internalists and externalists. One version of internalism (we might call it inferential internalism) insists that evidential connections between propositions believed does nothing to secure justification for the believer unless the believer has access to the fact that the evidential connections hold. We can then distinguish two radically different versions of coherentism. On one version, a belief is epistemically justified provided that it forms a part of a coherent belief system. On the other, a belief is epistemically justified provided that the believer is aware that (has a justified belief that) the belief coheres with the rest of what is believed. The first version of coherentism seems vulnerable to devastating counterexamples. If a person believes a set of propositions that cohere wonderfully when the person has no way of discovering the inferential connections, in what sense are the beliefs justified? Suppose, for example, that I decide to believe every proposition expressed by the fourth sentence of every paragraph in a very sophisticated physics text. Through a miraculous coincidence the propositions I believe cohere wonderfully. Each is made probable by some conjunction of the others. I, however, have no clue as to what the evidential connections are. Would anyone suppose that my good fortune translates into justification?

If we embrace instead access coherentism, then coherentists face the very regress that traditional foundationalists tried so desperately to avoid. To justifiably believe that our beliefs cohere we would need to know first what we believe and second that the propositions believed stand in the appropriate evidential relations. But as coherentists we have no foundations to fall back on. We can't just give ourselves privileged access to propositions describing our own belief states. Our only access to what we believe is through a coherence we discover between our belief that we have certain beliefs and the rest of what we believe. But to discover this coherence we will once again be forced to discover what we believe, and so on, ad infinitum. An equally vicious regress seems to plague any attempt to discover evidential connections. To justify our belief that a given evidential connection obtains, we would need to discover coherence between our belief that the evidential connection obtains and the rest of what we believe. But discovering that coherence would require that we discover another coherence between our belief about coherence and the rest of what we believe, and so on, ad infinitum.

The basic problem facing access coherence theorists is simple. As pure coherence theorists they have no business giving themselves unproblematic access to any facts about the internal or external world, or the world of logical connections. If there really is a “veil” of belief, then beliefs themselves are hidden from us by metabeliefs, which are hidden from us by metametabeliefs, and so on, ad infinitum. Whenever we attempt to get anything before our consciousness we are led on an endless goose chase toward higher‐ and higher‐level metabeliefs.

Mixed Theories

Susan Haack ( 1993 ), Roderick Chisholm ( 1989 ), Ernest Sosa ( 1991 ), and others have suggested that we don't need to choose between foundationalism and coherentism. We can incorporate elements of both. Haack's crossword puzzle metaphor is perhaps the most vivid illustration of the idea. In a crossword puzzle, we are given an initial clue that may lead us to a tentative conclusion about the correct entry in the puzzle. But it is only when our tentative entry “fits” with the other entries we try that we feel confident that we have the correct solution to the puzzle. According to Haack, experience provides a kind of foundational clue with respect to truth, but coherence (fit) is necessary to raise the level of initial credibility to that of epistemic justification. Sosa allows for a kind of animal knowledge resulting from reliable belief‐forming processes (where reliability is relativized to internal and external circumstances) but insists that it is only when one's belief that one has animal knowledge coheres with the rest of one's beliefs that we can turn animal knowledge into reflective knowledge. Although he is one of the most prominent foundationalists, Chisholm allowed that coherence (concurrence) among propositions believed might be one way to raise the epistemic status of those beliefs (69–71).

Such views obviously need to be evaluated carefully, but it is not clear that any concept of justification purportedly captured by the mixed theory cannot be captured by a more straightforward foundationalism. If we have foundational evidence E1 for P1, foundational evidence E2 for P2, and foundational evidence E3 for P3, then instead of insisting that it is coherence among P1, P2, and P3 that raises the epistemic justification for believing each one, why not simply claim that it is the conjunction of E1, E2, and E3 that constitutes a foundational justification for believing each of P1, P2, and P3, where the conjunction of evidence makes more probable P1, for example, than E1 does alone?

A survey of this sort can at best suggest the rich diversity of views about the nature of epistemic justification and the equally rich diversity of objections those views face. In illustrating many of these views and objections I have painted with a very broad stroke. Moreover, there are a host of interesting variations on the views I did discuss that have been defended by able philosophers one would have liked to mention in a survey of this sort. Painting with a broad stroke can still give one a useful “big” picture, and this is all I hoped to accomplish in the preceding remarks.

See Cohen ( 1984 ) for a defense of the idea that a connection to truth lies at the heart of epistemic justification.

We often speak of having some epistemic justification for believing a proposition in contrast with having justification simpliciter. One can have some epistemic justification for believing P when the justification does not even make P more likely to be true than not—it simply increases the probability of P's being true. In what follows I'll almost always be talking about justification as “all‐things‐considered justification” and will use the term in such a way that one has justification for believing P only if, all things considered, the justification makes P more likely than not to be true.

I have argued elsewhere that our understanding of the “ought” of practical rationality and morality is in fact parasitic upon our understanding of the epistemic ought. It is implausible to understand what it is rational or moral to do in terms of the actual consequences that would result from alternatives. Practical and moral reasons seem to have more to do with what one is epistemically justified in believing about consequences.

For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Fumerton ( 2001 ).

The example may not be fair. It is far from clear that anyone really accepts as legitimate an argument whose premise describes a lifeline and whose conclusion describes length of life. Such arguments may always be enthymemes. The question then becomes whether it is still plausible to claim that one cannot justifiably accept the conclusion of any argument without justifiably believing that there exists the relevant connection between premise and conclusion. I think one can make the case that it is.

There is, however, nothing to prevent an acquaintance theorist from allowing that one can have noninferential justification for believing P that does not entail P's truth. It may be that one can be noninferentially justified in believing P in virtue of being directly acquainted with a fact very similar to, but ultimately different from the fact that P. For an attempt to develop this view in more detail see Fumerton ( 1985 ).

See, for example, Goodman ( 1978 ) and Putnam ( 1988 ).

One of the earliest attempts to construe probability as a relation that holds necessarily between certain propositions was Keynes ( 1921 ).

Or, one could replace talk of frequency in defining reliability with some other notion. Goldman toys with the idea of understanding reliability in terms of an undefined notion of propensity to produce true beliefs.

David Hume ( 1888 ), for example, attacked relentlessly the legitimacy of inductive reasoning and the rationality of belief in an external world, only to assume both in the context of investigating the subject matter of moral judgments.

For a more detailed discussion of contextualism see Moser 1985 , chap. 2.

There is also a coherence theory of truth that might seem a natural ally of the coherence theory of justification. The problems facing a coherence theory of justification, however, pale in comparison to those facing the coherence theory of truth. See Fumerton ( 2001 ).

Annis, David ( 1978 ). “ A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification. ” American Philosophical Quarterly 15: 213–219.

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Chinese International Students’ Stressors and Coping Strategies in the United States pp 33–39 Cite as

Methodology: Methodology Justification

• Kun Yan 4  
• First Online: 13 January 2017

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Part of the book series: Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects ((EDAP,volume 37))

This study adopts one design of the mixed methods—the sequential explanatory design. This design is characterized by the collection and analysis of quantitative data followed by the collection and analysis of qualitative data. The underlying epistemology for this methodology is based on Behren and Smith’s arguments. Behren and Smith (Data and data analysis. In Berliner DC, Calfee RC (eds) Handbook of educational psychology. Macmillan, New York, pp 945–989, 1996) argued that there is compatibility between a statistical analysis and qualitative analysis.

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Yan, K. (2017). Methodology: Methodology Justification. In: Chinese International Students’ Stressors and Coping Strategies in the United States. Education in the Asia-Pacific Region: Issues, Concerns and Prospects, vol 37. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-3347-6_4

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Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Knowledge-first theories of justification.

Knowledge-first theories of justification are theories of justification that give knowledge priority when it comes to explaining when and why someone has justification for an attitude or an action. The emphasis of this article is on knowledge-first theories of justification for belief. As it turns out, there are a number of ways of giving knowledge priority when theorizing about justification, and what follows is  a survey of more than a dozen existing options that have emerged in the early 21st century since the publication of Timothy Williamson’s  Knowledge and Its Limits . The article traces several of the general theoretical motivations that have been offered for putting knowledge first in the theory of justification. This is followed by an examination of existing knowledge-first theories of justification and their standing objections. These objections are largely, but not exclusively, concerned with the extensional adequacy of knowledge-first theories of justification. There are doubtless more ways to give knowledge priority in the theory of justification, but the survey is instructive because it highlights  potential  shortcomings that would-be knowledge-first theorists of justification may wish either to avoid or else to be prepared with a suitable error theory.

Table of Contents

• Introduction
• Token-Identity Theory
• Modal Theories
• Reasons-First, Knowledge-First Theories
• Perspectival Theories
• Virtue Theories
• Infallibilist Theories
• Proficiency Theories
• Ability-Based and Functionalist Theories
• Know-How Theories and the No-Defeat Condition
• Excuse vs Justification
• A Methodological Reflection on Gettierology vs. Knowledge-Centrology
• References and Further Reading

1. Introduction

Knowledge-first theories of justification give knowledge priority when it comes to explaining when and why someone has a justified belief. As it turns out there are a number of ways of giving knowledge priority when theorizing about justification (compare Ichikawa and Jenkins 2018), and what follows is a survey of several existing options.

Before examining specific knowledge-first theories of justification it is worth considering what might motivate such an approach to begin with. One kind of reason involves the potential extensional adequacy of knowledge-first views. The history of knowledge-first views of justification is a history of revisions that are, at least partially, motivated by the desire to find a knowledge-first theory that is extensionally adequate. Surprising progress has been made in this direction, and it is a major focus of this article. But there is another set of reasons for putting knowledge-first in the theory of justification and they involve more general, theoretical considerations. Here are several.

Consider, first, conceptual relations between knowledge and justification. Sutton (2005; 2007) has argued that grasping the concept of epistemic justification depends on our prior understanding of knowledge:

We only understand what it is to be justified in the appropriate sense because we understand what it is to know, and can extend the notion of justification to non-knowledge only because they are would-be knowers. We grasp the circumstances—ordinary rather than extraordinary—in which the justified would know. Justification in the relevant sense is perhaps a disjunctive concept—it is knowledge or would-be knowledge (Sutton 2005: 361).

Second, consider some plausible claims about the normativity of belief. As Williamson (2014: 5) reasons: “If justification is the fundamental epistemic norm of belief, and a belief ought to constitute knowledge, then justification should be understood in terms of knowledge too.” Here Williamson is connecting norms for good instances of a kind and norms for bringing about instances of that kind. So if one is justified in holding a belief only if it is a good belief, and a good belief is one that constitutes knowledge, then it seems to follow that a justified belief has to be understood in terms of knowledge (Kelp, et al. 2016; Simion 2019).

A third reason for putting knowledge first in the theory of justification stems from Williamson’s (2000) defense of the unanalyzability of knowledge together with the E=K thesis, which says that the evidence you possess is just what you know. Assuming we should understand justification in terms of having sufficient evidence, it seems to follow that we should understand justification in terms of knowledge. (For critical discussion of E=K see Silins (2005), Pritchard and Greenough (2009), Neta (2017), and Fratantonio (2019).)

A fourth reason stems from the way in which asymmetries of knowledge can explain certain asymmetries of justification. While much of the knowledge-first literature on lottery beliefs has focused on assertion (see the article on knowledge norms ), the points are easily extended to justification. One cannot have justification to believe that (L) one has a losing lottery ticket just on the basis of one’s statistical evidence. But one can have justification to believe (L) on the basis of a newspaper report. What can explain this asymmetry? Knowledge. For one cannot know (L) on the basis of merely statistical evidence, but one can know (L) on the basis a newspaper report. Accordingly, knowledge can play a role in explaining the justificatory asymmetry involving (L) (Hawthorne 2004; Smithies 2012). A similar asymmetry and knowledge-first explanation can be drawn from the literature on pragmatic encroachment (Smithies 2012; De Rose 1996). For a further justificatory asymmetry that certain knowledge-first approaches to justification can explain involving lottery and prefaces cases, see Dutant and Littlejohn (2020).

Further, putting knowledge in the explanatory forefront can explain (broadly) Moorean absurdities. Consider, for instance, the absurdity involved in believing p while also believing that one does not know p. Some explanation for the irrationality of this combination of beliefs should fall out of a theory of justification that tells us when and why a belief is (or is not) justified. Theories of justification that explain justification in terms of knowledge have an easy time explaining this (Williamson 2000; 2009; 2014).

Lastly, putting knowledge in the explanatory forefront of justification can provide an explanation of the tight connection between justification and knowledge. For it is widely believed that knowing p or being in a position to know p entails that one has justification for believing p. The traditional explanation of this entailment relation involves the idea that knowledge is to be analyzed in terms of, and hence entails, justification. But another way of explaining this entailment is by saying that knowledge or being in a position to know is constitutively required for justification (Sylvan 2018).

2. Token-Identity Theory

Perhaps the first knowledge-first theory of justified belief is the token-identity theory, according to which token instances of justified belief just are token instances of knowledge, which yield the following biconditional (Williamson 2009, 2014; Sutton 2005, 2007; Littlejohn 2017: 41-42):

(J=K) S’s belief that p is justified iff S knows that p.

The term ‘iff’ abbreviates “if and only if.” This is a theory of a justified act of believing (doxastic justification), not a theory of having justification to believe, whether or not one does in fact believe (propositional justification). But it is not hard to see how a (J=K) theorist might accommodate propositional justification (Silva 2018: 2926):

(PJ=PK) S has justification to believe p iff S is in a position to know p.

What does it take to be in a position to know p? One type of characterization takes being in a position to know as being in a position where all the non-doxastic demands on knowing are met (Smithies 2012; Neta 2017; Rosenkranz 2018; Lord 2018). The doxastic demands involve believing p in the right kind of way, that is, the kind of way required for knowing. The non-doxastic demands involve the truth of p and one’s standing in a suitably non-accidental relation to p such that, typically, were one to believe p in the right kind of way, one would know. (For alternative characterizations of being in a position to know see Williamson 2000: 95; Rosenkranz 2007: 70-71.)

One issue raised by characterizing being in a position to know in counterfactual terms concerns what we might call doxastic finks: features of one’s situation that are triggered by one’s act of coming to believe p at a time t +1 that would preclude one from knowing p despite all the non-doxastic requirements of knowledge being met at an earlier time t. For example, you might have all the evidence it could take for anyone to know p, but suppose Lewis’ (1997) sorcerer does not want you to know p. So, in all or most nearby worlds when the sorcerer sees you beginning to form the belief in p, he dishes out some kind of defeater that prevents you from knowing p. So, on standard possible worlds analyses of counterfactuals, it is false that you have some way of coming to believe p such that were you to use it, you would know p (compare Whitcomb 2014). Alternatively, one might seek to characterize being in a position to know in terms of having the disposition to know which is compatible with the existence of doxastic finks. Another alternative is to give up on the idea that being in a position to know is best understood in terms of worlds and situations nearby or close to one’s actual situation, thereby making the target characterization of being in a position to know a much more idealized notion, one that is discussed below (compare  Smithies 2012: 268, 2019: sect 10.4; Rosenkrantz 2018; Chalmers 2012).

There are various problems with (J=K), and by extension, (PJ=PK).  First, (J=K) is incompatible with the fallibility of justification, that is, the possibility of having justified false beliefs. So (J=K) cannot permit justified false beliefs. But any theory of justification that rules out such beliefs is widely seen to be implausible (Bird 2007; Comesana and Kantin 2010; Whitcomb 2014; Ichikawa 2014).

Second, (J=K) is incompatible with the possibility of having a justified true belief in the absence of knowledge. Gettier cases are typically cases of justified true belief that do not constitute knowledge. But (J=K) implies that there are no such cases because it implies that there can be no cases of justification without knowledge. This bucks against a history of strong intuitions to the contrary (Bird 2007; Comesana and Kantin 2010; Whitcomb 2014; Ichikawa 2014).

Third, (J=K) is incompatible with the new evil demon hypothesis. Consider someone who, unwittingly, has had their brain removed, placed in a vat (that is, envatted), and is now being stimulated in such a way that the person’s life seems to go on as normal. According to the new evil demon hypothesis: if in normal circumstances S holds a justified belief that p, then S’s recently envatted brain-duplicate also holds a justified belief that p. It is beyond the scope of this article to defend the new evil demon hypothesis. But as Neta and Pritchard (2007) point out, it is a widely shared intuition in 21 st century epistemology. This generates problems for (J=K). For since one cannot know that one is looking at a hand (or that a hand is in the room) if one is a recently envatted brain who merely seems to be looking at a hand, then according to (J=K) one cannot be justified in believing it either (Bird 2007; Ichikawa 2014). (For further discussion see the article on   The New Evil Demon Hypothesis . See also Meylan (2017).)

There are further objections to (J=K) that are noted below since they apply also to alternative knowledge-first theories of justification. The standard response to these objections is discussed in the final section on excuses below.

3. Modal Theories

To avoid the problems with (J=K), some have sought to connect justification and knowledge in a less direct way, invoking some modal relation or other.

Here is Alexander Bird’s (2007) knowledge-first account of justification:

(JuJu) If in world w1 S has mental states M and then forms a judgment [or belief], that judgment [or belief] is justified iff there is some world w2 where, with the same mental states M, S forms a corresponding judgment and that judgment [or belief] yields knowledge.

(JuJu) counts as a knowledge-first theory of justification because it explains one’s justification in terms of the knowledge of one’s mental state duplicates. And it does a good deal better than (J=K) when it comes to accounting for justification’s intuitive characteristics, including its fallibility, its compatibility with Gettier cases, and its compatibility with the new evil demon hypothesis. Despite this, various problems have been pointed out concerning (JuJu).

First, it seems that we can obtain justified false beliefs from justified false beliefs. For example, suppose S knew that:

(a) Hesperus is Venus.

But, due to some misleading evidence, S had the justified false belief that:

(b) Hesperus is not Phosphorus.

Putting these two together S could infer that:

(c) Phosphorus is not Venus.

As Ichikawa (2014: 191-192) argues, S could justifiably believe (c) on this inferential basis. But, according to (JuJu), S can justifiably believe (c) on the basis of an inference from (a) and (b) only if it is possible for a mental state duplicate of S’s to know (c) on this basis. As Ichikawa argues, content externalism precludes such a possibility. For content externalism implies that any mental state duplicate of S’s who believes (c) on the basis of (a) and (b) will be a thinker for whom the terms ‘Phosphorus’ and ‘Venus’ refer to the very same astral body, thus making knowledge of (c) on the basis of (a) and (b) impossible. Because of this, (JuJu) implies that you cannot have justification to believe (c) on this inferential basis, contrary to what seems to be the case. This is not just a problem for (JuJu), but also (J=K).

Second, (JuJu) fails to survive the Williamsonian counterexamples to internalism. Williamson’s counterexamples, as McGlynn (2014: 44ff) observes, were not intended to undermine (JuJu) but they do so anyway. Here is one example of the kind of case (JuJu) has difficulty with:

Suppose that it looks and sounds to you as though you see and hear a barking dog; you believe that a dog is barking on the basis of the argument ‘That dog is barking; therefore, a dog is barking’. Unfortunately, you are the victim of an illusion, your demonstrative fails to refer, your premise sentence thereby fails to express a proposition, and your lack of a corresponding singular belief is a feature of your mental state, according to the content externalist. If you rationally believe that a dog is barking, then by [JuJu] someone could be in exactly the same mental state as you actually are and know that a dog is barking. But that person, too, would lack a singular belief to serve as the premise of the inference, and would therefore not know that a dog is barking. (Williamson (2000: 57-58).

McGlynn (2014: 44) draws attention to the fact that a “natural verdict is that one’s belief that a dog is barking is rational or justified” despite the fact that one cannot know this while having the same mental states. For any (non-factive) mental state duplicate will be one for whom the sentence ‘That dog is barking’ cannot be true, and hence cannot be known either. So, we have another counterexample to (JuJu). Again, this is not just a problem for (JuJu), but also (J=K).

Since (JuJu)’s problems stem from its insistence on sameness of mental states, a natural response is to abandon that emphasis and focus on what a thinker and, say, her duplicate on Twin Earth can have in common. This is just what Ichikawa (2014: 189) attempts to do:

(JPK) S has a justified belief iff S has a possible counterpart, alike to S in all relevant intrinsic respects, whose corresponding belief is knowledge.

The target intrinsic respects are limited to the non-intentional properties that S and her Twin Earth duplicate can share. But they are not intended to include all such properties. Ichikawa wants to maintain that if, say, S unwittingly lost her body in an envattment procedure, she could still have a justified belief that she has a body even though the only counterparts of hers who could know this are ones who have a body. So, the target intrinsic respects are to be further restricted to what S and her envatted counterpart could share. In the end, this seems to amount to sameness of brain states or something close to that. This aspect of (JPK) goes a long way towards making it internalist-friendly and also helps (JPK) avoid the difficulties facing (JuJu) and (J=K). (See Ichikawa (2017) for his most work on knowledge-first approaches to justification.)

Nevertheless, (JPK) has problems of its own. Both problems stem from the attempt to reconcile (JPK) with the idea that justified belief is a type of creditable belief. Here is how Ichikawa (2014: 187) describes the first problem. As Zagzebski (1996: 300-303) and many others have argued, it is plausible that S’s holding a justified belief entails that S is creditworthy (that is, praiseworthy) for believing as she does. Moreover, S is creditworthy because S holds a justified belief: that is, it is S’s particular act of believing that explains why S deserves credit. But (JPK) seems forced to explain S creditworthiness in terms of facts about a S’s counterparts since it is one’s counterparts that explain one’s doxastic justification. But this seems odd: why facts about a merely possible, distinct individual make me creditworthy for believing as I actually do? As others have pointed out, this can seem odd (Silva 2017). But a more promising response involves noting that having a justified belief immediately grounds being creditworthy for believing, just as our intuition has it. And facts about one’s counterparts’ knowledge immediately grounds having a justified belief. But immediate grounding is not transitive, so stuff about knowledge does not immediately ground being creditworthy for believing. So, the odd consequence does not follow. A consequence that does follow is that stuff about knowledge mediately grounds being creditworthy for believing. (Because there is a chain of immediate grounds connecting these.) But here it is open for the knowledge-firster to say that our intuition really concerns only immediate grounding.

Ichikawa is clear that (JPK) is a theory of justified belief (doxastic justification) and that this is the notion of justification that is connected to a believing being creditworthy. But doxastic justification has a basing requirement, and this makes doxastic justification partly a historical matter. And epistemic credit and blame also seem to depend on historical factors too (Greco 2014).  Thus, Ichikawa’s defense of (JPK) is susceptible to cases like the following:

Bad Past: At t S comes to believe that there is a ceiling overhead. S believes this because she just took a pill which she knew would induce random changes in her intrinsic states. In advance of taking the pill, S knew it would very likely cause her to have many false perceptual beliefs. But as it happens, the pill induced a total re-organization of her intrinsic states such that at t S has a counterpart who knows a ceiling is overhead.

(JPK) implies that S has a justified belief in Bad Past because she happens to have a knowledgeable counterpart. And because she has a justified belief, she is also creditworthy. But this seems wrong. Rather, S seems positively blameworthy for believing as she does. (See Silva (2017) for further discussion of (JuJu) and (JPK) and see Greco (2014) for further discussion of historical defeaters for doxastic justification.)

An alternative solution to these problems would be to revise (JPK) so that it is only a theory about propositional justification:

(PJPK) S has justification to hold a belief iff S has a possible counterpart, alike to S in all relevant intrinsic respects, whose corresponding belief is knowledge.

One could then, arguably, concoct a knowledge-first theory of doxastic justification by adding some kind of historical condition that rules out cases like Bad Past.

It should be noted that (PJPK) has a strange result. For if your internal counterpart knows p, then your internal counterpart believes p. But if your internal counterpart believes p, then you also believe p—provided you and your counterpart are not in very different environments (for example, earth vs. twin earth) that shift the content of the belief (compare Whitcomb 2014). So, if (PJPK) is true, you only have propositional justification to believe p if you actually believe p. But it is usually assumed that it is possible to have justification to believe p even if you do not believe p. To accommodate this (PJPK) will need revision.

4. Reasons-First, Knowledge-First Theories

Sylvan (2018), and Lord (2018) each take a reasons-first approach to justification, on which justified belief just is belief that is held for sufficient reason:

(J=SR) S’s belief that p is justified iff (i) S possess sufficient reason to believe p, and (ii) S believes that p for the right reasons.

While (J=SR) is not itself a knowledge-first view of justification, it becomes one when combined with a knowledge-first account of condition (i). Lord (2018: ch3) and Sylvan (2018: 212) both do this, taking reasons to be facts and arguing that one possesses a fact just in case one is in a position to know it:

(Pos=PK) S possess the fact that p iff S is in a position to know that p.

Others have argued for some kind of knowledge-first restriction on (Pos=PK). For example, Neta (2017) has argued that our evidence is the set of propositions we are in a position to know non-inferentially. Provided one’s evidence just is the set of reasons one has for belief, this view will fall into the reasons-first, knowledge-first camp. (For objections to (Pos=PK) see Kiesewetter (2017: 200-201, 208-209) and Silva (2020).)

Perhaps surprisingly, the category of reasons-first, knowledge-first views cross-cuts some of the other categories. For example, (J=K) theorists have tended to fall into this camp. Williamson (2009) and Littlejohn (2018) take one’s evidence to consist of the propositions that one knows. Provided one’s evidence just is the set of reasons one has for belief, this leads to a view on which one possess p iff one knows p. This more restrictive knowledge-first view of possession together with (J=SR) and (J=K) constitute a kind of reasons-first, knowledge-first theory of justification. Since justified belief that p and knowledge that p never separate on this view, it can seem hardly worth mentioning this view as a reasons-first view. But there is more in need of epistemic justification than belief (though that will not be discussed here). There are other doxastic attitudes (for example, suspension, credence, acceptance, faith) as well as actions and feelings that are in need of epistemic justification, and on knowledge-first, reasons-first views these states can only be justified by one’s knowledge.

As mentioned above (J=K) is subject to a range of objections. What follows focuses on Lord and Sylvan’s incarnation of the knowledge-first program that consists of (J=SR) and (Pos=PK). These two principles give us a knowledge-first theory of justification that avoids some of the main problems facing (J=K).

First, (J=SR) and (Pos=PK) are consistent with the existence of justified false beliefs. This is due to the fact that one’s reasons (the facts one is in a position to know) can provide one with sufficient, yet non-conclusive, reason to believe further propositions that may be false. The fact that a drunk has always lied about being sober, can be a sufficient yet non-conclusive inductive reason to believe that he will lie about being sober in the future. Since it is non-conclusive, having justification for this belief is consistent with it turning out to be false. So, this view can allow for justified yet false inferential beliefs. The possibility of justified false perceptual beliefs is discussed below in connection with the new evil demon hypothesis.

Second, (J=SR) and (Pos=PK) are consistent with the existence of unknown, justified true beliefs. Because Smith can have justified false beliefs in the way described above, he can have a justified false belief that Jones will get the job based on the fact that the employer said so and the fact that this is a highly reliable indicator of who will get the job. Smith may also know that Jones has ten coins in his pocket based on perception. So, through an appropriate inferential process, Smith can come by a justified true inferential belief that the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. This is a Gettier case, that is, an instance of a justified true belief without knowledge.

A few caveats. First, it’s worth noting that the reasons-first, knowledge-first theory of justification only has this implication under the assumption that the justificatory support one derives from facts one is in a position to know is transitive, or can at least sometimes carry over inferences from premises that one is not in a position to know. For, here, Smith’s false belief that Jones will get the job is justified by the reasons Smith is in a position to know, and we are assuming this justified false belief—which Smith is not in a position to know—can nevertheless facilitate Smith’s ability to acquire inferential justification for believing that the person who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket. For worries about the non-transitivity of the justification relation see Silins (2007) and Roche and Shogenji (2014).

Second, it is also worth noting that while Lord and Sylvan’s view is consistent with some intuitions about Gettier cases, it is not consistent with all such intuitions. After all, their view seems to be that we possess different reasons or evidence in the Gettier cases than we do in the good cases. This will seem counterintuitive to those who think that we have the same evidence in both cases.

Third, (J=SR) and (Pos=PK) are consistent with some intuitions about the new evil demon hypothesis. In the standard telling, the recently envatted brain has a non-veridical perceptual experience of p and believes p on the basis of that non-veridical experience. While the non-veridical experience does not give one access to the fact that p (if it is a fact), there is an inferential process that can give the envatted brain a justified belief according to (J=SR) and (Pos=PK). This is because mature thinkers who are recently envatted can know (or be in a position to know) that in the past their visual experiences have been a reliable guide to reality, and can sometimes know that they are now having an experience of p. Together, these are facts that can give one sufficient reason to believe p even if one is an unwittingly recently envatted brain.

Of course, the weakness here is that the envatted brain’s perceptual belief that p is not based on her inferential source of propositional justification to believe p. Rather, the envatted brain holds her belief in response to her perceptual experience. So, she is not doxastically justified, that is, her belief itself fails to be justified. So, there is some bullet to bite unless, perhaps, one can argue that knowledge of the fact that one is having an experience of p can itself be a reason to believe p even when one is an unwittingly envatted brain.

There are further problems that the reasons-first, knowledge-first view faces. They are along the lines of the problems for Bird’s (JuJu). For if reasons are facts, then one cannot obtain justified false beliefs from justified false-premise beliefs unless, as noted above, one’s justified false-premise beliefs are themselves inferentially justified and justificatory support carries over (see the discussion of (JuJu) above).  Similarly, it is unclear whether one can gain justified beliefs from contentless beliefs. For contentless “premise” beliefs do not stand in inferential relations to their “conclusions,” and such relations seem essential to the ability of justificatory support to transmit across inferences.

For a further concern about this view see Littlejohn’s (2019) “Being More Realistic About Reasons,” where he argues that the conjunction of (J=SR) and (Pos=K) generates explanatory lacunas regarding how reasons should constrain our credences.

5. Perspectival Theories

Perspectival knowledge-first theories of justification put “knowledge first” by letting one’s point of view on whether one has knowledge determine whether one has justification. Smithies (2012), for example, argues that:

(PJ=PJK) S has justification to believe that p iff S has justification to believe that she is in a position to know that p.

Smithies (2012: 268) treats being in a position to know as a matter of being in a position where all the non-psychological conditions for knowing are met. Smithies is clear that this is only a theory of propositional justification (having justification to believe), not doxastic justification (having a justified belief). For as a theory of doxastic justification it would be too demanding: it would require an infinite hierarchy of beliefs, and it would require that one have epistemic concepts ( Knowledge, justification, position to know ) if one is to have any justified beliefs at all. This would over-intellectualize justification, excluding agents incapable of epistemic reflection (for example, young children, people with handicaps, smart non-humans). Worse, if knowledge requires justification then this would also rob such beings of knowledge.

It is important to note that (PJ=PJK) is neutral on which side of the biconditional gets explanatory priority. To be a genuinely knowledge-first view it must be the condition on the right-hand side that explains why the condition on the left-hand side obtains. This is something that Smithies himself rejects.  And there are good reasons for this, as there are objections to (PJ=PJK) that emerge only if we give the right-hand side explanatory priority. But there is also a general objection to this view that is independent of which side gets priority. This article starts with the general objection and then turns to the others.

A central worry to have about (PJ=PJK), irrespective of which side gets explanatory priority, is the extent to which Smithies’ purely non-psychological conception of propositional justification is a theoretically valuable conception of justification as opposed to a theoretically valuable conception of evidential support. For our evidence can support propositions in virtue of entailment and probabilistic relations, where these propositions can be so complex as to be well beyond our psychological abilities to grasp. For example, even before I had the concept of a Gettier Case, my evidence supported the claim that I exist or I’m in a Gettier case just in virtue of the fact that I exist was already part of my evidence and entailed that disjunction. But since I did not have the concept of a Gettier Case , I could not form that belief.

One general question concerns whether the motivations appealed to in support of (PJ=PJK) wrongly identify the following two epistemic notions:

Evidential Support—Having evidence that entails or probabilistically supports p.

Justification—Having evidence that gives one justification to believe p.

Certain evidentialists will like the idea of binding these notions together, thinking that strong evidential support is all there is to epistemic justification (Smithies 2019). Yet many have objected to the kind of evidentialism implicit in making evidential support necessary and sufficient for justification. The necessity direction has been objected to due to lottery problems, pragmatic encroachment, and the existence of justified beliefs not derived from evidence (so called “basic” or “immediate” or “foundational” justification). The sufficiency direction, while rarely challenged, is also objectionable (Conee 1987, 1994; Silva 2018). For example, some mental states are such that we are not in a position to know that we are in them even upon reflection (Williamson 2000). Suppose you knew that you just took a pill that ensured that you are in a mental state M iff you do not believe (A) that you are in M. A rational response to this knowledge would be to suspend belief in (A) due to your knowledge of this biconditional: for if you believe (A) then it is false, and if you disbelieve (A) then it is true. So suspension seems like the only rational response available to you. In at least some such cases where you consciously suspend belief in (A), you will also know that you have suspended belief (A). This is at least a metaphysical possibility, and certainly a logical possibility. Now, since you know the biconditional and since you know you have suspended belief in (A), your evidence entails that you are in M. But it is logically impossible for you to justifiably believe or know (A) on your evidence—and you can know this a priori. For believing (A) on your evidence entails that (A) is false. So, connecting justification to evidential support in this way is inconsistent with the following plausible idea: S has justification to believe P on E only if it is logically possible for S to justifiably believe P on E. (For further discussion of these and related reasons to separate justification from evidential support see Silva (2018); for further objections to Smithies see Smith 2012; for further defense of Smithies’ theory see Smithies (2019: sect 9.4).)

Further, as Smith (2012) points out, (PJ=PJPK) implies that having justification to believe p requires having justification to believe an infinite hierarchy of meta-justificatory claims:

One thing that we can immediately observe is that [PJ=PJK]… is recursive, in that it can be reapplied to the results of previous applications. If one has justification to believe that p (Jp) then, by [PJ=PJK], one must have justification to believe that one is in a position to know that p (JKp). But if one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know that p (JKp) then, by [PJ=PJK], one must have justification to believe that one is in a position to know that one is in a position to know that p (JKKp) and so on… In general, we have it that Jp É JKn p for any positive integer n.

If one adds to this the priority claim that having justification to believe that one is in a position to know p is the source of one’s justification to believe p, one must either accept a skeptical result due to grounding worries about the infinite hierarchy of meta-justificatory claims, or accept a knowledge-first form of infinitism. But even overcoming the standard general worries with infinitism, knowledge-first infinitism will be especially difficult to handle due to luminosity failures for KK. For example, in Williamson’s (2000: 229) unmarked clock case, one is argued to know a proposition p, while also knowing that it is very improbable that one knows p. Intuitively, this is a case where one knows p and so justifiably believes p even though they lack justification to believe they know p. (For a discussion of the limits of the unmarked clock case see Horowitz 2014.)

The final issue with (PJ=PJPK) is whether or not having justification to believe that one is in a position to know is the source of one’s propositional justification to believe p (which would make this a knowledge-first view) or whether it is a non-explanatory necessary and sufficient condition on having justification to believe p (Smithies’ view). To illustrate the difference, suppose there is an infallible record of peoples’ heights. It is certainly true that Paul is 5’11’’ at t if and only if the infallible record says that Paul is 5’11’’ at t. But the right-hand-side of that biconditional is plausibly non-explanatory. The fact that there is an infallible record does not make or otherwise explain Paul’s height. Now, if the advocate of (PJ=PJPK) holds that having justification to believe that one is in a position to know is the source of one’s justification, then having a doxastically justified belief will, according to tradition, require one to base their belief that p on that source of justification. But ordinarily we do not base our beliefs on further facts about knowing or being in a position to know. So if we are not to risk an unacceptable skepticism about doxastically justified belief (and hence knowledge), it seems we will either have to give up the tradition or treat the right-hand-side of (PJ=PJPK) as specifying a mere non-explanatory necessary and sufficient condition. But if that is the case, it can seem puzzling why there should be such a modally robust connection between justification and one’s perspective on whether one knows.

A view much like (PJ=PJPK) that avoids all but this final problem is Dutant and Littlejohn’s (2020) thesis:

(Probable Knowledge): It is rational for S to believe p iff the probability that S is in a position to know p is sufficiently high.

Even after specifying the relevant notion of ‘in a position to know’ and the relevant notion of ‘probability’ (objective, subjective, epistemic, together with some specification of what counts as an agent’s evidence), provided we can and should distinguish between propositionally and doxastically rational belief, it seems that (Probable Knowledge) is either not going to be a genuinely knowledge-first view or one that does not allow for enough doxastically rational beliefs due to the basing worry described above in connection with Bad Past.

Reynolds (2013) offers a related view of doxastic justification on which justified belief is the appearance of knowledge: “I believe with justification that I am currently working on this paper if and only if there has been an appearance to me of my knowing that I am currently working on this paper.” Generalizing this we get:

(J=AK) S’s belief that p is justified if and only if S is appeared to as though S knows that p.

On his view appearances are not doxastic states nor are they conceptually demanding. As he (2013: 369) explains the target notion:

“Consider the following example: Walking in a park I notice an unfamiliar bird, and I decide I would like to find out what it is. Fortunately, it doesn’t immediately fly away, so I observe it for two or three minutes. A few hours later, having returned home, I look up a web site, find a few photos, follow up by watching a video, and conclude confidently that I saw a Steller’s Jay. I think it is perfectly correct to say that the bird I saw had the appearance of a Steller’s Jay, even though I didn’t know that that’s what it was at the time. If it hadn’t had the appearance of a Steller’s Jay, I wouldn’t have been able to remember that appearance later and match it to the photos and video of Steller’s Jays. I didn’t have the concept of a Steller’s Jay, yet I had an appearance of a Steller’s Jay.”

(J=AK) has advantages vis-à-vis (PJ=PJK). It does not lead to an infinite hierarchy of meta-justificatory claims and it is not hard to see how many of our occurrent beliefs might be based on such appearances, thereby avoiding some of the skeptical challenges that threatened (PJ=PJK). But there are problems.

One concern with (J=AK) is its self-reflective character. To have a justified belief you have to be (or have been) in a state in which it appears to you as though you have knowledge. This requires introspective abilities, which arguably some knowing creatures might lack. As Dretske (2009) put it: a dog can know where its bowl is, and a cat can know where the mouse ran. The correctness of these and other knowledge ascriptions does not seem to turn on whether or not dogs and cats have the capacity to access their own mental lives in such a way that they can appear to themselves to have knowledge.

Moreover, (J=AK) implies that every justified belief is a belief with such an appearance. But many of the justified beliefs we form and much of the knowledge we acquire is merely dispositional, that is, it involves dispositional beliefs that are never or only very briefly made occurrent. Do we, as a matter of psychological fact, also have the appearance of knowledge with regard to all such states? There is non-trivial empirical reason to find this suspicious. In the psychology of memory, it has been observed that our memory systems are not purely preservative, they are also constructive. For example, our sub-personal memory systems often lead us to forget very specific beliefs while forming new beliefs that are more general in character. Sometimes this leads to new knowledge and new justified beliefs (Grundmann and Bernecker 2019). But if the new belief is the product of sub-personal operations and the more general belief is itself un-retrieved, then it is unclear how that more general unretrieved justified belief could appear to oneself as a case of knowing.

A final concern with (J=AK) is its ability to handle undercutting defeat and the plausible idea that beliefs can cognitively penetrate appearances (see the article on cognitive penetration ). For suppose you have strong undefeated evidence that you are in fake-barn country, but you brazenly believe without justification that you are looking at the one real barn in all the country. Perhaps this is because you pathologically believe in your own good fortune. But pathology is not necessary to make the point, as it is often assumed that we can have unjustified beliefs that we believe to be justified. If either is your situation, your belief that you are looking at a real barn can appear to you to be knowledge given your normal visual experience and the fact that you (unjustifiably) believe your defeater to have been defeated. According to (J=AK) your belief is then justified. But that is the wrong result. Unjustified beliefs that enable the appearance of knowledge should not have the ability to neutralize defeaters.

Here is a final perspectival, knowledge-first theory of justification. It is mentioned by Smithies (2012) and explored by Rosenkranz (2018):

(J=¬K¬K): S has justification to believe p iff S is not in a position to know that S is not in a position to know that p.

Like Smithies, Rosenkranz relies on a conception of justification and being in a position to know that is psychologically undemanding. But unlike Smithies, Rosenkranz explicitly regards his view as being about justification for idealized agents and leaves open what relevance this notion has for ordinary, non-idealized agents like us.

There are at least two concerns with this view of justification. First, suppose we were to treat (J=¬K¬K) as a theory of justification for ordinary non-ideal agents and imposed (as many wish to) substantive psychological limits on what one has justification to believe. With such limits in place, (J=¬K¬K) would face not an over-intellectualization problem but an under-intellectualization problem. For agents who lack the concept KNOWLEDGE or the complicated concept POSITION TO KNOW could never be in a position to know that they are not in a position to know. So, such agents would be justified in believing anything.

But even once psychological limits are stripped away, and with them the under-intellectualization problem, another problem remains. Smithies (2012: 270) points out that, on this view, to lack justification one must be in a position to know that one is not in a position to know. Since being in a position to know is factive, this limits defeating information to factive defeating information. But it seems like misleading (non-factive) information can also defeat knowledge and justification. For example, suppose you are told that you are in fake-barn country. But in fact you are not, so you are not in a position to know that you are in fake-barn country. Still, the misleading testimony that you are in fake-barn country gives you justification to believe that you are in fake-barn country. Intuitively, this misleading testimony will defeat your justification to believe that there is a barn ahead; the misleading testimony ensures you should not believe that. But you are not in a position to know that you are not in a position to know that there is a barn ahead—recall the testimony you receive is misleading. So (J=¬K¬K) says you have justification when intuitively you do not.

In response, it seems open to advocates of (J=¬K¬K) to argue that while one might not be in a position to know the content of the misleading testimony (because it is false), the misleading testimony itself can defeat. In this case, for example, it is arguable that the misleading testimony that one is in circumstances that make one’s knowing that p improbable itself defeats one’s being in a position to know p, and so prevents one’s good visual contact with an actual nearby barn in normal conditions from putting one in position to know that a barn is nearby. (However, later arguments for the existence of “unreasonable knowledge”—that is, knowledge that p while knowing that it is improbable that one knows p—will challenge the integrity of this response in defense of (J=¬K¬K). For more on unreasonable knowledge see Lasonen-Aarnio (2010, 2014) and Benton and Baker-Hytch (2015).)

6. Virtue Theories

We are not simply retainers of propositional knowledge. We are also able to acquire it. You are, for example, able to figure out whether your bathroom faucet is currently leaking, you are able to figure out whether your favorite sports team won more games this season than last season, you are able to figure out the sum of 294 and 3342, and so on. In normal circumstances when you exercise this ability you gain propositional knowledge. If you are able to figure out whether the faucet is leaking and you use that ability, the typical result will be knowledge that the faucet is leaking (if it is leaking) or knowledge that the faucet is not leaking (if it is not leaking). The core idea behind knowledge-first virtue epistemology (KFVE) is that justified belief is belief that is somehow connected to exercises of the ability to know. Predictably, (KFVE)-theorists have had different things to say about how justified belief is connected to this ability.

a. Infallibilist Theories

Some have argued that success is a general feature of exercises of abilities (Millar 2016). That is, one exercises an ability only if one does what the ability is an ability to do. It is widely thought that belief formation is a part of exercising an ability to know because knowing is constituted by believing. From which it follows in the special case of exercises of abilities to know that:

(Exercise Infallibilism) S’s belief is the product of an exercise of an ability to know only if S’s belief constitutes knowledge.

For example, Millar (2019) argues for a special instance of this in arguing that we cannot exercise an ability to know by perception without thereby acquiring perceptual knowledge.

If (Exercise Infallibilism) is true, and if justified beliefs just are beliefs that are products of abilities to know, then (J=K) follows. And so we’ll have a virtue theoretic account of justified belief that faces all the same problems we saw above facing (J=K). Of note is the inability of such a view to accommodate the following desiderata:

Desideratum 1. Justification is non-factive, that is, one can have justified false beliefs.

Desideratum 2. One can have justified true beliefs that do not constitute knowledge, as in standard Gettier cases.

Desideratum 3. One can have justified perceptual beliefs even if one is in an environment where perceptual knowledge is impossible due to systematically misleading features of one’s perceptual environment. This can happen on a more global scale (as in the new evil demon case), and it can happen on a more local scale (as in beech-elm cases discussed below).

b. Proficiency Theories

The central point of departure from Millar’s virtue theory and the remaining virtue theories is that they reject (Exercise Infallibilism). It is this rejection that makes the resulting theories resilient to the objections facing (J=K). On Miracchi’s (2015) preferred instance of (KFVE), exercises of abilities to know explain our justified beliefs but it is not mere abilities to know that have the potential yield justified beliefs. Rather, it is only proficient abilities to know (“competences”) that yield justified beliefs, and all abilities to know are proficient abilities to know. One has a proficient ability to know just in case an exercise of their ability to know ensures a sufficiently high objective probability of knowing. That is, the conditional objective probability that S knows p given that S exercised a relevant ability to know is sufficiently high. This is a kind of in situ reliability demand on justification.

We can summarize her view of justified belief, roughly, as follows:

(KFVE-Proficiency) S has a justified belief iff S’s belief is competent, where S’s belief is competent iff S’s belief is produced by an exercise of a proficient ability to know.

Central to her view is the idea that exercises of proficient abilities are fallible, that is, an agent can exercise an ability to know without succeeding in knowing. So (Exercise Infallibilism) is given up. This enables (KFVE-Proficiency) to accommodate justified false beliefs (that is, Desideratum 1) as well as justified true beliefs that do not constitute knowledge (that is, Desideratum 2). So (KFVE-Proficiency) avoids two of the main challenges to (J=K) and Millar’s (KFVE-Infallibilism).

However, by limiting justified beliefs to beliefs produced by proficient abilities, Miracchi’s view is, like (J=K) and Millar’s infallibilist view, unable to accommodate Desideratum 3, that is, the compatibility of justified beliefs formed in certain deceptive environments. The first case of this is just the familiar new evil demon case. For the recently envatted brain, as Kelp (2016; 2017; 2018) argues, retains the ability to know by perception that, say, they have hands by responding to visual appearances in normal circumstances. But because they are no longer in normal circumstances, they no longer possess a proficient ability to know. In other words, the recently envatted brain’s change of environment robs them of the proficiency needed to form justified beliefs.

Miracchi (2020) rejects, or is at least deeply suspicious of, the metaphysical possibility of the new evil demon hypothesis. But we need not rely on fantastical envatted brain scenarios to make this style of objection to (KFVE-Proficiency). Suppose you grew up in an environment with lots of beech trees and developed the ability to visually identify them and thus the ability to know that a beech tree is nearby by sight. Since exercises of abilities are fallible, you could exercise this beech-identification ability if you were to unwittingly end up in another environment where there are only elms (which, according to Putnam, look indistinguishable from beeches to the untrained). But this is not an environment where your ability to identify beeches amounts to a proficiency: conditional on your exercise of your ability to identify and come to know that beeches are nearby, it is objectively highly likely that you will fail to know. So the intuition that you can have justified perceptual beliefs about beeches being nearby in such a case appears inconsistent with (KFVE-Proficiency). While there may be some doubt about the metaphysical possibility of the new evil demon hypothesis, this is a perfectly possible scenario. See Kelp (2018: 92) for a similar objection for Miracchi.

One last concern with (KFVE-Proficiency) regards its ability to accommodate defeat. This is discussed in the next section.

c. Ability-Based and Functionalist Theories

Kelp (2016; 2017; 2018) and Simion (2019) offer versions of (KFVE) that do not tie justification so closely to in situ reliability and thereby avoid not only the problem of having justified false beliefs and the possibility of Gettier cases, but also problems arising from the new evil demon hypothesis and very local cases of deception (like the beech-elm case above). So Desiderata 1–3 are easily managed. This section first explains their distinctive views and then mentions some concerns they share.

On Kelp’s (2016; 2017; 2019) view, justified belief is competent belief, and competent beliefs are generated by exercises of an agent’s ability to know. Importantly, such exercises do not require proficiency in Miracchi’s sense. Kelp’s view, roughly, amounts to this:

(KFVE-Ability) S has a justified belief iff S’s belief is competent, where S’s belief is competent iff S’s belief is produced by an exercise of an ability to know.

In contrast, on Simion’s (2019) view justified beliefs are beliefs that are generated by properly functioning cognitive processes that are aimed at yielding knowledge. Like the exercise of abilities, cognitive processes can properly function without proficiency:

(KFVE-Functionalism) S’s belief is justified iff S’s belief is produced by a properly functioning cognitive process that has the etiological function of generating knowledge.

These statements of Kelp and Simion’s views are relatively coarse-grained and both Kelp and Simion defend more refined theses.

Kelp and Simion’s views are not unrelated to each other. For the ability to know is an ability one has in virtue of having certain belief-producing cognitive processes, and Kelp’s (2018) preferred account of how the ability to know is acquired is the same general kind of account that Simion (2019) relies on in arguing that the cognitive processes that constitute one’s ability to know are cognitive processes whose function is knowledge production. Nevertheless, the views are distinct in that (KFVE-Ability) grounds justification in agent abilities, while (KFVE-Functionalism) grounds them in cognitive processes. See Kelp (2019) for a discussion of the importance of this difference.

Central to their views is the idea that exercises of abilities to know are fallible, and given the fallibility of exercises of the ability to know (KFVE-Ability) and (KFVE-Functionalism) allow for justified false beliefs and justified true beliefs that do not constitute knowledge. So, Desiderata 1 and 2 are easily accommodated.

Desiderata 3 is likewise easily accommodated. In Kelp’s (2018) telling, the recently envatted brain retains and exercises an ability to know when believing she has a hand upon having the visual experience as of a hand. According to Simion (2019), just as an envatted heart pumping orange juice counts as a properly functioning heart, a recently envatted brain counts as properly functioning when it comes to believe it has a hand upon having the visual experience as of a hand. And if justified belief can be had in cases of such systematic perceptual deception, then they can also be had in cases of localized perceptual deception as in the beech-elm scenario above.

So (KFVE-Ability) and (KFVE-Functionalism) can accommodate Desiderata 1–3. What about the desiderata that emerged in the objections to (JuJu), (JPK), and reasons-first, knowledge-first views? That is:

Desideratum 4. Justified beliefs can be based on inferences from justified false beliefs.

Desideratum 5. Justified beliefs can be based on “inferences” from contentless beliefs.

Desideratum 6. Justified belief is a kind of creditable belief.

Desideratum 7. Justified belief has a historical dimension that is incompatible with situations like Bad Past.

If (KFVE-Ability) or (KFVE-Functionalism) imply that a recently envatted brain is able to have justified beliefs from an exercise of an ability to know or as a product of their cognitive competences which aim a knowledge, then it is easy to see how claims 4 and 5 will be verified by (KFVE-Ability) and (KFVE-Functionalism). For these seem like more local cases of deception. As for 6 and 7, the virtue-theoretic machinery here is key. For both can be explained by the demand that justified beliefs are beliefs that issue from an ability or a properly functioning cognitive process. But that was exactly what was lacking in the cases discussed above that motivated 6 and 7. (See Silva (2017) for an extended discussion of how certain versions of KFVE can satisfy these desiderata.)

There are some worries about these versions of (KFVE). Consider Schroeder’s (2015) discussion about defeater pairing. Any objective condition, d, which defeats knowledge that p is such that: if one justifiably believes that d obtains then this justified belief will defeat one’s justification to believe p. For example, suppose you formed the belief that a wall is red from an ability to know this by perception and that you are in normal circumstances where the wall is in fact red. You will have a justified belief according to each of the fallibilist versions of (KFVE) above. But suppose you were given misleading yet apparently reliable undercutting information that the wall is illuminated by red lights and so might not actually be red. This is not true, but were it true it would defeat your knowledge; were it true you would be in a Gettier situation. Now the defeater pairing insight says that the fact that you justifiably believe the wall is illuminated by red lights defeats your justification to believe the wall is red. But according to the fallibilist instances of (KFVE) discussed above, since you arrived at your belief that the wall is red through an exercise of your proficiency or ability or properly functioning cognitive process, you have a justified belief according to (KFVE-Proficiency), (KFVE-Competence), and (KFVE-Functionalism). But that is inconsistent with the intuition that the justification for your belief is defeated.

So, this objection gives rise to a further potential demand on an adequate theory of justified belief:

Desideratum 8. Justified belief is susceptible to defeat by justified defeating information.

A possible response to this objection is to maintain that exercises of abilities, or the use of a reliable processes, always depends on the absence of credible defeating information. In which case, the versions of (KFVE) above may be able to accommodate Desideratum 8.

Another response is to resist Desideratum 8 and the supposed phenomenon of defeater pairing. For more on this see discussion of “unreasonable justified beliefs”, that is, where S arrives at a justified belief (and perhaps knowledge), but also knows that it is improbable that she has knowledge in her circumstances (Lasonen-Aarnio 2010, 2014; Benton and Baker-Hytch 2015). For qualified opposition see Horowitz (2014).

The second concern to have about (KFVE-Ability) and (KFVE-Functionalism) is that there is a question about the extent to which abilities/cognitive processes are “in the head.” For example, consider the amputee gymnast. She lost her leg and so no longer has the ability to do a backflip. So, her ability to do backflips is located not just in her head, it is also located in her ability to successfully interact with the physical world in some ways. In this case, it is located in her ability to control her body’s physical movements in certain ways. This does not conflate proficiency with mere ability, for even with both legs the gymnast might not have a proficiency because she’s in an inhospitable environment for performing backflips (high winds, buckling floors, and so forth). We might wonder, then, whether the envatted brain’s ability to know by perception is lost with the loss of her body and the body’s perceptual apparatus just as the gymnast’s ability to do backflips is lost with the loss of her leg. If so, then it is a mistake to think (KFVE-Ability) and (KFVE-Functionalism) are compatible with the new evil demon hypothesis (Desideratum 3). This threatens to make these views much more revisionary than they initially appeared to be.

d. Know-How Theories and the No-Defeat Condition

Silva (2017) argues that justification is grounded in our practical knowledge (knowledge-how) concerning the acquisition of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). The motivation for this incarnation of (KFVE) starts with the simple observation that we know how to acquire propositional knowledge. You, for example, know how to figure out whether your bathroom faucet is currently leaking, you know how to figure out whether your favorite sports team won more games this season than last season, you know how to figure out the sum of 294 and 3342, and so on. In normal circumstances when you exercise such know-how you typically gain propositional knowledge. If you know how to figure out whether the faucet is leaking and you use that know-how, the typical result will be knowledge that the faucet is leaking (if it is leaking) or knowledge that the faucet is not leaking (if it is not leaking). One way of thinking about the grounds of justification is that it is crucially connected to this kind of know-how: justified belief is, roughly, belief produced by one’s knowledge how to acquire propositional knowledge.

Here is a characterization of Silva’s (2017) view:

(KFVE-Know How) S has a justified belief iff (i) S’s belief is produced by an exercise of S’s knowledge of how to gain propositional knowledge, and (ii) S is not justified in thinking she is not in a position to acquire propositional knowledge in her current circumstances.

One advantage of (KFVE-Know How) is that it is formulated in terms of know-how and so avoids worries about abilities not being “in the head.” For example, while the amputee gymnast discussed above lacks the ability to perform backflips, she still knows how to do them. Similarly, in thinking about the brain recently envatted brain, she still knows how to acquire propositional knowledge by perception even if she lacks the ability to do so because she has lost the necessary perceptual apparatus. So, Desideratum 3 is, arguably, easier to accommodate on (KFVE-Know How) than on (KFVE-Ability).

Similarly, since exercises of know-how are fallible in situ (Hawley 2003), (KFVE-Know How) has no trouble explaining how exercises of one’s knowledge how to know could lead one to have a false belief (that is, Desideratum 1) or have true beliefs that do not constitute knowledge (that is, Desideratum 2). For similar reasons (KFVE-Know How) is able to satisfy Desiderata 4-7. See Silva (2017) for detailed discussion of these points.

Lastly, condition (ii) is a kind of “no defeater” condition that makes (KFVE-Know How) compatible with Schroeder’s defeater-pairing thesis and standard intuitions about undercutting defeat. So it manages to accommodate Desideratum 8.  So (KFVE-Know How) appears capable of satisfying all the desiderata that emerged above. Accordingly, to the extent that one finds some subset of Desiderata 1–8 objectionable one will have reason to object to (KFVE-Know How). For one way of developing this point see the next section.

7. Excuse vs Justification

The objections to knowledge-first views of justification above assumed, among other things, that justification has the following properties:

Desideratum 1 . Justification is non-factive, that is, one can have justified false beliefs.

Desideratum 2 . One can have justified true beliefs that do not constitute knowledge, as in standard Gettier cases.

Desideratum 3 . One can have justified perceptual beliefs even if one is in an environment where perceptual knowledge is impossible due to systematically misleading features of one’s perceptual environment. This can happen on a more global scale (as in the new evil demon case), and it can happen on a more local scale (as in beech-elm cases discussed above).

Desideratum 4 . Justified beliefs can be based on inferences from justified false beliefs.

Desideratum 5 . Justified beliefs can be based on “inferences” from contentless beliefs.

Desideratum 6 . Justified belief is a kind of creditable belief.

Desideratum 7 . Justified belief has a historical dimension that is incompatible with situations like Bad Past.

Desideratum 8 . Justified belief is susceptible to defeat by justified defeating information.

Knowledge-first virtue epistemology has the easiest time accommodating these assumed properties of justification, with (KFVE-Know How) being able to accommodate all of them.

In defense of alternative knowledge-first views some might argue that Desiderata 1–8 (or some subset thereof) are not genuine properties of justification, but rather properties of a kindred notion: excuse. As Littlejohn (2012: ch. 6; 2020) and later Williamson (2014: 5; 2020) argue, the failure to properly distinguish justification from excuses undermines many of the arguments that object to there being a tight connection between knowledge and justification. An excuse renders you blameless in violating some norm, and it is easy to see how some might argue that 1–8 (or some subset thereof) indicate situations in which an agent is excusable, and so blameless, although her belief is not justified. (For the locus classicus on the concept of excuse see Austin’s “A Plea for Excuses.” For critical discussion of the excuse maneuver in defense of knowledge-first theories (of assertion and justification) see Lackey (2007), Gerken (2011), Kvanvig (2011), Schechter (2017), Madison (2018), and Brown (2018).)

Arguably, the most accommodating knowledge-first virtue theory, (KFVE-Know How), threatens to make the concept of an excuse nearly inapplicable in epistemology. For the situations indicated in 1–8 are so inclusive that it can be hard to see what work is left for excuses. If one thought there should be deep parallels between epistemology and moral theory, which leaves substantive work for excuses, then one might worry that holding on to all of Desiderata 1–8 conflates properties of justification with properties of excuse.

8. A Methodological Reflection on Gettierology vs. Knowledge-Centrology

After about forty years of unsuccessful work trying to give a reductive account of knowledge in terms of justification, many judged it to be a degenerating research program. In putting knowledge first in the theory of justification, these epistemologists are exploring whether we can more successfully reverse the order of explanation by giving an account of justification in terms of knowledge. Attempts to put knowledge first in the theory of justification began during the early twenty-first century, and efforts are ongoing in a way that is reminiscent the history of attempts to solve the Gettier problem: knowledge-first theories are proposed, counterexamples are given, new knowledge-first theories (or error theories) are developed, new counterexamples are given, and so on (compare Whitcomb 2014: section 6).

Perhaps this warrants a return to the tradition from which knowledge-first epistemology sprang, that is, perhaps we should just return to the prior project of analyzing knowledge in terms of justification plus other conditions. Alternatively, perhaps this repeat of Gettierology merits a new approach. One such approach, advocated by Gerken (2018) is an ‘equilibristic epistemology’ according to which there is not a single epistemic phenomenon or concept that comes first in the project of the analysis of knowledge or justification. Rather, there are various basic epistemic phenomena that are not reductively analyzable. At most, they may be co-elucidated in a non-reductive manner.

9. References and Further Reading

(Formater: Insert paragraphs for this section here.)

• Benton, M. and M. Baker-Hytch.  2015. ‘Defeatism Defeated.’  Philosophical Perspectives 29: 40-66.
• Bird, Alexander. 2007. ‘Justified Judging.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 74: 81-110.
• Brown, J. 2018. Fallibilism . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Chalmers, D. 2012. Constructing the World . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Comesana, J. and Kantin, H. 2010. ‘Is Evidence Knowledge?’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 89: 447-455.
• Conee, E. 1987. ‘Evident, but Rationally unacceptable’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 : 316-26.
• Conee, E. 1994. ‘Against and Epistemic Dilemma’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 : 475-81.
• Dretske, F. 2009. Perception, Knowledge, Belief . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Dutant, J. and C. Littlejohn. 2020. ‘Defeaters as indicators of ignorance.’ In J. Brown and M. Simion (ed.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat . Oxford University Press.
• Fratantonio, G. 2019. ‘Armchair Access and Imagination.’ Dialectica 72 (4): 525-547.
• Gerken, M. 2011. ‘Warrant and Action.’ Synthese , 178(3): 529-47.
• Gerken, M. 2018. ‘Against Knowledge-First Epistemology.’ In E. And B. A. Gordon and Jarvis Carter (ed.), Knowledge-First Approaches in Epistemology and Mind , Oxford University Press. pp. 46-71.
• Greco, J. 2014. ‘Justification is not Internal.’ In M. Steup, J. Turri, and E. Sosa (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology . Oxford: Wiley Blackwell: 325-336.
• Grundmann, T. and S. Bernecker. 2019. ‘Knowledge from Forgetting.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XCVIII: 525-539.
• Hawley, K. 2003. ‘Success and Knowledge-How.’ American Philosophical Quarterly , 40: 19-3.
• Hawthorne, J. Knowledge and Lotteries . Oxford:  Oxford University Press.
• Horowitz, S. 2014. ‘Epistemic Akrasia.’ Nous 48/4: 718-744.
• Ichikawa, J.J. 2014. ‘Justification is Potential Knowledge.’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 44: 184-206.
• Ichikawa, J.J. 2017. ‘Basic Knowledge First.’ Episteme 14(3): 343-361.
• Ichikawa, J. and Steup, M. 2012. ‘The Analysis of Knowledge.’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
• Ichikawa, J. and C.S.I. Jenkins. 2018. In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind . Oxford University Press.
• Kelp, C., M. Simion, H. Ghijsen. 2016. ‘Norms of Belief.’ Philosophical Issues 16: 374-92.
• Kelp. C. 2016. ‘‘Justified Belief: Knowledge First-Style.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93: 79-100.
• Kelp, C. 2017. ‘Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology.’ In Carter, A., Gordon, E. and Jarvis, B. (eds.) Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Kelp, C. 2019b. ‘How to Be a Reliabilist.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98: 346-74.
• Kelp, C. 2018. Good Thinking: A Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology . New York: Routledge.
• Kiesewetter, B. 2017. The Normativity of Rationality . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Kvanvig, J. L. 2011. ‘Norms of Assertion.’ In Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Lackey, J. 2007. ‘Norms of Assertion.’ Nous 41: 594-626.
• Lasonen-Aarnio, M. 2010. ‘Unreasonable knowledge.’ Philosophical Perspectives 24: 1-21.
• Lasonen-Aarnio, M. 2014. ‘Higher-order evidence and the limits of defeat.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88: 314–345.
• Lewis, D. 1997. ‘Finkish Dispositions.’ The Philosophical Quarterly 47: 143-58.
• Littlejohn, C. 2017. ‘How and Why Knowledge is First.’ In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Littlejohn, C. 2012. Justification and the Truth-Connection . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Littlejohn, C. 2019. ‘Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99/3: 605-627.
• Littlejohn, C. 2020. ‘Plea for Epistemic Excuses.’ In F. Dorsch and J. Dutant (eds.), The New Evil Demon Problem . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Madison, B. 2018. ‘On Justifications and Excuses.’ Synthese 195 (10):4551-4562.
• McGlynn, A. 2014. Knowledge First? Palgrave MacMillan.
• Meylan, A. 2017. ‘In support of the knowledge-first conception of the normativity of justification.’ In Carter, A., Gordon, E. and Jarvis, B. (eds.) Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Millar, A. 2016. Forthcoming a. ‘Abilities, Competences, and Fallibility.’ In M. Á. Fernández (ed.), Performance Epistemology . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Millar, A. 2019. Knowing by Perceiving . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Miracchi, L. 2015. ‘Competence to Know.’ Philosophical Studies , 172: 29-56.
• Miracchi, L. 2020. ‘Competent Perspectives and the New Evil Demon Problem.’ In J. Dutant and F. Dorsch, (eds.), The New Evil Demon . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Neta, R. and D. Pritchard. 2007. ‘McDowell and the New Evil Genius.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 74: 381-396.
• Neta, R. 2017. ‘Why Must Evidence Be True?’ in The Factive Turn in Epistemology , edited by Velislava Mitova. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Pritchard, D. and Greenough, P. Williamson on Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Reynolds, S. 2013. ‘Justification as the Appearance of Knowledge.’ Philosophical Studies , 163: 367-383.
• Rosenkranz, S. 2007. ‘Agnosticism as a Third Stance.” Mind 116: 55-104.
• Rosenkranz, S. 2018. ‘The Structure of Justification.’ Mind 127: 309-338.
• Roche, W. and T. Shogenji. 2014. ‘Confirmation, transitivity, and Moore: The Screening-off Approach.’ Philosophical Studies 168: 797-817.
• Schechter, J. 2017. ‘No Need for Excuses.’ In J. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind . Oxford University Press. pp. 132-159.
• Silins, N. 2005. Silins, N. (2005). ‘Deception and Evidence.’ Philosophical Perspectives 19: 375-404.
• Silins, N. 2007. ‘Basic justification and the Moorean response to the skeptic.’ In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Vol. 2, pp. 108–140). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Silva, P. 2017. ‘Knowing How to Put Knowledge First in the Theory of Justification.’ Episteme 14 (4): 393-412.
• Silva, P. 2018. ‘Explaining Enkratic Asymmetries: Knowledge-First Style.’ Philosophical Studies 175 (11): 2907-2930.
• Silva, P. 2020. ‘Knowledge, Awareness, and the Possession of Reasons.’ University of Cologne.
• Simion, M. 2019. ‘Knowledge‐first functionalism.’ Philosophical Issues 29 (1): 254-267.
• Smith, M. 2012. ‘Some Thoughts on the JK-Rule.’  Nous 46(4): 791-802.
• Smithies, D. 2012. ‘The Normative Role of Knowledge.’ Nous 46(2): 265-288.
• Smithies, D.  2019. The Epistemic Role of Consciousness . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Sutton, J. 2005. ‘Stick to What You Know.’ Nous 39(3): 359-396.
• Sutton, J. 2007. Beyond Justification . Cambridge: MIT Press.
• Sylvan, K. 2018. ‘Knowledge as a Non-Normative Relation.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1): 190-222.
• Whitcomb, D. 2014. ‘Can there be a knowledge-first ethics of belief.’ In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vits (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social , Oxford University Press. 2014.
• Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits . Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Williamson, T. 2009. ‘Replies to Critics.’ In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge . Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 279-384.
• Williamson, T. 2014. ‘Knowledge First.’ In M. Steup, J. Turri, and E. Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Second Edition). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
• Williamson, T. 2020. ‘Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios.’ In J. Dutant and F. Dorsch, (eds.), The New Evil Demon . Oxford: Oxford University Press. Archived in Phil
• Zagzebski, L. 1996. Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Author Information

Paul Silva Email: [email protected] University of Cologne Germany

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The Justification Hypothesis

• View history

The Justification Hypothesis , or ( JH ), is part of a larger theoretical framework called the Tree of Knowledge System developed by Gregg Henriques . Specifically, the JH represents the Mind-to-Culture Joint Point in the ToK.

• 2 References & Bibliography
• 5 External links

See also [ ]

• Behavioral Investment Theory
• Tree of Knowledge System/Expert article by Gregg Henriques
• Tree of Knowledge System (community article)

References & Bibliography [ ]

Key texts [ ].

• Henriques, Gregg . (2004). Psychology Defined . Journal of Clinical Psychology , 60: 1207-1221. Full text
• Henriques, Gregg. (2003). The Tree of Knowledge System and the Theoretical Unification of Psychology . Review of General Psychology , Vol. 7, No. 2, 150-182. Full text .

Additional material [ ]

• Shealy, C.N. (2005). Justifying the justification hypothesis: Scientific-humanism, Equilintegration (EI) Theory, and the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory (BEVI). Journal of Clinical Psychology , 61, 81-106. Full text
• Vazire, S., & Robins, R.W. (2004). Beyond the Justification Hypothesis: A Broader Theory of the Evolution of Self-Consciousness. Journal of Clinical Psychology , 60, 1271-1273. Full text

External links [ ]

• The Official Website on the Tree of Knowledge System
• Henriques' lecture slides on the JH
• 1 Race and intelligence (test data)
• 2 Pregnancy fetishism
• 3 Filipino psychology

Freudian Psychology

The justification hypothesis, the third piece of the unified theory.

Posted December 19, 2011

On June 11, 1963 an elderly Buddhist monk named Thich Quang Duc calmly walked to the center of a circle of protesters, sat down on a cushion, and meditated in the lotus position as he was doused by his religious brothers in a specially concocted mix of gasoline and diesel fuel. He then proceeded to light a match. Although he reportedly grimaced in agony, he did not move, scream, or cry out as his body was incinerated.

What could possibly account for such a dramatic and seemingly unnatural human act? Common psychological constructs such as schedules of reinforcement, personality traits, neural networks, unconscious conflicts, and evolved predispositions do not appear to provide a framework that would allow for the meaningful interpretation of such behavior.

The third piece of the Unified Theory is called the Justification Hypothesis. It is the 'joint point' between Mind and Culture on the ToK System . Whereas Behavioral Investment Theory provides a framework that allows for the understanding of how human behavior is continuous with other animals, the Justification Hypothesis provides the framework for understanding what makes people such unique animals. It is an idea that casts the relationship between language, human self-consciousness, and the evolution of Culture in a new light by interpreting both human self-consciousness and Culture as justification systems . As described in the first Theory of Knowledge post , justification systems are the interlocking networks of language-based beliefs and values that function to legitimize a particular worldview.

Look around and you will see systems and processes of justification everywhere in human affairs. Arguments, debates, moral dictates, excuses, laws, as well as many of the more core beliefs about the self, all involve the process of explaining why certain claims, thoughts, or actions are warranted. In virtually every form of social exchange, from blogging to warfare to politics to family struggles to science, humans are constantly justifying their behaviors to themselves and to others. Moreover, justification processes are a uniquely human phenomenon. Other animals communicate, struggle for dominance, and form alliances. But they don't justify why they do what they do. We are the justifying animal.

How does the understanding afforded by the Justification Hypothesis (JH) fare in explaining Quang Duc's actions? Before his final dramatic act, Quang Duc left a letter, now known as the Letter of Heart Blood, which justified his sacrifice as an attempt to demonstrate to the world the magnitude of injustices that were being perpetrated on the Buddhist community by a repressive regime. His plan worked well, in part because the act was captured by a Western photographer and entered the world's consciousness. Many nations consequently brought pressure on the South Vietnamese government to soften its attitude toward the traditional religion, and ultimately it complied. Quang Duc's justification for his self-sacrifice can thus be situated within a larger constellation of cultural justification narratives and-according to the JH-it is these very narratives that provide the key to interpreting a wide range of human behaviors.

The JH consists of three basic postulates. The first is the biological postulate, which is the idea that the evolution of language created a new and unique adaptive problem for our hominid ancestors, namely the problem of social justification. The problem of social justification is the problem of explaining why you do what you do. To consider why this is a 'problem', ask yourself the following question: Would you want everyone to be completely aware of all your thoughts? Or, to put it another way, do you always tell everyone who asks exactly what you are thinking? If your answer is "no" (which is basically everyone's answer), you have a sense that it is often important to filter your thoughts and offer a socially justifiable narrative that explains your actions.

The second postulate of the JH is the psychological postulate, which is the claim that the human self-consciousness system functions as a justification system that constructs narratives for why one does what one does in a manner that takes into account one's social context and relative degree of social influence, and filters out unacceptable images and feelings. Let's define the human self-consciousness system as the portion of the human mind that reflects on one's experiences and builds language-based narratives for what happens and why. In this light, self-consciousness becomes the conduit point that connects one's inner world to the outer world of others. (Along these lines, the well-known neuropsychologist Michael Gazzinga refers to the self-consciousness system as 'the Interpreter' ). The JH's second postulate predicts that the human self-consciousness system is designed in such a way that the individual maintains a consistent, relatively stable justification narrative of the self and generally works to maintain a justifiable image in the eyes of others.

To see the implications of this view of self-consciousness, think of Freud's perspective. Although many of Freud's original ideas (e.g., the Oedipal Complex) were wrong, Freud was an enormously astute observer of human behavior. And what was Freud's central insight about the nature of self-conscious thought? That it filters out socially unacceptable impulses (or wishes or fears) and generates socially justifiable narratives for one's behavior. This chapter on the JH reviews a large body of modern research in both cognitive and social psychology confirms that the self-consciousness system does in fact work this way. For example, people tend to alter their beliefs to maintain a narrative of themselves as effective, helpful and intelligent, people will consciously maintain socially acceptable nonprejudicial attitudes yet demonstrate subconscious biases against minorities, and people will tend to explain actions that result in favorable outcomes in terms of stable, internal causes, whereas actions that result in unfavorable outcomes are explained in terms of transient, external causes.

The third postulate is the social postulate, and is the idea that the JH provides the basic framework for understanding cultural levels of analyses. This is because the concept of large-scale justification systems providing the rules and patterns for acceptable behaviors is consonant with modern conceptions of culture. From this vantage point, laws, moral dictates, and even religious and philosophical beliefs are all seen as justification systems writ large that offer the individual roadmaps on what behaviors are socially acceptable. These large-scale cultural justification systems offer beliefs and values about what is morally right and wrong and make claims about how one should organize their personal and public lives accordingly.

As noted by the famed scientist E. O. Wilson, there currently is a large explanatory gap between the natural and social sciences. He wrote:

We know that virtually all of human behavior is transmitted by culture. We also know that biology has an important effect on the origin of culture and its transmission. The question remaining is how biology and culture interact, and in particular how they interact across all societies to create the commonalities of human nature. What, in the final analysis, joins the deep, mostly genetic history of the species as a whole to the more recent cultural histories of far-flung societies? That, in my opinion, is the nub of the relationship between the two cultures. It can be stated as a problem to be solved, the central problem of the social sciences and the humanities, and simultaneously one of the great remaining problems of the natural sciences (Wilson, 1998, p. 126).

The JH is an idea that fills this gap by: 1) offering a clear formulation of the evolutionary changes in mind that gave rise to human culture; 2) offering a theory of human self-consciousness that links human psychological with sociological levels of analysis; 3) integrating a wide variety of different theoretical perspectives (e.g., psychodynamic theory, social cognitive theory, everyday life sociology) into a coherent whole; 4) organizing and explaining vast domains of empirical data in psychology; and 5) offering a framework of explanation of human behavior that is consonant with frameworks in the social sciences.

Gregg Henriques, Ph.D. , is a professor of psychology at James Madison University.

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Justification of research using systematic reviews continues to be inconsistent in clinical health science—A systematic review and meta-analysis of meta-research studies

Jane Andreasen

1 Department of Physiotherapy and Occupational Therapy, Aalborg University Hospital, Denmark and Public Health and Epidemiology Group, Department of Health, Science and Technology, Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark

Birgitte Nørgaard

2 Department of Public Health, University of Southern Denmark Odense, Denmark

Eva Draborg

Carsten bogh juhl.

3 Department of Sports Science and Clinical Biomechanics, University of Southern Denmark and Department of Physiotherapy and Occupational Therapy, Copenhagen University Hospital, Herlev and Gentofte, Herlev, Denmark

Jennifer Yost

4 M. Louise Fitzpatrick College of Nursing, Villanova University, Villanova, PA, United States of America

Klara Brunnhuber

5 Digital Content Services, Elsevier, London, United Kingdom

Karen A. Robinson

6 Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, MD, United States of America

7 Department of Evidence-Based Practice, Western Norway University of Applied Sciences, Bergen, Norway

Associated Data

All relevant data are within the paper and its Supporting Information files.

Redundancy is an unethical, unscientific, and costly challenge in clinical health research. There is a high risk of redundancy when existing evidence is not used to justify the research question when a new study is initiated. Therefore, the aim of this study was to synthesize meta-research studies evaluating if and how authors of clinical health research studies use systematic reviews when initiating a new study.

Seven electronic bibliographic databases were searched (final search June 2021). Meta-research studies assessing the use of systematic reviews when justifying new clinical health studies were included. Screening and data extraction were performed by two reviewers independently. The primary outcome was defined as the percentage of original studies within the included meta-research studies using systematic reviews of previous studies to justify a new study. Results were synthesized narratively and quantitatively using a random-effects meta-analysis. The protocol has been registered in Open Science Framework ( https://osf.io/nw7ch/ ).

Twenty-one meta-research studies were included, representing 3,621 original studies or protocols. Nineteen of the 21 studies were included in the meta-analysis. The included studies represented different disciplines and exhibited wide variability both in how the use of previous systematic reviews was assessed, and in how this was reported. The use of systematic reviews to justify new studies varied from 16% to 87%. The mean percentage of original studies using systematic reviews to justify their study was 42% (95% CI: 36% to 48%).

Justification of new studies in clinical health research using systematic reviews is highly variable, and fewer than half of new clinical studies in health science were justified using a systematic review. Research redundancy is a challenge for clinical health researchers, as well as for funders, ethics committees, and journals.

Introduction

Research redundancy in clinical health research is an unethical, unscientific, and costly challenge that can be minimized by using an evidence-based research approach. First introduced in 2009 and since endorsed and promoted by organizations and researchers worldwide [ 1 – 6 ], evidence-based research is an approach whereby researchers systematically and transparently take into account the existing evidence on a topic before embarking on a new study. The researcher thus strives to enter the project unbiased, or at least aware of the risk of knowledge redundancy bias. The key is an evidence synthesis using formal, explicit, and rigorous methods to bring together the findings of pre-existing research to synthesize the totality what is known [ 7 ]. Evidence syntheses provide the basis for an unbiased justification of the proposed research study to ensure that the enrolling of participants, resource allocation, and healthcare systems are supporting only relevant and justified research. Enormous numbers of research studies are conducted, funded, and published globally every year [ 8 ]. Thus, if earlier relevant research is not considered in a systematic and transparent way when justifying research, the foundation for a research question is not properly established, thereby increasing the risk of redundant studies being conducted, funded, and published resulting in a waste of resources, such as time and funding [ 1 , 4 ]. Most importantly, when redundant research is initiated, participants unethically and unnecessarily receive placebos or receive suboptimal treatment.

Previous meta-research, defined as the study of research itself including the methods, reporting, reproducibility, evaluation and incentives of the research [ 9 ] have shown that there is considerable variation and bias in the use of evidence syntheses to justify research studies [ 10 – 12 ]. To the best of our knowledge, a systematic review of previous meta-research studies assessing the use of systematic reviews to justify studies in clinical health research has not previously been conducted. Evaluating how evidence-based research is implemented in research practices across disciplines and specialties when justifying new studies will provide an indication of the integration of evidence-based research in research practices [ 9 ]. The present systematic review aimed to identify and synthesize results from meta-research studies, regardless of study type, evaluating if and how authors of clinical health research studies use systematic reviews to justify a new study.

Prior to commencing the review, we registered the protocol in the Open Science Framework ( https://osf.io/nw7ch/ ). The protocol remained unchanged, but in this paper we have made adjustments to the risk-of-bias assessment, reducing the tool to 10 items and removing the assessment of reporting quality. The review is presented in accordance with the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic review and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) guidelines [ 13 ].

Eligibility criteria

Studies were eligible for inclusion if they were original meta-research studies, regardless of study type, that evaluated if and how authors of clinical health research studies used systematic reviews to justify new clinical health studies. No limitations on language, publication status, or publication year were applied. Only meta-research studies of studies on human subjects in clinical health sciences were eligible for inclusion. The primary outcome was defined as the percentage of original studies within the included meta-research studies using systematic reviews of previous studies to justify a new study. The secondary outcome was how the systematic reviews of previous research were used (e.g., within the text to justify the study) by the original studies.

Information sources and search strategy

This study is one of six ongoing evidence syntheses (four systematic reviews and two scoping reviews) planned to assess the global state of evidence-based research in clinical health research. These are; a scoping review mapping the area broadly to describe current practice and identify knowledge gaps, a systematic review on the use of prior research in reports of randomized controlled trials specifically, three systematic reviews assessing the use of systematic reviews when justifying, designing [ 14 ] or putting results of a new study in context, and finally a scoping review uncovering the breadth and characteristics of the available, empirical evidence on the topic of citation bias. Further, the research group is working with colleagues on a Handbook for Evidence-based Research in health sciences. Due to the common aim across the six evidence syntheses, a broad overall search strategy was designed to identify meta-research studies that assessed whether researchers used earlier similar studies and/or systematic reviews of earlier similar studies to inform the justification and/or design of a new study, whether researchers used systematic reviews to inform the interpretation of new results, and meta-research studies that assessed if there were published redundant studies within a specific area or not.

The first search was performed in June 2015. Databases included MEDLINE via both PubMed and Ovid, EMBASE via Ovid, CINAHL via EBSCO, Web of Science (Science Citation Index Expanded (SCI-EXPANDED), Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Arts & Humanities Citation Index (A&HCI), and the Cochrane Methodology Register (CMR, Methods Studies) from inception (Appendix 1 in S1 File ). In addition, reference lists of included studies were screened for relevant articles, as well as the authors’ relevant publications and abstracts from the Cochrane Methodology Reviews.

Based upon the experiences from the results of the baseline search in June 2015, an updated and revised search strategy was conducted in MEDLINE and Embase via Ovid from January 2015 to June 2021 (Appendix 1 in S1 File ). Once again, the reference lists of new included studies were screened for relevant references, as were abstracts from January 2015 to June 2021 in the Cochrane Methodology Reviews. Experts in the field were contacted to identify any additional published and/or grey literature. No restrictions were made on publication year and language. See Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 in S1 File for the full search strategy.

Screening and study selection

Following deduplication, the search results were uploaded to Rayyan ( https://rayyan.qcri.org/welcome ). The search results from the 1st search (June 2015) were independently screened by a pair of reviewers. Twenty screeners were paired, with each pair including an author very experienced in systematic reviews and a less experienced author. To increase consistency among reviewers, both reviewers initially screened the same 50 publications and discussed the results before beginning screening for this review. Disagreements on study selection were resolved by consensus and discussion with a third reviewer, if needed. The full-text screening was also performed by two reviewers independently. Disagreements on study selection were resolved by consensus and discussion. There were also two independent reviewers who screened following the last search, using the same procedure, as for the first search, for full-text screening and disagreements. The screening procedures resulted in a full list of studies potentially relevant for one or more of the six above-mentioned evidence syntheses.

A second title and abstract screening and full-text screening of the full list was then performed independently by two reviewers using screening criteria specific to this systematic review. Reasons for excluding trials were recorded, and disagreements between the reviewers were resolved through discussion. If consensus was not reached, a third reviewer was involved.

Data extraction

We developed and pilot tested a data extraction form to extract data regarding study characteristics and outcomes of interest. Two reviewers independently extracted data, with other reviewers available to resolve disagreements. The following study characteristics were extracted from each of the included studies: bibliographic information, study aim, study design, setting, country, inclusion period, area of interest, results, and conclusion. Further, data for this study’s primary and secondary outcomes were extracted; these included the percentage of original studies using systematic reviews to justify their study and how the systematic reviews of previous research were used (e.g., within the text to justify the study) by the original studies.

Risk-of-bias assessment

No standard tool was identified to assess the risk of bias in empirical meta-research studies. The Editorial Group of the Evidence-Based Research Network prepared a risk-of-bias tool for the planned five systematic reviews with list of items important for evaluating the risk of bias in meta-research studies. For each item, one could classify the study under examination as exhibiting a “low risk of bias”, “unclear risk of bias” or “high risk of bias”. We independently tested the list of items upon a sample of included studies. Following a discussion of the different answers, we adjusted the number and content of the list of items to ten and defined the criteria to evaluate the risk of bias in the included studies ( Table 1 ). Each of the included meta-research studies was appraised independently by two reviewers using the customized checklist to determine the risk of bias. Disagreements regarding the risk of bias were solved through discussion. No study was excluded on the grounds of low quality.

Data synthesis and interpretation

In addition, to narratively summarizing the characteristics of the included meta-research studies and their risk-of-bias assessments, the percentage of original studies using systematic review of previous similar studies to justify a new study (primary outcome) was calculated as the number of studies using at least one systematic review, divided by the total number of original studies within each of the included meta-research studies. A meta-analysis using the random-effects model (DerSimonian and Laird) was used to estimate the overall estimate and perform the forest plot as this model is the default when using the metaprop command. Heterogeneity was evaluated estimating the I 2 statistics (the percentage of variance attributable to heterogeneity i.e., inconsistency) and the between study variance tau 2 . When investigating reasons for heterogeneity, a restricted maximum likelihood (REML) model was used and covariates with the ability to reduce tau 2 was deemed relevant. [ 15 ].

All analyses were conducted in Stata, version 17.0 (StataCorp. 2019. Stata Statistical Software : Release 17 . College Station, TX: StataCorp LLC).

Study selection

In total, 30,592 publications were identified through the searches. Of these, 69 publications were determined eligible for one of the six evidence syntheses. A total of 21 meta-research studies fulfilled the inclusion criteria for this systematic review [ 10 , 11 , 16 – 34 ]; see Fig 1 .

Study characteristics

The 21 included meta-research studies were published from 2007 to 2021, representing 3,621 original studies or protocols and one survey with 106 participants; only three of these studies were published before 2013 [ 10 , 18 , 26 ]. The sample of the original study within each of the included meta-research studies varied. One meta-research study surveyed congress delegates [ 29 ], one study examined first-submission protocols for randomized controlled trials submitted to four hospital ethics committees [ 17 ], and 14 studies examined randomized or quasi-randomized primary studies published during a specific time period in a range of journals [ 10 , 11 , 18 , 21 – 28 , 31 , 32 , 34 ] or in specific databases [ 16 , 19 , 20 , 30 ]. Finally, one study examined the use of previously published systematic reviews when publishing a new systematic review [ 33 ]. Further, the number of original studies within each included meta-research study varied considerably, ranging from 18 [ 10 ] to 637 original studies [ 27 ]. The characteristics of the included meta-research studies are presented in Table 2 .

SR: systematic review; MA: meta–analysis; RCT: randomized controlled trial.

Risk of bias assessment

Overall, most studies were determined to exhibit a low risk of bias in the majority of items, and all of the included meta-research studies reported an unambiguous aim and a match between aim and methods. However, only a few studies provided argumentation for their choice of data source [ 17 , 20 , 24 , 30 ], and only two of the 21 studies referred to an available a-priori protocol [ 16 , 21 ]. Finally, seven studies provided poor or no discussion of the limitations of their study [ 10 , 19 , 22 , 26 – 28 , 34 ]. The risk-of-bias assessments are shown in Table 3 .

Synthesis of results

Of the included 21 studies, a total of 18 studies were included in the meta-analysis. Two studies included two cohorts each, and both cohorts in each of these studies were included in our meta-analysis [ 21 , 30 ]. The survey by Clayton and colleagues, with a response rate of 17%, was not included in the meta-analysis as the survey did not provide data to identify the use of systematic reviews to justify specific studies. However, their results showed that 42 of 84 respondents (50%) reported using a systematic review for justification [ 29 ]. The study by Chow, which was also not included in the meta-analysis, showed that justification varied largely within and between specialties. However, only relative numbers were provided, and, therefore, no overall percentage could be extracted [ 11 ]. The study by Seehra et al. counted the SR citations in RCTs and not the number of RCTs citing SRs and is therefore not included in the meta-analysis either [ 23 ].

The percentage of original studies that justified a new study with a systematic review within each meta-research study ranged from 16% to 87%. The pooled percentage of original studies using systematic reviews to justify their research question was 42% (95% CI: 36% to 48%) as shown in Fig 2 . Where the confidence interval showed the precision of the pooled estimate in a meta-analysis, the prediction interval showed the distribution of the individual studies. The heterogeneity in the meta-analysis assessed by I 2 was 94%. The clinical interpretation of this large heterogeneity is seen in a the very broad prediction interval ranging from 16 to 71%, meaning that based on these studies there is 95% chance that the results of the next study will show a prevalence between 16 to 71%.

Forest plot prevalence and 95% confidence intervals for the percentage of studies using an SR to justify the study.

Further, we conducted an explorative subgroup analysis of the study of Helfer et al. and the study of Joseph et al. as these two studies were on meta-analyses and protocols and therefore differ from the other included studies. This analysis did only marginally change the pooled percentage to 39% (95% CI; 33% to 46%) and the between-study variance (tau 2 ) was reduced with 23%.

The 21 included studies varied greatly in their approach and in their description of how systematic reviews were used, i.e., if the original studies referred and whether the used systematic reviews in the original studies were relevant and/or of high-quality. Nine studies assessed, to varying degrees, whether the used systematic reviews were relevant for the justification of the research [ 16 – 20 , 25 , 30 , 32 , 34 ]. Overall, the information reported by the meta-research studies was not sufficient to report the percentage of primary studies referring to relevant systematic reviews. No details were provided regarding the methodological quality of the systematic reviews used to justify the research question or if they were recently published reviews, except for Hoderlein et al., who reported that the mean number of years from publication of the cited systematic review and the trial report was four years [ 30 ].

We identified 21 meta-research studies, spanning 15 publication years and 12 medical disciplines. The findings showed substantial variability in the use of systematic reviews when justifying new clinical studies, with the incidence of use ranging from 16% to 87%. However, fewer than half of the 19 meta-analysis-eligible studies used a systematic review to justify their new study. There was wide variability, and a general lack of information, about how systematic reviews were used within many of the original studies. Our systematic review found that the proportion of original studies justifying their new research using evidence syntheses is sub-optimal and, thus, the potential for research redundancy continues to be a challenge. This study corroborates the serious possible consequences regarding research redundancy previously problematized by Chalmers et al. and Glasziou et al. [ 35 , 36 ].

Systematic reviews are considered crucial when justifying a new study, as is emphasized in reporting guidelines such as the CONSORT statement [ 37 ]. However, there are challenges involved in implementing an evidence-based research approach. The authors of the included meta-research study reporting the highest use of systematic reviews to justify a new systematic review study point out that even though the authors of the original studies refer to some of the published systematic reviews, they neglect others on the same topic, which may be problematic and result in a biased approach [ 33 ]. Other issues that have been identified are the risk of research waste when a systematic review may not be methodologically sound [ 12 , 38 ] and that there is also redundancy in the conduct of systematic reviews, with many overlapping systematic reviews existing on the same topic [ 39 – 41 ]. In the original studies within the meta-research studies, the use of systematic reviews was not consistent and, further, it was not explicated whether the systematic reviews used were the most recent and/or of high methodological quality. These issues speak to the need for refinement in the area of systematic review development, such as mandatory registration in prospective registries. Only two out of the included 21 studies in this study referred to an available a-priori protocol [ 16 , 21 ]. General recommendations in the use of systematic reviews as justification for a new study are difficult as these will be topic specific, however researchers should be aware to use the most robust and methodologically sound of recently published reviews, preferably with á priori published protocols.

Efforts must continue in promoting the use of evidence-based research approaches among clinical health researchers and other important stakeholders, such as funders. Collaborations such as the Ensuring Value in Research Funders Forum, and changes in funding review criteria mandating reference to previously published systematic reviews when justifying the research question within funding proposals, are examples of how stakeholders can promote research that is evidence-based [ 8 , 41 ].

Strengths and limitations

We conducted a comprehensive and systematic search. The lack of standard terminology for meta-research studies resulted in search strategies that retrieved thousands of citations. We also relied on snowballing efforts to identify relevant studies, such as by contacting experts and scanning the reference lists of relevant studies.

There is also a lack of tools to assess risk of bias for meta-research studies, so a specific risk-of bias tool for the five conducted reviews was created. The tool was discussed and revised continuously throughout the research process; however, we acknowledge that the checklist is not yet optimal and a validated risk-of-bias tool for meta-research studies is needed.

Many of the included meta-research studies did not provide details as to whether the systematic reviews used to justify the included studies were relevant, high-quality and/or recently published. This may raise questions as to the validity of our findings, as the majority of the meta-research studies only provide an indication of the citation of systematic reviews to justify new studies, not whether the systematic review cited was relevant, recent and of high-quality, or even how the systematic review was used. We did not assess this further either. Nonetheless, even if we assumed that these elements were provided for every original study included in the included meta-research studies (i.e. taking a conservative approach), fewer than half used systematic reviews to justify their research questions. The conservative approach used in this study therefore does not underestimate, and perhaps rather overestimates, the actual use of relevant systematic reviews to justify studies in clinical health science across disciplines.

Different study designs were included in the meta-analysis, which may have contributed to the high degree of heterogeneity observed. Therefore, the presented results should be interpreted with caution due to the high heterogeneity. Not only were there differences in the methods of the included meta-research studies, but there was also heterogeneity in the medical specialties evaluated [ 42 , 43 ].

In conclusion, justification of research questions in clinical health research with systematic reviews continues to be inconsistent; fewer than half of the primary studies within the included meta-research studies in this systematic review were found to have used a systematic review to justify their research question. This indicates that the risk of redundant research is still high when new studies across disciplines and professions in clinical health are initiated, thereby indicating that evidence-based research has not yet been successfully implemented in the clinical health sciences. Efforts to raise awareness and to ensure an evidence-based research approach continue to be necessary, and such efforts should involve clinical health researchers themselves as well as important stakeholders such as funders.

Supporting information

S1 checklist, s1 protocol, acknowledgments.

This work has been prepared as part of the Evidence-Based Research Network ( ebrnetwork.org ). The Evidence-Based Research Network is an international network that promotes the use of systematic reviews when justifying, designing, and interpreting research. The authors thank the Section for Evidence-Based Practice, Department for Health and Function, Western Norway University of Applied Sciences for their generous support of the EBRNetwork. Further, thanks to COST Association for supporting the COST Action “EVBRES” (CA 17117, evbres.eu) and thereby the preparation of this study. Thanks to Gunhild Austrheim, Head of Unit, Library at Western Norway University of Applied Sciences, Norway, for helping with the second search. Thanks to those helping with the screening: Durita Gunnarsson, Gorm Høj Jensen, Line Sjodsholm, Signe Versterre, Linda Baumbach, Karina Johansen, Rune Martens Andersen, and Thomas Aagaard.

We gratefully acknowledge the contribution from the EVBRES (COST ACTION CA 17117) Core Group, including Anne Gjerland (AG) and her specific contribution to the search and screening process.

Funding Statement

The authors received no specific funding for this work.

Data Availability

• PLoS One. 2022; 17(10): e0276955.

Decision Letter 0

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PONE-D-22-02383Justification of research using systematic reviews continues to be inconsistent in clinical health science - a systematic review and meta-analysis of meta-research studiesPLOS ONE

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Reviewer #2: Yes

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Reviewer #1: Thank you for the opportunity to review this interesting meta-research paper, which is part of a series of papers.

Basing new research on systematic reviews is clearly important and has been the subject of a number of reviews. This paper essentially reviews the meta-research in this area, to give a global assessment of the issue taking into account all of the evidence

The content of the rest of the series was not made clear, but a decision has been made to publish them singly. I think the short description of the rest of the programme could be expanded a little to put the work in context and help the reader understand how the work fits together. How do the different studies relate, and are other papers needed to put the current work in context?

The introduction defines meta-research in broad terms, but it is not until the results that the reader is given a sense of the actual designs included and of relevance to the research question. Were these defined a priori, or were these study designs that fit the broad definition which happened to be found in the search? Are there meta-research designs of relevance to the research question which were not found in the searches?

Personally, I would bring a description of the range of study design forward into the introduction, as getting a sense of the sorts of approaches to meta-research of relevance will help non-specialists in this area. I was not clear of the likely designs until quite late in the paper

The review methods seemed very rigorous, and I had no major comments on those beyond one clarification. When they said, ‘No study was excluded on the grounds of low quality’, did they mean that no studies were considered so bad, or that as a rule no studies were every going to be excluded on that basis?

As noted above, there were a number of study designs included, and all were assessed using the generic risk of bias tool. Presumably some designs are just stronger than others? The survey must be considered a weaker design that the others. Again, this links to the earlier comment about the need for more detail on design of the meta research, which I felt was lost in the use of a generic risk of bias assessment.

I did not understand the statement ‘The clinical interpretation of the large heterogeneity is seen in a broad prediction interval with a range from 16 to 71%’ and that needs clarification

The discussion is balanced, but there are a few significant issues that are given a fairly cursory consideration and would benefit from greater detail

I was interested in the issue of the ‘quality’ of the reviews used. I accept that the data here was not enough for analysis, but felt that the authors (as experts in this area) could be pushed to provide a stronger statement about what criteria should be used by further studies (for example, how do we judge if a review used as the basis for research is a strong basis. How long before a quoted review is too ‘old’?)

They acknowledge that ‘the checklist is not yet optimal and a validated risk-of-bias tool for meta-research studies is needed’. Given their experience and expertise, what would that look like, and how would it be best developed and tested? How would it take into account the role of different designs noted above, given variation in the approaches to meta-research they found?

I appreciate the simple and elegant assessment of the main findings, but they present only vague statement on the role of design and medical specialities. Is it not possible for them to say more on this, or explore the data more fully? What about change over time, which seems very relevant. I did feel the authors could be pushed a little more here, given that they have a programme of work and must be in a position to present more substantive statements. I think that would add to the contribution of the paper

Reviewer #2: The article is on interesting topic but several points needs emphasis:

the inclusion criteria should be defined more clearly in the text

Systematiic review and meta analysis are relatively new and first papers go to late seventies in previous century.

This should be considered when reviewing papers.

The risk of redundancy could not be well defined from the meta search papers rather it should be from the original articles . This would not be possible unless a focused issue is chosen as an example.

The different disciplines have different research out puts as the basis for systematic reviews which makes the comparison difficult .

I realize some studies are based on the disclosure of the authors whether they have used the previous systematic reviews or not . This should be confirmed by evidence .

These should be mentioned as the limitations of this work .

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Reviewer #1:  Yes:  Peter Bower

Reviewer #2: No

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Author response to Decision Letter 0

25 Apr 2022

Response letter to the editor and reviewers,

Thank you for the opportunity to revise the manuscript. Thank you to the reviewers for the positive and constructive comments concerning the manuscript. We have now revised the manuscript in accordance with these comments by addressing all issues from the editor and from the reviewers below.

Answer: we have addressed the requirements, see our answers below.

Answer: We believe we meet the style requirements, including correct file naming.

Answer: We agree that there are overlap in parts of the methods section with the mentioned publication. The paper was published in the period of this manuscript being in review, we have therefore now referred to the publication in this manuscript. This manuscript and the publication are both part of a series of papers assessing the global status of evidence-based research in clinical health research and therefore the overlap in the methods section was expected. We have thoroughly scrutinized the full manuscript and found no full sentences that are overlapping, except for the methods section. To be sure of this, we further have conducted a legal comparison in MS Words with the mentioned publication and again found no full sentences except in the methods section. This is to our sincere knowledge only in the methods section, please let us know if we are mistaken.

Answer: We have uploaded the data set necessary to replicate our study findings in a supplementary file and described the changes to the “Data Availability statement” in the cover letter.

Reviewer comments Reviewer #1:

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review this interesting meta-research paper, which is part of a series of papers.

Response: Thank you for this response and that is exactly the purpose.

2. The content of the rest of the series was not made clear, but a decision has been made to publish them singly. I think the short description of the rest of the program could be expanded a little to put the work in context and help the reader understand how the work fits together. How do the different studies relate, and are other papers needed to put the current work in context?

Response: We have expanded the text and especially regarding how the work fits together and shows our purpose of taking a global assessment of the on evidence-based research in the following six papers:

1. Meta-research evaluating redundancy and use of systematic reviews when planning new studies in health research – a scoping review

2. A Systematic Review on the Use of Prior Research in Reports of Randomized Clinical Trials

3. Justification

6. The problem of citation bias – a scoping review

We do not have other papers in pipeline at the moment, but we are currently working on a Handbook for Evidence-Based Research to provide tools and models to make it easier for researchers to work evidence- based in their research.

Changes to text: This study is one of six ongoing meta-syntheses (four systematic reviews and two scoping reviews) planned to assess the global state of evidence-based research in clinical health research. These are; a scoping review mapping the area broadly to describe current practice and identify knowledge gaps, a systematic review on the use of prior research in reports of randomized controlled trials specifically, three systematic reviews assessing the use of systematic reviews when justifying, designing [14] or putting results of a new study in context, and finally a scoping review uncovering the breadth and characteristics of the available, empirical evidence on the topic of citation bias . Further, the research group is working with colleagues on a Handbook for Evidence-based Research in health sciences.

3. The introduction defines meta-research in broad terms, but it is not until the results that the reader is given a sense of the actual designs included and of relevance to the research question. Were these defined a priori, or were these study designs that fit the broad definition which happened to be found in the search? Are there meta-research designs of relevance to the research question which were not found in the searches?

Response: We get your point. A very broad and inclusive definition was defined a priori in the published protocol: “Types of study to be included: We will include meta-research studies (or studies performing research on research)” in order not to miss out on relevant studies, because the research field was quite new and further, we did not identify other meta-research studies to guide our process. Due to our very broad and sensitive search strategy we believe we identified all relevant meta-research studies.

Only data regarding justification from original papers were included in our meta-analysis as the study design of a survey of delegates use of systematic reviews to justify their studies, was assessed as seriously subjected to a social desirability bias.

Changes to text:

Introduction: The present systematic review aimed to identify and synthesize results from meta-research studies, regardless study type, evaluating if and how authors of clinical health research studies use systematic reviews to justify a new study.

Methods section, eligibility criteria: Studies were eligible for inclusion if they were original meta-research studies, regardless study type, that evaluated if and how authors of clinical health studies used systematic reviews to justify new clinical health studies.

4. Personally, I would bring a description of the range of study design forward into the introduction, as getting a sense of the sorts of approaches to meta-research of relevance will help non-specialists in this area. I was not clear of the likely designs until quite late in the paper

Response: We agree and have made it clear that all meta-research studies regardless design was included.

Changes to text: see above.

5. The review methods seemed very rigorous, and I had no major comments on those beyond one clarification. When they said, ‘No study was excluded on the grounds of low quality’, did they mean that no studies were considered so bad, or that as a rule no studies were every going to be excluded on that basis?

Response: The latter, as a rule no studies were excluded, as our intention was not to guide clinical practice. This is stated in the manuscript as the last sentence in the Risk-of-Bias Assessment section. No changes are therefore made.

6. As noted above, there were a number of study designs included, and all were assessed using the generic risk of bias tool. Presumably some designs are just stronger than others? The survey must be considered a weaker design that the others. Again, this links to the earlier comment about the need for more detail on design of the meta research, which I felt was lost in the use of a generic risk of bias assessment.

Response: We agree on this point, but we did take a very open approach to monitor the field of justification. And we did not range the study designs in a hierarchical order in our “premature” Risk of Bias tool, as we aimed to assess the area and not to provide any clinical recommendations. However, the author group and colleagues are currently working on an improved checklist tool.

No further changes to text.

7. I did not understand the statement ‘The clinical interpretation of the large heterogeneity is seen in a broad prediction interval with a range from 16 to 71%’ and that needs clarification

Response: We agree that an explanation is appropriate.

Changes to text: The clinical interpretation of the large heterogeneity is seen in a broad prediction interval with a range from 16 to 71%, meaning that there is 95% confidence that the results of the next study will be between a prevalence of 16 to 71%.

8. The discussion is balanced, but there are a few significant issues that are given a fairly cursory consideration and would benefit from greater detail

Response: We have addressed the issues mentioned below and provided more detail

9. I was interested in the issue of the ‘quality’ of the reviews used. I accept that the data here was not enough for analysis, but felt that the authors (as experts in this area) could be pushed to provide a stronger statement about what criteria should be used by further studies (for example, how do we judge if a review used as the basis for research is a strong basis. How long before a quoted review is too ‘old’?)

Response: Very interesting topic to address further, which we have continuously discussed in the author group, but this is both complex and context dependent in specific topics. Therefore, we have chosen not to elaborate further on the topic in the manuscript, to give an appropriate consideration more space is needed.

Instead, we have mentioned these considerations as important to address further in future publications as to guide researchers when using systematic reviews to justify. As mentioned earlier, the research group is working with colleagues on a Handbook for Evidence-based Research in health sciences, which will elaborate on the topics in detail.

Changes to text in Discussion section:

General recommendations in the use of systematic reviews as justification for a new study are difficult as these will be topic specific, however researchers should be aware to use the most robust and methodologically sound of recently published reviews, preferably with á priori published protocols.

10. They acknowledge that ‘the checklist is not yet optimal and a validated risk-of-bias tool for meta-research studies is needed’. Given their experience and expertise, what would that look like, and how would it be best developed and tested? How would it take into account the role of different designs noted above, given variation in the approaches to meta-research they found?

Response: We fully agree with you on this topic and the author group and colleagues are currently working on an improved checklist tool. Your suggestion about ranging the study designs is very relevant and will be considered in the author group in this thorough work that we expect to publish in the near future. We find the work requires space and thorough analysis and we therefore have decided this should be published in an independent paper.

11. I appreciate the simple and elegant assessment of the main findings, but they present only vague statement on the role of design and medical specialities. Is it not possible for them to say more on this, or explore the data more fully? What about change over time, which seems very relevant. I did feel the authors could be pushed a little more here, given that they have a programme of work and must be in a position to present more substantive statements. I think that would add to the contribution of the paper

Response: The role of design is only considered in relation to that the studies has done meta - research on the topic “justification”. We do not find it was appropriate to explicate more about the roles of medical specialties as the approach in the different studies were very diverse ranging from participants in the survey, to specialties or to specific journals (mostly high ranking) or more broad aimed journals or databases.

Change over time is an important and relevant question. We did not address the issue for two reasons. Firstly, most of the papers are published after 2012 and it would be a short timeline to assess. But most importantly, as most of the included studies in our meta-research study were cross-sectional, we would not be able to validly assess change over time with the data at hand.

Reviewer comments Reviewer #2 :

1. The article is on interesting topic but several points needs emphasis

Response: Thank you. We have answered each point above.

2. The inclusion criteria should be defined more clearly in the text

Response: Methods section: we have clarified the inclusion criteria in the methods section.

3. Systematic review and meta analysis are relatively new and first papers go to late seventies in previous century. This should be considered when reviewing papers.

Response: Yes, it is a fairly new discipline, however it has been recommended to be evidence-based by the use of systematic reviews and meta-analyses for many years. Our aim was therefore to look at meta-research in a broad sense by using previously published studies investigating how large a percentage are using systematic reviews as justification when initiating new health science.

4. The risk of redundancy could not be well defined from the meta search papers rather it should be from the original articles . This would not be possible unless a focused issue is chosen as an example.

Response: Risk of redundancy can, in our perspective, be thoroughly assessed by the use of systematic reviews with meta-analyses included, and especially cumulative meta-analyses can pinpoint this in a specific research topic. Therefore, we agree that we cannot point it to a specific field but have taken this meta-research perspective to provide a more global status on the topic.

We hope you can follow our reasoning.

5. The different disciplines have different research out puts as the basis for systematic reviews which makes the comparison difficult

Response: In this paper, we did not look for the output, but the “input” so to speak, as we assess whether the authors have used justification by using systematic reviews, when initiating a new study in health science. We agree, it is important to define the aim and approach and the outcomes more specifically, if you look into a specific topic.

No changes to text.

6. I realize some studies are based on the disclosure of the authors whether they have used the previous systematic reviews or not. This should be confirmed by evidence.

These should be mentioned as the limitations of this work.

Response: We agree on this point and have clarified in the limitations that we have taken “the face value” reported by the authors in the included studies.

Changes to text: Discussion, Strengths and Limitations section:

This may raise questions as to the validity of our findings, as the majority of the meta-research studies only provide an indication of the citation of systematic reviews to justify new studies, not whether the systematic review was relevant, recent or of high-quality, or even how the systematic review was used. We did not assess this further either.

Submitted filename: Response letter_25042022.docx

Decision Letter 1

19 Sep 2022

PONE-D-22-02383R1Justification of research using systematic reviews continues to be inconsistent in clinical health science - a systematic review and meta-analysis of meta-research studiesPLOS ONE

Please submit your revised manuscript by Nov 03 2022 11:59PM. If you will need more time than this to complete your revisions, please reply to this message or contact the journal office at  gro.solp@enosolp . When you're ready to submit your revision, log on to https://www.editorialmanager.com/pone/ and select the 'Submissions Needing Revision' folder to locate your manuscript file.

Please review your reference list to ensure that it is complete and correct. If you have cited papers that have been retracted, please include the rationale for doing so in the manuscript text, or remove these references and replace them with relevant current references. Any changes to the reference list should be mentioned in the rebuttal letter that accompanies your revised manuscript. If you need to cite a retracted article, indicate the article’s retracted status in the References list and also include a citation and full reference for the retraction notice.

1. If the authors have adequately addressed your comments raised in a previous round of review and you feel that this manuscript is now acceptable for publication, you may indicate that here to bypass the “Comments to the Author” section, enter your conflict of interest statement in the “Confidential to Editor” section, and submit your "Accept" recommendation.

Reviewer #1: All comments have been addressed

2. Is the manuscript technically sound, and do the data support the conclusions?

3. Has the statistical analysis been performed appropriately and rigorously?

4. Have the authors made all data underlying the findings in their manuscript fully available?

5. Is the manuscript presented in an intelligible fashion and written in standard English?

6. Review Comments to the Author

Reviewer #1: I am happy with the responses and thank the authors for their detailed replies, but just had 2 minor issues

This probably reflects my ignorance so apologies to the authors, but I still do not understand the relationship between the 95% CI around the pooled percentage, and the 'broad prediction interval' which follows it. Could they add a line to explain?

There are some typos remaining. The phrase 'regardless study type' should read 'regardless of study type'. There are some rogue apostrophes in the tables (SR's, RCT's) which need to be edited

7. PLOS authors have the option to publish the peer review history of their article ( what does this mean? ). If published, this will include your full peer review and any attached files.

Reviewer #1: No

Author response to Decision Letter 1

21 Sep 2022

Response letter

Thank you for the opportunity to revise the manuscript. Thank you to the reviewer for the relevant comments concerning the manuscript. We have revised the manuscript in accordance with these comments by addressing all issues from the editor and from the reviewers below.

Reviewer #1: I am happy with the responses and thank the authors for their detailed replies, but just had 2 minor issues

Response: Thank you very much.

Response: We have revised and explained more in detail and hope the revised text explains this more clearly.

Where the confidence interval showed the precision of the pooled estimate in a meta-analysis, the prediction interval showed the distribution of the individual studies. The heterogeneity in the meta-analysis assessed by I2 was 94%. The clinical interpretation of this large heterogeneity is seen in a the very broad prediction interval ranging from 16 to 71%, meaning that based on these studies there is 95% chance that the results of the next study will show a prevalence between 16 to 71%.

There are some typos remaining. The phrase 'regardless study type' should read 'regardless of study type'.

Response: Thank you, we have revised as suggested.

There are some rogue apostrophes in the tables (SR's, RCT's) which need to be edited

Response: Thank you for pointing this out. We have edited this now.

On behalf of the author group,

Submitted filename: Response letter 20092022.docx

Decision Letter 2

18 Oct 2022

Justification of research using systematic reviews continues to be inconsistent in clinical health science - a systematic review and meta-analysis of meta-research studies

PONE-D-22-02383R2

We’re pleased to inform you that your manuscript has been judged scientifically suitable for publication and will be formally accepted for publication once it meets all outstanding technical requirements.

Within one week, you’ll receive an e-mail detailing the required amendments. When these have been addressed, you’ll receive a formal acceptance letter and your manuscript will be scheduled for publication.

An invoice for payment will follow shortly after the formal acceptance. To ensure an efficient process, please log into Editorial Manager at http://www.editorialmanager.com/pone/ , click the 'Update My Information' link at the top of the page, and double check that your user information is up-to-date. If you have any billing related questions, please contact our Author Billing department directly at gro.solp@gnillibrohtua .

If your institution or institutions have a press office, please notify them about your upcoming paper to help maximize its impact. If they’ll be preparing press materials, please inform our press team as soon as possible -- no later than 48 hours after receiving the formal acceptance. Your manuscript will remain under strict press embargo until 2 pm Eastern Time on the date of publication. For more information, please contact gro.solp@sserpeno .

Additional Editor Comments (optional):

Reviewer #1: (No Response)

Acceptance letter

21 Oct 2022

Dear Dr. Andreasen:

I'm pleased to inform you that your manuscript has been deemed suitable for publication in PLOS ONE. Congratulations! Your manuscript is now with our production department.

If your institution or institutions have a press office, please let them know about your upcoming paper now to help maximize its impact. If they'll be preparing press materials, please inform our press team within the next 48 hours. Your manuscript will remain under strict press embargo until 2 pm Eastern Time on the date of publication. For more information please contact gro.solp@sserpeno .

If we can help with anything else, please email us at gro.solp@enosolp .

Thank you for submitting your work to PLOS ONE and supporting open access.

PLOS ONE Editorial Office Staff

on behalf of

Dr. Andrzej Grzybowski

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Are Beijing and Washington testing the dark forest hypothesis?

A TV spin-off may explain why China and the US have chosen not to shoot first and ask questions later.

• United States

Last week, Netflix released Three-Body Problem , its widely anticipated TV adaptation of the acclaimed novels by science fiction author Liu Cixin. While met with broadly positive responses from US viewers, Chinese audiences took a much less favourable stance, with some accusing Netflix of hyping up the Cultural Revolution to make China look bad , or “white-washing” the cast for nefarious purposes. Its rating on the Chinese review site Douban stands at 6.8, with one in five voters giving it only one or two stars out of five.

This is but a microcosm of the increased disconnect and cultural friction between China and the West. Hollywood films have now almost completely lost the Chinese market, and after the controversy over the live-action Mulan film , there’s an increased sense in Hollywood that catering to Chinese audiences might be more trouble than it’s worth. Meanwhile, many Chinese no longer trust Western studios to tell stories concerning China, believing that the filmmakers might manipulate the content to score geopolitical points.

The Three-Body Problem has been frequently used as a metaphor for relations between China and the West. In the book series, Earth is faced with an invasion by the technologically superior alien Trisolarans. Many see Earth as corresponding to Indigenous peoples, specifically pre-Opium War China, and Trisolarans representing Western countries that conquered the world, first through advanced arms, later through pervasive cultural influence.

The analogy extends beyond just a colonialist reading: the books also raise the “dark forest hypothesis”, which says that the universe is like a forest in which cosmic distances obscure others’ intentions, forcing people to adopt a “shoot first, ask questions later” posture to ensure their own survival. This has been specifically compared to the chronic mistrust between China and America.

In the books, the hypothesis was used as a justification for civilisations keeping their existence secret from the outside world. China and America are not separated by light years and are well aware of one another after decades of dialogue, and as such, have chosen not to take that first shot. However, understanding has not managed to bring about trust between the two superpowers; in fact, understanding may even be pushing the two apart.

China believes that America’s strategy is to contain it, and perhaps even to instigate a colour revolution within China. This is something that America has indeed done to adversaries, and even allies. The 1980–90s democracy wave was global in nature, partly because the United States stopped propping up unsavoury allies, sometimes even helping civil society forces overthrow their old friends. Even if the US government, out of self-interest, does not act against friendly dictatorships, NGOs based in and/or staffed by Americans would surely spring to action. Should the opportunity arise, there would likely be American elite and public support for regime change in China. Short of a radical change in America’s ideology and self-perception then, there’s nothing America could do to allay China’s doubts.

Meanwhile, to counter America’s insinuations, China has repeatedly stated that it has no intention of seeking hegemony. However, there is no way for America to know if this is what China really thinks, or merely what China wants it to think; elite discussions there are closed to outsiders, especially after recent drives for greater security. The lack of Chinese action against Russia for geopolitical expediency, despite Russia violating another country’s territorial integrity – the protection of which is one of the clearest principles of Chinese foreign policy – certainly exacerbated American mistrust of anything China says.

Unless China deliberately allows America to wiretap their leadership, or engages in an unprecedented program of political reforms, there’s nothing China could do to allay America’s doubts. The Chinese government actually better reflects the assumptions of the “dark forest hypothesis”: Trying to know what the Chinese leadership really thinks is like trying to figure out what Trisolarans are thinking.

Thus, the basis for distrust between China and America is not trivial, but fundamental to their respective political systems, and therefore unlikely to abate so long as America remains America, and China remains China. Each country will have cause to view the actions of the other with great suspicion. Assuming that the leadership of both countries knows their counterparts well, they also know that the other side has ample reason (as detailed above) to harbour distrust, which only exacerbates the vicious cycle.

Perhaps both countries can take lessons from the Three-Body Problem . The war between Trisolarans and Earthers ends with the destruction of both star systems; the only people to escape travel through the Milky Way to settle on another planet. Perhaps everyone’s excess energies can be directed to exploring and exploiting the vast resources of the universe, instead of feuding here on Earth; the only conclusion to the latter course of action, as in the books, would be mutually assured destruction. While the “dark forest hypothesis” does raise the point that resources are finite and eventual competition is inevitable, John Maynard Keynes may have the answer to that: in the long run, we are all dead; time has a way of solving many problems.

Main image courtesy of Unsplash user Jr Korpa

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