cultural values research paper

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Published: 26 April 2021

Recognising values and engaging communities across cultures: towards developing a cultural protocol for researchers

Rakhshi Memon ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-6586-2248 1 ,
Muqaddas Asif 2 ,
Ameer B. Khoso 2 ,
Sehrish Tofique 2 ,
Tayyaba Kiran 2 ,
Nasim Chaudhry 2 ,
Nusrat Husain 3 , 4 ,
Sarah J. L. Edwards 1 on behalf of

Pakistan Institute of Living and Learning (PILL)

BMC Medical Ethics volume 22 , Article number: 47 ( 2021 ) Cite this article

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Efforts to build research capacity and capability in low and middle income countries (LMIC) has progressed over the last three decades, yet it confronts many challenges including issues with communicating or even negotiating across different cultures. Implementing global research requires a broader understanding of community engagement and participatory research approaches. There is a considerable amount of guidance available on community engagement in clinical trials, especially for studies for HIV/AIDS, even culturally specific codes for recruiting vulnerable populations such as the San or Maori people. However, the same cannot be said for implementing research in global health. In an effort to build on this work, the Pakistan Institute of Living and Learning and University College London in the UK sought to better understand differences in beliefs, values and norms of local communities in Pakistan. In particular, they have sought to help researchers from high income countries (HIC) understand how their values are perceived and understood by the local indigenous researchers in Pakistan. To achieve this end, a group discussion was organised with indigenous researchers at Pakistan Institute of Living and Learning. The discussion will ultimately help inform the development of a cultural protocol for researchers from HIC engaging with communities in LMIC. This discussion revealed five common themes; (1) religious principles and rules, (2) differing concepts of and moral emphasis on autonomy and privacy, (3) importance of respect and trust; (4) cultural differences (etiquette); (5) custom and tradition (gift giving and hospitality). Based on the above themes, we present a preliminary cultural analysis to raise awareness and to prepare researchers from HIC conducting cross cultural research in Pakistan. This is likely to be particularly relevant in collectivistic cultures where social interconnectedness, family and community is valued above individual autonomy and the self is not considered central to moral thinking. In certain cultures, HIC ideas of individual autonomy, the notion of informed consent may be regarded as a collective family decision. In addition, there may still be acceptance of traditional professional roles such as ‘doctor knows best’, while respect and privacy may have very different meanings.

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The debate on the ethics of international clinical research involving collaboration with Low and Middle Income Countries (LMIC) is of considerable significance because of increased interest in global health research [ 1 ]. This makes it an imperative that research is equitable, just, relevant to the context in which it is organised and responsive to local health needs. Global health ethics is emerging as a new discipline [ 2 , 3 ]. Although the field of global health ethics is largely underpinned by the concepts of bioethics from HIC, it is increasingly important to examine such concepts in different cultural and social contexts. Concerning ethics, Bernal and Adames [ 4 ] stated that “we caution to impose views, norms and values of the world’s dominant HIC society onto vulnerable populations such as ethno-cultural groups”. Considered in the round, the discipline of research ethics is mostly ‘Euro-American’ and not often recognised, let alone adapted for, within many other cultures [ 5 , 6 ]. For example, Zaman and Nahar note that when conducting research in Bangladesh, they found the word ‘research’ did not exist in the Bengali language and when translated meant ‘finding a lost cow’. Global health projects have too often been developed without the input of LMIC local partners, leading to claims of neo-colonialism [ 7 ]. The conditional adherence to HIC governance models by the funders of research who are predominantly from the global north could similarly be seen as neocolonial.

In defining “Global Health Ethics” Myers [ 8 ] likewise observed “that existing literature on global health ethics has majorly originated from north American medical doctors. This is corroborated by random searching of literature using the terms ‘community engagement’, ‘global health ethics’, ‘global health research and ‘global health partnerships’ from 2016 to 2020 revealed around 102 articles mostly from HIC. This was inferred by the first author’s names. Therefore, the question of whose perspectives, views, plans as well as advances, the global health ethics actually represents and how and why—invites scrutiny” [ 8 ]. As Japanese historian William LeFleur once commented, though, “bioethics has become international, it has not become ‘internationalised” [ 9 ]. HIC principles of bioethics focus on the individual’s rights of autonomy and consent disregarding the collectivistic cultural norms of interconnectedness of role of the family and how shared decision making is intertwined in some cultures. Consequently, despite all good intentions towards research participants, researchers possess a certain ‘ethnocentrism’ before research begins. While research carried out in a respectful manner has maximised social value [ 10 ], community engagement or community consultation in the proposed research projects has emerged as a requirement for ethical international research [ 7 ]. It refers to participation and involvement of people, groups, structures or community members for planning, design, decision-making, and governance to promote people centred delivery of services [ 11 ]. It is recently seen as critical and fundamental component of many health initiatives, particularly during disease outbreaks [ 12 ]. This entails understanding of the emergent global health gaps and of the lifestyle of potential research participants. In their book, Understanding Global Health, Velji and Bryant [ 13 ] state that when conducting research, global health ethics not only challenge its practitioners to identify potential research subjects but to assure respect for justice, dignity and human rights. It is necessary to understand the different mind sets, environments and frameworks of thinking while undertaking collaborative research in LMIC [ 2 ]. Kolev and Sprowl [ 14 ] emphasised the importance of addressing those aspects of health systems that continue to hinder efforts to meaningfully engage with patients, their families and local communities. In today’s world, when researchers may not reside in the communities where they work, knowing their experiences and culture i.e. differences in political, cultural and social structures, systems and processes among communities, social norms and beliefs is important.

With the World Health Organisation (WHO) global health agenda [ 15 ] and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) of 2030 [ 16 ] more and more young researchers want to apply their skills to global health research. It is a good thing that more and more research is being carried out in the pursuit of global health and that researchers and institutions from HIC are invited to build research capacity and capability. As part of these projects, researchers from HIC are often involved in community engagement workshops. In culturally diverse environments where linguistic and cultural barriers exist, standards for effective communication might be daunting [ 2 , 3 ]. Researchers from HIC are often unsure of the cultural norms, values and beliefs of local communities. Consequently, they may sometimes unknowingly come across as insensitive and disrespectful. “ How do we begin to think about unintended consequences when we are doing what we presume as ‘good’ for the patient, for their family, the community and society at large” [ 12 ].

Implementation of health research requires understanding and engaging key stakeholders at all levels of the local health systems. Cultural and linguistic variances, historic legacy of mistrust, manipulation within the research enterprise and scientific colonisation concerns further intensifies these conditions [ 17 ]. MacLachlan [ 18 ] highlighted how communities may see foreign aid workers as symbols of colonialism, capitalism, and eurocentrism. Conversely, communities may perceive the doctor from HIC to have magical powers and superior expertise. This can give rise to unrealistic expectations. To counter this, honesty must be a universal commitment [ 12 ].

Existing literature in research ethics has grappled with differences in culture to the extent that codes of conduct are now being developed to redress the balance. For example, the San Code of Research Ethics is written with the San people of South Africa for all research involving them [ 19 ]. Another code, the Te Ara Tika—Guidelines for Maori Research Ethics: A Framework for Researchers and Ethics Committee Members seeks to secure sensitivity to culture in the structural protections of research participants [ 20 ]. Community engagement guidance in clinical trials is available, particularly for HIV/AIDS in Africa [ 21 ] but there is a gap in guidance for implementing research in global health. To make interventions more relevant and meaningful to local people, whichever culture they are from, community participation has been regarded as essential.

Building on existing work in clinical trials and for research with specific cultures, thought to be vulnerable and in need of special consideration, more clear and specific guidance is needed for incorporating effective and relevant community engagement methodologies into planning and implementation [ 22 ]. Such guidance can help implementation researchers to engage community stakeholders in more strategic and practical ways to enhance quality and meaningful application of results in order to improve health and health system outcomes. This would not only assist planning for specific projects but would also be a useful contributor to ensure that new and early career researchers are better equipped to consciously and thoughtfully engage with communities affected by their work in ways that are respectful and empowering [ 22 ].

How we should think about differences in values between cultural and wider communities is a familiar topic to philosophers, yet the limits to cultural and moral relativism in global health research is yet to be resolved. If communities and cultures across the world were to have very different values, it would be almost impossible to find common ground and global health research would be effectively impossible to pursue. Rather than to start with relative moral values, it is possible to converse with members of different cultures about their values and to devise a ‘bottom up’, or rather a participatory framework informed by experience of global collaborations in the field. As a contribution towards moving forward the global health research endeavours, development of a cultural protocol would be a fundamental starting point to help dispel false preconceptions and improve communication for a better understanding of the research environment and its people. The essence of a participatory approach is to recognise ‘that people whose lives are to be changed by developing interventions should have a say in what these changes are to be, and how they will take place’ [ 23 ]. Although, there are various ways and approaches designed to facilitate stakeholder engagement at the national or institutional level [ 22 ], these tools are intended to assist as aids to discussion around community involvement issues within a particular partnership and/or as a way of exploring comparisons between partnerships. These are at a very early stage of development and have not yet been tested on the ground [ 24 ].

Pakistan Institute of Living and Learning (PILL) has many visiting researchers from HIC, who are involved in community engagement, training and development. PILL and University College London (UCL), UK have collaborated to identify the gap and to gain an understanding of the beliefs, cultural norms, and values of local communities with the aim to better understand and manage the differences in values and ethics in a different cultural setting. The rationale underpinning the development of a cultural protocol is that when there is no clear communication and understanding of the beliefs, culture, norms, nuances and values of a particular community, there is no foundation on which to build rapport, respect and trust needed for initiating the process of community engagement itself. If we believe in local participation and community engagement to be core values underpinning participatory approach, we need to make a concerted effort to gain insight into the belief system, norms and values of the communities we work with.

A culture protocol for researchers is not intended as a substitute for community engagement which itself is an important process for eliciting views and values of particular communities and relates to particular research proposals and projects. A cultural protocol, however, would prepare researchers to approach the process of community engagement with respectful cultural sensitivity. The aim of this paper is to present findings from a discussion group towards development of a cultural protocol for researchers for community engagement in Pakistan.

Methodology

This paper is based on a discussion group with local indigenous researchers from Pakistan.

The discussion group was convened on January 11th, 2019 at Pakistan Institute of Living and Learning (PILL) head office in Karachi with four other PILL centres from different cities via zoom. The discussion was in English and Urdu to facilitate communication. The participants were researchers from PILL (n = 32), they were all qualified psychologists who had experience of community engagement and partnership relied research activities across Pakistan and had volunteered for the group discussion. The discussion group lasted for one hour and 28 min. Written consent was taken from all the participants to audio record the discussion and to use the materials for publication.

A semi structured list of questions to facilitate the discussion was developed following literature review. This explored researcher cultural beliefs and the impact on their research activities, challenges and responsibilities as a researcher coming from another country. The discussion was moderated by RM (based in UK with a background in health services management and improvement sciences). The group discussion revolved around the experiences and learning of local researchers from community engagement activities.

The audio recording of discussion was transcribed by a qualitative researcher. The transcription was translated into English by a bilingual researcher. Translated transcript was then back translated into Urdu for checking by an independent researcher. Thematic analysis was used to analyse the discussion [ 25 ]. Steps involved in the analysis included familiarisation, generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes and finally transforming it in a report form. RM and MA did initial line by line coding and finalising the themes both were supervised by an experienced qualitative researcher (TK) to maintain data credibility and trust worthiness. TK reviewed the transcript and analysis.

The results presented here are based on the general themes that emerged from the discussion. The five themes from the discussion include: (1) religious principles and rules, (2) concept of autonomy and privacy, (3) notion of respect and trust, (4) cultural differences (etiquette) and (5) custom and tradition (gift giving and hospitality). The five themes which emerged from the discussion are as follows and the key messages from these five themes are in Table 1 .

Religious principles and rules

Following the British colonial rule in India, Pakistan was founded in 1947 on the basis of religion; Islam. Hence, religion and culture are very much intertwined. Most societal norms are underpinned by religious beliefs. The community religious leaders once engaged can be a great ally. This was stated in the Group “I think it is better to get hold of the imam in the community first. He prepares the ground for us by telling them who we are? And what we are trying to do? It makes our work much easier”.

As Islamic traditions and practices are virtually ingrained in all parts of Pakistani life, it is an imperative to understand the significance of prayer, religious festivals and festivities have in everyday life. This was expressed several times in the discussion Group “If it is prayer (namaaz) time specially Friday (Jummah) prayer we should not work during that time. Also, late afternoon (Asar prayer) and at sunset (Maghrib prayer). These prayer times are important so there should not be a clash with these times”. Prohibition of food in Ramadan and music and other festivities during the month of Moharram were also mentioned “During Ramadan people will be offended if you eat in public as everyone should be observing fast” “In Moharram, especially in Shia Sect we don’t play music or watch movies as it is the month of mourning”.

Islamic ideals and customs were further reiterated. A discussant mentioned “ We do Qurbani (slaughter of an animal in the name of Allah) on Eid ul Adha. It may be shocking for foreigners but it is our religion, we do it in the name of Allah”.

Concept of autonomy and privacy

It would be quite usual for the whole family to be involved in discussions and decision making on issues which in the HIC maybe perceived as violation of autonomy. The tension between the primacy of autonomy in HIC bioethics literature is sometimes in contrast and incompatible with the social value system of interconnectedness and interdependence within cultures such as Pakistan which are religiously grounded. “The whole families come and attend clinic with the patient. When people travel from far away villages, they have to camp outside hospitals for days as it is too costly and too far to go home every day”.

Respect for the elders of the family and especially the husband in a male dominated society make ‘surrogate’ decision making an expectation and the norm. “….. People come with their mother, husband, sometimes also friends. Mostly husband or mother will speak for them and decide.”

Notion of respect and trust

Distrust still exists within the (illegal) migrant community fleeing from Afghanistan to Pakistan since the Afghanistan war, as they may not possess identity cards. Young men dressed in foreign clothes are perceived to be government officials. “ So again it is related to credibility, integrity and trustworthiness. We experience in Orangi Town (in Karachi) that they don’t trust us. Actually as we are young men dressed in foreign clothes so they think that we are someone else, I mean they think we are ISI (Intelligence Services) or like that”.

As segregation still exists in most families, traditionally male researchers will be restricted from home visiting. This was expressed by a discussant “Only females can visit homes, male have to wait outside”.

However, being respectful to customs and traditions goes a long way to build trust. As someone in the Group said “if you sit on the chair and others are sitting on the floor, it is not good. It is all about respect”.

Family and family loyalties are held sacred in the Pakistani culture and social fabric of the society. This value system is derived from the Islamic belief of individual and collective responsibility for the welfare of kin and kinship. This translates into family loyalty as long as the family member fulfils the criteria, be it nuclear or extended, family comes above other social relationships and even commercial arrangements. As one discussant in the group eluded “ My uncle who is a cloth merchant wanted me to manage his shop when I completed my university education".

Cultural differences (etiquette)

Eye contact and physical touching between genders is considered disrespectful and an invasion into privacy. Eye contact with the elders is considered to be challenging to the status of the elders and therefore also disrespectful and rebellious. The cultural polarisation of understanding of the same gestures between cultures can be perceived as disrespect, misunderstanding and offensive; this can be detrimental to community engagement and distrust of researchers from HIC. “Making eye contact with your elders and opposite gender is considered disrespectful”.

The segregation of genders historically, religiously and traditionally has required ‘Parda’ separation between male and female outside the family confines. This cultural conditioning and tradition continues. As observed by one discussant: “Foreign professionals need to consider the cultural values before visiting other cultures. As most people don’t like to sit close to them or do hugs. Female professionals hesitate in sitting close with male foreigners”. The point was further reinforced by another “The girls don’t even shake hands with the boys, when they greet each other girls’ shake hands with each other but not with the boys”.

A similar comment was made in the Group: “You should prefer to wear long shirts with shawl and avoid wearing shorts or wear shawl or scarf. Is this relevant to female or is it relevant to male? Yes, both—So, they just should not go in shorts and t-shirts. Not shorts just jeans, trousers and shirts are best for male”.

The dress code signifies not only adherence to cultural norms of modesty but also signals religious significance. “I believe if people coming in foreign dress, they are seen as having more professional attitude, and coming with more professional background. They are having some kind of knowledge and people take them very seriously. Their comments and suggestions on any issue are taken very seriously”.

Interestingly, personal space and boundaries are not the same as in the west. People may stand quite close when communicating. Also, albeit out of respect they may call male ‘bhai’ (elder brother) and female ‘baji’ (elder sister). As a result, they perceive that they now have a close enough relationship “it is very common for people to become very friendly and ask very personal questions” and “they ask personal and intimate questions and also ask for personal numbers”.

Custom and tradition (gift giving and hospitality)

Pakistanis are renowned for their generosity and their love and respect towards their guests. In Islam, a guest is a blessing from Allah. So, however poor people are, they will go out of their way to welcome their guests with open arms. They believe that this would please Allah. “I don’t know what foreigners do when they go for community field work but in our culture, they offer us tea, coffee, eggs, even seasonal fruits and many other gifts”. Also, “we have to take tea with them and have lunch when they offer us meal, to give them assurance that we belong with them and to win their trust”.

Development of a cultural protocol for researchers would be a desirable step in fostering relationships between researchers from HIC and the communities they wish to recruit in research. In addition to accepted practices of community engagement and for special regard for protecting vulnerable cultures, observing a cultural protocol is another way in which researchers can show respect towards different cultural norms and values. A protocol would then become an integral part of community and participatory engagement process. We identified a number of key themes from discussion group including role of religious principles and rules, issues related to autonomy and privacy, notion of respect and trust, cultural differences in terms of etiquette and customs and traditions.

Previous evidence shows that involvement of religious leaders in raising awareness and community engagement is hugely important and they can play a significant role in bringing community on-board even when addressing taboo topic [ 26 ]. Therefore, engaging with and empowering religious leaders through capacity building and offering them support, recognition and appreciation can be an important component of community engagement [ 26 ]. Similar findings have been highlighted through this discussion group where researchers strongly emphasised the role of respecting religious practices and involving religious leaders to strengthen community involvement and trust.

An example of such a difference lies in the apparent need in HIC guidelines to protect the anonymity and confidentiality of participants [ 27 ]. However, this situation is different in Asian countries like Pakistan. In group discussion researchers emphasised the importance of shared decision making in Pakistani families. Accepting decisions made by elder members of the family is considered as matter of respect in Pakistani families and young people think that influence of elders is propitious for their life [ 28 ]. The joint decision making described in the results resonates with Dr Rose’s [ 12 ] narration in his book; A Blind Eye. He states ‘The Center is a buzz of clinical activity, like every facility in which I have worked in the developing world, the concept of privacy is wholly irrelevant. Observed by extended family, elders, and sometimes even village chiefs, several examinations take place in each room’.

Hospitality and gift giving is also considered as a universal behaviour in Pakistani culture that helps to integrate a society [ 29 ]. However, in a research context, gift giving poses an ethical challenge both for researchers and participants, since gift giving could be perceived by researchers from HIC as inducements, or worse, as bribes. In the discussion group, researchers highlighted that people in different communities express their hospitality by giving gifts. Therefore, people coming from other cultures should be aware of this gesture before visiting any community setting and be prepared to refuse gifts politely so that researcher-participant relationship is maintained.

In community based research, successful partnership between researchers and participants helps to generate trust and synergy [ 30 ]. Synergy in research is generated when participants hold space for a third culture that aims to integrate perspective of community members and academics, in order to generate innovative and valuable research [ 31 ]. Regarding trust Alpers [ 32 ] observed that ‘Cultural and linguistic differences may make it particularly challenging to build a trustful and positive relationship with patients of ethnic minority’. “Nepotism is seen positively as it assures hiring people who can be trusted” [ 33 ]. This would be an antithetical value stance from a HIC perspective. Attum, Waheed and Shamoon [ 34 ] in discussing cultural competence in the care of Muslim patients and their families state that “It is common understanding that women dress modestly. Men are mostly dressed to the knees or past the knees too. Although there is an impression that women dress modestly compared to men, but many men observe similar rules of modesty”.

Community engagement is concerned with directly approaching the host community and tapping into the community knowledge to identify the needs, issues and concerns. The community as the key stakeholder within the research process provides insight into the cultural and social context which is, as such, irreplaceable and invaluable to achieve the goals of the research. The enabling function of the protocol will be to inform and prepare researchers from HIC before they approach the community engagement process.

However, it is equally important to acknowledge that there are further sub-cultures within the different provinces of Pakistan so the development of a cultural protocol and guidance for community engagement with specific cultures will not only benefit visiting researchers from HIC it will also be of value to local indigenous researchers visiting different provinces within Pakistan.

In summary, from available literature and discussion group, it has been clear that understanding local cultural values and norms are important to understand before initiating community engagement in health research primarily to facilitate recruitment. Underpinned by this reflective inquiry, development of a cultural protocol for researchers from HIC can be an important part of an overall engagement strategy in Pakistan. This could potentially provide pathways to develop a cultural protocol for researchers in LMIC to ensure local cultural norms and values for research are considered.

Availability of data materials

A record of the full discussion used for the article is available from the corresponding author on reasonable request.

Abbreviations

Low and middle income countries

High income countries

Pakistan Institute of Living and Learning

University College London

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Acknowledgements

Discussion group participants: Prof Nasim Chaudhry, Mrs. Afshan Qureshi, Mrs. Shela Minhas, Ms. Tayyeba Kiran, Ms. Ambreen Khan, Ms. Sehrish Tofique, Ms. Maryam Tahir, Ms. Munazzah Farooq, Mr. Ashfaq Ahmed, Mr. Rab Dino, Ms. Maria Usman, Mr. Nawaz Khan, Ms. Tahira Khalid, Ms. Sehrish Irshad, Ms. Rabia Sattar, Mr. Akhtar Zaman, Mr. M. Asif, Ms. Ayesha, Ms Imrana Imrana, Mr. Sanaullah, Ms. Shafaq Ejaz, Mr. Umair Ahsan, Ms. Zainab Bibi, Ms. Amna Noureen, Ms, Anum Naz, Ms. Uzma Omer, Ms. Farhatulain, Mr. Awais Khan, Mr. Suleman Shakoor, Ms. Muqaddas Asif, Ms. Maham Rasheed and Mr. Usman Arshad. PILL website: www.pill.org.pk/events-2 . For their support during the Yale Bioethics Summer School and for commenting on early drafts of the paper, we would also like to thank Lori Bruce, Director Sherwin B Nuland Institute of Bioethics, Yale University, USA, Dr Aron Rose and Mayli Mertens, Faculty members of Sherwin B Nuland Institute of Bioethics, Yale University, USA.

RM’s PhD thesis is funded by PILL, while the other authors are, in part, funded by MRC/DFID/NIHR, Youth Culturally adapted Manual Assisted Psychological therapy (Y-CMAP) for adolescent Pakistani patients with a recent history of self-harm. Grant number: MR/R022461/1 and from the Global Challenges Research Fund “South Asia Harm Reduction Movement-SAHAR M” (MR/P028144/1) SJLE is also funded by the UK NIHR UCL/UCLH Biomedical Research Centre and the EDCTP. The funders had no role in the study design, collection, analysis or interpretation of the data, writing the manuscript, or the decision to submit the paper for publication.

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Muqaddas Asif, Ameer B. Khoso, Sehrish Tofique, Tayyaba Kiran & Nasim Chaudhry

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Nasim Chaudhry
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, Shela Minhas
, Tayyeba Kiran
, Ambreen Khan
, Sehrish Tofique
, Maryam Tahir
, Munazzah Farooq
, Ashfaq Ahmed
, Maria Usman
, Nawaz Khan
, Tahira Khalid
, Sehrish Irshad
, Rabia Sattar
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, Shafaq Ejaz
, Umair Ahsan
, Zainab Bibi
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, Muqaddas Asif
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The paper was conceived by SE, drafted mainly by RM and MA on the basis of their analysis of the Group discussion, with input from AB, ST, TK, NC, and NH. RM submitted an early version of the paper as an assignment for the Yale Bioethics Summer School of 2019 and has a poster of it accepted for the 14th World Conference on Bioethics, Medical Ethics & Health Law in Portugal 2020 (Conference postponed until March 2022 due to Covid 19 pandemic). All authors read and approved the final version of the paper. The names of all discussants in the PILL Group are listed in the Acknowledgements and on the website www.pill.org.pk/events-2 . All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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Memon, R., Asif, M., Khoso, A.B. et al. Recognising values and engaging communities across cultures: towards developing a cultural protocol for researchers. BMC Med Ethics 22 , 47 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12910-021-00608-4

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Cultural and economic value: a critical review

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Volume 43 , pages 173–188, ( 2019 )

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Francesco Angelini ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-7903-964X 1 &
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In this paper we present the state of the art concerning the distinction between economic and cultural value and the way the two values interact with each other. Our review espouses Klamer’s idea of creating a value-based approach in economics, systematizing the literature on the economic and cultural value of cultural goods. In order to analyze the relationship between the artist’s characteristics and the cultural goods’ values, we also propose a model of how fame and talent affect the economic and cultural value of cultural goods. In particular, the artist’s fame and talent and the cultural good’s price are included in the dynamic formation process of economic and cultural values.

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Appendix: A mathematical model

The framework in Fig. 2 can be represented by using an analytical model, which would consider the dynamics of the variables and the relationships among them.

We define \(\tau\) and \(\phi\) , respectively, as the artist’s talent and fame, and CV , EV , and p , respectively, as the artwork’s cultural value, economic value, and price. Assuming a discrete timing, we can represent the framework described in our paper by using the following system of equations:

where t represents the current period of time.

Given the structure of equations of the model, the artwork’s cultural value in t is influenced by the artist’s talent, which has no subscript since it is time-invariant, and by the cultural value of all the periods before t (since the cultural value in \(t-1\) is influenced by the cultural value in \(t-2\) , and so on), because of both exchange and interaction between the individuals and critics’ assessment, as we have seen in Sect. 3 . The artwork’s cultural value in t affects the economic value in t , which is also influenced by the artist’s fame \(\phi\) in t . The artist’s fame in the current period is influenced both by the fame in all the previous periods, and by the price in \(t-1\) . Finally, price in t is influenced by the economic value in the same period.

The potential presence of exogenous shocks could be taken into account by letting the functional forms to be time-variant, for example by adding a random shock with a distribution to be chosen, possibly based on empirical observation. The variable which is most likely to be affected by exogenous shocks is the artist’s fame, since it could also change because of actions that she did not do. Also cultural value could be sensitive to exogenous shocks, since its components could change in value because of several reasons.

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Angelini, F., Castellani, M. Cultural and economic value: a critical review. J Cult Econ 43 , 173–188 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10824-018-9334-4

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Universality and Cultural Diversity in Moral Reasoning and Judgment

Many theories have shaped the concept of morality and its development by anchoring it in the realm of the social systems and values of each culture. This review discusses the current formulation of moral theories that attempt to explain cultural factors affecting moral judgment and reasoning. It aims to survey key criticisms that emerged in the past decades. In both cases, we highlight examples of cultural differences in morality, to show that there are cultural patterns of moral cognition in Westerners’ individualistic culture and Easterners’ collectivist culture. It suggests a paradigmatic change in this field by proposing pluralist “moralities” thought to be universal and rooted in the human evolutionary past. Notwithstanding, cultures vary substantially in their promotion and transmission of a multitude of moral reasonings and judgments. Depending on history, religious beliefs, social ecology, and institutional regulations (e.g., kinship structure and economic markets), each society develops a moral system emphasizing several moral orientations. This variability raises questions for normative theories of morality from a cross-cultural perspective. Consequently, we shed light on future descriptive work on morality to identify the cultural characteristics likely to impact the expression or development of reasoning, justification, argumentation, and moral judgment in Westerners’ individualistic culture and Easterners’ collectivist culture.

Introduction

Morality plays a fundamental role in the functioning of any human society by regulating social interactions and behaviors. The concept of morality denotes a set of values, implicit rules, principles, and long-standing, and shared cultural customs, drawn on the opposition between Good and Evil to guide social behavior ( Haidt, 2007 ). Morality often means having to make the decision “What should I do?” by linking mental states (emotions, reasoning, and desire) and the subsequent action(s). Moral principles thus define the guidelines as to what an individual should do, or is allowed to do, both toward others and themselves, and this is in relation to socially constructed beliefs ( Matsumoto and Juang, 2013 ). It is a common heritage that an individual acquires during their development, across different social environments. Consequently, morality is connected to culture. The notion of culture should be looked at according to the definition of Hong (2009) , who describes it as “a network of understanding, made up of opinion-based routines, of feelings and interactions with other people, as well as a body of affirmations and essential ideas on aspects of life.” The individual’s environment establishes shared cultural knowledge, which brings about affective, cognitive, and behavioral consequences on morality. This link leads us to ask ourselves: to what extent does culture impact upon human morality? More specifically, are there cultural patterns of moral cognition in Westerners’ individualistic culture and Easterners’ collectivist culture?

In this review, we are going to discuss the current formulation of moral theories that attempt to explain cultural factors affecting moral judgment and reasoning. The distinction will be to contrast the cognitive-developmental and the social interactional approaches to the later spectrum of approaches that address intercultural variation in moral judgment. We will present in detail cross-cultural studies on moral judgment, which will allow us to better understand universal and societal aspects of morality. Finally, we will consider cultural models of moral cognition by identifying specific moral justification and argumentation in Westerners’ individualistic culture and Easterners’ collectivist culture.

Going Beyond a Developmental Approach of Morality To Account For Intercultural Moral Variations

Numerous theories have shaped the concept of morality and its development by embedding it in the field of social systems and values of each culture.

The scientific psychological study of morality can primarily be traced to the influential moral constructivist theory of Piaget ( Piaget and Gabain, 1965 ; Piaget, 1985 ) and theory on the development of moral reasoning of Kohlberg (1976) . Those theories are shaped by a philosophic heritage, strengthened by a liberal and individualistic vision of morality, backed by the works of Kant (1765) , Mill (1863/2002) , and Rawls (1971) . For these authors, morality is universal as it is based on rationality which, by definition, is shared by individuals everywhere. Both Piaget and Kohlberg have developed stage theories that show different reasoning about moral issues depending on the level of moral development. Kohlberg (1976) developed his stage theory of moral development based on work of Piaget (1932) and he conceptualized three levels of moral development, and each level contains two substages. First, the pre-conventional stage precedes understanding and acceptance of social conventions. It refers to heteronomous morality, whereby the individual obeys the rules for fear of being punished. Second, the conventional stage refers to autonomous morality and represents conformity to expectations and conventions of society and authority. Finally, comes the post-conventional stage, in which the individual formulates and accepts general moral principles, which are implicit to the rules, and whereby the individual independently faces social approval. The stages and substages of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development are shown in Table 1 . The focal point of their research is to question whether the same stages of development can be found in all cultures ( Piaget, 1977 ; Kohlberg, 1981 ). A meta-analysis of 45 intercultural studies across 27 countries ( Snarey, 1985 ) examined the universal affirmation of Kohlberg’s theory. The hypothesis, according to which the development stages are invariable, was well supported when there was an accurate adaptation of the content and when the language of the interview matched that of the subject. The transversal and longitudinal results indicate the presence of the pre-conventional stage and the conventional stage in all of the studied cultures. Additionally, a more recent study ( Gibbs et al., 2007 ) compared 75 studies across 23 countries and suggests that the first two stages of Kohlberg’s theory are universal.

The stages and substages of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development.

A significant criticism concerning this theory was put forward by Bukatko and Daehler (2003) ; it fails to address the measuring of moral values specific to the cultures. Kohlberg is neither interested in the content of morality, nor in the specific values which emerge from it. His concern is rather in the structure of moral development, by looking at how thoughts and reasonings are transformed throughout the different stages. Nevertheless, understanding the values of each culture is necessary to apprehend the development of moral reasoning. For instance, the beliefs of the Afar people in Ethiopia valorize polygamy with shared spouses, which play an essential role in their society, whereas this practice is considered as a moral transgression in Western countries. Further still, people from Asian cultures react differently to moral dilemmas compared to those who come from Western cultures. Indeed, Asian societies focus more on maintaining a harmonious social order ( Dien Winfield, 1982 ). The development of moral reasoning theory does not account for these observations, while intercultural research shows that values and moral principles can influence moral structure.

Research has equally examined social interactional differences and similarities in terms of morality through the lens of the social domain theory ( Turiel, 1983 ). This shows that morality is firmly rooted in the social systems and values of each culture. Turiel defines three domains; the moral domain, containing rules which protect and regulate the rights or the well-being of individuals. The conventional domain is linked to the understanding of social conventions and the rules which control social interactions. A third, the personal domain, determines personal decisions and choices ( Bukatko and Daehler, 2003 ). Turiel’s work suggests that all individuals are able to get along, no matter their culture, even if they have a difference of opinion, for the reason that they can recognize the differences between the three domains and use the same distinctive criteria ( Tostain, 1999 ). He, therefore, assumes that all individuals split morality into the same three domains. However, this is far from being always the case. Induced abortion is a striking example. Some believe that this is a personal choice, a private decision, whereas others, notably due to religious reasons (it is God who gives life, and it is He who taketh away), view it as a moral transgression. In this sense, the limits with Turiel’s model are that it leaves aside the issue of beliefs and ideas that supports how individuals assemble such content and pushes it into only one of the three domains. Other research reveals that the difference between morality and social conventions could not be as universal as the domain theory suggests. Study of Shweder et al. (1987) comparing Indian and American children, and study of Haidt et al. (1993) comparing individuals from Brazil and the United States, indicate that the moral domain is defined in a much broader sense in India and Brazil. Concerns regarding purity, spiritual degradation, and moral expectations of loyalty toward one’s social group, are the concerns that also arise within the moral domains. They observed that actions and rules considered as personal choices or social conventions by Western society are more “moralized” in India or Brazil. As such, Indians and Brazilians assimilate their conventions with a universal morality. The distinction put forward by Kohlberg and Turiel between morality and convention is therefore not applicable to these populations. Finally, Turiel and Kohlberg are doubly in agreement here. As Universalists, they believe that the framework of morality is the same in its outlines everywhere. As formalists, they are not sufficiently interested in the content of morality and believe that the subjects, whatever culture they may be, can agree insofar as they refer to the same moral reasoning ( Tostain, 1999 ).

Kohlberg’s view predominated for the past several decades but recent theoretical developments in social and cultural psychology ( Shweder et al., 1997 ; Haidt and Joseph, 2004 ; Curry, 2016 ) built on an evolutionary approach suggest that our behavior can be explained by internal psychological mechanisms. From that standpoint, the relevant internal mechanisms are adaptations and products of natural selection. Hence, rudimentary moral intuitions, such as harm aversion and reciprocity, go back to the very beginnings of human history. Moral evolved long before the emergence of our kind and serve the adaptive function of facilitating cooperation within groups and against enemies. Indeed, this evolutionary framework focuses on motivational orientations rooted in evolved unconscious emotional systems developed by experiences that predispose someone to react to an act or events in a particular way. It is suggested that evolutionary adaptations of species appear to regulate behaviors and promote individual welfare. As such, the moral principles of an individual are relative to the culture they belong to. According to cultures, the notions of Good and Evil are differently defined and lead to different values and principles. The same action could very well be considered as a serious moral transgression in some cultures and as a simple social misdemeanor in others ( Shweder et al., 1987 ). From this perspective, morality is extended beyond intercultural differences. Each society has a moral system, dependent upon its beliefs, ideologies, and views of the world ( Jensen, 2011 ). The history of societies has shown, for instance, that divorce, induced abortion, or more recently same-sex marriages, are perceived by some as a direct breach of morality, and thus must be avoided at all costs. Not everybody, therefore, has the same idea of the domains to which morality can be applied ( Skitka et al., 2005 ). Haidt (2007) suggests the term “moral community” to characterize each group that shares the same values and moral norms; these groups also share the same ideas about how to enforce them.

Several models have been conceived to come up with a broader, and more structured, approach to morality. Shweder and Sullivan (1990) and Shweder et al. (1997) , who carried out a series of ethnographic studies, mainly in the United States and India, noticed that moral judgments of Indians draw on social rules which are difficult to apply universally, and which are founded on social and religious rules. In the United States, on the other hand, moral judgments draw on more liberal social rules, founded upon individual rights, justice, and the principle of avoiding harm. From these results, Schweder talks about moral pluralism and develops a moral taxonomy which he considers to be universal with three main types of ethics “the big three” (three ethics approach). He defines them as three essential morals, each one conveying a particular vision of morality. Cultures differ from each other morally, depending upon the importance allocated to each one of the three ethics. The ethics of Autonomy aims to protect the individual, their liberty, their rights, to help them satisfy their needs, and to achieve their goals. The ethics of Community aims to protect the integrity of the group, its structure, its organization, its reputation, as well as the roles and the status of its members. The ethics of Divinity insists upon protecting the soul and the spirit, as well as all the spiritual aspects of the individual and their natural environment ( Shweder et al., 1997 ). Several studies have looked at the use of the three ethics in India, Brazil, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States ( Haidt et al., 1993 ; Rozin et al., 1999 ; Vasquez et al., 2001 ; Jensen, 2015 ). Generally, a pattern is noticed whereby Western countries more frequently use the ethics of Autonomy than the other two ethics, while Eastern countries present arguments based on Autonomy and Community. For Schweder, the Western hemisphere, taking into account its individualistic references, resonates with the ethics of Autonomy, while the Eastern societies, given the fact that they are based simultaneously on interdependence among individuals and beliefs of divine or natural law, mainly advocate the ethics of Community and ethics of Divinity. The limit of Kohlberg’s theory and Turiel’s differences between morality, convention, and the personal domain is that it restricts morality to the ethics of Autonomy by insisting upon justice and individual rights. This is limiting from an intercultural perspective, as they falsely reduce the moral field to values favored by Westerners. Thus, according to ideological contingencies, perhaps a historical interpretation would permit us to understand that each society only expresses a part of this universal morality. Depending upon their vision of the world, the individual could conform to either one, or all, of these three ethics, but to varying degrees.

Haidt and Joseph (2004) broadened the approach of the “big three” in terms of morality in their moral foundation theory. The motivation at the heart of their work is that most of the research in moral psychology concentrates on two aspects: Good/Evil or reciprocity/justice but does not take into account the cultural differences observed in the other moral domains. For example, among Westerners, emphasis is put upon compassion and fairness, whereas Easterners regard obeying authority, loyalty toward the group, and matters of purity as justifiable moral concerns ( Graham et al., 2011 ). The moral domain was widened to include these concerns. Consequently, the common ground of all cultures is composed of five main moral principles, each one being characterized by an adaptive function having emerged over time ( Graham et al., 2009 ; Haidt and Kesebir, 2010 ). These founding moral principles correspond to five psychological mechanisms underlying moral activity and behavior ( Graham et al., 2009 ). The principle of not doing harm (Care/Harm) prohibits all forms of suffering caused voluntarily to others and underpins the values linked to protection of the people. The principle of equity (Fairness/Cheating) aims to regulate exchanges and relationships between individuals by means of the idea of reciprocity. The principle of loyalty (Loyalty/Betrayal) refers to maintaining cohesion at the heart of the group, by means of valuing the links which unite the individual to their group. The principle of authority (Authority/Subversion) is based on maintaining the hierarchical structure at the heart of the group via the respect of status, societal roles, and associated duties. The principle of purity (Sanctity/Degradation) aims to protect the individual from contamination of their bodies, but also their spirits, by means of valorizing self-control and spirituality. Those theorists recently tentatively added a sixth foundation, Liberty/Oppression, which refers to reactance and resentment toward those who limit one’s freedom ( Graham et al., 2013 ). Because the majority of the research conducted to date has focused on the original five foundations, our discussion will focus on those. Characteristics of the five founding moral principles are shown in Table 2 .

The five founding moral principles and their characteristics.

Graham et al. (2011) examined the intercultural differences of the moral foundations of participants coming from Eastern cultures of South Asia, East Asia, and South-East Asia, and of participants coming from the Western cultures of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Western Europe. Overall, participants from Eastern cultures obtained higher scores when considering principles of loyalty and purity compared to Western participants. According to the same authors, the differences center around loyalty and purity, which are justifiable when one considers the cultural differences in terms of collectivism ( Triandis, 2001 ) and the link between purity and religious practice, in particular in South Asia ( Shweder et al., 1997 ). Graham et al. (2011) suggest representing these five founding principles as five markers on a “moral equalizer scale,” with varying levels depending on the moral systems. It is, therefore, the prioritization of moral values stemming from these principles, which differentiates cultures and individuals. Throughout these analyzes, it is conceivable that a pluralist universalism has its place, meaning that we can simultaneously take account of universal moral concerns (such as the worry of personal integrity, dignity, right to life, and, more generally, human rights) and also of specific beliefs of each culture. These new guidelines show once again what Kohlberg neglected, namely the role that specific life experiences of individuals and cultural representations can play in the formation of morality.

Graham et al. (2009) then describe the principles of non-harm and equity as the individualizing foundation, because they are all linked to individual rights and that the individual is at the center of moral values. This foundation strengthens the groups and institutions by linking individuals to roles and duties to constrain their imperfect nature. It is vital as it permits some cultures to get rid of egoism by directly protecting the individual and by teaching to respect the rights of others. The moral foundation theory affirms that this foundation is particularly widespread in Western societies. They emphasize the importance of personal rights, justice, and caring about the well-being of individuals ( Vauclair et al., 2014 ). Nowadays, we refer to them as being individualistic societies known as Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD; Henrich et al., 2010 ; Atari et al., 2020 ). The traits of an individualistic culture are autonomy, personal success, and the pursuit of uniqueness.

Nevertheless, cultures do not limit their value to that of protecting the individual. For this reason, Graham et al. (2009) defined the binding foundation, corresponding to three other principles (authority, loyalty, and purity) that put people together as groups ( Doğruyol et al., 2019 ). This foundation restricts the liberty of individuals in favor of promoting the interests of the group ( Vauclair and Fischer, 2011 ; Vauclair et al., 2014 ). Above all, the function of morality is social; it contributes to the definition of a shared ideal to ensure a harmonious group life. Morality regulates individuals’ egoism by encouraging them to adopt behaviors that facilitate cooperation ( Haidt and Kesebir, 2010 ). One mainly finds this foundation within Eastern societies, associating it to collectivist cultures, labeled non-WEIRD (known as oriental, less educated, less industrialized, quite poor, and non-democratic). Their modes of social organization are possibly close to those observed in the distant past in traditional societies. Collectivist cultures extol interdependence among individuals, conformity, and emphasize the needs of the group above the pursuit of individual goals.

Empirical results support the theory of division of the individualizing and binding foundations between individualistic and collectivist cultures ( Graham et al., 2009 , 2011 ). These foundations establish the moral system based on the idea that all intuitions and feelings induce judgments and moral arguments. Thereby, individuals, throughout their experiences and developments, rely more on one or another of these foundations and moral principles. Dependent on history, religious beliefs, social ecology, and institutional rules (like the structure of kinship or the economic markets), each society develops a moral system. This defines several moral guidelines among which one can find reciprocity of the group, protection, support given to others, and defense of the unity of the group but also self-preservation ( Graham et al., 2016 ). Maxwell (2011) acknowledges the idea according to which cultural context can make one or several foundations salient, sometimes even antagonistic. It is therefore important to take into account these prototypical foundations when evaluating the moral identity of cultures. However, it should not be assumed that just because of their singular experiences, or their culture, individuals live in completely different moral universes. Morality does not get reduced to one cultural moral or social status; in effect, there are universal moral concerns. The inter-individual heterogeneity has to be considered as individuals do not passively comply with social constraints and dominant portrayals of their culture ( Lloyd, 1992 ; Spiro, 1993 ). An individual cannot be in agreement with these traits. They can be confronted with multiple representations that span different cultures and against which they can choose to distance themselves.

There are more recent expansions of the evolutionary approach, such as the theory of Morality-as-Cooperation ( Curry, 2016 ) that explains that morality is a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of cooperation recurrent in human social life. This theory predicts seven well-established types of cooperation; helping family, helping group, exchange, resolving conflicts through hawkish and dovish displays, dividing disputed resources, and respecting prior possession. From this framework, seven types of morality were found; obligations to family, group loyalty, reciprocity, bravery, respect, fairness, and property rights. This theory provides more detailed coverage of the moral domain whereas moral foundation theory ( Haidt and Joseph, 2004 ) proposes only five. Indeed, there is no foundation dedicated to kin or reciprocal altruism, or hawkish displays of dominance such as bravery or property rights. Nevertheless, the theory of Morality-as-Cooperation neglects the role of disgust in moral reactions, found in the principle of purity in the moral foundation theory. A recent study tested the Morality-as-Cooperation theory with the following hypothesizes: those cooperative behaviors are considered morally good whatever the culture they appear in, and these seven moral values are universal ( Curry et al., 2019 ). To test this prediction, they investigated the moral valence of these seven cooperative behaviors in an ethnographic record of 60 societies. The ethnographic coverage was drawn from six regions of the globe (Sub-Saharan Africa, Circum-Mediterranean, East Eurasia, Insular Pacific, North America, and South America). The research found, first, that these behaviors were always considered morally good. Second, these morals were observed in the majority of the societies. There were no societies in which any of these behaviors were considered morally bad. And third, these morals were observed with equal frequency across all regions of the world; they were not the exclusive preserve of Western societies. They finally conclude that cooperation is always and everywhere considered moral with those seven cooperative behaviors which may be universal moral rules. This survey shows cross-cultural regularities with moral values that exhibit a multifactorial structure, varying on these seven dimensions.

As we have just seen, social and cultural structures (beliefs, symbols, and practices) shape morality in human societies. To this effect, the transgressive nature of an act strongly depends on an individual’s moral system and the moral principles that he valorizes the most. The moral norms (specifically culturally) of an individual are anticipated and expressed over the course of judgment and reasoning. It would be premature to assume that all psychological processes, even basic ones, are immune to experience and culture ( Wang et al., 2016 ), even more so when one focuses on high-level processes such as moral reasoning and judgment. The cultural characteristics susceptible to having an impact upon the expression or the development of reasoning, argumentation, and moral judgment among WEIRD and non-WEIRD populations, should be defined. To do so, we will be looking at the cognitive processes which underpin morality in these societies.

Cognitive Processes Which Underpin the Emergence of Moral Systems in Weird and Non-Weird Societies

The leading theories on moral judgment attempt to specify precisely the role that cognitive and emotional processes play in the elaboration of this type of judgment. Their focus is on knowing to what degree the moral or immoral nature established takes its origin from a logical and controlled reasoning, or an automatic and unconscious intuition.

Can reflecting on a moral question change one’s mind? Are societies amenable to moral reasoning? For decades, the field of moral psychology with Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s cognitive-developmental theories and Turiel’s social domain theory emphasized the role of reasoning in moral judgment. For them, the answer is “yes” because moral development is intricately connected to cognitive development, and subsequently, to the development of the capacities of reasoning. These models draw from a Kantian approach to morality. For Kant (1765) , to know if an act is moral, one should question one’s reasons, and by reasoning, reach the conclusion that the action can be established as a universal law of nature. Generally speaking, moral reasoning can be considered as a systematic and reflected approach that allows individuals to make moral decisions. The process of moral reasoning consists of three steps: the first is the definition of the situation, the second is the analysis of the situation, and the third is the making of the decision ( Lyons, 1983 ). Moral reasoning includes justifications made for and during a moral action ( Royal and baker, 2005 ; Smetana, 2006 ). Individuals would thus be influenced by a controlled cognitive process, which is a conscious mental activity through which one evaluates a moral judgment. Moral reasoning is linked to the development of controlled processes, but they are compromised by cognitive biases, in particular, that of egocentricity ( Fontaine and Pennequin, 2020 ). The moral level of an individual would depend upon their capacities of reasoning, and as such, non-WEIRD societies would have a lesser moral development compared to WEIRD societies (for a synthesis, see Snarey, 1985 ). This is because Western societies are founded upon a philosophical tradition that puts the focus on debating and reasoning. The latter plays a pivotal role in institutions, whether it will be concerning education, justice, or even politics ( Lloyd, 1992 ; Peng and Nisbett, 1999 ). Institutionalization of education theoretically means that individuals within WEIRD societies are naturally programmed to reason in an abstract manner. Furthermore, middle- or higher-class parents in Western societies have numerous arguments with their children and wait for them to offer explanations ( Mercier, 2016 ). All of these factors suggest that reasoning is a particularly valorized cognitive ability in Western societies and that it is conceivable that their moral level is therefore higher. Their particular cultural context seems to create conditions that favor the development of moral reasoning abilities and a motivation to enter into argumentative activities. Several empirical data do however throw doubt upon these theses.

First of all, Shweder et al. (1997) exhibit that conventional responses from individuals in non-WEIRD societies do not represent a simple upholding of their tradition (based on religious beliefs and original myths), but more likely conform to an alternative post-conventional abstract reasoning based on different premises. Their analysis, based on interviews, shows that Easterners’ collectivist culture does not refer to individual rights (based on the premise that the subject is autonomous and free) as do Westerners’ individualistic culture. To this effect, Easterners organize their lives around an idea instead: the expression of self, based on interdependence between individuals, and that the place and the obligations each one has in society grant access to a morally acceptable life. Their beliefs are based on the premise that certain traditions allow a superior moral order to be obtained. This moral order is, for instance, described within religious societies in holy texts and bestows an ultimate meaning to human life. If one refers to Schweder’s three ethics, regarding the ethics of Autonomy, the ideas relative to individual rights are comparatively less widespread in the morals of Eastern societies. Among the latter, moral discourses uphold the duties, not intending to protect individual’s rights, but by upholding the social order or for religious reasons ( Hwang, 2015 ). For example, according to Islam, life on Earth is short and temporary, whereas life after death is eternal and perpetual. Those who dedicate themselves to charity will go to Heaven, whereas those who commit sins will go to Hell. Among Buddhists, one must adhere to five principles: do not kill, steal, lie, be lascivious, and do not eat meat. The violation of one of these principles can lead to automatic retribution from Karma in the next life. This type of moral discourse falls within the model of the Easterners’ moral systems, which implies the ethics of the Community or the ethics of Divinity, rather than the ethics of Autonomy.

Next, intercultural studies have observed that the difference concerning the moral level of the two kinds of societies is linked to the fact that individuals from collectivist cultures resort more often to conventional type arguments, whereas individuals from individualistic cultures rely more willingly on abstract principles ( Tostain, 1999 ). Two interpretations will be highlighted to explain this difference. The first, equally shared by Kohlberg, is to say that individuals from Eastern societies have a lifestyle that impedes their moral development. For example, less education, rigid social structures, or even archaic beliefs which constrain an individual to access autonomy of reasoning, hinder one to develop a true morality of rights and principles. This explanation is refutable because as we have seen, moral judgments can be justified in different ways. WEIRD societies are more likely to call for abstract principles to justify a moral judgment (see Kohlberg’s post-conventional stage). The second explanation is to consider that there is an ethnocentric bias. The alleged universal morality of Kohlberg’s theory is typically a Western trait. They attempt to show that there are other morals, equally as sophisticated, but based on different principles, stemming from a different vision of relationships between the person and the society.

Empirical facts bring out the limits of the traditional rationalist theories, which give a predominant role to reasoning in moral judgment. More recent research critiques and emphasizes the strength and importance of emotionally based moral intuitions. With the framework of the social intuitionist model, Haidt (2001) proposes a set of casual “links” connecting three psychological processes: intuition, judgment, and reasoning. As a matter of fact, it operates a model in which judgment is not the product of conscious reasoning but a product of intuitionist cognitive processes that are automatic and unconscious. This approach builds upon the dual-process theory ( Wason and Evans, 1974 ; Evans, 1989 ; Stanovich and West, 2008 ). It proposes that multiple independent but interacting processing systems underlie thought, judgment, and decision-making. Two types of different rationalities characterized by two systems exist. The System 1; namely the heuristic system, is influenced by the beliefs of the individual. It allows one to think, speak, reason, make a decision, and act adaptively to meet one’s objectives without looking for consistency. The System 2; namely the analytical system, allows one to think, speak, reason, and make a decision according to a hypothetic-deductive approach. In the social intuitionist model, moral judgment is therefore predominantly intuitive, firstly linked to the heuristic system. It leads the individual to evaluate if the action of a person is acceptable or not from a moral point of view. The “ post-hoc reasoning” posits (contrary to traditional rationalist models) that one’s reasoning is driven primarily by one’s judgment, rather than the other way around. According to social intuitionist theorists, an individual knows immediately if his judgment unearths a morally acceptable or unacceptable act. An intuition that he calls “gut-feeling” is sensed quickly and is full of affect without the individual necessarily being aware of the reasons that have led him to such a judgment. This explains the reason why some people do not know how to spontaneously explain their judgments. Reasoning, a conscious, intentional, and controlled process through System 2, only happens “retrospectively,” once the person has to justify an action in a conscious manner ( Hauser et al., 2007 ). For that to occur, he will then refer explicitly to moral intuitions which guided his judgment.

Haidt (2003) discusses innate and universal moral intuitions guiding moral judgments. He identifies five categories of intuitions (corresponding to the five moral principles) that individuals inherit, produced by means of natural selection at work throughout human evolution. These intuitions are developed according to an individual’s background and culture. This model includes processes of social influences linked to the formulation of moral reasoning or judgment. To this effect, throughout one’s development, an individual is influenced by several members of a group. By verbalizing them, these individuals can trigger the emergence of certain intuitions which are conducive to beliefs, values, and ideologies of the group. As such, they can influence the moral judgment of the person. For this reason, some intuitions are able to develop and expand, and others are inhibited. This explains why WEIRD and non-WEIRD societies do not judge and justify in the same way. Everybody has areas of moral concern developed by evolution, in which some intuitions are more predominant than others. Haidt even suggests that there is a critical period during childhood, beyond which the categories of non-developed intuitions are subsequently eternally forgotten.

An individual’s spirit has a morally diversified content that is specific to social experiences. Children actively form their moral understanding in a cultural context that uses stories to shape and guide the development of their particular moral principles ( Haidt and Joseph, 2008 ). For instance, according to the culture, the definition of a human being varies. It depends upon these definitions whether one opts to grant, or not, rights to individuals throughout a moral judgment. If one poses the question: “is induced abortion morally acceptable?,” some societies do consider it to be acceptable as the fetus is not yet perceived as a complete human being. They justify their thinking on the basis that the fetus has not experienced social acknowledgment, a rite of passage, etc. Other societies which abide by respecting the individual, consider this act to be unacceptable and justify their thinking by the motive that the fetus is a human being who has the right to life, and thus see this act as murder. Moral judgment happens based on moral intuitions, linking up the perception of a model in the social world (often a value or a vice) to an appraisal. These are the elements of rapid mental structuring and are specific to a domain that strongly influences moral judgment ( Haidt, 2001 ). To this effect, if the five intuitions are innate, individuals simply learn which event, in their culture, counts as an act of prejudice or injustice. For example, over recent years, Western societies (notably Americans) have become sensitive regarding the topic of sexual abuse of children, to such an extent that they are appalled by social behaviors which are completely normal in other parts of the world. These include the idea of making children sleep in the same bed as a parent of the opposite sex until halfway through their childhood ( Shweder et al., 1995 ), or kissing genitalia of little boys as a sign of affection, as is done in some countries in the Middle-East. With regard to this moral concern, these Western societies then react quickly, automatically, and using emotions.

Each society, therefore, has immediate implicit reactions to stories of moral violations created by their beliefs, values, and social ideologies ( Haidt, 2001 ). Emotional reactions, such as anger or guilt, can sway judgments and moral behaviors. Neurological and behavioral data back up the idea that emotions are essential for moral judgments. Huebner et al. (2009) suggested that moral judgment is moderated by a fast and unconscious process that acts upon causal-intentional representations. Individuals are sometimes able to know that an act is not correct, without having the capacity to explain why this is so ( Haidt, 2001 ). We are therefore led to believe that moral reasoning is only one of the factors, certainly not the strongest, which influences judgments and moral behaviors. According to Matsumoto and Juang (2013) , culture can affect emotions in many ways. Human beings are born with a range of basic emotions. These are universally expressed among all humans by facial expressions. However, culture creates rules, directives, and norms which regulate these emotions and influence the system of basic emotions to maintain social coordination. For example, individuals from collectivist cultures tend to include emotions in the evaluation of their social values, whereas individuals from individualistic cultures are likely to include emotions in their evaluation of the environment. Studies have revealed that moral violations are perceived as more or less severe depending upon the current emotional state of a person ( Greene and Haidt, 2002 ; Greene et al., 2009 ; Horberg et al., 2011 ). Emotions amplify moral judgment, and each society expresses emotions differently depending on the moral concern in question. In the thesis of Alqahtani (2018) which compares a Saudi population representing a collectivist culture with a British population representing an individualistic culture, one can see that the two groups did not experience the same emotions during moral violations of the moral foundations (see theory of Haidt and Joseph, 2004 ). As a matter of fact, in the Saudi population, the non-harm and equity foundations triggered resentment. The loyalty foundation triggered sadness, resentment, and apathy. The authority foundation triggered resentment and apathy. Last, the purity foundation triggered disgust. Within the British sample, the non-harm foundation triggered anger. The equity foundation triggered anger and disgust. The loyalty foundation triggered sadness, anger, and apathy. The authority foundation triggered anger and apathy. Last, the purity foundation triggered disgust. Emotion has a link with environmental conditions; it can thus create a moral judgment as a result of a motivational process, such as values, beliefs, needs, and objectives ( Blasi, 1999 ).

Haidt’s model is the first to have highlighted the place of intuitions and the role of these associated emotions in moral judgment. He is, nevertheless, the object of several critics. Approaching morality from the intuitionist perspective leads to consider conscious moral reasoning secondary to automatic and unconscious in moral judgment. It is also considered that the rational discourse of morality has no relevant impact on moral decision-making and solution-finding. In his reaction to Haidt’s emotional reductionism, Lind (2016) explains that moral judgment can be strengthened if moral reasoning is trained and re-trained repeatedly. Instincts, emotions, and intuitions may be an evolutionary legacy in the human mind, arising unconsciously. However, with experience, human beings learn and develop conscious tools to understand their natural impulses and navigate them ( Nowak, 2016 ). Evolution has endowed humans with moral emotions (including empathy), but they need more advanced instruments to deal with the demanding social contexts in which decisions are required. Following intuitions and emotions is not enough; this is why moral reasoning matters, especially in social contexts. For Lind (2016) , moral judgment competence is to be defined as “an ability to apply a certain moral orientation in a consistent (manner, as trained, developed, and trustworthy moral subjects) and differentiated manner in varying social situations.”

Haidt’s model does not explain the process at the origin of moral intuitions, by giving an extremely limited role to controlled processes ( Mikhail, 2007 ; Waldmann et al., 2012 ). In fact, Haidt and Kesebir (2010) only touch upon the use of the heuristic system among implied cognitive processes during a moral judgment. They do not provide any further explanation detailing the cognitive processes underpinning moral intuitions. To plug this gap, Mikhail (2007) developed a model describing the different mental processes, which drive all moral intuitions. He thus describes three steps. The first process consists of developing a structured representation of the situation, integrating its timeline, its causal chain, the intentions of its contributors, its moral properties, and all of the implicit pertinent elements. The second process involves forming a structured description of the situation by linking all of the characteristics together to carefully separate the desired effects from any collateral effects. The third process consists of applying a certain tacit understanding, principles, and specific rules to the situation, to determine its moral acceptability. Mikhail, having been inspired by the works of Chomsky (1957) and Rawls (1971) , suggests that this knowledge takes the shape of a universal moral grammar which gives the individual a form of stability and systematicity within their moral intuitions. He considers that morality has at its center a nucleus of rules or innate principles. This moral grammar allows the individual, over the course of his development, to integrate into the value system of his environment to internalize specific moral principles of his cultural universe ( Mikhail, 2011 ). Societies have a unique and universal moral competence that emerges from underlying, subjacent, and unconscious cognitive processes.

To test the confirmation of the existence of a universal moral grammar, Hauser et al. (2007) bring experimental elements to the fore by evoking judgments and arguments of people confronted by the tram dilemma ( Foot, 1967 ; Thomson, 1976 ). They posed a dilemma presented under the guise of two different versions to 5,000 subjects coming from 18 WEIRD and non-WEIRD countries, including young people and adults (13–70 years of age), men and women, religious people and atheists, as well as varying levels of education.

In the first version, the moral dilemma was presented as follows: A tram is moving at a high speed on its track. Five workers are carrying out repairs on the track. On another track, onto which the tram could be redirected, a sole laborer is working. An employee from the tram company who is near the railway switch point and who understands the situation, could or could not, redirect the tram. If he does so, he would avoid the death of five workers and if he does not, he would avoid the death of one sole laborer. Does he have the moral right to redirect the tram onto the other track?

In the second version, the dilemma is presented in the following manner: A tram is moving at high speed on its track. Five workers are carrying out repairs on the track. John, who is passing on a bridge above the track, understands that he could stop the tram by throwing something big down onto the track. A pedestrian carrying a big bag is walking next to him. If he were to push him onto the track, he would instigate the stopping of the tram and would save the lives of the five workers. But consequently, the life of the pedestrian would be sacrificed. But if he does not do it, he would avoid the death of only one sole worker. Does he morally have the right to push the pedestrian off the bridge?

Faced with the first version, 89% of the subjects judged the action of redirecting the tram to be morally acceptable. On the other hand, faced with the second version, 11% of the subjects judged the fact of pushing the pedestrian onto the track to be morally acceptable. In both cases, moral reasoning has a universal character because the results are independent of the level of study, religion, and culture. These results suggest the existence of a universal moral grammar ( Hauser et al., 2007 ).

As we saw, the social intuitionist model offered by Haidt gives a limited place to controlled processes in moral reasoning ( Paxton and Greene, 2010 ). Hence, these authors propose an alternative dual-process model according to which intuitions and reasoning are equal. Moral reasoning would occur more frequently. Its function is not only to justify moral judgment but also to counteract the primary intuition. To this end, several studies have shown that an individual engages within extensive moral reasoning when they become aware that their moral judgment could be deemed as being incorrect, and that they look to go beyond an implicit negative attitude ( Paharia et al., 2009 ). The context (notably cultural) in which an individual finds themself can push them to be particularly rational or to re-evaluate their emotional reactions. This model shows that the individual can be sensitive to arguments presented to them, that they then integrate them into their reasoning, and following that, they will judge the moral acceptability of a situation differently. Moral judgment thus seems to be the product of both automated and controlled processes. It is the temporality of these processes that differs. Automated processes include processing emotional information and doing this quickly, whereas controlled processes include slower reasoning, giving the person time to have consciously obtained abstract information and evaluated it systematically. According to the argumentative theory ( Paxton et al., 2012 ; Mercier, 2016 ), reasoning comes ex post to justify moral decisions which happen instinctively. These authors explain that the two situations of the dilemma are independently examined without seeking coherence. In this situation, the choice made by an individual is the one that is the easiest to justify in relation to mainly unconscious moral principles. During moral reasoning, each person is thus motivated by their moral system. Here, reasoning has an ecological function as individuals are led to defend an opinion that is influenced by society and conformity, acting as a means of persuasion.

Social Justification and Argumentation in Weird and Non-Weird Societies

Justification processes are a uniquely human phenomenon. In almost every form of social exchange, humans constantly justify their behaviors to themselves and others. Moral choices can be justified in different ways. To explain a practice, one can invoke public opinion (“the majority of people find this practice good”), customs in the culture (“we have always done it this way”), an eminent authority (“our leader or God commands us to do this”), or principles resulting from personal reflection (“it is not good to make others suffer”; Tostain, 1999 ). Science, laws, moral dictates, religions, and philosophical beliefs can be seen as large-scale justification systems that provide individuals guidelines for socially acceptable or unacceptable behavior ( Henriques, 2011 ). Henriques (2011) introduces the justification hypothesis to provide a framework for understanding human beliefs and values with a cultural level process. The justification hypothesis is part of a larger theoretical framework called the Tree of Knowledge System developed by Henrique. Justifications can be associated with what Dawkins (1989) calls a meme, which is a unit of cultural evolution. We can clearly envisage the evolution of such systems. There are three key elements of evolution: variation (different justifications are offered), selection (certain justifications are better at legitimizing action than others), and retention (selected justifications are stored and repeated; Schaffer et al., 2008 ). From those elements, new justifications systems emerge through the course of human evolution.

The justification hypothesis answers the question of why there is such a variety of types of justification systems. Henriques (2011) explains that WEIRD societies have distinct systems of justification. Religion is separated from the law, the government, Science, and all other cultural institutions. On the other hand, non-WEIRD societies do not necessarily distinguish religious worldviews, explanations of natural phenomena, and prescriptions for social conduct in their systems of justification. This can explain why moral justification, which involves a value, a principle, and a judgment, is not the same between WEIRD and non-WEIRD societies. Schaffer et al. (2008) argues forcefully for the utility of conceptualizing religion as a large-scale justification system. The individuals follow different fundamental purposes serving as differentiating forces in the justification systems. As such, the core of culture relies on the presence of large-scale justification systems to coordinate and justify human moral’s opinions and behaviors.

Arguments are the substantive reasons put forward to justify one’s moral choice or behavior. The power of argumentation during moral debates is not the same for all cultures. In fact, the nature or the types of arguments accepted or rejected varies depending on the social and cultural context ( Mercier, 2016 ; Mercier et al., 2016 ). Members of WEIRD societies have attributed more value to argumentation in their institutions for a long time, whether it be regarding science, rights, or politics ( Peng and Nisbett, 1999 ). They put relatively less emphasis on saving social harmony ( Kim and Markus, 1999 ; Oetzel et al., 2001 ) than non-WEIRD cultures. This permits them consequently to have more confrontational and open debates ( Mercier et al., 2015 ). Furthermore, in WEIRD societies, individuals are confronted by a variety of choices and views of the world. In such cultures, one can expect to defend one’s choices; since it is probable one will encounter people who make different choices ( Schwartz, 2004 ).

As a rule, members of Eastern societies have much fewer choices: much fewer religions to choose from, much fewer products to buy, much fewer professions to choose from, much fewer people to visit, etc. ( Levi-Strauss, 1966 ). This relative lack of choice results in a lighter burden of justification. Individuals from Easterners’ cultures, therefore, need to resort less to argumentation to justify their judgments or moral choices. They have less appreciation for argumentation and can be more reticent to engage themselves in moral debates on subjects, such as euthanasia, induced abortion, religion, divorce, education, etc. In fact, they adhere more strongly to their moral beliefs, and this often demonstrates the power of the institutions that they valorize and their impenetrability toward demonstrations and logical arguments. Furthermore, these societies attribute a symbolic value to their moral decisions, so that it is without a doubt more important to make a socially acceptable decision than an intrinsically correct decision. To this end, the links between the individuals are strong and as such, a person should priorities the interests of their group, in the opinions and beliefs they hold ( Triandis, 2011 ). Norms, obligations, and duties linked to the objectives, the safety, and the harmony of the group guide the moral decisions of individuals.

However, we could envision a universality concerning the role of argumentation, no matter the culture. In this perspective, individuals would be confronted with the myside bias. The Argumentative theory describes it as a bias whereby individuals overwhelmingly produce arguments defending their preferred opinions ( Mercier, 2010 ). Consequently, reasoning rarely allows individuals to rectify their erroneous intuitions. The myside bias can lead to over-confidence regarding moral choices ( Koriat et al., 1980 ). This bias can be a cognitive response to a specific cultural environment in which argumentation is valorized and where it is particularly important to be capable of defending one’s point of view. As predicted, these characteristics are adaptative and frequently present among adults in WEIRD populations ( Mercier and Sperber, 2017 ), but they are equally noticed in a culture that differs in many ways to WEIRD cultures, such as among the K’iche people in Guatemala ( Castelain et al., 2015 ), and there is no solid proof of their absence in other cultures.

Argumentation has an adaptive function because it greatly facilitates communication. Thereby, a second characteristic of the myside bias can be highlighted: the capacity to reasonably evaluate other’s arguments, by rejecting the weak and accepting those which are sufficiently strong ( Hahn and Oaksford, 2007 ). Sufficiently strong arguments can prevail and make an individual change their mind on an opinion. But during a moral judgment, the latter can be put at stake in the framework of a debate, as the (heuristic) intuition is too powerful and reasoning remains insensitive to all counter suggestions. It is like an impenetrable model ( Fodor, 2008 ). Above all, reasoning remains motivated by the needs and the moral motivations of the individual.

Morality is a necessary parameter in the functioning of all societies. It defines an ideal to strive for as well as limits one should not transgress. It guides the social behaviors of individuals and plays a part in maintaining cooperation and cohesion at the heart of societies. Recent socio-cognitive research brings to light an intuitive, universal, and emotional character of moral judgment. It also highlights the essential role of reasoning in enabling argumentation or inhibiting moral intuitions. Indeed, reasoning allows individuals to mobilize moral principles that may be used to override moral intuitions. The tendency to control one’s biased intuitions has become widespread due to social influences. Moral reasoning thus has a significant role in moral judgment, including the suspension of moral intuitions in the presence of justificatory reasons. This effect depends critically on the strength of the involved arguments, knowing that the types of arguments accepted or rejected vary according to the social and cultural context.

The moral system is organized around major principles. Depending on the culture to which one belongs those principles take on a different weighting. Heterogeneity accrued in societies implies the creation of a consequent number of groups that differ in their values and moral perspectives. This variability raises numerous concerns for moral science on the topic of norms, such as the objective criteria according to which one can assert that an action or a specific practice is moral or not. On a descriptive level, this variability offers numerous possibilities for moral psychology to identify the background, the sources, and the structures of moral lives of societies.

Author Contributions

LB wrote the article and made a substantial contribution to the concept of the article. RF and VP revised the article critically for important intellectual content. All authors contributed to the article and approved the submitted version.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Publisher’s Note

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

Acknowledgments

We thank the members of the laboratory “Psychologie des Ages de la Vie” for support. We would also like to express our gratitude to Thibaud Martinez for his comments on the earlier draft of this paper and to three reviewers for their comments on the manuscript.

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International Marketing Review

ISSN : 0265-1335

Article publication date: 2 November 2010

Cross‐cultural research in marketing has been dominated by survey‐based quantitative approaches; however, the assumption of prior validity required for the adoption of the survey approach to values in cross‐cultural research has yet to be established. This paper aims to review the literature and outlines the problems of the survey‐based approach to cross‐cultural values research. These criticisms relate both to the choice of the method and its execution. The paper outlines the multiplicative effects of these problems, that threaten the validity of the survey methodology in this context, and suggests a methodological alternative.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper reviews and synthesises the relevant literature on conceptual and methodological issues pertinent to the survey approach to values research in a cross‐cultural context.

A review of the literature suggests numerous methodological problems that threaten the validity and reliability of the survey approach to cross‐cultural values research. This review exposes a methodological gap that can be filled by a qualitative approach to the study of values in cross‐cultural research. In particular, the paper advocates means‐end methodology as offering significant strengths and addressing several of the weaknesses of the survey‐based approach to cross‐cultural values research.

Originality/value

The paper synthesises the literature on methodological issues in cross‐cultural values research, bringing together disparate criticisms which reveal the range of unresolved problems with the empirical, survey‐based approach to cross‐cultural values research; the paper also offers a suggestion for an alternative methodological approach. The means‐end approach is increasingly being used in various research areas; this paper highlights its appropriateness in a cross‐cultural context, as an alternative to predefined and culturally determined measures that limit our understanding of cross‐cultural values. Means‐end addresses many of the specific weaknesses of the survey method identified in the literature review. This discussion of methodological issues has implications for the field of cross‐cultural research more generally and suggests a critical re‐assessment of cross‐cultural methods is needed.

Cross‐cultural studies
Qualitative methods

Watkins, L. (2010), "The cross‐cultural appropriateness of survey‐based value(s) research: A review of methodological issues and suggestion of alternative methodology", International Marketing Review , Vol. 27 No. 6, pp. 694-716. https://doi.org/10.1108/02651331011088290

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Creating a Corporate Social Responsibility Program with Real Impact

Emilio Marti,
David Risi,
Eva Schlindwein,
Andromachi Athanasopoulou

Lessons from multinational companies that adapted their CSR practices based on local feedback and knowledge.

Exploring the critical role of experimentation in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), research on four multinational companies reveals a stark difference in CSR effectiveness. Successful companies integrate an experimental approach, constantly adapting their CSR practices based on local feedback and knowledge. This strategy fosters genuine community engagement and responsive initiatives, as seen in a mining company’s impactful HIV/AIDS program. Conversely, companies that rely on standardized, inflexible CSR methods often fail to achieve their goals, demonstrated by a failed partnership due to local corruption in another mining company. The study recommends encouraging broad employee participation in CSR and fostering a culture that values CSR’s long-term business benefits. It also suggests that sustainable investors and ESG rating agencies should focus on assessing companies’ experimental approaches to CSR, going beyond current practices to examine the involvement of diverse employees in both developing and adapting CSR initiatives. Overall, embracing a dynamic, data-driven approach to CSR is essential for meaningful social and environmental impact.

By now, almost all large companies are engaged in corporate social responsibility (CSR): they have CSR policies, employ CSR staff, engage in activities that aim to have a positive impact on the environment and society, and write CSR reports. However, the evolution of CSR has brought forth new challenges. A stark contrast to two decades ago, when the primary concern was the sheer neglect of CSR, the current issue lies in the ineffective execution of these practices. Why do some companies implement CSR in ways that create a positive impact on the environment and society, while others fail to do so? Our research reveals that experimentation is critical for impactful CSR, which has implications for both companies that implement CSR and companies that externally monitor these CSR activities, such as sustainable investors and ESG rating agencies.

EM Emilio Marti is an assistant professor at the Rotterdam School of Management (RSM) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
DR David Risi is a professor at the Bern University of Applied Sciences and a habilitated lecturer at the University of St. Gallen. His research focuses on how companies organize CSR and sustainability.
ES Eva Schlindwein is a professor at the Bern University of Applied Sciences and a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Oxford. Her research focuses on how organizations navigate tensions between business and society.
AA Andromachi Athanasopoulou is an associate professor at Queen Mary University of London and an associate fellow at the University of Oxford. Her research focuses on how individuals manage their leadership careers and make ethically charged decisions.

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8 in 10 americans say religion is losing influence in public life, few see biden or trump as especially religious.

Pew Research Center conducted this survey to explore Americans’ attitudes about religion’s role in public life, including politics in a presidential election year.

For this report, we surveyed 12,693 respondents from Feb. 13 to 25, 2024. Most of the respondents (10,642) are members of the American Trends Panel, an online survey panel recruited through national random sampling of residential addresses, which gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection.

The remaining respondents (2,051) are members of three other panels, the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, the NORC Amerispeak panel and the SSRS opinion panel. All three are national survey panels recruited through random sampling (not “opt-in” polls). We used these additional panels to ensure that the survey would have enough Jewish and Muslim respondents to be able to report on their views.

The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education, religious affiliation and other categories.

For more, refer to the ATP’s Methodology and the Methodology for this report. Read the questions used in this report .

Chart shows the share of Americans who say religion’s influence is declining is as high as it’s ever been

A new Pew Research Center survey finds that 80% of U.S. adults say religion’s role in American life is shrinking – a percentage that’s as high as it’s ever been in our surveys.

Most Americans who say religion’s influence is shrinking are not happy about it. Overall, 49% of U.S. adults say both that religion is losing influence and that this is a bad thing. An additional 8% of U.S. adults think religion’s influence is growing and that this is a good thing.

Together, a combined 57% of U.S adults – a clear majority – express a positive view of religion’s influence on American life.

Chart shows 49% of Americans say religion’s influence is declining and that this is a bad thing

The survey also finds that about half of U.S. adults say it’s “very” or “somewhat” important to them to have a president who has strong religious beliefs, even if those beliefs are different from their own. But relatively few Americans view either of the leading presidential candidates as very religious: 13% of Americans say they think President Joe Biden is very religious, and just 4% say this about former President Donald Trump.

Overall, there are widespread signs of unease with religion’s trajectory in American life. This dissatisfaction is not just among religious Americans. Rather, many religious and nonreligious Americans say they feel that their religious beliefs put them at odds with mainstream culture, with the people around them and with the other side of the political spectrum. For example:

Chart shows a growing share of Americans feel their religious views are at odds with the mainstream

48% of U.S. adults say there’s “a great deal” of or “some” conflict between their religious beliefs and mainstream American culture, up from 42% in 2020.
29% say they think of themselves as religious minorities, up from 24% in 2020.
41% say it’s best to avoid discussing religion at all if someone disagrees with you, up from 33% in 2019.
72% of religiously unaffiliated adults – those who identify, religiously, as atheist, agnostic or “nothing in particular” – say conservative Christians have gone too far in trying to control religion in the government and public schools; 63% of Christians say the same about secular liberals.

These are among the key findings of a new Pew Research Center survey, conducted Feb. 13-25, 2024, among a nationally representative sample of 12,693 U.S. adults.

This report examines:

Religion’s role in public life
U.S. presidential candidates and their religious engagement
Christianity’s place in politics, and “Christian nationalism”

The survey also finds wide partisan gaps on questions about the proper role for religion in society, with Republicans more likely than Democrats to favor religious influence in governance and public life. For instance:

42% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents say that when the Bible and the will of the people conflict, the Bible should have more influence on U.S. laws than the will of the people. Just 16% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say this.
21% of Republicans and GOP leaners say the federal government should declare Christianity the official religion of the United States, compared with 7% of Democrats and Democratic leaners.

Moral and religious qualities in a president

Almost all Americans (94%) say it is “very” or “somewhat” important to have a president who personally lives a moral and ethical life. And a majority (64%) say it’s important to have a president who stands up for people with their religious beliefs.

About half of U.S. adults (48%) say it is important for the president to hold strong religious beliefs. Fewer (37%) say it’s important for the president to have the same religious beliefs as their own.

Republicans are much more likely than Democrats to value religious qualities in a president, and Christians are more likely than the religiously unaffiliated to do so. For example:

Republicans and GOP leaners are twice as likely as Democrats and Democratic leaners to say it is important to have a president who has the same religious beliefs they do (51% vs. 25%).
70% of White evangelical Protestants say it is important to have a president who shares their religious beliefs. Just 11% of religiously unaffiliated Americans say this.

Chart shows Nearly all U.S. adults say it is important to have a president who personally lives a moral, ethical life

Views of Biden, Trump and their religious engagement

Relatively few Americans think of Biden or Trump as “very” religious. Indeed, even most Republicans don’t think Trump is very religious, and even most Democrats don’t think Biden is very religious.

6% of Republicans and GOP leaners say Trump is very religious, while 44% say he is “somewhat” religious. Nearly half (48%) say he is “not too” or “not at all” religious.
23% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents say Biden is very religious, while 55% say he is somewhat religious. And 21% say he is not too or not at all religious.

Chart shows Few Americans see Biden, Trump as very religious

Though they don’t think Trump is very religious himself, most Republicans and people in religious groups that tend to favor the Republican Party do think he stands up at least to some extent for people with their religious beliefs. Two-thirds of Republicans and independents who lean toward the GOP (67%) say Trump stands up for people with their religious beliefs “a great deal,” “quite a bit” or “some.” About the same share of White evangelical Protestants (69%) say this about Trump.

Similarly, 60% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents, as well as 73% of Jewish Americans and 60% of Black Protestants, say Biden stands up for people with their religious beliefs a great deal, quite a bit or some.

Chart shows About 7 in 10 White evangelical Protestants say Trump stands up for people with their religious beliefs at least to ‘some’ extent

Overall, views of both Trump and Biden are generally unfavorable.

White evangelical Protestants – a largely Republican group – stand out as having particularly favorable views of Trump (67%) and unfavorable views of Biden (86%).
Black Protestants and Jewish Americans – largely Democratic groups – stand out for having favorable views of Biden and unfavorable views of Trump.

Chart shows Views of Biden and Trump are divided along religious and partisan lines

Views on trying to control religious values in the government and schools

Americans are almost equally split on whether conservative Christians have gone too far in trying to push their religious values in the government and public schools, as well as on whether secular liberals have gone too far in trying to keep religious values out of these institutions.

Most religiously unaffiliated Americans (72%) and Democrats (72%) say conservative Christians have gone too far. And most Christians (63%) and Republicans (76%) say secular liberals have gone too far.

Chart shows Many Americans think conservative Christians, secular liberals have gone too far in trying to control religion in government and public schools

Christianity’s place in politics, and Christian nationalism

In recent years, “Christian nationalism” has received a great deal of attention as an ideology that some critics have said could threaten American democracy .

Table shows Americans’ views of Christian nationalism have been stable since 2022

Despite growing news coverage of Christian nationalism – including reports of political leaders who seem to endorse the concept – the new survey shows that there has been no change in the share of Americans who have heard of Christian nationalism over the past year and a half. Similarly, the new survey finds no change in how favorably U.S. adults view Christian nationalism.

Overall, 45% say they have heard or read about Christian nationalism, including 25% who also have an unfavorable view of it and 5% who have a favorable view of it. Meanwhile, 54% of Americans say they haven’t heard of Christian nationalism at all.

One element often associated with Christian nationalism is the idea that church and state should not be separated, despite the Establishment Clause in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The survey finds that about half of Americans (49%) say the Bible should have “a great deal” of or “some” influence on U.S. laws, while another half (51%) say it should have “not much” or “no influence.” And 28% of U.S. adults say the Bible should have more influence than the will of the people if the two conflict. These numbers have remained virtually unchanged over the past four years.

Chart shows 28% of Americans say the Bible should prevail if Bible and the people’s will conflict

In the new survey, 16% of U.S. adults say the government should stop enforcing the separation of church and state. This is little changed since 2021.

Chart shows Views on church-state separation and the U.S. as a Christian nation

In response to a separate question, 13% of U.S. adults say the federal government should declare Christianity the official religion of the U.S., and 44% say the government should not declare the country a Christian nation but should promote Christian moral values. Meanwhile, 39% say the government should not elevate Christianity in either way. 1

Overall, 3% of U.S. adults say the Bible should have more influence on U.S. laws than the will of the people; and that the government should stop enforcing separation of church and state; and that Christianity should be declared the country’s official religion. And 13% of U.S. adults endorse two of these three statements. Roughly one-fifth of the public (22%) expresses one of these three views that are often associated with Christian nationalism. The majority (62%) expresses none.

Guide to this report

The remainder of this report describes these findings in additional detail. Chapter 1 focuses on the public’s perceptions of religion’s role in public life. Chapter 2 examines views of presidential candidates and their religious engagement. And Chapter 3 focuses on Christian nationalism and views of the U.S. as a Christian nation.

The share saying that the government should declare Christianity the official national religion (13%) is almost identical to the share who said the government should declare the U.S. a Christian nation in a March 2021 survey that asked a similar question (15%). ↩

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Table of contents, 5 facts about religion and americans’ views of donald trump, u.s. christians more likely than ‘nones’ to say situation at the border is a crisis, from businesses and banks to colleges and churches: americans’ views of u.s. institutions, most u.s. parents pass along their religion and politics to their children, growing share of americans see the supreme court as ‘friendly’ toward religion, most popular.

About Pew Research Center Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan fact tank that informs the public about the issues, attitudes and trends shaping the world. It conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis and other empirical social science research. Pew Research Center does not take policy positions. It is a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts .

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Recognising values and engaging communities across cultures: towards developing a cultural protocol for researchers

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Universality and Cultural Diversity in Moral Reasoning and Judgment

Introduction

Going Beyond a Developmental Approach of Morality To Account For Intercultural Moral Variations

Cognitive Processes Which Underpin the Emergence of Moral Systems in Weird and Non-Weird Societies

Social Justification and Argumentation in Weird and Non-Weird Societies

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