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Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue

Steup, Matthias (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue , Oxford University Press, 2001, 272 pp, $49.95 (hbk), ISBN 0-195-12892-3.

Reviewed by Thomas D. Senor, The University of Arkansas

Knowledge, Truth, and Duty is a collection of fourteen essays by fourteen different authors. As the title indicates, the central topic is epistemic normativity and its relationship to the concepts of knowledge and justification, and to the twin goals of truth-seeking and error avoidance. The contributors are (in order of appearance): Susan Haack, Bruce Russell, Richard Fumerton, Carl Ginet, Richard Feldman, Robert Audi, Alvin Goldman, Matthias Steup, Marian David, Michael DePaul, Ernest Sosa, Noah Lemos, Vrinda Dalmiya, and Linda Zagzebski. With the exception of the papers of Haack, Goldman, and Sosa, these essays are making their print debut here. There is not space to adequately discuss each essay, so we will have to content ourselves with a quick description of each. After that I’ll take a closer look at one of the book’s central essays.

In her paper, “’The Ethics of Belief’ Reconsidered,” Susan Haack considers the relationship between epistemic and moral appraisal. After distinguishing five possible relationships between the two, Haack argues that the view that epistemic appraisal is but a subspecies of moral appraisal is false. For, Haack claims, if one’s evidence for p isn’t good enough, then one will be unjustified in believing that p. But a person “can’t be morally at fault in believing that p unless his belief is willfully induced” (p. 23). Yet that might not be the case; perhaps the person is intellectually deficient and cannot help but believe p even though his evidence does not support it—then his belief is epistemically unjustified but not morally permissible. Haack’s perspective on the relationship between epistemic and moral justification is captured in what she calls the “overlap thesis,” which says that there is a “partial overlap” and that “positive/negative epistemic appraisal is associated with positive/negative ethical appraisal” (p. 21). Her idea is that there are certain ways of being unjustified that bring along with them moral unjustifiedness. So a belief about, say, the current safety of my children that is formed on the basis of hasty generalization might well be both epistemically and morally unjustified. Believing in this way is a form of culpable ignorance.

Bruce Russell’s paper, “Epistemic and Moral Duty,” explores the same topic in a different way. Russell is concerned with the distinction between subjective and objective duty—moral and epistemic. Russell argues that knowledge requires the completion of both one’s objective and subjective epistemic duties. Borrowing from the work of Richard Feldman, Russell takes objective justification to require that the subject have good reason to believe the proposition in question; a subjectively justified belief is a belief that the person is blameless in holding. Russell uses this distinction to reply to examples of Alvin Plantinga’s in which a person has epistemically blameless true belief that is nevertheless not knowledge. These examples crucially involve a person’s holding a belief for which the subject lacks good reason. Russell takes these examples to show that objective justification is also necessary for knowledge. It is similar for beliefs for which the person allegedly has objective justification but lacks subjective justification.

Both Haack’s and Russell’s papers assume that epistemic appraisals are in some sense “normative.” But what is it for an appraisal to merit this appellation? This is the topic of Richard Fumerton’s paper, “Epistemic Justification and Normativity.” In the end, Fumerton can find no good sense of the term according to which epistemic judgments are normative. What’s the result of this? Fumerton claims that one potential implication is that epistemic internalists who criticize externalists for failing to fully appreciate epistemic normativity are off the mark (although Fumerton is sympathetic to other criticisms of internalists).

Part II of the book is entitled “Epistemic Deontology and Doxastic Voluntarism.” Carl Ginet’s fascinating paper, “Deciding to Believe,” kicks off this section. Ginet argues that while we lack direct control over a great many of our beliefs (i.e., that doxastic voluntarism is false regarding much of what we believe), there is a class of propositions that we can, in the right circumstances, come to believe “just by deciding to believe” them. The kind of case Ginet has in mind occurs when some doubt with respect to p comes up and one considers whether to believe that p, thinks that it would be better to believe p in these circumstances than to withhold p, and so decides to believe that p. To illustrate, Ginet offers the example of leaving home for vacation and then wondering whether the front door has been locked at the house. One might seem to remember doing it but not being completely sure. Nevertheless, given the hassle of driving the 50 miles back to one’s house, the good reason to think the door is locked, and the undesirability of worrying about it for the rest of the trip, one simply decides to believe the door is locked. Simultaneous with the decision is the forming of a disposition to “count on” p in deciding how to act in relevantly similar situations. Ginet recognizes that our having direct voluntary control in cases of this sort does little to motivate a general voluntarism of the sort that, for example, William Alston has argued against. Nevertheless, his article is noteworthy as a defense of even a rather restricted version of doxastic voluntarism.

No one has done more to defend the significance of epistemic deontologism against recent attacks than Richard Feldman. Here, in his paper, “Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation,” Feldman argues that a recent defense of doxastic voluntarism is flawed and that we lack the kind of control over our beliefs that we have over our actions, control that arguably is necessary for our actions to admit of deontological evaluation. However, Feldman argues that, as in the financial and legal domains, the “ought” of epistemology does not entail “can.” Just was we ought to repay our debt even if we are broke when the payment is due, so we ought to believe according to our evidence.

In “Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of belief,” Robert Audi considers and then rejects arguments for two versions of doxastic voluntarism. Audi then considers the place for the ethics of belief in light of the failure of voluntarism. It turns out that there is a place for such an ethic but that the beliefs themselves are not the targets.

Alvin Goldman’s reprinted essay, “Internalism Exposed,” is the first paper of Part III, “Epistemic Deontology and the Internality of Justification.” Goldman is here interested in the motivation of internalism. The first rationale for internalism Goldman considers comes from what he calls the “guidance deontology” conception of justification. This is a long and rich essay that resists quick summarization. The bottom line is that Goldman finds internalism problematic because any way of construing “internal” that is sufficiently robust to guarantee that reliabilism is “external” has problems accounting for the justification of a whole range of beliefs—from stored beliefs, to beliefs originally justified by now-forgotten evidence, to beliefs about logical and probabilistic relations.

Editor Matthias Steup’s paper, “Epistemic Duty, Evidence, and Internality,” is a response to Goldman’s essay. Steup grants that the accessibility motivation for internalism leads to difficulties but argues one can motivate internalism by appeal to evidentialist principles. I shall have more to say about Steup’s defense of internalism at the end of this review.

Marian David’s paper, “Truth as the Epistemic Goal,” kicks off the fourth section, “Justification and Truth.” David’s paper is a thorough discussion of the relationship between justification and truth. In particular, David considers many possible variations on how to make explicit the “truth goal” (the goal of believing truth while avoiding error) spoken of by epistemologists of all stripes. In the end, David suggests a version of reliabilism that employs a subjunctive truth-goal (for every p, if S were to believe p, then p would be true, and if p were true, S would believe p) as the leading contender.

In “Value Monism in Epistemology,” Michael DePaul argues against the monism of his essay’s title. While some have claimed that truth is the only epistemic goal, DePaul claims that this can be seen to be wrong by considering that knowledge is better than mere true belief; true belief is be valued but not as much as knowledge is. There are, according to DePaul, a number of epistemic values—knowledge, truth, and justification to name a few.

Section V is “Epistemic Virtue and Criteria of Justified Belief.” These two papers seem somewhat thematically distant from their comrades. The first, Ernest Sosa’s reprinted “Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles,” is concerned with, for example, how Descartes can noncircularly use what he clearly and distinctly perceives to show that God exists and thereby legitimize what is clearly and distinctly perceived. Sosa’s answer is the answer of the externalist: as long as the beliefs used in the proof arise from reliable (or “apt”) faculties they provide Descartes with non-reflective, animal knowledge. By using what we learn from our apt or virtuous faculties, we can achieve reflective knowledge by using our animal knowledge to construct explanations of how we know.

In “Commonsensism in Ethics and Epistemology,” Noah Lemos defends so-called “common sense” in both domains. He argues that beginning the epistemological enterprise with Moorean beliefs such as “I have two hands” is not objectionably parochial; furthermore, Lemos follows Sosa’s lead and argues that as long as these starter beliefs indeed have a positive epistemic status, they can ground our further beliefs—including our beliefs in epistemic principles.

The book’s final section focuses on virtue epistemology. Vrinda Dalmiya’s paper, “Knowing People,” takes its cue from virtue ethics and the method of care. While the notion of epistemic responsibility has a role to play, it is not simply the responsibility of standard deontological theories of justification. Rather the method of care centers the epistemic discussion on cultivating and reinforcing attitudes that are regarded as positive in the wider epistemic community.

Linda Zagzebski’s essay, “Recovering Understanding,” is an example of the way a virtue epistemologist evaluates and analyses an epistemic virtue. Citing the work of Plato and Aristotle on understanding, Zagzebski offers an account that takes understanding’s object to be structures of reality—that is, objects like pieces of art or buildings—rather than propositions that are the objects of knowledge. To understand is to comprehend these structures. Virtue epistemology, Zagzebski argues, is in a better position than non-virtue epistemology to give us workable accounts of subjects like understanding because the former but not the latter is able to accommodate both proposition and nonpropositional subjects.

If one is going to critically discuss a collection of essays in a short review, one will have to do so either by talking only abstractly about the collection as a whole or else by focusing on one particular essay. I shall do the latter. The remainder of this essay is a raises an objection to Steup’s reply to Goldman.

As mentioned above, Steup believes that one aspect of Goldman’s critique of internalism is correct: if the internalist starts with the accessibility constraint, she’ll run into problems. However, not all is lost for the internalist. She can instead motivate her view by adopting an evidentialist account of justification. Moreover, Steup argues, she can motivate her evidentialism by deontology. Steup notes that the relationship between the two is “complex” (p. 137) and that an adequate defense of it would be beyond the scope of his essay. He then gives a sketch of an argument that is prima facie problematic, but since Steup recognizes the sketchiness of his remarks on this score, I’ll not stop here to comment further.

What do we know about the sort of evidentialism that Steup prefers? Although he says rather little about the details, he makes two important theoretical points and then tells us a bit more when he responds to Goldman. Let’s look at these in turn.

Steup tells us that deontology leads to evidentialism. This is because no item can be that in virtue of which S is justified in holding a belief unless S is in “cognitive possession” of that item (p. 137), and the kinds of states that S possesses in the relevant sense are evidential states. So nothing is evidence for S that S does not possess.

The second theoretical point is that one need not have beliefs about what one’s duties are, still less beliefs about how one determines what one’s duty is. Saying he is taking a page from the externalist’s book, Steup maintains that justification requires only that a person has done her duty, not that she know she has done her duty or even be in a position to know it. “[A]ccording to evidentialism, having (undefeated) evidence for p is sufficient for being justified in believing that p. No further condition must be met” (p. 138). Now as it stands, this version of evidentialism would seem to have little to do with deontology. For as we learn a page later, Steup is willing to allow both stored and conscious beliefs to count as evidence. But then it looks as though if I have fifty beliefs that together entail p (and no set of 49 does), and I never put these beliefs together to see the entailment and am not being derelict in my failing to do this, I am nevertheless justified in believing p because I have undefeated (let us suppose) evidence for it. And this might be true even if my reason for believing p has nothing to do with my good evidence.

Let’s now take a look at how Steup’s internalism handles the problems that Goldman raises. The first Steup discusses is the problem of forgotten evidence. Suppose that Sally, an epistemically responsible person, believes that broccoli is good for her by reading it in the New York Times Science section. However, she later forgets where she read it and now only knows she believes it. Goldman claims that the person lacks an internal justification for her belief even though the belief is clearly justified and, if true, even counts as knowledge.

Steup replies that the evidentialist will argue that Sally does have evidence in this case: a memorial seeming. She seems to remember that broccoli is healthy; she also has a background belief that what she seems to remember is usually true. These comprise, Steup assures us, a good evidentialist justification for her broccoli belief. One point to raise here, it seems to me, concerns the epistemic status of stored beliefs. Steup allows these beliefs to play an evidentiary role in the justification of other beliefs. But in order for those beliefs to be justifiers, one would suppose, they must be justified themselves. So that should mean that stored beliefs, even when stored, are justified or unjustified. But then consider Sally’s broccoli belief before she remembers it, when there is no memorial seeming associated with it. One would suppose that if this belief will be justified when it becomes occurrent, it must be justified just before then. But then the justification of the belief doesn’t depend on the memorial seeming.

Be this as it may, Goldman foresees the move Steup makes and says that what this shows is that the kind of justification the internalist can get is not the sort that is crucial for knowledge. To see this, we should reconfigure the Sally case so that she initially forms the belief on the basis of what is known to be a bad source. So suppose also that she acquired this belief in a very unreliable way (and in a way she would take to be unreliable) and that she has not had the belief corroborated in the meantime by trustworthy sources. As with the original case, she doesn’t now remember where she came by the belief; she’s forgotten her source. Yet she has a memorial seeming and knows that she is a responsible believer who generally comes to her beliefs via reliable sources. Goldman claims that Sally is unjustified in her belief in the sense of justification that “carries a true belief a good distance toward knowledge” (Goldman, p 121). Steup rightly takes Goldman’s point here to signal a significant theoretical divide between them. Indeed, I think that this gulf generally exists between internalists and externalists about justification. The externalist and internalist will agree that knowledge requires justified true belief that also satisfies a fourth anti-Gettier condition. They will disagree, however, about how much work the fourth condition does. Traditionally, it has been the condition called on to show why Gettier cases are not instances of knowledge. Consider the following: suppose this were a world in which the demon is very effective at leading you into falsity but in which he screws up once and, quite fortuitously, you believe something true. Let this be a belief that we would typically count as justified—perhaps it is a standard perceptual belief. Is this a Gettier case? If you think it is, then you are likely an internalist who thinks that the fourth condition of knowledge has a lot of work to do. On the other hand, the externalist will typically say that there are no Gettier cases at demon worlds. Getting back to Sally, Goldman believes that the kind of justification that “carries true belief a good distance toward knowledge” is not had in a demon world; Steup and other internalists deny this. Is there any way of adjudicating this dispute without undertaking a general evaluation of the internalism/externalism controversy?

I believe there is. I think there is a rather sizable problem for Steup here; a problem that indicates that deontology and his brand of evidentialism might not rest together as well as he thinks. First, let’s consider the second Sally case from the perspective of deontology; and to do this, let’s consider a point in moral theory. As St. Anselm showed in Cur Deus Homo , the “ought implies can” principle fails when one is culpable for one’s inability to do what one ought. I promise to pay you back tomorrow the $100 I borrowed last week. In the meantime I’ve spent my entire paycheck on CDs, books, and beer; I have only $10 until my next paycheck in two weeks. I now cannot pay you tomorrow. Does that mean that I’m no longer have an obligation and hence will not be culpable for failing to pay? Of course not. My inability to pay today is explained by my earlier misdeed. There may a synchronic notion of doing one’s duty according to which as long as I’m doing the best I can now I am justified in acting as I do, but this is surely not the currency that standard moral evaluations trade in. We expect better of each other. Now I think that the epistemic deontologist should say the same regarding Sally. Sure, given that she believed irresponsibly in the first place and has since forgotten the ground of her belief, there is a synchronic sense of doing one’s epistemic duty in which her current believing is nonculpable. Yet since were it not for her earlier misdeed (believing irresponsibly) Sally wouldn’t now have the broccoli belief, and since all that has happened in the meantime is that Sally has forgotten the source of her belief (hardly an off-setting epistemic virtue), Sally must be judged to not have done her (diachronic) duty in believing as she does.

This result is doubly problematic for Steup. First, these considerations suggest that even if we are thinking of a deontological, internalist sense of justification, we should side with Goldman and say that Sally is unjustified. Second, and more significantly, the above considerations suggest that deontological considerations get on rather poorly with evidentialism. For what I’ve been arguing about the deontological evaluation of Sally’s belief is independent of considerations of the quality of her evidence. What seems clear from Steup’s sketch of evidentialism is that it is a synchronic theory: whether or not one is justified at t depends upon one’s evidence at t; and one’s evidence at t depends only on what’s happening at t. Here then is the big problem: deontological considerations generate a diachronic concept of justification but evidentialist considerations of the sort highlighted by Steup lead to a synchronic notion.

Despite its problems, Steup’s paper is a good read; it advances the internalism/externalism debate by showing that there are conceptual resources for resisting at least some of Goldman’s conclusions. (If evidentialism is unshackled from deontology there might well be sufficient resources for responding to Goldman). In addition to the Steup essay, of the previously unpublished essays, I found those of Ginet, David, Fumerton, and Feldman to be particularly thought provoking and insightful; but the overall quality of the papers is high. Knowledge, Truth, and Duty is well worth the time of any epistemologist.

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1.3: The Concept of Knowledge

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• Page ID 22243
• Jeffery L. Johnson
• Portland State University via Portland State University Library

So when a man gets hold of the true notion of something without an account, his mind does truly think of it, but he does not know it, for if he cannot give and receive an account of a thing, one has no knowledge of that thing. But when he has also got hold of an account, all this becomes possible to him and he is fully equipped with knowledge.

—PLATO1

Definitions and Word Games

Suppose that we are concerned with the question of economic justice—the fact that a few are ridiculously wealthy, while many are pitifully poor. We might convene an academic conference to discuss the issue and suggest some sort of coherent social policy. Economists might tell us about how income distribution is empirically related to national productivity. Political scientists might tell something about relative tax rates and the amount of government services. Sociologists could address the social effects of long-term poverty. Historians could give us some sense of whether the problem is better or worse than it was a hundred years ago. It would not be at all surprising if a philosopher contributed a paper on the meaning of economic justice. In one way, such a contribution seems necessary and foundational. After all, how can we reasonably construct some social policy aimed at greater economic justice if we are not crystal clear as to what we mean by this concept? In another light, however, the philosopher’s contribution seems frivolous and even counterproductive. If there is wide agreement that there is a problem that needs to be solved, the philosopher’s concern with long-dead thinkers such as Plato, Adam Smith, and Marx may strike us as an irresponsible waste of time and intellectual energy. To carry this example just a bit further, suppose the philosopher’s paper offers a definition of economic justice that suggests some kind of tension with other widely held values and social policies and goes so far as to suggest that we will never have a concept of economic justice that everyone will feel comfortable with. Now the philosopher’s concern with theory and the definition of terms may strike us as subversive. It may be difficult and controversial to articulate a theory about the nature of economic justice that everyone will agree with. Nevertheless, we know injustice when we see it. And to suggest that we spend our time defining terms and teasing out subtle philosophical arguments rather than offering constructive solutions to the obvious problems that plague our society is both dangerous and immoral. But all this is quite unfair. No sane philosopher is going to suggest that we spend all our time and energy in academic theoretical pursuits. Obviously, there are crises that call for immediate action, and we all recognize the need to make decisions on less than perfect information. But there is also a need for abstract theoretical work. It does seem crazy to propose significant social changes that will affect all of us without some kind of clear understanding of what we are trying to bring about. Pausing to reflect on the nature of economic justice—defining our terms, as they say—may be worthwhile even in a time of some urgency.

Please excuse the above digression. I have included it because I believe that many beginning students see much of traditional epistemology in the same uncharitable light that our philosopher was portrayed. Every reader of this book is a mature speaker of English. The verb to know and the abstract noun knowledge are fairly normal words within the English language. Obviously, we must know what they mean. We will discover, however, that it proves exceedingly difficult to articulate a clear and coherent definition, or theory, of knowledge.

The Myth of Definition

This chapter discusses the prospects for offering a helpful analysis, or definition, of the concept of knowledge. As a starting point, we need to take a little time dispelling a common misunderstanding about the importance of definition in everyday contexts, as well as philosophical contexts. It is widely believed that people do not know the meaning of the words they use—they do not know what they are talking about—unless they can provide adequate definitions for all those words. This is simply a mistaken view of meaning.

Someone can be an excellent athlete—a hitter in baseball, for example—yet be a very poor coach or teacher of how to hit. Surprisingly, perhaps, others can be mediocre hitters but turn into outstanding hitting coaches. The reason these things are possible is that there is all the difference in the world between doing something and describing, or explaining, how to do something. Think for a moment about those things that you are most skilled at doing—shooting free throws, playing a musical instrument, riding a bicycle, and so on. How confident would you be that you could teach someone else how to be skillful at these activities? Could you write a manual for them on how to do any one of these?

Speaking a language is much more like hitting a baseball than being a good hitting coach. Language is a skillful activity that human beings master with remarkable facility in ways that philosophers, psychologists, and linguists are only beginning to appreciate. I can safely assume that any reader of this book is an accomplished enough user of English that you know full well the meaning of almost every word that philosophers have spent a great deal of time and energy trying to analyze or define. You all know the meaning of terms such as beauty , justice , and knowledge because you can use sentences such as the following to communicate with other English speakers.

• 1. That’s a beautiful painting.
• 2. Simple justice demands that all the kids get to play.
• 3. You don’t really know that the Dodgers will win the pennant; you just hope they will.

All this is important because it is so easy to forget in the middle of philosophical battles. We are going to analyze the concept of knowledge in this chapter. We will see that this task is difficult, controversial, and perhaps in the end, impossible to complete satisfactorily. This doesn’t mean for a second that you or the great minds of Western philosophy do not know how to use words such as know and knowledge for the purposes of clear communication.

The Need for Conceptual Clarity

Although I stand 100 percent behind what I said previously, this doesn’t mean that careful conceptual analysis is not important. People sometimes make remarkable claims about knowledge. We have just seen how the skeptic can put together plausible and disturbing arguments that we know next to nothing. The arguments of the last chapter are classical examples of the sorts of intellectual concerns that occupy the attention of professional philosophers. Disputes about knowledge are not limited to philosophers, however. We often hear that modern scientists do not know that evolution by natural selection is true. Many claim that it is only a “theory.” This is sometimes backed up with an argument. Science, so this line of thinking goes, is only concerned with what can be directly observed or proved with laboratory experiments. But evolution, it is sometimes claimed, cannot be directly observed, both because it is too slow of a process and because the most interesting observations would have needed to take place in a time before there were human observers. Furthermore, creationists claim that no controlled laboratory experiment can prove that evolution is true.

If we are to make any progress in understanding, let alone resolving, these kinds of intellectual disputes, we are going to need to be much clearer in our own minds as to what counts as knowledge. I claim to know that I am at my computer composing this chapter. The skeptic tells me I don’t know this after all; it might only be a dream. I am quite sure that I know that natural selection is true. Creationists claim that I don’t and that my “faith” in the theory is no different from religious belief. How can we possibly hope to make progress toward resolving these disputes without some fairly specific agreement as to what counts as genuine knowledge?

For some, the kind of conceptual analysis in which we engage in this chapter can be fun and exciting in its own right. Most of you, however, should see it as a necessary means to an end. I assume most of you care about whether scientists know what they are talking about. If you are like I am, you think they probably do. But to really feel confident about this, you need to have some answers to the philosophical skeptic who says it might all be a dream and the procedural skeptic who argues from a specific model of scientific knowledge to doubt about things such as evolution and climate change. To answer either of these skeptics productively, you need some agreement about the nature of knowledge.

Knowledge and Belief

Human beings seem to be a very credulous species; we believe an amazing variety of things. Our ancestors believed in witches, that the earth was flat, and in the divine right of kings. People today believe that their futures are foretold in horoscopes, that good writing can be accomplished in first drafts, and that their favorite sports team will finally get it together. From the perspective of history, it is easy to find countless beliefs that we sincerely held that strike us as foolish, dangerous, and immoral. But of course, not all beliefs fit into this category.

Other things we don’t merely believe, we know. I, of course, believe that I am a philosophy professor, a one-time softball player, and a husband to a beautiful woman. But I don’t just believe these things, I know them. The distinction between belief and knowledge is not like the one between being a sibling and being an only child—it is not an exclusive, either/or difference. It is rather like the distinction between an automobile and a convertible. To be a convertible is to be a special kind of automobile. As logicians put it, being an automobile is a necessary condition of being a convertible. Not all automobiles are convertibles, but all convertibles are automobiles.

Traditional models, or definitions, of knowledge have attempted to articulate a list of necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient for having genuine knowledge. The abstract noun knowledge is kind of artificial. I think we will do better to use the more familiar verb. Our observations about knowing and believing suggest the first entry on our list of necessary conditions:

There is a fairly common way of talking that seems to call this into question. Suppose we have a friend who is headed for heartache partly because he refuses to take seriously the obvious evidence of his lover’s infidelity. We might say, “Jake knows that she’s untrue, but he can’t bring himself to believe it.” Or perhaps we have a colleague who is foolishly refusing to take heed of medical symptoms: “Sarah knows something is wrong but just won’t believe it.” How seriously should we take the claim that both Jake and Sarah have knowledge but lack belief? Not very.

Jake sees the obvious signs and has his moments of doubt. Sarah too. If they didn’t, we wouldn’t be inclined to say they knew. It is, of course, possible for people to be perversely dense. People can be totally oblivious to things that are perfectly obvious to others. Connie may genuinely believe that her lover is totally faithful despite the lame excuses and the lipstick on his collar. But we would never be tempted to say Connie knows this, though perhaps she should. When we use the “knows but doesn’t believe” idiom, we are getting at something interesting about Jake and Sarah. They seem to be engaging in what philosophers call self-deception. This is an important issue in both philosophy and psychology but really says nothing about how to define knowledge.

I take it to be settled that knowledge implies some kind of genuine conviction or intellectual confidence. Thus the first necessary condition of knowledge turns out to be relatively secure, uncontroversial, and philosophically straightforward. Would that we could say the same about the conditions to follow.

The Search for the Truth

You are the district attorney, and you’ve got a great case. The defendant is the kind of lowlife that society needs to do something about. You’ve got the goods on him too, lots of physical evidence, a clear motive, and witnesses. The case will be an easy one to try, and it will be a feather in your cap to be the one who put him away. You just “know” that the slime ball’s guilty. There’s only one problem with this scenario; the guy didn’t do it. It does not matter how sincere your belief is nor how good the evidence seems to be—if what you thought you knew turns out to be false, it’s back to the drawing board. Truth is an absolute precondition for knowledge. Unfortunately, truth is a philosophical mess.

Contemporary philosophy is about as far from consensus about the nature of truth as any issue in the field. Some believe that truth is correspondence with reality. Others believe that it is coherence with other widely held beliefs. Yet others claim that the assertion that “snow is white is true” is just a fancy way of saying that “snow is white.” All these theories of truth have plausible arguments in their defense, and all suffer from serious conceptual problems. Professional philosophy doesn’t know what truth is. I don’t know what it is either, but I will nevertheless say a little more about truth toward the end of this book.

In spite of all the confusion about the nature of truth, however, the relationship between truth and knowledge is as clear as could be. The only beliefs that we have that are viable candidates for being knowledge are those that are true. The surest way to defeat someone’s claim that they know something is to show that what they claim to know is false. This suggests a work-around epistemological definition of truth:

Admittedly, this is a pretty trivial definition. It does, however, have the advantage of separating philosophical disputes about the nature of truth from the noncontroversial connection between truth and knowledge.

Thus truth supplies a second necessary condition for knowledge. We can expand our evolving model of knowledge as follows:

Epistemic Justification

Perhaps we already have all that we need. The concept of knowledge seems both subjective and objective. To believe something is to be in a certain cognitive state that individual “subjects” find themselves in or fail to find themselves in. For that belief to be true (or not-false) it must be dependent on things entirely independent of those subjects—the way things “objectively” are. Condition i takes care of the subjective element, and ii covers the objective. What more do we need?

I have been hoping for a raise. Unfortunately, my latest evaluation left a lot to be desired, and the state’s budget looks pretty bleak. Forever the optimist, I continue to think the best. I woke up yesterday and as I was having my morning coffee I glanced at my horoscope. The entry for Pisces was way cool: “You will receive something long overdue and well deserved. All the signs are positive.” My raise! What could be clearer? I went to work with a smile on my face absolutely confident that I would get the good news. And I did! The governor decided that all state employees should get a modest salary adjustment, and that afternoon, we were all formally notified.

The two conditions for knowledge are satisfied. Johnson believes that he will get a raise, and it is true that he will get a raise. Does he therefore know that he will get a raise? Most of us would be very reluctant to say he possesses knowledge. What he believes turns out to be true but merely by coincidence or good luck. The subjective element of belief and the objective element of truth seem much too tenuously connected. What seems to be missing is some reason or evidence in support of my belief. Sure, the horoscope is a reason in the sense of providing a psychological explanation for why I happen to have this belief. But it’s such a poor reason—it’s so unreliable—that we attribute the belief’s truth to good fortune and not the strength of the reason.

Epistemologists have adopted the idiom of normative obligation to get at the stronger connection between belief and truth that is required for genuine knowledge. You are entitled to claim knowledge, according to this way of thinking about things, only if your belief is justified —that is, just in case you have very good reason for thinking it is true. Thus on the so-called standard analysis of knowledge a third necessary condition of knowledge, one that completes the package and makes it jointly sufficient, is the justification condition.

What Does It Take to Be Justified?

We have seen how skeptics can produce a formidable battery of arguments designed to show that we are never completely justified in believing anything. The problem concerns the connection between truth and justification. The only standard that completely eliminates the possibility of our beliefs being held in error is one of self-evidence or certainty. But as the Cartesian project has convinced most of us, epistemological certainty is unattainable. This means that whatever model of knowledge is finally endorsed will be committed to some sort of epistemic fallibility. This is not that serious a worry for most natural or social scientists but does run counter to the dominant tradition in Western epistemology.

Self-evidence and certainty may have set unrealistically high standards for knowledge, but these epistemic standards had the superficial appearance of being clear and identifiable. Models of knowledge that substitute criteria for epistemic justification must be prepared to state some new criterion for distinguishing unfounded belief from a promising theory and from established knowledge. The contemporary literature offers many intriguing possibilities—some highly formal and some quite commonsensical—but none that have won anything approaching consensus.

I suggest that we understand the idea of epistemic justification in terms of evidence. The things that we know are those true beliefs for which we have very, very, very good evidence—what a lawyer calls proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Good evidence is something that we are all familiar with and something that we can learn to reliably spot. I will be offering in the chapters to follow a model of—or a kind of formula for testing for—good evidence. I hope to convince you that this model captures almost everything we care about when we assess the quality of a person’s evidence or for that matter, their claims to knowledge.

Let’s transform the standard analysis of knowledge in light of all this into the following:

An Unsolved Problem

If you were reading very carefully, you may have noticed a slight difference in the way I stated the standard analysis of knowledge at the end of preceding section and the section immediately before that one. You are all smart enough to see the obvious change in condition iii , but can you find the other difference? The way the philosophic tradition has defined knowledge is to articulate necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing something. The standard analysis of knowledge claims that the three necessary conditions are, taken together, sufficient for knowing something. In my statement of a “transformed” analysis, I wimped out a bit. I claimed that my three conditions were all necessary—that’s what the “only if” signifies—but I left it open whether the three conditions were sufficient. Here’s why.

Consider the following little thought experiment. My wife and I have spent the last hour collaborating on our special spaghetti sauce. Just as we are getting ready to serve dinner, we discover that we are out of Parmesan cheese. We divide responsibilities—she will toss the salad and serve dinner; I’ll make the emergency run to the store. While at the store, I meet a colleague doing research in contemporary epistemology—she wants an example of knowledge. I suggest that I know there is a spaghetti dinner sitting on our dining room table right now. And as luck would have it, it’s true that a spaghetti dinner is on the table. I believe it, it’s true, and I’m justified in believing it. All is well. Well, maybe not. After I left, our German shepherd, Guido, got rambunctious and knocked the pot of simmering spaghetti sauce on the dirty kitchen floor. My wife considered violence against the dog, but before anything could happen, a neighbor arrived with a pot of leftover spaghetti sauce, announcing that she was leaving on vacation and it would surely spoil before she returned. Thus the spaghetti sauce that made my knowledge claim true is unconnected to the spaghetti sauce that provided the justification for my belief. It is odd in the extreme to claim that I had knowledge of the pot of spaghetti sitting on my table. It is pure serendipity that my belief turned out to be true.

A lot of contemporary epistemology has been concerned with ruling out these kinds of “Guido” cases (actually, they are called Gettier examples, after the philosopher who first made them famous). Many philosophers have suggested that some fourth or fifth or sixth and so on condition must be added to our analysis of knowledge. I am not sure whether I personally agree. To be on the safe side, however, I will be content with the above transformed analysis. The epistemic action in this little book will focus on condition iii anyway. What the heck is it to have evidence or good evidence or exceedingly good evidence for something?

• 1. What is the myth of definition? Does it show that the traditional philosophical quest of defining terms (analyzing them) is unnecessary? Why, or why not?
• 2. Explain why having a true belief that something is the case is not good enough for claiming to know that it is the case.
• 3. What does the “Guido” example show us about knowledge?

Here’s something I claim to know: climate change (global warming) is very real and very dangerous. How would the epistemological skeptic respond to this? Given the view of knowledge defended in this chapter, what would need to be true if my knowledge claim is correct?

1. Plato, “Theatetus,” in Plato: The Collected Dialogues , trans. F. M. Cornford (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 909.

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Knowledge and Responsibility, Essay Example

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Knowledge is considered to be valuable for all people. Knowing something, however, does not mean that someone would become more useful for the society than those who do not. There are three different types of knowledge: propositional knowledge, acquaintance knowledge and how-to knowledge. Some skills and types of knowledge need theoretical, others require practical knowledge. One’s general and factual knowledge would create no connection but a picture of the person or the thing in question. However, adding personal experiences would create acquaintance and add further information to the propositional knowledge. Being able to complete a task and having real life experience with the problem would provide the person with a “how-to” knowledge.

Example: The presence of ethical responsibility of knowledge is simple to spot in the legal system. Knowing of a crime and failing to report it carries a penalty. Another example can be the claim that by educating children about the environmental issues and pollution, we might be able to see them grow up to be more responsible adults. Most companies approach the question of social responsibility through education of staff and the public about issues. This is in line with the theory of epistemology; the possession of knowledge carried ethical responsibility.

The question of epistemic and moral duty states that there is a need for both subjective and objective justification when acting upon knowledge. Moral knowledge is also considered to be “how-to” as the person needs to know exactly know to react in a situation. If it is true that we are responsible for all our conscious actions and knowledge provides the individual with consciousness, the thesis statement of epistemology is confirmed. However, as the “rules” of behaviour are constantly changing, the ethical requirements also do. In the beginning of Christianity, the ethical rules were based on the Ten Commandments, and they were known by all Christians. However, later, additional regulations and church rules were added, and this meant that those aware of the “how to” of the right Christian actions had to follow these.

Some authors state that moral responsibility as a knowledge issue only involves ethics because in order to judge actions, the person needs to be able to determine who is at fault based on their existing knowledge.

Ethical responsibility and knowledge in psychology

Knowledge of psychological illnesses, understanding and the “how-to” knowledge of psychologists is extremely crucial in the ethical code of conduct. Procedures (“how-to” knowledge) are laid down by organizations in order to set up ethical standards.

Example: Knowing about the symptoms and the treatment options would mean that psychologists are bound to make an informed decision regarding treatment options, fairness and take into consideration the interest of the patient. This involves all three types of knowledge. Propositional knowledge is learned during the university years and through observation, acquaintance knowledge is also developed through interacting with patients during the practical training, and “how-to” knowledge is gained through practicing the profession.

When providing training for psychologists, it is essential to set high standards of knowledge for all three epistemological areas. As during treatments, practitioners need to use all three types of knowledge, the level of the knowledge would determine the level of responsibility the psychologist has towards the patient. Knowing the basics and the theories is the basis of the knowledge. Having a connection through interaction or observation of the different symptoms and illnesses would create an acquaintance knowledge. Getting involved with patients’ problems would result in a higher level of responsibility and understanding.

No matter if the psychologist works as a researchers or psychotherapist, the aim of their work is to develop fully working and reliable treatment options and ways of helping other people. This is a great responsibility for all professionals in psychology.

Ethical responsibility and knowledge in history

History studies and research have the power of teaching people about the main motivations of the human race, the development of countries, culture, politics and structures. Therefore, ensuring that the most relevant and true facts are revealed and patterns are identified has a great importance.

Example: Gaining knowledge and researching different historical eras would create an ethical responsibility of speaking the truth. However, in many cases, there are different, contradicting reports present. Determining which of these reports carries more truth and revealing the fact enabling people to learn from the past is a responsibility for humanity.

Wineburg (2000) concludes that public interest in history does mean that historians should be interested in what people want to learn as well. Preserving and passing on heritage is a responsibility of historians, and as such, it is not only the matter of providing facts but helping people achieve acquaintance knowledge as well. This would mean that people’s way of judging events, politicians and movements around the world would change thanks to historians. No science should be self-serving; studying history is not only useful for politicians, historians, sociologists and psychologists but all people. Serving the public through revealing the real events and the motivations behind them would help people gain acquaintance knowledge by understanding connections between events and movements.

A shared understanding can be created if all people are able to comprehend the same knowledge of the history, therefore, historians have a great responsibility in passing on knowledge.

Implications and significance

In the 21 st Century, science governance was developed further, on the second Forum on Knowledge. (2005, online) The forum since then has met every two years, and developed a system that deals with the interdependence of science and society, focusing in particular on the social responsibility and education issues. Passing on knowledge is one of the forms of fulfilling responsibilities, and creating a sustainable environment for future generations based on the existing knowledge available for scientists and future research is crucial to express this.

Perspective

UNESCO is one of the partners of the World Science Forum, last met in Hungary, in 2011. Therefore, the work is not reduced to education and creating sustainable environmental projects, but also is able to influence decision-makers all over the word. The programme included creating policy recommendations and inter-disciplinary discussions. The World Science Forum truly believes that “The possession of knowledge carries an ethical responsibility.”

Some authors argue that knowledge is a social responsibility, as well as a virtue. It is interesting to review one of the most commonly quoted example for responsibility of the knowing. The first person in the Bible, Adam became responsible for his actions, because he ate the apple from the Tree of Knowledge. He suddenly became “aware” of his actions. The root of epistemology can lie in this narrative, which is present in many myths and religious scripts as well. (Wineburg, 2000)

Epistemic justification and responsibility – Conclusion

Epistemic justification is an interesting approach to taking responsibility of knowing something. The question is whether the person who holds a belief can justify that belief based in their knowledge. There are different types of justifications, and the most common when one is pragmatically justified in that belief. This means that outside of their own interest or motivations, the ethical standards are true and unquestionable. Compared to a person who is morally justified, these justifications cannot be questioned by moving from one culture or belief system to another. A person is epistemically justified when holding the belief satisfies epistemic standards. Therefore, the criterion of being responsible for knowing is most relevant when epistemic justification is present.

The idea of being responsible based on knowledge is a belief which is pragmatically, epistemically and morally justified as well. This means that the statement is true, and has been confirmed by researchers, scientist and philosophers before. An example for this is the virtue epistemology approach, developed by Plato and Aristotle. The theory also includes virtue responsibilism, which values some intellectual traits more than others, based on knowledge and assigns people in the possession of knowledge with responsibility to guide and lead others. One of the theories within virtue responsibilism is developed by Lorraine Code, who says that the desire for truth is the main motivation for seeking knowledge, and knowing things about the world is one of the main goals of humanity. James Montmarquet added that the responsibility of those possessing knowledge is to defuse fanticism and dogmatism. Zagzebski, however, added that those knowing are responsible to unify moral and intellectual virtues. (McCord, 1996)

References:

Axtell, Guy, ed. Knowledge, Belief, and Character: Readings in Contemporary Virtue. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

Wineburg, P. (2000) Knowing, Teaching, and Learning History: National and International Perspectives

McCord, G. (1996) Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory. Moral Knowledge . Edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons. Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 137- 189.

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Knowledge, truth, and duty : essays on epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue

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Article Contents

Introduction, critical thinking and the role of knowledge—an empirically based discussion, conclusions and appeal.

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On the role of knowledge in critical thinking—using student essay responses to bring empirical fuel to the debate between ‘generalists’ and ‘specifists’

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Kristoffer Larsson, On the role of knowledge in critical thinking—using student essay responses to bring empirical fuel to the debate between ‘generalists’ and ‘specifists’, Journal of Philosophy of Education , Volume 55, Issue 2, April 2021, Pages 314–322, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12545

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To develop students’ critical thinking is one of the primary goals of a modern democratic school system. However, what is to be developed has been the matter of long-standing debate. One particular area of conflict has been what role is played by the knowledge concerning the object to be critically thought about. The ‘specifists’ have asserted that knowledge about the object is the core. The ‘generalists’ have claimed that there is no need for any actual profound knowledge. Typically, this debate has been held at a theoretical and philosophical level. In this paper, I will make an empirically based contribution to the debate. In a unique approach, I will use a number of student essay responses to argue in favour of a specifist view, and at the same time to question some of the generalists’ basic assumptions. The paper ends with an appeal to the generalists to provide us with proper clarification regarding the questions I raise. This is important as they hold the dominant position in the field. If they are to continue to do so, we need to be clear about the accuracy of their basic assumptions. This becomes even more essential as the generalist research has been severely criticised for producing inconclusive results, as well as the fact that the generalist view on critical thinking has been adopted by major policymakers both in Europe and the United States.

Developing students’ critical thinking is often agreed upon as one of the most important assignments of a modern democratic school system, promoting personal as well societal progress (Behar-Horenstein and Niu, 2011 ; Beyer, 1995; European Commission, 2016 ; Facione, 2006 ; Martin, 2005 ; NGA/CCSSO, 2010; Paul & Elder, 2009 ; Elder & Paul, 2010 ; Tsui, 1998 ). However, what is actually to be developed by the students has been a matter of debate over the decades, since there has been no agreement on the actual definition or construct of critical thinking (Brodin, 2007 ; Johnson and Hamby, 2015 ; Petress, 2004 ). At the heart of the matter is the ongoing battle fought between the so-called ‘specifists’ 1 and ‘generalists’ (Davies, 2006 , 2013 ; Moore, 2004 , 2011 , 2013 ). The specifists have talked about critical thinking as something specific, not generalisable outside certain realms (Gardner & Johnson, 1996 ; McPeck, 1985a , 1985b , 1990a , 1990b ; Moore, 2004 , 2011 , 2013 ). The most radical of these is McPeck, claiming that there are ‘almost as many different kinds of critical thinking as there are different kinds of things to think about’ (McPeck, 1990a , p. 10). The generalists, on the other hand, have talked about critical thinking as something generic, an ability that can be applied to more or less every object of thought belonging to any discipline, subject etc. (Davies, 2006 , 2013 ; Ennis, 1987 , 1989 , 1990 ; Higgins & Baumfield, 1998 ; Paul, 1985 ; Quinn, 1994 ).

One particular controversy in this debate has been the role of knowledge about the object to be critically thought about (Ennis, 1989 , 1990 ; McPeck, 1985a , 1985b , 1990a , 1990b , 1990c , 1990d ; Paul, 1985 ).

The specifists have claimed that this kind of knowledge is the actual key to good critical thinking. McPeck ( 1985a , 1985b , 1990a , 1990b ) argues that critical thinking amounts to a reflective approach towards the knowledge one has about the object of thought, proclaiming that ‘one's abilities here are a function of one's knowledge’ ( 1985b , p. 51), and over the years he has offered several examples of what he means. In one of these, he sets himself in a situation where he is to think about what to believe concerning different descriptions of the status of the US economy. He concludes that it is impossible for him to make use of some toolbox of generic critical thinking to evaluate the different descriptions. What he needs is more knowledge about Laffer curves, zero-sum systems, monetary versus fiscal policy and so on, since such an evaluation would require ‘being in possession of, and comprehending, large amounts of complex information’ ( 1990b , p. 11).

The generalists, in contrast, have claimed that knowledge about the object, though necessary to some degree, is neither a sufficient nor the most prominent criterion for critical thinking; more important is one's ability to apply generic critical thinking (Davies, 2013 ; Ennis, 1989 ; Scriven, 1990 ; Siegel, 1991 ; Bailin & Siegel, 2003 ). Scriven ( 1990 , pp. x–xi) perhaps explicates this view in the most straightforward way, stating that when it comes to critical thinking about an object, there is no ‘need for delving into vast subject matters’; it is about ‘using a finite box of [generic] tools’. What these tools actually are has been described in several different taxonomies. One of the most renowned taxonomies is the Ennis ( 1993 ) taxonomy, with tools such as to: ‘identify assumptions’, ‘judge the quality of an argument’, ‘be open-minded’ and ‘draw conclusions when warranted, but with caution’.

To sum it up somewhat bluntly, the specifists equate the ability to think critically to one's knowledge about the object to be thought about, adding merely the reflective eye. The generalists see knowledge about the object to be thought about as a subordinate part of one's ability to think critically, the application of generic critical thinking abilities being the superior and decisive part.

The discussion on the matter among scholars has typically been held at a philosophical level, with close to nothing more than general praise, supported by purely theoretically founded arguments, of either knowledge as the demarcation of one's critical thinking ability or knowledge as being neither sufficient for nor vital to one's critical thinking ability (Bailin & Siegel, 2003 ; Davies, 2006 , 2013 ; Ennis, 1989 , 1990 ; Gardner and Johnson, 1996 ; McPeck, 1985a , 1985b , 1990a , 1990b , 1990c , 1990d ; Moore, 2004 , 2011 ; Scriven, 1990 ; Siegel, 1991 ). ‘Indeed, one has to admit to a lack of empirical evidence …’, as Moore ( 2011 , p. 264) puts it. However, both sides have stressed the need for further use of empirical data when discussing the topic (Ennis, 1989 ; Moore, 2004 , 2011 ). The aim of this paper is to make such an empirically founded contribution. In a unique approach, I will use a number of essay responses by students trying to think critically, in order to argue for a specifist point of view concerning the role of knowledge. In doing so, I will dispute some of the generalists’ basic assumptions and I will conclude my line of reasoning with a direct appeal to the generalists to properly clarify the questions raised at their expense.

To sort out the questions raised is actually of vital importance for the future of critical thinking. The generalists have over the years held a predominant position in the field. For instance, important policy documents describe critical thinking in terms of a transversal phenomenon. Examples include A New Skills Agenda For Europe, declared by the European Commission (the EU's executive body) (European Commission, 2016 ), and the Common Core State Standards set by the National Governors Association Center for Best Practices and the Council of Chief State School Officers (Lai, 2011 ; NGA/CCSSO, 2010 ) and so far adopted by 43 of the states in the United States. The empirical research on improving critical thinking among students has also for the most part approved of this generic perspective: as Tiruneh et al. ( 2014 , p. 3) put it in their review of the field, the studies mainly consider critical thinking to be ‘clearly identifiable and definable thinking skills which are domain-independent’. If the generalist is to continue to hold this dominant position, we need to be absolutely clear about the accuracy of the assumptions underpinning their view, not least as reviewers of the field have continually and severely criticised the research conducted within this generalist perspective for arriving at inconclusive results (Behar-Horenstein & Nui, 2011; McMillan, 1987 ; Tsui, 1998 ). Behar-Horenstein and Nui (2011, p. 38) go as far as asking readers ‘to consider the trustworthiness of the publications and to critically analyse the substance of empirical studies on teaching critical thinking’.

Before going further into the discussion, I would like to make some clarifications. In the literature, there are several terms, such as being ‘informed’ and having ‘knowledge’, that are used when discussing how knowledgeable one ought to be about the object to be thought about. I will use the term ‘knowledge’ throughout this paper, with the exception of direct quotations.

It is also important to recognise that, in this paper, knowledge (about the object of thought) is seen as some kind of a progressive continuum. It stretches from having no knowledge or very sparse knowledge about the object of thought to having deep and profound knowledge, including such things as knowing the structure and the rationale behind the knowledge, that is, questions concerning the epistemic status of the knowledge involved (McPeck, 1985a ). 2

Moreover, it is important to stress that the phrase ‘knowledge about the object to be thought about’ amounts to knowledge about that specific object of thought. It is not knowledge in a discipline, domain or subject in a general sense, it is knowledge directly required or called for by the specific object of thought. This kind of knowledge could, of course, most often be obtained from a certain discipline, but it could also be obtained from several different disciplines or other domains of knowledge. This particular distinction might be especially important to notice, as many times when the role of knowledge in critical thinking is discussed, it is done with regard to having knowledge in a certain discipline , domain or subject . However, these concepts have been found to be vague and often not to the point when discussing what actual knowledge might come into play when thinking critically about a certain thing (Ennis, 1989 , 1990 ; McPeck, 1990a ). Therefore, McPeck has focused the discussion on the actual knowledge required by the specific object to be thought about, whichever domains etc. that particular knowledge needs to be retrieved from (McPeck, 1985b , 1990a ). Thus, in this paper I use the phrase ‘knowledge about the object to be thought about’ to describe that specific knowledge required by the problem at hand. The empirical examples and the arguments I use to further the discussion are to be viewed accordingly.

As stated, I will use essay responses as empirical data to put forward my argument. These essay responses are taken from a classroom setting, primarily because it is in these kinds of pedagogical contexts that the educational goal of developing students’ critical thinking is to be fulfilled. More specifically I will use three essay responses written by three 15-year-old students who, with nothing more than pen and paper, were asked individually to develop their thoughts on how a deontological ethicist 3 would argue concerning the case of the death penalty. I will discuss each of these three responses in turn and elaborate my thoughts on them. I will look at how a specifist would be likely to view the response but also how a generalist might view it. In doing so, I will argue for the specifist standpoint on knowledge in critical thinking, putting the pressure on the generalists. It is worth noting here that my purpose is to make a well-reasoned and empirically well-grounded interpretation of the students’ responses on behalf of the specifists and the generalists. I do not claim that my interpretations are the only ones, or that all specifists or generalists would agree on these interpretations (as that would be futile) but I argue that these interpretations are reasonable and plausible. Let us now consider the first response:

A deontological ethicist would say that the death penalty is wrong because you can use a rule that ‘it is always wrong to kill’, which says that the act is wrong regardless of consequences or intention. A deontological ethicist could also say that the death penalty is right and lean on rules like ‘an eye for an eye’, when he says that if someone committed a murder he should also be killed as punishment. The principle, however, would only justify the death penalty if the perpetrator committed a murder. 4

Viewed from a specifist perspective, I would like to put forward this response as a manifestation of critical thinking. The response displays accurate and sufficiently extensive knowledge on deontological ethics and the death penalty, and indicates a reflective dimension. If we look deeper into what knowledge could be claimed to be present in this response, I argue that the response exhibits basic knowledge of what rules and the death penalty are. In relation to the specific rules presented, the response further demonstrates knowledge concerning the circumstances under which the rules are applicable in relation to the death penalty (most profoundly evident in the third sentence). The response also shows knowledge about the fact that deontological ethics revolve around rules, and furthermore, that rules are to determine one's standpoint or action concerning an issue or a situation (for example, the first sentence). Moreover, I argue that the response displays knowledge about the role of the chosen rule in deontological ethics and the possibility of coming up with a different conclusion on an issue based on what rules are used to guide the decision (the first and second sentences). In sum, this exhibition of knowledge about deontological ethics and the death penalty amounts to a dimension of reflection on deontological ethics and the death penalty, i.e. critical thinking. Using this line of argument, I would claim that the critical thinking manifested is best described as a function of the knowledge displayed, opening the way for the specifist standpoint on the role of knowledge in critical thinking.

However, a generalist could problematise my way of reasoning. 5 For example, they could use the earlier mentioned Ennis taxonomy of generic abilities (Ennis, 1993 ) and argue that the response shows patterns linked to at least three of those. They could start by claiming a pattern linked to the ability to ‘be open-minded’ when engaging with an object of thought, indicated by the first and second sentences, when the student shifts from one rule and one standpoint to another rule and another standpoint. Using the same pattern of shifting, they could also claim an indication of the ability to ‘identify assumptions’, as these sentences could be said to show an identification of the role of rules in deontological ethics, that is, varying standpoints could be taken on the same issue depending on the rule favoured. The generalist could further assert the presence of a third pattern that it is possible to link to yet another generic ability. Looking at sentences two and three, they could argue that this ought to be seen as a display of a pattern linked to the ability to ‘draw conclusions when warranted, but with caution’, as sentence three states under which circumstances the conclusion made in sentence two is relevant, and thereby shows caution in terms of the conclusion reached. The generalist could even claim that another pattern is linked to this ability, as the shift in perspective between sentences one and two could be viewed as indicating a certain caution regarding which conclusion a deontological ethicist would come to, opening the way for at least two different conclusions, depending on the preferred rule. Based on this counterargument, the generalist can claim that the major explanatory factor behind the critical thinking displayed in the response is the application of the above-mentioned abilities, not the knowledge about the object of thought, its subordinate.

Even if this is seen as a thoughtful objection to the specifist standpoint, I have two concerns that would call its validity into question. Firstly, if the response is primarily explained in terms of the generic abilities in question, it implies that the response is not achievable without applying these generic critical thinking abilities. Looking at the response, it seems impossible, with any certainty, to put forward such an argument. In fact, everything in the response is satisfactorily explained as merely a display of knowledge about deontological ethics and the death penalty, nothing more, and this display is thorough enough to demonstrate a reflective stance. On the other hand, the patterns that could possibly be linked to generic critical thinking can only be used ad hoc to prove their own plausible existence. Secondly, if the generic abilities offer the cardinal explanation, and are to be of some true use, it also implies that some of the knowledge being displayed in the response ought to be derived by applying generic critical thinking, and not by knowledge about the object. That is, it ought to be possible to arrive at this response without having all the knowledge about the object being displayed, instead generating this knowledge by applying generic critical thinking abilities to the case. By looking at the response as it is, this kind of knowledge-generating process is in no way obvious; in fact, it is impossible to infer something even close to this from the response. Even if such a process were in theory possible, it seems both extremely far-fetched in any practical sense and paved with pitfalls that may lead to incorrect ‘knowledge’ about the object of thought being generated.

To continue the discussion, let's look at another of the student responses:

A deontological ethicist would probably say that we shouldn't have it [the death penalty] as it becomes wrong in our laws, but he could also say that we should have it [the death penalty], as it could be needed in some brutal cases (the absolute worst) for certain criminals.

From a specifist point of view, I argue that this response lacks manifestations of critical thinking, as it is tainted by a knowledge deficit concerning the object of thought. The only relevant knowledge that the response seems to contain is some vague knowledge about what the death penalty is and under which circumstances this is often discussed (the most brutal cases). Otherwise, there appears to be no obvious knowledge displayed concerning what a rule actually is and certainly no knowledge shown concerning deontological ethics. In sum, the response can be confidently argued to manifest deficient knowledge in relation to the object to be thought about, thereby making any display of relevant reflection on the knowledge impossible, as such a reflection is a function of pertinent knowledge about the object of thought.

What, then, could generalists say about this response? I think they would indeed agree that the response lacks manifestations of critical thinking, as there is no accurate reasoning concerning deontological ethics and the death penalty displayed in the response. However, if I shine a torch on the generalist standpoint, and use the same tactic as in the previous response, something interesting occurs. To be specific, even in this response, it is possible to argue for the presence of patterns that can be linked to generic critical thinking abilities. The shift in perspective between the first part of the sentence, before the first comma, and the second part of the sentence could be seen as an indication of a pattern that can be linked to the ability to ‘be open-minded’, as the response here states that a deontological ethicist could be both for and against the death penalty and presents reasons for this. This shift in perspective can also be seen as a pattern that can be linked to the ability to ‘draw conclusions when warranted, but with caution’, as it opens the way for deontological ethicists to be able to take different standpoints regarding the issue of the death penalty.

I would argue that this kind of situation paves the way for further questioning the generalist idea of the superiority of generic abilities over knowledge. To start, the presence of patterns linked to generic critical thinking, even though no actual critical thinking is evident in the response, contradicts the core of this idea. If the main force behind critical thinking is generic abilities, how could there be a presence of these abilities without any critical thinking taking place? This presence also entails another deceitful risk which should not be underestimated, namely, to mislead the interpretation, making what is corrupt critical thinking appear as critical thinking. A generalist would perhaps counter such a claim by arguing that this risk can be avoided by applying generic critical thinking abilities to discover the corruption. However, I would claim that this line of reasoning is crooked. The only way to see through this illusion ought to be by knowing more about the object to be thought about, as the actual problem with the response is knowledge deficit, nothing more, nothing less. Add to this the fact that the knowledge deficit in the response contradicts even the generalist implication of generic critical thinking as a generator of knowledge about the object to be thought about. Though there are patterns linked to generic critical thinking abilities, there is no sign of applicable knowledge being generated by this presence. If any such process (in theory) is at work, it is generating flawed knowledge.

Before closing this argument, let us look at one last response:

A deontological ethicist would probably say that the death penalty is wrong because you are not allowed to kill someone. That is a rule and the action must follow that rule.

As with the previous response, I would argue that from a specifist perspective, this response is not a representation of critical thinking. Comparatively though, there is more pertinent knowledge present in this response, as it would be reasonable to say that it displays basic knowledge about what rules and the death penalty are. Further, it is also fair to say that it contains some knowledge about deontological ethics, such as that deontological ethics concerns rules, and that rules determine the standpoint to be taken on an issue. Even so, I would claim that this response is mostly characterised by its knowledge deficit. It is of the utmost importance to recognise that a specifist view does not claim that every display of knowledge is to be considered as critical thinking. In fact, the basic idea of this view is the opposite. Critical thinking is a function of knowledge about the object of thought. If a response lacks critical thinking but displays some knowledge about the object, this would be considered as a lack of knowledge that is deep enough to manifest a reflective approach towards the object of thought, i.e. critical thinking. There is no way, as McPeck ( 1990d , p. 117) puts it, that ‘a minimal amount of understanding of that which is to be thought about’ can generate critical thinking about that object. If compared with the first response discussed (claimed to be characterised by critical thinking), this response, for example, lacks any display of knowledge about the role of the rule in deontological ethics and the possibility of coming up with diverse standpoints on an issue based on what rule is followed.

The argument put forward above may well seem fine from a specifist standpoint, but there might be a way for a generalist to attack the specifist standpoint based on this response and my line of reasoning. This attack would involve commencing with a claim that they also see this response as lacking any manifestation of critical thinking according to the Ennis taxonomy (1993), continuing by admitting that they too see that there is relevant knowledge on the object of thought displayed, and then consolidating these two into an argument by asserting that the problem is not a knowledge deficit as in my specifist claim—there is knowledge enough in the response—but that the crux of the matter is that there is a lack of generic critical thinking.

Yet, I would say that this is a fraudulent way for the generalist to travel. I would grant them that there are no patterns of generic critical thinking evident in the response as it is. I would also, as already articulated, grant them that relevant knowledge about the object to be thought about is present. But there is also an obvious knowledge deficit in the response compared to a response that displays critical thinking, such as the first one. This deficit cannot be explained away. The generalist claim that what is missing in the response is any application of generic abilities and that such an application could turn this response into critical thinking, once again, has to explain how these generic abilities can generate knowledge, such as the kind displayed in the first response discussed.

To sum this discussion up, I would claim that the type of empirically based argument presented here makes a strong case for the specifist's standpoint on the role of knowledge in critical thinking and quite a weak case for the generalist standpoint.

As the specifist standpoint seems to be applicable to all the instances I have presented in this paper, I would maintain that the argumentation presented sharpens the McPeckian assertion that knowledge about the object to be thought about is the vehicle for, and the only real explanatory factor for, critical thinking (McPeck, 1985a , 1985b , 1990a , 1990b , 1990c , 1990d ).

The generalist view that knowledge about the object is a subordinate part of critical thinking, is, as I have shown, on the other hand, flawed in several ways. The possible presence of generic critical thinking in a response perceived as a displaying critical thinking by both generalists and specifists cannot preclude the possibility that the response displays nothing more than knowledge. Nor can this presence explain which knowledge it is necessary to have about the object and which knowledge ought to be generated by applying generic critical thinking abilities (i.e. by means of the assumed immanent knowledge-generating capacity of generic critical thinking). Further, the fact that generic critical thinking abilities can be present in a response that both sides view as lacking any actual critical thinking, seriously brings into question the generalist view on generic critical thinking as the main driving force behind critical thinking. This also relates to the risk of creating an illusion of critical thinking in a response where there is none—an illusion that logically can only be dispelled by knowing more about the object to be thought about.

Based on the argument I have made in this paper, I urge the generalist side to come up with a proper reply to the questions raised here. They need to clarify:

how generic critical thinking actually adds something to the critical thinking that knowledge about the object cannot explain;

how generic critical thinking abilities are the driving force behind critical thinking (and not knowledge about the object), especially when these abilities can be present without any critical thinking taking place;

how generic critical thinking can generate knowledge about the object not already obtained; and

how to come to terms with the chimera of generic critical thinking posing as genuine critical thinking, and to do so in terms of the use of generic critical thinking rather than knowing more about the object to be thought about.

As stated in the introduction, a clarification on the matters concerned is, in fact, of the utmost importance, and not only for the sake of the argument made. The generalist side has over the years held a dominant position in the field of critical thinking. Major policymakers in Europe and in the United States have adopted a generalist view (European Commission, 2016 ; Lai, 2011 ; NGA/CCSSO, 2010 ). The lion's share of research on improving students’ critical thinking has been conducted from a generalist perspective (Tiruneh et al ., 2014 ). To this we need to add the continual and severe criticism by reviewers that this research has arrived at surprisingly inconsistent results and suffers from an overall lack of trustworthiness (Behar-Horenstein & Nui, 2011; McMillan, 1987 ; Tsui, 1998 ). If the generalists are to hold their predominant position in the future, we need to be absolutely clear about the adequacy of their basic assumptions. Otherwise, the risk is that we will go even further down a path that is destined to end in a blind alley.

Sometimes called ‘specificists’.

Although they are not investigated in this paper, it is worth noting that the epistemological properties of critical thinking per se have been part of the wider debate between generalists and specifists (e.g. McPeck, 1985a ; Moore, 2004 ; Norris, 1985 ; Siegel, 1991 ).

The normative ethical position that judges the morality of an action based on rules.

This student response, and those presented below, have been translated from Swedish to English by the author. An effort has been made to stay as close to the original written response as possible.

In fact, the generalist Quinn identified patterns linked to generic critical thinking abilities in a student response of similar kind (Quinn, 1994 , p. 110).

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Moral Responsibility

When a person performs or fails to perform a morally significant action, we sometimes think that a particular kind of response is warranted. Praise and blame are perhaps the most obvious forms this reaction might take. For example, one who encounters a car accident may be regarded as worthy of praise for having saved a child from inside the burning car, or alternatively, one may be regarded as worthy of blame for not having used one's mobile phone to call for help. To regard such agents as worthy of one of these reactions is to regard them as responsible for what they have done or left undone. (These are examples of other-directed ascriptions of responsibility. The reaction might also be self-directed, e.g., one can recognize oneself to be blameworthy). Thus, to be morally responsible for something, say an action, is to be worthy of a particular kind of reaction—praise, blame, or something akin to these—for having performed it. [ 1 ]

Though further elaboration and qualification of the above characterization of moral responsibility is called for and will be provided below, this is enough to distinguish concern about this form of responsibility from some others commonly referred to through use of the terms ‘responsibility’ or ‘responsible.’ To illustrate, we might say that higher than normal rainfall in the spring is responsible for an increase in the amount of vegetation or that it is the judge's responsibility to give instructions to the jury before they begin deliberating. In the first case, we mean to identify a causal connection between the earlier amount of rain and the later increased vegetation. In the second, we mean to say that when one assumes the role of judge, certain duties, or obligations, follow. Although these concepts are connected with the concept of moral responsibility discussed here, they are not the same, for in neither case are we directly concerned about whether it would be appropriate to react to some candidate (here, the rainfall or a particular judge) with something like praise or blame. [ 2 ]

Philosophical reflection on moral responsibility has a long history. One reason for this persistent interest is the way the topic seems connected with our conception of ourselves as ‘persons.’ [ 3 ] Many have held that one distinct feature of persons is their status as morally responsible agents, a status resting—some have proposed—on a special kind of control that only they can exercise. Many who view persons in this way have wondered whether their special status is threatened if certain other claims about our universe are true. For example, can a person be morally responsible for her behavior if that behavior can be explained solely by reference to physical states of the universe and the laws governing changes in those physical states, or solely by reference to the existence of a sovereign God who guides the world along a divinely ordained path? Concerns of this sort have often motivated reflection on moral responsibility.

A comprehensive theory of moral responsibility would elucidate the following: (1) the concept, or idea, of moral responsibility itself; (2) the criteria for being a moral agent, i.e., one who qualifies generally as an agent open to responsibility ascriptions (e.g., only beings possessing the general capacity to evaluate reasons for acting can be moral agents); (3) the conditions under which the concept of moral responsibility is properly applied, i.e., those conditions under which a moral agent is responsible for a particular something (e.g., a moral agent can be responsible for an action she has performed only if she performed it freely, where acting freely entails the ability to have done otherwise at the time of action); and finally 4) possible objects of responsibility ascriptions (e.g., actions, omissions, consequences, character traits, etc.). Although each of these will be touched upon in the discussion below (see, e.g., the brief sketch of Aristotle's account in the next section), the primary focus of this entry is on the first component—i.e., the concept of moral responsibility. The section immediately following this introduction is a discussion of the origin and history of Western reflection on moral responsibility. This is followed by an overview of recent work on the concept of moral responsibility. For further discussion of issues associated with moral responsibility, see the related entries below.

1. Some Historical Background

2.1 strawson and the reactive attitudes, 2.2 developments after strawson, other internet resources, related entries.

What follows in this section is a brief outline of the origins and trajectory of reflection on moral responsibility in the Western philosophical tradition. Against this background, a distinction will be drawn between two conceptions of moral responsibility that have exerted considerable influence on subsequent thinkers.

An understanding of the concept of moral responsibility and its application is present implicitly in some of the earliest surviving Greek texts, i.e., the Homeric epics (circa 8th century BCE but no doubt informed by a much earlier oral tradition). [ 4 ] In these texts, both human and superhuman agents are often regarded as fair targets of praise and blame on the basis of how they have behaved, and at other times, an agent's behavior is excused because of the presence of some factor that has undermined his/her control (Irwin 1999: 225). Reflection on these factors gave rise to fatalism —the view that one's future or some aspect of it is predetermined, e.g., by the gods, or the stars, or simply some facts about truth and time—in such a way as to make one's particular deliberations, choices and actions irrelevant to whether that particular future is realized (recall, e.g., the plight of Oedipus). If some particular outcome is fated, then it seems that the agent concerned could not be morally responsible for that outcome. Likewise, if fatalism were true with respect to all human futures, then it would seem that no human agent could be morally responsible for anything. Though this brand of fatalism has sometimes exerted significant historical influence, most philosophers have rejected it on the grounds that there is no good reason to think that our futures are fated in the sense that they will unfold no matter what particular deliberations we engage in, choices we make, or actions we perform.

Aristotle (384–323 BCE) seems to have been the first to construct a theory of moral responsibility. [ 5 ] In the course of discussing human virtues and their corresponding vices, Aristotle pauses in Nicomachean Ethics III.1–5 to explore their underpinnings. He begins with a brief statement of the concept of moral responsibility—that it is sometimes appropriate to respond to an agent with praise or blame on the basis of her actions and/or dispositional traits of character (1109b30–35). A bit later, he clarifies that only a certain kind of agent qualifies as a moral agent and is thus properly subject to ascriptions of responsibility, namely, one who possess a capacity for decision. For Aristotle, a decision is a particular kind of desire resulting from deliberation, one that expresses the agent's conception of what is good (1111b5–1113b3). The remainder of Aristotle's discussion is devoted to spelling out the conditions under which it is appropriate to hold a moral agent blameworthy or praiseworthy for some particular action or trait. His general proposal  is that one is an apt candidate for praise or blame if and only if the action and/or disposition is voluntary. According to Aristotle, a voluntary action or trait has two distinctive features. First, there is a control condition: the action or trait must have its origin in the agent. That is, it must be up to the agent whether to perform that action or possess the trait—it cannot be compelled externally. Second, Aristotle proposes an epistemic condition: the agent must be aware of what it is she is doing or bringing about (1110a-1111b4). [ 6 ]

There is an instructive ambiguity in Aristotle's account of responsibility, an ambiguity that has led to competing interpretations of his view. Aristotle aims to identify the conditions under which it is appropriate to praise or blame an agent, but it is not entirely clear how to understand the pivotal notion of appropriateness in his conception of responsibility. There are at least two possibilities: a) praise or blame is appropriate in the sense that the agent deserves such a response, given his behavior and/or traits of character; or b) praise or blame is appropriate in the sense that such a reaction is likely to bring about a desired consequence, namely an improvement in the agent's behavior and/or character. These two possibilities may be characterized in terms of two competing interpretations of the concept of moral responsibility: 1) the merit-based view , according to which praise or blame would be an appropriate reaction toward the candidate if and only if she merits—in the sense of ‘deserves’—such a reaction; vs. 2) the consequentialist view , according to which praise or blame would be appropriate if and only if a reaction of this sort would likely lead to a desired change in the agent and/or her behavior. [ 7 ]

Scholars disagree about which of the above views Aristotle endorsed, but the importance of distinguishing between them grew as philosophers began to focus on a newly conceived threat to moral responsibility. While Aristotle argued against a version of fatalism ( On Interpretation , ch. 9), he may not have recognized the difference between it and the related possible threat of causal determinism . Causal determinism is the view that everything that happens or exists is caused by sufficient antecedent conditions, making it impossible for anything to happen or be other than it does or is. One variety of causal determinism, scientific determinism, identifies the relevant antecedent conditions as a combination of prior states of the universe and the laws of nature. Another, theological determinism , identifies those conditions as being the nature and will of God. It seems likely that theological determinism evolved out of the shift, both in Greek religion and in Ancient Mesopotamian religions, from polytheism to belief in one sovereign God, or at least one god who reigned over all others. The doctrine of scientific determinism can be traced back as far as the Presocratic Atomists (5th cent. BCE), but the difference between it and the earlier fatalistic view seems not to be clearly recognized until the development of Stoic philosophy (3rd. cent. BCE). Though fatalism, like causal determinism, might seem to threaten moral responsibility by threatening an agent's control, the two differ on the significance of human deliberation, choice, and action. If fatalism is true, then human deliberation, choice, and action are completely otiose, for what is fated will transpire no matter what one chooses to do. According to causal determinism, however, one's deliberations, choices, and actions will often be necessary links in the causal chain that brings something about. In other words, even though our deliberations, choices, and actions are themselves determined like everything else, it is still the case, according to causal determinism, that the occurrence or existence of yet other things depends upon our deliberating, choosing and acting in a certain way (Irwin 1999: 243–249; Meyer 1998: 225–227; and Pereboom 1997: ch. 2).

Since the Stoics, the thesis of causal determinism, if true, and its ramifications, have taken center stage in theorizing about moral responsibility. During the Medieval period, especially in the work of Augustine (354–430) and Aquinas (1225–1274), reflection on freedom and responsibility was often generated by questions concerning versions of theological determinism, including most prominently: a) Does God's sovereignty entail that God is responsible for evil?; and b) Does God's foreknowledge entail that we are not free and morally responsible since it would seem that we cannot do anything other than what God foreknows we will do? During the Modern period, there was renewed interest in scientific determinism—a change attributable to the development of increasingly sophisticated mechanistic models of the universe culminating in the success of Newtonian physics. The possibility of giving a comprehensive explanation of every aspect of the universe—including human action—in terms of physical causes became much more plausible. Many thought that persons could not be free and morally responsible if such an explanation of human action turned out to be true. Others argued that freedom and responsibility would not be undermined by the truth of scientific determinism. In keeping with this focus on the ramifications of causal determinism for moral responsibility, thinkers may be classified as being one of two types: 1) an incompatibilist about causal determinism and moral responsibility—one who maintains that if causal determinism is true, then there is nothing for which one can be morally responsible; or 2) a compatibilist —one who holds that a person can be morally responsible for some things, even if both who she is and what she does is causally determined. [ 8 ] In Ancient Greece, these positions were exemplified in the thought of Epicurus (341–270 BCE) and the Stoics, respectively.

Above, an ambiguity in Aristotle's conception of moral responsibility was highlighted—that it was not clear whether he endorsed a merit-based vs. a consequentialist conception of moral responsibility. The history of reflection on moral responsibility demonstrates that how one interprets the concept of moral responsibility strongly influences one's overall account of moral responsibility. For example, those who accept the merit-based conception of moral responsibility have tended to be incompatibilists. That is, most have thought that if an agent were to genuinely merit praise or blame for something, then he would need to exercise a special form of control over that thing (e.g., the ability at the time of action to both perform or not perform the action) that is incompatible with one's being causally determined. In addition to Epicurus, we can cite early Augustine, Thomas Reid (1710–1796), and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) as historical examples here. Those accepting the consequentialist conception of moral responsibility, on the other hand, have traditionally contended that determinism poses no threat to moral responsibility since praising and blaming could still be an effective means of influencing another's behavior, even in a deterministic world. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), David Hume (1711–1776), and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) are, along with the Stoics, representatives of this view. This general trend of linking the consequentialist conception of moral responsibility with compatibilism about causal determinism and moral responsibility and the merit-based conception with incompatibilism continued to persist through the first half of the twentieth century.

2. Recent Work on the Concept of Responsibility

The issue of how best to understand the concept of moral responsibility is important, for it can strongly influence one's view of what, if any, philosophical problems might be associated with the notion, and further, if there are problems, what might count as a solution. As discussed above, philosophical reflection on moral responsibility has historically relied upon one of two broad interpretations of the concept: 1) the merit-based view , according to which praise or blame would be an appropriate reaction toward the candidate if and only if she merits—in the sense of ‘deserves’—such a reaction; or 2) the consequentialist view , according to which praise or blame would be appropriate if and only if a reaction of this sort would likely lead to a desired change in the agent and/or her behavior. Though versions of the consequentialist view have continued to garner support (Smart; Frankena 1963: ch. 4; Schlick 1966; Brandt 1992; Dennett 1984: ch. 7; Kupperman 1991: ch. 3; and Vargas 2013: ch. 6), work in the last 50 years on the concept of moral responsibility has increasingly focused on: a) offering alternative versions of the merit-based view; and b) questioning whether there is but one concept of moral responsibility.

Increased attention to the stance of regarding and holding persons morally responsible has generated much of the recent work on the concept of moral responsibility. All theorists have recognized features of this practice—inner attitudes and emotions, their outward expression in censure or praise, and the imposition of corresponding sanctions or rewards. However, most understood the inner attitudes and emotions involved to rest on a more fundamental theoretical judgment about the agent's being responsible. In other words, it was typically assumed that blame and praise depended upon a judgment, or belief (pre-reflective in most cases), that the agent in question had satisfied the objective conditions on being responsible. These judgments were presumed to be independent of the inner attitudinal/emotive states involved in holding responsible in the sense that reaching such judgments and evaluating them required no essential reference to the attitudes and emotions of the one making the judgment. For the holder of the consequentialist view, this is a judgment that the agent exercised a form of control that could be influenced through outward expressions of praise and blame in order to curb or promote certain behaviors. For those holding the merit view, it is a judgment that the agent has exercised the requisite form of metaphysical control, e.g., that she could have done otherwise at the time of action (Watson 1987: 258).

If holding responsible is best understood as resting on an independent judgment about being responsible, then it is legitimate to inquire whether such underlying judgments and their associated outward expressions can be justified, as a whole, in the face of our best current understanding of the world, e.g., in the face of evidence that our world is possibly deterministic. According to incompatibilists, a judgment that someone is morally responsible could never be true if the world were deterministic; thus praising and blaming in the merit-based sense would be beside the point. Compatibilists, on the other hand, contend that the truth of determinism would not undermine the relevant underlying judgments concerning the efficacy of praising and blaming practices, thereby leaving the rationale of such practices intact.

In his landmark essay, ‘Freedom and Resentment,’ P. F. Strawson (1962) sets out to adjudicate the dispute between those compatibilists who hold a consequentialist view of responsibility and those incompatibilists who hold the merit-based view. [ 9 ] Both are wrong, Strawson believes, because they distort the concept of moral responsibility by sharing the prevailing assumption sketched above — the assumption that holding persons responsible rests upon a theoretical judgment of their being responsible. According to Strawson, the attitudes expressed in holding persons morally responsible are varieties of a wide range of attitudes deriving from our participation in personal relationships, e.g., resentment, indignation, hurt feelings, anger, gratitude, reciprocal love, and forgiveness. The function of these attitudes is to express “…how much we actually mind, how much it matters to us, whether the actions of other people—and particularly some other people—reflect attitudes towards us of good will, affection, or esteem on the one hand or contempt, indifference, or malevolence on the other.” (p. 5, author's emphasis) These attitudes are thus participant reactive attitudes, because they are: a) natural attitudinal reactions to the perception of another's good will, ill will, or indifference (pp. 4–6), and b) expressed from the stance of one who is immersed in interpersonal relationships and who regards the candidate held responsible as a participant in such relationships as well (p. 10). [ 10 ]

The reactive attitudes can be suspended or modified in at least two kinds of circumstances, corresponding to the two features just mentioned. In the first, one might conclude that, contrary to first appearances, the candidate did not violate the demand for a reasonable degree of good will. For example, a person's behavior may be excused when one determines that it was an accident, or one may determine that the behavior was justified , say, in the case of an emergency when some greater good is being pursued. In the second kind of circumstance, one may abandon the participant perspective in relation to the candidate. In these cases, one adopts the objective standpoint , one from which one ceases to regard the individual as capable of participating in genuine personal relations (either for some limited time or permanently). Instead, one regards the individual as psychologically/morally abnormal or undeveloped and thereby a candidate, not for the full range of reactive attitudes, but primarily for those objective attitudes associated with treatment or simply instrumental control. Such individuals lie, in some sense or to some varying extent, outside the boundaries of the moral community. For example, we may regard a very young child as initially exempt from the reactive attitudes (but increasingly less so in cases of normal development) or adopt the objective standpoint in relation to an individual we determine to be suffering from severe mental illness (P. F. Strawson 1962: 6–10; Bennett: 40; Watson 1987: 259–260; R. Jay Wallace: chs. 5–6).

The central criticism Strawson directs at both consequentialist and traditional merit views is that both have over-intellectualized the issue of moral responsibility—a criticism with which many subsequent thinkers have wrestled. [ 11 ] The charge of over intellectualization stems from the traditional tendency to presume that the rationality of holding a person responsible depends upon a judgment that the person in question has satisfied some set of objective requirements on being responsible (conditions on efficacy or metaphysical freedom) and that these requirements themselves are justifiable. Strawson, by contrast, maintains that the reactive attitudes are a natural expression of an essential feature of our form of life, in particular, the interpersonal nature of our way of life. The practice, then, of holding responsible—embedded as it is in our way of life—“neither calls for nor permits, an external ‘rational’ justification” (p. 23). Though judgments about the appropriateness of particular responses may arise (i.e., answers to questions like: Was the candidate's behavior really an expression of ill will?; or Is the candidate involved a genuine participant in the moral sphere of human relations?), these judgments are based on principles internal to the practice. That is, their justification refers back to an account of the reactive attitudes and their role in personal relationships, not to some independent theoretical account of the conditions on being responsible .

Given the above, Strawson contends that it is pointless to ask whether the practice of holding responsible can be rationally justified if determinism is true. This is either because it is not psychologically possible to divest ourselves of these reactions and so continually inhabit the objective standpoint, or even if that were possible, because it is not clear that rationality could ever demand that we give up the reactive attitudes, given the loss in quality of life should we do so. In sum, Strawson attempts to turn the traditional debate on its head, for now judgments about being responsible are understood in relation to the role reactive attitudes play in the practice of holding responsible , rather than the other way around. Whereas judgments are true or false and thereby can generate the need for justification, the desire for good will and those attitudes generated by it possess no truth value themselves, thereby eliminating any need for an external justification (Magill 1887: 21; Double 1996b: 848).

Strawson's concept of moral responsibility yields a compatibilist account of being responsible but one that departs significantly from earlier such accounts in two respects. First, Strawson's is a compatibilist view by default only. That is, on Strawson's view, the problem of determinism and freedom/responsibility is not so much resolved by showing that the objective conditions on being responsible are consistent with one's being determined but rather dissolved by showing that the practice of holding people responsible relies on no such conditions and therefore needs no external justification in the face of determinism. Second, Strawson's is a merit-based form of compatibilism. That is, unlike most former consequentialist forms of compatibilism, it helps to explain why we feel that some agents deserve our censure or merit our praise. They do so because they have violated, met, or exceeded our demand for a reasonable degree of good will.

Most agree that Strawson's discussion of the reactive attitudes is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the practice of holding responsible, but many have taken issue with his contentions about the insular nature of that practice, namely that a) since propriety judgments about the reactive attitudes are strictly internal to the practice (i.e., being responsible is defined in relation to the practice of holding responsible), their justification cannot be considered from a standpoint outside that practice; and b) since the reactive attitudes are natural responses deriving from our psychological constitution, they cannot be dislodged by theoretical considerations. Responding to the first of these, some have argued that it does seem possible to critique existing practices of holding responsible from standpoints outside them. For example, one might judge that either one's own existing community practice or some other community's practice of holding responsible ought to be modified (Fischer and Ravizza 1993: 18; Ekstrom 2000: 148–149). If such evaluations are legitimate, then, contrary to what Strawson suggested, it seems that an existing practice can be questioned from a standpoint external to it. In other words, being responsible cannot be explicated strictly in terms of an existing practice of holding responsible. This then, would suggest a possible role to be played by independent theoretical conditions on being responsible, conditions which could prove to be compatibilist or incompatibilist in nature.

Objecting to the second of Strawson's anti-theory contentions, some have argued that incompatibilist intuitions are embedded in the reactive attitudes themselves so that these attitudes cannot persist unless some justification can be given of them, or more weakly, that they cannot but be disturbed if something like determinism is true. Here, cases are often cited where negative reactive attitudes seem to be dispelled or mitigated upon learning that an agent's past includes severe deprivation and/or abuse. There is a strong pull to think that our reactive attitudes are altered in such cases because we perceive such a background to be deterministic. If this is the proper interpretation of the phenomenon, then it is evidence that theoretical considerations, like the truth of determinism, could in fact dislodge the reactive attitudes (Nagel 1986: 125; Kane 1996: 84–89; Galen Strawson 1986: 88; Honderich 1988: vol. 2, ch. 1; and replies by Watson 1987: 279–286 and 1996: 240; and McKenna 1998).

Versions of Strawson's view continue to be very ably defended, and shortly, more will be said about the significant way in which his work continues to shape contemporary discussion of the concept of responsibility. However, many have taken objections of the above sort to be decisive in undermining the most radical of Strawson's anti-theory claims. Incompatibilists, in particular, seem largely unpersuaded and so have continued to assume a more or less traditional merit-based conception of moral responsibility as the basis for their theorizing. A number of compatibilists also remain unconvinced that Strawson has successfully shown independent theoretical considerations to be irrelevant to ascriptions of responsibility. It is noteworthy that some of these have accorded the reactive attitudes a central role in their discussions of the concept of responsibility, resulting in new merit-based versions of compatibilism (see e.g., Fischer and Ravizza 1998, and McKenna 2012).

Until recently philosophers have assumed that they were concerned about a shared concept of moral responsibility. Even when controversy increasingly arose over how best to characterize it, the assumption seems to have been that it was a controversy over the one correct way of characterizing the concept of responsibility. Strawson was certainly amongst those who made this assumption in trying to adjudicate the dispute between those compatibilists who held the consequentialist view of responsibility and incompatibilists who held the merit-based view. However, a number of authors have suggested of late that at least some disagreements about the most plausible overall theory might be based on a failure to distinguish between different but related concepts of responsibility.

Broadly speaking, a distinction has been made between responsibility as accountability and responsibility as attributability. [ 12 ] Drawing on Strawson's work, many contemporary accountability theorists maintain that to be responsible is to be an apt candidate for the reactive attitudes (Bennett 1980; Wallace 1994; Watson 1996; Fischer & Ravizza 1998; and Darwall 2006). In other words, an agent is responsible, if and only if it is appropriate for us to hold her responsible, or accountable, via the reactive attitudes. This highlights a main theme in Strawson--namely, that our responsibility practices are inherently social. Through the reactive attitudes (e.g., resentment) we communicate to fellow members of the moral community our interpersonal expectation for a reasonable degree of goodwill (Stern 1974; Watson 1987/1996; McKenna 1998/2012; Darwall 2006; Shoemaker 2007). [ 13 ]

Since the reactive attitudes--when expressed and accompanied by their associated practices--may have consequences for the well-being of an agent (especially in the case of those blaming attitudes and practices involved in holding someone accountable for wrong-doing), they would seem to be appropriate only if it is fair that the agent be subject to them in the sense that s/he deserve them. [ 14 ] This concern about fairness may be the original source of the merit-based view of responsibility. Relatedly, this line of thought may help explain the historical preoccupation with whether responsibility for an action requires the ability to have done otherwise. That is, the normative concern for a fair opportunity to avoid blame and sanction may lie behind the felt need to have access to alternatives. (Zimmerman: ch. 5; Wallace: 103–117; Watson 1996: 238–9; Magill 1997: 42–53; Nelkin 2012:31–50).

Notably, some accounts of responsibility make no essential reference to the reactive attitudes or their accompanying practices. Perhaps the clearest example of these are so-called “ledger” views of moral responsibility. According to such views, the practice of ascribing responsibility involves assigning a credit or debit to a metaphorical ledger associated with each agent (Feinberg: 30–1; Glover: 64; Zimmerman: 38–9; and discussion of such views in Watson 1987: 261–2; and Fischer & Ravizza 1998: 8–10, nt. 12). In other words, an agent is responsible if a fault or credit is properly attributable to her.

Ledger views belong to a broader class of views which regard responsibility to be a matter of proper attributability. As Gary Watson has highlighted, the central concern in such views is whether the agent's action or attitude discloses her evaluative judgments or commitments (1996). Satisfying some baseline conditions of responsibility as attributability would appear to be necessary in order to be responsible in the sense of accountable. For example, it would seem unfair to hold someone accountable for an action via reactive attitudes such as resentment or indignation, if the action was not properly attributable to the agent--say, because she succumbed to a genuinely coercive psychological compulsion. Yet being responsible in the attributability sense is not sufficient for being responsible in the accountability sense. As Watson points out, it may make no sense to hold the agent responsible for the action in question, since it may not be the sort of thing for which they are accountable to us. For example, one may think that in making a career decision, an acquaintance failed to give due consideration to what would most fully develop and exercise his talents. Though this is not a moral judgment in the narrow sense favored by accountability theorists (that is, it is unconnected to any interpersonal demand, or mutual expectation, of the sort presupposed by the reactive attitudes) it is a case of finding fault in the way an agent has exercised his judgment. If responsibility as accountability and attributability can come apart in this way, then there appear to be at least two distinct concepts of responsibility. [ 15 ]

Some views fit uneasily in either of these two categories. For example, according to another influential view, someone is responsible for an action or attitude just in case it is connected to her capacity for evaluative judgment in a way that opens her up, in principle, to demands for justification from others (Oshana 1997; Scanlon 1998; and Smith 2005/2008/2012). Such a view—call it the "answerability" model—appears to combine aspects of the attributability and accountability models (see discussion by Watson 2011 and Shoemaker 2012). The self-disclosure aspect of the attributability model is reflected in emphasizing that the target of appraisal must be judgment-sensitive. The interpersonal emphasis characteristic of Strawson-inspired accountability models is reflected in the demand for justification (though answerability theorists tend to reject a necessary connection between these demands and the reactive attitudes). In this way, the answerability model offers the possibility of re-unifying discussions of responsibility (Smith 2012), but some see further grounds for distinguishing an additional sense of responsibility (Shoemaker 2012).

The recognition of diversity within the concept or amongst concepts of moral responsibility has generated new reflection on whether the conditions on being morally responsible are in tension with one another (Nagel 1986; G. Strawson 1986, 105–117, 307–317; Honderich 1988: vol. 2, ch. 1; Double 1996a: chs. 6–7; Bok 1998: ch. 1; Smilansky 2000: ch. 6); For example, some have argued that while a compatibilist sense of freedom is sufficient for attributability, genuine accountability would require that agents be capable of exercising libertarian freedom. A rapidly expanding body of empirical data on folk intuitions about freedom and responsibility has added fuel to this debate (Nahmias et. al. 2005 and 2007; Vargas 2006; Nichols & Knobe 2007; Nelkin 2007; Roskies & Nichols 2008; and Knobe & Doris 2010).

If there are irreconcilable tensions within the concept of responsibility, then the conditions of its application cannot be jointly satisfied. Of course, there have always been those—e.g., hard determinists—who have concluded that the conditions on being morally responsible cannot be met and thus that no one is ever morally responsible. However, a noteworthy new trend amongst both contemporary hard determinists and others who conclude that the conditions for the applicability of our folk concept cannot be jointly satisfied has been the move to offer a revisionist conception of moral responsibility (or something analogous to moral responsibility) and its associated practices rather than to reject talk about being responsible outright. Revisionism about moral responsibility is a matter of degree. Some revisionists seek to salvage much if not most of what they take to be linked to the folk concept (Dennett 1984: 19; Honderich 1988: vol. 2, ch. 1; Scanlon 1998: 274–277; Vargas 2004/2005/2013), while others offer more radical reconstructions of the concept and associated practices (Smart 1961; Pereboom 2001: 199–212; Smilansky 2000: chps. 7–8; Kelly 2002). [ 16 ]

It is difficult to overestimate the influence of Strawson's work on the topic of moral responsibility. The resurgence of interest in metaphysical treatments of freedom and moral responsibility in recent years is a sign that most have not been persuaded by his most radical critique of such approaches. Nevertheless, his enduring influence is reflected in the ongoing rich discussion of the place and role of the reactive attitudes in human life and in the way contemporary theorists situate their models of responsibility in relation to the accountability model, which he helped to define.

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Personal Responsibility Essay

Looking for an essay on personal responsibility as a student or an office worker? Or want to know more about the importance of being a responsible person? Find here a free short personal responsibility essay to get inspired!

Thesis Statement

Introduction.

• Importance of Personal Responsibility
• Personal Responsibility Strategies

Personal responsibility results to increase in the rate of success and decrease in examination cheating among the students in schools.

The word personal responsibility is the self-awareness of a person towards success of one’s life. It is also being aware of the initial goal of one’s life hence doing everything towards one’s own progress, to attain ones initial plan. Different people can define personal responsibility differently but one of the major definitions is that it is an attempt to use your own effort to be successful in everything.

The responsible person is the one who can make decisions and face the consequences of those decisions without complaining. One is responsible in life if he or she can be able to progress in life by abstaining anything, which might not be useful. Making such decisions need a strong person whose focus is purely in God and his ability to work in life without affecting anyone around negatively (Reiss, 2010).

The main aim of personal responsibility is to be able to show forth and even express the inner most beauty in visible ways, by responding to the issues of life and express your genuine love towards yourself and other people. The main aim of one’s personal responsibility is to ensure that the environment can also benefit from the gift of your appearance in that particular place or the society.

Making ones personal responsibility relies mainly on the people who want to ensure total success in everything they are doing. It also takes one’s self to be able to motivate own self to pursue a goal that seems difficult for people or even which people might neglect due to the vices that they are doing.

Importance of Personal Responsibility for a Student

There is correlation between personal responsibility of the student and their success in college. This relationship exists because personal responsibility directly affects issues that are pertinent to one’s life such as family, education, relationships as well as physical and spiritual well-being of an individual. Personal responsibility determines the success of the student in college for a number of reasons (Chester, 2008).

The first reason is self-discipline or self-control. Personal responsibility is the ability to be in control of one’s life in terms of emotions and actions. Students who do not have personal responsibility concerning their lives are prone to influences of doing what others are doing without proper reasons because they simply shift the blame on others when things do not go as they were expected. This lack of self-control comes about because any individual without a sense of personal responsibility will always be irresponsible.

A student without personal responsibility will blame the lecturer for failing in the exam. On the other hand, a student who has personal responsibility will not blame the lecture for the failure rather the student will critically analyze the reasons behind his failure and decide that they have a responsibility to pass. This explains why students who have a sense of personal responsibility have higher scores than those without personal responsibility (Bourbon, 1994).

Students who know that their actions affect others are also sensitive to the needs of others. They know when they have hurt someone and they are quick to apologize. If they wrong a teacher, they are likely to apologize. This endears them to both their fellow students and to their teachers.

This harmonious coexistence with others because of taking personal responsibility creates inner peace and concentration required by the mind for study purposes. Therefore, a student who has personal responsibility is likely to understand concepts better than a student who is at loggerheads with everyone (Chester, 2008).

Peer pressure as a factor that wields huge influence on the college students seems not to have a major effect on students who have a sense of responsibility. Personal responsibility dictates that one’s actions have consequences even when acted in a group setting.

Drug abuse, which often starts in a group setting, is not likely to affect a student who has a personal responsibility over his or her actions. This means that students who are personally responsible for their lives are unlikely to be involved in drug abuse, which negatively affects one academic performance (Chester, 2008).

The other factor that makes the student who takes personal responsibility to succeed in college more than those who do not take personal responsibility is that they do not allow circumstances to hinder their progress in life. They have a high sense of self-esteem or self worth, which makes them to confront issues critically rather than emotionally.

Students who feel that they are not in control pity themselves when they have issues to deal with in their lives thus affecting their physical health negatively. This may lead to absenteeism from classes and even suicidal cases (Chester, 2008).

Students who are aware of the word personal responsibility also manage to delay gratification. Delay of gratification is simply the ability to deny oneself pleasure in pursuit of a particular goal.

Personal responsibility enables the student to stick out or to persevere in pursuit of academic excellence thereby delaying the enjoyment of pleasures, which may affect the concentration, or peace of mind in pursuit of excellence.

They delay gratification of pleasures such as drug use, sexual relationships, and hooliganism known to affect student’s academic performance (Bourbon, 1994).

Personal Responsibility Strategies for Success

As a student, one should ensure that all the work given does not go to waste by ensuring that all people around do not copy the assignments but rather do their own work as commanded by the lecturers or professors. Copying of other student’s work robs the student competency and the necessary self-confidence required at work as well as circumstances outside college.

This will be a great stride in personal responsibility by personally handling one assignment, as it will give the student a chance to have mastery of the topic in an honest manner.

One should also ensure that the area surrounding the school is always clean and ready for use by anyone who wants to learn and all students can breathe the right air as required by the education policies. Commitment to the environment is imperative in promoting personal responsibility not only over oneself but also on the environment at large (Bourbon, 1994).

Personal timetable that will assist to manage time during study hours and to reduce time wastage during other activities is very important. One should also ensure timely completion of the school projects to avoid being at loggerheads with the lecturers.

This is because the recognition that time is a resource, it is precious, and it is out of order to waste it is the beginning of personal development (Bourbon, 1994).

There is a need to ensure that the people around are able to learn about self-responsibility and its advantages by setting a good example to them. This is because personal responsibility involves having responsibility on not only ones actions but also reviewing ones plans and goals all the time for better performance.

Goal setting enables one to review their personal progress. Goals also provide a sense of purpose to a student as they focus on ones actions and activities towards one major goal. One should break down those goals into daily goals, monthly goals and yearly goals.

Personal responsibility is an important aspect of human life. It is even more important when the student learns personal responsibility early in life. The apathy, accidents, and laziness, which lead to lower standards of living, are preventable if the students learn early in life to exercise responsibility over their own lives.

The world would certainly be a better place if the blame games stopped and people took responsibility over their actions. This change can start from the school especially if teachers take as their responsibility to instill a culture of taking responsibility among students.

Performance of college students therefore directly relates to the student’s ability to take personal responsibility over their lives. Although there is no direct correlation between college grades and success in life, there is direct correlation between the ability to take responsibility in life and to succeed elsewhere.

One of the best environments to nurture personal responsibility in one’s life is in college and students in college should take it upon themselves to ensure that they not only score better grades in life but they have also mastered the art of self responsibility which will propel them to higher heights of life.

Bourbon, T. (1994). Discipline at home and at school . New York: Brandt.

This book is about Perceptual control theory PCT on how perceptions determine actions. This theory looks into what happens in the classroom and how teachers try to bring in discipline to the students based on their perceptions.

The student on the other hand has his or her perceptions about what discipline is. This book looks into human behavioral system on how perceptions affect habit and performance of students in the classroom. Thomas Walter Bourbon is a retired professor of psychology who focused his study on physiology and human perceptions.

He has worked with medical research institutions to develop the perceptual control theory into an alternative science. He is now a consultant with various schools and colleges on how they may apply the perception control theory to deal with behavioral problems in school, homes, and in clinical settings.

Chester, C. (2008). Building classroom discipline. Boston: Pearson Education.

This book is indeed helpful to teachers who wish to understand how to model discipline in their classrooms. It looks into the various ways and models of doing this in a way that involves the student.

It shows the impact of discipline on students and how to motivate students in self-responsibility. It also delves into the new ways and trends in the application of classroom discipline. This book is helpful to beginner teachers and teachers in colleges in handling adult students.

Charles Chester the author of the book is a professor in San Diego University and he has many awards accorded to him due to his contribution in the field of classroom discipline. Due to his wealth of experience in classroom, teaching his work is worth of study.

Reiss, S. (2010). What happened to personal responsibility? Chicago, Journal of Psychology (8).

This journal article is a critique on the education system as well as the society as a whole for their failure to instill personal responsibility in the life of students.

Institutions are the ones blamed for individual failures. The author gives an example where if a student fails in the exam or caught cheating in national exams, it is not the student who is to blame but the education system. This kind of attitude irks the author as he questions the kind of society, which we are building without taking responsibility for the consequences of one’s actions.

Steven Reiss is a contributor and a commentator on social issues in the Journal of Psychology today. He teaches psychology in Ohio State University. His research on human motivation makes his work on issues of discipline and personal responsibility authentic.

• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

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Essay on Responsibility

Students are often asked to write an essay on Responsibility in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Responsibility

Understanding responsibility.

Responsibility means being accountable for our actions. It involves making decisions and facing the consequences. It’s a vital life skill, crucial for personal growth.

Types of Responsibility

Responsibility can be personal or social. Personal responsibility involves self-care, while social responsibility involves caring for others and the environment.

Importance of Responsibility

Being responsible helps in building trust and respect. It also aids in developing self-confidence and a sense of accomplishment.

In conclusion, responsibility shapes our character. It’s a key to success, making us reliable and respected individuals.

Also check:

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250 Words Essay on Responsibility

Responsibility is a multifaceted concept that encompasses moral, social, and personal dimensions. It is the obligation to carry out tasks and roles effectively and efficiently, and it is integral to the development of an individual’s character and societal structure.

Moral Responsibility

Moral responsibility refers to the duty one has towards oneself and others, encapsulating the principles of honesty, integrity, and fairness. It involves making conscientious decisions that respect the rights and welfare of others. For instance, a journalist has a moral responsibility to report news objectively, without bias or distortion.

Social Responsibility

On a broader scale, social responsibility concerns the obligations individuals or organizations have towards society. It includes actions that contribute to the welfare of the community, such as volunteering, environmental conservation, or philanthropy. Corporations, too, bear social responsibility, aiming to minimize their negative impact on society while maximizing their positive contributions.

Personal Responsibility

Personal responsibility, meanwhile, involves acknowledging and fulfilling personal commitments and obligations. It is about taking ownership of one’s actions and their consequences. For example, a student has a personal responsibility to complete their assignments on time and to the best of their ability.

The Importance of Responsibility

Responsibility is pivotal in shaping a just and harmonious society. It fosters trust, cooperation, and respect among individuals and groups. Moreover, it promotes personal growth, self-discipline, and resilience. Embracing responsibility, therefore, is a stepping stone towards personal success and societal progress.

In conclusion, responsibility is a cornerstone of ethical conduct and social cohesion. It is an attribute that should be cultivated and cherished for the betterment of individuals and society at large.

500 Words Essay on Responsibility

Introduction.

Responsibility is a fundamental concept that permeates all aspects of life. It is a principle that guides our actions, decisions, and relationships, shaping our character and defining who we are as individuals and as members of society. Understanding responsibility and its implications is crucial to personal development and social cohesion.

Conceptualizing Responsibility

Responsibility is a multifaceted construct. It can be seen as a duty or obligation, an expectation to perform certain tasks or uphold specific standards. It can also be understood as accountability, the acceptance of the consequences of our actions. Responsibility implies a moral dimension, an ethical commitment to do what is right and fair.

Personal responsibility involves taking charge of one’s own actions, decisions, and their outcomes. It is about owning up to mistakes, learning from them, and striving to do better. Personal responsibility is a cornerstone of self-improvement and personal growth. It promotes self-efficacy, self-respect, and integrity.

Beyond the personal realm, responsibility also has a social dimension. Social responsibility refers to the duties and obligations we have towards others and society at large. It is about contributing to the common good, respecting the rights of others, and promoting social justice. Social responsibility fosters empathy, cooperation, and social harmony.

Responsibility and Freedom

Responsibility is intrinsically linked to freedom. With freedom comes responsibility. The more freedom we have, the more responsibility we bear for our actions. Conversely, the more responsible we are, the more freedom we are likely to enjoy. Responsibility and freedom are thus two sides of the same coin, mutually reinforcing and interdependent.

Challenges and Opportunities

Responsibility, while fundamentally important, is not always easy to uphold. It requires self-discipline, moral courage, and a sense of duty. It can sometimes be burdensome and demanding. However, responsibility also presents opportunities. It empowers us to shape our destiny, to make a difference, and to lead a meaningful and fulfilling life.

In conclusion, responsibility is a powerful principle that governs our actions and shapes our character. It is a duty, an accountability, and a moral commitment. It is about taking charge of our actions, contributing to the common good, and respecting the rights of others. Responsibility is a challenge, but also an opportunity. It is a pathway to personal growth, social harmony, and a fulfilling life. Embracing responsibility is thus not only a personal choice but a societal imperative.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

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