define self representation psychology

• Oct 22, 2023
• 16 min read

Social Cognition 101: The Self as a Mental Representation

The “Social Cognition 101” series serves as an exemplary model for our endeavor in the realm of social cognition within the field of experimental psychology. This series aspires to delve deeply into the cognitive mechanisms that underpin our perceptions and understanding of individuals in social contexts, encompassing the intricate dynamics of self-awareness. As we explore these mechanisms, we'll gain insights into how these cognitive processes can sometimes lead to stereotyping and, crucially, how to effectively prevent such biases from taking root. Just as the "101" collection imparts invaluable knowledge and practical strategies, our journey through social cognition promises to unlock the transformative potential of knowledge and personal growth in the context of understanding and interacting with others.

This 101 series is divided into eight articles including:

1. The Self as a Mental Representation

2. The Self Provides Information to Guide Self-Regulation

3. The Self Has Varied Motivations for Self-Regulation

4. The Self Serves as a Reference Point: Attribution Processes

5. Attributional Biases

6. Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP)

7. Heuristics & Shortcuts

8. Stereotyping: Cognition & Biases

Over the course of history, numerous scholars and researchers have endeavored to gain insights into the intricacies of the self. William James’s (1907) analysis laid the groundwork for many enduring concerns, and sociologists Charles Cooley and George Herbert Mead provided frameworks for understanding the self in social interaction (Fiske & Taylor, 2017). In the past several decades, social cognition researchers have taken up this challenge and enhanced our comprehension of the self (Beer, 2012). "The Self is a mental representation" is a statement that reflects a fundamental concept in the field of social cognition. It suggests that the way individuals perceive and understand themselves is constructed within their minds, and this mental representation of the self plays a crucial role in how they navigate social interactions and make sense of the world around them. This ongoing exploration of the self as a mental representation continues to shed light on the intricate interplay between individual psychology and social dynamics, offering valuable insights into human behavior and cognition.

In this sub-topic, a deeper exploration will be conducted into the elements of this mental representation, such as "Self-Concept," "Self-Schemas," "Self-Esteem," and "Culture and the Self (Independent vs. Interdependent Self)" (Fiske & Taylor, 2017). These components are the building blocks of the self as a mental representation, shaping how individuals perceive themselves and interact with others. This chapter begins with the definition of the self.

What Is a Self?

The concept of the self is a central question that has intrigued philosophers, psychologists, and everyday individuals alike for centuries. Historically, philosophers like Plato, Kant, and various religious thinkers have posited the existence of an immortal soul as the essence of the self, transcending physical existence. However, contrasting this metaphysical perspective, philosophers such as David Hume challenged the notion of the self, regarding it as a mere collection of perceptions. In contrast to these philosophical debates, psychologists have taken a more empirical and detailed approach to exploring the self. Research in psychology has revealed that one distinctive trait that sets humans apart from many other creatures is our cognitive capacity for self-reflection and self-awareness. This mental representation of "me" plays a pivotal role in shaping our sense of self. Moreover, the development of self-awareness is significantly influenced by language, conversation, play, and pretend play (Lewis, 2011). Interestingly, a portion of the self exhibits a degree of self-awareness, sometimes referred to as implicit consciousness. This concept of implicit consciousness also encompasses the unaware facets of the self, and it is closely linked to the realm of the unconscious mind.

Researchers have delved into topics such as self-identity, self-esteem, self-regulation, and self-improvement. Notably, studies have suggested that the self holds a special place in memory processing, exhibiting superior information processing for self-relevant material (Markus, 1977; Rogers et al., 1977). Moreover, humans possess a unique inclination to attribute human-like characteristics to both living and non-living entities—a phenomenon known as anthropomorphism. This aspect becomes particularly relevant when considering infants and the origins of self-awareness. For the reason that the attributions made, including labeling emotions verbally, can shape a child's emotional development and self-perception ( Lewis , 2012) . Furthermore, what children learn, including cultural aspects such as emotions, interactions, rules, goals, and standards, is greatly influenced by the teachings and guidance they receive from their environment. This underscores the critical role of culture in shaping one's understanding of the self.

More importantly, mental representation of ourselves not only affects one's self-reported self-image but also influences how others socially evaluate them. Research has shown that the valence ratings of self-images by independent observers can predict expert evaluations of psychological adjustment, even when accounting for self-reported self-esteem and extraversion (Kim et al., 2023). This highlights the intricate interplay between self-perception and the perceptions of others in shaping social cognition.

How Do Individuals Gain Self-knowledge?

The development of self-knowledge in adults is a complex concept influenced by brain maturation and socialization throughout life. Different viewpoints exist, with some focusing on "intersubjectivity," emphasizing shared understanding and communication between infants and caregivers. As a result of this interaction during development, individuals can relate to and understand the mental and emotional states of others, as well as share one's own thoughts and emotions with them. Thus, individuals come to develop a sense of self and self-awareness through their interactions with others. Another perspective suggests that infants possess an implicit, basic sense of their own bodies and existence. This implicit embodied self is the foundation upon which self-knowledge is built. It refers to an early awareness of one's own physical presence and the capacity to engage with the environment through sensory experiences and bodily actions. The idea that this implicit embodied self evolves through interactions with others emphasizes the social and relational aspect of self-development. However, there is a debate about its conceptual and evaluative abilities.

Over time, self-representation becomes more complex and encompasses self-referential behavior like gender identity and age awareness, typically developing between 15 and 24 months of age (Lewis, 1990). However, this timeline may differ in cases such as Down's syndrome and autism. Additionally, children's understanding of others' intentions and abilities, known as the theory of mind, emerges around the second year of life and is related to self-recognition (Meltzoff, 1995). The development of a representational self can be measured with personal pronoun usage, mirror self-recognition, and pretend play, which are associated with specific brain regions.

Researchers in the field of social cognition have developed two primary categories of cognitive models to understand self-knowledge. These models offer distinct approaches to understanding how individuals come to know and define themselves within the social context. The first category, computational models, emphasizes specific self-related events and behaviors. Computational models are mathematical or computer-based representations of cognitive processes involved in social perception, reasoning, and behavior (Hackel & Amodio, 2018). These models are designed to simulate and explain how people make sense of social information, make decisions, and interact with others. They often involve algorithms and mathematical equations to represent the underlying cognitive processes. The second category, abstraction models, shift their focus towards the creation of summary representations that are abstracted from these very experiences (Linville & Fischer, 1993). These models involve reducing the complexity of social stimuli or situations to their essential components or abstract features. Abstraction models aim to understand how people extract, process, and represent these essential features in their minds. In both computational and abstraction models of social cognition, memory is fundamental for processing and interpreting social information. Together, these two categories provide a comprehensive framework for exploring the complex mechanisms behind self-perception and self-awareness, shedding light on the multifaceted nature of self-knowledge acquisition.

Whether through the mathematical representations of cognitive processes in computational models or the mental constructs and categories in abstraction models, memory systems contribute to how individuals understand and interact with the social world. Research findings have indicated that memory processing gives special attention to the self, demonstrating enhanced information handling for self-related content. However, findings on patients with Alzheimer's Dementia further support the idea that self-knowledge may be functionally independent of traditional memory systems, highlighting six potentially separable components of the self (Hodges & Patterson, 1997; Kazuki et al., 2000). These components include episodic memory, personality trait representations, factual life knowledge, personal continuity, agency, and self-reflection. Studying each component individually may help us understand the concept of the unitary self better.

To sum up, the development of a representational self is a bio-psychosocial process that combines brain maturation and cultural/social influences, which begin to shape it from birth. Moreover, self-knowledge is a multifaceted concept that goes beyond traditional memory systems, and understanding its development involves various cognitive and social factors.

The Intricacies of the Self; Exploring Mental Representations and Self-awareness

The concept of the self as a mental representation is fundamental to understanding the interconnectedness of social, cognitive, and emotional abilities in humans. It serves as the core of a developmental system that evolves as engaging with others. Throughout the development, this unified system differentiates and specializes, much like branches growing on a tree trunk, allowing for the integration of knowledge while preserving functional independence. At the heart of this process lies the development of consciousness, which acts as the cornerstone. It transforms sensory experiences into a theory of mind, social interactions into meaningful relationships, and basic emotions into self-conscious feelings. Human consciousness enables all of these transformations to occur. This ability emanates from intricate self-system and mental representation of one's self. It empowers to reflect on past, present, and future selves, shaping cognitive, social, and emotional landscape. This facet of the self emerges through the interplay of biological processes in the brain and the influence of the cultural contexts. Recent advances, such as the Reverse Correlation (RC) method, have allowed researchers to visualize these mental representations of the self. Studies have demonstrated the significant connection between one's self-image and how they are perceived by others. Furthermore, these findings reveal that self-images offer insights beyond what individuals report about themselves, underlining the RC method's value in making implicit aspects of self-image explicit (Kim et al., 2023). While some may argue that the link between self-images and social evaluation is rooted in facial appearance, research suggests otherwise. Although facial attractiveness may influence self-images to some extent, the valence of self-images is not solely determined by physical appearance. Importantly, social evaluation was associated with self-images, not facial attractiveness, indicating that self-images reflect multifaceted psychological factors beyond mere physical attributes.

So, what exactly does the self do? The term "self" encompasses a wide range of meanings, from the self-awareness of infants to the multiple selves that adults exhibit. To address these variations, it is helpful to conceptualize the human body and mind as a complex system. Complex systems exhibit key characteristics like self-regulation, distinguishing between self and other, and the ability to perform intricate actions without constant self-awareness. Some self-systems also possess a mental representation, enabling self-awareness and the capacity to understand that one possess self-knowledge. It is important to note that not all information within this complex system is always accessible to self-awareness, suggesting inherent limitations. What sets humans apart from other creatures is the presence of self-awareness and its cognitive elaboration through cultural learning. This self-awareness hinges on a mental representation of "me" that distinguishes humans from non-human animals. Within the realm of emotions, there exist both emotional states, which can be innate or learned, and the mental representation of those states. These facets of the self begin to develop in early childhood. Intentions and actions sometimes appear to arise effortlessly, leading to self-deception and introducing the concept of a multifaceted, modular self-system.

Self-concept

One's self-concept is a multifaceted and intricate construct that undergoes changes over the course of a lifetime. Starting in childhood, the manner in which individuals are treated by parents, teachers, and friends, along with their participation in different religious, ethnic, or cultural activities, significantly influences the development of their identity. Individuals initiate the process of recognizing their personal traits and the societal expectations placed upon them. These roles, such as being a student or a partner, become integral to one's identity. Additionally, a private sense of self is upheld while different facets are presented to the world. The intricate combination of beliefs and perceptions regarding the self is termed the self-concept (Fiske & Taylor, 2017).

The mental representations of self exhibit high complexity. At times, the central focus revolves around maintaining self-esteem and a consistent self-image. The need for affiliation and effectiveness also exerts influence on cognition, emotions, and actions. This adaptability gives rise to an ever-changing self-encoding process, largely occurring within the framework of person-situation interactions. Within different contexts, distinct facets of the self are activated, guided by the norms and pressures inherent to each situation. This working self-concept concept highlights the idea that diverse facets of the self can direct social conduct in accordance with the specific context. Rather than a single, unified entity, the self-concept is an amalgamation of various selves that come to the forefront in different settings (Markus & Wurf, 1987). How we perceive ourselves in a social gathering is likely to contrast markedly with our self-perception in an educational setting. This variance in the working self-concept elucidates how self-perception guides behavior across varying circumstances.

Furthermore, the self-concept is shaped not only by the situational context but also by the connections established with significant others (Fiske & Taylor, 2017). These relationships leave an imprint on the self-concept, with our understanding of these important individuals becoming an integral component of one's identity. Parents, siblings, close friends, and past and current partners all contribute to the self-concept through the knowledge we possess about them. The activation of mental representations of significant others can induce the emergence of specific relational selves, a phenomenon known as transference. Consider the scenario of returning home for the holidays. Even as an independent and grown individual, the relational selves as a daughter and a younger sister can suddenly become active. This can result in behaviors that contradict the typical self-concept, underscoring the influence of these relational selves on molding interactions.

In many social situations, people often interpret themselves in ways that complement others. They might defer when their relational partner assumes a dominant role, and assume a leading position when the partner defers. Within close-knit groups, personal identities may blend with group identities, motivating individuals to make notable self-sacrifices. Relational selves provide both stability, stemming from enduring representations of significant others, and variability, as different social situations activate different facets of our identity. Thus, self-concept is not a static entity but a dynamic and context-dependent mosaic of selves.

Self-schemas

Self-schemas are cognitive-affective structures representing one's qualities within a specific domain (Fiske & Taylor, 2017). Individuals tend to be more certain about some attributes of themselves while having less clarity about others. These self-schemas primarily pertain to dimensions that hold significance to them. They play a crucial role in organizing how information related to that specific domain is processed. Moreover, possible and feared selves, the envisioned versions of the self we aim to achieve or fear becoming, wield a significant impact on the way self-perception is shaped. These ideas govern thoughts, direct the selection of social roles, and determine the circumstances one can pursue. Importantly, possible selves can evolve in response to external influences, subsequently impacts behavior.

The study from Oyserman, Bybee and Terry (2006) highlights a prominent instance of a short-term intervention, yielding significant and positive outcomes spanning a two-year timeframe. This intervention produced notable enhancements in academic performance, manifesting as augmented test scores and improved grades, along with a notable surge in academic motivation. Concurrently, it engendered reductions in manifestations of depression, instances of school absenteeism, and incidents of misbehavior. The observed transformations were attributed to alterations in the prospective self-concepts that students had assimilated into their overall identity framework. This underscores the pivotal role played by one's self-schemas and the dynamic evolution of potential self-concepts in shaping self-perception and decision-making in life.

Self-esteem

Self-esteem's importance becomes evident in mental self-representation, impacting the evaluation of oneself. It pertains not only to identity but also the assessment of one's attributes. This valuable resource assists in the upkeep of well-being, the establishment of suitable objectives, the enjoyment of positive experiences, and the adept management of demanding circumstances (Christensen, Wood, & Barrett, 2003; Creswell et al., 2005; Sommer & Baumeister, 2002; Wood, Heimpel, & Michela, 2003).

Interestingly, self-esteem has a social dimension as well. The act of sharing oneself with others is naturally enjoyable because it stems from a concern for their opinions (Tamir & Mitchell, 2012). The drive for self-esteem is based on the fundamental need for human connection and the search for external validation (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). In this regard, self-esteem can serve as a sociometer, offering a broad indication of how others perceive us.

Assessments of self-esteem occur on both explicit and implicit levels. Sometimes, these explicit and implicit evaluations conflict, leading people to spend more time understanding their self-conceptions (Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler, 2006). Those with high explicit but low implicit self-esteem often exhibit defensive behaviors (Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2003). The distinction between implicit and explicit self-esteem highlights that not only do we consciously seek to feel good about ourselves, but our unconscious self-evaluations also significantly influence our judgments and actions. This influence extends to our preferences for people, places, and things that resembles oneself—a phenomenon known as implicit egotism (Pelham, Carvallo, & Jones, 2005). Unconscious self-evaluations aren't limited to the trivial; they can even shape major life decisions.

Self-esteem reflects beliefs about what must be achieved or done to establish worth as individuals (Crocker & Knight, 2005). Beyond general self-esteem, domain-specific self-evaluations influence the overall sense of self-worth. These self-worth contingencies shape selectivity regarding the areas on which self-esteem is built. While pursuing a positive self-image is commendable, an excessive pursuit of high self-esteem can have disadvantages (Crocker & Knight, 2005).

In essence, self-esteem serves as a driving force in life. High self-esteem individuals actively seek opportunities to enhance their self-image, while those with low self-esteem tend to avoid situations that might diminish it. Furthermore, people carefully choose the domains on which they build their self-esteem, recognizing that a balanced approach is often the key to a healthier self-concept.

Neural Bases of Self-views

The neural bases of self-views play a crucial role in the ability to navigate the world effectively. To function well, one must distinguish between what is "me" and what is "not me." This distinction involves activity in the left hemisphere of the prefrontal cortex (Kircher et al., 2002; Turk et al., 2002). Subjective sense of self seems to emerge from the functions of a left-hemisphere interpreter, which integrates various self-relevant processes across different brain regions (Gazzaniga, 2000).

In a study conducted by Ochsner et al. (2005), participants had their brains scanned while they rated adjectives describing themselves, a friend, their friend's perception of them, or someone less close to them. The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) was consistently active during all tasks involving personal evaluations, highlighting its role in social judgment. A broader network, including the posterior cingulate/precuneus and parts of the temporal lobe, was also activated during both self and other evaluations. Notably, evaluations of oneself and close others engaged distinct brain pathways compared to evaluations of less-close individuals. To discern self-ratings from ratings of close others, the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) came into play. Self-appraisals activated both the mPFC and the right rostrolateral PFC. Moreover, Brodmann's area 10 showed activity during self-judgment. Brodmann's area 10, also known as the frontopolar prefrontal cortex, is involved in higher-order cognitive functions and executive processes include complex decision-making, social cognition, prospective memory (remembering to do things in the future), and monitoring and integrating information from various sources for goal-directed behavior. Thus, activation in this area suggests that self-knowledge has a degree of independence from information about close others within the medial prefrontal cortex.

When it comes to self-views, neuroimaging can distinguish between processing self-schematic information and non-self-schematic information. Contemplating information related to your self-concept triggers specific brain regions responsible for automatic, emotional, and motivational processes. These regions include the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the nucleus accumbens, and the amygdala. As your self-concept solidifies in a particular domain, its neural representation appears to shift toward brain regions associated with affective, motivational, and automatic processing (Lieberman, Jarcho, & Satpute, 2004).

Culture Cognition and Emotion

Culture plays a significant role in shaping cognition and emotions. One fundamental difference lies in the concept of individualism versus collectivism (Fiske & Taylor, 2017; Oyserman & Lee, 2008; Triandis, 2018). In Western societies, individualism is emphasized, focusing on personal goals, independence, and self-expression. In contrast, East Asian societies tend to prioritize collectivism, emphasizing group harmony, interdependence, and meeting community expectations.

The impact of individualism and collectivism extends its influence in human cognition, thus mental representation domains' of the self. This distinction extends to self-perception (Darwish & Huber, 2003). Those with an independent sense of self view themselves as distinct individuals and strive to achieve personal goals. On the other hand, individuals with interdependent self-construals consider their relationships with others and the social context when defining themselves. These cultural differences also impact memory and social inferences (Uleman, 2018). European Americans tend to overlook social context when making inferences, while those with interdependent self-construals pay more attention to relational aspects. Moreover, emotional experiences are influenced by one's sense of self (Hess & Hareli, 2017). People with an independent sense of self often experience ego-focused emotions like pride or frustration over personal achievements or setbacks. In contrast, cultures with interdependent self-conceptions tend to experience other-focused emotions, such as the Japanese concept of "amae" which involves being lovingly pampered by others. Furthermore, the sense of self also affects self-esteem (Chung & Mallery, 1999). Those with an independent sense of self are more likely to endorse self-esteem items, while the importance of self-esteem varies between independent and interdependent cultures. In interdependent cultures, approval from others for adhering to social norms is a better predictor of life satisfaction.

Situational factors in different cultures also play a role. In the United States, situations encourage self-enhancement, while Japanese situations promote self-criticism. Researchers have questioned the nature of self-esteem across cultures. People from interdependent cultures who score high on Western self-esteem scales exhibit behaviors consistent with high self-esteem in Western cultures. Additionally, even in interdependent cultures, there are tendencies to self-enhance indirectly (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997).

William James advocated separating structural and content aspects when considering cross-cultural differences. Certain structural aspects may be universal, while content aspects are heavily influenced by culture. One's culture shapes one's self-concept. Independent cultures view the self as unique, autonomous, and distinct from others, while interdependent cultures see the self as part of social relationships, adjusting behavior according to others' thoughts, feelings, and actions. Furthermore, the content of self-awareness differs between Western and non-Western cultures, with the Western idea of a single, independent self contrasting with the "we-self" found in cultures like Japan and India. This highlights the complex interplay between culture, cognition, and emotion in shaping our identities.

Conclusions

The self is not a static entity but a complex and context-dependent mosaic of selves that come into play in different situations and relationships. Self-concept is shaped by the roles individuals assume in society, the influential people in their lives, and their personal assessments of their attributes. Self-schemas are essential for organizing and handling self-related data, while potential selves steer aspirations and fears, influencing decisions and actions. Neuroscientific research has revealed the neural bases of self-views, highlighting the left hemisphere's role in distinguishing between "me" and "not me." Additionally, self-esteem plays a vital role in self-perception, affecting one's well-being, goal-setting, and social interactions. Additionally, culture exerts a substantial influence on the shaping of perceptions about oneself, where individualism and collectivism represent separate cultural models affecting self-construal, emotional responses, and self-esteem. Understanding the interplay between culture, cognition, and emotion is crucial in comprehending the complexities of the self.

In the quest to answer the question "Who are you?" philosophers continue to ponder the nature of the self, while psychologists explore its role in memory, social interactions, and various aspects of human behavior. The self, as a mental representation, remains a captivating subject at the intersection of these intellectual pursuits, inviting continued exploration and inquiry into the essence of the self in social cognition. It is a concept that continues to evolve, offering valuable insights into the intricate interplay between individual psychology and social dynamics, enriching our understanding of human nature and our place in the world.

In conclusion, the concept of the self as a mental representation is a multifaceted and dynamic aspect of human cognition and behavior that has intrigued philosophers, psychologists, and scholars throughout history. From William James's foundational ideas to the frameworks of Charles Cooley and George Herbert Mead, the exploration of the self has evolved and deepened over time. Contemporary research in social cognition has contributed significantly to our understanding of the self, shedding light on its various components, such as self-concept, self-schemas, self-esteem, and the influence of culture on the self.

Bibliographical References

Chung, T., Mallery, P. (199). Social comparison, individualism-collectivism, and self-esteem in China and the United States. Curr Psychol 18, 340–352. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-999-1008-0

Cooley, C. H. (1902). Human nature and the social order. New York: Scribners.

Costin, V., & Vignoles, V. L. (2021). What do people find most meaningful? how representations of the self and the world provide meaning in life. Journal of Personality , 90 (4), 541–558. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/jopy.12682

Darwish, A.-F. E., & Huber, G. L. (2003). Individualism vs collectivism in different cultures: A cross-cultural study. Intercultural Education , 14 (1), 47–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/1467598032000044647

Fiske, S.T. & Taylor, S. (2017). Social Cognition. From brain to Culture. 3rd edition. Sage Publication. Chapter 5.

Gazzaniga, M. S. (2000). Cerebral specialization and interhemispheric communication: Does the corpus callosum enable the human condition? Brain, 123, 1293–1326.

Hackel, L. M., & Amodio, D. M. (2018). Computational neuroscience approaches to social cognition. Current Opinion in Psychology , 24 , 92–97. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2018.09.001

Hess, U., & Hareli, S. (2017). The social signal value of emotions: The role of contextual factors in social inferences drawn from emotion displays. In J.-M. Fernández-Dols & J. A. Russell (Eds.), The science of facial expression (pp. 375–393). Oxford University Press.

Hodges, J. R., & Patterson, K. (1997). Semantic memory disorders. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 1 (2), 68–72.

James, W. (1907). Pragmatism. New York: Longmans-Green

Kazuki, H., Hashimoto, M., Hirono, N., Mamura, T., Taniimukai, S., Hanihara, T., Ikeda, M., Komori, K., & Mori, E. (2000). A study of remote memory in Alzheimer’s disease using the family line test. Dementia and Geriatric Cognitive Disorders, 11 , 53–58.

Kim, J., Moon, K., Kim, S., Kim, H., & Ko, Y. (2023). The relationship between mental representations of self and social evaluation: Examining the validity and usefulness of visual proxies of self-image. Frontiers in Psychology , 13 . https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.937905

Kircher, T. T. J., Brammer, M., Bullmore, E., Simmons, A., Bartels, M., & David, A. S. (2002). The neural correlates of intentional and incidental self processing. Neuropsychologia, 40, 683–692.

Klein, S. B., Rozendal, K., & Cosmides, L. (2002). A social-cognitive neuroscience analysis of the self. Social Cognition , 20 (2), 105–135. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.20.2.105.20991

Lewis, M. (1990). Social knowledge and social behavior. Special Issue of Merrill-Palmer Quarterly , 36 (1), 93-116.

Lewis, M. (2011). The origins and uses of self-AWARENESSS or the mental representation of me. Consciousness and Cognition , 20 (1), 120–129. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2010.11.002

Lewis, M. (Ed.). (2012). Children’s emotions and moods: Developmental theory and measurement . Springer Science & Business Media.

Lieberman, M. D., Jarcho, J. M., & Satpute, A. B. (2004). Evidence-based and intuition-based self-knowledge: An fMRI study. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 421–435.

Linville, P. W., & Fischer, G. W. (1993). Exemplar and abstraction models of perceived group variability and stereotypicality. Social Cognition , 11 (1), 92–125. https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.1993.11.1.92

Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 35 (2), 63–78. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.35.2.63

Markus, H., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic self-concept: A Social Psychological Perspective. Annual Review of Psychology , 38 (1), 299–337. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.38.020187.001503

Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Meltzoff, A. N. (1995). Understanding the intentions of others: Re-enactment of intended acts by 18-month-old children. Developmental Psychology , 31 (5), 838–850. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.31.5.838

Ochsner, K. N., Beer, J. S., Robertson, E. R., Cooper, J. C., Gabrieli, J. D. E., Kihlstrom, J. F., et al. (2005). The neural correlates of direct and reflected self-knowledge. NeuroImage, 28, 797–814.

Oyserman, D., & Lee, S. W. (2008). Does culture influence what and how we think? effects of priming individualism and collectivism. Psychological Bulletin , 134 (2), 311–342. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.134.2.311

Oyserman, D., Bybee, D., & Terry, K. (2006). Possible selves and academic outcomes: How and when possible selves Impel Action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 91 (1), 188–204. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.91.1.188

Rogers, T. B., Kuiper, N. A., & Kirker, W. S. (1977). Self-reference and the encoding of personal information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 35 (9), 677–688. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.35.9.677

Triandis, H. C. (2018). Attributes of individualism and collectivism. Individualism and Collectivism , 43–80. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429499845-3

Turk, D. J., Heatherton, T. F., Kelley, W. M., Funnell, M. G., Gazzaniga, M. S., & Macrae, C. N. (2002). Mike or me? Self-recognition in a splitbrain patient. Nature Neuroscience, 5, 841–842.

Uleman, J. S. (2018). I/C: Individualism/collectivism or individuate/categorise? Asian Journal of Social Psychology , 21 (4), 317–323. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajsp.12330

Visual Sources

Arcadia, has many categories starting from Literature to Science. If you liked this article and would like to read more, you can subscribe from below or click the bar and discover unique more  experiences  in our articles in many categories

Let the posts come to you.

Thanks for submitting!

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

• Publications
• Account settings

Preview improvements coming to the PMC website in October 2024. Learn More or Try it out now .

• Advanced Search
• Journal List
• HHS Author Manuscripts

Finding the “self” in self-regulation: The identity-value model

Many psychological theories suggest a link between self-regulation and identity, but until now a mechanistic account that suggests ways to improve self-regulation has not been put forth. The identity-value model (IVM) connects the idea from social psychology, that aspects of identity such as core values and group affiliations hold positive subjective value, to the process-focused account from decision-making and behavioral economics, that self-regulation is driven by a dynamic value integration across a range of choice attributes. Together, these ideas imply that goal-directed behaviors that are identity-relevant are more likely to be enacted because they have greater subjective value than identity-irrelevant behaviors. A central hypothesis, therefore, is that interventions that increase the degree to which a target behavior is perceived as self-relevant will improve self-regulation. Additionally, identity-based changes in self-regulation are expected to be mediated by changes in subjective value and its underlying neural systems. In this paper, we define the key constructs relevant to the IVM, explicate the model and delineate its boundary conditions, and describe how it fits with related theories. We also review disparate results in the research literature that might share identity-related value as a common underlying mechanism of action. We close by discussing questions about the model whose answers could advance the study of self-regulation.

Guiding one’s actions toward goals and away from behaviors that detract from those goals, referred to as self-regulation, is a perennial challenge for human beings. To study goals and how they are more or less successfully pursued is to study a constellation of issues that revolve around the tension between different types of rewards, such as those that are delivered immediately versus later in time ( Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992 ), those motivated primarily by hot versus cold processes ( Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999 ), and rewards that are more concrete and proximal versus abstract and distal ( Trope & Liberman, 2003 ). We use the term self-regulation to refer to the set of processes that aligning behavior with long-term goals ( Carver & Scheier, 1998 ), and self-control to refer to the process of resolving conflicts between lower-order and higher-order goals ( Duckworth & Gross, 2014 ).

In this article, we present a process-oriented model of self-control that posits a central role for identity in goal directed behavior. This model shares the assumption of many decision-making models that behavior is driven by a value integration process in which the values of heterogeneous choice attributes (e.g., primary reward value, self-relevance, effort) are dynamically accumulated until a threshold is met, triggering behavior. Focusing on this value-based choice process as a mechanism of self-regulation is highly advantageous for three reasons. First, it opens channels of knowledge into the self-regulation literature from otherwise unrelated areas of social psychology (e.g., self, identity, and reward) and from neighboring fields (e.g., social neuroscience, neuroeconomics, and philosophy). Second, a value integration model of self-regulation can explain results from social psychology and other fields that are not fully accommodated by current models of self-regulation. And third, it provides avenues for interventions to improve self-regulation that target its underlying valuation process.

The Identity-Value Model (IVM) focuses on a specific kind of value—that derived from identity—as a particularly potent motivating factor in self-control. In a self-control conflict, many kinds of inputs can contribute to the total subjective value of each choice option. From this perspective, a successful act of self-control reflects the tipping point at which the cumulative subjective value of a self-controlled behavior (i.e., one of the choice options that is in line with the long-term goal) exceeds that of the alternatives. The subjective value of each response option can be derived from many different sources (e.g., hedonic value, social influence, effort cost), but the IVM emphasizes the role of identity because it is superordinate to many self-regulatory goals ( Carver & Scheier, 1998 ) and relatively enduring, and may even be inherently intertwined in the computation of subjective value ( Northoff & Hayes, 2011 ).

The overarching prediction of the IVM is that identity can promote self-control in identity-relevant domains by increasing the value of goal-relevant behaviors (i.e., actions, decisions, and choices) that, were they not seen as self-relevant, would be undervalued relative to alternative behaviors. This hypothesis assumes that a relevant aspect of identity is salient and perceived as related to the self-controlled behavior. For example, consider someone who is trying to quit smoking. The IVM predicts that, all else being equal, a person will be more likely to succeed in resisting a temptation to smoke—both at a given moment and cumulatively across the quit attempt—to the extent that she identifies as a “quitter” and that her quitter identity tends to be salient at the times that she decides whether to smoke.

Though the cumulative value of a behavior derives from many sources, the IVM places particular emphasis on the role of identity as a source of value for self-regulatory behaviors. The rationale for focusing on identity is that it is, by definition, relatively stable across time and contexts compared to other potential sources of value (e.g., social influence or monetary incentives). Identity exists on a comparable plane with long-term goals in the sense that it is relatively abstract and enduring. Additionally, aspects of identity are generally positively valued and chronically accessible. Together, these features of identity (stability, positivity, and accessibility) make it a promising target for interventions that aim to increase self-regulation by increasing the value of goal-relevant behaviors. If being a quitter (or a dieter or an exerciser) is part of a person’s identity and integral to who she aspires to be, then maintaining and reinforcing that identity will be valuable across time and in a variety of situations.

The model pulls together several distinct yet related threads of inquiry from social psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and neuroeconomics that have evolved in parallel but have yet to be woven together into a unifying framework ( Figure 1 ). The IVM builds in particular on two core ideas: that identity-relevant behaviors are more valued than identity-irrelevant ones, and that a subjective value integration is a mechanism by which self-control decisions are made. In addition to the data behind these two ideas, the theory is supported by evidence that identity can improve self-control in domains that part of one’s self-concept (here referred to as identified domains); that the neural systems related to identity and value are substantially overlapping in dopaminergic regions such as the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC); and that activation in the vmPFC and related regions mediate self-control success when relevant aspects of identity are made salient. In articulating this model, we lay out its assumptions and describe how it accounts for a number of results across a range of self-regulation behaviors. We close by discussing several questions the model poses that are currently unanswered.

The identity-value model of self-regulation. Identity, among other factors, contributes to the subjective value of goal-consistent behaviors to the extent that the goal is identity-relevant. The cumulative subjective value of the behavior is compared to the value of other response options (only one shown, but more are possible), and the behavior with the highest subjective value is enacted. All else being equal, therefore, increasing the identity relevance of a goal will facilitate behaviors that foster goal progress.

Theory and evidence

The main prediction of the IVM is that behaviors that are connected to identity are more likely to be enacted because they hold greater subjective value. To the extent that self-control reflects the output of a value comparison among response options, then self-regulatory goals (e.g., smoking cessation, dieting, exercise) that are more central to identity will have more value and consequently be more likely to succeed. The subjective value of a given behavior is determined by a number of input sources including, but not limited to, identity ( Figure 1 ).

What do we mean by self-regulation and self-control?

Self-regulation is defined here as the process of directing one’s actions, thoughts, and feelings toward a goal ( Carver & Scheier, 2011 ). A goal is a cognitive construct that specifies an intended outcome, typically one that is relatively long in duration and wide in scope compared to immediate or hedonic goals. Goals are embedded in an action hierarchy with long-term, abstract, “be” goals at the top and short-term, concrete, “do” goals at the bottom ( Carver & Scheier, 1998 ). For example, “eat healthfully” is a high-level goal that might require self-control in cases when it conflicts with the low-level goal to “eat this donut”. Our working definition, then, is that self-control is the set of processes that promote the enactment of psychologically distant goals when they conflict with psychologically proximal ones. It is noteworthy that in this definition self-control includes not only overriding or inhibiting prepotent responses (typically referred to as inhibitory control) but also biasing behavior toward desired responses, usually in the face of prepotent alternative responses or mere inertia (sometimes referred to as goal striving). Self-control is a critical component of self-regulation because goal conflicts are common.

Self-control is usually considered to operate through a competition between two opposing processes: one control process that promotes successful self-regulation by impelling behavior toward a goal and a second impulsive process that promotes failed self-regulation by impelling behavior toward an alternative behavior that is counter to the goal ( Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009 ). For example, in the classic dieter’s dilemma, the impulsive process is a craving for a tasty but high-calorie snack and the control process is the ability to resist the craving (e.g., through attentional deployment, cognitive control, or some other top-down process). These “dual process” models explain the outcome of a given self-control effort as the product of a competition between the two processes, whereby the stronger “wins out” to enact the behavior.

The dominant process is nearly always inferred by observation. For example, if a hungry participant does not eat a tempting food then his behavior is attributed to effective self-control, but if he eats it this is attributed to poor self-control and/or excessive impulsiveness. Using this logic to infer a mental process from observed behavior is a key limitation of studies on dual process models because it is somewhat circular; if there are only two outcomes, then only two processes can be inferred. Thus, no pattern of observations can falsify the model in studies following this template. Also problematic is the lack of a specific mechanism by which the conflict between the two processes is resolved.

A valuation-based model of self-control addresses both of these issues. If both processes serve as inputs to a common valuation process instead of interacting directly with one another, then additional (third, fourth, etc.) processes can contribute to self-control conflict resolution simply by also contributing to the value calculation. Researchers in behavioral economics and decision science have built computational models of a value-integration process that capture many of the properties of self-control choices, and these models are beginning to be articulated in a coherent way across psychological, computational, and neural levels (Berkman, Hutcherson, Livingston, Kahn, & Inzlicht, in press). Valuation, then, represents a parsimonious framework to understand how multiple processes come together and give rise to specific patterns of behavior during self-control, where the relevant neural systems are and how they interact, and at what points in the process interventions are mostly likely to be effective and enduring.

What do we mean by “identity”?

Following the long history of the study of self and identity in psychology, we define identity as a relatively stable mental representation of the self that includes, but is not limited to, cherished core values and beliefs, social identities, long-term goals, and important past experiences ( McAdams, 2013 ; Swann & Bosson, 2010 ). This definition fits with the narrative, edited aspect of the self that William James classically referred to as the “Me,” which is to be distinguished from the phenomenological “stream of consciousness” aspect of self or “I” ( James, 1890 ). Neuroimaging has shown that thinking about one’s own beliefs and values (e.g., Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006 ), identities (e.g., Pfeifer, Kahn, Merchant, Peake, Veroude, Masten, et al., 2013 ), and past experiences (e.g., Bonnici, Chadwick, Lutti, Hassabis, Weiskopf, & Maguire, 2012 ) all recruit activity in the vmPFC, suggesting that these aspects of identity are related to each other at a computational level.

Though our definition casts identity as a representation that is relatively stable across time, the IVM also draws upon the notion of a “working self-concept”—that different aspects of the whole of identity can be more or less salient in a given moment ( Markus & Kunda, 1986 ). We use the term identity to reflect both the active (i.e., salient and accessible in the moment) and inactive (i.e., relatively less salient and accessible) parts of the self-concept, which includes core values, social identities, long-term goals, past experiences, and so forth, but assume that the effects of identity are primarily driven by its active parts. Because the IVM holds that the active identity directs both motivation (e.g., subjective value) and cognition (e.g., information processing) in the moment, aligning goals and identity—and particularly the working self-concept—is a critically important step toward goal achievement. (This also implies that individuals with larger working memory capacities would self-regulate more effectively if some aspects of their identities were goal-relevant. There is some evidence for this, e.g., Schmeichel & Demaree, 2010 ; Schmeichel, Volkhov, & Demaree, 2008 .) In short, we predict that behaviors related to active aspects of identity will have greater subjective value than behaviors that are related to inactive aspects or unrelated to identity entirely.

Another definitional issue related to identity is the distinction between the “actual self”, or the self-concept an individual believes to be currently accurate, and the “ideal self”, or the self-concept toward which an individual strives ( Higgins, 1987 ). We define identity to include aspects of both. For example, someone can identify as a smoker (actual self) but also strongly desire to be a quitter (ideal self). In these cases, one factor that drives which of the two will “win out” is the degree to which one versus the other is more central (vs. peripheral) to identity ( Greenwald et al., 2002 ), which would presumably make it more likely to occupy the working self-concept, or to be active, at any given moment. A central challenge in self-regulation, then, is to maintain within one’s working self-concept the goal-relevant aspects of one’s ideal, as opposed to actual, self. We return to the matter of actual and ideal selves in the final section, but for now it will suffice to note what we consider to be parts of identity that can, in turn, endow related behaviors with subjective value.

What do we mean by “subjective value”?

Value has been given a variety of definitions in the research literature, but here we use it to refer to a subjective sense of net reward or utility (positive value) or punishment or disutility (negative value) associated with a given behavior ( Camerer & Loewenstein, 2004 ; Kahneman, 2003 ). Value is important to self-regulation because choices about behaviors relevant to goals play out through a value accumulation process: attributes, including the identity-relevance, of each response option are assigned a weighted value and dynamically integrated to guide choice (Berkman et al., in press). Value is a continuous, stochastic, and fluctuating process that depends on which choices are presented and which of their attributes are salient. For the purposes of the IVM, value is a “common currency” that enables a comparison among qualitatively different outcomes ( Georgescu-Roegen, 1968 ; Glimcher & Rustichini, 2004 ). For example, in deciding whether or not to go for a run, an exerciser might compare the anticipated negative value derived from the effort and discomfort of running against the anticipated positive value associated with living up to social expectations and his or her long-term goals and identity. The term “value” is sometimes used synonymously with “reward”; however, reward generally refers to the outcome of a decision, whereas value refers to the expected outcome ( Montague, King-Casas, & Cohen, 2006 ). As such, subjective value is computed in the pre-choice period, after options have been considered but before a decision has been made. In the behavioral economics and neuroeconomics literatures, this kind of value is called “decision value” because it represents a key input to the decision-making process ( Chib, Rangel, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2009 ).

One way that researchers in neuroeconomics have sought to understand the processes behind the unified value calculation is by identifying its neuroanatomical substrates. With remarkable consistency, these researchers have found that activity in the vmPFC and related mesolimbic dopamine structures such as the orbitofrontal cortex, OFC, and the ventral striatum, VS ( Wallis, 2007 ) tracks closely with the subjective value of a variety of stimuli including food, goods, money, and charitable donations ( Chib et al., 2009 ; Gallagher, McMahan, & Schoenbaum, 1999 ; Hare, Camerer, Knoepfle, O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2010 ; Izuma, Saito, Sadato, 2008 ; Levy & Glimcher, 2011 ; O’Doherty, 2007 ). Thus, there is substantial overlap in the neuroanatomical regions involved in subjective value and identity.

Prediction 1: Identity in a domain increases the value of domain-relevant behaviors

The first hypothesis of the IVM is that there is a positive relationship between identity and value. Identified constructs (e.g., goals, relationships, beliefs) will have higher subjective value than non-identified constructs. Enacting identified behaviors has value because it verifies one’s identity to one’s self ( Swann, Pelham, & Krull, 1989 ). An important conceptual distinction here is between core values , which are part of one’s identity (e.g., loyalty), and subjective value , which is a momentary evaluation of the subjective worth of a particular action, object, belief, choice, etc. This first prediction is meant to describe the relationship between identity (including core values) and subjective value. For example, if the principle that “education is important” were a core value in a person’s identity, then that person would be hypothesized to value, say, a college degree and be more disposed to work hard at academics compared to someone who does not identify with the importance of education.

The relationship between identity and value is a core tenant of many theories from social psychology. One of the fundamental conclusions of the rich history of research on self-esteem is that people are motivated to maintain a positive self-image ( Rosenberg, 1979 ), and that maintaining valued identities is one of the main ways that we do so ( Crocker & Wolfe, 2001 ; Pelham, 1995 ; Pelham & Swann, 1989 ). One theorist even compared the self to a totalitarian regime in its apparent motive to see itself as fundamentally good, stable, and consistent ( Greenwald, 1980 ). A central prediction of Self-Affirmation Theory ( Steele, 1988 ) is that affirming personal values buffers the self from threats. Recent perspectives from neuroscience, which we will review further below, also point to a close interconnection between identity and reward/value ( Kim & Johnson, 2014a ; Northoff & Hayes, 2011 ). Together, this work suggests that (a) maintaining a global, positive, and unified sense of self (“self-integrity”) is a fundamental motive for humans, and (b) one of the main ways people do this is by integrating specific positive core values (e.g., family), broad goals (e.g., be kind), and social group memberships (e.g., social psychologists) into their identities.

The strategy of coupling identity to value has both risks and benefits. On one hand, research on Social Identity Theory ( Tajfel & Turner, 1979 ) has shown how threats to social identity can motivate group-based discrimination such as in-group favoritism and out-group bias ( Brewer, 1979 ), or cause disidentification from certain identities that are seen as unfavorable or unwelcoming to other identities (e.g., women distance themselves from STEM fields following exposure to gender stereotypic TV ads; Davies, Spencer, Quinn, & Gerhardstein, 2002 ). On the other hand, because different aspects of the self are linked and value is somewhat fluid between them, bolstering one part of one’s identity can protect other parts from threats or the whole from integrity threat ( Cohen & Sherman, 2014 ; Sherman & Cohen, 2002 ). Deriving a sense of self-worth from core values and group memberships has both positive and negative consequences that follow from the fact that those core values and groups are closely linked with the self. An important consideration for the IVM, then, is that the failure of goals that are closely linked to the self will be threatening and could cause goal disengagement. We will return to this issue below in our discussion of potential interventions based on the model.

A parsimonious way of integrating the findings reviewed above is by positing that, among its cognitive functions such as attentional biasing, identity also plays the motivational role of maintaining and protecting the positive value of the self and its linked construct. Social identities, long-term goals, and core values contribute to positive self-esteem by increasing the subjective value of objects related to the self, which then become part of the extended self ( Belk, 1989 ; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982 ; Kim & Johnson, 2014b ). Notably, the boost in subjective value associated with ownership of objects, i.e., the endowment effect ( Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991 ), extends as well to beliefs and attitudes ( De Dreu & van Knippenberg, 2005 ). Self-enhancement (e.g., through in-group favoritism or positive illusions) feels good in part because it increases value of the identity, and self-threat (e.g., discrimination or negative health effects of identified behaviors) feel bad in part because it decreases the value of the identity. Different aspects of identity have varying levels of value, each contributing to a global sense of self-worth, with more central and active aspects contributing with a greater weight than more peripheral and inactive aspects ( Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984 ). This idea is related to the notion from Self-Affirmation Theory that affirming activities such as thinking or writing about core values protects the self from threats—even ones unrelated to the self-affirmation—by making the value of the self more salient relative to the threats against it ( Sherman, 2013 ). In both cases, self-enhancement and self-threat contribute toward a global, fluctuating sense of self-worth and integrity. Engaging in behaviors that promote and reinforce the value and integrity of the self, therefore, becomes an effective way to maintain self-worth.

An interesting theoretical nuance is the question of directionality: Does identity lead to value, or do behaviors that are valued for another reason (e.g., extrinsic rewards) become incorporated into one’s identity? These are not mutually exclusive, so a bidirectional relationship is one possibility. For the present purposes, we note that the IVM accommodates either a unidirectional relationship from identity to value or a bidirectional relationship (an advantage of the model), so this issue does not need to be resolved at this point. However, it remains an important question for identity research that deserves empirical attention, and one that will re-emerge in the discussion below about the potential of identity-bolstering interventions to increase self-regulation.

Neuroimaging data relevant to Prediction 1: Overlapping neural systems for identity and subjective value

Our model claims that aspects of identity hold subjective value because of the strong motive to maintain self-worth. Evidence for this comes from social psychology, but it remains mostly indirect because the construct of value is inferred based on behavior and not easily directly measured. Corroborating, though still indirect, evidence for the link between identity and value comes from the related field of social neuroscience, where researchers have investigated the brain regions and networks that underlie many of the social psychological concepts relevant to the conceptual model in Figure 1 , especially identity (and self-concept) and subjective value.

One of the marquee claims of social neuroscience is that self-reflection and social cognition are distinct from other kinds of information processing, reflected in a special role of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), and particularly its ventral aspect (i.e., the vmPFC), in those processes ( Amodio & Frith, 2006 ; Mitchell, 2009 ). Though the veracity of that claim is still debated, the evidence marshaled in its favor is relevant here because the evidence has consistently found the vmPFC to be a locus of self-related information processing. The vmPFC, among other regions, is active when people reflect on their traits ( Kelley, Macrae, Wyland, Caglar, Inati, & Heatherton, 2002 ; Pfeifer, Lieberman, & Dapretto, 2007 ), attitudes and preferences ( Ames, Jenkins, Banaji, & Mitchell, 2008 ; Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006 ), and ongoing emotional experience ( Ochsner, Knierim, Ludlow, Hanelin, Ramachandran, Glover, et al., 2004 ; Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002 ). A recent meta-analysis of over 200 neuroimaging studies further supports the role of mPFC in self-related processes, particularly implicating the vmPFC in self-processing ( Van Overwalle, 2009 ).

A separate line of work has evolved in the neuroeconomics literature implicating the vmPFC in the computation of subjective value (referred to in economics as decision utility). This work conceptualizes decision-making as value-based choice process ( Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008 ), and consistently finds the vmPFC to be involved in value computations of both appetitive and aversive stimuli ( Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007 ). The vmPFC appears to integrate information across a range of properties about a stimulus to produce a final value signal that includes stimulus properties, active goals, costs, and other types of choice-relevant information ( Rangel & Hare, 2010 ). Activity in the vmPFC tracks the subjective value of a range of stimulus types ( Lebreton, Jorge, Michel, Thirion, & Pessiglione, 2009 ; Padoa-Schioppa & Assad, 2006 ; Philiastides, Biele, & Heekeren, 2010 ). For example, vmPFC activity predicts choice regardless of whether the stimuli in question are food or money ( Levy & Glimcher, 2011 ). A related study found that activity in vmPFC scales with the subjective value of a monetary gain for oneself and another person ( Zaki, Lopez, & Mitchell, 2014 ). These findings converge in identifying the vmPFC as playing a central role in the integration of subjective value.

The presumptive purpose of this “unified valuation” system that integrates across disparate outcomes is to facilitate choice among them ( Levy & Glimcher, 2011 ). For example, the vmPFC value signal predicts decisions regardless of whether they appear to be driven by impulsive or self-controlled processes (e.g., keeping money vs. giving it to charity, or eating unhealthy vs. healthy foods; Hare, Camerer, Knoepfle, O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2010 ; Hare, Malmaud, & Rangel, 2011a ). In another study, participants separately rated the tastiness and healthiness of a series of food stimuli, and then made choices about whether or not to eat each food (with one choice randomly selected at the conclusion of the study and given to the participant to eat). Activity in vmPFC predicted stimulus value (i.e., choice) regardless of whether the choice was driven by health or taste concerns ( Hare, Camerer, & Rangel, 2009 ). The vmPFC thus appears to be a point of convergence for value-related information during choice.

Consistent with this idea, vmPFC receives inputs from other brain regions depending on the contextual cues and response options available. For example, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) is functionally connected with the vmPFC when higher-order goals such as health concerns or social factors are made salient ( Hare et al., 2010 ; 2011a ; Hutcherson, Plassman, Gross, & Rangel, 2012 ). There is also evidence that the value of potential response options are reflected in the vmPFC before specific action plans are selected ( Wunderlich, Rangel, & O’Doherty, 2010 ), but that value signals provide input to downstream brain regions that are responsible for selecting and implementing motor plans ( Hare, Schultz, Camerer, O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2011b ). Taken together, then, the emerging view from the neuroeconomics literature is that the vmPFC represents a point of convergence for a variety of input signals that are relevant to the decision at hand, and its activation reflects a dynamic value integration process that subsequently biases behavior toward high-valued actions.

Noting the similarity in the brain regions involved between studies of self and value, scholars have now begun directly investigating the overlap between these two. For example, when directly choosing between monetary reward and self-disclosure (e.g., choosing between keeping information private for $0.02 vs. sharing information for $0.01), individuals in many cases were willing to forego the former in favor of the latter, and this disclosure was associated with increased activation in the vmPFC in addition to other mesolimbic dopamine structures ( Tamir & Mitchell, 2012 ). Another study dissociated value from self-relevance by crossing an endowment manipulation with an ingroup/outgroup manipulation; participants were scanned before and after they imagined owning an item that was highly valued by either an ingroup or an outgroup member ( Kim & Johnson, 2014a ). The vmPFC was more active when participants imagined ingroup items that increased in value post-ownership, and also when participants imagined outgroup items that later decreased in value. Furthermore, this effect was moderated by ingroup-outgroup implicit associations such that more ingroup bias was associated with greater vmPFC increases for ingroup items and greater decreases for outgroup items. This pattern of results supports the role of vmPFC in a unified subjective value calculation that reflects not only monetary value (e.g., ownership) but also social value (e.g., ingroup preference) vis-a-vis the self. In line with an account of vmPFC reflecting a hybrid of momentary self-relevance and value, the researchers characterized its function as “assign[ing] significance to self-relevant experiences based on individuals’ motivations (needs, goals) that are salient at a given moment” ( Kim & Johnson, 2014a ).

To provide further evidence of the coupling between identity and value at the level of neural function, we used the Neurosynth database ( Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011 ) to conduct a meta-analysis and conjunction of studies on identity (“self” and “self-referential” terms in the database) and value (“value” term in the database). At the time of the meta-analysis (March 2017) there were 903 studies related to identity/self and 344 related to value. For both of these, we computed a forward-inference map of activations that are likely to appear (with 1% family-wise error rate) in studies that use the term. We then created a conjunction map of regions that appeared in both identity and value maps ( Figure 2 ). This image contained several regions along the medial cortical wall, notably the vmPFC, the posterior cingulate, and the rostral dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. As expected, the vmPFC was the single largest cluster to be consistently associated with both identity and value. We interpret this and the other neuroscience evidence presented here as broadly consistent with the ideas that (a) identity and value are functionally related and (b) relative to other potential sources of value that do not necessarily invoke the self (e.g., health considerations for a smoker), identity might have special status because it overlaps to a great degree with value in terms of its neural systems and conceptual representation. (Other sources of value may be generated or represented in other areas such as the dlPFC in the case of health concerns; Hare et al., 2011a .) It may even be that identity and value are inseparable, in the sense that things that are valued are by definition part of the self, and all aspects of the self are valued ( Northoff & Hayes, 2011 ), in which case our case for focusing particularly on the role of identity in self-regulation is even stronger.

Overlap between identity and subjective value in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) shown in yellow. Identity-related neural activity is defined as regions active during self-processing and self-related thought (903 studies; red); value is defined as regions active during subjective value computation (344 studies; green). Image generated using the NeuroSynth tool for automated meta-analysis of neuroimaging data ( Yarkoni et al., 2011 ).

Prediction 2: Subjective value contributes to self-regulation toward relevant goals

The second link in our model is a positive relationship between value, derived from identity among other sources, and self-regulation. The most direct evidence for this path comes from research in behavioral economics and neuroeconomics, which conceptualize self-regulation as a class of value-based decision-making in which each response option is assigned a subjective value, the values are compared, and the option with the highest value is chosen ( Kable & Glimcher, 2007 ; Rangel et al., 2008 ; Rieskamp, Busemeyer, & Mellers, 2006 ). Computational modeling shows that even simple models of this sort (sometimes called drift-diffusion models) capture many of the properties of self-regulation decisions such as how they differ when made quickly versus slowly and how they change with the presentation of new information (e.g., taste versus health information about food choices; Sullivan, Hutcherson, Harris, & Rangel, 2015 ). Critical to the model presented here, the value for each option is computed by integrating inputs from a number of qualitatively different sources such as hedonic values, ongoing goals, or social influence ( Rangel & Hare, 2010 ). For example, a person may assign a value of +7 to a donut and a value of +2 to a piece of celery based on tastiness alone, but when dieting might modify those scores by −9 and +5, respectively, resulting in a decision to eat the celery instead, thereby promoting self-regulation.

From this perspective, self-regulation is less the result of a battle between “hot” impulses and “cold” control ( Metcalf & Mischel, 1999 ) than it is an integration of value inputs from an arbitrary number of sources including self-relevance, primary rewards, social value and effort costs (Berkman et al., in press; see Figure 1 ). Computational modeling has demonstrated that choices that appear to be driven by two competing systems can arise from a unified value-integration process ( Hutcherson, Bushong, & Rangel, 2015 ). Under a value-integration model, self-regulation success can be increased by amplifying the value of the goal-related behavior, attenuating the value of the alternative choices, or some combination of the two. Evidence of the efficacy of the first approach comes from research on contingency management treatment for substance use disorders ( Bigelow & Silverman, 1999 ), in which the value of drug abstinence is increased with monetary incentives. A meta-analysis found this approach to have an effect size d = 0.42 on treatment for alcohol, tobacco, and illicit drugs, which was larger than therapy (d = 0.25) and outpatient treatment (d = 0.37), and comparable to methadone treatment for opiate use ( Prendergast, Podus, Finney, Greenwell, & Roll, 2006 ). Similarly, “precommitting” to buy more healthy foods at the risk of losing financial incentives is more effective than having the incentives alone ( Schwartz, Mochon, Wyper, Maroba, Patel, & Ariely, 2014 ). Another line of work relating value to self-regulation shows that monetary incentives increase persistence at exercise ( Cabanac, 1986 ), endurance on a cold-pressor task ( Baker & Kirsch, 1991 ), and performance on a difficult cognitive task ( Boksem, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006 ). Manipulating the salience of self-regulation itself increases self-regulation performance, presumably because many people value willpower as an attribute ( Magen & Gross, 2007 ; Study 2). In that study, participants completed a self-regulation task twice, and in between were randomly assigned to reconstrue the task itself as a measure of their own “willpower” or not. Performance improved only among participants whose perceptions of the task were changed from non-diagnostic to diagnostic of willpower.

Other examples of the link between value and self-regulation come from research on the ego depletion effect ( Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996 ), which refers to the observation that self-regulation performance decreases with sequential use across different tasks. Ego depletion has been observed in over 100 studies using a range of tasks and operationalizations ( Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010 ; however, the bias-corrected effect size may be quite small, Carter & McCullough, 2014 ; Inzlicht & Berkman, 2015 ). Nonetheless, giving participants monetary incentives for performance ( Muraven & Slessareva, 2003 ), or even encouraging participants to think about incentives ( Boucher & Kofos, 2012 ), mitigates or eliminates the ego depletion effect, consistent with the idea that increasing the value of self-regulation can improve performance that would otherwise drop off. Value can also be enhanced by adding other inputs or rewards to the intervening period between the two self-regulation tasks in a typical ego depletion paradigm. Smoking cigarettes ( Heckman, Ditre, & Brandon, 2012 ), watching a favorite television program ( Derrick, 2013 ), experiencing a positive change in mood ( Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, & Muraven, 2007 ), gargling with sugar ( Hagger & Chatzisarantis, 2013 ; Molden, Hui, Scholer, Meier, Noreen, D’Agostino, et al., 2012 ), meditating ( Friese, Messner, & Schaffner, 2012 ), or even praying ( Friese & Wanke, 2014 ) all prevent the reductions in self-regulation characteristic of ego depletion.

These results are difficult to explain in terms of a dual-process model, whereby an impulsive process takes over when the control process becomes depleted, because it is unclear how the manipulations described provide renewed resources to the control process. However, the results are broadly consistent with the view that self-regulation is a function of an ongoing valuation integration with a variety of inputs. According to the IVM, the ego depletion effect reflects a decrease in the subjective value of self-regulation (relative to other, more hedonic behaviors) over time. The valuation model can account for ego depletion in terms of the diminishing marginal value of effort: the value of completing the initial task is high enough to warrant working hard on it, but then the value of completing subsequent tasks is reduced because further effort does not produce sufficient additional gains ( Berkman, Kahn, & Livingston, 2016 ). From this perspective, it follows that manipulations that add value to persistence, either by rewarding it directly or drawing the participant’s attention to valued aspects of the self, would restore the subjective value of self-regulation, which, in ego depletion studies, is generally more consistent with participants’ identities (e.g., persistence, achievement, or pleasing the experimenter) than the alternative (e.g., quitting, failing, or disappointing the experimenter).

An interesting question is whether value needs to be directly relevant to self-regulation to have an impact. For example, in some cases participants were paid (e.g., Boksem et al., 2006 ) or otherwise incentivized (e.g., Magen & Gross, 2007 ) for better performance, whereas in other cases participants were simply rewarded in a way that was unrelated to task performance (e.g., Heckman et al., 2012 ). How could it be that simply rewarding people can improve their self-regulation? In a way, this parallels the idea of fluidity of value across self domains ( Greenwald, 1980 ), which explains why bolstering one aspect of self can protect otherwise unrelated aspects of self from threat ( Steele, 1988 ). The “fluidity of value” idea is also consistent with the process model (or shifting-priorities model) of ego depletion ( Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012 ; Inzlicht, Schmeichel, & Macrae, 2014 ), which states that “depleting” tasks cause a motivational shift from “have-to” to “want-to” goals as people try to maintain a balance between them. Rewards delivered between two self-regulation tasks improve performance on the second task by fulfilling a hedonic “want-to” motive, thereby facilitating a shift back to effortful, “have-to” tasks.

Neuroscience evidence consistent with Prediction 2: A central role for value-related brain regions in self-regulation

Computations in the vmPFC and related regions appear to represent both (a) self-related processes, particularly those relating to self-concept attributes, preferences, and traits, and (b) subjective value of options during choice. A function of these regions during choice could be described as matching preferences with possibilities . This function is on display when the situation might require self-regulation, when the behavioral possibilities each have some amount of value but one is more in line with long-term goals than the other. For example, in a classic dieter’s dilemma where someone is faced with a tasty but unhealthy treat and a bland but healthy food, the IVM predicts that these regions would play a decisive role in tracking which kind of value trumps: taste or health. Evidence reveals that the vmPFC plays exactly that role during choice, tracking decisions in these kinds of self-regulatory situations ( Hare et al., 2009 , 2011b ; Hutcherson et al., 2012 ; Plassmann, O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2010 ). In one study ( Hare et al., 2011 ), participants were presented with health-versus-taste decisions with or without the presence of health cues. As expected, health cues increased the likelihood of healthy choices. Tellingly, the healthiness rating of the foods (assessed earlier) was strongly correlated with vmPFC activity at the moment of decision, which in turn predicted the food choice. When unhealthy foods were selected, their earlier tastiness ratings were correlated with vmPFC activity during choice. Further, activity in vmPFC before healthy choices was coupled with activity in another brain region, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), which is frequently associated with executive control, suggesting that this region modulated the value signal in the vmPFC to produce healthy choices. We take this evidence to support the claim that vmPFC contributes to self-regulation by reflecting the subjective value of a choice, and that this value can be modulated by ongoing goals.

Studies of “intertemporal choice” between smaller-sooner and larger-later options provide further evidence of a central role of vmPFC in self-regulation. The challenge in effective self-regulation in intertemporal choice, which is usually defined as choosing the larger-later over the smaller-sooner reward, is in finding a way to boost the immediate subjective value of the former despite the fact that it has no immediate monetary value. In economic terms, each individual has an idiosyncratic “discount function” that relates the duration of the delay and the payout to the immediate subjective value ( Laibson, 1997 ; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992 ); a person with a flat discount function values immediate and delayed rewards equally, whereas a person with a steep discount function is biased toward immediate rewards.

According to the IVM, the degree of this temporal discounting can be mitigated by amplifying the value of the larger-later option or by attenuating the value of the smaller-sooner option. In a classic study, Kable and Glimcher (2007) showed that activity in vmPFC (and two other regions) tracked the subjective values of larger-later options when the smaller-sooner options were held constant, and did so across subjects with a range of discount parameters, consistent with the idea that activity in this region indexes the value of both immediate and delayed decision options in self-regulation contexts, and both within and across individuals. Another study leveraged the fact that reframing intertemporal choice to include an “explicit zero” (e.g., offering participants a choice of “either $5 now and $0 later or $0 now and $10 later”) increases larger-later choices ( Magen, Dweck, & Gross, 2008 ) to characterize the neural dynamics of shifting valuation; in that study ( Magen, Kim, Dweck, Gross, & McClure, 2014 ), reframing to include an explicit zero increased activation in the ventral striatum (a region functionally and anatomically interconnected with the vmPFC) during larger-later choices. Other studies have shown that activity and connectivity of the vmPFC during exposure to health messaging (e.g., the benefits of physical activity) predicts successful self-regulation in response to the messages ( Cooper, Bassett, & Falk, 2017 ; Falk et al., 2015 ). In one case, so-called “top-down control” regions impaired self-regulation by boosting the value of the smaller-sooner reward ( Hayashi, Ko, Strafella, & Dagher, 2013 ). In that study, information about whether or not a cigarette would be available to smokers was represented in the DLPFC, which in turn was coupled with the vmPFC and related strongly with cravings; deactivation of the DLPFC by transcranial magnetic stimulation eliminated its coupling with vmPFC and reduced cravings. These studies are all consistent with the ideas that the vmPFC provides an online index of the subjective value of choice options during self-regulation, and that its modulation by DLPFC, ventral striatum, and other regions can contribute to, or even detract from, self-regulation behavior depending on the balance of the value inputs.

Put together, Predictions 1 and 2 suggest a third, indirect, relationship between identity and self-regulation. We review some of the evidence for this relationship from a wide range of sources below. Before we do so, however, we first describe the scope of the model in terms of the situations in which the model is expected to apply and the conditions that are assumed to be met. As we summarize below, it is under these conditions that the relationship between identity and self-regulation emerges most strongly.

Theoretical scope and assumptions

The IVM applies any time an individual is faced with a self-regulation dilemma, defined as a situation with two or more response options that vary in terms of their fit with ongoing goals. Examples of self-regulation dilemmas include classic dieting situations where a healthy option is pitted against a tasty one, intertemporal choice scenarios where greater utility can be achieved at the cost of a temporal delay, and labor/leisure trade-offs where immediate relaxation comes at the cost of reduced or delayed productivity. The IVM is thus relevant to a broad range of situations that involve some degree of choice among goal-relevant behaviors. Though it is probable that the effect of identity on value computations influences other variables too (e.g., moral decisions; Hutcherson et al., 2015 ), for now we specifically focus on self-regulation given its importance to well-being and physical and mental health (e.g., Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004 ).

Identity is salient and perceived as relevant to the behavior at hand

Within this broad range of self-regulation situations, a central prediction of the IVM is that the extent to which an aspect of identity is salient and perceived as relevant to the action at hand will increase the subjective value of that action, in turn increasing the likelihood of its enactment. In other words, salience and perceived relevance are preconditions for identity to influence self-regulation. Salience refers to the level of cognitive accessibility of some aspect or aspects of one’s identity, referred to elsewhere as the “working self-concept” ( Markus & Kunda, 1986 ). Salience is important given the complexity and dynamic nature of self-concepts, which do not exist as a unitary construct in working memory with all parts being equally accessible at all times. Instead, various aspects of one’s identity can be brought to the fore of consciousness for any number of reasons including motivational ( Dodgson & Wood, 1998 ) and situational ( Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002 ; Oyserman, 2007 ; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994 ) ones. Relevance refers to the extent to which an aspect of identity is perceived as applicable to the behavior at hand. We characterize relevance as a matter of degree rather than absolute presence or absence, and as such variation in perceived relevance can amplify or attenuate the effect of a given identity on subjective value. Identity, and even central aspects of identity, will only impart values to behaviors that are seen as identity-relevant. For example, even if I see being a good cook as central to who I am, slogging through a difficult cooking class will have high identity-value only if I make the connection that finishing that class is relevant to my “good cook” identity. The IVM requires that the self-regulated behavior be appraised (though not necessarily consciously) as relevant to some aspect of identity. This flexibility of construal is thus a potential point of intervention for increasing self-regulation, and one to which we will return in the concluding section about questions for the future of self-regulation research.

A clear example of the importance of salience and perceptions in self-regulation comes from the ego depletion literature. Studies there have now shown that perceptions and beliefs about the task and/or one’s own self-regulation capacity can reduce or eliminate the ego depletion effect. For example, people who hold lay theories that willpower is an unlimited resource do not evince the ego depletion effect ( Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010 ), and ego depletion tracks with people’s perceptions of their degree of depletion, even when the participants were not actually depleted ( Clarkson, Hirt, Jia, & Alexander, 2010 ). Though there are a number of possible explanations for these effects including strategic resource allocation ( Clarkson et al., 2010 ) and self-verification ( Swann et al., 1989 ), they also fit within the IVM. Specifically, the way a task is presented to participants (e.g., in terms of difficulty or relevance to willpower) might make certain aspects of identity more or less salient (e.g., “I think of myself as a person with strong willpower”) and can thus change the overall value calculation.

The relevant aspect of identity is positive

After relevance and salience, a third key assumption is that identity is positive. Though social psychological research and theory on self and identity strongly support the notion that identity is positively valenced for most people most of the time ( Diener & Diener, 1996 ; Epstein, 1973 ; Greenwald, 1980 ; Steele, 1988 ), this is not always the case. For example, a minority of people have low enough self-esteem that their identities might be considered negatively valenced ( Baumeister, 1993 ). This may also be the case for people who are clinically depressed ( Roberts, Gotlib, & Kassel, 1996 ; Swann, Wenzlaff, & Tafarodi, 1992 ). Even among people who have positive overall self-esteem, it seems that most have at least some negatively valenced identity aspects ( Swann, 1992 ; Swann et al., 1989 ), or vary in their ability to compartmentalize the positive and negative aspects of their identities (Showers & Zeigler-Hill, 2007). Given that all or part of an individual’s identity has no or even negative value in these cases, the theory predicts no facilitation of self-regulation by identity. If anything, it is possible that verification of a negatively-valued aspect of identity could work against self-regulation ( Swann et al., 1989 ). For example, an individual who believes himself to be impulsive might lapse in a cigarette cessation attempt in part to affirm that belief.

What happens when a positive identity is threatened?

We alluded above to some of the compensatory processes that can be launched to protect identities from threat. It is important to consider these kinds of processes here because the possibility of self-regulation failure may become threatening when the goal being pursued is seen as highly self- or identity-relevant. Faced with this situation, people have two options. One is to disidentify from the domain so that failure is less self-relevant and therefore less harmful to self-esteem ( Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995 ). This could potentially undermine motivation toward the goal entirely, though some evidence suggests that appraisal of failure as reflective of goal commitment (as opposed to goal progress) can actually increase identification with the goal ( Fishbach, Eyal, & Finkelstein, 2010 ). Understanding how interpretations of feedback contribute to or detract from goal identification is therefore critical in future work. A second option is to self-handicap performance to supply oneself an alternative explanation for self-regulation failure besides a lack of skill or motivation ( Berglas & Jones, 1978 ; Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer, 1979 ). Self-handicapping by definition undermines goal pursuit, but can also be mitigated in a number of ways ( Niiya, Brook, & Crocker, 2010 ; Urdan & Midgley, 2001 ). In any case, disidentification and self-handicapping are ways that efforts to leverage identity to increase self-regulation might backfire, and as such should be considered carefully when crafting an intervention to increase self-regulation based on this or other theories that draw upon identity as a source of value.

The content of identity varies across demographics and cultures

There are also boundary conditions of the model in terms of demographic factors. We claim that the key advantages of identity above other sources of value are that it is relatively stable and superordinate to many other ongoing priorities. This is generally the case in adulthood, but identity is still forming in childhood ( Cole, Maxwell, Martin, Peeke, Seroczynski, Tram, et al., 2001 ) and is particularly labile during adolescence ( Kroger, Martinussn, & Marcia, 2010 ), so the IVM may not hold during these periods. However, adolescence bears some consideration here because it is widely recognized as a period when increased self-regulation would be beneficial. Thought adolescent identity may be in flux, it does seem that social identity emerges at this time—particularly one’s identity relative to the peer group ( Pfeifer, Masten, Borofsky, Dapretto, Fuligni, & Lieberman, 2009 ; Smetana, Campione-Barr, & Metzger, 2006 ). Drawing values from peer-related social identity might thus be a particularly powerful way to boost self-regulation among adolescents, though of course this depends on those peers valuing behaviors that are related in some way to self-regulation. (On the flip side, deviant peer influence is a major risk factor for a range of antisocial behaviors, e.g., Gardner, Dishion, & Connell, 2008 .)

Cultural factors are also relevant. It has been argued that a universally positive self is a distinctly western phenomenon, and that other cultures (e.g., East Asian) place value on different features of self and social relationships such as a self-critique ( Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999 ). For example, the most highly valued, “ideal affect” states in East Asian cultures are different from those in western cultures ( Tsai, 2007 ). In terms of the IVM, the content of identity is arbitrary as long as it holds value for the individual. The content and structure of identity will clearly vary from country to country and culture to culture ( Markus & Kitayama, 2010 ). Furthermore, culture can powerfully determine what aspects of identity are more or less likely to find their way into the working self-concept at a given time ( Oyserman & Lee, 2008 ). For example, bicultural individuals can be primed with one cultural identity or the other, which is likely to make different aspects of identity salient and valued ( Shih, Pittinsky, Ambady, 1999 ). In all of these cases, identity is expected to impart value toward self-regulation in identified domains that are salient, whatever those domains may be.

Related and foundational models

The IVM specifies a mechanistic account of self-regulation that cuts across the psychological, computational, and neural levels of analysis, and thereby suggests new routes to improving self-regulation by targeting identity and other enduring sources of positive value. These innovations were gained by synthesizing theoretical ideas from social psychology and neighboring fields, so the IVM naturally connects with many theories in terms of shared constructs and the relationships among them. The IVM is intended to be an extension, not a replacement, of these ideas. In describing the model, it is helpful to clarify the distinct space it occupies and the overlapping space it shares with its predecessors and relatives. Also, by describing a neurocomputational model of how value contributes to self-regulation, the IVM feeds back to these theories by suggesting a common mechanism of action that might capture how some of these disparate theories are related to one another.

Self-Determination Theory

Perhaps the nearest neighbor to the IVM in goals research is self-determination theory ( Deci & Ryan, 1985 ; Ryan & Deci, 2000 ). Whereas the IVM focuses on identity, self-determination theory instead emphasizes the role of intrinsic value in making a goal more or less likely to be acted upon, sustained, and ultimately successful. A foundational idea in self-determination theory is that humans are intrinsically motivated by primary needs for competence, relatedness, and autonomy, and will preferentially seek goals that fulfill those needs. In turn, goals that are evaluated as consistent with one or more of the intrinsic needs foster well-being and are broadly more likely to endure and succeed than goals motivated by external rewards. Like self-determination theory, the IVM is concerned with properties of goals that facilitate or hinder their progress, and also focuses on motivation as the ultimate force that impels their pursuit. In contrast, the IVM identifies subjective value as the underlying source of motivation when it comes to self-regulation, and suggests that value can be derived from any number of external or internal rewards including and especially identity. Further, in the IVM, identity can influence self-regulation in any domain that is seen as relevant to a valued aspect of one’s self-concept, even beyond competence, relatedness, and autonomy. In that sense, the variety of ways in which the self can increase motivation is somewhat broader in IVM than in self-determination theory, though the resulting motivation is applied more narrowly in IVM to self-regulation. Another key difference is that self-determination theory is primarily concerned with the consequences of how a goal is motivated (e.g., intrinsically vs. extrinsically), whereas the IVM is also concerned with the antecedents of motivation, particularly identity, and whether they can serve as a point of intervention to increase motivation.

Self-Concordance Theory

The central claim of Self-Concordance Theory (SCT) is that striving toward a particular goal is a function of the degree to which the goal aligns with a person’s “authentic interests and values” (pp. 483), or, in other words, is integrated with the self ( Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001 ). Self-concordant goals tend to elicit sustained effort (because the self is stable), which in turn promotes attainment ( Sheldon & Elliot, 1999 ). Furthermore, because self-concordant goals by definition fulfill the primary needs for autonomy, relatedness, and competence described by self-determination theory, attaining self-concordant goals increases overall well-being. SCT and IVM share the ideas that goals vary in the extent to which they are related to one’s self and identity, and those that are more central are more likely to succeed by virtue of their connection to the self. However, the IVM is more specific about the mechanism responsible for the relation between self-concordance and sustained effort, namely subjective value. The IVM can be thought of as a refinement of SCT in this sense. Another difference is that the IVM adopts a broader perspective on the possible ways that identity can increase self-regulation. This is based on recent evidence, reviewed below, that associative processes such as priming or construal can be used to increase the subjective value of a goal by linking it to core values or other aspects of identity, even if that goal is not central to one’s identity (self-concordant) per se. The assertion of the IVM that people can flexibly (re)construe the relationship between a behavior and their identity is important because it allows the model both to explain cases when self-regulation fluctuates over time (e.g., ego depletion) and to offer ways to intervene to improve self-regulation.

Identity-Based Motivation Model

The identity-based motivation model states that actions and choices are shaped by their relevance to identity ( Oyserman, 2007 ; 2009). Specifically, the model holds that identity-congruent actions and beliefs have a motivational pull because they reaffirm one’s membership within the identified social group. For example, to the extent that individuals from ethnic minorities view certain unhealthy behaviors as defining of their in-group, priming those individuals with ethnicity reduces the cognitive accessibility of heath knowledge and the perceived efficacy of health behaviors ( Oyserman, Fryber, & Yoder, 2007 ). The idea that identity-congruent behaviors are more likely to be enacted than identity-incongruent or identity-irrelevant ones is entirely consistent with the IVM. However, the IVM is more focused on self-regulation as an outcome than the identity-based model, which suggests that all behaviors are potentially influenced by their degree of identity-relevance, including thoughts, beliefs, and even cognitive processes. Also, the identity-motivation model emphasizes the “socially situated” nature of identity (Oyserman, 2009), meaning that identity shifts depending on the social environment and salient situational cues. Therefore, what is considered identity-congruent may fluctuate to some extent from one moment to the next. The IVM accommodates the view that identity is malleable (or at least that the aspects of it that are active in the moment are malleable), though the IVM assumes that at least some aspects of identity are chronically accessible or otherwise temporally stable such that they can impart value to goal-consistent actions repeatedly across time and place.

Other theories from the self and identity literature

Self-esteem.

The IVM shares the assumption from the self-esteem literature that humans are motivated to seek and maintain positive evaluations of the self ( Crocker & Major, 1989 ). In the self-esteem literature, these positive evaluations include both cognitions (e.g., positive illusions; Taylor & Brown, 1988 ) and emotions (e.g., self-worth; Rosenberg, 1979 ) about the self. Some self-evaluations are more strongly connected to global self-esteem than others, and which domains of the self are most central to global self-esteem varies across individuals ( Crocker & Wolfe, 2001 ). The IVM adopts a similar perspective in characterizing self-evaluations as generally positive, stable, and idiosyncratic, and extends the self-positivity assumption to other aspects of identity (e.g., social categories). The IVM also shares the view that positivity (and negativity) about one aspect of the self can spread to other aspects in the sense of spreading activation ( Greenwald, Banaji, Rudman, Farnham, Nosek, & Mellott, 2002 ; Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986 ). The IVM is fully consistent with the notion that there are mutually reinforcing relationships among self-esteem, successful striving toward self-concordant goals, and overall well-being that can lead to an “upward spiral” of positive outcomes ( Ryff & Singer, 1998 ; Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001 ).

Self-Affirmation Theory

The IVM draws upon the prediction from the self-affirmation literature that people are motivated to maintain a sense of self-integrity and protect the integrity and positivity of the self from threats ( Steele, 1988 ). This motivation turns out to be a double-edged sword. On one side, the motivation to protect the integrity and internal consistency of self with respect to certain beliefs or actions can lead to biases and/or false beliefs generated by a rationalization process (as described extensively by Festinger, 1957 ). On the other side, a key mechanism by which people maintain a coherent and unitary sense of the self is by introducing a degree of fluidity across aspects of the self ( Greenwald, 1980 ), which allows a threat to one aspect of the self to be mitigated by bolstering the positive evaluation of another aspect. For example, heavy alcohol drinkers tend to minimize messages about the dangers of drinking because they are threatening, but this discounting can be eliminated by affirmation of core values unrelated to alcohol or health ( Klein & Harris, 2009 ).

Like self-affirmation theory, the IVM also suggests that identity can alternately promote or prevent successful self-regulation, respectively, when the regulated behavior in question is seen as contributing to or detracting from a sense of a positive, consistent, and rational self. All else being equal, for example, the IVM predicts that a person who sees exercising as consistent with his core values, long-term goals, social group, culture, etc., will have an easier time at it than someone who sees exercising as inconsistent with or orthogonal to those other aspects of his identity. The dark side of this is that, if quitting is viewed as central to identity, then threats to the success of that goal may be met with a variety of rationalization tactics (e.g., discounting, denial, distancing) that may in fact run counter to successful quitting. A key contribution of self-affirmation research and theory to the model proposed here is a nuanced understanding of the ways that threats to valued aspects of identity can some times strengthen and other times weaken the centrality of those aspects to the self ( Steele, 1997 ). We return to this idea when we discuss the risks and benefits of increasing self-regulation with identity-based manipulations.

Self-Schema Theory

The idea that the content and organization of one’s identity and self-concept can influence cognition is not new. Self-schema theory ( Markus, 1977 ) has suggested that self-schemas, or interconnected cognitive networks of beliefs, memories, and representations of the self, bias information processing preferentially toward self-relevant information. Social cognition research has established that self-relevant information is processed faster, allocated greater attention, and remembered better compared to non-self-relevant information ( Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984 ; Markus, 1983 ). The IVM draws upon these ideas in claiming that goals will also receive preferential attention, processing, memory, etc., to the extent that those goals are incorporated within one’s self-schema or otherwise strongly connected to the self-schema. The other main tenant of self-schema theory pertinent to the IVM is the idea that people hold multiple self-schemas that are more or less active in a given moment, and that these multiple schemas can differentially influence cognitive processing and behavioral outcomes based on contextual factors (e.g., priming, the social environment, or recent tasks). The key difference between the theories is that self-schema theory focuses on the “cold” information processing functions of the self, whereas the IVM highlights how identity also can generate “hot” valuation computations that serve as an important source of input to self-regulation behaviors.

Emergent lessons from foundational theories applied to the IVM

We extract two overarching theoretical lessons from the theories reviewed above. First is the assumption that the self is, on balance, positively valenced, and that people are generally motivated to maintain a positive self-view. In the IVM, the positive affect associated with the self is considered to be a form of value, such that concepts within the self and actions consistent with the self are not just liked, but are also imbued with positive value such that they are more likely to be enacted relative to actions that are not linked to the self. In this sense, the IVM expands the definition of the self as a cognitive/motivational construct (as it is typically studied within social psychology) to also include the notion from decision-making and behavioral economic frameworks that decisions related to the self can be understood in terms of expected value or utility. Behaviors that are connected in some way to the self come to have increased value (e.g., Newman, Bloom, & Knobe, 2014 ).

A second broad lesson is that identity is somewhat malleable in response to past behavior and other situational factors. In other words, there is a bidirectional relationship between what is valued and enacted, on one hand, and what is part of identity, on the other. This becomes important to the IVM because, if identity does influence self-regulation, then one way to increase self-regulation is to alter identity. Both cognitive dissonance theory ( Festinger, 1957 ) and self-perception theory ( Bem, 1972 ) predict a bidirectional relationship between identity and subjective value such that actions/decisions/beliefs that are valued highly enough would eventually come to be part of one’s identity, and that aspects of one’s identity would come to be positively valued. The two theories famously provide different explanations of why that would be the case—with dissonance advocating a self-consistency process and self-perception offering a cognitive and informational one—but the relevant fact here is that the content of our identities and the set of things we value are mutually informative. Regardless of the cause and direction of the relationship between identity and value, all of these accounts are consistent with one of the main proposals of the IVM: that there is a strong and positive association between identity and the valuation of the actions, beliefs, decisions, etc., that comprise it. We merely note here for clarity that the IVM is agnostic about how the identity-value relationship develops, and focuses instead on the implications of that relationship, whatever its source, for self-regulation and interventions aimed at improving it.

The IVM as a unifying framework for disparate results

Putting together the first two predictions of the IVM yields a third: that identity-based manipulations should improve self-regulation toward goals that are viewed as self-relevant. At least five separate lines of research are broadly consistent with this prediction. Notably, the studies reviewed below are grounded in a variety of theoretical models; though the models share some constructs they are mostly non-overlapping, and none provides a mechanistic account of their effects. In this section, we survey evidence of the relation between identity and self-regulation, and argue that a value integration process is a plausible candidate mechanism of the observed effects.

Why does self-affirmation mitigate ego depletion?

Manipulations of identity and related constructs (e.g., self-affirmation) can attenuate the ego depletion effect or eliminate it altogether. Schmeichel and Vohs (2009) tested this by adding a values-affirmation task between the first and second self-control tasks in an ego depletion study; they found that participants who wrote about core values showed equal if not better performance on a cold-pressor task following a difficult (vs. easy) writing task. The IVM suggests the hypothesis that self-affirmation increases the salience of valued aspects of the self (which are linked to each other and positively valued; Greenwald et al., 2002 ), in turn increasing the value of related behaviors (e.g., agency or stamina in the context of a cold-pressor). Relatedly, increasing participants’ sense of autonomy during a task also reduces ego depletion relative autonomy-undermining or forced-choice conditions ( Moller, Deci, & Ryan, 2006 ; Muraven, Gagne, & Rosman, 2008 ; Sheldon & Elliot, 1998 ). Self-affirmation also amplifies neurophysiological activity during self-regulation, even outside of an ego depletion paradigm ( Legault, Al-Khindi, & Inzlicht, 2012 ; Legault & Inzlicht, 2013 ). These results are consistent with the IVM’s prediction that highlighting how a task is linked to valued aspects of identity, such as autonomy, can increase the value of performance.

Interestingly, one study found that self-awareness induced between the first and second self-control tasks in an ego depletion paradigm also eliminated the depletion effect ( Alberts, Martijn, & de Vries, 2010 ). The authors interpreted this result in terms of self-awareness theory ( Duval & Wicklund, 1972 ), such that self-awareness increased the salience of internalized standards for behavior (e.g., the expectations of the generalized other; Mead, 1925 ), which in turn motivated people to live up to those standards. We additionally suggest the possibility that increasing identity salience (through self-awareness) also increased the salience of self-relevant values (e.g., competency), which improved self-regulation performance on a value-relevant task. These studies provide converging evidence that making valued aspects of identity salient (via self-affirmation, increasing self-awareness, or priming autonomy goals) can bolster self-regulatory performance in cases that it otherwise would diminish. Our model suggests that the underlying mechanism in all these studies is an increase in the subjective value of behaviors that are in line with the participant’s identity.

Why does self-affirmation and personalized tailoring facilitate health behavior?

A common problem in health behavior change is that personally-relevant health messaging can be threatening ( Liberman & Chaiken, 1992 ), which triggers people to engage in motivated, self-protective reasoning in order to discount the information ( Kunda, 1990 ). For example, smokers generally underestimate the dangers of smoking compared to non-smokers, and this effect is most pronounced in heavy smokers ( Schoenbaum, 1997 ). However, self-affirmation reduces or eliminates this effect. People who affirm core values are more willing to be screened for diabetes ( van Koningsbruggen & Das, 2009 ), more likely to adhere to a medication regimen ( Ogedegbe, Boutin-Foster, Wells, Allegrante, Isen, Jobe, et al., 2012 ), and, among smokers, more likely to be receptive to messages about the risks of smoking ( Dillard, McCaul, & Magnan, 2005 ). Non-affirmed heavy drinkers tended to bias their attention away from words drawn from an article about the health risks of drinking, but those who completed a values affirmation showed an attention bias toward those threatening words ( Klein & Harris, 2009 ). This last study is especially illuminating because it establishes a plausible pathway through which self-affirmation can influence self-regulation: core-values priming enables people to direct their attentional resources toward health-relevant information that would otherwise threaten the self ( Harris & Epton, 2009 ; McQueen & Klein, 2006 ; Sherman, Nelson, & Steele, 2000 ). Considering the link between subjective value and attention ( Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010 ; Louie & Glimcher, 2010 ; Maunsell, 2004 ), it is plausible that the proximal mechanism by which self-affirmation helps people engage with health messages is attentional biasing toward information that is threating though relevant to important long-term goals. In these cases, self-affirmation might enhance the warm glow of positivity that identification casts upon self-regulatory goals, briefly banishing their shadow of threat.

A meta-analysis of 52 studies testing the effect of self-affirmation on health behavior change found that self-affirmation significantly increased acceptance of health messages, intentions to change, and actual health behavior ( Epton, Harris, Kane, van Koningsbruggen, & Sheeran, 2015 ). The effect of self-affirmation was about twice as strong on behavior (d = 0.32) than on acceptance (d = 0.17) and intentions (d = 0.14). This discrepancy is intriguing because most models indicate that effects of affirmation on behavior are mediated through (cognitive) changes in acceptance of the risks of certain behaviors and intentions to change them, suggesting that the magnitude of its effect should be smaller on behavior—a more distal outcome—compared to acceptance and intentions. The alternative explanation offered by the IVM is a motivational one. Self-affirmation broadly increases the salience of valued aspects of the self, in turn raising the value of and attention to health goals that are related to identity, ultimately increasing the likelihood that behaviors related to those goals will be enacted. In other words, the IVM posits that self-affirmation facilitates identity-relevant health behavior by increasing its value - a motivational route - instead of by increasing intentions to change and acceptance, a cognitive route. This may be why self-affirmation has a stronger effect on behavior than on more cognitive constructs.

The effect of identity on health behavior change is also apparent in studies on tailored messaging. Tailoring, in this context, refers to creating messages about a given health behavior or outcome that are customized to each person based on one or more individualizing characteristic such as age, gender, race, personality, personal or family history ( Rimer & Kreuter, 2006 ). By definition, then, tailored messages are more self-relevant than non-tailored messages, leading to the prediction that tailored content would hold more value than non-tailored content. As expected, tailored messages are generally more effective than generic ones at promoting health behavior change ( Krebs, Prochaska, & Rossi, 2010 ; Lustria, Noar, Cortese, Van Stee, Glueckauf, & Lee, 2013 ). Not all tailored messages are equally self-relevant, and a meta-analysis suggests that efficacy increases as the number of tailored features goes up ( Noar, Benac, & Harris, 2007 ), presumably because each additional tailored feature makes the messages that much more self-relevant. This is an exciting area of growth where identity-based manipulations could have a major impact on health behavior change. A recent innovation, for example, is to use highly realistic virtual doppelgangers to help people literally visualize their own behavior change ( Fox & Bailenson, 2009 ), using “the self to persuade the self” ( Ahn & Bailenson, 2014 ).

Why does high-level, abstract construal promote self-control?

A fascinating line of research grounded in construal level theory ( Trope & Liberman, 2003 ) shows that construing behavior at a high, more abstract level promotes self-regulation compared to lower-level, more concrete construal ( Fujita, 2011 ; Fujita & Carnevale, 2012 ). For example, priming high-level construal by having participants think about “why” they performed certain actions (instead of “how” they did them) increases self-regulation on a subsequent handgrip and intertemporal choice tasks ( Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006 ). This work draws upon the idea from construal level theory that cognitively reframing, or construing, an action can increase its psychological distance. Thinking about an action from a psychological distance increases its level of abstractness by obscuring the fine-grained details (e.g., how to do it) and bringing the bigger picture into focus (e.g., why it’s done). In a simple intertemporal choice scenario of $5 now or $10 in a month, low-level construal encourages focus on experience in the present moment, favoring the smaller-sooner choice; whereas high-level construal helps broaden the perspective beyond one’s immediate experience and frames the problem as an abstract choice between impulsiveness and thriftiness, tipping the scale toward the larger-later choice.

High-level construal also does something else: it increases the salience of the self. In a conceptualization of goals as action hierarchies with abstract ends at the higher levels and concrete means at the lower levels—which is entirely compatible with construal level theory—the highest possible level is “be” goals, or self-concepts ( Figure 3 ; Carver & Scheier, 1998 ). In this view, the ideal self is the ultimate high-level goal. As such, high-level goals constitute a critical part of identity. Any manipulation that promotes higher-level construal will be expected to increase the salience of one very important aspect of identity, the ideal self-concept 1 . This is related to the idea from action identification theory ( Vallacher & Wegner, 1987 ) that high-level construal reflects the motives, agency, and personal meanings of an action—its “why”—whereas low-level construal reflects the details, steps, and means of an action—its “how”. Together, these ideas can account for the finding that self-determined or self-concordant beliefs or primes, which connect tasks to their underlying motives (“why am I doing this?”), increase self-regulation, persistence, and ultimately goal achievement ( Koestner, Otis, Powers, Pelletier, & Gagnon, 2008 ; Ntoumanis, Healy, Sedikides, Duda, Stewart, Smith, et al., 2014 ; Sheldon & Elliot, 1998 ). The IVM adds to this the idea that higher (vs. lower) level construal promotes self-regulation because it brings identity to the fore, thus increasing the immediate subjective value of behaviors associated with long-term goals, core values, and ideal selves.

Identity resides at the highest levels of the goal hierarchy. Higher-level, more abstract, longer-term (“why”) construals connect actions to identity. Lower-level, more concrete, shorter-term (“how”) construals distance actions from identity. Only some aspects of identity are shown; others (e.g., actual self, important past events) are not necessarily higher-level. [Adapted from Carver & Scheier, 1998 .]

The connection between high-level construal and identity suggests a new interpretation of the result that “explicit zero” effect on intertemporal choice. The presence of the explicit zero in the later outcome broadens the scope of temporal attention ( Radu, Yi, Bickel, Gross, & McClure, 2011 ), and a broader temporal horizon increases the construal of the problem to a more abstract level, bringing the future self into the working self-concept. This interpretation is supported by evidence that substance abusers—who typically show dramatic temporal discounting during intertemporal choice—also have a severely restricted temporal horizon, essentially living in the immediate present with little consideration of the future self ( Bickel, Kowal, & Gatchalian, 2006 ). Interventions that focus on increasing thoughts of the future either explicitly ( Kober, Kross, Mischel, Hart, & Ochsner, 2010 ) or implicitly ( Bickel, Yi, Landes, & Baxter, 2011 ) are effective in reducing drug craving and use. Put together, these results converge on the notion that higher-level construal, which is abstract, broad, and long-ranging, also invokes important aspects of identity to a greater degree than lower-level construal. And, for that reason, higher-level construal also facilitates behavior that is in line with self-relevant goals.

Why do identity-based manipulations influence economic choice?

One of the more disheartening recent discoveries in psychology is the extent to which poverty apparently diminishes cognitive functioning. Compared to those with plentiful resources, participants given scarce resources on a letter-guessing game perform more poorly, use their resources less wisely, and even perform worse on an unrelated subsequent game ( Shah, Mullainathan, & Shafir, 2012 ). In a natural experiment, sugarcane farmers in India were found to have reduced cognitive control before they sold their crop, when they are poor, compared to after, when they receive an annual windfall, even controlling for stress, nutrition, and time pressure ( Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zhao, 2013 ). It is increasingly clear that poverty is characterized by not just restricted monetary resources but also cognitive ones, which forces poor individuals to limit their temporal and attentional scope. In effect, poverty is a chronic low-level construal induction, restricting space in the working self-concept for the ideal self and other high-level aspects of identity.

If it is true that one way that poverty reduces self-regulation (e.g., cognitive control performance) is by inducing people to focus on immediate in favor of long-term concerns, then broadening their attentional scope or reorienting them toward their long-term goals and values might mitigate its effects. In line with this prediction, a self-affirmation induction increased cognitive control performance in very low SES individuals relative to a positive mood induction ( Hall, Zhao, & Shafir, 2014 ). Remarkably, participants in the self-affirmation condition were also three times as likely (46% vs. 15%) to take a flier advertising benefits programs available to but generally underutilized by the working poor. A potential mechanism of this effect is the increased salience of valued aspects of identity brought about by self-affirmation. Insofar as broad goals to achieve competence and autonomy are seen as integral to the self, then affirming the self also increases the value of behaviors related to those goals.

A similar mechanism might account for the effect of time perspective on personal savings. This work targets the problem of under-saving in the US, and shows that vividly imagining one’s future self makes people more willing to save for the future instead of spend now ( Hershfield, 2011 ). In one study, for example, participants who spend several minutes navigating a virtual environment as a digital rendering of their aged selves put more than twice as much money in a retirement account than participants who interacted as a rendering of their actual selves ( Hershfield, Goldstein, Sharpe, Fox, Yeykelis, Carstensen, et al., 2011 ). These studies represent a rather direct identity manipulation: by literally interacting with the world as their future selves , participants are made to feel the connection between the future and present self. The future self comes to have increased value via its incorporation into current identity, and, thereby, behaviors linked to the future self become more likely to be enacted.

Why do groups (sometimes) promote self-regulation?

Social groups can facilitate self-regulation across a range of behavioral domains, perhaps by increasing the value of actions that would otherwise be less valued and by increasing the salience of a goal-consistent identities. The effect of groups on behavior may not be surprising given the high value that humans place on sociality ( Baumeister & Leary, 1995 ) and group identification in particular ( Hogg, Terry, & White, 1995 ). For example, success at smoking cessation is related to social factors such as partner support, perceived general social support, and even the mere presence or absence of smokers in an individual’s social network ( Mermelstein, Cohen, Lichtenstein, Baer, & Kamarck, 1986 ). These effects are independent of other predictors of cessation (e.g., age, disease status, SES), indicating that social factors can add independent value to self-regulation. The value of social groups may also help explain the positive effects of group or even individual therapy on behavior change. A rough summary of the literature is that, independent of everything else, merely identifying with a group that values a particular behavior (e.g., smoking cessation, healthy eating) seems to increase the chances of its enactment.

There are many reasons why social groups can influence self-regulation, some related to identity and some not, and we do not presume that the IVM can explain them all. However, the IVM is pertinent to two. First, the value that peers place on specific behaviors can change our value calculation through simple social influence ( Turner, 1991 ), separate from identity. For example, information about how peers rated the attractiveness of a series of face images altered both the self-reported ratings and the vmPFC activity while viewing the faces from pre- to post-peer information ( Zaki, Schirmer, & Mitchell, 2011 ). Second, social identity may impart value to behaviors that are valued by the social group, separate from direct social influence. For example, even if I am alone, I know what kinds of behaviors would and would not be valued by my identified groups. In this way, social groups are doubly powerful factors in self-regulation because they have two plausible routes to influence value, direct social influence and social identity.

These two forces might work in concert: when we interact with people who are members of our identified groups, we might feel both social influence (e.g., conformity) and motivation to live up to our social identity within the group. Because social influence is, on its own, a source of value distinct from identity, if a person both identifies with a group and separately feels social pressure to conform to the group, then the two sources each contribute value to the self-regulated behavior. When aligned, the two sources might even interact to increase the value of self-regulation beyond an additive effect of the two separately. Consistency theories predict the two sources of value to be mutually reinforcing: if I conform with my peers’ behavior, I’m more likely to identify with those peers, which in turn makes me more likely to conform to them. Social constructionist models of virtue (including self-regulation) further support this idea (e.g., Alfano, 2016 ). In these accounts, social groups reinforce, and perhaps even constitute, virtuous behavior by setting expectations publically and acknowledging mutual awareness of those expectations: you expect me to act a certain way, I know that you have that expectation, you know that I know about the expectation, and so forth. People who are high in the individual difference characteristic of “social value orientation” ( van Lange, 1999 ) might evince the effect particularly strongly (Bogaert, Boone, & Declerck, 2008). Interactions between value sources such as social influence and social identity are be a promising avenue for self-regulation intervention, and might be able to account for diverging trajectories of self-regulatory behavior among some peer groups.

Questions for the future of the identity-value model

In this final section, we consider in further depth three questions that emerged in various forms throughout the presentation of the model above. Seeking answers to these questions constitutes a research agenda for the future of research on self-regulation based on the IVM.

How can identity be used to increase self-regulation?

The central question that motivates the IVM is whether it is possible to build interventions to improve self-regulation by altering identity and/or value. Above, we touched upon one potential strategy based in consistency ( Festinger, 1957 ) and balance ( Greenwald et al., 2002 ; Heider, 1958 ) models of self. Engaging in a behavior that is otherwise not consistent with identity demands justification, which, in some cases, can be provided by a shift in identity to align with the behavior. Changing behavior can lead to shifts in identity if the change is a relatively easy way to restore balance to the self-concept and does not introduce new intrapersonal conflicts ( Greenwald et al., 2002 ). Cognitive dissonance has convincingly shown that behavior change can lead to attitude change.

But at what point does attitude change become internalized to the point that it is incorporated into one’s identity? Theories of change within psychology have long recognized the importance of identity change as a force for behavior change (e.g., Prochaska, DiClemente, & Norcross, 1992 ), though these theories generally view identity change as reflecting a relatively autonomous intrapersonal process (e.g., self-reevaluation) that can be facilitated, but not necessarily directly caused, by external processes. However, philosophy, and particularly moral philosophy, has considered this possibility. For example, Aristotle wrote in Rhetoric that “to praise a man is in one respect akin to urging a course of action” ( Aristotle, 2000 ); Nietzsche noted how ascriptions of identity can be directive as well as descriptive ( Alfano, 2015 ). To tell someone that she is kind both describes that person’s kindness and also invokes kindness behavior. Contemporary philosophers have used that insight as a starting point to develop a theory of “factitous virtue”, or summoning virtuous behavior by prompting an identity shift ( Alfano, 2013 ). To some degree, identity can molded by a self-fulfilling prophecy. Calling someone conscientious might make them disposed to act in a conscientious way, which might eventually turn in to full-blown consciousness. Labeling children as “tidy” prompts them to conform to this label to a greater degree than merely asking them to be tidier (Miller, Brickman, & Bolen, 1975); calling adults helpful led them to see themselves as altruistic, which in turn increased their willingness to volunteer ( Burger & Caldwell, 2003 ). To our knowledge, nobody has yet tried this with self-regulation (“you are good at self-control”) or related aspects of identity. This could be a promising avenue for future research.

Another way to approach the identity change problem is to leverage the fact that identity is somewhat susceptible to cognitive shifts such as framing, construal, or priming effects. Of course, there are reality constraints. A heavy smoker, for example, might never come to identify as a non-smoker, but he might be able to think of himself as someone who can smoke less. Using this phenomenon as a starting point, psychologists have shown that a simple “noun-verb” manipulation can increase self-regulatory behavior, presumably through a subtle shift in the extent to which the behavior is construed as identity-relevant. In one study, phrasing questions about voting intentions in terms of identity (noun: “being a voter”) instead of an action (verb: “voting”) increased voting intentions and actual turnout in statewide elections ( Bryan, Walton, Rogers, & Dweck, 2011 ). In another, participants were less likely to cheat by claiming money they were not entitled to if that behavior was described as a (negative) identity (noun: “being a cheater”) instead of an action (verb: “cheating”; Bryan, Adams, & Monin, 2013 ). Both of these results are consistent with the idea that identity influences self-regulation, presumably by underscoring the subjective value of desired (“voter”) or undesired (“cheater”) identities. Following this path is a promising direction for the future of self-regulation interventions because it is low-cost, modest in scope, and easily scalable to a broad range of populations and types of desired identities.

How does value seemingly flow between aspects of identity?

Previous work examining the structure of self and identity suggests that the self is a unitary construct that nonetheless has transitive properties, such that affirming the self in one domain can reduce threat in others ( Tesser, 2001 ). For example, core-values affirmations reduce the tendency to resolve cognitive dissonance ( Steele & Liu, 1983 ) and react defensively to unfavorable social comparisons ( Tesser & Cornell, 1991 ), even if the affirmation is unrelated to the dissonant cognitions or social comparisons. The positivity or value derived from self-affirmation apparently spreads to other domains of the self. To what extent does this transitive self apply to the IVM?

It is important to note that the transitive nature of the self is not a precondition or assumption of the IVM, which narrowly focuses on identity in a specific domain imparting value to actions in that domain , in turn making domain-relevant actions more readily executed. However, we recognize that some of the evidence we presented here in support of the model relied on general affirmations as a source of value to specific actions—consistent with a transitive model. Hence the importance of the construct of identity in the model: identity itself is what binds its constituent parts ( Greenwald, 1980 ). In varying degrees, each aspect of identity both receives and supplies value to all the others; this is what allows self-affirmation to protect against a range of threats. Also, identities are not random collections of nouns; they are constructed and maintained in part under a guiding force for consistency (Steele, 1998). Identities may thus come to (or be defined to) overlap; the smoking “quitter” aspect and the “healthy eater” aspect of a person’s identity likely have overlapping representations at the cognitive and neural levels insofar as both support a superordinate identity of a “healthy person”. Likewise, being a “good friend” and a “therapist” might reinforce each other and bolster a “good listener” identity. The idea of superordinate identities may in part explain the transitivity among domains; after all, at the highest level, all aspects of identity are subordinate to some larger aspect of identity within the hierarchy ( Carver & Scheier, 1998 ). The transitive and mutually reinforcing aspects of identity could also account for “upward spirals” in self-regulation where success at a goal serves, in part, to reinforce the values and other aspects of identity that propelled the goal in the first place ( Sheldon & Houser-Marko, 2001 ).

What are the relative contributions of the actual and ideal selves to value?

The degree to which identity represents the actual versus ideal self has arisen in several places in this article. Identity contains aspects of both. Long-term goals that have not yet been attained are part of the ideal self and certainly part of identity; social identities are part of the actual self (e.g., “I am a father”) and just as certainly constitute one part of identity. Generally speaking, these are compatible, but the role of identity as a source of value brings up an interesting potential conflict. When an ideal self is in direct conflict with an actual self (e.g., “I am a smoker, but I strive to be a quitter”), which will be more valued?

This issue relates to discussion about the relationship between implicit and explicit attitudes ( Fazio & Olson, 2003 ; Nosek & Smyth, 2007 ) such that actual self can be validly measured by implicit measures (e.g., response times on a me/not me implicit association task, or IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998 ) whereas ideal self is typically indexed with explicit measures (e.g., direct report). For example, it is possible that a smoker’s responses on a questionnaire would indicate that she identifies strongly as a quitter (ideal), whereas her IAT responses suggest that she more easily links her identity to smoking than quitting (actual). A behavioral economic answer to this question would rely upon “revealed preferences” ( Kahneman & Tversky, 1979 ): decisions reveal what we actually value. However, revealed preferences might more strongly reflect the subjective value of an action rather imply that it is integral to identity, because there are a number of other ways for a behavior to have increased value besides identification (e.g., social pressure). A contemporary interpretation of Nietzsche’s thinking is that he believed the two selves would ultimately converge ( Alfano, 2015 ); in Human, All Too Human, he writes that “if someone obstinately and for a long time wants to appear something it is in the end hard for him to be anything else” ( Nietzsche, 1878/1996 ; pp. 51). In any case, this is an important question for the model that can be clarified by future work in both psychology and philosophy.

We presented an identity-value model that describes a self-regulation process that integrates and compares choice options in terms of their subjective value, which is partly driven by the choice’s relevance to identity. Situational factors can alter the salience of goal-relevant aspects of identity, and these factors can be strategically modulated in the service of long-term goals. Novel pathways for improving self-regulation follow from the mechanistic account of how various attributes of a choice are integrated. We hope this model will inform psychological theory on self-regulation by casting self-regulation as value-based choice and articulating the role of identity in contributing to value, and also inspire a new generation of research on self-regulation interventions based on identity. If the central challenge in the war of self-regulation is to sustain motivation throughout the course of a prolonged series of battles, then, by its enduring nature, identity may prove to be a powerful weapon.

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to Natalie Berkman, Charles Carver, Reid Hester, Rita Ludwig, and Lexi Suppes for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We particularly wish to acknowledge Mark Alfano and Mickey Inzlicht, whose conversations with the first author were instrumental in refining the model. This work was supported by grants AG048840, CA175241, and DA035763 from the National Institutes of Health to ETB.

1 The relationship between high-level construal and identity is likely bidirectional: it may also be the case that thinking about one’s ideal self-concept can serve as a high-level construal induction. A reader might wonder, then, whether the effects of identity on self-regulation operate through increased construal level instead of the reverse. We cannot rule out this possibility given the data available now. However, we provide two reasons why it is unlikely. First, identity-relevant behaviors can be valuable without being construed at a high level. Doing lots of push-ups or playing hours and hours of video games, for example, are closer to “do” goals than “be” goals yet are still highly valued by many people who identify with those activities. Second, as noted above, the actual self can also be part of identity, and need not be abstract. Identifying as a marine, father, or recovering alcoholic can powerfully influence value and attentional salience even though those kinds of social identities do not necessarily invoke high-level construal.

• Ahn SJ, & Bailenson J (2014). Self-endorsed advertisements: When the self persuades the self . The Journal of Marketing Theory and Practice , 22 ( 2 ), 135–136. doi: 10.2753/MTP1069-6679220203 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Alberts HJEM, Martijn C, & Vries NK de. (2010). Fighting self-control failure: Overcoming ego depletion by increasing self-awareness . Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 47 ( 1 ), 58–62. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2010.08.004 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Alfano M (2013). Character as Moral Fiction . New York: Cambridge University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Alfano M (2015). How one becomes what one is called: On the relation between traits and trait-terms in Nietzsche . Journal of Nietzsche Studies , 46 ( 2 ), 261–269. [ Google Scholar ]
• Alfano M (2016). Friendship and the structure of trust In Webber J & Masala A (eds.), From Personality to Virtue: Essays on the Philosophy of Character , Chapter 3, pp. 186–206. Oxford University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Ames DL, Jenkins AC, Banaji MR, & Mitchell JP (2008). Taking another person’s perspective increases self-referential neural processing . Psychological Science , 19 ( 7 ), 642–644. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02135.x [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Amodio DM, & Frith CD (2006). Meeting of minds: The medial frontal cortex and social cognition . Nature Reviews Neuroscience , 7 ( 4 ), 268–277. doi: 10.1038/nrn1884 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Aristotle (2000). Rhetoric In Barnes J (ed.) and Roberts W. Rhys, The Complete Works of Aristotle . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Aronson J, Blanton H, & Cooper J (1995). From dissonance to disidentification: Selectivity in the self-affirmation process . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 68 ( 6 ), 986–996. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.68.6.986 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Baker SL, & Kirsch I (1991). Cognitive mediators of pain perception and tolerance . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 61 ( 3 ), 504–510. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Baumeister RF (1993). Self-Esteem: The Puzzle of Low Self-Regard . New York: Plenum Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Baumeister RF, & Heatherton TF (1996). Self-regulation failure: An overview . Psychological Inquiry , 7 ( 1 ), 1–15. [ Google Scholar ]
• Baumeister RF, & Leary MR (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation . Psychological Bulletin , 117 ( 3 ), 497–529. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.117.3.497 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Belk RW (1989). Extended self and extending paradigmatic perspective . Journal of Consumer Research . doi: 10.2307/2489310 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bem DJ (1972). Self-perception theory . Advances in Experimental Social Psychology , 6 ( 1 ), 1–62. [ Google Scholar ]
• Berglas S, & Jones EE (1978). Drug choice as a self-handicapping strategy in response to noncontingent success . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 36 ( 4 ), 405. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Berkman ET, Hutcherson CA, Livingston JL, Kahn LE, & Inzlicht M (in press). Self-control as value-based choice . Current Directions in Psychological Science . [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Berkman ET, Kahn LE, & Livingston JL (2016). Valuation as a mechanism of self-control and ego depletion In Hirt ER (Ed.), Self-Regulation and Ego Control (pp. 255–279). New York: Elsevier. [ Google Scholar ]
• Bickel WK, Kowal BP, & Gatchalian KM (2006). Understanding addiction as a pathology of temporal horizon . The Behavior Analyst Today , 7 ( 1 ), 32–47. [ Google Scholar ]
• Bickel WK, Yi R, Landes RD, Hill PF, & Baxter C (2011). Remember the future: Working memory training decreases delay discounting among stimulant addicts . Biological Psychiatry , 69 ( 3 ), 260–265. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.08.017 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bigelow GE, & Silverman K (1999). Theoretical and empirical foundations of contingency management treatments for drug abuse. In S. T. Higgins & K. Silverman, Motivating behavior change among illicit-drug abusers: Research on contingency management interventions (pp. 15–31). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. [ Google Scholar ]
• Bogaert S, Boone C, & Declerck C (2010). Social value orientation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A review and conceptual model . The British Journal of Social Psychology / the British Psychological Society , 47 ( 3 ), 453–480. doi: 10.1348/014466607X244970 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Boksem MAS, Meijman TF, & Lorist MM (2006). Mental fatigue, motivation and action monitoring . Biological Psychology , 72 ( 2 ), 123–132. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2005.08.007 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bonnici HM, Chadwick MJ, Lutti A, Hassabis D, Weiskopf N, & Maguire EA (2012). Detecting representations of recent and remote autobiographical memories in vmPFC and hippocampus . The Journal of Neuroscience , 32 ( 47 ), 16982–16991. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2475-12.2012 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Boucher HC, & Kofos MN (2012). The idea of money counteracts ego depletion effects . Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 48 ( 4 ), 804–810. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2012.02.003 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Brewer MB (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-motivational analysis . Psychological Bulletin , 86 ( 2 ), 307–324. [ Google Scholar ]
• Bryan CJ, Adams GS, & Monin B (2013). When cheating would make you a cheater: Implicating the self prevents unethical behavior . Journal of Experimental Psychology: General , 142 ( 4 ), 1001–1005. doi: 10.1037/a0030655.supp [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Bryan CJ, Walton GM, Rogers T, & Dweck CS (2011). Motivating voter turnout by invoking the self . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 108 ( 31 ), 12653–12656. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1103343108 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Burger JM, & Caldwell DF (2003). The effects of monetary incentives and labeling on the foot-in-the-door effect: Evidence for a self-perception process . Basic and Applied Social Psychology , 25 ( 3 ), 235–241. doi: 10.1207/S15324834BASP2503_06 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Cabanac M (1986). Money versus pain: Experimental study of a conflict in humans . Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior , 46 ( 1 ), 37–44. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Camerer CF, & Loewenstein G (2004). Behavioral economics: Past, present, future In Camerer CF, Loewenstein G, & Rabin M, Advances in Behavioral Economics (Vol. 1 , pp. 3–51). Princeton: Princeton University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Carter EC, & McCullough ME (2014). Publication bias and the limited strength model of self-control: Has the evidence for ego depletion been overestimated? Frontiers in Psychology , 5 ( 1 ), 1–11. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00823/abstract [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Carver CS, & Scheier MF (2011). Self-regulation of action and affect In Vohs KD & Baumeister RF, Handbook of Self-Regulation (2nd ed., pp. 3–21). New York: The Guilford Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Carver C, & Scheier M (1998). On the Self-Regulation of Behavior . New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Chib VS, Rangel A, Shimojo S, & O’Doherty JP (2009). Evidence for a common representation of decision values for dissimilar goods in human ventromedial prefrontal cortex . The Journal of Neuroscience , 29 ( 39 ), 12315–12320. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2575-09.2009 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Clarkson JJ, Hirt ER, Jia L, & Alexander MB (2010). When perception is more than reality: The effects of perceived versus actual resource depletion on self-regulatory behavior . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 98 ( 1 ), 29–46. 10.1037/a0017539 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Cohen GL, & Sherman DK (2014). The psychology of change: Self-affirmation and social psychological intervention . Annual Review of Psychology , 65 ( 1 ), 333–371. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115137 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Cole DA, Maxwell SE, Martin JM, Peeke LG, Seroczynski AD, Tram JM, et al. (2001). The development of multiple domains of child and adolescent self-concept: A cohort sequential longitudinal design . Child Development , 72 ( 6 ), 1723–1746. doi: 10.1111/1467-8624.00375 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Cooper N, Bassett DS, & Falk EB (2017). Coherent activity between brain regions that code for value is linked to the malleability of human behavior . Scientific Reports , 7 , 43250 10.1038/srep43250 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Crocker J, & Major B (1989). Social stigma and self-esteem: The self-protective properties of stigma . Psychological Review , 96 ( 4 ), 608–630. [ Google Scholar ]
• Crocker J, & Wolfe CT (2001). Contingencies of self-worth . Psychological Review , 108 ( 3 ), 593–623. doi: 10.1037//0033-295X.108.3.593 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Davies PG, Spencer SJ, Quinn DM, & Gerhardstein R (2002). Consuming images: How television commercials that elicit stereotype threat can restrain women academically and professionally . Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 28 ( 12 ), 1615–1628. doi: 10.1177/014616702237644 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• De Dreu CKW, & van Knippenberg D (2005). The possessive self as a barrier to conflict resolution: Effects of mere ownership, process accountability, and self-concept clarity on competitive cognitions and behavior . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 89 ( 3 ), 345–357. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.89.3.345 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Deci EL, & Ryan RM (1985). Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination in Human Behavior . New York: Plenum. [ Google Scholar ]
• Derrick JL (2013). Energized by television: Familiar fictional worlds restore self-control . Social Psychological and Personality Science , 4 ( 3 ), 299–307. doi: 10.1177/1948550612454889 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Diener E, & Diener C (1996). Most people are happy . Psychological Science , 7 ( 3 ), 181–185. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.1996.tb00354.x [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Dillard AJ, McCaul KD, & Magnan RE (2005). Why is such a smart person like you smoking? Journal of Applied Biobehavioral Research , 10 ( 3 ), 165–183. [ Google Scholar ]
• Dodgson PG, & Wood JV (1998). Self-esteem and the cognitive accessibility of strengths and weaknesses after failure . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 75 ( 1 ), 178–197. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.75.1.178 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Duckworth A, & Gross JJ (2014). Self-control and grit: Related but separable determinants of success . Current Directions in Psychological Science , 23 ( 5 ), 319–325. 10.1177/0963721414541462 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Duval S, & Wicklund RA (1972). A Theory of Objective Self-Awareness . Oxford, England: Academic Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Ellemers N, Spears R, & Doosje B (2002). Self and social identity . Annual Review of Psychology , 52 ( 1 ), 161–186. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Epstein S (1973). The self-concept revisited. Or a theory of a theory . The American Psychologist , 28 ( 5 ), 404–416. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Epton T, Harris PR, Kane R, van Koningsbruggen GM, & Sheeran P (2015). The impact of self-affirmation on health-behavior change: A meta-analysis . Health Psychology , 34 ( 3 ), 187–196. 10.1037/hea0000116 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Falk EB, O’Donnell MB, Cascio CN, Tinney F, Kang Y, Lieberman MD, et al. (2015). Self-affirmation alters the brain’s response to health messages and subsequent behavior change . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 112 ( 7 ), 201500247–7. 10.1073/pnas.1500247112 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Fazio RH, & Olson MA (2003). Implicit measures in social cognition research: Their meaning and use . Annual Review of Psychology , 54 , 297–327. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145225 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Festinger L (1957). A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance . Evanston, IL: Row Peterson. [ Google Scholar ]
• Fishbach A, Eyal T, & Finkelstein SR (2010). How positive and negative feedback motivate goal pursuit . Social and Personality Psychology Compass , 4 ( 8 ), 517–530. [ Google Scholar ]
• Fox J, & Bailenson JN (2009). Virtual self-modeling: The effects of vicarious reinforcement and identification on exercise behaviors . Media Psychology , 12 ( 1 ), 1–25. doi: 10.1080/15213260802669474 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Friese M, & Wänke M (2014). Personal prayer buffers self-control depletion . Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 51 ( C ), 56–59. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2013.11.006 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Friese M, Messner C, & Schaffner Y (2012). Mindfulness meditation counteracts self-control depletion . Consciousness and Cognition , 21 ( 2 ), 1016–1022. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2012.01.008 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Fujita KK (2011). On conceptualizing self-control as more than the effortful inhibition of impulses . Personality and Social Psychology Review , 15 ( 4 ), 352–366. doi: 10.1177/1088868311411165 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Fujita K, & Carnevale JJ (2012). Transcending temptation through abstraction: The role of construal level in self-control . Current Directions in Psychological Science , 21 ( 4 ), 248–252. doi: 10.1177/0963721412449169 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Fujita K, Trope Y, Liberman N, & Levin-Sagi M (2006). Construal levels and self-control . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 90 ( 3 ), 351–367. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.90.3.351 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gallagher M, McMahan RW, & Schoenbaum G (1999). Orbitofrontal cortex and representation of incentive value in associative learning . The Journal of Neuroscience , 19 ( 15 ), 6610–6614. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Gardner TW, Dishion TJ, & Connell AM (2008). Adolescent self-regulation as resilience: resistance to antisocial behavior within the deviant peer context . Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology , 36 ( 2 ), 273–284. doi: 10.1007/s10802-007-9176-6 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Georgescu-Roegen N (1968). Utility. In International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (Vol. 16 , pp. 236–267). New York. [ Google Scholar ]
• Glimcher PW, & Rustichini A (2004). Neuroeconomics: The consilience of brain and decision . Science , 306 ( 5695 ), 447–452. doi: 10.1126/science.1102566 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Greenwald AG (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history . American Psychologist , 35 ( 7 ), 603–618. [ Google Scholar ]
• Greenwald AG, & Pratkanis AR (1984). The self In Wyer RS & Srull TK, Handbook of Social Cognition , 1st ed. (pp. 129–178). Hillsdale, NJ. [ Google Scholar ]
• Greenwald AG, Banaji MR, Rudman LA, Farnham SD, Nosek BA, & Mellott DS (2002). A unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, and self-concept . Psychological Review , 109 ( 1 ), 3–25. doi: 10.1037//0033-295X.109.1.3 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Greenwald AG, McGhee DE, & Schwartz JL (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 74 ( 6 ), 1464–1480. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.6.1464 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hagger MS, & Chatzisarantis NLD (2013). The sweet taste of success: The presence of glucose in the oral cavity moderates the depletion of self-control resources . Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 39 ( 1 ), 28–42. doi: 10.1177/0146167212459912 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hagger MS, Wood C, Stiff C, & Chatzisarantis NLD (2010). Ego depletion and the strength model of self-control: A meta-analysis . Psychological Bulletin , 136 ( 4 ), 495–525. doi: 10.1037/a0019486 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hall CC, Zhao J, & Shafir E (2014). Self-affirmation among the poor: Cognitive and behavioral implications . Psychological Science , 25 ( 2 ), 619–625. doi: 10.1177/0956797613510949 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hare TA, Camerer CF, & Rangel A (2009). Self-control in decision-making involves modulation of the vmPFC valuation system . Science , 324 ( 5927 ), 646–648. doi: 10.1126/science.1168450 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hare TA, Camerer CF, Knoepfle DT, O’Doherty JP, & Rangel A (2010). Value computations in ventral medial prefrontal cortex during charitable decision making incorporate input from regions involved in social cognition . The Journal of Neuroscience , 30 ( 2 ), 583–590. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4089-09.2010 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hare TA, Malmaud J, & Rangel A (2011a). Focusing attention on the health aspects of foods changes value signals in vmPFC and improves dietary choice . Journal of Neuroscience , 31 ( 30 ), 11077–11087. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6383-10.2011 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hare TA, Schultz W, Camerer CF, O’Doherty JP, & Rangel A (2011b). Transformation of stimulus value signals into motor commands during simple choice . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America , 108 ( 44 ), 18120–18125. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1109322108 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Harris PR, & Epton T (2009). The impact of self-affirmation on health cognition, health behaviour and other health-related responses: A narrative review . Social and Personality Psychology Compass , 3 ( 6 ), 962–978. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00233.x [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hayashi T, Ko JH, Strafella AP, & Dagher A (2013). Dorsolateral prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex interactions during self-control of cigarette craving . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America , 110 ( 11 ), 4422–4427. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1212185110 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Heckman BW, Ditre JW, & Brandon TH (2012). The restorative effects of smoking upon self-control resources: A negative reinforcement pathway . Journal of Abnormal Psychology , 121 ( 1 ), 244–249. doi: 10.1037/a0023032 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Heider F (1958). The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations . New York: Wiley. [ Google Scholar ]
• Heine SJ, Lehman DR, Markus HR, & Kitayama S (1999). Is there a universal need for positive self-regard? Psychological Review , 106 ( 4 ), 766–794. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hershfield HE (2011). Future self-continuity: How conceptions of the future self transform intertemporal choice . Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences , 1235 ( 1 ), 30–43. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06201.x [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hershfield HE, Goldstein DG, Sharpe WF, Fox J, Yeykelis L, Carstensen LL, & Bailenson JN (2011). Increasing saving behavior through age-progressed renderings of the future self . JMR, Journal of Marketing Research , 48 ( SPL ), S23–S37. doi: 10.1509/jmkr.48.SPL.S23 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Higgins ET (1987). Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect . Psychological Review , 94 ( 3 ), 319–340. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hofmann W, Friese M, & Strack F (2009). Impulse and self-control from a dual-systems perspective . Perspectives on Psychological Science , 4 ( 2 ), 162–176. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hogg MA, Terry DJ, & White KM (1995). A tale of two theories: A critical comparison of identity theory with social identity theory . Social Psychology Quarterly , 58 ( 4 ), 255–269. [ Google Scholar ]
• Hutcherson CA, Bushong B, & Rangel A (2015). A Neurocomputational Model of Altruistic Choice and Its Implications . Neuron , 87 ( 2 ), 451–462. 10.1016/j.neuron.2015.06.031 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Hutcherson CA, Plassmann H, Gross JJ, & Rangel A (2012). Cognitive regulation during decision making shifts behavioral control between ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal value systems . The Journal of Neuroscience , 32 ( 39 ), 13543–13554. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6387-11.2012 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Inzlicht M & Berkman ET (2015). Six questions for the resource model of control (and some answers) . Social and Personality Psychology Compass , 9 , 511–524. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Inzlicht M, & Schmeichel BJ (2012). What is ego depletion? Toward a mechanistic revision of the resource model of self-control . Perspectives on Psychological Science , 7 ( 5 ), 450–463. doi: 10.1177/1745691612454134 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Inzlicht M, Schmeichel BJ, & Macrae CN (2014). Why self-control seems (but may not be) limited . Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 18 ( 3 ), 127–133. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2013.12.009 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Izuma K, Saito DN, & Sadato N (2008). Processing of social and monetary rewards in the human striatum . Neuron , 58 ( 2 ), 284–294. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2008.03.020 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• James W (1890). Principles of Psychology . New York: Dover Publications. [ Google Scholar ]
• Job V, Dweck CS, & Walton GM (2010). Ego depletion—Is it all in your head? Implicit theories about willpower affect self-regulation . Psychological Science , 21 ( 11 ), 1686–1693. 10.1177/0956797610384745 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kable JW, & Glimcher PW (2007). The neural correlates of subjective value during intertemporal choice . Nature Neuroscience , 10 ( 12 ), 1625–1633. doi: 10.1038/nn2007 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kahneman D (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality . The American Psychologist , 58 ( 9 ), 697–720. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.58.9.697 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kahneman D, & Tversky A (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk . Econometrica , 47 ( 2 ), 263–292. [ Google Scholar ]
• Kahneman D, Knetsch JL, & Thaler RH (1991). Anomalies: The endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias . The Journal of Economic Perspectives , 5 ( 1 ), 193–206. doi: 10.2307/1942711 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kelley WM, Macrae CN, Wyland CL, Caglar S, Inati S, & Heatherton TF (2002). Finding the self? An event-related fMRI study . Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience , 14 ( 5 ), 785–794. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kihlstrom JF, & Cantor N (1984). Mental representations of the self In Berkowitz L, (Vol. 17 , pp. 1–47). New York. [ Google Scholar ]
• Kim K, & Johnson MK (2014a). Activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex during self-related processing: Positive subjective value or personal significance? Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience . doi: 10.1093/scan/nsu078 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kim K, & Johnson MK (2014b). Extended self: Spontaneous activation of medial prefrontal cortex by objects that are “mine .” Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience , 9 ( 7 ), 1006–1012. doi: 10.1093/scan/nst082 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Klein WMP, & Harris PR (2009). Self-affirmation enhances attentional bias toward threatening components of a persuasive message . Psychological Science , 20 ( 12 ), 1463–1467. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02467.x [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kober H, Kross EF, Mischel W, Hart CL, & Ochsner KN (2010). Regulation of craving by cognitive strategies in cigarette smokers . Drug and Alcohol Dependence , 106 ( 1 ), 52–55. doi: 10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2009.07.017 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Koestner R, Otis N, Powers TA, Pelletier L, & Gagnon H (2008). Autonomous motivation, controlled motivation, and goal Progress . Journal of Personality , 76 ( 5 ), 1201–1230. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.2008.00519.x [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Krajbich I, Armel C, & Rangel A (2010). Visual fixations and the computation and comparison of value in simple choice . Nature Neuroscience , 13 ( 10 ), 1292–1298. 10.1038/nn.2635 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Krebs P, Prochaska JO, & Rossi JS (2010). A meta-analysis of computer-tailored interventions for health behavior change . Preventive Medicine , 51 ( 3–4 ), 214–221. doi: 10.1016/j.ypmed.2010.06.004 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kroger J, Martinussen M, & Marcia JE (2010). Identity status change during adolescence and young adulthood: A meta-analysis . Journal of Adolescence , 33 ( 5 ), 683–698. doi: 10.1016/j.adolescence.2009.11.002 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kruglanski AW, Bélanger JJ, Chen X, Köpetz C, Pierro A, & Mannetti L (2012). The energetics of motivated cognition: A force-field analysis . Psychological Review , 119 ( 1 ), 1–20. doi: 10.1037/a0025488 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Kunda Z (1990). The case for motivated reasoning . Psychological Bulletin , 108 ( 3 ), 480–498. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Laibson D (1997). Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting . The Quarterly Journal of Economics , 112 ( 2 ), 443–477. [ Google Scholar ]
• Lebreton M, Jorge S, Michel V, Thirion B, & Pessiglione M (2009). An automatic valuation system in the human brain: Evidence from functional neuroimaging . Neuron , 64 ( 3 ), 431–439. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2009.09.040 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Legault L, & Inzlicht M (2013). Self-determination, self-regulation, and the brain: Autonomy improves performance by enhancing neuroaffective responsiveness to self-regulation failure . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 105 ( 1 ), 123–138. doi: 10.1037/a0030426 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Legault L, Al-Khindi T, & Inzlicht M (2012). Preserving integrity in the face of performance threat: Self-affirmation enhances neurophysiological responsiveness to errors . Psychological Science , 23 ( 12 ), 1455–1460. doi: 10.1177/0956797612448483 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Levy DJ, & Glimcher PW (2011). Comparing apples and oranges: Using reward-specific and reward-general subjective value representation in the brain . The Journal of Neuroscience , 31 ( 41 ), 14693–14707. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2218-11.2011 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Liberman A, & Chaiken S (1992). Defensive processing of personally relevant health messages . Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 18 ( 6 ), 669–679. doi: 10.1177/0146167292186002 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Loewenstein G, & Prelec D (1992). Anomalies in intertemporal choice . The Quarterly Journal of Economics , 107 ( 2 ), 573–597. [ Google Scholar ]
• Louie K, & Glimcher PW (2010). Separating value from choice: Delay discounting activity in the lateral intraparietal area . The Journal of Neuroscience , 30 ( 16 ), 5498–5507. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5742-09.2010 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Lustria MLA, Noar SM, Cortese J, Van Stee SK, Glueckauf RL, & Lee J (2013). A meta-analysis of web-delivered tailored health behavior change interventions . Journal of Health Communication , 18 ( 9 ), 1039–1069. doi: 10.1080/10810730.2013.768727 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Magen E, & Gross JJ (2007). Harnessing the need for immediate gratification: Cognitive reconstrual modulates the reward value of temptations . Emotion , 7 ( 2 ), 415–428. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.7.2.415 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Magen E, Dweck CS, & Gross JJ (2008). The hidden-zero effect: Representing a single choice as an extended sequence reduces impulsive choice . Psychological Science , 19 ( 7 ), 648–649. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02137.x [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Magen E, Kim B, Dweck CS, Gross JJ, & McClure SM (2014). Behavioral and neural correlates of increased self-control in the absence of increased willpower . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 111 ( 27 ), 9786–9791. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1408991111 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Mani A, Mullainathan S, Shafir E, & Zhao J (2013). Poverty impedes cognitive function . Science , 341 ( 6149 ), 976–980. doi: 10.1126/science.1238041 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Markus H (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 35 ( 2 ), 63–78. [ Google Scholar ]
• Markus H (1983). Self‐knowledge: An expanded view . Journal of Personality , 51 ( 3 ), 543–565. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1983.tb00344.x [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Markus HR, & Kitayama S (2010). Cultures and selves: A cycle of mutual constitution . Perspectives on Psychological Science , 5 ( 4 ), 420–430. doi: 10.1177/1745691610375557 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Markus H, & Kunda Z (1986). Stability and malleability of the self-concept . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 51 ( 4 ), 858–866. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.51.4.858 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Maunsell JHR (2004). Neuronal representations of cognitive state: Reward or attention? Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 8 ( 6 ), 261–265. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.04.003 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• McAdams DP (2013). The psychological self as actor, agent, and author . Perspectives on Psychological Science , 8 ( 3 ), 272–295. 10.1177/1745691612464657 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• McQueen A, & Klein WMP (2006). Experimental manipulations of self-affirmation: A systematic review . Self and Identity , 5 ( 4 ), 289–354. doi: 10.1080/15298860600805325 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Mead GH (1925). The genesis of the self and social control . International Journal of Ethics , 35 ( 3 ), 251–277. [ Google Scholar ]
• Mermelstein R, Cohen S, Lichtenstein E, Baer JS, & Kamarck T (1986). Social support and smoking cessation and maintenance . Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology , 54 ( 4 ), 447–453. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Metcalfe J, & Mischel W (1999). A hot/cool-system analysis of delay of gratification: Dynamics of willpower . Psychological Review , 106 ( 1 ), 3–19. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Mitchell J (2009). Social psychology as a natural kind . Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 13 ( 6 ), 246–251. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2009.03.008 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Mitchell JP, Macrae CN, & Banaji MR (2006). Dissociable medial prefrontal contributions to judgments of similar and dissimilar others . Neuron , 50 ( 4 ), 655–663. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2006.03.040 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Molden DC, Hui CM, Scholer AA, Meier BP, Noreen EE, D’Agostino PR, & Martin V (2012). Motivational versus metabolic effects of carbohydrates on self-control . Psychological Science . doi: 10.1177/0956797612439069 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Moller AC, Deci EL, & Ryan RM (2006). Choice and ego-depletion: The moderating role of autonomy . Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 32 ( 8 ), 1024–1036. doi: 10.1177/0146167206288008 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Montague PR, King-Casas B, & Cohen JD (2006). Imaging valuation models in human choice . Annual Review of Neuroscience , 29 , 417–448. doi: 10.1146/annurev.neuro.29.051605.112903 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Muraven M, & Slessareva E (2003). Mechanisms of self-control failure: Motivation and limited resources . Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 29 ( 7 ), 894–906. doi: 10.1177/0146167203029007008 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Muraven M, Gagné M, & Rosman H (2008). Helpful self-control: Autonomy support, vitality, and depletion . Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 44 ( 3 ), 573–585. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2007.10.008 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Newman GE, Bloom P, & Knobe J (2014). Value judgments and the true self . Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 40 ( 2 ), 203–216. doi: 10.1177/0146167213508791 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Nietzsche FW (1878/1996). Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits . (Hollingdale J). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Niiya Y, Brook AT, & Crocker J (2010). Contingent self-worth and self-handicapping: Do incremental theorists protect self-esteem? Self and Identity , 9 ( 3 ), 276–297. doi: 10.1080/15298860903054233 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Noar SM, Benac CN, & Harris MS (2007). Does tailoring matter? Meta-analytic review of tailored print health behavior change interventions . Psychological Bulletin , 133 ( 4 ), 673–693. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.133.4.673 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Northoff G, & Hayes DJ (2011). Is our self nothing but reward? Biological Psychiatry . doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.12.014 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Nosek BA, & Smyth FL (2007). A multitrait-multimethod validation of the implicit association test . Experimental Psychology , 54 ( 1 ), 14–29. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169.54.1.14 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ntoumanis N, Healy LC, Sedikides C, Duda J, Stewart B, Smith A, & Bond J (2014). When the going gets tough: The “why” of goal striving matters . Journal of Personality , 82 ( 3 ), 225–236. doi: 10.1111/jopy.12047 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• O’Doherty JP (2007). Lights, camembert, action! The role of human orbitofrontal cortex in encoding stimuli, rewards, and choices . Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences , 1121 ( 1 ), 254–272. doi: 10.1196/annals.1401.036 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ochsner KN, Knierim K, Ludlow DH, Hanelin J, Ramachandran T, Glover G, & Mackey SC (2004). Reflecting upon feelings: an fMRI study of neural systems supporting the attribution of emotion to self and other . Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience , 16 ( 10 ), 1746–1772. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ogedegbe GO, Boutin-Foster C, Wells MT, Allegrante JP, Isen AM, Jobe JB, & Charlson ME (2012). A randomized controlled trial of positive-affect intervention and medication adherence in hypertensive African Americans . Archives of Internal Medicine , 172 ( 4 ), 322–326. doi: 10.1001/archinternmed.2011.1307 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Oyserman D (2007). Social identity and self-regulation In Kruglanski A, & Higgins T (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (pp. 432–453), 2nd Ed. New York: Guilford Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Oyserman D (2009). Identity-based motivation: Implications for action-readiness, procedural-readiness, and consumer behavior . Journal of Consumer Psychology , 19 ( 3 ), 250–260. 10.1016/j.jcps.2009.05.008 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Oyserman D, Fryberg SA, & Yoder N (2007). Identity-based motivation and health . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 93 ( 6 ), 1011–1027. 10.1037/0022-3514.93.6.1011 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Oyserman D, & Lee SWS (2008). Does culture influence what and how we think? Effects of priming individualism and collectivism . Psychological Bulletin , 134 ( 2 ), 311–342. 10.1037/0033-2909.134.2.311 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Padoa-Schioppa C, & Assad JA (2006). Neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex encode economic value . Nature , 441 ( 7090 ), 223–226. doi: 10.1038/nature04676 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pelham BW (1995). Self-investment and self-esteem: Evidence for a Jamesian model of self-worth . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 69 ( 6 ), 1141–1150. [ Google Scholar ]
• Pelham BW, & Swann WB (1989). From self-conceptions to self-worth: On the sources and structure of global self-esteem . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 57 ( 4 ), 672–680. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pfeifer JH, Kahn LE, Merchant JS, Peake SJ, Kim Veroude, Masten CL, et al. (2013). Longitudinal change in the neural bases of adolescent social self-evaluations: Effects of age and pubertal development . Journal of Neuroscience , 33 ( 17 ), 7415–7419. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4074-12.2013 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pfeifer JH, Lieberman MD, & Dapretto M (2007). “ I know you are but what am I?!”: Neural bases of self- and social knowledge retrieval in children and adults . Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience , 19 ( 8 ), 1323–1337. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Pfeifer JH, Masten CL, Borofsky LA, Dapretto M, Fuligni AJ, & Lieberman MD (2009). Neural correlates of direct and reflected self-appraisals in adolescents and adults: When social perspective-taking informs self-perception . Child Development , 80 ( 4 ), 1016–1038. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01314.x [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Phan KL, Wager T, Taylor SF, & Liberzon I (2002). Functional neuroanatomy of emotion: A meta-analysis of emotion activation studies in PET and fMRI . NeuroImage , 16 ( 2 ), 331–348. doi: 10.1006/nimg.2002.1087 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Philiastides MG, Biele G, & Heekeren HR (2010). A mechanistic account of value computation in the human brain . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America , 107 ( 20 ), 9430–9435. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1001732107 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Plassmann H, ODoherty JP, & Rangel A (2010). Appetitive and aversive goal values are encoded in the medial orbitofrontal cortex at the time of decision making . Journal of Neuroscience , 30 ( 32 ), 10799–10808. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Prendergast M, Podus D, Finney J, Greenwell L, & Roll J (2006). Contingency management for treatment of substance use disorders: a meta-analysis . Addiction , 101 ( 11 ), 1546–1560. doi: 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2006.01581.x [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Prochaska JO, DiClemente CC, & Norcross JC (1992). In search of how people change. Applications to addictive behaviors . The American Psychologist , 47 ( 9 ), 1102–1114. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Radu PT, Yi R, Bickel WK, Gross JJ, & McClure SM (2011). A mechanism for reducing delay discounting by altering temporal attention . Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior , 96 ( 3 ), 363–385. doi: 10.1901/jeab.2011.96-363 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Rangel A, & Hare T (2010). Neural computations associated with goal-directed choice . Current Opinion in Neurobiology , 20 ( 2 ), 262–270. doi: 10.1016/j.conb.2010.03.001 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Rangel A, Camerer C, & Montague PR (2008). A framework for studying the neurobiology of value-based decision making . Nature Reviews Neuroscience , 9 ( 7 ), 545–556. doi: 10.1038/nrn2357 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Rieskamp J, Busemeyer JR, & Mellers BA (2006). Extending the bounds of rationality: Evidence and theories of preferential choice . Journal of Economic Literature , 631–661. [ Google Scholar ]
• Rimer BK, & Kreuter MW (2006). Advancing tailored health communication: A persuasion and message effects perspective . Journal of Communication , 56 ( s1 ), S184–S201. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00289.x [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Roberts JE, Gotlib IH, & Kassel JD (1996). Adult attachment security and symptoms of depression: The mediating roles of dysfunctional attitudes and low self-esteem . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 70 ( 2 ), 310–320. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.70.2.310 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Rosenberg M (1979). Conceiving the Self . New York: Basic Books. [ Google Scholar ]
• Rumelhart DE, & McClelland JL (1986). Parallel Distributed Processing . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Ryan RM, & Deci EL (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being . American Psychologist , 55 ( 1 ), 68–78. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Ryff CD, & Singer B (1998). The contours of positive human health . Psychological Inquiry , 9 ( 1 ), 1–28. doi: 10.1207/s15327965pli0901_1 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Schmeichel BJ, & Demaree HA (2010). Working memory capacity and spontaneous emotion regulation: High capacity predicts self-enhancement in response to negative feedback . Emotion , 10 ( 5 ), 739–744. doi: 10.1037/a0019355 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Schmeichel BJ, Volokhov RN, & Demaree HA (2008). Working memory capacity and the self-regulation of emotional expression and experience . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 95 ( 6 ), 1526–1540. doi: 10.1037/a0013345 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Schmeichel BJ, & Vohs K (2009). Self-affirmation and self-control: Affirming core values counteracts ego depletion . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 96 ( 4 ), 770–782. doi: 10.1037/a0014635 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Schoenbaum M (1997). Do smokers understand the mortality effects of smoking? Evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey . American Journal of Public Health , 87 ( 5 ), 755–759. [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Schwartz J, Mochon D, Wyper L, Maroba J, Patel D, & Ariely D (2014). Healthier by precommitment . Psychological Science , 25 ( 2 ), 538–546. doi: 10.1177/0956797613510950 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Shah AK, Mullainathan S, & Shafir E (2012). Some consequences of having too little . Science , 338 ( 6107 ), 682–685. doi: 10.1126/science.1222426 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sheldon KM, & Elliot AJ (1998). Not all personal goals are personal: Comparing autonomous and controlled reasons for goals as predictors of effort and attainment . Personality and Social Psychology , 24 ( 5 ), 546. [ Google Scholar ]
• Sheldon KM, & Elliot AJ (1999). Goal striving, need satisfaction, and longitudinal well-being: The self-concordance model . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 76 ( 3 ), 482–497. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sheldon KM, & Houser-Marko L (2001). Self-concordance, goal attainment, and the pursuit of happiness: Can there be an upward spiral? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 80 ( 1 ), 152–165. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sherman DAK, Nelson LD, & Steele CM (2000). Do messages about health risks threaten the self? Increasing the acceptance of threatening health messages via self-affirmation . Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 26 ( 9 ), 1046–1058. [ Google Scholar ]
• Sherman DK (2013). Self-affirmation: Understanding the effects . Social and Personality Psychology Compass , 7 ( 11 ), 834–845. doi: 10.1111/spc3.12072 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sherman DK, & Cohen GL (2002). Accepting threatening information: Self-affirmation and the reduction of defensive biases . Current Directions in Psychological Science , 11 ( 4 ), 119–123. [ Google Scholar ]
• Shih M, Pittinsky TL, & Ambady N (1999). Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity salience and shifts in quantitative performance . Psychological Science , 10 ( 1 ), 80–83. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Smetana JG, Campione-Barr N, & Metzger A (2006). Adolescent development in interpersonal and societal contexts . Annual Review of Psychology , 57 ( 1 ), 255–284. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190124 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Snyder ML, Kleck RE, Strenta A, & Mentzer SJ (1979). Avoidance of the handicapped: An attributional ambiguity analysis . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 37 ( 12 ), 2297–2306. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Steele CM (1988). The psychology of self-affirmation: Sustaining the integrity of the self . Advances in Experimental Social Psychology , 21 ( 1 ), 261–302. [ Google Scholar ]
• Steele CM (1997). A threat in the air. How stereotypes shape intellectual identity and performance . The American Psychologist , 52 ( 6 ), 613–629. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Steele CM, & Liu TJ (1983). Dissonance processes as self-affirmation . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 45 ( 1 ), 5–19. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.45.1.5 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Sullivan N, Hutcherson C, Harris A, & Rangel A (2015). Dietary self-control is related to the speed with which attributes of healthfulness and tastiness are processed . Psychological Science , 26 ( 2 ), 122–134. 10.1177/0956797614559543 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Swann WB (1992). Seeking “truth,” finding despair: Some unhappy consequences of a negative self-concept . Current Directions in Psychological Science . doi: 10.2307/20182117 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Swann WB, Jr, & Bosson JK (2010). Self and identity In Fiske ST, Gilbert DT, & Lindzey G, Handbook of Social Psychology (5 ed., Vol . 1 , pp. 589–628). Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley. [ Google Scholar ]
• Swann WB, Jr, Pelham BW, & Krull DS (1989). Agreeable fancy or disagreeable truth? Reconciling self-enhancement and self-verification . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 57 ( 5 ), 782. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Swann WB, Wenzlaff RM, & Tafarodi RW (1992). Depression and the search for negative evaluations: More evidence of the role of self-verification strivings . Journal of Abnormal Psychology , 101 ( 2 ), 314–317. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Tajfel H, & Turner J (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict In Austin W & Worchel S, The Social Psychology of Integroup Relations (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. [ Google Scholar ]
• Tamir DI, & Mitchell JP (2012). Disclosing information about the self is intrinsically rewarding . Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A , 109 ( 21 ), 8038–8043. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1202129109 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Tangney JP, Baumeister RF, & Boone AL (2004). High self-control predicts good adjustment, less pathology, better grades, and interpersonal success . Journal of Personality , 72 ( 2 ), 271–324. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Taylor SE, & Brown JD (1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health . Psychological Bulletin , 103 ( 2 ), 193–210. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Tesser A (2001). On the plasticity of self-defense . Current Directions in Psychological Science , 10 ( 2 ), 66–69. doi: 10.1111/1467-8721.00117 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Tesser A, & Cornell DP (1991). On the confluence of self processes . Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 27 ( 6 ), 501–526. [ Google Scholar ]
• Tice DM, Baumeister R, Shmueli D, & Muraven M (2007). Restoring the self: Positive affect helps improve self-regulation following ego depletion . Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 43 , 379–384. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2006.05.007 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Tom SM, Fox CR, Trepel C, & Poldrack RA (2007). The neural basis of loss aversion in decision-making under risk . Science , 315 ( 5811 ), 515–518. doi: 10.1126/science.1134239 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Trope Y, & Liberman N (2003). Temporal construal . Psychological Review , 110 ( 3 ), 403–421. [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Tsai JL (2007). Ideal affect: Cultural causes and behavioral consequences . Perspectives on Psychological Science , 2 ( 3 ), 242–259. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2007.00043.x [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Turner JC (1991). Social Influence . London, England: Open University Press. [ Google Scholar ]
• Turner JC, Oakes PJ, Haslam SA, & McGarty C (1994). Self and collective: Cognition and social context . Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 20 ( 5 ), 454–463. [ Google Scholar ]
• Urdan T, & Midgley C (2001). Academic self-handicapping: What we know, what more there is to learn . Educational Psychology Review , 13 ( 2 ), 115–138. [ Google Scholar ]
• Vallacher RR, & Wegner DM (1987). What do people thing they’re doing? Action identification and human behavior . Psychological Review , 94 ( 1 ), 3–15. [ Google Scholar ]
• van Koningsbruggen GM, & Das E (2009). Don’t derogate this message! Self-affirmation promotes online type 2 diabetes risk test taking . Psychology and Health , 24 ( 6 ), 635–649. doi: 10.1080/08870440802340156 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Van Lange PAM (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: An integrative model of social value orientation . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 77 ( 2 ), 337–349. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.77.2.337 [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Van Overwalle F (2009). Social cognition and the brain: A meta-analysis . Human Brain Mapping , 30 ( 3 ), 829–858. doi: 10.1002/hbm.20547 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Wallis JD (2007). Orbitofrontal Cortex and Its Contribution to Decision-Making . Annual Review of Neuroscience , 30 ( 1 ), 31–56. 10.1146/annurev.neuro.30.051606.094334 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Wicklund RA, & Gollwitzer PM (1982). Symbolic Self-Completion . Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. [ Google Scholar ]
• Wunderlich K, Rangel A, & O’Doherty JP (2010). Economic choices can be made using only stimulus values . Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 107 ( 34 ), 15005–15010. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1002258107 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Yarkoni T, Poldrack RA, Nichols TE, Van Essen DC, & Wager TD (2011). Large-scale automated synthesis of human functional neuroimaging data . Nature Methods , 8 ( 8 ), 665–670. doi: 10.1038/nmeth.1635 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Zaki J, Lopez G, & Mitchell JP (2014). Activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex co-varies with revealed social preferences: Evidence for person-invariant value . Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience , 9 ( 4 ), 464–469. doi: 10.1093/scan/nst005 [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]
• Zaki J, Schirmer J, & Mitchell JP (2011). Social influence modulates the neural computation of value . Psychological Science , 22 ( 7 ), 894–900. doi: 10.1177/0956797611411057 [ PubMed ] [ CrossRef ] [ Google Scholar ]

What is Self-Concept Theory? A Psychologist Explains

You might answer with “ I’m a mother ,” or, “ I’m a therapist, ” or maybe, “ I’m a believer, ” “ I’m a good friend, ” “ I’m a brother. ”

Maybe you answer with, “ I am excellent at my job, ” “ I’m an accomplished musician, ” or “ I’m a successful athlete. ”

Other responses might fall into the category of traits: “ I’m a kind-hearted person, ” “ I’m intelligent and hard-working, ” or “ I’m laid-back and easy-going. ”

These responses come from your internal sense of who you are. This sense is developed early in life, but it goes through constant evaluation and adjustment throughout the lifespan.

In psychology, this sense of self has a specific term: self-concept.

Before you read on, we thought you might like to download our three Self-Compassion Exercises for free . These detailed, science-based exercises will not only help you understand and show more compassion and kindness to yourself but will also give you the tools to help your clients, students or employees improve their self-compassion.

This Article Contains:

What is self-concept a definition, self-concept theory, the components and elements of the self-concept model, the development stages of self-concept, 10 examples of self-concept, research on self-concept, measuring self-concept with scales, tests, and inventories, self-concept activities and lesson plans for preschoolers and older students (pdf), self-concept worksheets (pdf), 8 quotes on self-concept, a take-home message.

Self-concept is an overarching idea we have about who we are—physically, emotionally, socially, spiritually, and in terms of any other aspects that make up who we are (Neill, 2005). We form and regulate our self-concept as we grow, based on the knowledge we have about ourselves. It is multidimensional, and can be broken down into these individual aspects.

For example, you may have a very different idea of who you are in terms of your physical body, and who you are in terms of your spirit or soul.

The influential self-efficacy researcher Roy Baumeister (1999) defines self-concept as follows:

“The individual’s belief about himself or herself, including the person’s attributes and who and what the self is.”

A similar definition comes from Rosenberg’s 1979 book on the topic; he says self-concept is:

“…the totality of an individual’s thoughts and feelings having reference to himself as an object.”

Self-concept is related to several other “self” constructs, such as self-esteem, self-image, self-efficacy, and self-awareness. In the following section, we will explain these slight—yet important—differences.

Self-Concept vs. Self-Esteem

Self-concept is not self-esteem, although self-esteem may be a part of self-concept. Self-concept is the perception that we have of ourselves, our answer when we ask ourselves the question “Who am I?”

It is knowing about one’s own tendencies, thoughts, preferences and habits, hobbies, skills, and areas of weakness. According to Carl Rogers, founder of client-centered therapy , self-concept is an overarching construct that self-esteem is one of the components of it (McLeod, 2008).

Self-Concept vs. Self-Image

Self-image is related to self-concept but is less broad. Self-image is how an individual sees themselves, and it does not have to align with reality.

A person’s self-image is based on how they see themselves, while self-concept is a more comprehensive evaluation of the self, largely based on how a person sees themselves, values themselves, thinks about themselves, and feels about themselves.

Carl Rogers posited that self-image is a component of self-concept, along with self-esteem or self-worth and one’s “ideal self” (McLeod, 2008).

Self-Concept vs. Self-Efficacy

Self-concept is a more complex construct than self-efficacy. While self-efficacy refers to an individual’s judgments of their own abilities, self-concept is more general and includes both cognitive (thoughts about) and affective (feelings about) judgments about oneself (Bong & Clark, 1999).

Self-Concept vs. Self-Awareness

Self-awareness also influences self-concept. It is the quality or trait that involves conscious awareness of one’s own thoughts, feelings, behaviors, and traits (Cherry, 2018A). To have a fully developed self-concept (and one that is based in reality), a person must have at least some level of self-awareness .

We explore this further in The Science of Self-Acceptance Masterclass© .

Generally, theorists agree on the following points:

• On the broadest level, self-concept is the overall idea we have about who we are and includes cognitive and affective judgments about ourselves;
• Self-concept is multi-dimensional, incorporating our views of ourselves in terms of several different aspects (e.g., social, religious, spiritual, physical, emotional);
• It is learned, not inherent;
• It is influenced by biological and environmental factors, but social interaction plays a big role as well;
• Self-concept develops through childhood and early adulthood when it is more easily changed or updated;
• It can be changed in later years, but it is more of an uphill battle since people have established ideas about who they are;
• Self-concept does not always align with reality. When it does, our self-concept is “congruent.” When it doesn’t, our self-concept is “incongruent.”

Identity and Self-Concept Theory in Psychology vs. Self-Concept in Sociology

Both psychology and sociology share an interest in self-concept, but they use slightly different ways to explore it. Individual researchers vary, of course, but generally, the divide can be thought of in these terms:

• Sociology/social psychology focuses on how self-concept develops, specifically within the context of the individual’s social environment.
• Psychology focuses on how self-concept impacts people (Gecas, 1982).

There are other differences between the two, including psychology’s general focus on the individual versus sociology’s focus on the group, community, or society; however, this difference in focus has led to two diverse research streams. Both have resulted in great insights and interesting findings, and they sometimes overlap, but this divide can still be seen in the literature today.

Carl Rogers and the Self-Concept Theory of Personality

Famed psychologist, theorist, and clinician Carl Rogers posited a theory of how self-concept influences and, indeed, acts as the framework for, one’s personality.

The image we have of who we are contributes to our personality, and our actions—combined with our personality —create a feedback loop into our image of ourselves. Rogers believed that our personality is driven by our desire for self-actualization . This is the condition that emerges when we reach our full potential and our self-concept, self-worth, and ideal self all overlap (Journal Psyche, n.d.).

How we develop our personalities and self-concepts varies, thus creating the unique individuals we are. According to Rogers, we always strive for self-actualization, some with more success than others.

How do people go about striving for self-actualization and congruence? This relates to the idea of how anyone “maintains” their idea of themselves. We explore that next.

Self-Concept Maintenance Theory

Self-concept maintenance refers to how people maintain or enhance their sense of self. It is relatively fixed after a person reaches adulthood, but it can—and does—change based on the person’s experiences.

The theory of self-concept maintenance states that we do not simply sit and wait for our self-concept to develop: we take an active role in shaping our self-concept at all ages (whether we are aware of this or not).

Although there are different theories about the processes of self-concept maintenance, it generally concerns:

• Our evaluations of ourselves
• Our comparison of our actual selves with our ideal selves
• Our actions taken to move closer to our ideal selves (Munoz, 2012).

This may seem like a pretty logical and straightforward process, but we tend to give ourselves room for moral ambiguity. For example, a study by Mazar, Amir, and Ariely (2007) showed that people will generally engage in beneficial dishonesty when given the opportunity. However, these same people might not revise their self-concept to incorporate this dishonesty.

When participants in the study were prompted to be more aware of their internal standards for honesty , they were less likely to engage in beneficial dishonesty; on the other hand, when given a “degrees of freedom” (greater separation between their actions and the rewards they would receive for dishonesty), they were more likely to engage in dishonesty—with no impact to their self-concept.

This is one example of the work on self-concept maintenance, as humans constantly assess themselves and their moral code since it influences their identity and actions.

Self-Concept Clarity and Self-Concept Differentiation

Self-concept clarity is different from self-concept.

Self-concept clarity (SCC) refers to how clear, confident, and consistent an individual’s definitions of themselves are (Diehl & Hay, 2011). Self-concept differentiation (SCD) refers to how an individual’s self-representation may vary across contexts or social roles (e.g., self as a spouse, self as a parent, self as a student).

SCC and SCD are hot topics in psychology since they influence thought patterns and behavior.

Higher SCC indicates a firmer and more stable self-concept, while low SCC indicates that an individual is unclear or vague about who they really are. Those with low SCC may struggle with low self-esteem, self-consciousness, and neuroticism.

SCD is not as clear-cut. Having a high SCD may be viewed as a bad thing, but it can also be an effective coping mechanism for succeeding in the modern world where individuals have many different roles. If SCD is very high, it might mean that the individual does not have a stable self-concept and “wears a different mask” for each of their roles.

A very low level of SCD may indicate that the individual is authentically “them” across all of their roles—although it may also indicate that he cannot effectively switch from one role to another (Diehl & Hay, 2011).

Essentially, people who differentiate their roles slightly, yet maintain a clear image of themselves, may succeed most at finding balance in their identity and image.

There are different ideas about what self-concept consists of, and how it should be defined; however, there are some characteristics and dimensions that apply to the basic, agreed-upon conceptualization of self-concept.

Characteristics of Self-Concept

As a brief review, self-concept is the perspective we have on who we are. Each of us has a unique self-concept, different from the self-concept of others and from their concept of us.

However, there are some characteristics that all of our self-concepts have in common.

Self-concept:

• Displays uniquely with each person.
• Vary from very positive to very negative.
• Carries emotional, intellectual, and functional dimensions.
• Changes with the context.
• Changes over time.
• Influence the individual’s life (Delmar Learning, n.d.)

Dimensions of Self-Concept

Different dimensions may constitute different kinds of self-concept; for example, the dimensions that create “academic self-efficacy” will not have as much overlap with “social self-efficacy.”

There are some overarching dimensions that researchers understand with the self-concept puzzle. These dimensions include:

• Self-esteem
• Self-image (physical)
• Identities or roles (social)
• Personal traits and qualities (Elliot, 1984; Gecas, 1982)

Early childhood is a ripe time for young humans to perceive themselves in the world.

The Formation of Self-Concept During Early Childhood

There are three general stages of self-concept development during early childhood:

• Stage 1 : 0 to 2 years-old a. Babies need consistent, loving relationships to develop a positive sense of self. b. Babies form preferences that align with their innate sense of self. c. Toddlers feel secure with gentle but firm limits d. At age two, language skill develops and toddlers have a sense of “me.”
• Stage 2 : 3 to 4 years-old a. Three and four-year-olds begin to see themselves as separate and unique individuals. b. Their self-images tend to be descriptive rather than prescriptive or judgmental. c. Preschoolers are increasingly independent and curious about what they can do.
• Stage 3 : 5 to 6 years-old a. They are transitioning from the “me” stage to the “us” stage, where they are more aware of the needs and interests of the larger group. b. Kindergarteners can use their words to communicate their wants, needs, and feelings. c. Five and six-year-olds can use even more advanced language to help define themselves within the context of the group (Miller, Church, & Poole, n.d.).

Self-Concept in Middle Childhood

During middle childhood (about 7 to 11 years old), children are beginning to develop a sense of their social selves and figuring out how they fit in with everyone else. They reference social groups and make social comparisons more often, and begin to think about how others see them.

Other characteristics of their self-concept at this stage include:

• More balanced, less all-or-none descriptions
• Development of the ideal and real self
• Descriptions of the self by competencies instead of specific behaviors
• Development of a personal sense of self (Berk, 2004)

Culture begins to play a big role at this stage, but we’ll talk more about that later.

The Development of Self-Concept in Adolescence

Adolescence is where the development of one’s self-concept really explodes.

This is the stage in which individuals (about age 12-18) play with their sense of self, including a time when they experiment with their identity, compare themselves with others, and develop the basis of a self-concept that may stay with them the rest of their life.

During this period, adolescents are prone to greater self-consciousness and susceptibility to the influence of their peers and chemical changes happening in the brain (Sebastian, Burnett, & Blakemore, 2008).

They enjoy greater freedom and independence, engage in increasingly competitive activities, compare themselves with their peers, and can value (even over-value) the perspective of others (Manning, 2007).

In adolescence, there are two important factors that influence self-concept and self-worth:

• Success in areas in which the adolescent desires success
• Approval from significant people in the adolescent’s life (Manning, 2007).

Download 3 Free Self-Compassion Exercises (PDF)

These detailed, science-based exercises will equip you to help others create a kinder and more nurturing relationship with themselves.

Download 3 Free Self-Compassion Tools Pack (PDF)

By filling out your name and email address below.

You may have a good handle on what self-concept is but these examples can help explain it more.

Self-concepts are rarely all positive or all negative; someone may have both positive and some negative self-concepts in different domains (e.g., a husband who thinks of himself as a good father but sees his physical self as out-of-shape and unhealthy or a student who think so themselves as a great athlete who struggles academically).

Some examples of positive self-concepts include:

• A person sees herself as an intelligent person;
• A man perceives himself as an important member of his community;
• A woman sees herself as an excellent spouse and friend;
• A person thinks of himself as a nurturing and caring person;
• A person views herself as a hard-working and competent employee.

On the flip side, these people could have negative self-concepts like:

• A person sees herself as stupid and slow;
• A man perceives himself as expendable and a burden on his community;
• A woman sees herself as a terrible spouse and friend;
• A person thinks of himself as a cold and unapproachable person;
• A person views herself as a lazy and incompetent employee.

We all have many of these mini or domain-specific self-concepts that encompass our self-concept. Some may be more positive or negative than others, and each is an important piece of what makes us who we are.

Self concept, self identity and social identity – Khan Academy

Given the marked interest in this topic within sociology and psychology, there is quite a bit of research out there on the subject. Here are a few of the most interesting and impactful findings on self-concept.

Self-Concept in Marketing and How it Influences Consumer Behavior

It probably won’t shock you that the idea of self-concept has made its way into marketing—after all, brands and companies can profit from targeting certain desirable identities. In fact, it is the basis of fashion and consumerism.

Our self-concept influences our wants and needs, and can also shape our behavior. Whether it is true or not, we tend to believe that our purchases will help establish our identity. There is a reason why people buy certain clothing, cars, etc.

And this idea has a name: self-concept attachment.

Self-Concept Attachment

Self-concept attachment refers to the attachment we form to a product as it influences identity. For example, someone who loves their Patagonia jacket may also consider it as a status symbol that also represents their “outdoorsy” side.

Thus, this jacket has a strong self-concept attachment, in addition to its purpose of providing warmth.

Surprisingly, consumers become more attached to a brand when the brands match their “actual selves” rather than their ideal selves (Malär, Krohmer, Hoyer, & Nyffenegger, 2011). We tend to identify more with brands that “meet us where we are” rather than trying to connect with our higher, ideal selves.

Companies understand this and work to (1) get to know their target consumers better, and (2) mold their brand identity to match the self-concept of their consumers. The more they can get consumers to identify with their brand, the more they will buy that brand.

How Does Self-Concept Affect Interpersonal Communication?

Think about a cycle in which we develop, maintain, and revise our self-concept: we have an idea of who we are, and we act in accordance with that self-concept. Consequently, others form an idea about who we are, and they react in accordance with their idea of who we are, thus impacting our idea of who we are.

This feedback loop continues to shape us, and interpersonal communication plays a big role here.

Our self-concept drives our motivations, methods, and experiences with communicating with others. For example, if you see yourself as someone who is always right (or who must always be right), you may struggle in communicating with others when disagreements arise.

If that need is accompanied by an acceptance of aggression, you may use hostility, assertiveness , and argumentativeness to attack the self-concepts of the people you are debating instead of discussing their positions (Infante & Wigley, 1986).

Communication on social media is also a determinant and an outcome of an individual’s self-concept.

Sponcil and Gitimu (2012) suggested that, in general, the more friends an individual has on social networking sites, the more positively they feel about themselves as a whole. Conversely, the anxiety of social media and maintaining one’s image poses separate issues.

Self-Concept and Academic Achievement

Self-concept and academic achievement is also a positive feedback loop, as actions beget similar actions and identity to match.

In a longitudinal study, Marsh (1990) found that students with more positive academic self-concept achieved greater academic success the following year. Later studies confirmed the relationship between the two but indicated that achievement affects self-concept more than self-concept inherently influences achievement success (Muijs, 2011).

Research by Byrne (1986) offered instead that self-concept and academic self-concept can be considered two separate constructs; academic achievement may impact one’s overall self-concept, but it is most directly related to academic self-concept.

Self-Concept and Career Development

Self-concept develops throughout the lifespan and during any career.

According to researcher Donald Super, there are five life and career development stages:

• Growth (Ages 0 to 14)
• Exploration (Ages 15 to 24)
• Establishment (Age 25 to 44)
• Maintenance (Age 45 to 64)
• Decline (Age 65+)

The first stage is marked by the development of one’s basic self-concept. In the second stage, able individuals experiment and try out new classes, experiences, and jobs. Stage 3 sees individuals establishing their career and building their skills, likely starting in an entry-level position.

In the fourth stage, individuals engage in a continuous management and adjustment process to both their self-concept and their career. Finally, the fifth stage is characterized by reduced output and preparations for retirement, activities which can have a huge impact on one’s self-concept (Super, Starishevsky, Matlin, & Jordaan, 1963).

Of course, this model assumes equal access and privilege upon entering the workforce, which is not truthful to reality. Not all humans, for example, have the opportunity to explore and establish themselves as easily as others.

Nevertheless, Super posited that self-concept drives career development and can act as a general framework and inspiration for future research in this area, including a social and racial unearthing of Rogers’ theory on self-actualization.

The research could also be conducted on Bandura’s work on self-efficacy, on role salience, and on the idea of multiple identities in career development (Betz, 1994).

Culture and Self-Concept

Unsurprisingly, culture can have a big impact on self-concept. For example, how children are treated in early childhood influences how their sense of self develops.

Many parents might be more concerned with emotions and satisfying the wants of their children, while others may be more firm and controlling of their child’s behavior, worrying about their needs rather than fulfilling their desires. This is a generalization, but one that holds under scrutiny: culture influence self-concept.

Research suggests that those from more collectivist cultures produced more group self-descriptions and fewer idiocentric self-descriptions than those from individualistic cultures (Bochner, 1994).

Further research also indicated that East Asian cultures are more accepting of contradictory beliefs about the self; this indicates that one’s self-concept in these cultures may be more flexible than, say, American culture (Choi & Choi, 2002).

Findings like these are fascinating, but they also reveal how and why it is difficult to measure self-concept. The next section summarizes those attempts.

One’s self-concept does not always align with “reality” or with how others view a person. However, there are still some tools that can measure self-concept.

If you are interested in using a self-concept measure for research purposes, look first at the development of the instrument, the definition it is based on, and the dimensions or components it measures. It’s important that you choose a tool that aligns with the idea of self-concept that your research uses.

Some of the most prominent tools to measure self-concept include:

• The Robson Self-Concept Questionnaire (SCQ; Robson, 1989)
• The Social Self-Concept Questionnaire (SSC; Fernández-Zabala, Rodríguez-Fernández, & Goñi, 2016)
• The Academic Self-Concept Questionnaire (ASCQ; Liu & Wang, 2005)

Self-Concept Questionnaire by Dr. Saraswat

The Self-Concept Questionnaire from Dr. Saraswat (1984) has become a popular choice for measuring self-concept. It consists of 48 items measuring self-concept across six dimensions:

• Temperamental;
• Educational;
• Intellectual.

For each item, the respondent rates how well each item describes their ideas about themselves on a 5-point scale. Higher scores indicate high self-concept, while low scores indicate low self-concept.

This self-concept questionnaire is generally thought of as reliable by researchers, but it is dated.

If you’re looking for a great resource with 10 simple but effective activities for cultivating self-concept in young children, Glori Chaika’s article “Ten Activities to Improve Students’ Self-Concepts” can be adapted to fit the context for several age ranges.

We summarize the 10 activities she suggests here:

1 – The Interview

This activity is great for the beginning of the year as students to get to know their peers.

Break the group into pairs, and make sure each student is paired with someone they don’t very well. Give them 10 minutes to interview each other (5 minutes per interview) with fun questions like “would you rather live on a boat or on an island?” or “what is your favorite subject at this school?”.

When all of the interviews have been completed, have each pair come to the front of the class and introduce their partner to the other children.

2 – The Journal

Journals can be beneficial in many ways, as  keeping a journal  allows you to self-examine. Help your students develop their sense of self by assigning journal entries that they keep in one notebook all year.

Tell your students that they can put whatever they want in their journal—they can write a poem, describe a dream they had, write about what they hope for, something they are happy about, something they are sad about, etc.—and that they must make at least three entries (or however many you decide is appropriate) per week.

Make sure to tell them that you will only read the entry if they give you permission, but that you will check to ensure they have at least three dated entries per week.

3 – Designing Self-Collages

Self-collages are a great activity from young children to high-schoolers. Tell the students they need to create a collage that represents who they are by using pictures, words, and/or symbols. They can cut things from magazines, print them out from the internet, or draw pictures themselves.

You may want to guide them by suggesting to focus on things they enjoy or are good at, places they’ve been or would like to go, and people they admire.

When everyone’s collage is complete, you can do an extra activity where students present their collage to the classroom, or maybe everyone tries to guess which collage belongs to which student.

4 – Ranking Traits

This activity is best for older students with writing skills. Have the students rip a piece of paper into ten strips and write a word or phrase on each strip that they feel describes them. Tell them that no one will see the things they write down, so they can be completely honest.

Once the students have written down their ten traits, have them arrange them in order from those they most like about themselves to those they least like about themselves.

Encourage them to reflect on their traits by asking questions like:

• Do you like what you see?
• Do you want to keep it?
• Now give up one trait. How does the lack of that affect you?
• Now give up another. Give up three. Now what kind of person are you?

After the students have reduced their traits to six, have them add the traits back, one by one. For an extra boost to this activity, you can have the students journal about their experience at the end, and how they want to use their strengths.

5 – Accentuate the Positive

Accentuating the positive is all about noticing and sharing the positive things about others (and themselves).

To try this activity, break the students up into groups of four to six. Instruct the groups to pick one person (to start with) and tell that person all the positive things about them. Encourage the students to focus on traits and skills that can be altered (e.g., work ethic, skill in soccer), rather than permanent features (e.g., eyes, skin).

One student in each group will act as a recorder, writing down all the positive things that are said about someone. Each member of the group takes a turn, and the recorder gives the individual the list of all the positive things said about them at the end of the activity.

This exercise can also make a great focus for a journal entry.

6 – Thumbprints

This activity requires an ink pad and the willingness to get a bit messy!

Have each of your students place his or her thumb on the inkpad and then on a piece of paper to get a thumbprint. Show them the five major fingerprint patterns and have them identify their print type. Explain how fingerprints are unique—both across their own fingers and from person to person.

Next, have each student create an animal out of their thumbprint. Bonus points if the animal is one the student feels represents him or her! Encourage them to write about this in their journal, or to add the thumbprint drawing to their journal.

7 – Create a “Me” Commercial

This activity can be especially fun for the drama-loving students. Tell them that they are each going to make a two or three-minute commercial on why you should hire them.

The commercial should focus on their special skills, talents, and positive qualities. It should highlight what is great about them and what they would bring to the fictional position they are auditioning for.

Give the students some time to write their commercial, then have them present their commercials to the class. An alternative method for this activity is to have small groups create commercials for each group member.

8 – Shared Learning

This is a simple activity if you’ve been having your students write in their journal for the whole term.

Tell the students to look through their journal entries and reflect. Have them choose one thing they have learned about themselves during this term.

When each student has chosen something they would like to share, sit in a circle and have each student share out on what they learned over the past three months (or four months, or six months, etc.).

9 – Write Yourself a Letter

This is another activity that is appropriate for older children since it requires somewhat advanced writing skills.

Tell the students that they will be writing a letter to themselves, and to be totally honest since no one else will be able to read it. They can write whatever they’d like in this letter to their future selves, but they may want to add in things that describe them today (e.g., height and weight, current friends, favorite music and movies, special things that happened to them this year).

On another piece of paper or on the back of this letter, tell students to write down ten goals they would like to accomplish by this time next year. Have your students seal the letter and their goals in an envelope, address the envelope to themselves, and give it to you. In one year, mail the letters out to the students.

This is a far-reaching activity that will encourage your students to think about how they change over time, and how they stay the same.

10 – Drawing Self Portraits

Make sure that each student has access to a mirror for this activity. If there isn’t one handy in your classroom, bring some small mirrors in for the students to use.

Tell your students to use the mirror to draw a picture of themselves. It doesn’t have to look exactly like them, but it should be a good representation of them. This simple activity can promote self-reflection in students (beyond the kind that involves a mirror).

To take this activity a bit further, have them divide the drawing in half—on the left side, each student should draw herself as she sees herself, and on the right side, she should draw herself as she thinks others see her. Along with this drawing, the students can make an entry in their journal on the differences between how they see themselves and how they think others see them.

Self-Concept Activities for Preschoolers

For example, a few of the activities that can help preschoolers develop a self-concept include:

• Record each child’s voice during an activity period. Have the children listen to the voices and guess which voice goes with each child.
• Have several children stand in a line in front of the class. Name the child who is first, second, third and so on. Ask the children to change positions. Then have each child in line name his or her new position. To vary the activity, have the children at their seats name each child in line and describe his or her position.
• Make a friendship quilt. Cut several squares of brightly colored construction paper. Give each child one of the squares. Have them decorate the square or even glue a picture of himself, glitter, beads, sequins, or yarn to the square. Staple the squares, side by side, to the bulletin board. If extra squares are needed to fill in empty spaces, print the school’s name or teacher’s name on additional squares and intermingle them with the student’s squares.
• Have the children think of some things they can’t do now, but can do when they grow older. What are some things they can do now that they couldn’t do when they were younger?
• Role-play the growth process from baby to father or mother to grandparent. The child can interpret the process as he or she goes along. Children can also develop a short play about the family.

Any of these activities can be adapted to fit your children’s context, whether that is a classroom, at home, in a playgroup, in a therapy session, etc.

Lesson Plan on Self-Concept

If you’re looking for a good lesson plan on teaching self-concept, this plan from the Utah Education Network is a great choice.

It starts with a description of self-concept as “the person I think I am” and contrasts it with “the person others think I am” and “the person others think I think I am.”

A diagram on the first page shows a cycle with four “stops:”

• As I see myself
• As others see me
• Other’s reactions to me

This diagram shows how each stop on the cycle feeds into the next, influencing each aspect and eventually coming back to the original stop. For example, how we see ourselves influences our actions. Our actions drive how others see us, and their image of us drives their reactions or behavior toward us.

Feedback on ourselves contributes to our overall image of ourselves, and the cycle continues.

Next, it describes several case studies to help drive the point home. There is the case of a 45-year old father who looks in the mirror and thinks about the wrinkle he just found, the weight he would like to lose, his desire to be a stay-at-home dad, his messy and unorganized house, and a commitment he made that has overextended him.

There is also a case of a middle-aged mother thinking about her miserable day at work, the last decade or so of overtime, her struggles to pay the bills and have a little money left for herself, and all the things she has on her to-do list.

A third case focuses on a teenage girl who is concerned about her skin, her haircut, whether her friends truly care about her, and an upcoming chemistry test that she has not studied for.

The final case concerns a teenage guy who was struggling to understand calculus and thinking back to the counselor that encouraged him to take it. He is also comparing himself to his straight-A brother and thinking about how he wished he could be the athlete his father wanted him to be. He is worrying about tryouts and doubting his ability to even make the team.

For each of these cases, the questions are:

• How will the individual see himself or herself?
• How will the individual act toward others?
• How will the individual think others see him or her?
• How will others act toward the individual?
• What effect does this have on how the individual sees him- or herself?
• Where is the spiral headed and how can its motion be reversed?

This is a great lesson for children to learn, whether you introduce it in elementary school (with some extra time and patience set aside!) or in high school.

Follow this link and click on “Self Concept Transparency” to see the example lesson plan for yourself, and feel free to invent examples most relevant to your class or client.

Three of the most useful worksheets on self-concept are described below.

All About Me

This worksheet from the Utah Education Network is a good option for children of all ages.

It is only one page with 15 prompts to complete. These prompts are:

• I feel good about…
• I feel successful when…
• My favorite person is…
• My favorite activity is…
• I wish I could…
• If I could have three wishes, they would be: a. b. c.
• I feel depressed when…
• A character trait I need to improve is…
• I am good at…
• I wish I did not…
• My family is…
• I would like to be…
• The most important thing to me is…
• The thing I like best about myself…

You can find this worksheet and other worksheets and lesson plans on the Utah Education Network’s website here .

17 Exercises To Foster Self-Acceptance and Compassion

Help your clients develop a kinder, more accepting relationship with themselves using these 17 Self-Compassion Exercises [PDF] that promote self-care and self-compassion.

Created by Experts. 100% Science-based.

Learning about how others perceive a construct can be helpful in furthering our own understanding of that construct.

Use the quotes below to see how your idea of self-concept compares to the ideas of others.

What others think of us would of little moment did it not, when known, so deeply tinge what we think of ourselves.

Paul Valéry

Know, first, who you are; and then adorn yourself accordingly.

Seek out that particular mental attribute which makes you feel most deeply and vitally alive, along with which comes the inner voice which says, ‘This is the real me’, and when you have found that attitude, follow it.

William James

Today you are You, that is truer than true. There is no one alive who is Youer than You.

Act as if you are the person you want to be.

Bernie Siegel

The self is not something that one finds. It is something that one creates.

Thomas Szasz

There is but one cause of human failure. And that is man’s lack of faith in his true Self.

An individual’s self-concept is the core of his personality. It affects every aspect of human behavior: the ability to learn, the capacity to grow and change. A strong, positive self-image is the best possible preparation for success in life.

Joyce Brothers

In this piece, we learned about what self-concept is (an overarching idea about who we are), how it comes about (it develops throughout the lifespan, and is most flexible in the early years), what it is related to and affected by (just about everything, but namely consumer behavior, academic achievement, career development, and culture), and whether you can do anything to change it—you can.

Our self-concept is affected by how we feel about ourselves and how we judge our abilities, competencies, and worth as a person. When we put some effort into boosting these self-evaluations, our self-concept will adjust to accommodate these changes.

We have the ability to change how we think about ourselves by working to become more like our ideal selves.

It might seem daunting to put in the effort required to revise your self-esteem and self-image, but like most tasks, getting started is the hardest part. Refer to some of the quotes above to get a dose of inspiration, or find some quotes on the subject that inspire you and keep them nearby whenever you’re in need of some motivation.

What do you think about self-concept? Do you have any other good quotes about self-concept? Do you have a developed self-concept or is it vaguer? Do you think it’s good or bad to have self-concept differentiation?

Let us know in the comments, and thanks for reading.

We hope you enjoyed reading this article. Don’t forget to download our three Self Compassion Exercises for free .

• Baumeister, R. F. (1999). The nature and structure of the self: An overview. In R. Baumeister (Ed.), The self in social psychology (pp. 1-20). Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press (Taylor & Francis).
• Berk L. E. (2004). Development through the lifespan. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
• Betz, N. E. (1994). Self-concept theory in career development and counseling. Career Development Quarterly, 43, 32-43.
• Bochner, S. (1994). Cross-cultural differences in the self concept: A test of Hofstede’s individualism/collectivism distinction. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 25 , 273-283.
• Bong, M., & Clark, R. E. (1999). Comparison between self-concept and self-efficacy in academic motivation research. Educational Psychologist, 34 , 139-153.
• Byrne, B. M. (1986). Self-concept/academic achievement relations: An investigation of dimensionality, stability, and causality. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 18, 173-186.
• Chaika, G. (2012). Ten activities to improve students’ self-concepts. Education World. Retrieved from http://www.educationworld.com/a_lesson/lesson/lesson085.shtml
• Cherry, K. (2018A). What is self-awareness? Very Well Mind. Retrieved from https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-self-awareness-2795023
• Cherry, K. (2018B). What is self-concept and how does it form? Very Well Mind. Retrieved from https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-self-concept-2795865
• Choi, I., & Choi, Y. (2002). Culture and self-concept flexibility. Personality and Social Psychology, 28, 1508-1517.
• Delmar Learning. (n.d.). Summary chapter 43: Self-concept. Nursing Fundamentals: Caring & Clinical Decision Making Online Companion. Retrieved from http://www.delmarlearning.com/companions/content/0766838366/students/ch43/summary.asp
• Diehl, M., & Hay, E. L. (2011). Self-concept differentiation and self-concept clarity across adulthood: Associations with age and psychological well-being. International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 73(2) , 125-152.
• Elliot, G. C. (1984). Dimensions of the self-concept: A source of further distinctions in the nature of self-consciousness. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 13, 285-307.
• Fernández-Zabala, A., Rodríguez-Fernández, A., & Goñi, A. (2016). The structure of the Social Self-Concept (SSC) Questionnaire. Anales de Psicologia, 32, 199-205.
• Gecas, V. (1982). The self-concept. Annual Review of Sociology, 8 , 1-33.
• Infante, D. A., & Wigley, C. J. (1986). Verbal aggressiveness: An interpersonal model and measure. Communication Monographs, 53 , 61-69.
• Journal Psyche. (n.d.). Revisiting Car Rogers’ theory of personality. Retrieved from http://journalpsyche.org/revisiting-carl-rogers-theory-of-personality/
• Liu, W. C., & Wang, C. K. J. (2005). Academic self-concept: A cross-sectional study of grade and gender differences in a Singapore Secondary School. Asia Pacific Education Review, 6, 20-27.
• Malär, L., Krohmer, H., Hoyer, W. D., & Nyffenegger, B. (2011). Emotional brand attachment and brand personality: The relative importance of the actual and the ideal self. Journal of Marketing, 75, 35-52.
• Manning, M. A. (2007, February). Self-concept and self-esteem in adolescents. Principle Leadership Magazine, February 2007, 11-15.
• Marsh, H. W. (1990). Causal ordering of academic self-concept and academic achievement: A multiwave, longitudinal panel analysis. Journal of Educational Psychology, 82, 646-656.
• Mazar, N., Amir, O., & Ariely, D. (2007). Mostly honest: A theory of self-concept maintenance. Unpublished Manuscript, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
• McLeod, S. (2008). Self concept. Simply Psychology. Retrieved from https://www.simplypsychology.org/self-concept.html
• Miller, S. A., Church, E. B., & Poole, C. (n.d.). Ages & stages: How children develop self-concept. Scholastic. Retrieved from https://www.scholastic.com/teachers/articles/teaching-content/ages-stages-how-children-develop-self-concept/
• Muijs, R. D. (2011). Predictors of academic achievement and academic self-concept: A longitudinal perspective. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 67, 263-277.
• Munoz, L. (2012). Theories of self-concept maintenance. Life Long Learning: Social Psychology. Retrieved from https://lynnmunoz.wordpress.com/2012/11/22/theories-of-self-concept-maintenance/
• Neill, J. (2005). Definitions of various self constructs: Self-esteem, self-efficacy, self-confidence & self-concept. Wilderdom. Retrieved from http://www.wilderdom.com/self/
• Robson (1989). Development of a new self-report questionnaire to measure self-esteem. Psychological Medicine, 19, 513-518.
• Rosenberg, M. (1979). Conceiving the Self. New York, NY: Basic.
• Saraswat, R. K. (1984). Manual for Self-Concept Questionnaire. Agra, India: National Psychological Corporation.
• Sebastian, C., Burnett, S., & Blakemore, S. J. (2008). Development of the self-concept during adolescence. Trends in Cognitive Science, 12, 441-446.
• Sponcil, M., & Gitimu, P. (2012). Use of social media by college students: Relationship to communication and self-concept. Journal of Technology Research, 4.
• Super, D. E., Starishevsky, R., Matlin, N., & Jordaan, J. P. (1963). Career development; Self-concept theory. New York, NY: College Entrance Examination Board.

Share this article:

Article feedback

What our readers think.

Help me to make preparations for grade5 class about positive self concept.

Here is an idea: – Brief Introduction: Explain self-concept in simple terms—how we see ourselves, including our abilities, personality, and place in the world. Activities: – Positive Affirmation Cards: Students create and decorate cards with positive statements about themselves. Self-Portrait: Draw or paint self-portraits that express individual personalities and strengths. – Growth Mindset Chat: Discuss how effort and perseverance can improve abilities, showing that self-concept can grow and change. – Role-Playing: Practice scenarios that involve giving compliments, asking for help, and overcoming obstacles to understand how actions affect self-concept. – Reflection: Encourage journaling about personal growth, challenges, and successes to help students see their progress. – Parent Guide: Send home tips on reinforcing positive self-concept, including praise, open discussions, and setting a positive example.

I hope this helps!

Warm regards, Julia | Community Manager

If you don”t mind proceed with this extraordinary work and I anticipate a greater amount of your magnificent blog entries. 

A stupendous offering indeed. Ackerman, the author, presents a comprehensive account of Self-Concept with stunning clarity and richness. A sumptuously edifying gift for students of sociology and psychology everywhere.

Thank you so much. This helped a lot in my psychology project

Appreciating the persistence you put into your blog and detailed information you provide. I’ve bookmarked your site and I’m adding your RSS feeds to my Google account.

Let us know your thoughts Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published.

Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment.

Related articles

Reparenting: Seeking Healing for Your Inner Child

In our work as therapists, we often encounter the undeniable truth: we never truly outgrow our inner child. A youthful part within us persists, sometimes [...]

30 Best Self-Exploration Questions, Journal Prompts, & Tools

Life is constantly in flux – our environment and ‘self’ change continually. Self-exploration helps us make sense of who we are, where we are, and [...]

Inner Child Healing: 35 Practical Tools for Growing Beyond Your Past

Many clients enter therapy because they have relationship patterns that they are tired of repeating (Jackman, 2020). They may arrive at the first session asking, [...]

Read other articles by their category

• Body & Brain (48)
• Coaching & Application (57)
• Compassion (26)
• Counseling (51)
• Emotional Intelligence (24)
• Gratitude (18)
• Grief & Bereavement (21)
• Happiness & SWB (40)
• Meaning & Values (26)
• Meditation (20)
• Mindfulness (45)
• Motivation & Goals (45)
• Optimism & Mindset (34)
• Positive CBT (28)
• Positive Communication (20)
• Positive Education (47)
• Positive Emotions (32)
• Positive Leadership (17)
• Positive Parenting (3)
• Positive Psychology (33)
• Positive Workplace (37)
• Productivity (16)
• Relationships (46)
• Resilience & Coping (36)
• Self Awareness (21)
• Self Esteem (37)
• Strengths & Virtues (31)
• Stress & Burnout Prevention (34)
• Theory & Books (46)
• Therapy Exercises (37)
• Types of Therapy (64)

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Mental Representation

The notion of a “mental representation” is, arguably, in the first instance a theoretical construct of cognitive science. As such, it is a basic concept of the Computational Theory of Mind, according to which cognitive states and processes are constituted by the occurrence, transformation and storage (in the mind/brain) of information-bearing structures (representations) of one kind or another.

However, on the assumption that a representation is an object with semantic properties (content, reference, truth-conditions, truth-value, etc.), a mental representation may be more broadly construed as a mental object with semantic properties. As such, mental representations (and the states and processes that involve them) need not be understood only in cognitive/computational terms. On this broader construal, mental representation is a philosophical topic with roots in antiquity and a rich history and literature predating the recent “cognitive revolution,” and which continues to be of interest in pure philosophy. Though most contemporary philosophers of mind acknowledge the relevance and importance of cognitive science, they vary in their degree of engagement with its literature, methods and results; and there remain, for many, issues concerning the representational properties of the mind that can be addressed independently of the computational hypothesis.

Though the term ‘Representational Theory of Mind’ is sometimes used almost interchangeably with ‘Computational Theory of Mind’, I will use it here to refer to any theory that postulates the existence of semantically evaluable mental objects, including philosophy’s stock-in-trade mentalia – thoughts, concepts, percepts, ideas, impressions, notions, rules, schemas, images, phantasms, etc. – as well as the various sorts of “subpersonal” representations postulated by cognitive science. Representational theories may thus be contrasted with theories, such as those of Baker (1995), Collins (1987), Dennett (1987), Gibson (1966, 1979), Reid (1764/1997), Stich (1983) and Thau (2002), which deny the existence of such things.

1. The Representational Theory of Mind

2. propositional attitudes.

• 3. Conceptual and Nonconceptual Representation

4. Representationalism and Phenomenalism

6. content determination, 7. internalism and externalism, 8. the computational theory of mind, 9. thought and language, other internet resources, related entries.

The Representational Theory of Mind (RTM) (which goes back at least to Aristotle) takes as its starting point commonsense mental states, such as thoughts, beliefs, desires, perceptions and imagings. Such states are said to have “intentionality” – they are about or refer to things, and may be evaluated with respect to properties like consistency, truth, appropriateness and accuracy. (For example, the thought that cousins are not related is inconsistent, the belief that Elvis is dead is true, the desire to eat the moon is inappropriate, a visual experience of a ripe strawberry as red is accurate, an imaging of George Washington with dreadlocks is inaccurate.)

RTM defines such intentional mental states as relations to mental representations, and explains the intentionality of the former in terms of the semantic properties of the latter. For example, to believe that Elvis is dead is to be appropriately related to a mental representation whose propositional content is that Elvis is dead . (The desire that Elvis be dead, the fear that he is dead, the regret that he is dead, etc., involve different relations to the same mental representation.) To perceive a strawberry is, on the representational view, to have a sensory experience of some kind which is appropriately related to (e.g., caused by) the strawberry.

RTM also understands mental processes such as thinking, reasoning and imagining as sequences of intentional mental states. For example, to imagine the moon rising over a mountain is, inter alia , to entertain a series of mental images of the moon (and a mountain). To infer a proposition q from the propositions p and if p then q is ( inter alia ) to have a sequence of thoughts of the form p , if p then q , q .

Contemporary philosophers of mind have typically supposed (or at least hoped ) that the mind can be naturalized – i.e., that all mental facts have explanations in the terms of natural science. This assumption is shared within cognitive science, which attempts to provide accounts of mental states and processes in terms (ultimately) of features of the brain and central nervous system. In the course of doing so, the various sub-disciplines of cognitive science (including cognitive and computational psychology and cognitive and computational neuroscience) postulate a number of different kinds of structures and processes, many of which are not directly implicated by mental states and processes as commonsensically conceived. There remains, however, a shared commitment to the idea that mental states and processes are to be explained in terms of mental representations.

In philosophy, recent debates about mental representation have centered around the existence of propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, etc.) and the determination of their contents (how they come to be about what they are about), and the existence of phenomenal properties and their relation to the content of thought and perceptual experience. Within cognitive science itself, the philosophically relevant debates have been focused on the computational architecture of the brain and central nervous system, and the compatibility of scientific and commonsense accounts of mentality.

Intentional Realists such as Dretske (e.g., 1988) and Fodor (e.g., 1987) note that the generalizations we apply in everyday life in predicting and explaining each other’s behavior (often collectively referred to as “folk psychology”) are both remarkably successful and indispensable. What a person believes, doubts, desires, fears, etc. is a highly reliable indicator of what that person will do; and we have no other way of making sense of each other’s behavior than by ascribing such states and applying the relevant generalizations. We are thus committed to the basic truth of commonsense psychology and, hence, to the existence of the states its generalizations refer to. (Some realists, such as Fodor, also hold that commonsense psychology will be vindicated by cognitive science, given that propositional attitudes can be construed as computational relations to mental representations.)

Intentional Eliminativists , such as Churchland, (perhaps) Dennett and (at one time) Stich argue that no such things as propositional attitudes (and their constituent representational states) are implicated by the successful explanation and prediction of our mental lives and behavior. Churchland (1981) denies that the generalizations of commonsense propositional-attitude psychology are true. He argues that folk psychology is a theory of the mind with a long history of failure and decline, and that it resists incorporation into the framework of modern scientific theories (including cognitive psychology). As such, it is comparable to alchemy and phlogiston theory, and ought to suffer a comparable fate. Commonsense psychology is false , and the states (and representations) it postulates simply don’t exist. (It should be noted that Churchland is not an eliminativist about mental representation tout court . See, e.g., Churchland 1989.)

Dennett (1987a) grants that the generalizations of commonsense psychology are true and indispensable, but denies that this is sufficient reason to believe in the entities they appear to refer to. He argues that to give an intentional explanation of a system’s behavior is merely to adopt the “intentional stance” toward it. If the strategy of assigning contentful states to a system and predicting and explaining its behavior (on the assumption that it is rational – i.e., that it behaves as it should, given the propositional attitudes it should have, given its environment) is successful, then the system is intentional, and the propositional-attitude generalizations we apply to it are true. But there is nothing more to having a propositional attitude than this. (See Dennett 1987a: 29.)

Though he has been taken to be thus claiming that intentional explanations should be construed instrumentally, Dennett (1991) insists that he is a “moderate” realist about propositional attitudes, since he believes that the patterns in the behavior and behavioral dispositions of a system on the basis of which we (truly) attribute intentional states to it are objectively real. In the event that there are two or more explanatorily adequate but substantially different systems of intentional ascriptions to an individual, however, Dennett claims there is no fact of the matter about what the individual believes (1987b, 1991). This does suggest an irrealism at least with respect to the sorts of things Fodor and Dretske take beliefs to be; though it is not the view that there is simply nothing in the world that makes intentional explanations true.

(Davidson 1973, 1974 and Lewis 1974 also defend the view that what it is to have a propositional attitude is just to be interpretable in a particular way. It is, however, not entirely clear whether they intend their views to imply irrealism about propositional attitudes.)

Stich (1983) argues that cognitive psychology does not (or, in any case, should not) taxonomize mental states by their semantic properties at all, since attribution of psychological states by content is sensitive to factors that render it problematic in the context of a scientific psychology. Cognitive psychology seeks causal explanations of behavior and cognition, and the causal powers of a mental state are determined by its intrinsic “structural” or “syntactic” properties. The semantic properties of a mental state, however, are determined by its extrinsic properties – e.g., its history, environmental or intramental relations. Hence, such properties cannot figure in causal-scientific explanations of behavior. (Fodor 1994 and Dretske 1988 are realist attempts to come to grips with some of these problems.) Stich proposes a syntactic theory of the mind, on which the semantic properties of mental states play no explanatory role. (Stich has since changed his views on a number of these issues. See Stich 1996.)

3. Conceptual and Non-Conceptual Representation

It is a traditional assumption among realists about mental representations that representational states come in two basic varieties (cf. Boghossian 1995). There are those, such as thoughts, that are composed of concepts and have no phenomenal (“what-it’s-like”) features (“qualia”), and those, such as sensations, which have phenomenal features but no conceptual constituents. (Nonconceptual content is usually defined as a kind of content that states of a creature lacking concepts might nonetheless have. [ 1 ] ) On this taxonomy, mental states can represent either in a way analogous to expressions of natural languages or in a way analogous to drawings, paintings, maps, photographs or movies. Perceptual states such as seeing that something is blue, are sometimes thought of as hybrid states, consisting of, for example, a non-conceptual sensory experience and a belief, or some more integrated compound of conceptual and non-conceptual elements. (There is an extensive literature on the representational content of perceptual experience. See the entry on the contents of perception .)

Disagreement over non-conceptual representation concerns the existence and nature of phenomenal properties, the role they play in determining the contents of sensory representations, and which kinds of properties can be represented by non-conceptual states. Dennett (1988), for example, denies that there are such things as qualia at all (as they are standardly construed); while Brandom (2002), McDowell (1994), Rey (1991) and Sellars (1956) deny that they are needed to explain the content of sensory experience. Among those who accept that experiences have phenomenal content, some (Dretske, Lycan, Tye) argue that it is reducible to a kind of intentional content, while others (Block, Loar, Peacocke) argue that it is irreducible. (See the discussion in the next section.) A further debate concerns the non-conceptual representability of high-level properties such as kind properties and moral properties. (See, e.g., Dretske 1995 and Siegel 2010, and the entry on the contents of perception.)

Some historical discussions of the representational properties of mind (e.g., Aristotle De Anima , Locke 1689/1975, Hume 1739/1978) seem to assume that nonconceptual representations – percepts (“impressions”), images (“ideas”) and the like – are the only (or at least the main) kinds of mental representations, and that the mind represents the world in virtue of being in states that resemble things in it. On such a view, all representational states have their content in virtue of their sensory phenomenal features. Powerful arguments, however, focusing on the lack of generality (Berkeley Principles of Human Knowledge ), ambiguity (Wittgenstein 1953) and non-compositionality (Fodor 1981d) of sensory and imagistic representations, as well as their unsuitability to function as logical (Frege 1918/1997, Geach 1957) or mathematical (Frege 1884/1953) concepts, and the symmetry of resemblance (Goodman 1976), convinced philosophers that no theory of mind can get by with only nonconceptual representations construed in this way. (For more discussion, see the entry on nonconceputal mental content .)

There has also been dissent from the traditional claim that conceptual representations (thoughts, beliefs) lack phenomenology. Chalmers (1996), Flanagan (1992), Goldman (1993), Horgan and Tienson (2002), Jackendoff (1987), Levine (1993, 1995, 2001), McGinn (1991a), Pitt (2004, 2009, 2011, 2013), Searle (1992), Siewert (1998, 2011) and Strawson (1994, 2010), claim that purely conceptual (conscious) representational states themselves have a proprietary kind of phenomenology. This view – bread and butter, it should be said, among historical and contemporary Phenomenologists – has been gaining momentum of late among analytic philosophers of mind. (See, e.g., the essays in Bayne and Montague 2011 and Kriegel 2013, and Chudnoff 2015, Farkas 2008a, Kriegel 2011, Mendelovici 2018, Montague 2016.) If this claim is correct, the question of what role phenomenology plays in the determination of representational content re-arises for conceptual representation; and the eliminativist ambitions of Sellars, Brandom, Rey, et al. would meet a new obstacle. It would also raise prima facie problems for reductive representationalism, as well as for reductive naturalistic theories of intentional content, and externalism in general.

The view that there is a proprietary phenomenology of conscious thought – a cognitive ( conceptual , propositional ) phenomenology – claims that there is something it’s like to occurrently, consciously think a thought (entertain a propositional content), which is as different from other kinds of phenomenology (visual, auditory, etc.) as they are from each other. Opinions diverge, however, with respect to the role such phenomenology plays in determining the contents of conceptual/propositional representations. Some (e.g., Siewert) claim that it plays no such role. Others (e.g., Horgan and Tienson, Strawson) hold that it determines only “narrow” contents, further, “broad” contents being determined by extrinsic relations to represented objects and properties. Still others (e.g., Farkas 2008b, Pitt) argue that it is the only kind of conceptual content, insisting on a sharp distinction between content (sense) and reference. There is also disagreement about whether or not cognitive phenomenology determines but is distinct from conceptual/propositional content (e.g., Pitt 2004) or is identical to it (e.g., Pitt 2009).

Outstanding challenges for this thesis include unconscious thought (which seems to entail the existence of unconscious phenomenology, on this view), indexical concepts (whose content is standardly taken to be referentially individuated; see Pitt 2013 for an attempt to address this challenge), and nominal concepts (concepts expressed by utterances of names, likewise standardly referentially individuated).

See the entries on consciousness and intentionality and phenomenal intentionality for further discussion.

Among realists about non-conceptual representations, the central division is between representationalists (also called “representationists” and “intentionalists”) – e.g., Dretske (1995), Harman (1990), Leeds (1993), Lycan (1987, 1996), Rey (1991), Thau (2002), Tye (1995, 2000, 2009) – and phenomenalists (also called “phenomenists”) – e.g., Block (1996, 2003), Chalmers (1996, 2004), Evans (1982), Loar (2003a, 2003b), Peacocke (1983, 1989, 1992, 2001), Raffman (1995), Shoemaker (1990). Representationalists claim that the phenomenal content of a non-conceptual representation – i.e., its phenomenal character – is reducible to a kind of intentional content, naturalistically construed (à la Dretske). On this view, phenomenal contents are extrinsic properties represented by non-conceptual representations. In contrast, phenomenalists claim that the phenomenal content of a non-conceptual mental representation is identical to its intrinsic phenomenal properties.

The representationalist thesis is often formulated as the claim that phenomenal properties are representational or intentional. However, this formulation is ambiguous between a reductive and a non-reductive claim (though the term ‘representationalism’ is most often used for the reductive claim. See Chalmers 2004a). As a reductive claim, it means that the phenomenal content of an experience, the properties that characterize what it is like to have it (i.e., qualia ), are certain extrinsic properties it represents. For example, the blueness one might mention in describing one’s experience (perceptual representation) of a clear sky at noon is a property of the sky, not of one’s experience of it. Blueness is relevant to the characterization of one’s experience because one’s experience represents it, not because one’s experience instantiates it. An experience of the sky no more instantiates blueness than a thought that snow is cold instantiates coldness. On this view, the phenomenal content of sensory experience is explained as its representation of extrinsic properties. (See Byrne and Tye 2006, Dretske 1995, Harman 1990, Lycan 1987, 1996 and Tye 2014, 2015 for elaboration and defense of this “qualia externalism.” See Thompson 2008 and Pitt 2017 for objections to this account.) (See also the entry on representational theories of consciousness .)

As a non-reductive claim, it means that the phenomenal content of an experience is its intrinsic subjective phenomenal properties, which are themselves representational. One’s experience of the sky represents its color by instantiating phenomenal blueness. Among phenomenalists there is disagreement over whether non-conceptual representation requires complex structuring of phenomenal properties (Block and Peacocke, op. cit., Robinson 1994) or not (Loar 2003b). So-called “Ganzfeld” experiences, in which, for example, the visual field is completely taken up with a uniform experience of a single color, are a standard test case: Do Ganzfeld experiences represent anything? (It may be that doubts about the representationality of such experiences are simply a consequence of the fact that (outside of the laboratory) we never encounter things that would produce them. Supposing we routinely did (and especially if we had names for them), it seems unlikely such skepticism would arise.)

Most (reductive) representationalists are motivated by the conviction that one or another naturalistic explanation of intentionality (see the next section) is, in broad outline, correct, and by the desire to complete the naturalization of the mental by applying such theories to the problem of phenomenality. (Needless to say, many phenomenalists are just as eager to naturalize the phenomenal – though not in the same way.)

The main argument for representationalism appeals to the transparency of experience (cf. Tye 2000: 45–51). The properties that characterize what it’s like to have a sensory experience are presented in experience as properties of objects perceived: in attempting to attend to an experience, one seems to “see through it” to the objects and properties it is experiences of . [ 2 ] They are not presented as properties of the experience itself. If nonetheless they were properties of the experience, perception would be massively deceptive. But perception is not massively deceptive. In veridical perception, these properties are locally instantiated; in illusion and hallucination, they are not. On this view, introspection is indirect perception: one comes to know what phenomenal features one’s experience has by coming to know what objective features it represents. (Cf. also Dretske 1996, 1999.)

In order to account for the intuitive differences between conceptual and sensory representations, representationalists appeal to structural or functional properties. Dretske (1995), for example, distinguishes experiences and thoughts on the basis of the origin and nature of their functions: an experience of a property P is a state of a system whose evolved function is to indicate the presence of P in the environment; a thought representing the property P , on the other hand, is a state of a system whose assigned (learned) function is to calibrate the output of the experiential system. Rey (1991) takes both thoughts and experiences to be relations to sentences in the language of thought, and distinguishes them on the basis of (the functional roles of) such sentences’ constituent predicates. Lycan (1987, 1996) distinguishes them in terms of their functional-computational profiles. Tye (2000) distinguishes them in terms of their functional roles and the intrinsic structure of their vehicles: thoughts are representations in a language-like medium, whereas experiences are image-like representations consisting of “symbol-filled arrays.” (Cf. the account of mental images in Tye 1991.)

Phenomenalists tend to make use of the same sorts of features (function, intrinsic structure) in explaining some of the intuitive differences between thoughts and experiences; but they do not suppose that such features exhaust the differences between phenomenal and non-phenomenal representations. For the phenomenalist, it is the phenomenal properties of experiences – qualia themselves – that constitute the fundamental difference between experience and thought. Peacocke (1992), for example, develops the notion of a perceptual “scenario” (an assignment of phenomenal properties to coordinates of a three-dimensional egocentric space), whose content is “correct” (a semantic property) if in the corresponding “scene” (the portion of the external world represented by the scenario) properties are distributed as their phenomenal analogues are in the scenario.

Another sort of representation appealed to by some phenomenalists (e.g., Chalmers (2003), Block (2003)) is what Chalmers calls a “pure phenomenal concept.” A phenomenal concept in general is a concept whose denotation is a phenomenal property, and it may be discursive (‘the color of ripe bananas’), demonstrative (‘ this color’; Loar 1990/96)), or even more direct. On Chalmers’s view, a pure phenomenal concept is (something like) a conceptual/phenomenal hybrid consisting of a phenomenological “sample” (an image or an occurrent sensation) integrated with (or functioning as) a conceptual component (see also Balog 1999 and Papineau 2002). Phenomenal concepts are postulated to account for the apparent fact (among others) that, as McGinn (1991b) puts it, “you cannot form [introspective] concepts of conscious properties unless you yourself instantiate those properties.” One cannot have a phenomenal concept of a phenomenal property P , and, hence, phenomenal beliefs about P , without having experience of P , because P itself is (in some way) constitutive of the concept of P . (Cf. Jackson 1982, 1986 and Nagel 1974.) (The so-called “ phenomenal concept strategy” puts pure phenomenal concepts to use in defending the Knowledge Argument against physicalism. See Loar 1990/96, Chalmers 2004a. Alter and Walter 2007 is an excellent collection of essays on phenomenal concepts. See Conee 1994 and Pitt 2019 for skeptical responses to this strategy.)

Though imagery has played an important role in the history of philosophy of mind, the important contemporary literature on it is primarily psychological. (Tye 1991 and McGinn 2004 are notable recent exceptions.) In a series of psychological experiments done in the 1970s (summarized in Kosslyn 1980 and Shepard and Cooper 1982), subjects’ response time in tasks involving mental manipulation and examination of presented figures was found to vary in proportion to the spatial properties (size, orientation, etc.) of the figures presented. The question of how these experimental results are to be explained kindled a lively debate on the nature of imagery and imagination.

Kosslyn (1980) claims that the results suggest that the tasks were accomplished via the examination and manipulation of mental representations that themselves have spatial properties – i.e., pictorial representations, or images . Others, principally Pylyshyn (1979, 1981a, 1981b, 2003), argue that the empirical facts can be explained in terms exclusively of discursive , or propositional representations and cognitive processes defined over them. (Pylyshyn takes such representations to be sentences in a language of thought.)

The idea that pictorial representations are literally pictures in the head is not taken seriously by proponents of the pictorial view of imagery (see, e.g., Kosslyn and Pomerantz 1977). The claim is, rather, that mental images represent in a way that is relevantly like the way pictures represent. (Attention has been focused on visual imagery – hence the designation ‘pictorial’; though of course there may be imagery in other modalities – auditory, olfactory, etc. – as well. See O’Callaghan 2007 for discussion of auditory imagery.)

The distinction between pictorial and discursive representation can be characterized in terms of the distinction between analog and digital representation (Goodman 1976). This distinction has itself been variously understood (Fodor & Pylyshyn 1981, Goodman 1976, Haugeland 1981, Lewis 1971, McGinn 1989), though a widely accepted construal is that analog representation is continuous (i.e., in virtue of continuously variable properties of the representation), while digital representation is discrete (i.e., in virtue of properties a representation either has or doesn’t have) (Dretske 1981). (An analog/digital distinction may also be made with respect to cognitive processes . (Block 1983.)) On this understanding of the analog/digital distinction, imagistic representations, which represent in virtue of properties that may vary continuously (such as being more or less bright, loud, vivid, etc.), would be analog, while conceptual representations, whose properties do not vary continuously (a thought cannot be more or less about Elvis: either it is or it is not) would be digital.

It might be supposed that the pictorial/discursive distinction is best made in terms of the phenomenal/non-phenomenal distinction, but it is not obvious that this is the case. For one thing, there may be non-phenomenal properties of representations that vary continuously. Moreover, there are ways of understanding pictorial representation that presuppose neither phenomenality nor analogicity. According to Kosslyn (1980, 1982, 1983), a mental representation is “quasi-pictorial” when every part of the representation corresponds to a part of the object represented, and relative distances between parts of the object represented are preserved among the parts of the representation. But distances between parts of a representation can be defined functionally rather than spatially – for example, in terms of the number of discrete computational steps required to combine stored information about them. (Cf. Rey 1981.)

Tye (1991) proposes a view of images on which they are hybrid representations, consisting both of pictorial and discursive elements. On Tye’s account, images are “(labeled) interpreted symbol-filled arrays.” The symbols represent discursively, while their arrangement in arrays has representational significance (the location of each “cell” in the array represents a specific viewer-centered 2-D location on the surface of the imagined object).

See the entry on mental imagery for further discussion.

The contents of mental representations are typically taken to be abstract objects (properties, relations, propositions, sets, etc.). A pressing question, especially for the naturalist, is how mental representations come to have their contents. Here the issue is not how to naturalize content (abstract objects can’t be naturalized), but, rather, how to specify naturalistic content-determining relations between mental representations and the abstract objects they express. There are two basic types of contemporary naturalistic theories of content-determination and causal-informational and functional . [ 3 ]

Causal-informational theories (Dretske 1981, 1988, 1995) hold that the content of a mental representation is grounded in the information it carries about what does (Devitt 1996) or would (Fodor 1987, 1990a) cause it to occur. [ 4 ] There is, however, widespread agreement that causal-informational relations are not sufficient to determine the content of mental representations. Such relations are common, but representation is not. Tree trunks, smoke, thermostats and ringing telephones carry information about what they are causally related to, but they do not represent (in the relevant sense) what they carry information about. A mental representation can be caused by something it does not represent, and can represent something that has not caused it, whereas nothing can be caused by something that doesn’t cause it.

The main attempts to specify what makes a causal-informational state a mental representation are Asymmetric Dependency Theories (e.g., Fodor 1987, 1990a, 1994) and Teleological Theories (Dretske 1988, 1995, Fodor 1990b, Millikan 1984, Neander 2017, Papineau 1987). The Asymmetric Dependency Theory distinguishes merely informational relations from representational relations on the basis of their higher-order relations to each other: informational relations depend upon representational relations, but not vice versa. For example, if tokens of a mental state type are reliably caused by horses, cows-on-dark-nights, zebras-in-the-mist and Great Danes, then they carry information about horses, etc. If, however, such tokens are caused by cows-on-dark-nights, etc. because they were caused by horses, but not vice versa, then they represent horses (or the property horse ).

According to Teleological Theories, representational relations are those a representation-producing mechanism has the selected (by evolution or learning) function of establishing. For example, zebra-caused horse-representations do not mean zebra , because the mechanism by which such tokens are produced has the selected function of indicating horses, not zebras. The horse-representation-producing mechanism that responds to zebras is malfunctioning .

See the entries on teleological theories of mental content and causal theories of mental content .

Functional theories (Block 1986, Harman 1973), hold that the content of a mental representation is determined, at least in part, by its (causal, computational, inferential) relations to other mental representations. They differ on whether relata should include all other mental representations or only some of them, and on whether to include external states of affairs. The view that the content of a mental representation is determined by its inferential/computational relations with all other representations is holism ; the view it is determined by relations to only some other mental states is localism (or molecularism ). (The non-functional view that the content of a mental state depends on none of its relations to other mental states is atomism .) Functional theories that recognize no content-determining external relata have been called solipsistic (Harman 1987). Some theorists posit distinct roles for internal and external connections, the former determining semantic properties analogous to sense, the latter determining semantic properties analogous to reference (McGinn 1982, Sterelny 1989).

(Reductive) representationalists (Dretske, Lycan, Tye) usually take one or another of these theories to provide an explanation of the (non-conceptual) content of experiential states. They thus tend to be externalists (see the next section) about phenomenological as well as conceptual content. Phenomenalists and non-reductive representationalists (Block, Chalmers, Loar, Peacocke, Siewert), on the other hand, take it that the representational content of such states is (at least in part) determined by their intrinsic phenomenal properties. Further, those who advocate a phenomenally-based approach to conceptual content (Horgan and Tienson, Kriegel, Loar, Pitt, Searle, Siewert) also seem to be committed to internalist individuation of the content (if not the reference) of such states.

Persistent indeterminacy problems with causal-informational-teleological theories of content determination have motivated a growing number of (analytic) philosophers to seek a different approach, grounded not in external relations of representational states but in their intrinsic phenomenal properties. This approach has come to be known as the “Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program” (Kriegel 2013), or, simply “Phenomenal Intentionality.” These philosophers (including Bourget, Kriegel, Loar, Mendelovici, Montague, Pitt, Searle, Smithies (2012, 2013a and b, 2019), Strawson and Siewert), argue that causal-informational-teleological relations cannot yield the fine-grained, determinate content conceptual and perceptual representations possess, and that such content can only be delivered by phenomenal character. The cognitive phenomenology thesis (discussed above) is an important component of this overall approach.

Generally, those who, like informational theorists, think relations to one’s (natural or social) environment are (at least partially) determinative of the content of mental representations are externalists , or anti-individualists (e.g., Burge 1979, 1986b, 2010, McGinn 1977), whereas those who, like some proponents of functional theories, think representational content is determined by an individual’s intrinsic properties alone, are internalists (or individualists ; cf. Putnam 1975, Fodor 1981c). [ 5 ]

This issue is widely taken to be of central importance, since psychological explanation, whether commonsense or scientific, is supposed to be both causal and content-based. (Beliefs and desires cause the behaviors they do because they have the contents they do. For example, the desire that one have a beer and the beliefs that there is beer in the refrigerator and that the refrigerator is in the kitchen may explain one’s getting up and going to the kitchen.) If, however, a mental representation’s having a particular content is due to factors extrinsic to it, it is unclear how its having that content could determine its causal powers, which, arguably, must be intrinsic (see Stich 1983, Fodor 1982, 1987, 1994). Some who accept the standard arguments for externalism have argued that internal factors determine a component of the content of a mental representation. They say that mental representations have both “narrow” content (determined by intrinsic factors) and “wide” or “broad” content (determined by narrow content plus extrinsic factors). (This distinction may be applied to the sub-personal representations of cognitive science as well as to those of commonsense psychology. See von Eckardt 1993: 189.)

Narrow content has been variously construed. Putnam (1975), Fodor (1982: 114; 1994: 39ff), and Block (1986: 627ff), for example, seem to understand it as something like de dicto content (i.e., Fregean sense , or perhaps character , à la Kaplan 1989). On this construal, narrow content is context-independent and directly expressible. Fodor (1987) and Block (1986), however, have also characterized narrow content as radically inexpressible . On this construal, narrow content is a kind of proto-content, or content-determinant, and can be specified only indirectly, via specifications of context/wide-content pairings. On both construals, narrow contents are characterized as functions from context to (wide) content. The narrow content of a representation is determined by properties intrinsic to it or its possessor, such as its syntactic structure or its intramental computational or inferential role.

Burge (1986b) has argued that causation-based worries about externalist individuation of psychological content, and the introduction of the narrow notion, are misguided. Fodor (1994, 1998) has more recently urged that a scientific psychology might not need narrow content in order to supply naturalistic (causal) explanations of human cognition and action, since the sorts of cases they were introduced to handle, viz., Twin-Earth cases and Frege cases, are either nomologically impossible or dismissible as exceptions to non-strict psychological laws.

On the most common versions of externalism, though intentional contents are externally determined, mental representations themselves, and the states they partly constitute, remain “in the head.” More radical versions are possible. One might maintain that since thoughts are individuated by their contents, and some thought contents are partially constituted by objects external to the mind, then some thoughts are partly constituted by objects external to the mind. On such a view, a singular thought – i.e., a thought about a particular object – literally contains the object it is about. It is “object-involving.” Such a thought (and the mind that thinks it) thus extend beyond the boundaries of the skull. (This appears to be the view articulated in McDowell 1986, on which there is “interpenetration” between the mind and the world.)

See the entries on externalism about mental content and narrow mental content .

Clark and Chalmers (1998) and Clark (2001, 2005, 2008) have argued that mental representations may exist entirely “outside the head.” On their view, which they call “active externalism,” cognitive processes (e.g., calculation) may be realized in external media (e.g., a calculator or pen and paper), and the “coupled system” of the individual mind and the external workspace ought to count as a cognitive system – a mind –in its own right. Symbolic representations on external media would thus count as mental representations.

Clark and Chalmers’s paper has inspired a burgeoning literature on extended, embodied and interactive cognition. (Menary 2010 is a recent collection of essays. See also the entry on embodied cognition .)

The leading contemporary version of the Representational Theory of Mind, the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), claims that the brain is a kind of computer and that mental processes are computations. According to CTM, cognitive states are constituted by computational relations to mental representations of various kinds, and cognitive processes are sequences of such states.

CTM develops RTM by attempting to explain all psychological states and processes in terms of mental representation. In the course of constructing detailed empirical theories of human and other animal cognition, and developing models of cognitive processes implementable in artificial information processing systems, cognitive scientists have proposed a variety of types of mental representations. While some of these may be suited to be mental relata of commonsense psychological states, some – so-called “subpersonal” or “sub-doxastic” representations – are not. Though many philosophers believe that CTM can provide the best scientific explanations of cognition and behavior, there is disagreement over whether such explanations will vindicate the commonsense psychological explanations of prescientific RTM.

According to Stich’s (1983) Syntactic Theory of Mind, for example, computational theories of psychological states should concern themselves only with the formal properties of the objects those states are relations to. Commitment to the explanatory relevance of content , however, is for most cognitive scientists fundamental (Fodor 1981a, Pylyshyn 1984, Von Eckardt 1993). That mental processes are computations, that computations are rule-governed sequences of semantically evaluable objects , and that the rules apply to the symbols in virtue of their content, are central tenets of mainstream cognitive science.

Explanations in cognitive science appeal to a many different kinds of mental representation, including, for example, the “mental models” of Johnson-Laird 1983, the “retinal arrays,” “primal sketches” and “2½-D sketches” of Marr 1982, the “frames” of Minsky 1974, the “sub-symbolic” structures of Smolensky 1989, the “quasi-pictures” of Kosslyn 1980, and the “interpreted symbol-filled arrays” of Tye 1991 – in addition to representations that may be appropriate to the explanation of commonsense psychological states. Computational explanations have been offered of, among other mental phenomena, belief (Fodor 1975, 2008 Field 1978), visual perception (Marr 1982, Osherson, et al. 1990), rationality (Newell and Simon 1972, Fodor 1975, Johnson-Laird and Wason 1977), language learning and use (Chomsky 1965, Pinker 1989), and musical comprehension (Lerdahl and Jackendoff 1983).

A fundamental disagreement among proponents of CTM concerns the realization of personal-level representations (e.g., thoughts) and processes (e.g., inferences) in the brain. The central debate here is between proponents of Classical Architectures and proponents of Connectionist Architectures .

The classicists (e.g., Turing 1950, Fodor 1975, 2000, 2003, 2008, Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988, Marr 1982, Newell and Simon 1976) hold that mental representations are symbolic structures, which typically have semantically evaluable constituents, and that mental processes are rule-governed manipulations of them that are sensitive to their constituent structure. The connectionists (e.g., McCulloch & Pitts 1943, Rumelhart 1989, Rumelhart and McClelland 1986, Smolensky 1988) hold that mental representations are realized by patterns of activation in a network of simple processors (“nodes”) and that mental processes consist of the spreading activation of such patterns. The nodes themselves are, typically, not taken to be semantically evaluable; nor do the patterns have semantically evaluable constituents. (Though there are versions of Connectionism – “localist” versions – on which individual nodes are taken to have semantic properties (e.g., Ballard 1986.) It is arguable, however, that localist theories are neither definitive nor representative of the connectionist program (Smolensky 1988, 1991, Chalmers 1993).)

Classicists are motivated (in part) by properties thought seems to share with language. Fodor’s Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) (Fodor 1975, 1987, 2008), according to which the system of mental symbols constituting the neural basis of thought is structured like a language, provides a well-worked-out version of the classical approach as applied to commonsense psychology. (Cf. also Marr 1982 for an application of classical approach in scientific psychology.) According to the LOTH, the potential infinity of complex representational mental states is generated from a finite stock of primitive representational states, in accordance with recursive formation rules. This combinatorial structure accounts for the properties of productivity and systematicity of the system of mental representations. As in the case of symbolic languages, including natural languages (though Fodor does not suppose either that the LOTH explains only linguistic capacities or that only verbal creatures have this sort of cognitive architecture), these properties of thought are explained by appeal to the content of the representational units and their combinability into contentful complexes. That is, the semantics of both language and thought is compositional : the content of a complex representation is determined by the contents of its constituents and their structural configuration. (See, e.g.,Fodor and Lepore 2002.)

Connectionists are motivated mainly by a consideration of the architecture of the brain, which apparently consists of layered networks of interconnected neurons. They argue that this sort of architecture is unsuited to carrying out classical serial computations. For one thing, processing in the brain is typically massively parallel. In addition, the elements whose manipulation drives computation in connectionist networks (principally, the connections between nodes) are neither semantically compositional nor semantically evaluable, as they are on the classical approach. This contrast with classical computationalism is often characterized by saying that representation is, with respect to computation, distributed as opposed to local : representation is local if it is computationally basic; and distributed if it is not. (Another way of putting this is to say that for classicists mental representations are computationally atomic , whereas for connectionists they are not.)

Moreover, connectionists argue that information processing as it occurs in connectionist networks more closely resembles some features of actual human cognitive functioning. For example, whereas on the classical view learning involves something like hypothesis formation and testing (Fodor 1981c), on the connectionist model it is a matter of evolving distribution of “weights” (strengths) on the connections between nodes, and typically does not involve the formulation of hypotheses regarding the identity conditions for the objects of knowledge. The connectionist network is “trained up” by repeated exposure to the objects it is to learn to distinguish; and, though networks typically require many more exposures to the objects than do humans, this seems to model at least one feature of this type of human learning quite well. (Cf. the sonar example in Churchland 1989.)

Further, degradation in the performance of such networks in response to damage is gradual, not sudden as in the case of a classical information processor, and hence more accurately models the loss of human cognitive function as it typically occurs in response to brain damage. It is also sometimes claimed that connectionist systems show the kind of flexibility in response to novel situations typical of human cognition – situations in which classical systems are relatively “brittle” or “fragile.”

Some philosophers have maintained that connectionism entails that there are no propositional attitudes. Ramsey, Stich and Garon (1990) have argued that if connectionist models of cognition are basically correct, then there are no discrete representational states as conceived in ordinary commonsense psychology and classical cognitive science. Others, however (e.g., Smolensky 1989), hold that certain types of higher-level patterns of activity in a neural network may be roughly identified with the representational states of commonsense psychology. Still others (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988, Heil 1991, Horgan and Tienson 1996) argue that language-of-thought style representation is both necessary in general and realizable within connectionist architectures. (MacDonald & MacDonald 1995 collects the central contemporary papers in the classicist/connectionist debate, and provides useful introductory material as well. See also Von Eckardt 2005.)

Whereas Stich (1983) accepts that mental processes are computational, but denies that computations are sequences of mental representations, others accept the notion of mental representation, but deny that CTM provides the correct account of mental states and processes.

Van Gelder (1995) denies that psychological processes are computational. He argues that cognitive systems are dynamic , and that cognitive states are not relations to mental symbols, but quantifiable states of a complex system consisting of (in the case of human beings) a nervous system, a body and the environment in which they are embedded. Cognitive processes are not rule-governed sequences of discrete symbolic states, but continuous, evolving total states of dynamic systems determined by continuous, simultaneous and mutually determining states of the systems’ components. Representation in a dynamic system is essentially information-theoretic, though the bearers of information are not symbols, but state variables or parameters. (See also Port and Van Gelder 1995; Clark 1997a, 1997b, 2008.)

Horst (1996), on the other hand, argues that though computational models may be useful in scientific psychology, they are of no help in achieving a philosophical understanding of the intentionality of commonsense mental states. CTM attempts to reduce the intentionality of such states to the intentionality of the mental symbols they are relations to. But, Horst claims, the relevant notion of symbolic content is essentially bound up with the notions of convention and intention. So CTM involves itself in a vicious circularity: the very properties that are supposed to be reduced are (tacitly) appealed to in the reduction.

See the entries on the computational theory of mind and connectionism .

To say that a mental object has semantic properties is, paradigmatically, to say that it is about , or true or false of, an object or objects, or that it is true or false simpliciter . Suppose I think that democracy is dying. I am thinking about democracy, and if what I think of it (that it is dying) is true of it, then my thought is true. According to RTM such states are to be explained as relations between agents and mental representations. To think that democracy is dying is to token in some way a mental representation whose content is that democracy is dying. On this view, the semantic properties of mental states are the semantic properties of the representations they are relations to.

Linguistic acts seem to share such properties with mental states. Suppose I say that democracy is dying. I am talking about democracy, and if what I say of it (that it is dying) is true of it, then my utterance is true. Now, to say that democracy is dying is (in part) to utter a sentence that means that democracy is dying. Many philosophers have thought that the semantic properties of linguistic expressions are inherited from the intentional mental states they are conventionally used to express (Grice 1957, Fodor 1978, Schiffer1972/1988, Searle 1983). On this view, the semantic properties of linguistic expressions are the semantic properties of the representations that are the mental relata of the states they are conventionally used to express. Fodor has famously argued that these states themselves have a language-like structure. (See the entry on the language of thought hypothesis .)

(Others, however, e.g., Davidson (1975, 1982) have suggested that the kind of thought human beings are capable of is not possible without language, so that the dependency might be reversed, or somehow mutual (see also Sellars 1956). (But see Martin 1987 for a defense of the claim that thought is possible without language. See also Chisholm and Sellars 1958.) Schiffer (1987) subsequently despaired of the success of what he calls “Intention-Based Semantics.”)

It is also widely held that in addition to having such properties as reference, truth-conditions and truth – so-called extensional properties – expressions of natural languages also have intensional properties, in virtue of expressing properties or propositions – i.e., in virtue of having meanings or senses , where two expressions may have the same reference, truth-conditions or truth value, yet express different properties or propositions (Frege 1892/1997). If the semantic properties of natural-language expressions are inherited from the thoughts and concepts they express (or vice versa, or both), then an analogous distinction may be appropriate for mental representations.

• Almog, J., Perry, J. and Wettstein, H. (eds.), 1989, Themes from Kaplan , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Alter, T. and Walter, S. (eds.), 2007, Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Aristotle, 1984, De Anima , in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Baker, L. R., 1995, Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Ballard, D.H., 1986, “Cortical Connections and Parallel Processing: Structure and Function,” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences , 9: 67–120.
• Bayne, T. and Montague, M. (eds.), 2011, Cognitive Phenomenology , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Beaney, M. (ed.), 1997, The Frege Reader , Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
• Berkeley, G., 1975, Principles of Human Knowledge , in M.R. Ayers (ed.), Berkeley: Philosophical Writings , London: Dent.
• Block, N., 1983, “Mental Pictures and Cognitive Science,” Philosophical Review , 93: 499–542.
• –––, 1986, “Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology,” in P.A. French, T.E. Uehling and H.K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Volume X), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 615–678.
• –––, 1996, “Mental Paint and Mental Latex,” in E. Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues , 7 (Perception): 19–49.
• –––, 2003, “Mental Paint,” in M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Block, N. (ed.), 1981, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology (Volume 2), Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
• ––– (ed.), 1982, Imagery , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Boghossian, P. A., 1995, “Content,” in J. Kim and E. Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Metaphysics , Oxford: Blackwell: 94–96.
• Brandom, R., 2002, “Non-inferential Knowledge, Perceptual Experience, and Secondary Qualities: Placing McDowell’s Empiricism,” in N.H. Smith (ed.), Reading McDowell: On Mind and World , London: Routledge.
• Burge, T., 1979, “Individualism and the Mental,” in P.A. French, T.E. Uehling and H.K.Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Volume IV), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 73–121; reprinted, with Postscript, in Burge 2007.
• –––, 1986a, “Individualism and Psychology,” Philosophical Review , 95: 3–45.
• –––, 1986b, “Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind,” The Journal of Philosophy , 83: 697–720.
• –––, 2007, Foundations of Mind: Philosophical Essays (Volume 2), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2010, Origins of Objectivity , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Byrne, A and Tye, M., 2006, “Qualia Ain’t in the Head,” Noûs , 40: 241–255.
• Chalmers, D., 1993, “Connectionism and Compositionality: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn Were Wrong,” Philosophical Psychology , 6: 305–319.
• –––, 1996, The Conscious Mind , New York: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2003, “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief,” in Q. Smith & A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives , Oxford: Oxford University Press: 220–272.
• –––, 2004a, “The Representational Character of Experience,” in B. Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy , Oxford: Oxford University Press: 153–181.
• –––, 2004b, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument,” in P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa and D. Stoljar (eds.), There’s Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press: 269–298.
• Chisholm, R. and Sellars, W., 1958, “The Chisholm-Sellars Correspondence on Intentionality,” in H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Volume II), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 529–539.
• Chomsky, N., 1965, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Churchland, P.M., 1981, “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,” Journal of Philosophy , 78: 67–90.
• –––, 1989, “On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective,” in W. Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Volume 14), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 59–101.
• Clark, A., 1997a, “The Dynamical Challenge,” Cognitive Science , 21: 461–481.
• –––, 1997b, Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again , Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
• –––, 2001, “Reasons, Robots and the Extended Mind,” Mind and Language , 16: 121–145.
• –––, 2005, “Intrinsic Content, Active Memory, and the Extended Mind,” Analysis , 65: 1–11.
• –––, 2008, Supersizing the Mind , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Clark, A., and Chalmers, D., 1998, “The Extended Mind,” Analysis , 58: 7–19.
• Collins, A., 1987, The Nature of Mental Things , Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.
• Conee, E., 1994, “Phenomenal Knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 72: 136–150.
• Crane, T., 1995, The Mechanical Mind , London: Penguin Books Ltd.
• Davidson, D., 1973, “Radical Interpretation,” Dialectica 27: 313–328.
• –––, 1974, “Belief and the Basis of Meaning,” Synthese , 27: 309–323.
• –––, 1975, “Thought and Talk,” in S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language , Oxford: Clarendon Press: 7–23.
• –––, 1982, “Rational Animals,” Dialectica , 4: 317–327.
• Dennett, D., 1969, Content and Consciousness , London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
• –––, 1981, “The Nature of Images and the Introspective Trap,” in Dennett 1969: 132–141; reprinted in Block 1981: 128–134.
• –––, 1987a, The Intentional Stance , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 1987b, “True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works,” in Dennett 1987: 13–35.
• –––, 1987c, “Reflections: Real Patterns, Deeper Facts, and Empty Questions,” in Dennett 1987: 37–42.
• –––, 1988, “Quining Qualia,” in A.J. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science , Oxford: Clarendon Press: 42–77.
• –––, 1991, “Real Patterns,” The Journal of Philosophy , 87: 27–51.
• Devitt, M. 1996, Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Dretske, F. 1969, Seeing and Knowing , Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
• –––, 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 1988, Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 1995, Naturalizing the Mind , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 1996, “Phenomenal Externalism, or If Meanings Ain’t in the Head, Where are Qualia?”, in E. Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues , 7 (Perception): 143–158.
• –––, 1998, “Minds, Machines, and Money: What Really Explains Behavior,” in J. Bransen and S. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation (Philosophical Studies Series: 77), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Dretske 2000.
• –––, 1999, “The Mind’s Awareness of Itself,” Philosophical Studies , 95: 103–124.
• –––, 2000, Perception, Knowledge and Belief , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Evans, G., 1982, The Varieties of Reference , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Farkas, K., 2008a, The Subject’s Point of View , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2008b, “Phenomenal Intentionality Without Compromise,” The Monist , 91: 273–293.
• Field, H., 1978, “Mental representation,” Erkenntnis , 13: 9–61.
• Flanagan, O., 1992, Consciousness Reconsidered , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Fodor, J.A., 1975, The Language of Thought , Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
• –––, 1978, “Propositional Attitudes,” The Monist 61: 501–523.
• –––, 1981a, Representations , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 1981b, “Introduction,” in Fodor 1981a: 1–31.
• –––, 1981c, “Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology,” in Fodor 1981a: 225–253.
• –––, 1981d, “The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy,” in Fodor 1981a: 257–316.
• –––, 1982, “Cognitive Science and the Twin-Earth Problem,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic , 23: 98–118.
• –––, 1987, Psychosemantics , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 1990a, A Theory of Content and Other Essays , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 1990b, “Psychosemantics or: Where Do Truth Conditions Come From?” in W.G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition: A Reader , Oxford: Blackwell Publishers: 312–337.
• –––, 1994, The Elm and the Expert , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 1998, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• –––, 2000, The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 2003, LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 2008, The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Fodor, J.A. and Lepore, E., 2002, The Compositionality Papers , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Fodor, J.A. and Pylyshyn, Z., 1981, “How Direct is Visual Perception?: Some Reflections on Gibson’s ‘Ecological Approach’,” Cognition , 9: 207–246.
• –––, 1988, “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis,” Cognition , 28: 3–71.
• Frege, G., 1884, The Foundations of Arithmetic , trans. J.L. Austin, New York: Philosophical Library, 1954.
• –––, 1892, “On Sinn and Bedeutung ”, in Beany 1997: 151–171.
• –––, 1918, “Thought”, in Beany 1997: 325–345.
• Geach, P., 1957, Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects , London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
• Gibson, J.J., 1966, The senses considered as perceptual systems , Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
• –––, 1979, The ecological approach to visual perception , Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
• Goldman, A., 1993, “The Psychology of Folk Psychology,” Behavioral and Brian Sciences , 16: 15–28.
• Goodman, N., 1976, Languages of Art , 2nd edition, Indianapolis: Hackett.
• Grice, H.P., 1957, “Meaning,” Philosophical Review , 66: 377–388; reprinted in Studies in the Way of Words , Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (1989): 213–223.
• Gunther, Y.H. (ed.), 2003, Essays on Nonconceptual Content , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Harman, G., 1973, Thought , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• –––, 1987, “(Non-Solipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics,” in E. Lepore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics , London: Academic Press: 55–81.
• –––, 1990, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (Philosophical Perspectives: Volume 4), Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company: 31–52.
• Harnish, R., 2002, Minds, Brains, Computers , Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers Inc.
• Haugeland, J., 1981, “Analog and analog,” Philosophical Topics , 12: 213–226.
• Heil, J., 1991, “Being Indiscrete,” in J. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 120–134.
• Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (1996), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology , Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.
• –––, 2002, “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality,” in D.J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind , Oxford: Oxford University Press: 520–533 .
• Horst, S., 1996, Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality , Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Hume, D., 1739, A Treatise of Human Nature , L.A. Selby-Bigg (ed.), rev. P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
• Jackendoff, R., 1987, Computation and Cognition , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Jackson, F., 1982, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly , 32: 127–136.
• –––, 1986, “What Mary Didn’t Know,” Journal of Philosophy , 83: 291–295.
• Johnson-Laird, P.N., 1983, Mental Models , Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
• Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Wason, P.C., 1977, Thinking: Readings in Cognitive Science , Cambridge University Press.
• Kaplan, D., 1989, “Demonstratives,” in Almog, Perry and Wettstein 1989: 481–614.
• Kosslyn, S.M., 1980, Image and Mind , Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
• –––, 1982, “The Medium and the Message in Mental Imagery,” in Block 1982: 207–246.
• –––, 1983, Ghosts in the Mind’s Machine , New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
• Kosslyn, S.M. and Pomerantz, J.R., 1977, “Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations,” Cognitive Psychology , 9: 52–76.
• Kriegel, U., 2011, The Sources of Intentionality , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Kriegel, U. (ed.), 2013, Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Leeds, S., 1993, “Qualia, Awareness, Sellars,” Noûs XXVII: 303–329.
• Lerdahl, F. and Jackendoff, R., 1983, A Generative Theory of Tonal Music , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Levine, J., 1993, “On Leaving Out What It’s Like,” in M. Davies and G. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness , Oxford: Blackwell Publishers: 121–136.
• –––, 1995, “On What It Is Like to Grasp a Concept,” in E. Villanueva (ed.), Content (Philosophical Issues: Volume 6), Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company: 38–43.
• –––, 2001, Purple Haze , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Lewis, D., 1971, “Analog and Digital,” Noûs , 5: 321–328.
• –––, 1974, “Radical Interpretation,” Synthese , 27: 331–344.
• Loar, B., 1981, Mind and Meaning , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1996, “Phenomenal States” (Revised Version), in N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press: 597–616.
• –––, 2003a, “Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia,” in Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives , Oxford: Clarendon Press: 77–96.
• –––, 2003b, “Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content,” in M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Locke, J., 1689, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding , P.H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.
• Lycan, W.G., 1987, Consciousness , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 1986, Consciousness and Experience , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• MacDonald, C. and MacDonald, G., 1995, Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation , Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
• Marr, D., 1982, Vision , New York: W.H. Freeman and Company.
• Martin, C.B., 1987, “Proto-Language,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 65: 277–289.
• McCulloch, W.S. and Pitts, W., 1943, “A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity,” Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics , 5: 115–33.
• McDowell, J., 1986, “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space,” in P. Pettit and J. McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context , Oxford: Clarendon Press: 137–168.
• –––, 1994, Mind and World , Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
• McGinn, C., 1977, “Charity, Interpretation, and Belief,” Journal of Philosophy , 74: 521–535.
• –––, 1982, “The Structure of Content,” in A. Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Content , Oxford: Oxford University Press: 207–258.
• –––, 1989, Mental Content , Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
• –––, 1991a, The Problem of Consciousness , Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
• –––, 1991b, “Content and Consciousness,” in McGinn 1991: 23–43.
• –––, 1991c, “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” in McGinn 1991: 1–22.
• –––, 2004, Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning , Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
• Mendelovici, A., 2018, The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Millikan, R., 1984, Language, Thought and other Biological Categories , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Menary, R. (ed.), 2010, The Extended Mind , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Minsky, M., 1974, “A Framework for Representing Knowledge,” MIT-AI Laboratory Memo 306 June; abridged version in J. Haugeland (ed.), Mind Design II , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997.
• Montague, M., 2016, The Given: Experience and Its Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Nagel, T., 1974, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review , 83: 435–450.
• Neander, K., 2017, A Mark of the Mental: in Defense of Informational Teleosemantics Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Newell, A. and Simon, H.A., 1972, Human Problem Solving , New York: Prentice-Hall.
• –––, 1976, “Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search,” Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery , 19: 113–126.
• O’Callaghan, C., 2007, Sounds , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Osherson, D.N., Kosslyn, S.M. and Hollerbach, J.M., 1990, Visual Cognition and Action: An Invitation to Cognitive Science (Volume 2), Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Papineau, D., 1987, Reality and Representation , Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
• Peacocke, C., 1983, Sense and Content , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 1989, “Perceptual Content,” in Almog, Perry and Wettstein 1989: 297–329.
• –––, 1992, “Scenarios, Concepts and Perception,” in T. Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 105–35.
• –––, 2001, “Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?” Journal of Philosophy , 99: 239–264.
• Pinker, S., 1989, Learnability and Cognition , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Pitt, D., 2004, “The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is it Like to Think That P?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 69: 1–36.
• –––, 2009, “Intentional Psychologism” Philosophical Studies , 146: 117–138.
• –––, 2011, “Introspection, Phenomenality and the Availability of Intentional Content,” in Bayne and Montague 2011: 141–173.
• –––, 2013, “Indexical Thought,” in Kriegel (ed.) Phenomenal Intentionality , Oxford: Oxford University Press: 49–70.
• –––, 2017, “The Paraphenomenal Hypothesis,” Analysis , 77: 735–741.
• –––, 2019, “Acquaintance and Phenomenal Concepts,” in S. Coleman (ed.), Cambridge Classic Arguments Series: the Knowledge Argument : 87–101.
• Port, R., and Van Gelder, T., 1995, Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Putnam, H., 1975, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 215–71.
• Pylyshyn, Z., 1979, “The Rate of ‘Mental Rotation’ of Images: A Test of a Holistic Analogue Hypothesis,” Memory and Cognition , 7: 19–28.
• –––, 1981a, “Imagery and Artificial Intelligence,” in Block 1981: 170–194.
• –––, 1981b, “The Imagery Debate: Analog Media versus Tacit Knowledge,” Psychological Review , 88: 16–45.
• –––, 1984, Computation and Cognition , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 2003, Seeing and Visualizing: It’s Not What You Think , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Raffman, D., 1995, “The Persistence of Phenomenology,” in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience , Paderborn: Schönigh/Imprint Academic: 293–308.
• Ramsey, W., Stich, S. and Garon, J., 1990, “Connectionism, Eliminativism and the Future of Folk Psychology,” Philosophical Perspectives , 4: 499–533.
• Reid, T., 1764, An Inquiry into the Human Mind , D.R. Brooks (ed.), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997.
• Rey, G., 1981, “Introduction: What Are Mental Images?” in Block 1981: 117–127.
• –––, 1991, “Sensations in a Language of Thought,” in E. Villaneuva (ed.), Consciousness (Philosophical Issues: Volume 1), Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company: 73–112.
• Robinson, H., 1994, Perception , New York: Routledge.
• Rumelhart, D.E., 1989, “The Architecture of the Mind: A Connectionist Approach,” in M.I. Posner (ed.), Foundations of Cognitive Science , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press: 133–159.
• Rumelhart, D.E. and McClelland, J.L., 1986. Parallel Distributed Processing (Volume I), Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Schiffer, S., 1987, Remnants of Meaning , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 1972, “Introduction” in Meaning , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, xi-xxix.
• Searle, J.R., 1980, “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences , 3: 417–424.
• –––, 1983, Intentionality , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1984, Minds, Brains, and Science , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
• –––, 1992, The Rediscovery of the Mind , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Sellars, W., 1956, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (Volume I), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 253–329.
• Shepard, R.N. and Cooper, L., 198), Mental Images and their Transformations , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Shoemaker, S., 1990, “Qualities and Qualia: What’s in the Mind?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 50: 109–31.
• Siegel, S., 2010, The Contents of Visual Experience, New York: Oxford University Press.
• Siewert, C., 1998, The Significance of Consciousness , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• –––, 2011, “Phenomenal Thought,”, in Bayne and Montague 2011: 236–267.
• Smithies, D., 2013a, “The Significance of Cognitive Phenomenology,”, Philosophy Compass , 8: 731–743.
• –––, 2013b, “The Nature of Cognitive Phenomenology,” Philosophy Compass , 8: 744–754.
• –––, 2019, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Smolensky, P., 1988, “On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences , 11: 1–74.
• –––, 1989, “Connectionist Modeling: Neural Computation/Mental Connections,” in L. Nadel, L.A. Cooper, P. Culicover and R.M. Harnish (eds.), Neural Connections, Mental Computation , Cambridge, Mass.:The MIT Press: 49–67.
• –––, 1991, “Connectionism and the Language of Thought,” in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics , Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.: 201–227.
• Sterelny, K., 1989, “Fodor’s Nativism,” Philosophical Studies , 55: 119–141.
• Stich, S., 1983, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• ––– (1996), Deconstructing the Mind , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Strawson, G., 1994, Mental Reality , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• ––– (2008), Real Materialism and Other Essays , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Thompson, B., 2008, “Representationalism and the Argument from Hallucination,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly , 89: 384–412.
• Thau, M., 2002, Consciousness and Cognition , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Turing, A., 1950, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Mind , 59: 433–460.
• Tye, M., 1991, The Imagery Debate , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 2000, Consciousness, Color, and Content , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 2009, Consciousness Revisited , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 2015a, “Yes, Phenomenal Character Really is Out There in the World,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , XCI: 483–488.
• –––, 2015b, “Transparency, Qualia Realism and Representationalism,” Philosophical Studies , 170: 39–57.
• Van Gelder, T., 1995, “What Might Cognition Be, if not Computation?”, Journal of Philosophy , XCI: 345–381.
• Von Eckardt, B., 1993, What Is Cognitive Science? , Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• –––, 2005, “Connectionism and the Propositional Attitudes,” in C.E. Erneling and D.M. Johnson (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Wittgenstein, L., 1953, Philosophical Investigations , trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

[Please contact the author with suggestions.]

• Consciousness and Content on PhilPapers (edited by David Bourget).
• Intentionality on PhilPapers (edited by Robert Rupert).
• Perception on PhilPapers (edited by Benj Hellie).

artificial intelligence: logic-based | cognition: embodied | cognitive science | concepts | connectionism | consciousness: and intentionality | consciousness: representational theories of | externalism about the mind | folk psychology: as mental simulation | information: semantic conceptions of | intentionality | intentionality: phenomenal | language of thought hypothesis | materialism: eliminative | mental content: causal theories of | mental content: narrow | mental content: teleological theories of | mental imagery | mental representation: in medieval philosophy | mind: computational theory of | neuroscience, philosophy of | perception: the contents of | perception: the problem of | qualia | reference

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Brad Armour-Garb, Mark Balaguer, Dave Chalmers, Jim Garson, John Heil, Jeff Poland, Bill Robinson, Galen Strawson, Adam Vinueza and (especially) Barbara Von Eckardt for comments on earlier versions of this entry.

Copyright © 2020 by David Pitt < dalanpitt @ gmail . com >

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2023 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Moral Identity as a System of Self-representations Centrally Integrating Moral Values

• Original Article
• Published: 28 December 2023

Cite this article

• Marco Antonio Morgado da Silva   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-0440-0947 1  

78 Accesses

Explore all metrics

Since the emergence of the field of moral identity, different theoretical and methodological perspectives have been developed, showing that it is a complex phenomenon that manifests itself and can be defined in different ways. Most such studies have defined and investigated moral identity as a generalized self-schema around moral traits. This perspective analyzes moral identity on a macro-scale of analysis. Despite its importance, to broaden the comprehension of moral identity, it is necessary to apprehend and investigate moral identity from other perspectives, being able to capture its functioning in a more detailed and in-depth way, comprising its nuances and complexity. From an integrative reading, the present article systematizes some perspectives on moral identity and proposes that moral identity can be defined as a system of self-representations centrally integrating moral values. Such proposition is synthesized in three premises that may constitute parameters for studies aimed at exploring moral identity from this perspective: (a) identity is constituted by different self-representations that can integrate moral values in different ways; (b) when this integration occurs in different self-representations, this confers regularity, consistency, and, therefore, can be an indicator of the centrality of these values in the system of self-representations; (c) when such moral values are coordinated with other values (moral and non-moral), it configures a coherent system of values that organizes the system of self-representations that constitute the identity, indicating its centrality to the subject.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price includes VAT (Russian Federation)

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Rent this article via DeepDyve

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Ethical decision-making theory: an integrated approach.

Mark S. Schwartz

An evolutionary perspective on Kohlberg’s theory of moral development

Eugene W. Mathes

More Things in Heaven and Earth: Spirit Possession, Mental Disorder, and Intentionality

Mohammed Abouelleil Rashed

Data Availability

Not applicable.

Code Availability

Aquino, K., & Reed, A. (2002). The self-importance of moral identity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83 (6), 1423–1440. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1423

Article   PubMed   Google Scholar  

Aquino, K., Freeman, D., Reed, A., Felps, W., & Lim, V. K. G. (2009). Testing a social-cognitive model of moral behavior: The interactive influence of situations and moral identity centrality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97 (1), 123–141. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015406

Araújo, U. F. (2007). Construção social e psicológica dos valores [Social and psychological construction of values]. In V. A. Arantes (Org.), Educação e valores: Pontos e contrapontos [Values and Education] (pp. 17–64). Summus Editorial.

Blasi, A. (1983). Moral cognition and moral action: A theoretical perspective. Developmental Review, 3 (2), 178–210. https://doi.org/10.1016/0273-2297(83)90029-1

Article   Google Scholar  

Blasi, A. (2004). Moral functioning: Moral understanding and personality. In D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity (pp. 335–347). Psychology Press.

Google Scholar  

Blasi, A.& Glodis, K. (1995). The development of identity. A critical analysis from the perspective of the self as subject. Development Review, 15(4), 404–433. https://doi.org/10.1006/drev.1995.1017 .

Blasi, A. (1995). Moral understanding and moral personality: The process of moral integration. In W. M. Kurtines, & J. L. Gewirtz (Orgs.), Moral development: An introduction (pp. 229–254). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Colby, A., & Damon, W. (1992). Some do care: Contemporary lives of moral commitment . Free Press.

Cox, K., & McAdams, D. P. (2012). The transforming self: Service narratives and identity change in emerging adulthood. Journal of Adolescent Research, 27 (1), 18–43. https://doi.org/10.1177/0743558410384732

Cramer, P. (2017). Identity change between late adolescence and adulthood. Personality and Individual Differences, 104 , 538–543. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.08.044

Damon, W., & Colby, A. (2015). The power of ideals: The real story of moral choice . Oxford University Press.

Damon, W. (1984). Self-understanding and moral development from childhood to adolescence. In W. M. Kurtines, & J. L. Gewirtz (Eds.). Morality, moral behavior and moral development (pp. 109–127). Hoboken: Willey.

Erikson, E. H. (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis . Norton.

Fadjukoff, P., Pulkkinen, L., & Kokko, K. (2016). Identity formation in adulthood: A longitudinal study from age 27 to 50. Identity, 16 (1), 8–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/15283488.2015.1121820

Frimer, J. A., & Walker, L. J. (2009). Reconciling the self and morality: An empirical model of moral centrality development. Developmental Psychology, 45 (6), 1669–1681. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0017418

Frimer, J. A., Walker, L. J., Dunlop, W. L., Lee, B. H., & Riches, A. (2011). The integration of agency and communion in moral personality: Evidence of enlightened self-interest. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101 (1), 149–163. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0023780

Hardy, S. (2006). Identity, reasoning, and emotion: An empirical comparison of three sources of moral motivation. Motivation and Emotion, 30 , 207–2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-006-9034-9

Hardy, S. A., & Carlo, G. (2011). Moral identity: What is it, how does it develop, and is it linked to moral action? Child Development Perspectives, 5 (3), 212–218. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1750-8606.2011.00189.x

Hardy, S. A., Walker, L. J., Olsen, J. A., Woodbury, R. D., & Hickman, J. R. (2014). Moral identity as moral ideal self: Links to adolescent outcomes. Developmental Psychology, 50 (1), 45–57. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033598

Hart, D., & Fegley, S. (1995). Prosocial behavior and caring in adolescence: Relations to self-understanding and social judgment. Child Development, 66 (5), 1346–1359. https://doi.org/10.2307/1131651

Harter, S. (2012). The construction of the self: Developmental and sociocultural foundations . Guilford Publications.

Hertz, S. G., & Krettenauer, T. (2016). Does moral identity effectively predict moral behavior? A Meta-Analysis. Review of General Psychology, 20 (2), 129–140. https://doi.org/10.1037/gpr0000062

Jennings, P. L., Mitchell, M. S., & Hannah, S. T. (2015). The moral self: A review and integration of the literature. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 36 (51), 104–168. https://doi.org/10.1002/job.1919

Kingsford, J. M., Hawes, D. J., & de Rosnay, M. (2018). The moral self and moral identity: Developmental questions and conceptual challenges. The British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 36 (4), 652–666. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjdp.12260

Kochanska, G., Aksan, N., & Joy, M. E. (2007). Children’s fearfulness as a moderator of parenting in early socialization: Two longitudinal studies. Development Psychology, 43 , 222–237. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.43.1.222

Krettenauer, T. (2018). Children’s moral self as a precursor of moral identity development. In C. C. Helwig (Ed.), New Perspectives on Moral Development (pp. 73–87). Routledge.

Krettenauer, T. (2020). Moral Identity as a goal of moral action: A self-determination theory perspective. Journal of Moral Education, 49 , 330–345. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2019.1698414

Krettenauer, T (2022). Development of moral identity: From the age of responsibility to adult maturity. Developmental Review , 65. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dr.2022.101036

Kristjánsson, K. (2009). Putting emotion into the self: A response to the 2008 Journal of Moral Education special issue on moral functioning. Journal of Moral Education, 38 (3), 255–270. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240903101374

Kroger, J., Martinussen, M., & Marcia, J. E. (2010). Identity status change during adolescence and young adulthood: A meta-analysis. Journal of Adolescence, 33 , 683–698. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2009.11.002

Lapsley, D. K. (2010). Moral agency, identity and narrative in moral development: Commentary on Pasupathi and Wainryb. Human Development, 53 (2), 87–97. https://doi.org/10.1159/000288210

Lapsley, D. K., & Narvaez, D. (2004). A social-cognitive approach to the moral personality. In D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity (pp. 189–212). Psychology Press.

Chapter   Google Scholar  

Lapsley, D. K., & Stay, P. (2014). Moral self-identity as the aim of education. In L. Nucci, & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Handbook of moral and character education . Abingdon: Routledge.

La Taille (2006). Moral e ética: dimensões intelectuais e afetivas [Morals and ethics: intellectual and affective dimensions]. Porto Alegre: Artmed.

Lefebvre, J. P., & Krettenauer, T. (2019). Linking moral identity with moral emotions: A meta-analysis. Review of General Psychology, 23 (4), 444–457. https://doi.org/10.1177/1089268019880887

Marcia, J. E. (1966). Development and validation of ego identity status. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5 , 551–558. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0023281

Markus, H., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic self-concept: A psychological perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 38 , 299–337. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.38.020187.001503

McAdams, D. P. (2001). The psychology of life stories. Review on General Psychology, 5 (2), 100–122. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.5.2.1

McAdams, D. P. (2018). Narrative identity: What is it? What does it do? How do you measure it? Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 37 (3), 359–372. https://doi.org/10.1177/0276236618756704

McAdams, D. P. (2009). The moral personality. In D. Narvaez, & D. K. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity and character: Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 11–29). Nova York: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511627125

McLean, K. C., Syed, M., Yoder, A., & Greenhoot, A. F. (2016). The role of domain content in understanding identity development processes. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 26 (1), 60–75. https://doi.org/10.1111/jora.12169

Moshman, D. (2011). Adolescent rationality and development: Cognition, morality, and identity (3a ed.). Taylor & Francis.

Book   Google Scholar  

Nisan, M. (1993). Balanced identity: Morality and other identity values. In G. Noam & T. Wren (Eds.), The moral self (pp. 239–266). MIT Press.

Nisan, M. (2004). Judgment and choice in moral functioning. In D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self, and identity (pp. 133–160). Psychology Press.

Piaget, P. (1954). Les relations entre l’affectivité et l’intelligence [Relations between affectivity and inteligence] . Sorbonne.

Pletti, C., Decety, J., & Paulus, M. (2022). Neural processing of moral content reflects moral identity in 10-year-old children. Developmental Science, 25 , e13232. https://doi.org/10.1111/desc.13232

Power, F. C. (2004). Moral self in community. In D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Moral development, self and identity (pp. 47–64). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Pratt, M. W., Hunsberger, B., Pancer, M. S., & Alisat, S. (2003). A longitudinal analysis of personal values socialization: Correlates of a moral self-ideal in late adolescence. Social Development, 12 (4), 563–585. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9507.00249

Pratt, M. W., Arnold, M. L., & Lawford, H. (2009). Growing towards care: A narrative approach to prosocial moral identity and generativity of personality in emerging adulthood. In D. Narvaez & D. K. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 295–315). Cambridge University Press.

Puig, J. M (1998). La construcción de la personalidad moral [The construction of moral personality]. Paidós.

Reed, A., Kay, A., Finnel, S., Aquino, K., & Levy, E. (2016). I don’t want the money, I just want your time: How moral identity overcomes the aversion to giving time to prosocial causes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 110 (3), 435–457. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000058

Schwartz, S. J., Luyckx, K., & Crocetti, E. (2015). What have we learned since Schwartz (2001)? A reappraisal of the field of identity development. In K. C. McLean & M. Syed (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of identity development (pp. 539–561). Oxford library of psychology.

da Silva, M. A. M., & Araújo, U. F. de. (2021). Aprendizagem por projetos sociais: integração de conteúdos morais à representação de si de jovens. ETD - Educação Temática Digital, Campinas, SP, 23 (4), 1061–1078. https://doi.org/10.20396/etd.v23i4.8659662

Silva, M. A. M. (2020). Integração de valores morais às representações de si de adolescentes [Integrating moral values into adolescents’ self-representations] (Tese de Doutorado [Doctoral thesis]. Faculdade de Educação, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo. https://doi.org/10.11606/T.48.2020.tde-29092020-162754

Silva, M. A. M., & Araújo, U. F. (2020). Self moral e identidade moral: integração entre perspectivas [Moral self and moral identity: an integrative perspective]. Psicologia USP, 31 , 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1590/0103-6564e200055

Silva, M. A. M., & Araújo, U. F (2023): The Theory of Organizing Models of Thinking as a Tool for the Qualitative and Microanalytical Study of Moral Identity, Identity, https://doi.org/10.1080/15283488.2023.2218878

Sonnentag, T. L., McManus, J. L., Wadian, T. W., & Saucier, D. A. (2019). Prioritizing morality in the self and consistent moral responses despite encouragement to behave immorally. Journal of Moral Education, 48 (4), 412–422. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2018.1469479

Spears, R. (2011). Group identities: A social identity approach. In S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, & V. L. Vignoles (Eds.), Handbook of identity theory and research (pp. 201–224). Springer.

Thompson, R. A. (2009). Early foundations: Conscience and the development of moral character. In D. Narvaez & D. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character: Explorations in moral psychology (pp. 159–184). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511627125

Turiel, E. (1996). Equality and Hierarchy: conflict in values. In: Reed, E.: Turiel, E, Brown, T. (Ed.) Values and knowledge. Lawrence Erbawn Associates, New Jersey.

Yates, M. A., & Youniss, J. (1996). A developmental perspective on community service in adolescence. Social Development, 5 (1), 85–111. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.1996.tb00073.x

Download references

Acknowledgements

Professor Ulisses Araújo for contributing with the reflections and research that originated this article.

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Faculty of Education, University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil

Marco Antonio Morgado da Silva

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Marco Antonio Morgado da Silva .

Ethics declarations

Informed consent, conflict of interest.

The author declares no competing interests.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

da Silva, M.A.M. Moral Identity as a System of Self-representations Centrally Integrating Moral Values. Trends in Psychol. (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s43076-023-00354-z

Download citation

Accepted : 06 December 2023

Published : 28 December 2023

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s43076-023-00354-z

Share this article

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Moral identity
• Self-representation
• Moral values
• Moral functioning
• Find a journal
• Publish with us
• Track your research

• Search Menu
• Browse content in Arts and Humanities
• Browse content in Archaeology
• Anglo-Saxon and Medieval Archaeology
• Archaeological Methodology and Techniques
• Archaeology by Region
• Archaeology of Religion
• Archaeology of Trade and Exchange
• Biblical Archaeology
• Contemporary and Public Archaeology
• Environmental Archaeology
• Historical Archaeology
• History and Theory of Archaeology
• Industrial Archaeology
• Landscape Archaeology
• Mortuary Archaeology
• Prehistoric Archaeology
• Underwater Archaeology
• Urban Archaeology
• Zooarchaeology
• Browse content in Architecture
• Architectural Structure and Design
• History of Architecture
• Residential and Domestic Buildings
• Theory of Architecture
• Browse content in Art
• Art Subjects and Themes
• History of Art
• Industrial and Commercial Art
• Theory of Art
• Biographical Studies
• Byzantine Studies
• Browse content in Classical Studies
• Classical History
• Classical Philosophy
• Classical Mythology
• Classical Literature
• Classical Reception
• Classical Art and Architecture
• Classical Oratory and Rhetoric
• Greek and Roman Epigraphy
• Greek and Roman Law
• Greek and Roman Papyrology
• Greek and Roman Archaeology
• Late Antiquity
• Religion in the Ancient World
• Digital Humanities
• Browse content in History
• Colonialism and Imperialism
• Diplomatic History
• Environmental History
• Genealogy, Heraldry, Names, and Honours
• Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing
• Historical Geography
• History by Period
• History of Emotions
• History of Agriculture
• History of Education
• History of Gender and Sexuality
• Industrial History
• Intellectual History
• International History
• Labour History
• Legal and Constitutional History
• Local and Family History
• Maritime History
• Military History
• National Liberation and Post-Colonialism
• Oral History
• Political History
• Public History
• Regional and National History
• Revolutions and Rebellions
• Slavery and Abolition of Slavery
• Social and Cultural History
• Theory, Methods, and Historiography
• Urban History
• World History
• Browse content in Language Teaching and Learning
• Language Learning (Specific Skills)
• Language Teaching Theory and Methods
• Browse content in Linguistics
• Applied Linguistics
• Cognitive Linguistics
• Computational Linguistics
• Forensic Linguistics
• Grammar, Syntax and Morphology
• Historical and Diachronic Linguistics
• History of English
• Language Acquisition
• Language Evolution
• Language Reference
• Language Variation
• Language Families
• Lexicography
• Linguistic Anthropology
• Linguistic Theories
• Linguistic Typology
• Phonetics and Phonology
• Psycholinguistics
• Sociolinguistics
• Translation and Interpretation
• Writing Systems
• Browse content in Literature
• Bibliography
• Children's Literature Studies
• Literary Studies (Asian)
• Literary Studies (European)
• Literary Studies (Eco-criticism)
• Literary Studies (Romanticism)
• Literary Studies (American)
• Literary Studies (Modernism)
• Literary Studies - World
• Literary Studies (1500 to 1800)
• Literary Studies (19th Century)
• Literary Studies (20th Century onwards)
• Literary Studies (African American Literature)
• Literary Studies (British and Irish)
• Literary Studies (Early and Medieval)
• Literary Studies (Fiction, Novelists, and Prose Writers)
• Literary Studies (Gender Studies)
• Literary Studies (Graphic Novels)
• Literary Studies (History of the Book)
• Literary Studies (Plays and Playwrights)
• Literary Studies (Poetry and Poets)
• Literary Studies (Postcolonial Literature)
• Literary Studies (Queer Studies)
• Literary Studies (Science Fiction)
• Literary Studies (Travel Literature)
• Literary Studies (War Literature)
• Literary Studies (Women's Writing)
• Literary Theory and Cultural Studies
• Mythology and Folklore
• Shakespeare Studies and Criticism
• Browse content in Media Studies
• Browse content in Music
• Applied Music
• Dance and Music
• Ethics in Music
• Ethnomusicology
• Gender and Sexuality in Music
• Medicine and Music
• Music Cultures
• Music and Religion
• Music and Media
• Music and Culture
• Music Education and Pedagogy
• Music Theory and Analysis
• Musical Scores, Lyrics, and Libretti
• Musical Structures, Styles, and Techniques
• Musicology and Music History
• Performance Practice and Studies
• Race and Ethnicity in Music
• Sound Studies
• Browse content in Performing Arts
• Browse content in Philosophy
• Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
• Epistemology
• Feminist Philosophy
• History of Western Philosophy
• Metaphysics
• Moral Philosophy
• Non-Western Philosophy
• Philosophy of Science
• Philosophy of Language
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Perception
• Philosophy of Action
• Philosophy of Law
• Philosophy of Religion
• Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
• Practical Ethics
• Social and Political Philosophy
• Browse content in Religion
• Biblical Studies
• Christianity
• East Asian Religions
• History of Religion
• Judaism and Jewish Studies
• Qumran Studies
• Religion and Education
• Religion and Health
• Religion and Politics
• Religion and Science
• Religion and Law
• Religion and Art, Literature, and Music
• Religious Studies
• Browse content in Society and Culture
• Cookery, Food, and Drink
• Cultural Studies
• Customs and Traditions
• Ethical Issues and Debates
• Hobbies, Games, Arts and Crafts
• Lifestyle, Home, and Garden
• Natural world, Country Life, and Pets
• Popular Beliefs and Controversial Knowledge
• Sports and Outdoor Recreation
• Technology and Society
• Travel and Holiday
• Visual Culture
• Browse content in Law
• Arbitration
• Browse content in Company and Commercial Law
• Commercial Law
• Company Law
• Browse content in Comparative Law
• Systems of Law
• Competition Law
• Browse content in Constitutional and Administrative Law
• Government Powers
• Judicial Review
• Local Government Law
• Military and Defence Law
• Parliamentary and Legislative Practice
• Construction Law
• Contract Law
• Browse content in Criminal Law
• Criminal Procedure
• Criminal Evidence Law
• Sentencing and Punishment
• Employment and Labour Law
• Environment and Energy Law
• Browse content in Financial Law
• Banking Law
• Insolvency Law
• History of Law
• Human Rights and Immigration
• Intellectual Property Law
• Browse content in International Law
• Private International Law and Conflict of Laws
• Public International Law
• IT and Communications Law
• Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law
• Law and Politics
• Law and Society
• Browse content in Legal System and Practice
• Courts and Procedure
• Legal Skills and Practice
• Primary Sources of Law
• Regulation of Legal Profession
• Medical and Healthcare Law
• Browse content in Policing
• Criminal Investigation and Detection
• Police and Security Services
• Police Procedure and Law
• Police Regional Planning
• Browse content in Property Law
• Personal Property Law
• Study and Revision
• Terrorism and National Security Law
• Browse content in Trusts Law
• Wills and Probate or Succession
• Browse content in Medicine and Health
• Browse content in Allied Health Professions
• Arts Therapies
• Clinical Science
• Dietetics and Nutrition
• Occupational Therapy
• Operating Department Practice
• Physiotherapy
• Radiography
• Speech and Language Therapy
• Browse content in Anaesthetics
• General Anaesthesia
• Neuroanaesthesia
• Browse content in Clinical Medicine
• Acute Medicine
• Cardiovascular Medicine
• Clinical Genetics
• Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics
• Dermatology
• Endocrinology and Diabetes
• Gastroenterology
• Genito-urinary Medicine
• Geriatric Medicine
• Infectious Diseases
• Medical Toxicology
• Medical Oncology
• Pain Medicine
• Palliative Medicine
• Rehabilitation Medicine
• Respiratory Medicine and Pulmonology
• Rheumatology
• Sleep Medicine
• Sports and Exercise Medicine
• Clinical Neuroscience
• Community Medical Services
• Critical Care
• Emergency Medicine
• Forensic Medicine
• Haematology
• History of Medicine
• Browse content in Medical Dentistry
• Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery
• Paediatric Dentistry
• Restorative Dentistry and Orthodontics
• Surgical Dentistry
• Browse content in Medical Skills
• Clinical Skills
• Communication Skills
• Nursing Skills
• Surgical Skills
• Medical Ethics
• Medical Statistics and Methodology
• Browse content in Neurology
• Clinical Neurophysiology
• Neuropathology
• Nursing Studies
• Browse content in Obstetrics and Gynaecology
• Gynaecology
• Occupational Medicine
• Ophthalmology
• Otolaryngology (ENT)
• Browse content in Paediatrics
• Neonatology
• Browse content in Pathology
• Chemical Pathology
• Clinical Cytogenetics and Molecular Genetics
• Histopathology
• Medical Microbiology and Virology
• Patient Education and Information
• Browse content in Pharmacology
• Psychopharmacology
• Browse content in Popular Health
• Caring for Others
• Complementary and Alternative Medicine
• Self-help and Personal Development
• Browse content in Preclinical Medicine
• Cell Biology
• Molecular Biology and Genetics
• Reproduction, Growth and Development
• Primary Care
• Professional Development in Medicine
• Browse content in Psychiatry
• Addiction Medicine
• Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
• Forensic Psychiatry
• Learning Disabilities
• Old Age Psychiatry
• Psychotherapy
• Browse content in Public Health and Epidemiology
• Epidemiology
• Public Health
• Browse content in Radiology
• Clinical Radiology
• Interventional Radiology
• Nuclear Medicine
• Radiation Oncology
• Reproductive Medicine
• Browse content in Surgery
• Cardiothoracic Surgery
• Gastro-intestinal and Colorectal Surgery
• General Surgery
• Neurosurgery
• Paediatric Surgery
• Peri-operative Care
• Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery
• Surgical Oncology
• Transplant Surgery
• Trauma and Orthopaedic Surgery
• Vascular Surgery
• Browse content in Science and Mathematics
• Browse content in Biological Sciences
• Aquatic Biology
• Biochemistry
• Bioinformatics and Computational Biology
• Developmental Biology
• Ecology and Conservation
• Evolutionary Biology
• Genetics and Genomics
• Microbiology
• Molecular and Cell Biology
• Natural History
• Plant Sciences and Forestry
• Research Methods in Life Sciences
• Structural Biology
• Systems Biology
• Zoology and Animal Sciences
• Browse content in Chemistry
• Analytical Chemistry
• Computational Chemistry
• Crystallography
• Environmental Chemistry
• Industrial Chemistry
• Inorganic Chemistry
• Materials Chemistry
• Medicinal Chemistry
• Mineralogy and Gems
• Organic Chemistry
• Physical Chemistry
• Polymer Chemistry
• Study and Communication Skills in Chemistry
• Theoretical Chemistry
• Browse content in Computer Science
• Artificial Intelligence
• Computer Architecture and Logic Design
• Game Studies
• Human-Computer Interaction
• Mathematical Theory of Computation
• Programming Languages
• Software Engineering
• Systems Analysis and Design
• Virtual Reality
• Browse content in Computing
• Business Applications
• Computer Security
• Computer Games
• Computer Networking and Communications
• Digital Lifestyle
• Graphical and Digital Media Applications
• Operating Systems
• Browse content in Earth Sciences and Geography
• Atmospheric Sciences
• Environmental Geography
• Geology and the Lithosphere
• Maps and Map-making
• Meteorology and Climatology
• Oceanography and Hydrology
• Palaeontology
• Physical Geography and Topography
• Regional Geography
• Soil Science
• Urban Geography
• Browse content in Engineering and Technology
• Agriculture and Farming
• Biological Engineering
• Civil Engineering, Surveying, and Building
• Electronics and Communications Engineering
• Energy Technology
• Engineering (General)
• Environmental Science, Engineering, and Technology
• History of Engineering and Technology
• Mechanical Engineering and Materials
• Technology of Industrial Chemistry
• Transport Technology and Trades
• Browse content in Environmental Science
• Applied Ecology (Environmental Science)
• Conservation of the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Environmental Sustainability
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Environmental Science)
• Management of Land and Natural Resources (Environmental Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environmental Science)
• Nuclear Issues (Environmental Science)
• Pollution and Threats to the Environment (Environmental Science)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Environmental Science)
• History of Science and Technology
• Browse content in Materials Science
• Ceramics and Glasses
• Composite Materials
• Metals, Alloying, and Corrosion
• Nanotechnology
• Browse content in Mathematics
• Applied Mathematics
• Biomathematics and Statistics
• History of Mathematics
• Mathematical Education
• Mathematical Finance
• Mathematical Analysis
• Numerical and Computational Mathematics
• Probability and Statistics
• Pure Mathematics
• Browse content in Neuroscience
• Cognition and Behavioural Neuroscience
• Development of the Nervous System
• Disorders of the Nervous System
• History of Neuroscience
• Invertebrate Neurobiology
• Molecular and Cellular Systems
• Neuroendocrinology and Autonomic Nervous System
• Neuroscientific Techniques
• Sensory and Motor Systems
• Browse content in Physics
• Astronomy and Astrophysics
• Atomic, Molecular, and Optical Physics
• Biological and Medical Physics
• Classical Mechanics
• Computational Physics
• Condensed Matter Physics
• Electromagnetism, Optics, and Acoustics
• History of Physics
• Mathematical and Statistical Physics
• Measurement Science
• Nuclear Physics
• Particles and Fields
• Plasma Physics
• Quantum Physics
• Relativity and Gravitation
• Semiconductor and Mesoscopic Physics
• Browse content in Psychology
• Affective Sciences
• Clinical Psychology
• Cognitive Psychology
• Cognitive Neuroscience
• Criminal and Forensic Psychology
• Developmental Psychology
• Educational Psychology
• Evolutionary Psychology
• Health Psychology
• History and Systems in Psychology
• Music Psychology
• Neuropsychology
• Organizational Psychology
• Psychological Assessment and Testing
• Psychology of Human-Technology Interaction
• Psychology Professional Development and Training
• Research Methods in Psychology
• Social Psychology
• Browse content in Social Sciences
• Browse content in Anthropology
• Anthropology of Religion
• Human Evolution
• Medical Anthropology
• Physical Anthropology
• Regional Anthropology
• Social and Cultural Anthropology
• Theory and Practice of Anthropology
• Browse content in Business and Management
• Business Strategy
• Business Ethics
• Business History
• Business and Government
• Business and Technology
• Business and the Environment
• Comparative Management
• Corporate Governance
• Corporate Social Responsibility
• Entrepreneurship
• Health Management
• Human Resource Management
• Industrial and Employment Relations
• Industry Studies
• Information and Communication Technologies
• International Business
• Knowledge Management
• Management and Management Techniques
• Operations Management
• Organizational Theory and Behaviour
• Pensions and Pension Management
• Public and Nonprofit Management
• Strategic Management
• Supply Chain Management
• Browse content in Criminology and Criminal Justice
• Criminal Justice
• Criminology
• Forms of Crime
• International and Comparative Criminology
• Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice
• Development Studies
• Browse content in Economics
• Agricultural, Environmental, and Natural Resource Economics
• Asian Economics
• Behavioural Finance
• Behavioural Economics and Neuroeconomics
• Econometrics and Mathematical Economics
• Economic Systems
• Economic History
• Economic Methodology
• Economic Development and Growth
• Financial Markets
• Financial Institutions and Services
• General Economics and Teaching
• Health, Education, and Welfare
• History of Economic Thought
• International Economics
• Labour and Demographic Economics
• Law and Economics
• Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
• Microeconomics
• Public Economics
• Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics
• Welfare Economics
• Browse content in Education
• Adult Education and Continuous Learning
• Care and Counselling of Students
• Early Childhood and Elementary Education
• Educational Equipment and Technology
• Educational Strategies and Policy
• Higher and Further Education
• Organization and Management of Education
• Philosophy and Theory of Education
• Schools Studies
• Secondary Education
• Teaching of a Specific Subject
• Teaching of Specific Groups and Special Educational Needs
• Teaching Skills and Techniques
• Browse content in Environment
• Applied Ecology (Social Science)
• Climate Change
• Conservation of the Environment (Social Science)
• Environmentalist Thought and Ideology (Social Science)
• Natural Disasters (Environment)
• Social Impact of Environmental Issues (Social Science)
• Browse content in Human Geography
• Cultural Geography
• Economic Geography
• Political Geography
• Browse content in Interdisciplinary Studies
• Communication Studies
• Museums, Libraries, and Information Sciences
• Browse content in Politics
• African Politics
• Asian Politics
• Chinese Politics
• Comparative Politics
• Conflict Politics
• Elections and Electoral Studies
• Environmental Politics
• European Union
• Foreign Policy
• Gender and Politics
• Human Rights and Politics
• Indian Politics
• International Relations
• International Organization (Politics)
• International Political Economy
• Irish Politics
• Latin American Politics
• Middle Eastern Politics
• Political Methodology
• Political Communication
• Political Philosophy
• Political Sociology
• Political Behaviour
• Political Economy
• Political Institutions
• Political Theory
• Politics and Law
• Public Administration
• Public Policy
• Quantitative Political Methodology
• Regional Political Studies
• Russian Politics
• Security Studies
• State and Local Government
• UK Politics
• US Politics
• Browse content in Regional and Area Studies
• African Studies
• Asian Studies
• East Asian Studies
• Japanese Studies
• Latin American Studies
• Middle Eastern Studies
• Native American Studies
• Scottish Studies
• Browse content in Research and Information
• Research Methods
• Browse content in Social Work
• Addictions and Substance Misuse
• Adoption and Fostering
• Care of the Elderly
• Child and Adolescent Social Work
• Couple and Family Social Work
• Developmental and Physical Disabilities Social Work
• Direct Practice and Clinical Social Work
• Emergency Services
• Human Behaviour and the Social Environment
• International and Global Issues in Social Work
• Mental and Behavioural Health
• Social Justice and Human Rights
• Social Policy and Advocacy
• Social Work and Crime and Justice
• Social Work Macro Practice
• Social Work Practice Settings
• Social Work Research and Evidence-based Practice
• Welfare and Benefit Systems
• Browse content in Sociology
• Childhood Studies
• Community Development
• Comparative and Historical Sociology
• Economic Sociology
• Gender and Sexuality
• Gerontology and Ageing
• Health, Illness, and Medicine
• Marriage and the Family
• Migration Studies
• Occupations, Professions, and Work
• Organizations
• Population and Demography
• Race and Ethnicity
• Social Theory
• Social Movements and Social Change
• Social Research and Statistics
• Social Stratification, Inequality, and Mobility
• Sociology of Religion
• Sociology of Education
• Sport and Leisure
• Urban and Rural Studies
• Browse content in Warfare and Defence
• Defence Strategy, Planning, and Research
• Land Forces and Warfare
• Military Administration
• Military Life and Institutions
• Naval Forces and Warfare
• Other Warfare and Defence Issues
• Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution
• Weapons and Equipment

• < Previous chapter
• Next chapter >

13 Self-Presentation and Social Influence: Evidence for an Automatic Process

Purdue University, Department of Psychological Sciences

• Published: 10 September 2015
• Cite Icon Cite
• Permissions Icon Permissions

Self-presentation is a social influence tactic in which people engage in communicative efforts to influence the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of others as related to the self-presenter. Despite theoretical arguments that such efforts comprise an automatic component, the majority of research continues to characterize self-presentation as primarily involving controlled and strategic efforts. This focus is theoretically challenging and empirically problematic; it fosters an exclusionary perspective, leading to a scarcity of research concerning automatic self-presentations. With the current chapter, we examine whether self-presentation involves an automatic cognitive mechanism in which such efforts spontaneously emerge, nonconsciously triggered by cues in the social environment.

In his classic work, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life , Erving Goffman (1959) popularized the concept of self-presentation, describing social life as a series of behavioral performances that symbolically communicate information about the self to others. Since the publication of this seminal work, research on self-presentation has bourgeoned, emerging as a fundamental topic in social psychology, as well as numerous other disciplines ranging from communication to organizational behavior and management. The breadth of work ranges from examining “the targets of people’s self-presentation attempts to the levels of awareness at which self-presentation efforts may be enacted” ( DePaulo, 1992 , p. 204).

Although theorists frame self-presentation from slightly different theoretical perspectives, there is agreement that the overarching goal of self-presentation falls under the umbrella of social influence, in that people’s self-presentations are aimed at influencing how others perceive them and behave toward them. Leary and Kowalski (1990) succinctly capture this goal in their characterization of self-presentation as including “all behavioral attempts to create impressions in others’ minds” (p. 39). The reason why people self-present is built on their recognition that the impressions others hold of them have important influences on desired outcomes ranging across a variety of life domains. Conveying desired identity-images provides a framework for people’s social relationships, holds direct and indirect implications for the achievement of occupational and financial goals, and satisfies important intra- and interpersonal functions ( Leary, Allen, & Terry, 2011 ; Schlenker, 2003 ). In all, self-presentation is a social influence tactic in which people engage in efforts to influence the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of others as applied and related to the self-presenter.

There is abundant research examining various aspects of self-presentation; however, the literature remains replete with a number of entrenched misconceptions. One particularly persistent belief that continues to plague self-presentation research involves the implicit or explicit assumption that most if not all self-presentation involves conscious and deliberate efforts. The definitional words that researchers use to characterize self-presentation typically emphasize and focus on words like controlling, deliberate , and strategic . Self-presentation efforts are also frequently described as people trying to or attempting to influence the impression others form of them. Even Goffman (1959) defined self-presentation as a process in which people strategically control the inferences that others draw about them. We argue that the obvious face value of these types of words are heavily skewed toward controlled and deliberate efforts, and as such have exerted both an unbalanced and inaccurate influence on the resulting direction that most empirical research lines follow.

Although there has been a good deal of theoretical discussion focused on automatic self-presentation, there is a scarcity of empirical work, and the degree to which this work supports the viability of an automatic self-presentational component has not been fully vetted or reviewed. In this chapter, we focus on evaluating the hypothesis that the self-presentation process involves an automatic cognitive mechanism in which people spontaneously engage in automatic self-presentational efforts. We examine whether automatic self-presentations emerge of their own accord nonconsciously triggered by context cues, in the absence of direct instructional prompts. We also seek to actively draw attention to the dearth of empirical work examining automatic self-presentation; by doing so we hope to encourage researchers to more fully explore this vitally important feature of interpersonal behavior. To foreshadow our overall conclusion, although some evidence supports the general tenets of automatic self-presentation, it remains unclear empirically whether such efforts are truly emerging via a nonconscious mechanism. The key elements concerning such a mechanism relate primarily to the awareness (i.e., behavior is activated outside of conscious awareness) and involuntary (i.e., behavior is initiated by certain cues or prompts in the situation) features of automaticity as described by Bargh (1996) .

Our summary to date clearly begs the question: Why is construing self-presentation as primarily involving controlled and strategic actions, while giving short shrift to nonconscious efforts, necessarily a problem? To reiterate, self-presentations are typically described as involving controlled and deliberate actions that are grounded in the implicit or explicit belief that self-presentation includes only conscious efforts that are meant to explicitly influence others’ impressions. We argue that characterizing self-presentation as solely deliberate has the negative consequence of fostering an exclusionary research perspective, which results in severely limiting research attention to a narrower bandwidth of social situations. Such a narrow conceptual approach characterizes self-presentation as primarily occurring only in limited situations in which people are deliberately trying to control the conveyance of self-information to others. Put differently, if people are not consciously trying to communicate a desired image, it is simply assumed they are not engaging in self-presentation at all (see Schlenker, 2003 ).

These fundamental constraints shape and impact the theoretical and conceptual foundations of most self-presentation research. The majority of paradigms explicitly and directly provide participants with self-presentational instructions, narrowly focusing empirical attention on controlled and deliberate self-presentational efforts. Participants are instructed to consciously think about the particular impression they are trying to convey, and of importance, the impression per se becomes the focal goal, rather than framing the presented identity as a means to achieve another type of valued goal ( Leary et al., 2011 ).

Emphasizing that self-presentations comprise only controlled and strategic efforts also further promotes one of the most widespread misconceptions about self-presentation, which holds that such efforts are inherently false, manipulative, and duplicitous. Although certainly self-presentations can involve deception, for the most part, people’s efforts reflect an accurate, if slightly embellished portrayal of themselves ( Back et al., 2010 ; Leary & Allen, 2011 ; Wilson, Gosling, & Graham, 2012 ).

Our summary is not meant to suggest that examining controlled self-presentations has been an unproductive strategy; such approaches have generated useful and valuable findings concerning basic self-presentational processes. Nonetheless, we argue that adopting a limited conceptualization of self-presentation as primarily involving controlled efforts results in an artificially narrow empirical framework. This serves to restrict the field of inquiry to arguably only a small and specific slice of self-presentation behavior, while relatively ignoring the broader automatic component ( Leary et al., 2011 ; Schlenker, 2003 ). Focusing on the strategically controlled aspects of self-presentation has left a lingering theoretical residual, resulting in forceful, but misguided assumptions that continue to reinforce and propagate the common misperception that all, or at least most of self-presentation involves conscious and deliberate efforts.

However, like most other social behaviors, self-presentation has also been characterized in theoretical terms as comprising dual processes involving conscious and nonconscious behaviors (e.g., Leary & Kowalski, 1990 ; Paulhus, 1993 ; Schlenker, 2003 ). In that spirit, theorists argue that self-presentations more often occur in an automatic rather than controlled fashion, and that the intentions underlying the initiation of such efforts do not necessarily have to be conscious. For instance, Paulhus (1993) suggests an automatic path for self-presentation that focuses on people’s tendency to communicate overly positive self-descriptions; Hogan (1983) proposed that self-presentational efforts often involve automatic and modularized behavior, unfolding in a nonconscious fashion; Baumeister (1982) posited that the intention behind self-presentation need not be conscious; while Leary and Kowalski (1990) suggest that people nonconsciously monitor others’ impressions of them and engage in automatic self-presentation when impression-relevant cues are detected.

Schlenker (2003) also proposed that context cues guide self-presentations outside of conscious awareness and trigger interpersonal goals, behavior, and motivation, and once activated, these nonconscious efforts continue until the desired goal or outcome is achieved. Schlenker goes on to argue that many self-presentations are characteristic of goal-dependent forms of automatic behavior. Evidence concerning social behavior, in general, shows that “goal pursuit can arise from mental processes put into motion by features of the social environment outside of conscious awareness … with the assumption that goals are represented in mental structures that include the context, the goal, and the actions to aid goal pursuit, and thus goals can be triggered automatically by relevant environmental stimuli” ( Custers & Aarts, 2005 , p. 129). The goal activation sequence and the operations to obtain a particular goal can unfold in the absence of a person’s intention or awareness.

In much the same manner, self-presentations can be conceptualized as being nonconsciously activated by features of the social environment ( Schlenker, 2003 ). This suggests that self-presentations comprise cognitive structures that include the context, the goal, and the actions to achieve the goal, and like other social behaviors, these efforts can be automatically triggered by environmental stimuli. People strive to achieve a self-presentation goal, although they are often not aware that such efforts have been activated. As a result, they do not characterize their behavior as self-presentation, in that they do not view themselves as self-consciously and purposefully trying to achieve impression-oriented goals. A key element underscoring automatic self-presentations is the assertion that such efforts comprise “behaviors that consist of modulated, habit-formed patterns of action” or consist of “an individual’s most well-practiced set of self-attributes” ( Paulhus, 1993 , p. 576; Schlenker & Pontari, 2000 , p. 205). Characterizing automatic self-presentations as habitual patterns of behavior finds broad conceptual support from the more general theorizing on habitual responding. For example, theorists’ perspective concerning the relationship between context-cueing and self-presentational efforts dovetails nicely with the general framework of habit performance as outlined in Wood and Neal’s (2007) habit model. We will highlight conceptual areas of relevance where appropriate, focusing attention on propositions drawn from Wood and Neal’s model. In summary, theorists argue that self-presentations can unfold in an automatic or habitual manner via a context-cueing process; these efforts are guided outside of conscious awareness when interpersonal goals, behavior, and motivation are automatically triggered by context cues in the social environment. Once activated, people’s self-presentations persist until the desired goal is achieved.

Our goal, in the sections to follow, is to examine the degree to which relevant literature supports the proposition of an automatic self-presentational process (for more controlled aspects, see Schlenker, Britt, & Pennington, 1996 ; Schlenker, & Pontari, 2000 ). Before delving into the empirical evidence, we first briefly outline one theoretical perspective—the self-identification theory—that provides a succinct and integrative framework to conceptualize and illustrate the processes and mechanisms thought to be involved in automatic self-presentation (Schlenker, 1985 , 2003 ). Although there are other automatic self-presentation models (e.g., Paulhus, 1993 ), the self-identification theory is arguably the most comprehensive one; areas of overlap with other approaches will be noted where appropriate.

Self-Identification Theory

Self-identification theory characterizes self-presentation as a common and pervasive feature of social life in which self-identification is broadly described as the process with which people attempt to demonstrate that they are a particular type of person. More formally, self-presentation is defined as a “goal-directed activity in which people communicate identity-images for themselves with audiences by behaving in ways that convey certain roles and personal qualities. They do so in order to influence the impressions that others form of them” ( Schlenker, 2003 , p. 492). The communication of identity-images provides a framework for people’s relationships, holds direct and indirect implications for the outcomes and goals that people receive, and satisfies valued intra- and interpersonal functions. Self-identification theory posits that communicating specific identity-images, via self-presentation, is a key aspect of interpersonal interactions.

Identity-images are desirable in that they typically embody what people would like to be within the parameters of their abilities, appearance, and history. These images often involve beneficial self-identifications that are structured to serve a person’s interpersonal goals ( Schlenker, 2003 ). In the parlance of self-identification theory the combination of a desired identity-image and a corresponding behavioral script is defined as an agenda , which is activated by context cues in the social environment ( Schlenker, 2003 ).

Although people are frequently motivated to achieve multiple agendas, the limits of cognitive capacity minimize the number of agendas that can simultaneously occupy the foreground of attention ( Paulhus, 1993 ). Some agendas necessarily receive greater attention, effort, and monitoring than others, with those considered more relevant operating in the foreground and those of less concern unfolding in the background. Imagine a computer running numerous programs—some open, contents displayed and attentively monitored and examined, whereas others are minimized, operating behind the scenes, working on tasks but not distracting the operator unless a reason or purpose to check them arises (this metaphor is borrowed from Schlenker & Pontari, 2000 ). In a similar fashion, agendas focusing on self-presentation concerns, involving the goal of communicating a particular impression to an audience, can be more or less in the foreground of conscious awareness. This leads us directly to an overview of background-automatic and foreground-controlled modes of self-presentation as described in the self-identification theory.

Foreground Self-Presentation

Self-presentation agendas that operate in the foreground are characterized as involving consciously controlled attention, with people exerting significant cognitive resources to plan and implement their behaviors. Such efforts consume cognitive attention by requiring people to first access self-information, after doing so they must synthesize and integrate the information in a manner relevant to an interaction and prepare it for expression; people make judgments about what to say and about how to communicate it to others. In doing so, people stay more alert and aware, consciously scanning and monitoring the environment to assess their behaviors and audience reactions. They engage in these efforts, in part, to accomplish the goal of communicating desired identity-images. Foreground self-presentations represent those occasions that people are most likely to report being on stage and consciously concerned with the impression they project to others ( Schlenker, 2003 ).

The antecedent conditions that direct self-presentation agendas to operate in the foreground involve broad features of the situation, the audience, and people’s interaction goals. People more thoroughly process a social situation when they perceive that the situation is important, in that their performance bears on their desired identity; involves positive or negative outcomes; or is relevant to valued role expectations. The motivation to process a situation is also more likely to increase when people expect or encounter a potential impediment (e.g., critical audience) to achieving their desired self-presentation goals ( Schlenker et al., 1996 ). This outline of foreground self-presentations is consistent with Paulhus’s (1993) description of controlled self-presentations; he posits that such efforts require attentional resources to consider one’s desired self-presentation goal and the target audience, prior to the delivery of any particular self-description. In summary, self-presentation agendas become salient, moving from the background to the foreground when the context is perceived as important or when obstacles impede the successful communication of a desired identity-image ( Schlenker et al., 1994 ).

Background Self-Presentation

In contrast and key to the current chapter, self-presentation agendas that operate in the background are conceptualized as automatically guided by goal-directed behavior, operating with minimal conscious cognitive attention or effort. This representation is akin to Bargh’s (1996) proposition that “automatic processes can be intentional; well-learned social scripts and social action sequences can be guided by intended, goal-dependent automaticity,” which refers to an autonomous process that requires the intention that an action occur, but requires no conscious guidance once the action begins to operate (p. 174). Like Bargh, Schlenker (2003) argues that self-presentations with familiar others, or those involving well-learned behavioral patterns and scripts, are characteristic of an intended, goal-dependent form of automaticity. Here, self-presentations involve an automatic process in which cues in the social milieu direct self-presentations in the absence of conscious awareness and trigger interpersonal goals, behavior, and motivation. Once activated, these efforts are maintained until the desired goal or outcome is achieved ( Paulhus, Graf, & Van Selst, 1989 ; Schlenker, 2003 ).

Theorists propose that background self-presentation agendas are automatically activated based on overlearned responses to social contingencies. This description is similar to Paulhus’s (1993) idea that automatic self-presentation is a residual of overlearned situationally specific self-presentations. These overlearned responses include scripts that provide an efficient and nonconscious guidance system to construct a desired identity-image. Context-contingent cues (e.g., audience) converge in the background to trigger automatic self-presentation agendas. People are often not aware that these efforts have been activated and, as a result, do not characterize their communications or behavior as self-presentation, in that they do not view themselves as self-consciously and effortfully attempting to achieve impression-oriented goals ( Schlenker et al., 1996 ).

While background self-presentation agendas unfold, people nonconsciously monitor their behavior and the audience’s responses to ensure a proper construal of a desired impression. For these automatic efforts to be overridden by conscious, controlled processing, at least two requirements need to occur. First, people must be motivated to think or act differently than what occurs automatically, and second, they must have the cognitive resources to support the flexible, relatively unusual sequence of actions ( Schlenker, 2003 ). If a deviation from a social script or an impediment is detected, the agenda can pop into the foreground. As a result, attention is drawn to conscious awareness to correct the misimpression and to achieve one’s self-presentation goals, shifting self-presentation agendas from a background to a foreground mode of operation. This attention-drawing process is akin to Paulhus’s (1993) automatic self-presentation model, where affect regulates that attention is directed toward any glitch in an activity that is currently unfolding via an automatic process.

Characterizing automatic self-presentation as habit-like is also consistent with theoretical descriptions of habits in general, as outlined in Wood and Neal’s (2007) habit model. They argue that the “automaticity underlying habits builds on patterns of repeated covariation between the features of performance contexts and responses—that is, habits are defined as learned dispositions to repeat past responses” (Wood & Neal, p. 843). Once the habitual response is created, it can be triggered when an individual perceives relevant cues that are embedded in the performance context. Even though habits are not necessarily mediated by a goal, they can also advance the original goal that first impelled people to repetitively perform the context-response, which in effect resulted in the formation of the habit ( Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000 ; Verplanken & Aarts, 1999 ). Habits and goals interface, in that habit associations are initially formed under the guidance of goals: “goals direct control of responses prior to habit formation, and thus define the cuing contexts under which a response is repeated into a habit” (p. 851). Theorists posit that self-presentations can become so well practiced that they operate like mindless habits that are triggered nonconsciously by environmental cues and unfold in an automatic fashion, similar to the operational processes associated with habit responding as described by Wood and Neal.

Having outlined the theoretical foundation for automatic self-presentations, we now examine research germane to the key question underscoring the current chapter: Do automatic self-presentations emerge of their own accord nonconsciously triggered by context cues, in the absence of direct instructional prompts? Following a review of this evidence, we provide discussion and critical assessment.

Evidence for Automatic Self-Presentation

Although the self-presentation literature includes a voluminous number of studies, the vast majority does not include measurements or manipulations that can be interpreted as depicting automatic self-presentation. Rather, previous work primarily centered on identifying self-presentation strategies, discerning when self-presentation will or will not occur, and determining whether such efforts communicate self-beliefs accurately or in a self-serving manner, promote self-consistency or maximize self-esteem, or depict self-enhancement or self-protective purposes (see Schlenker et al., 1996 ). There are a number of studies, however, that either directly involve the manipulation of self-presentational automaticity or focus attention on self-presentation behaviors that can be viewed as unfolding via an automatic process. Review of these studies will be divided into sections; the first four relate to the availability of cognitive resources during self-presentation and its effect on recall, self-presentation effectiveness, reaction times , and self-description , followed by sections focused on the availability of self-regulatory resources during self-presentations and the implicit activation of self-presentational efforts.

The first four sections examine the cognitive effects of automatic self-presentation, beginning with the general concept that there is a limit to people’s cognitive resources, and effectively attending to simultaneous activities that require cognitive effort is difficult ( Bargh, 1996 ). These limitations in cognitive capacity enable researchers to use empirical methods to investigate the differences between automatic and controlled self-presentations. Introducing a second, cognitively effortful activity generates nominal interference with a concurrent task if a process is automatic; however, this second task significantly interrupts the ongoing efforts if the process is controlled.

The Availability of Cognitive Resources during Self-Presentation and Its Effect on Recall

Given the proposition that automaticity consumes minimal cognitive resources, it follows that people should be able to more efficiently process information when delivering automatic self-presentations. To override these automatic efforts, however, more controlled self-presentations require an increase in cognitive resources ( Schlenker, 2003 ). As a result, controlled rather than automatic self-presentations may disrupt the processing of information ( Schlenker, 1986 ). To demonstrate empirically the presence of automatic self-presentations, the studies in this first section focus on the differential effects of automatic and controlled self-presentations on subsequent recall.

It is important to preface the studies that address this issue by emphasizing that Western norms typically favor positive self-presentations (e.g., Schlenker, 1980 ; see also Baumeister & Jones, 1978 ; Jones & Wortman, 1973 ). People are far more practiced at conveying a self-promoting identity-image (i.e., automatic self-presentation) rather than a self-depreciating one (i.e., controlled self-presentation). Self-promotion efforts would be expected to leave more cognitive resources available to process information and ultimately should have less negative impact on recall. However, engaging in self-deprecation—a controlled self-presentation—should remove the automaticity of self-presentation, increasing the demand for cognitive resources. These expectations found support across a series of studies in which participants displayed significantly better recall of interaction details when their social interaction comprised automatic compared to controlled self-presentations ( Baumeister, Hutton, & Tice, 1989 ).

Evidence also indicates that a key determinant of people’s self-presentations is whether an interaction involves strangers or friends ( Tice, Butler, Muraven, & Stillwell, 1995 ). From this work we know that certain constraints and contingencies position the communication of a favorable image as the optimal way to self-present to strangers, whereas a more modest identity approach prevails among friends. If these self-presentation patterns are habitually used, they should be relatively automatic, requiring minimal cognitive resources for encoding, leading to more accurate recall. Violation of these patterns, however, should trigger controlled self-presentations, requiring more cognitive resources, consequently impairing accurate recall. Like Baumeister et al., (1989) , this work also shows that when participants engaged in automatic self-presentations— they interacted with a stranger in a self-promoting manner or with a friend in a modest manner —their recall of interaction details was significantly better compared to when they engaged in controlled self-presentations— they interacted with a stranger in a modest fashion or with a friend in a self-promoting manner . Follow-up studies replicated these results and additionally demonstrated that even when recalling a stranger’s behavior people made fewer recall errors when engaged in automatic self-presentations rather than controlled ones ( Tice et al., 1995 ).

The Availability of Cognitive Resources during Self-Presentation and Its Effect on Self-Presentational Effectiveness

The studies in the prior section demonstrate that the automatic-controlled self-presentation process involves the availability of cognitive resources and, in part, familiarity with the self-presentational context. Automatic self-presentations are characterized by familiar and habitual self-presentations, which require minimal cognitive resources. It follows that under low cognitive demand people should be able to engage effectively in the self-presentation of familiar identity-images but also unfamiliar ones as well. In contrast, controlled self-presentations are characterized by unfamiliar and atypical self-presentations, which require increased cognitive resources. It can then be reasoned that under high cognitive demand people’s capacity to engage effectively in the self-presentation of unfamiliar identity-images will be negatively impacted, whereas the effectiveness of self-presenting a familiar identity-image should not suffer. To demonstrate an automatic self-presentation process, the studies in the second section focus on the effect that automatic and controlled self-presentations have on people’s self-presentational effectiveness.

In this first set of studies, Pontari and Schlenker (2000) interviewed extraverted and introverted individuals under low- or high-cognitive load conditions. As part of the instructions, these individuals were told to convey either an extraverted or introverted identity-image to the interviewer. It was thought that participants who enacted congruent self-presentations, for example, an extravert acting as an extravert, were acting consistently with their self-schemata. They delivered familiar and relatively automatic self-presentations, requiring minimal cognitive resources. In contrast, those who enacted incongruent self-presentations, for example, an extravert acting as an introvert, were acting inconsistently with their self-schemata. They delivered unfamiliar and relatively controlled self-presentations, requiring an increase in cognitive resources.

The results from these studies indicated that for extraverts and introverts alike, the self-presentation of congruent and familiar identities was successfully achieved in both the high- and low-cognitive-load conditions. Extraverts were also successful at self-presenting incongruent identities when they had sufficient cognitive resources available, that is, in the low-cognitive-load condition. However, extraverts were unable to successfully self-present incongruent and unfamiliar identities when they lacked the requisite cognitive resources, that is, in the high-cognitive-load condition. By comparison, an unexpected finding showed that introverts were successful at self-presenting incongruent and unfamiliar identities even when they lacked available cognitive resources. Pontari and Schlenker (2000) posited that the increased cognitive load interrupted introverts’ dysfunctional thoughts, which would have otherwise interfered with their capacity to engage effectively in controlled self-presentations. The additional mental tasks in the high-cognitive-load condition may have shifted introverts’ attention from negative self-ruminations to more dispassionate thoughts. This shift in attention may have allowed introverts to successfully enact a social performance that was relatively incongruent with their automatic pattern of self-presentational responses.

The Availability of Cognitive Resources during Self-Presentation and Its Effect on Reaction Times

A set of studies consistent with Pontari and Schlenker’s (2000) notion of self-presentations as congruent or incongruent with self-schema were carried out by Holden and colleagues ( 1992 , 2001 ). These studies focused on reaction times rather than self-presentational effectiveness to demonstrate automatic and controlled self-presentation processes. Participants were instructed to respond quickly to self-descriptive personality items in a manner that would make them appear either very well adjusted or not well adjusted. When participants made responses that were incongruent with a self-schema—conveying a favorable impression via socially undesirable items or an unfavorable impression via socially desirable items—their reaction times were slower. When they made responses that were congruent with a self-schema—conveying a favorable impression via socially desirable items or an unfavorable impression via socially undesirable items—their reaction times were faster.

These findings show that responding in a manner incongruent with a self-schema requires the availability of cognitive resources, whereas responding in a congruent manner consumes minimal cognitive resources and attention. The data also support the presence of a cognitive mechanism that is fast and efficient, and a cognitive override mechanism that is slower and intentional, which they suggest are consistent with the processes described in Paulhus’s (1993) automatic and controlled self-presentation model ( Holden, Wood, & Tomashewski, 2001 ). In Paulhus’s work, “automatic processes are those that are so well rehearsed that they are fast, oriented toward positive self-presentations, and operate without attention, whereas controlled processes are much slower and require increased attention” ( Holden et al., 2001 , p. 167).

The Availability of Cognitive Resources during Self-Presentations and Its Effect on Self-Descriptions

Other programs of research (e.g., Paulhus & Levitt, 1987 ) also posit that controlled self-presentations occur when attentional capacity is available, whereas automatic self-presentations emerge when attentional capacity is relatively limited. Controlled self-presentations are thought to involve conscious self-descriptions that are adjusted to fit situational demands with such efforts requiring available cognitive resources and attentional capacity. Automatic self-presentations, in contrast, are posited to involve nonconscious default responses that are characterized by the communication of overly positive self-descriptions. These efforts require minimal cognitive attention and resources, primarily because they consist of well-practiced and chronically activated self-descriptions ( Paulhus, 1993 ).

To examine these ideas, a series of studies were conducted in which participants provided self-descriptive ratings on positive, negative, or neutral traits while in a high- or low-cognitive-load condition ( Paulhus, 1993 ; Paulhus et al., 1989 ; Paulhus & Levitt, 1987 ). Results showed that participants in the high-cognitive-load condition endorsed more positive than negative traits. They were also significantly faster at both endorsing positive and denying negative traits when their resources and attention were focused on other tasks. Put differently, when cognitive attention was diverted, only a default set of positive self-descriptions was left available for automatic self-presentations. Paulhus (1993) concluded that increasing cognitive demands can trigger automatic self-presentations in which people are more likely and quicker to claim positive traits and deny negative ones.

In a similar fashion, cognitive capacity is also required for honest trait responding—it takes attentional resources to scan one’s memory for accurate responses. If cognitive demands are increased, attention is diverted and honest trait responding can be disrupted. But the subsequent responses are not random; they are systematically more positive and emerge from the positive automatic self. Evidence from a number of studies shows that participants instructed to engage in controlled self-presentations produced more positive self-descriptions in a high- compared to low-cognitive-load condition (e.g., Paulhus & Murphy, unpublished data ). These findings support the assertion that automatic self-presentations are activated when controlled self-presentations are disrupted by an increase in cognitive demands.

To examine this idea further, a second study experimentally created automatic self-presentation patterns and then tested whether these patterns reappeared under cognitive load ( Paulhus, Bruce, & Stoffer, 1990 ). To induce a new automatic-self, participants practiced communicating overly positive self-descriptions, negative self-descriptions, or honest self-descriptions by repeatedly responding to a set of 12 traits. Subsequently, participants were told to forget what they did during this practice phase and to instead respond honestly to the 12 traits (i.e., controlled self-presentation). During a first test, participants were given as much time as they wanted to respond, a low-cognitive-load condition, whereas in a second test they were told to answer as fast as possible, a high-cognitive-load condition. Results showed that the automatization effects that were created in the initial practice phase emerged in the high-cognitive-load condition but not in the low-cognitive-load condition. When controlled self-presentations were disrupted, automatic self-presentations appeared, as evidenced by the automatic self emerging only during the high-cognitive-load condition.

Another line of evidence also shows that people positively bias their descriptions of self-associated stimuli, and they do so without conscious awareness ( Koole, Dijksterhuis, & van Knippenberg, 2001 ). Theorists posit that early self-descriptions shape later self-descriptions by structuring self-relevant cognitions and behavior into working models, which can be nonconsciously activated ( Mikulincer, 1995 ). These models are conceptualized as an integral part of automatic self-presentations, typifying people’s most well-practiced and chronically activated self-descriptions ( Paulhus, 1993 ). When encountering self-associated stimuli, people’s positively biased self-descriptions can be automatically triggered and, as such, can be characterized as automatic self-presentations. If people lack available cognitive capacity, their self-descriptions of self-associated stimuli may reflect implicit and automatic efforts, whereas, if sufficient cognitive resources are available, self-descriptions may reflect more explicit and controlled efforts ( Koole et al., 2001 ).

These ideas were tested in two studies by examining the relationship between implicit self-positivity and explicit self-descriptions. Implicit self-positivity was measured by the name-letter bias ( Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997 ) and explicit self-description by participants’ self-ratings on positive, negative, or neutral trait words ( Paulhus & Levitt, 1987 ). With respect to the explicit measure, quickly delivered self-descriptions were characterized as automatic self-presentations, and slowly delivered self-descriptions were characterized as controlled self-presentations, primarily because automatic processing requires less time than controlled processing. It was expected and found that implicit self-positivity only matched the explicit self-descriptions when the trait self-ratings were quickly delivered but not when they were slowly delivered.

A second study mirrored the results of the first by manipulating the availability of cognitive resources rather than the delivery speed of explicit self-descriptions. Specifically, participants under a high cognitive load (vs. low cognitive load) displayed greater congruence between implicit and explicit self-descriptions. When cognitive resources were limited, it increased the self-positivity of explicit self-descriptions, in that the congruence between implicit and explicit self-descriptions only increased when controlled efforts were undermined, that is, in the high-cognitive-demand condition. But when participants were in a situation in which they possessed sufficient cognitive resources, their explicit and implicit self-descriptions did not match. When responding explicitly, participants presumably were aware of the self-presentation implications of responding in an overly positive manner and, as such, managed their responses accordingly. Their responses were far less positive when they were explicitly versus implicitly measured. In contrast, when participants lacked sufficient cognitive resources, they presumably were unable to consciously control the delivery of their explicit self-descriptions, which essentially then became automatic self-presentations. As result, their implicit and explicit self-descriptions were congruent in the high-cognitive-load condition; both showed positively biased self-descriptions, which is characteristic of automatic self-presentations.

Related studies also examined whether the automatic self-descriptions that underlie the self-positivity bias can be inhibited by consciously controlled efforts ( Koole et al., 2001 ). Here, participants were instructed to judge self-associated stimuli while focusing on either cognitive reasoning , which was thought to require more controlled efforts, or feeling , which was thought to require less controlled efforts. If greater preference for self-associated stimuli results from automatic self-presentation, a positive bias for such stimuli should increase when the focus is on feelings, an automatic response, compared to deliberate reasoning, a controlled response. In line with this reasoning, participants delivered more positively biased judgments for self-associated stimuli when they were focused on feelings rather than reasoning. This suggests that controlled efforts inhibit the emergence of automatic self-presentations. Participants also reported no awareness that they were displaying a positivity bias toward self-associated stimuli. In all, implicit self-positivity responses, based on overlearned self-descriptions, may be representative of automatic self-presentations.

The Availability of Self-Regulatory Resources during Self-Presentations

The first four sections focused on studies that essentially involved either low or high cognitive demands as a means to demonstrate, respectively, automatic or controlled self-presentations. We now turn to a set of studies that addressed the relationship between self-presentation and the consumption of self-regulatory resources ( Vohs, Baumeister, & Ciarocco, 2005 ). The logic underlying this relationship basically mimics the argument underscoring how the availability of cognitive resources impacts the degree to which self-presentations emerge via automatic or controlled efforts. When people engage in unfamiliar patterns of self-presentation, it requires increased self-regulatory efforts to override their habitual responses and to effortfully control their behavior. Carrying out “these effortful self-presentations drain[s]‌ more self-regulatory resources compared with presenting oneself in a standard, familiar, or habitual manner of self-presentation” ( Vohs et al., 2005 , p. 634). In four studies that examined this idea, participants were instructed to present themselves in a manner that was based either on familiar/habitual and less effortful patterns of self-presentations or on patterns that were unfamiliar/atypical, which called for more deliberate and thoughtful efforts.

The results across all four studies consistently demonstrated that engaging in habitual self-presentations demanded less regulatory efforts than carrying out an atypical or unfamiliar self-presentation, which required an increase in regulatory efforts, and subsequently depleted the self’s resources. As with cognitive demands, these findings suggest that automatic self-presentations emerge when the situation is perceived as more familiar and routine, and hence does not require exerting an increase in regulatory efforts. In contrast, more effortful and controlled self-presentations emerge when the situation calls for patterns of responding that are not typical or habitual, thus requiring more regulatory resources to be consumed. The results from these studies are consistent with the cognitive demand studies in the previous sections, again demonstrating that self-presentational efforts can assume different forms, and that conveying an image that is in conflict with one’s typical, habitual response patterns consumes greater regulatory resources than responses that follow one’s familiar self-presentational patterns. Automatic self-presentations require less regulatory resources than controlled self-presentations, which is theoretically consistent with the broad sentiment of the first four sections.

Cued Activation of Automatic Self-Presentation and Its Effect on Self-Description

For the most part, automatic self-presentations involve the conveyance of relatively favorable identity-images. Paulhus (1993) describes these efforts as “consisting of the individual’s most well-practiced, and hence, most chronically activated set of self-attributes,” which he posits are typically positive due to a lifetime of practice (p. 576). He argues that there are copious sources that underlie the widespread prevalence of the positivity that follows from a lifetime of practice. From childhood, people actively learn that they should provide more positively oriented self-descriptions and explanations for their social behavior. These ideas fit well with Schlenker’s (2003) description of background self-presentation agendas, which involve the construction of desired images of the self and are based on overlearned and habitual responses to social contingencies.

It is also important to note that although the majority of peoples’ automatic self-presentations are indeed characterized by positive self-representations, they are not necessarily restricted to just positive images. Certainly not all early life lessons and habits will reflect or result in only positive representations of the self. Some context cues can serve to trigger habit-molded patterns of behaviors that result in the conveyance of a less than favorable image of the self.

These automatic instances of less favorable images emerge from “people’s repertoire of relational schemas, or cognitive structures representing regularities in patterns of interpersonal relatedness involving a range of common interpersonal orientations: from expecting that another person will be consistently accepting, for example, to expecting that others will be evaluative or judgmental” ( Baldwin, 1992 , p. 209). Theorists propose that these relationships become internalized, in part, via the development of relation-oriented schemas. These schemas are thought to represent patterns of interpersonal behavior, consisting of interaction scripts including schemas for self and other as experienced within that interaction, which also include inference processes for communicating self-descriptions ( Baldwin, 1992 ). Researchers suggest, for example, that an individual can anticipate a negative evaluation because negative memories and knowledge structures have become activated, which influences how one anticipates and interprets a forthcoming or ongoing social interaction ( Baldwin & Main, 2001 ).

Theoretically any cue that has become linked with a particular interpersonal experience can trigger relational constructs and knowledge, and as such it can impact one’s current behavior ( Baldwin & Main, 2001 ). It is plausible that these cued activation procedures could impact automatic self-presentations, in that such efforts may involve more positive self-descriptions if the activated relational knowledge is associated with acceptance/favorability, and more negative self-descriptions if associated with rejection/unfavorability.

In a series of studies, researchers examined the idea that cued knowledge activation may differentially impact interpersonal behavior depending on the context of the activated relational schema. Although the direct intent of these studies was not focused on automatic self-presentations, the results, involving participants’ self-descriptions, can be construed as such ( Baldwin & Main, 2001 ). At the outset of these studies, participants underwent a conditioning procedure that surreptitiously paired expectations of acceptance and rejection with distinct aural tones ( Baldwin & Meunier, 1999 ). These conditioned tones were later used to nonconsciously activate the knowledge structures associated with acceptance and rejection. Specifically, during an interpersonal interaction one of the two tones from the conditioning procedure was repeatedly emitted from a computer terminal. The results indicated that participants communicated more positive self-descriptions in the acceptance compared to rejection condition and, conversely, more negative self-descriptions in the rejection versus acceptance condition. The conditioned tones to cue acceptance or rejection may have nonconsciously triggered automatic self-presentations, even to the degree that some of these efforts resulted in negative self-descriptions (see Swann, 1983 ).

In a similar fashion, other studies have examined the implicit motivational effects that significant others can have on automatic self-presentations (e.g., Shah, 2003 ). This research suggests that people’s self-representations incorporate the goals, values, and expectations that close others hold for them, and that the cued activation of these internal representations automatically influences people’s behavior via the other’s association to a variety of interpersonal goals ( Moretti & Higgins, 1999 ). The implicit effect of close others may extend to goal-directed behavior in which others influence people’s interpersonal behavior during ongoing social interactions. In other words, the implicit influence of significant others may serve to trigger automatic self-presentations.

To examine this idea, researchers covertly acquired the names of significant others, either an accepting or a critical other’s name ( Baldwin, 1994 ; Shah, 2003 ). These names were used at a later point to prime subliminally participants’ interpersonal goals. Following the priming manipulation, participants completed an ego-threatening task, after which they completed self-descriptive questionnaires. The results indicated that participant’s self-descriptions were influenced by the critical and accepting others’ name, even though detailed manipulation checks showed that participants were not consciously aware of name exposure. When a critical other’s name was primed, self-descriptions were more negative; when an accepting other’s name was primed, self-descriptions were more positive. These findings suggest that self-descriptions were nonconsciously influenced by the cued activation of relational schemas that were associated with the accepting or critical other. Subliminally reminding people, for example, of a negative, demanding or positive, friendly other may automatically trigger a be friendly or be aggressive goal, as well as the corresponding self-presentation behavior associated with the activated relational schema.

Consistent with the idea of cued activation, Tyler (2012) utilized priming procedures across a set of three studies to assess directly the automatic nature of self-presentational efforts. In the first two studies, participants were primed with words associated with impression-oriented people or with a set of neutral words; the second study also included a condition in which participants received explicit self-presentation instructions to present themselves favorably. In the first study, the self-presentation measure involved participants answering a series of self-descriptive questions put forth by the experimenter. With the second study, each participant engaged in an unscripted conversation with a confederate, which was videotaped and later coded for how favorable the participants described themselves. The results across both studies revealed that participants in the impression condition self-presented a more favorable image compared to participants in the neutral condition. The results from the second study also showed that participants’ self-presentations in the explicit condition mimicked the favorability of participants’ self-presentations in the impression prime condition. Put differently, participants’ automatic self-presentations were very similar to their efforts when they were explicitly instructed to self-present a favorable persona. The third study was grounded on the idea that the participating audience one is interacting with might serve as a nonconscious self-presentation cue. Here, participants were primed with words associated with friends or strangers. Following the priming procedure, participants were instructed to write a self-description, which was later coded with regard to how favorable participants described themselves. Analysis in the friend prime condition showed that participants self-presented a more modest image, whereas in the stranger prime condition participants self-presented a more self-enhancing image. Taken together, the findings across these studies provide compelling support for the proposition that people’s self-presentations can be primed by environmental cues outside of their conscious awareness.

Critical Assessment and Discussion

The driving logic underlying the proposal of an automatic self-presentational process is the same across all review sections, allowing for a straightforward interpretation of the findings. Recall that the goal of the current chapter is focused on determining if automatic self-presentations emerge of their own accord, triggered outside of conscious awareness by context cues in the absence of direct self-presentational instructions.

Automatic Self-Presentations and Context Cues

According to a number of influential models (e.g., Leary & Kowalski, 1990 ; Paulhus, 1993 ; Schlenker, 1985 , 2003 ), automatic self-presentations are predicated on habitual and routine response patterns that include scripts, overlearned responses, and well-practiced sets of self-attributes. For instance, Paulhus (1993) suggests “the default self-presentation, the automatic self, has it origins in a lifetime of self-presentation practice” (p. 580). Even more directly, Schlenker ( 1985 , 2003 ) posits:

Automatic self-presentations reflect modulated units of action that eventually “settle in” to become habits. These habitual patterns of behavior form self-presentation scripts that are triggered automatically by context cues and guide action unthinkingly, in relevant situations. Such scripts provide a rich store of knowledge and experience (i.e., relational knowledge), which can be automatically accessed to quickly and effectively communicate desired identity-images. When a script is triggered consciously or unconsciously by context cues, it provides a definition of the situation being encountered, a set of expectations about events, and a set of operations for thoughts and behaviors in the situation. (pp. 76, 495)

A common thread among these models underscores the notion that habitual self-presentation patterns are triggered by context cues and people are not consciously aware that their efforts are influenced by such cues. Although the exact nature of context cues varies from occasion to occasion, in general, “the situation or audience itself cues associated information about the self, social roles, and social expectations in memory and makes salient the context-contingencies between particular self-presentations and relevant outcomes” ( Schlenker, 1986 , p. 35). This description accentuates the context-contingent nature of the cues that can trigger automatic self-presentations and, as noted earlier, has a straightforward connection with Wood and Neal’s (2007) habit model, in that habits are characterized as learned dispositions to repeat past responses and are activated by context cues. In summary, theorists’ characterization of automatic self-presentations as habit responses, automatically triggered by context cues, unfolds in much the same fashion as Wood and Neal describe habit performances.

Describing automatic self-presentations as triggered by context cues is also consistent with the characterization of automatic processes as involuntary, such that people’s behavior is activated by prompts in the social environment ( Bargh, 1996 ). Schlenker and Pontari (2000) also argue that background self-presentations are guided by an intended, goal-dependent automatic process, characterized as “an autonomous process requiring the intention that it occur, and thus awareness that it is occurring, but no conscious guidance once put into operation” ( Bargh, 1996 , p. 174). Self-presentational efforts that emerge via an intended, goal-dependent automatic process comprise a well-learned, sequential set of actions that were previously associated with goal accomplishment. People are not consciously aware that context cues influence their social behavior; however, the goal-directed activity of structuring and maintaining a desired identity is nonetheless occurring. In summary, theorists contend that automatic self-presentations are activated nonconsciously by cues in the social situation and are founded on overlearned responses to behavioral-outcome contingencies.

Consistent with self-presentation theories and with support from more general models of habit responding, we argue that cues in the social environment, in and of themselves, are a necessary imperative and represent the fundamental cornerstone with which to establish the validity of an automatic self-presentation process. Although such a process has strong logical and theoretical footing, without corroborating evidence for context cuing, the process would nonetheless remain nothing but a conceptual proposition. If we fail to demonstrate empirically a context-contingent pathway for the nonconscious activation of automatic self-presentations, there is no other logical or clear mechanism with which to build and support an evidentiary foundation for such a process. As a result, we would necessarily be required to accept the notion outlined at the outset of this chapter: that the vast majority of self-presentations involve controlled and deliberate efforts, and as such only emerge during very specific sets of narrowly defined occasions. Without clear and sustaining evidence demonstrating that cues in the social environment trigger automatic self-presentations, identifying a mechanistic pathway for an automatic self-presentational process would be untenable. This leads directly to the key question underpinning our goal for this chapter: Do automatic self-presentations emerge of their own accord, triggered outside of conscious awareness by context cues in the absence of explicit self-presentation instructions? This issue relates to specific features of automatic processes in which self-presentations are thought to be involuntary responses initiated outside of conscious awareness by prompts in the social environment.

To shed light on this question, we look to the studies outlined in the research section. Although the evidence in support is quite limited, the findings suggest that automatic self-presentations are likely to emerge during situations involving familiar and routine patterns of responding, which require minimal cognitive and regulatory resources. Presenting oneself in accord with habitual response patterns required less effort, was delivered with greater speed, and was more likely to involve a favorable presentation of self. For instance, the studies that focused on recall measures demonstrate that automatic self-presentational efforts represent habitual patterns of responding that can be triggered automatically by features of the audience and situation ( Schlenker, 2003 ). To go against habitual patterns requires foregoing the benefits of automaticity, with the resulting use of controlled self-presentations then operating like cognitive load. Faced with the need to make conscious self-presentation decisions, people are then left with diminished cognitive resources, for example, to encode and recall information. The studies addressing the effect of cognitive resources on self-presentational effectiveness also illustrate that habitual self-presentations transpire with minimal resource demands, and they can unfold effectively even if an individual is faced with other cognitively demanding activities. Engaging in controlled self-presentations, however, requires increased cognitive resources and, as such, suffers if an individual is simultaneously engaged in other efforts that diminish his or her resources. These findings are consistent with Schlenker and Pontari’s (2000) notion of foreground self-presentations, which require available cognitive resources, and background self-presentations, which require minimal resources, primarily because background efforts are founded on repeatedly used scripts and over time have emerged as habitual aspects of a person’s personality and identity. In all, participants prompted to self-present in a typical or familiar manner displayed cognitive effects consistent with an automatic process.

It is important, however, to emphasize that the design of most of the studies involved the efficiency feature of automatic processes, which focused on the influence that available cognitive resources have on self-presentations. Such evidence only demonstrates that automatic self-presentational behavior may occur in the absence of controlled efforts; that is, once consciously activated, self-presentations may unfold in an autonomous manner. For the most part, participants were aware of the goal conditions, in that they received explicit instructions to engage in a specific type of self-presentation, typically one that was either congruent or incongruent with what would be expected in that particular situation, and with the implication that under certain conditions these different self-presentations would consume more or less cognitive resources. These research designs did not just rely on the presence of context cues to nonconsciously trigger automatic self-presentations, and because participants were explicitly given instructions to self-present in a particular manner, it is impossible to tease apart any effects being due to self-presentation instructions or to context cues. We argue that the majority of research cannot unequivocally confirm an automatic process; the data do not allow for definitive conclusions in that we cannot determine whether self-presentations were triggered outside of conscious awareness by context cues in the absence of explicit self-presentation instructions.

However, the few studies outlined in the cued activation section may offer plausible evidence supporting the proposition that self-presentation involves an automatic cognitive mechanism in which people’s efforts are nonconsciously triggered by context cues. Together, these studies demonstrate that cued knowledge activation, the implicit influence of significant others, and the subliminal priming of self-presentation cues can influence people’s self-presentational efforts. For instance, as a context cue, the conditioned aural tones triggered self-presentations outside of conscious awareness, in that positive or negative self-descriptions emerged, respectively, when participants were surreptitiously cued with a tone that had been previously paired with either acceptance or rejection ( Baldwin & Meunier, 1999 ). Results from Shah (2003) also showed that participants’ self-descriptions were more negative when primed with a critical other’s name and more positive when primed with an accepting others’ name. He proffered that this effect occurred because the self-descriptions were nonconsciously influenced by the cued activation of relational schemas, which had become cognitively and emotionally linked over time to an accepting or critical other. In the same vein, Tyler’s (2012) data revealed that participants primed with an impression word self-presented a more favorable persona, which not incidentally mimicked self-presentations in an explicit self-presentation control condition. Tyler’s findings, which are consistent with Tice et al. (1995) , also showed that participants primed with friend-oriented words self-presented a more modest image, whereas those primed with stranger-oriented words conveyed a more self-enhancing image.

The findings outlined in the cued activation section are theoretically consistent with the concept of a background self-presentation agenda in which an individual’s behavior is automatically guided based on repeatedly used scripts that have been successful in the past. The behaviors that ensue comprise patterns of action that are habit-formed and emerge without conscious awareness. In a background mode, impression-relevant cues prompt or activate self-presentations, although people are not consciously aware that their efforts are, in part, fashioned by the social environment and their activated self-presentation scripts ( Schlenker & Pontari, 2000 ). These automatic self-presentations typically represent positive characterizations of the self, but as the studies in the final review section illustrate, they can also involve more negatively oriented self-descriptions.

Although we tender our comments with a healthy degree of caution, we are optimistic that the results utilizing very subtle or subliminally primed context cues offer the strongest, albeit limited evidence in support of the proposition that self-presentations can be activated by environmental cues outside of conscious awareness. What these few studies seriously lack, however, is an examination of the effect during an actual ongoing social interaction.

Future work is sorely needed to not only conceptually replicate the cued context and priming effects but also to move the examination of these effects into more real-life types of situations ( Leary et al., 2011 ). To do so will require the use of creative designs to offset the fact that in real-life settings the context cues may often exist within the boundaries of people’s conscious awareness. People are cognizant of an audience, for instance, and as such, their self-presentations may be guided by an intended, but goal-dependent, automatic process, which is consistent with background self-presentations as proposed in the self-identification theory.

We also emphasize that any research designs utilizing context cues or primes to trigger automatic self-presentations need to take particular care to ensure that the cues/primes are not transparent, and that their influence occurs, indeed via a nonconscious mechanism. Clarifying the mechanism underlying automatic self-presentation is of key import, in part, because research designs may unintentionally neglect cues in the experimental setting that nonconsciously trigger or motivate self-presentational behavior, which of course, would inadvertently affect the subsequent results. This concern has historical precedent; during the 1970s, a significant amount of self-presentation research was aimed at providing alternatives to the currently held explanations for a variety of interpersonal phenomena. Results from numerous studies, spanning wide domains within social psychology, provided evidence demonstrating that people’s interpersonal behavior (e.g., helping behavior, conformity, cognitive dissonance, voting behavior) was influenced by their desire that others view them in a particular fashion (e.g., Tedeschi, Schlenker, & Bonoma, 1971 ; see Leary, 1995 ). For the most part, the self-presentation perspective argued, “that the people we use as the sources of behavioral data are active, anticipatory, problem-solving, role-playing, and impression-managing beings ( Page, 1981 , p. 59; see Adair, 1973 ). Page further argued that experimental subjects “may feel very much as if they are on stage ( Goffman, 1959 , ), and they may control and calculate their own behavior so as not to receive what in their own eyes would be a negative evaluation of their performance” (p. 60). At the time, these contentions were directly aimed at participants’ consciously, controlled self-presentational efforts and were viewed by traditional social psychology as methodological artifacts that could be ameliorated (see Kruglanski, 1975 ). The degree to which these issues have actually been remedied is well beyond the scope of the current chapter. If theorists’ proposition is correct, however, and automatic self-presentations are a ubiquitous feature of people’s daily life, it would behoove researchers to assiduously examine their experimental design and protocols to determine if potential cues in the laboratory setting are unintentionally triggering participants’ automatic self-presentational efforts. If this were the case, the concerns are obvious and meaningful, in that such cued behavior would severely confound any subsequent results and data interpretation.

An essential ingredient of the research that directly examines automatic self-presentations is the development of tightly designed control or comparison conditions; at the least, such conditions must demonstrate that the absence of a particular cue leads to less self-presentational efforts compared to the presence of the cue. Such research designs must also keep potential self-presentational motivations, for example, goal importance and audience status, constant across all experimental conditions, while manipulating the context-cued condition. If the design fails to adequately do so, it is nearly impossible to determine if participants’ self-presentation efforts are unfolding in a background mode or whether other motivational factors have shifted participants’ efforts to the foreground. It is important to evaluate implicit self-presentation cues, not only for their effectiveness at triggering automatic self-presentations, but also to ensure that they are able to do so in a nonconscious manner.

Integrating elements from a number of the reviewed studies may also prove useful in examining automatic self-presentations, particularly during the course of an ongoing interpersonal interaction. In a number of studies, various self-presentations were characterized as comprising or inducing different levels of cognitive demand, which combined with information processing measures, enabled researchers to infer automatic self-presentations. Much of the evidence indicated that when cognitive attention was diverted only a default set of positive self-descriptions remained available for automatic self-presentations. By turning the notion around that different self-presentations induce high or low cognitive load, one could predict that high- or low-cognitive-load circumstances would lead to automatic or controlled self-presentations, respectively. It would be fruitful to manipulate the level of cognitive demand during an ongoing interpersonal interaction in the absence of any explicit self-presentation instructions, with the expectation that automatic self-presentations (i.e., default set of positive self-descriptions) should emerge in the high- compared to low-cognitive-load condition. Rather than assess self-ratings or recall, it would also be more externally valid and informative to measure and/or code people’s self-descriptions or behaviors.

Although Pontari and Schlenker’s extravert-introvert study (2000) involved explicit self-presentation instructions, it followed a design similar to the one proposed herein; they directly manipulated cognitive demands during an interaction. Automatic self-presentations were presumed to have occurred under conditions in which participants were instructed to engage in congruent self-presentations in both the high- and low-cognitive-load conditions. One can readily imagine adding another condition in which participants under both cognitive load conditions received no explicit self-presentation instructions. The results from such a condition should mirror the data from the presumed automatic self-presentation condition because participants in either cognitive load condition who received no self-presentation instructions would have no particular reason or motivation to behave in a manner other than the one they are most familiar with—extraverts would act extraverted and introverts would act introverted. If this no-instruction condition replicated the automatic self-presentation condition, it would provide additional support for an automatic component to the self-presentation process. It would also provide much needed evidence to demonstrate that automatic self-presentations emerge spontaneously during interpersonal interactions, in the absence of any direct instructional prompts.

At the start of this chapter, we argued that characterizing self-presentation in terms that predominantly evoke controlled and strategic efforts is not only theoretically challenging but also empirically problematic. It serves to foster an exclusionary research perspective, severely limiting research attention, leading to a paucity of work examining automatic self-presentations. Following a conceptual approach that positions self-presentation as occurring primarily in limited situations has fundamentally shaped the fabric of most self-presentation research designs, in that participants are often explicitly provided with self-presentation instructions, essentially bypassing the issue of context cuing.

Although the scarcity of empirical work became apparent in the evidence sections, the studies that are available offer some promising avenues for future work. Pontari and Schlenker’s (2000) extravert-introvert studies suggest an empirical direction and offer results to build and expand upon. The cued activation and priming studies not only provide the strongest evidence to date for automatic self-presentations, but they also provide a solid empirical foundation with which to design additional work. Nonetheless, the evidence remains very limited, underscoring a palpable and substantive need for further research. Considerable work remains to be done in order to determine empirically whether self-presentations are actually triggered nonconsciously by cues in the social environment, in that people are unaware of the initiation, flow, or impact of their self-presentational efforts.

Aarts, H. , & Dijksterhuis, A. ( 2000 ). Habits as knowledge structures: Automaticity in goal directed behavior.   Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 78 , 53–63.

Google Scholar

Adair, J. G. ( 1973 ). The human subject: The social psychology of the psychological experiment. Boston: Little Brown.

Google Preview

Back, M. D. , Stopfer, J. M. , Vazire, S. , Gaddis, S. , Schmukle, S. C. , Egloff, B. , & Gosling, S. D. ( 2010 ). Facebook profiles reflect actual personality not self-idealization.   Psychological Science , 21 , 372–374.

Baldwin, M. ( 1992 ). Relational schemas and the processing of social information.   Psychological Bulletin , 112 , 461–484.

Baldwin, M. ( 1994 ). Primed relational schemas as a source of self-evaluative reactions.   Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology , 13 , 380–403.

Baldwin, M. W. , & Main, K. J. ( 2001 ). Social anxiety and the cued activation of relational knowledge.   Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 27 , 1637–1647.

Baldwin, M. , & Meunier, J. ( 1999 ). The cued activation of attachment relational schemas.   Social Cognition , 17 , 209–227.

Bargh, J. A. ( 1996 ). Automaticity in social psychology. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 169–183). New York: Guilford Press.

Baumeister, R. F. ( 1982 ). Self-esteem, self-presentation, and future interaction: A dilemma of reputation.   Journal of Personality , 50 , 29–45.

Baumeister, R. F. , Hutton, D. G. , & Tice, D. M. ( 1989 ). Cognitive processes during deliberate self-presentation: How self-presenters alter and misinterpret the behavior of their interaction partners.   Journal of Experimental Social Psychology , 25 , 59–78.

Baumeister, R. F. , & Jones, E. E. ( 1978 ). When self-presentation is constrained by the target’s knowledge: Consistency and compensation.   Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 36 , 608–618.

Custers, R. , & Aarts, H. ( 2005 ). Positive affect as implicit motivator: On nonconscious operation of behavioral goals.   Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 89 , 129–142.

DePaulo, B. M. ( 1992 ). Nonverbal behavior and self-presentation.   Psychological Bulletin , 111 , 203–243.

Goffman, E. ( 1959 ). The presentation of self in everyday life . New York: Doubleday Books.

Hogan R. ( 1983 ). A socioanalytic theory of personality. In Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 30 , pp. 55–89). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Holden, R. R. , Kroner, D. G. , Fekken, G. C , & Popham, S. M. ( 1992 ). A model of personality test item response dissimulation.   Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 63 , 272–279.

Holden, R. R. , Wood, L. L , & Tomashewski L. ( 2001 ). Do response time limitations counteract the effect of faking on personality inventory validity?   Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 81 , 160–169.

Jones, E. E. , & Wortman, C. ( 1973 ). Ingratiation: An attributional approach . Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.

Kitayama, S. , & Karasawa, M. ( 1997 ). Implicit self-esteem in Japan: Name letters and birthday numbers.   Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 23 , 736–742.

Koole, S. L. , Dijksterhuis, A. , & van Knippenberg, A. ( 2001 ). What’s in a name: Implicit self-esteem and the automatic self.   Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 80 , 669–685.

Kruglanski , ( 1975 ). The human subject in the psychological experiment: Fact and artifact. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 8 , pp. 101–147). New York: Academic Press.

Leary, M. R. ( 1995 ). Self-presentation: Impression management and interpersonal behavior . Boulder, CO: Westview.

Leary, M. R. , & Allen, A. ( 2011 ). Self-presentational persona: Simultaneous management of multiple impressions.   Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 101 , 1033–1049.

Leary, M. R. , Allen, A. , & Terry, M. L. ( 2011 ). Managing social images in naturalistic versus laboratory settings: Implications for understanding and studying self-presentation. European Journal of Social Psychology , 41 , 411–421.

Leary, M. R. , & Kowalski, R. M. ( 1990 ). Impression management: A literature review and two-component model.   Psychological Bulletin , 107 , 34–47.

Mikulincer, M. ( 1995 ). Attachment style and the mental representation of the self.   Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 69 , 1203–1215.

Moretti, M. M. , & Higgins, E. T. ( 1999 ). Own versus other standpoints in self-regulation: Developmental antecedents and functional consequences.   Review of General Psychology , 3 , 188–223.

Paulhus, D. L. ( 1993 ). Bypassing the will: The automatization of affirmations. In D. M. Wegner & J. W. Pennebaker (Eds.), Handbook of mental control (pp. 573–587). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Paulhus, D. L. , Bruce, N. , & Stoffer, E. (1990, August). Automatizing self-descriptions . Paper presented at the American Psychological Association meeting, Boston, MA.

Paulhus, D. L. , Graf, P. , & Van Selst, M. ( 1989 ). Attentional load increases the positivity of self-presentation.   Social Cognition , 7 , 389–400.

Paulhus, D. L. , & Levitt, K. ( 1987 ). Desirable responding triggered by affect: Automatic egotism?   Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 52 , 245–259.

Page, M. P. ( 1981 ). Demand compliance in laboratory experiments. In J. T. Tedeschi (Ed.), Impression management theory and social psychological research (pp. 57–82). New York: Academic Press.

Pontari, B. A. , & Schlenker, B. R. ( 2000 ). The influence of cognitive load on self-presentation: Can cognitive busyness help as well as harm social performance?   Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 78 , 1092–1108.

Schlenker, B. R. ( 1980 ). Impression management. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Schlenker, B. R. ( 1985 ). Identity and self-identification. In B. R. Schlenker (Ed.), The self and social life (pp. 65–99). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Schlenker, B. R. ( 1986 ). Self-identification: Toward an integration of the private and public self. In R. Baumeister (Ed.), Public self and private self (pp. 21–62). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Schlenker, B. R. ( 2003 ). Self-presentation. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 492–518). New York: Guilford Press.

Schlenker, B. R. , Britt, T. W. , & Pennington, J. W. ( 1996 ). Impression regulation and management: A theory of self-identification. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition: The interpersonal context (pp. 118–147). New York: Guilford Press.

Schlenker, B. R. , Britt, T. W. , Pennington, J. W. , Murphy, R. , & Doherty, K. J. ( 1994 ). The triangle model of responsibility.   Psychological Review , 101 , 632–652.

Schlenker, B. R. , & Pontari, B. A. ( 2000 ). The strategic control of information: Impression management and self-presentation in daily life. In A. Tesser & R. B. Felson (Eds.), Psychological perspectives on self and identity (pp. 199–232). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Shah, J. ( 2003 ). Automatic for the people: How representations of significant others implicitly affect goal pursuit.   Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 84 , 661–681.

Swann, W. B., Jr . ( 1983 ). Self-verification: Bringing social reality into harmony with the self. In J. Suls & A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), Psychological perspectives on the self (pp. 33–66). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Tedeschi, J. T. , Schlenker, B. R. , & Bonoma, T. V. ( 1971 ). Cognitive dissonance: Private ratiocination or public spectacle?   American Psychologist , 26 , 685–695.

Tice, D. M. , Butler, J. L. , Muraven, M. B. , & Stillwell, A. M. ( 1995 ). When modesty prevails: Differential favorability of self-presentation to friends and strangers.   Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 69 , 1120–1138.

Tyler, J. M. ( 2012 ). Triggering self-presentation efforts outside of people’s conscious awareness.   Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin , 38 , 619–627.

Verplanken, B. , & Aarts, H. ( 1999 ). Habit, attitude, and planned behaviour: Is habit an empty construct or an interesting case of goal-directed automaticity? European Review of Social Psychology , 10 , 101–134.

Vohs, K. D. , Baumeister, R. F. , & Ciarocco, N. J. ( 2005 ). Self-regulation and self-presentation: Regulatory resource depletion impairs impression management and effortful self-presentation depletes regulatory resources.   Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 88 , 632–657.

Wilson, R. E. , Gosling, S. D. , & Graham, L. T. ( 2012 ). A review of Facebook research in the social sciences.   Perspectives on Psychological Science , 7 , 203–220.

Wood, W. , & Neal, D. T. ( 2007 ). A new look at habits and the habit–goal interface.   Psychological Review, 114, 843–863.

• About Oxford Academic
• Publish journals with us
• University press partners
• What we publish
• New features  
• Open access
• Institutional account management
• Rights and permissions
• Get help with access
• Accessibility
• Advertising
• Media enquiries
• Oxford University Press
• Oxford Languages
• University of Oxford

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide

• Copyright © 2024 Oxford University Press
• Cookie settings
• Cookie policy
• Privacy policy
• Legal notice

This Feature Is Available To Subscribers Only

Sign In or Create an Account

This PDF is available to Subscribers Only

For full access to this pdf, sign in to an existing account, or purchase an annual subscription.

• Bipolar Disorder
• Therapy Center
• When To See a Therapist
• Types of Therapy
• Best Online Therapy
• Best Couples Therapy
• Best Family Therapy
• Managing Stress
• Sleep and Dreaming
• Understanding Emotions
• Self-Improvement
• Healthy Relationships
• Student Resources
• Personality Types
• Guided Meditations
• Verywell Mind Insights
• 2023 Verywell Mind 25
• Mental Health in the Classroom
• Editorial Process
• Meet Our Review Board
• Crisis Support

What Is Self-Concept?

Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Rachel Goldman, PhD FTOS, is a licensed psychologist, clinical assistant professor, speaker, wellness expert specializing in eating behaviors, stress management, and health behavior change.

Verywell / Cindy Chung 

• Development
• Can It Be Changed?
• Self-Concept Theories

Frequently Asked Questions

Self-concept is the image we have of ourselves. It is influenced by many forces, including our interaction with important people in our lives. It is how we perceive our behaviors, abilities, and unique characteristics. For example, beliefs such as "I am a good friend" or "I am a kind person" are part of an overall self-concept.

Other examples of self-concept include:

• How you view your personality traits, such as whether you are an extrovert or introvert
• How you see your roles in life, such as whether you feel that being a parent, sibling, friend, and partner are important parts of your identity
• The hobbies or passions that are important to your sense of identity, such as being a sports enthusiast or belonging to a certain political party
• How you feel about your interactions with the world, such as whether you feel that you are contributing to society

Our self-perception is important because it affects our motivations , attitudes, and behaviors . It also affects how we feel about the person we think we are, including whether we are competent or have self-worth.

Self-concept tends to be more malleable when we're younger and still going through self-discovery and identity formation . As we age and learn who we are and what's important to us, these self-perceptions become much more detailed and organized.

At its most basic, self-concept is a collection of beliefs one holds about oneself and the responses of others. It embodies the answer to the question: " Who am I? " If you want to find your self-concept, list things that describe you as an individual. What are your traits? What do you like? How do you feel about yourself?

Rogers' Three Parts of Self-Concept

Humanist psychologist  Carl Rogers believed that self-concept is made up of three different parts:

• Ideal self : The ideal self is the person you want to be. This person has the attributes or qualities you are either working toward or want to possess. It's who you envision yourself to be if you were exactly as you wanted.
• Self-image : Self-image refers to how you see yourself at this moment in time. Attributes like physical characteristics, personality traits , and social roles all play a role in your self-image.
• Self-esteem : How much you like, accept, and value yourself all contribute to your self-concept. Self-esteem can be affected by a number of factors—including how others see you, how you think you compare to others, and your role in society.

Incongruence and Congruence

Self-concept is not always aligned with reality. When it is aligned, your self-concept is said to be congruent . If there is a mismatch between how you see yourself (your self-image) and who you wish you were (your ideal self), your self-concept is incongruent . This incongruence can negatively affect self-esteem .

Rogers believed that incongruence has its earliest roots in childhood. When parents place conditions on their affection for their children (only expressing love if children "earn it" through certain behaviors and living up to the parents' expectations), children begin to distort the memories of experiences that leave them feeling unworthy of their parents' love.

Unconditional love, on the other hand, helps to foster congruence. Children who experience such love—also referred to as family love —feel no need to continually distort their memories in order to believe that other people will love and accept them as they are.

How Self-Concept Develops

Self-concept develops, in part, through our interaction with others. In addition to family members and close friends, other people in our lives can contribute to our self-identity.

For instance, one study found that the more a teacher believes in a high-performing student's abilities, the higher that student's self-concept. (Interestingly, no such association was found with lower-performing students.)

Self-concept can also be developed through the stories we hear. As an example, one study found that female readers who were "deeply transported" into a story about a leading character with a traditional gender role had a more feminist self-concept than those who weren't as moved by the story.

The media plays a role in self-concept development as well—both mass media and social media . When these media promote certain ideals, we're more likely to make those ideals our own. And the more often these ideals are presented, the more they affect our self-identity and self-perception.

Can Self-Concept Be Changed?

Self-concept is not static, meaning that it can change. Our environment plays a role in this process. Places that hold a lot of meaning to us actively contribute to our future self-concept through both the way we relate these environments to ourselves and how society relates to them.

Self-concept can also change based on the people with whom we interact. This is particularly true with regard to individuals in our lives who are in leadership roles. They can impact the collective self (the self in social groups) and the relational self (the self in relationships).

In some cases, a medical diagnosis can change self-concept by helping people understand why they feel the way they do—such as someone receiving an autism diagnosis later in life, finally providing clarity as to why they feel different.

Get Advice From The Verywell Mind Podcast

Hosted by therapist Amy Morin, LCSW, this episode of The Verywell Mind Podcast shares how you can be kinder to yourself.

Follow Now : Apple Podcasts / Spotify / Google Podcasts

Other Self-Concept Theories

As with many topics within psychology , a number of other theorists have proposed different ways of thinking about self-concept.

Social Identity

Social psychologist Henri Tajfel developed social identity theory, which states that self-concept is composed of two key parts:

• Personal identity : The traits and other characteristics that make you unique
• Social identity : Who you are based on your membership in social groups, such as sports teams, religions, political parties, or social class

This theory states that our social identity influences our self-concept, thus affecting our emotions and behaviors. If we're playing sports, for instance, and our team loses a game, we might feel sad for the team (emotion) or act out against the winning team (behavior).

Multiple Dimensions

Psychologist Bruce A. Bracken had a slightly different theory and believed that self-concept was multidimensional, consisting of six independent traits:

• Academic : Success or failure in school
• Affect : Awareness of emotional states
• Competence : Ability to meet basic needs
• Family : How well you work in your family unit
• Physical : How you feel about your looks, health, physical condition, and overall appearance
• Social : Ability to interact with others

In 1992, Bracken developed the Multidimensional Self-Concept Scale, a comprehensive assessment that evaluates each of these six elements of self-concept in children and adolescents.

Self-concept development is never finished. Though one's self-identity is thought to be primarily formed in childhood, your experiences as an adult can also change how you feel about yourself. If your self-esteem increases later in life, for instance, it can improve your self-concept.

Our self-concept can affect the method by which we communicate. If you feel you are a good writer, for instance, you may prefer to communicate in writing versus speaking with others.

It can also affect the way we communicate. If your social group communicates a certain way, you would likely choose to communicate that way as well. Studies on teens have connected high self-concept clarity with more open communication with parents.

Self-concept refers to a broad description of ourselves ("I am a good writer") while self-esteem includes any judgments or opinions we have of ourselves ("I feel proud to be a good writer"). Put another way, self-concept answers the question: Who am I? Self-esteem answers the question: How do I feel about who I am?

Our self-concept impacts how we respond to life, so a well-developed self-concept helps us respond in ways that are more positive and beneficial for us. One of the ways it does this is by enabling us to recognize our worth. A well-developed self-concept also helps keep us from internalizing negative feedback from others.

Different cultures have different beliefs. They have different ideas of how dependent or independent one should be, different religious beliefs, and differing views of socioeconomic development.

All of these cultural norms influence self-concept by providing the structure of what is expected within that society and how one sees oneself in relation to others.

Bailey JA 2nd. Self-image, self-concept, and self-identity revisited . J Natl Med Assoc . 2003;95(5):383-386.

Mercer S. Self-concept: Situating the self . In: Mercer S, Ryan S, Williams M, eds. Psychology for Language Learning . Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1057/9781137032829_2

Argyle M. Social encounters: Contributions to Social Interaction . 1st ed . Routledge.

Koch S. Formulations of the person and the social context . In: Psychology: A study of a science. Vol. III. McGraw-Hill:184-256.

Pesu L, Viljaranta J, Aunola K. The role of parents' and teachers' beliefs in children's self-concept development . J App Develop Psychol . 2016;44:63-71. doi:10.1016/j.appdev.2016.03.001

Richter T, Appel M, Calio F. Stories can influence the self-concept . Social Influence . 2014;9(3):172-88. doi:10.1080/15534510.2013.799099

Vandenbosch L, Eggermont S. The interrelated roles of mass media and social media in adolescents' development of an objectified self-concept: A longitudinal study . Communc Res . 2015. doi:10.1177/0093650215600488

Prince D. What about place? Considering the role of physical environment on youth imagining of future possible selves . J Youth Stud . 2014;17(6):697-716. doi:10.1080/13676261.2013.836591

Kark R, Shamir B. The dual effect of transformational leadership: priming relational and collective selves and further effects on followers . In: Avolio BJ, Yammarino FJ, eds.  Monographs in Leadership and Management . Vol 5. Emerald Group Publishing Limited; 2013:77-101. doi:10.1108/S1479-357120130000005010

Stagg SD, Belcher H. Living with autism without knowing: receiving a diagnosis in later life . Health Psychol Behav Med . 2019;7(1):348-361. doi:10.1080/21642850.2019.1684920

Tajfel H, Turner J. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict . In: Hogg MA, Abrams D, eds.  Intergroup Relations: Essential Readings. Psychology Press:94–109.

Scheepers D. Social identity theory . Social Psychol Act . 2019. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-13788-5_9

Bracken BA. Multidimensional Self Concept Scale . American Psychological Association. doi:10.1037/t01247-000

Sampthirao P. Self-concept and interpersonal communication . Int J Indian Psychol . 2016;3(3):6. dip:18.01.115/20160303

Van Dijk M, Branje S, Keijsers L, Hawk S, Hale !, Meeus W. Self-concept clarity across adolescence: Longitudinal associations with open communication with parents and internalizing symptoms . J Youth Adolesc . 2013;43:1861-76. doi:10.1007/s10964-013-0055-x

Vignoles V, Owe E, Becker M, et al. Beyond the 'east-west' dichotomy: Global variation in cultural models of selfhood . J Exp Psychol Gen . 2016;145(8):966-1000. doi:10.1037/xge0000175

Weiten W, Dunn DS, Hammer EY. Psychology Applied to Modern Life: Adjustment in the 21st Century . Cengage Learning.

By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

• Subscriber Services
• For Authors
• Publications
• Archaeology
• Art & Architecture
• Bilingual dictionaries
• Classical studies
• Encyclopedias
• English Dictionaries and Thesauri
• Language reference
• Linguistics
• Media studies
• Medicine and health
• Names studies
• Performing arts
• Science and technology
• Social sciences
• Society and culture
• Overview Pages
• Subject Reference
• English Dictionaries
• Bilingual Dictionaries

Recently viewed (0)

• Save Search
• Share This Facebook LinkedIn Twitter

Related Content

Related overviews.

self-monitoring

impression management

performance

Erving Goffman (1922—1982)

See all related overviews in Oxford Reference »

More Like This

Show all results sharing these subjects:

self-presentation

Quick reference.

The conscious or unconscious control of the impression that one creates in social interactions or situations. It is one of the important forms of impression management, namely management of one's own impression on others through role playing. The phenomenon is encapsulated in Shakespeare's famous observation in As You Like It: ‘All the world's a stage, / And all the men and women merely players: / They have their exits and their entrances; / And one man in his time plays many parts’ (II.vii.139–42). It was popularized by the Canadian-born US sociologist Erving Goffman (1922–82) in his influential book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959). See also ingratiation, self-monitoring, social constructionist psychology.

From:   self-presentation   in  A Dictionary of Psychology »

Subjects: Science and technology — Psychology

Related content in Oxford Reference

Reference entries, self-presentation n..

View all related items in Oxford Reference »

Search for: 'self-presentation' in Oxford Reference »

• Oxford University Press

PRINTED FROM OXFORD REFERENCE (www.oxfordreference.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2023. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single entry from a reference work in OR for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice ).

date: 11 April 2024

• Cookie Policy
• Privacy Policy
• Legal Notice
• Accessibility
• [66.249.64.20|185.80.151.9]
• 185.80.151.9

Character limit 500 /500

• To save this word, you'll need to log in. Log In

self - rep re sen ta tion

Definition of self-representation.

Note: In legal terminology, a person who engages in self-representation can be said to be acting pro se or in propria persona .

Examples of self-representation in a Sentence

These examples are programmatically compiled from various online sources to illustrate current usage of the word 'self-representation.' Any opinions expressed in the examples do not represent those of Merriam-Webster or its editors. Send us feedback about these examples.

Word History

1696, in the meaning defined above

Dictionary Entries Near self-representation

self-report

self-representation

self-repression

Cite this Entry

“Self-representation.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary , Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/self-representation. Accessed 11 Apr. 2024.

Subscribe to America's largest dictionary and get thousands more definitions and advanced search—ad free!

Can you solve 4 words at once?

Word of the day.

See Definitions and Examples »

Get Word of the Day daily email!

Popular in Grammar & Usage

Your vs. you're: how to use them correctly, every letter is silent, sometimes: a-z list of examples, more commonly mispronounced words, how to use em dashes (—), en dashes (–) , and hyphens (-), absent letters that are heard anyway, popular in wordplay, the words of the week - apr. 5, 12 bird names that sound like compliments, 10 scrabble words without any vowels, 12 more bird names that sound like insults (and sometimes are), 8 uncommon words related to love, games & quizzes.

REVIEW article

Eighty phenomena about the self: representation, evaluation, regulation, and change.

• 1 Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada
• 2 Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada

We propose a new approach for examining self-related aspects and phenomena. The approach includes (1) a taxonomy and (2) an emphasis on multiple levels of mechanisms. The taxonomy categorizes approximately eighty self-related phenomena according to three primary functions involving the self: representing, effecting, and changing. The representing self encompasses the ways in which people depict themselves, either to themselves or to others (e.g., self-concepts, self-presentation). The effecting self concerns ways in which people facilitate or limit their own traits and behaviors (e.g., self-enhancement, self-regulation). The changing self is less time-limited than the effecting self; it concerns phenomena that involve lasting alterations in how people represent and control themselves (e.g., self-expansion, self-development). Each self-related phenomenon within these three categories may be examined at four levels of interacting mechanisms (social, individual, neural, and molecular). We illustrate our approach by focusing on seven self-related phenomena.

Introduction

Social and clinical psychologists frequently use the concept of the self in their discussions of a wide range of phenomena (e.g., Baumeister, 1999 ; Sedikides and Brewer, 2001 ; Leary and Tangney, 2003 ; Alicke et al., 2005 ; Sedikides and Spencer, 2007 ). However, there is no general, unified psychological theory of the self that can account for these phenomena. Thagard (2014) has proposed a view of the self as a multilevel system consisting of social, individual, neural, and molecular mechanisms. Like James (1890) and Mead (1967) , this view accommodates social, cognitive, and physiological aspects of the self, but provides far more detail about the nature of the relevant mechanisms. Our aim in the current paper is to show the applicability of the multilevel system account of the self to a large range of phenomena.

We will present a new taxonomy that categorizes approximately eighty self-related phenomena according to three primary aspects of the self: representing, effecting, and changing. The representing self encompasses the ways in which people depict themselves, either to themselves or to others (e.g., self-concepts, self-presentation). The effecting self concerns ways in which people facilitate or limit their own traits and behaviors (e.g., self-enhancement, self-regulation). The changing self is less time-limited than the effecting self; it concerns phenomena that involve lasting alterations in how people represent and control themselves (e.g., self-expansion, self-development). After presenting this taxonomy, we will describe how four levels of mechanisms—social, individual, neural, and molecular—are relevant to understanding these phenomena about the self. It would be premature to offer a full theory of the self, because not enough is known about the nature of these mechanisms and how they produce the relevant phenomena. But we hope our taxonomy and outline of relevant mechanisms provides a new and useful framework for theorizing about the self.

A Taxonomy of Self-Phenomena

There are more than eighty frequently discussed topics that we call the self-phenomena. More accurately, each of these topics should be understood as a group of phenomena. For example, there are many empirical findings about self-esteem that should count as distinctive phenomena to be explained, so there are potentially hundreds of findings for which a scientific theory of the self should be able to account.

Fortunately, the task of accounting for all of the self-phenomena, through causal explanations of the large number of empirical findings about them, can be managed by grouping the phenomena according to three primary aspects of the self: representing, effecting, and changing. All of the self-phenomena fall primarily under one of these functional groups, although a few are related to more than one group. Figure 1 summarizes the proposed organization of self-phenomena that we now discuss in more detail.

Figure 1. Grouping of many self-phenomena into six main classes: self-representing (with three sub-categories), self-effecting (with two sub-categories), and self-changing. Source: Thagard (2014) .

The Representing Self

A representation is a structure or activity that stands for something, and many of the self-phenomena listed in Figure 1 concern ways in which people represent themselves. The representing self can roughly be divided into three subgroups concerned with (1) depicting oneself to oneself, (2) depicting oneself to others, and (3) evaluating oneself according to one’s own standards.

The most general terms for depicting oneself to oneself are self-knowledge and self-understanding, which seem roughly equivalent. Self-concepts and self-schemata are both mental ingredients of self-knowledge, serving as cognitive structures to represent different aspects of the self. (Later we provide a more detailed account of self-concepts.) Self-interest consists in the collection of one’s personal goals, conscious or unconscious. Self-identity and self-image are also ways in which one represents oneself to oneself, although they may also contribute to how one represents oneself to others. Self-discovery and self-projection are processes that involve self-representation.

Several aspects of depicting oneself to oneself assume conscious experience, as in self-awareness and other phenomena listed in Figure 1 . Such experience is not purely cognitive, as it can also involve prominent affective components such as moods and emotions. Another set of phenomena that involve depicting oneself to oneself includes self-deception and self-delusion, in which the representation of self is false. The second division within the group of self-representing phenomena involves depicting and communicating oneself to others.

The third sub-group of self-phenomena in the representing category concerns the evaluation of the self, either as on ongoing process or as the product that results from the evaluation. Phenomena concerned with the process of evaluation include self-appraisal. There are many products that result from this process, including both general assessments such as self-confidence and particular emotional reactions such as self-pity.

The Effecting Self

The self does more than just represent itself; it also does things to itself, including facilitating its own functioning in desirable ways and limiting its functioning to prevent undesirable consequences. Self-phenomena that have a facilitating effect include self-actualization. Self-evaluation can also produce the self-knowledge that unconstrained actions may have undesirable consequences, as in excessive eating, drinking, drug use, and dangerous liaisons. Accordingly, there is a set of important phenomena concerning limits that people put on their own behavior, including self-control. All of these self-effecting phenomena involve people encouraging or discouraging their own behaviors, but they do not bring about fundamental, longer lasting changes in the self, which is the third and probably rarest aspect of the self.

The Changing Self

Over a lifetime, people change as the result of aging and experiences such as major life events. Some self-phenomena such as self-development concern processes of change. The changes can involve alterations in self-representing, when people come to apply different concepts to themselves, and also self-effecting, if people manage to change the degree to which they are capable of either facilitating desired behaviors or limiting undesired ones. Whereas short-term psychotherapy is aimed at dealing with small-scale problems in self-representing and self-efficacy, long-term psychotherapy may aim at larger alterations in the underlying nature of the self.

The proposed grouping of self-phenomena summarized in Figure 1 is not meant to be exhaustive, as there are aspects of self that are described by words without the “self” prefix, such as agency, autonomy, personhood, and resilience, as well as more esoteric terms that do use the prefix. But the diagram serves to provide an idea of the large range of phenomena concerning the self. Our goal is to show the applicability of the multilevel account of the self to this range of phenomena, by selecting phenomena from each of the six main classes in Figure 1 . It would be tedious to apply the multilevel theory to more than eighty phenomena, so we take a representative sampling that includes: self-concepts, self-presentation, self-esteem, self-enhancement, self-regulation, self-expansion, and self-development. Each of these has aspects that need to be understood by considering the self as a system that operates at social, individual, neural, and molecular levels.

Figure 2 displays the relevant levels and their interconnections. We understand a mechanism to be a system of parts whose interactions produce regular changes ( Bechtel, 2008 ; Thagard, 2012 ). The social level consists of people who communicate with each other. The individual level consists of mental representations and computational procedures that operate on them. The neural level consists of neurons that excite and inhibit each other. Finally, the molecular level consists of genes, proteins, neurotransmitters, and hormones that affect neural operation. For defense of this account of levels of mechanisms, and the occurrence of causal links between social and molecular levels, see Thagard (2014) .

Figure 2. Diagram of the self as a multilevel system. Lines with arrows indicate causality. Thick lines indicate composition. Source: Thagard (2014) .

We do not mean to suggest that there are three separate selves capable of representing, effecting, and changing, any more than we implied that there are separate social, individual, neural, and molecular selves. We especially want to avoid the ridiculous suggestion that a person might consist of twelve different selves combining three different aspects at four different levels. Our goal is to display the unity of the self, not just its amazing diversity. Unification arises first from seeing the interconnections of the four levels described earlier, and second from recognizing how the interconnected mechanisms produce all three of the self’s functions.

The scientific value of understanding the self as a multilevel system depends on its fruitfulness in generating explanations of important empirical findings concerning the various self-phenomena. We will attempt to show the relevance of multiple mechanisms for understanding three phenomena that are involved in representational aspects of the self: self-concepts, self-presentation, and self-esteem. Respectively, these involve representing oneself to oneself, representing oneself to others, and evaluating oneself.

Self-Concepts (Representing Oneself to Oneself)

Self researchers distinguish between self-concept, which involves content —one’s thoughts, beliefs, and knowledge about the self—and self-esteem, which involves evaluation —evaluation of oneself as good, bad, worthy, unworthy, and so forth. Here we focus on self-concepts, considering them at individual, social, neural, and molecular levels. Psychologists studying the self no longer think of people as possessing a single, unified self-concept, but as possessing self-views in many domains ( Baumeister, 1999 ). People have various concepts that they apply to characterize themselves with respect to features such as gender, race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, occupation, hobbies, personality, and physical characteristics. For example, a man might think of himself as an intellectual, Canadian, and aging father. Moreover, not all content of those various self-views can be held in mind at once. The part of self-concept that is present in awareness at a given time has been called the “working self-concept” ( Markus and Kunda, 1986 ). What is the nature of the concepts that people apply to themselves, and what are the mechanisms underlying these applications?

The individual level of mental representations is clearly highly relevant to understanding concepts including ones about the self. What kind of mental representations are concepts? Unfortunately, there is no single currently available psychological theory of concepts that can be applied to self-concepts. Debate is ongoing about whether concepts should be understood as prototypes, collections of exemplars, or theoretical explanations ( Murphy, 2002 ; Machery, 2009 ), and all of these aspects are relevant to self-concepts ( Kunda, 1999 , Ch. 2). For example, the concept of extravert carries with it prototypical conditions such as enjoying social interactions, exemplars such as Bill Clinton, and explanations such as people going to parties because they are extraverted. Below we will suggest how all of these aspects of concepts can be integrated at the neural level.

Psychological mechanisms such as priming carried out by spreading activation between concepts explain how different concepts get applied in different situations. For example, people at parties may be especially prone to think of themselves as extraverted. Such explanations require also taking into account social mechanisms such as communication and other forms of interaction. Then the causes of applying the concept extraverted to oneself include social mechanisms as well as the individual mechanism of spreading activation among concepts.

The vast literature on self-concepts points to the interplay of the individual and social levels in a myriad of ways. First is research on social comparison, which shows that one’s working self-concept depends on the other people present ( Wood, 1989 ). Ads with skinny models can make one feel fat, and unkempt people can make one feel well-groomed. When asked to describe themselves, people tend to list characteristics that make them distinctive in their immediate social setting. A woman in a group of men is especially likely to list her gender, and a white man in a group of African–American men is especially likely to list his race (e.g., McGuire et al., 1978 ).

More permanent aspects of one’s social surround can have more consequential effects on self-concept. For example, college graduates’ career aspirations depend on their standing relative to their peers at their own college, regardless of the college’s standing relative to other institutions ( Davis, 1966 ). A student who earns high grades at institutions where grading is easier tends to have higher career aspirations than an equally qualified student at a more competitive college. This phenomenon has been called “the campus as a frog pond”; for the frog in a shallow pond aims his [or her] sights higher than an equally talented frog in a deep pond ( Pettigrew, 1967 , p. 257). According to social identity theory, one psychological basis of group discrimination is that people identify with some groups and contrast themselves with other groups that are viewed less favorably ( Tajfel, 1974 ).

Self-concepts are also influenced by the culture in which one lives. Markus and Kitayama (1991) proposed that whereas Westerners have more “independent self-construals,” in which the self is autonomous and guided by internal thoughts and feelings, Asians have more “interdependent self-construals,” in which the self is connected with others and guided, at least in part, by others’ thoughts and feelings.

Another way that the individual and social levels intersect with respect to self-concept involves the “looking-glass self” or “reflected appraisals”—the idea that people come to see themselves as others see them. This idea has been prominent in social science for some time (e.g., Mead, 1967 ), but research in social psychology in the last few decades leads to a different conclusion: People do not see very clearly how others, especially strangers, see them, and instead believe that others see them as they see themselves (see Tice and Wallace, 2003 , for a review). Instead of others’ views influencing one’s self-view, then, one’s self-view determines how one thinks others view oneself. It is possible, however, that within close relationships, the reflected self plays a greater role in shaping the self-concept ( Tice and Wallace, 2003 ).

Feedback from others can also affect self-concepts, and not just in the way one might expect. For example, although people may think of themselves as more attractive when they have been told they are attractive, people sometimes resist others’ feedback in various ways ( Swann and Schroeder, 1995 ). For example, when people with high self-esteem (HSEs) learn they have failed in one domain, they recruit positive self-conceptions in other domains (e.g., Dodgson and Wood, 1998 ). People are more likely to incorporate others’ feedback into their self-views if that feedback is close to their pre-existing self-view than if it is too discrepant ( Shrauger and Rosenberg, 1970 ).

Self-concepts also change with one’s relationships. Two longitudinal studies showed that people’s self-descriptions increased in diversity after they fell in love; people appear to adopt some of their beloved’s characteristics as their own ( Aron et al., 1995 ). Several studies also indicate that cognitive representations of one’s romantic partner become part of one’s own self-representation (as reviewed by Aron, 2003 ). Andersen and Chen (2002) describe a “relational self” in which knowledge about the self is linked with knowledge about significant others.

Interactions with other people also affect the self-concept through a process called “behavioral confirmation,” whereby people act to confirm other people’s expectations ( Darley and Fazio, 1980 ). For example, when male participants were led to believe that a woman they were speaking to over an intercom was physically attractive, that woman ended up behaving in a more appealing way than when the man thought she was unattractive ( Snyder et al., 1977 ). Presumably, a man’s expectation that a woman is attractive leads him to act especially warmly toward her, which in turn brings to the fore a working self-concept for her that is especially friendly and warm. Evidence suggests that when people believe that others will accept them, they behave warmly, which in turn leads those others to accept them; when they expect rejection, they behave coldly, which leads to less acceptance ( Stinson et al., 2009 ). More consequential results of behavioral confirmation are evident in a classic study of the “Pygmalion” effect, in which teachers were led to have high expectations for certain students (randomly determined), who then improved in academic performance ( Rosenthal and Jacobson, 1968 ).

So far we have considered social effects on the self-concept. In turn, one’s self-concept influences one’s judgments of others in many ways. In his review of this large literature, Dunning (2003) grouped such effects into three main categories. First, in the absence of information about others, people assume that others are similar to themselves. Second, in their impressions of another person, people emphasize the domains in which they themselves are strong or proficient. Third, when judging others on some dimension, such as physical fitness, people tend to use themselves as a benchmark. Given a man who takes a daily 20-min walk, athletes will judge him to be unfit, whereas couch potatoes will judge him to be highly fit.

Finally, researchers have examined not only the content of self-concepts, but their clarity. People with clearer self-concepts respond to questions about themselves more quickly, extremely, and confidently, and their self-concepts are more stable over time ( Campbell, 1990 ). Recent research has pointed to social influences on self-concept clarity. For example, clarity of self-concepts regarding particular traits depends in part on how observable those traits are to others ( Stinson et al., 2008b ). And when people with low self-esteem (LSEs) receive more social acceptance than they are accustomed to, they become less clear in their self-concepts; the same is true when people with high self-esteem encounter social rejection ( Stinson et al., 2010 ). In sum, social factors are as relevant to understanding the operation of self-concepts as are factors involving the operation of mental representations in individual minds.

Moving to the level of neural mechanisms provides a way of seeing how concepts can function in all the ways that psychologists have investigated—as prototypes, exemplars, and theories, if concepts are understood as patterns of neural activity ( Thagard, 2010 , p. 78),

Simulations with artificial neural networks enable us to see how concepts can have properties associated with sets of exemplars and prototypes. When a neural network is trained with multiple examples, it forms connections between its neurons that enable it to store the features of those examples implicitly. These same connections also enable the population of connected neurons to behave like a prototype, recognizing instances of a concept in accord with their ability to match various typical features rather than having to satisfy a strict set of conditions. Thus even simulated populations of artificial neurons much simpler than real ones in the brain can capture the exemplar and prototype aspects of concepts.

It is trickier to show how neural networks can be used in causal explanations, but current research is investigating how neural patterns can be used for explanatory purposes ( Thagard and Litt, 2008 ). Blouw et al. (forthcoming) present a detailed model of how neural populations can function as exemplars, prototypes, and rule-based explanations.

Another advantage of moving down to the neural level is that it becomes easier to apply multimodal concepts such as ones concerned with physical appearance. People who think of themselves as thin or fat, young or old, and quiet or loud, are applying to themselves representations that are not just verbal but also involve other modalities such as vision and sound. Because much is known about the neural basis of sensory systems, the neural level of analysis makes it easier to see how human concepts can involve representations tied to sensory systems, not only for objects such as cars with associated visual and auditory images, but also for kinds of people ( Barsalou, 2008 ).

Brain scanning experiments reveal important neural aspects of self-concepts. Tasks that involve reflecting on one’s own personality traits, feelings, physical attributes, attitudes, or preferences produce preferential activation in the medial prefrontal cortex ( Northoff and Bermpohl, 2004 ; Mitchell, 2009 ; Jenkins and Mitchell, 2011 ). Neural correlates of culturally different self-construals have also have been demonstrated. When East Asian participants were primed with an independent self-construal, right ventrolateral PFC (prefrontal cortex) activity was more active for their own face relative to a coworker’s face, whereas when primed with an interdependent self-construal, this region was activated for both faces ( Sui and Han, 2007 ).

Once concepts are understood partly in neural terms, the relevance of molecular mechanisms becomes evident too, because of the important role of affect and emotion in self-concepts. For most people, thinking of themselves as young and thin carries positive affect, whereas thinking of themselves as old and fat carries negative valence. When such valences are interpreted neurologically, molecular mechanisms involving neurotransmitters and hormones can be applied. For example, the pleasurable feelings associated with young, thin , and other concepts that people enjoy applying to themselves plausibly result from activity in neural regions rich in the neurotransmitter dopamine, such as the nucleus accumbens. On the negative side, negative feelings such as anxiety are associated with activity in the amygdala, whose neurons have receptors for the stress hormone cortisol as well as various neurotransmitters. Hence if we want to understand why people much prefer to apply some concepts to themselves and different concepts to others, it is helpful to consider the molecular mechanisms that underlie emotion as well as social, individual, and neural mechanisms. Of course, merely knowing about physiological correlates does not provide causal explanations, which requires mechanisms that link physiology to behavior.

Self-concepts illustrate complex interactions among multiple levels, belying oversimplified reductionist views that see causality as only emanating from lower to higher levels. For example, a social interaction such as a job interview can have the psychological effects of applications of particular concepts (e.g., nervous or competent ) to oneself. Activation of these concepts consists of instantiation of patterns of firing in neural populations, attended by increases and decreases in levels of various chemicals such as cortisol and dopamine. Changes in chemical levels can in turn lead to social changes, as when high cortisol makes a person socially awkward, producing counterproductive social interactions that then lead to self-application of negative concepts. Under such circumstances, the four levels can provide an amplifying feedback loop, from the social to the neuromolecular and back again.

Self-Presentation (Representing Oneself to Others)

The modes of self-representing discussed so far largely concern how one thinks about oneself, although some aspects of self-image and self-identity also sometimes concern how one wants others to think about oneself. Self-presentation is the central phenomenon for representing oneself to others. It has been discussed extensively by sociologists such as Goffman (1959) and by social psychologists ( Leary and Kowalski, 1990 ). We want to show that self-presentation involves multilevel interacting mechanisms.

Thirty years of research by social psychologists highlight the interplay of the individual and social levels in self-presentation ( Schlenker, 2003 ). One’s goals, at the individual level, affect the social level. People have a basic need for relatedness, for belonging to groups of people that they care about ( Baumeister and Leary, 1995 ; Deci and Ryan, 2000 ). People know that they are more likely to be accepted by others who have a positive impression of them, so it is natural that people typically want to create a favorable impression. However, people’s goals sometimes lead them to present themselves in socially undesirable ways (for references, see Schlenker, 2003 ). They may self-deprecate to lower others’ expectations, or try to appear intimidating to generate fear.

The social level also affects the individual level. One’s audience influences one’s self-presentation goals. For example, people tend to be more self-aggrandizing with strangers and more modest with friends ( Tice et al., 1995 ). Particularly striking evidence of the social level affecting the individual level comes from studies indicating that one’s self-presentation to others can influence one’s private self-concept (see Schlenker, 2003 ; Tice and Wallace, 2003 ). For example, in one study, participants who had been randomly assigned to present themselves as extraverted were more likely than those who had presented themselves as introverted to later rate themselves as extraverted, and even to behave in a more outgoing fashion, by sitting closer and talking more to others ( Fazio et al., 1981 ). Such self-concept change does not seem to occur unless one’s actions are observed by others ( Tice and Wallace, 2003 ), which again emphasizes the social level. In reviewing the self-presentation literature, Baumeister (1998 , p. 705) stated:

People use self-presentation to construct an identity for themselves. Most people have a certain ideal image of the person they would like to be. It is not enough merely to act like that person or to convince oneself that one resembles that person. Identity requires social validation.

Self-presentation is also dependent on neural mechanisms. People naturally fear not being accepted by others, and a variety of studies have found that the social pain of rejection involves some of the same brain areas as physical pain, such as the periaqueductal gray ( MacDonald and Leary, 2005 ). On the other hand, being accepted by others produces pleasure, which involves activation of brain areas such as the nucleus accumbens ( Ikemoto and Panksepp, 1999 ). Izuma et al. (2009) found that the prospect of social approval activates the ventral striatum, which includes the nucleus accumbens. Of course, these neural processes are also molecular ones, with dopamine and opioids associated with positive social experiences, and stress hormones like cortisol associated with negative ones. For example, when people have to give a public speech, often a painful instance of self-presentation, their cortisol levels increase, which may even produce behaviors that undermine the effectiveness of their attempts to produce a good impression ( Al’Absi et al., 1997 ).

Another substance at the molecular level that is likely to be involved in self-presentation is oxytocin, a neuropeptide that has been linked to various social behaviors (e.g., Carter, 1998 ). Oxytocin is implicated when successful self-presentation requires accurately “reading” other people to understand what would impress or please them, because oxytocin has been linked with social recognition ( Kavaliers and Choleris, 2011 ), empathic accuracy ( Rodrigues et al., 2009 ; Bartz et al., 2010 ), the processing of positive social cues ( Unkelbach et al., 2008 ), and discerning whether others are trustworthy and should be approached or not ( Mikolajczak et al., 2010 ). Thus, self-presentation involves the complex interaction of social, individual, neural, and molecular mechanisms.

Self-Esteem (Evaluating Oneself)

The third major kind of self-representing is self-evaluation, which can involve processes such as self-appraisal and self-monitoring, and result in products that range from self-love to self-loathing. We discuss self-esteem as a sample product.

Self-esteem refers to one’s overall evaluation of and liking for oneself. People differ from each other in their characteristic levels of self-esteem, which remain quite stable over time, yet people also fluctuate in their self-esteem around their own average levels. “State self-esteem” refers to one’s feelings about oneself at the moment. Measures of explicit self-esteem obtained by surveys may differ from measures of implicit self-esteem, which are thought to be based associations that are unconscious, or at least less cognitively accessible ( Zeigler-Hill and Jordan, 2011 ).

At the individual level, self-esteem involves the application of self-concepts with positive or negative emotional valence, for example thinking of oneself as a success or failure in important pursuits such as love, work, and play. When people focus on positive aspects of themselves, their state self-esteem increases (e.g., McGuire and McGuire, 1996 ).

Considerable evidence indicates that social experiences are central to both trait and state self-esteem. According to attachment theory, people begin to learn about their self-worth as infants, in their interactions with caregivers. If the caregiver is loving and responsive to the infant’s needs, the infant develops a model of the self that is worthy of love and responsiveness. If not, the child will develop negative self-models and be anxious in relationships (e.g., Holmes et al., 2005 ). We have already discussed how social comparisons can influence one’s self-concept; comparisons with other people also can boost or deflate one’s self-esteem ( Wood, 1989 ).

Social acceptance may be the chief determinant of self-esteem. Leary’s sociometer theory proposed that the very existence of self-esteem is due to the need to monitor the degree to which one is accepted and included by other people ( Leary and Baumeister, 2000 ). Indeed, the more people feel included by other people in general, as well as accepted and loved by specific people in their lives, the higher their trait self-esteem ( Leary and Baumeister, 2000 ). Numerous experimental studies indicate that rejection leads to drops in state self-esteem (e.g., Wood et al., 2009a ). Interpersonal stressors in the everyday lives of university students are associated with declines in state self-esteem ( Stinson et al., 2008a ). In contrast, being in a long-term relationship with a loving partner can raise the self-esteem of people with low self-esteem ( Murray et al., 1996 ).

The connection between the individual and social levels of self is also evident in research on how individuals’ self-esteem-related goals influence their social lives. A vast social psychological literature reveals that motivations to maintain, protect, or improve self-esteem can, for example, guide how people present themselves to others (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1989 ), lead people to compare themselves with others who are less fortunate so as to boost their own spirits ( Wood et al., 1985 ), and lead them to stereotype other people in order to feel better about themselves ( Fein and Spencer, 1997 ; Sinclair and Kunda, 2000 ).

We have repeatedly described the neural and molecular underpinnings of self-representations involving emotions, and the account of self-concepts as patterns of neural activity associated with particular kinds of neurochemical activity applies directly to self-esteem. Self-esteem is connected with depression, which has been examined at the neural level. Depression and self-esteem are substantially inversely correlated (e.g., with r s reaching –0.60 and –0.70 s; Watson et al., 2002 ); low self-esteem is even one of the symptoms of depression. Depression is well known to have neurotransmitter correlates and to be associated with brain changes.

Evidence is mounting that social acceptance and rejection are accompanied by changes at the neural level (e.g., Eisenberger et al., 2003 , 2007 ; Way et al., 2009 ). For example, in one study, participants underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while they viewed words (e.g., boring, interesting) that they believed to be feedback from another person. The rejection-induced drops in self-esteem that we described earlier were accompanied by greater activity in rejection-related neural regions (dorsal ACC, anterior insula; Eisenberger et al., 2011 ). Neuroimaging studies suggest that the social pain caused by rejection involve the same brain areas as does physical pain (namely, dorsal ACC activity), whereas signs of social acceptance have been associated with subgenual ACC activity ( Somerville et al., 2006 ), and ventral striatum activity ( Izuma et al., 2008 ), neural regions associated with reward (see Lieberman, 2010 ).

Social threats not only lead to changes in the neural level, but also elicit a host of physiological responses, which point to the links between the social and molecular level. Dickerson et al. (2011) reviewed evidence of cardiovascular (e.g., blood pressure, heart rate), neuroendocrine (e.g., cortisol reactivity), and immune (e.g., inflammatory activity) changes, as well as ways in which social threats “influence the regulation of these systems” (p. 799).

Connections between the social level (rejection and acceptance by others) and the neural level (anterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex) have also been associated with the individual level (self-esteem). People who were low in self-esteem differed in their neural responses from those high in self-esteem when others evaluated them ( Somerville et al., 2010 ) or others excluded them ( Onoda et al., 2010 ).

Similarly, individual differences in traits that have been associated with trait self-esteem, rejection sensitivity and attachment styles, have also been linked with differences in neural responses to rejection. Burklund et al. (2007) found that rejection-sensitive people had increased dorsal anterior cingulate activity in response to disapproving facial expressions. Zayas et al. (2009) found that women who differed in attachment styles (which are associated with self-esteem) differed in their neural responses to partner rejection, as reflected in event-related potentials. There is some evidence that the causes of low self-esteem may be genetic as well as social ( Roy et al., 1995 ; Neiss et al., 2002 ), which provides another reason for moving down to the molecular level in order to consider how genes affecting neural processing might be involved in self-esteem. The operation of the molecular level also may underlie self-esteem differences in responses to stress. Taylor et al. (2003) found that people who had positive self-appraisals had lower cardiovascular responses to stress, more rapid cardiovascular recovery, and lower baseline cortisol levels than people with negative self-appraisals. Furthermore, additional research by Taylor et al. (2008) links these findings with the neural level. Participants with greater psychosocial resources, including higher self-esteem along with other characteristics such as optimism and extraversion, exhibited lower amygdala activity during threat regulation, which appeared to account for their lower cortisol reactivity ( Taylor et al., 2008 ). These psychosocial resources appear to be linked with the oxytocin receptor gene ( Saphire-Bernstein et al., 2011 ).

The interplay of three levels—social, individual, and molecular—is suggested by research by Stinson et al. (2008a) . Two studies of university students yielded evidence consistent with their prediction that low self-esteem (individual level) led to interpersonal problems (social level), which in turn resulted in health problems (e.g., missed classes due to illness and visits to the physician). Health problems indicate changes at the molecular level as they imply physiological changes. Dickerson et al. (2011) have made a compelling case that the physiological responses brought about by social threats can worsen physical health.

Considering self-esteem at the neural and molecular levels may provide explanations for why self-esteem in some individuals is less influenced by life experience than learning theories would explain. For example, not all successful people have high self-esteem (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2003a ), and it is possible that the exceptions may arise from underlying neural and molecular differences that the individual level does not capture.

In addition to the dozens of self-phenomena concerned with self-representation, there are many phenomena concerned with the self attempting to modify its own states and behavior. These self-effecting phenomena fall into two groups, self-facilitating cases in which one attempts to foster positive aspects of oneself, and self-limiting cases in which one attempts to prevent the behavioral expression of negative aspects of oneself. We will discuss self-enhancement as an important kind of self-facilitation, and self-regulation as an important kind of self-limitation.

Self-Enhancement

Self-enhancement, the motive to develop and maintain a positive self-view, has been a dominant topic in the social psychological literature for decades. Self-enhancement has been seen as a motivation guiding much of human behavior, with some researchers concluding that it is the paramount self-related motive, overriding other goals such as self-accuracy and self-consistency (e.g., Baumeister, 1998 ; but see Kwang and Swann, 2010 ). However, a wealth of self-verification studies have provided compelling evidence that people also want to confirm their self-views and to get others to see them as they see themselves ( Swann, 2012 ). Hence self-verification can sometimes be self-limiting and sometimes self-facilitating.

Research has identified many strategies of self-enhancement. To cope with failure, for example, people may attribute the failure externally (e.g., say the test is unfair), minimize the failure, focus on other positive aspects of themselves, derogate other people, or make downward comparisons—that is, compare themselves with others who are inferior (e.g., Blaine and Crocker, 1993 ; Dodgson and Wood, 1998 ). Over and over again, research has found that the people who engage in such self-enhancement strategies are dispositionally high in self-esteem, rather than low in self-esteem (e.g., Blaine and Crocker, 1993 ). This self-esteem difference may occur because people with high self-esteem are more motivated than people with low self-esteem to repair unhappy moods ( Heimpel et al., 2002 ); or because HSEs are more motivated than LSEs to feel good about themselves (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1989 ); or because LSEs are equally motivated to self-enhance, but cannot as readily claim or defend a positive view of themselves (e.g., Blaine and Crocker, 1993 ).

One self-enhancement strategy deserves mention because it is a mainstay of self-help books and the popular press: positive self-statements. People facing a stressor, cancer patients, and people chronically low in self-esteem are encouraged to say to themselves such things as, “I am a beautiful person” and “I can do this!” Despite the popularity of positive self-statements and the widespread assumption that they work, their effectiveness was not subjected to scientific scrutiny until recently. Wood et al. (2009b) found that repeating the statement, “I am a lovable person” improved people’s moods only for those who already had high self-esteem. For people with low self-esteem, the statement actually backfired, worsening their moods and their feelings about themselves.

A strikingly different self-enhancement strategy is “self-affirmation” ( Steele, 1988 ). As studied by social psychologists, self-affirmation does not refer to saying positive things to oneself, but to much more subtle methods involving the expression of one’s values. Self-affirmation strategies have included writing a paragraph concerning a value one cherishes (e.g., politics, social connections), or even merely completing a scale highlighting such values. Such strategies seem to be self-enhancing in that they reduce defensiveness (e.g., Crocker et al., 2008 ), reduce stereotyping ( Fein and Spencer, 1997 ), make people more open to self-evaluation ( Spencer et al., 2001 ), and can substitute for other methods of self-enhancement (e.g., Wood et al., 1999 ).

Although self-enhancement may seem to be a private matter, operating at the individual level, the social level is clearly influential. Most threats to self-esteem arise in social contexts when feedback from others or others’ behavior leads people to doubt their preferred view of themselves, or to feel devalued or rejected. Hence self-enhancement results from the process of self-evaluation, whose social causes and context we have already discussed. In addition, self-enhancement processes may enlist the social level. Some of the self-enhancement strategies identified above, such as downward comparisons and derogating other people, involve using the social realm to boost oneself at the individual level. Another example comes from research on the triggers of stereotyping. Fein and Spencer (1997) showed that after they fail, people were especially likely to seize on a stereotype of Jewish women. Similarly, after receiving negative feedback, people derogated the person who delivered the feedback, if that person was a woman rather than a man ( Sinclair and Kunda, 2000 ). Other social strategies of self-enhancement can include being boastful and overconfident (e.g., Colvin et al., 1995 ), helping others (e.g., Brown and Smart, 1991 ), and aggressing against others ( Twenge and Campbell, 2003 ). People may also enhance themselves through their group memberships and social identities ( Banaji and Prentice, 1994 ). Self-enhancement research, then, reveals links between the individual and social levels of self because the social world often elicits the need for self-enhancement, and certain self-enhancement strategies involve the interpersonal realm. In addition, because self-enhancement can encourage or diminish stereotyping, aggression, and prosocial behavior, self-enhancement clearly has many potential social consequences.

That self-enhancement also operates at the molecular level is shown by a study of self-affirmation. Participants who engaged in a values-affirmation task before they faced a stressor had lower cortisol responses to stress than did participants who had not engaged in values-affirmation ( Creswell et al., 2005 ).

Self-enhancement also operates at the neural level as it involves applications of concepts such as loveable which, as we argued earlier, can be understood as patterns of activation in populations of neurons. The study by Wood et al. (2009a) showed that self-statements can alter positive and negative moods, which plausibly involves alteration of activities of neurotransmitters such as dopamine. Better understanding of the neural and genetic determinants of low self-esteem could provide the basis for explaining why positive self-statements can have negative effects on people with low self-esteem.

Self-Regulation

Although self researchers were long preoccupied with the topics of self-concept and self-esteem, they have come to appreciate that “self-regulation is one of the most important functions of the self” ( Gailliot et al., 2008 , p. 474). Self-regulation concerns how people pursue their goals or try to control their own behavior, thoughts, or feelings. An idea discussed earlier in the section on self-evaluation—that people continually compare themselves with standards—is central to many theories of self-regulation (e.g., Carver and Scheier, 1990 ). Such theories posit that when people experience a discrepancy between a standard and their own standing (behavior, thoughts, or feelings) on the relevant dimension, they deliberately or even automatically attempt to reduce that discrepancy, in one of three ways. They can try to adjust their behavior (or thoughts or feelings) so that it meets the standard, change their standards, or exit the situation. Self-regulation is successful when the discrepancy is eliminated or reduced (e.g., Carver and Scheier, 1990 ).

The biological aspects of the self are most obvious in the self-limiting phenomena aimed at controlling or managing excessive desires for food, alcohol, drugs, sex, or inactivity. Such desires are all rooted in neural and molecular mechanisms that must be counteracted in order to overcome self-destructive behaviors such as overeating. We will not attempt a comprehensive account of all the phenomena concerned with limiting the self, but discuss three main foci of self-regulation research in recent years: goal pursuit, emotion regulation, and ego-depletion—how exercising self-control in one domain diminishes one’s capacity to do so in a second domain.

Research on social comparison establishes a basic connection between the individual and social levels. To meet such goals as self-evaluation, self-improvement, and self-enhancement, individuals compare themselves with other people ( Wood, 1989 ). In this case, other people serve as the standards for meeting one’s goal progress.

Other people can even influence which goals we adopt. Fitzsimons and her colleagues have found that observing a stranger’s goal-directed behavior can lead people to pursue the same goals themselves, or to synchronize their goal pursuits with others, with interesting consequences. For example, people who observe others fail work harder, and people who observe others succeed take it easy ( McCullough et al., 2010 ). Even being in the presence of someone who was a stranger a few minutes before, but who shares similarities such as tastes in movies, can lead one to adopt the other’s goals as one’s own ( Walton et al., 2012 ). Such effects can even occur subconsciously. For example, when participants who had a goal to achieve to please their mother were primed with their mother, they outperformed control participants on an achievement task ( Fitzsimons and Bargh, 2003 ).

One’s own goals also affect one’s relationships with others. People draw closer to others who are instrumental in helping them to progress toward their goals, and distance themselves from others who do not promote such progress ( Fitzsimons and Shah, 2008 ). People seem to cultivate a social environment for themselves that promotes their goals, especially when their progress toward their goals is poor ( Fitzsimons and Fishbach, 2010 ).

Regulation of emotions is an important topic in clinical, social, and cross-cultural psychology ( Vandekerckhove et al., 2008 ). Research on emotion regulation—which concerns how people try to manage their emotional states—has amply demonstrated the interplay between the individual and social levels. For example, people try to adjust their moods in preparation for an upcoming social interaction, according to the social requirements expected ( Erber and Erber, 2000 ). In addition, social events affect one’s emotion regulation: Rejection experiences appear to lead people with low self-esteem to feel less deserving of a good mood, which in turn dampens their motivation to improve a sad mood ( Wood et al., 2009a ).

A specific example of emotion regulation, anger management, shows the need for multilevel explanations. The strategies for anger management recommended by the American Psychological Association ( APA, 2012 ) operate at all four levels: social, individual, neural, and molecular. Social strategies including expressing concerns with a sympathetic person and moderately communicating with the sources of anger. Humor involving pleasant social interactions can be a potent way of defusing anger. Temporary or permanent removal from anger-provoking social environments can also be helpful.

Psychological strategies for managing anger include the revisions of beliefs, goals, and attitudes. Cognitive therapy aims to help people by changing dysfunctional thinking, behavior, and emotion. Dysfunctional aspects of anger can be addressed by examining whether the beliefs and goals that underlie angry reactions are inaccurate and modifiable. According to the theory of emotions as cognitive appraisals, anger is a judgment that someone or something is thwarting one’s goals, so that anger should be reduced by realization either that the goals are not so important or by revision of beliefs about whatever is thought to be responsible for goal blocking.

Emotions such as anger, however, are not merely cognitive judgments, but also simultaneously involve brain perception of physiological states ( Thagard, 2006 ; Thagard and Aubie, 2008 ). Hence it is not surprising that anger management techniques include various methods for reducing physiological arousal, such as exercise and relaxation through deep breathing, mediation, and muscle tensing and release. Reducing physiological arousal reduces perception of body states performed by the insula and other brain areas, thereby reducing the overall brain activity that constitutes anger. Similarly, when oxytocin is administered to couples discussing a conflict, their positive verbal and non-verbal behaviors increase ( Ditzen et al., 2009 ).

In severe cases of anger, pharmaceutical treatments may be useful, including anti-depressants such as Prozac that affect the neurotransmitter serotonin, anti-anxiety drugs that affect the neurotransmitter GABA (gamma-Aminobutyric acid), and sometimes even anti-psychotics that affect various other neurotransmitters. The onset of anger can also be exacerbated by recreational use of drugs such as alcohol whose effects on brain chemistry are well known. Hence anger management is an aspect of self-regulation that operates at the molecular level as well as the higher ones.

Ego-depletion studies demonstrate that when people override their emotions, thoughts, impulses, or automatic or habitual behaviors, they have trouble doing so a second time ( Baumeister et al., 2007 ). For example, in one study, research participants had to resist freshly-baked chocolate-chip cookies; they were allowed to eat only radishes instead. When they then faced an impossible puzzle, they gave up more rapidly than participants who had not been required to resist the tempting cookies ( Baumeister et al., 1998 ). In another study, participants who were asked to suppress certain thoughts subsequently had more trouble resisting free beer than did control participants, even when they expected to take a driving test ( Muraven et al., 2002 ).

Ego-depletion research has shown connections between the individual and social levels in two ways. First, difficult social interactions can deplete one’s self-regulatory resources ( Vohs et al., 2005 ). Interracial interactions, for example, can be taxing if one tries not to appear prejudiced. Richeson and Shelton (2003) found that after prejudiced white participants interacted with a black participant, they performed more poorly on a cognitive control task, compared to participants who interacted with a white participant or participants scoring low in prejudice. Social interactions also can be depleting if one is required to engage in atypical self-presentation, such as being boastful to strangers ( Vohs et al., 2005 ). And in yet another example of the harmful consequences of social rejection, studies have indicated that it too can impair self-regulation (see Gailliot et al., 2008 , for references).

Second, ego-depletion makes it difficult to navigate social interactions. Participants who had engaged in previous acts of unrelated effortful self-regulation later were more egotistical in their self-descriptions and less able to choose topics for discussion with a stranger that were appropriate in their level of intimacy ( Vohs et al., 2005 ). Self-regulatory depletion also may encourage sexual infidelity and acts of discrimination ( Gailliot et al., 2008 ). Successful self-regulation, then, may smooth one’s interpersonal interactions and make one’s close relationships more harmonious. It is unclear, however, whether ego-depletion is the result of fundamental neural mechanisms of will, or rather individual mechanisms of self-representation: Job et al. (2010) report studies that support the view that reduced self-control after a depleting task or during demanding periods may reflect people’s beliefs about the availability of willpower rather than true resource depletion.

People who have sustained damage to the prefrontal cortex exhibit various self-regulatory deficits, such as impulsivity and poor judgment (see Gailliot et al., 2008 , for references). The anterior cingulate is involved in tasks that deplete self-regulatory resources via the coordination of divided attention, and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex affects the activation, maintenance, and modification of goal-directed responses ( Baumeister et al., 2003b ). Attempts at self-control recruit a network of brain regions including the lateral and posterior dorsomedial prefrontal cortex ( MacDonald et al., 2000 ). The consensus across thirty neuroimaging studies of emotion regulation in particular is that right ventrolateral PFC and left ventrolateral PFC activity are involved. Other areas also are implicated, including the presupplementary motor area, the posterior dorsomedial PFC, left dorsolateral PFC, and rostral ACC, and their involvement appears to depend on whether the emotion regulation is intentional or incidental to the participants’ task (see Lieberman, 2010 , for a review).

Research by Richeson et al. (2003) elegantly links the neural, individual, and social levels of self-regulation. They found that for White participants who held especially negative unconscious attitudes toward Blacks, interacting with a Black person led them to perform poorly on a subsequent self-regulatory task. This effect was mediated by the extent to which these White participants’ dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was activated while they viewed Black faces (in a separate session).

Molecular mechanisms are also undoubtedly involved in self-regulation, although few have been identified. Blood glucose has been thought to underlie ego-depletion phenomena ( Gailliot et al., 2008 ), but recent evidence has challenged that idea (e.g., Molden et al., 2012 ). Oxytocin may well promote self-regulation in the interpersonal sphere. It appears to lead mothers to tend to their offspring ( Taylor, 2002 ; Feldman et al., 2007 ), lead people in general to seek and provide social support in stressful circumstances ( Taylor, 2002 ), and to promote helping behavior ( Brown and Brown, 2006 ).

In sum, self-effecting phenomena such as self-enhancement and self-regulation are best understood at multiple mechanistic levels.

Self-effecting phenomena involve local changes and behavior, but there is a final group of phenomena that involve more permanent changes to the self ( Brinthaupt and Lipka, 1994 ). We cover two change phenomena: self-expansion and self-development.

Self-Expansion

According to Aron’s self-expansion theory, human beings have a central desire to expand the self—to acquire resources, perspectives, and identities that enhance their ability to accomplish goals. Self expansion is a motivation to enhance potential efficacy ( Aron et al., 2004 , p. 105).

This motivation to self-expand at the individual level influences the social level: Aron et al. (2004) argue that self-expansion motives lead people to enter and maintain close relationships with others. In close relationships, each partner includes the other in the self, meaning that each takes on the other’s resources, perspectives, and identities to some extent. Evidence for such processes is illustrated by findings of a study by Aron et al. (1995) , who asked university students to respond to the open-ended question “Who are you today?” every 2 weeks for 10 weeks. When respondents had fallen in love during the preceding 2 weeks, their answers to this question revealed increases in the diversity of their self-concept, compared to periods when they had not fallen in love and compared to other respondents who had not fallen in love. They also showed increased self-efficacy and self-esteem. These results remained significant even after mood changes were controlled statistically.

Falling in love also seems to be accompanied by changes in the brain. fMRI studies show that when people who have recently fallen intensely in love look at a photo of or think about their beloved, they have increased activity in the caudate nucleus, which is a central part of the brain’s reward system, as well as in the right ventral tegmental area, a region associated with the production and distribution of dopamine to other brain regions ( Aron et al., 2005 ). Even subliminal priming with a beloved’s name has similar effects ( Ortigue et al., 2007 ). These results suggest that passionate romantic love is associated with dopamine pathways in the reward system of the brain. These dopaminergic pathways are rich in oxytocin receptors ( Bartels and Zeki, 2004 ; Fisher et al., 2006 ). When women talk about a love experience, oxytocin release is associated with the extent to which they display affiliation cues such as smiles and head nods ( Gonzaga et al., 2006 ).

Recent research offers exciting evidence of possible brain changes with self-expansion. Ortigue and Bianchi-Demicheli (2010) found that when people were primed with their romantic partner’s name (and not a friend’s), they showed more intense activation of the left angular gyrus, the same region that is activated when people think of themselves.

Self-Development

Self-development refers to the changes that people naturally undergo over the course of their lives. Major developmental periods include early years when infants and toddlers begin to acquire identities ( Bloom, 2004 ; Rochat, 2009 ), adolescence when teenagers establish increasing independence from parents ( Sylwester, 2007 ), and old age when physical decline imposes new limitations on the self. Each of these periods involves extensive social, individual, neural, and molecular changes, but we will focus on old age, drawing on Breytspraak (1984) and Johnson (2005) .

Social relations and the aspects of the self dependent on them change dramatically as people get older. Major changes can include the completion of child-rearing, retirement from employment, diminishing social contacts resulting from physical disabilities, and loss of friends and family to death or infirmity. These changes can all affect the quantity and quality of social interactions that are causally associated with a person’s behaviors and representations.

At the individual level, there are changes in processes, representations, and emotions. Cognitive functioning measured by processing speed and short-term memory capability declines steadily from people’s thirties, and more precipitously in their sixties and later ( Salthouse, 2004 ). Self-conceptions may be stable in some respects, but often alter in others, as people define themselves increasingly in terms of health and physical functioning rather than work roles. People in early stages of old age tend to be happier than those in middle age, but infirmities can bring substantial difficulties ( Stone et al., 2010 ).

Neural causes of changes in the self are most evident in extreme cases like Alzheimer’s disease, when brain degeneration progressively eliminates anything but a minimal sense of self. There are also age-related disorders such as fronto-temporal dementia that can drastically diminish self-effecting phenomena such as self-control ( Eslinger et al., 2005 ). Aging also brings about molecular changes, for example in reduction of levels of hormones such as testosterone and estrogen that affect neural processing. Hence for a combination of social, individual, neural, and molecular reasons, self-development takes on important directions in old age. Similar observations could be made about other crucial stages of personal development such as adolescence. The changing self, like the representing and effecting self, operates through multilevel interacting mechanisms.

We have shown the relevance of social, individual, neural, and molecular levels to seven important phenomena: self-concepts, self-presentation, self-esteem, self-enhancement, self-regulation, self-expansion, and self-development. These seven are representative of three general classes (self-representing, self-effecting, and self-changing) that cover more than eighty self-phenomena important in psychological discussions of the self.

A full theory of the self will need to specify much more about the nature of the mechanisms at each level, and equally importantly, will need to specify much more about the relations between the levels. Thagard (2014) argued against the common reductionist assumption that causation runs only upward from molecular to neural to individual to social mechanisms. A social interaction such as one person complimenting another has effects on individuals’ mental representations, on neural firing, and on molecular processes such as ones involving dopamine and oxytocin. Fuller explanation of the more than eighty self-phenomena that we have classified in this paper will require elucidation of how they each result from multilevel interactions.

Explanations of complex systems often identify emergent properties, which belong to wholes but not to their parts because they result from the interactions of their parts ( Findlay and Thagard, 2012 ). This basic idea of emergence concerns only the connections of two levels, where the properties of wholes at the higher level (e.g., consciousness) emerge from interactions of parts at the lower levels (neurons). Thinking of the self as resulting from multiple interacting mechanisms points to a more complicated kind of emergence that has gone unrecognized. Multilevel emergence occurs when the property of a whole such as the self results from interactions in mechanisms at several different levels, in this case molecular and social as well as neural and cognitive. What you are as a self depends on your genes and your social influences as well as on your semantic pointers and mental representations. Major changes in the self such as religious conversions, dramatic career shifts, and recovery from mental illness are critical transitions that result from interactions among multiple levels. For example, recovery from severe depression often requires (1) changes in neurotransmitters through medication operating at the molecular and neural levels and (2) changes in beliefs and goals through psychotherapy operating at the mental and social levels. Future theoretical work on the self will benefit from more detailed accounts of the interactions of individual, social, neural, and molecular mechanisms.

Conflict of Interest Statement

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Al’Absi, M., Bongard, S., Buchanan, T., Pincomb, G. A., Licinio, J., and Lovallo, W. R. (1997). Cardiovascular and neuroendocrine adjustment to public speaking and mental arithmetic stressors. Psychophysiology 34, 266–275. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.1997.tb02397.x

PubMed Abstract | Full Text | CrossRef Full Text | Google Scholar

Alicke, M. D., Dunning, D. A., and Krueger, J. I. (eds). (2005). The Self in Social Judgment . New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Google Scholar

Andersen, S. M., and Chen, S. (2002). The relational self: an interpersonal social-cognitive theory. Psychol. Rev. 109, 619–645. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.109.4.619

APA. (2012). Controlling Anger Before it Controls You . Available at: http://www.apa.org/topics/anger/control.aspx [accessed March 18, 2015].

Aron, A. (2003). “Self and close relationships,” in Handbook of Self and Identity , eds M. R. Leary and J. P. Tangney (New York, NY: Guilford Press), 442–461.

Aron, A., Fisher, H., Mashek, D. J., Strong, G., Li, H., and Brown, L. L. (2005). Reward, motivation, and emotion systems associated with early-stage intense romantic love. J. Neurophysiol. 94, 327–337. doi: 10.1152/jn.00838.2004

Aron, A., McLaughlin-Volpe, T., Mashek, D., Lewandowski, G., Wright, S. C., and Aron, E. N. (2004). Including others in the self. Eur. Rev. Soc. Psychol. 15, 101–132. doi: 10.1080/10463280440000008

CrossRef Full Text | Google Scholar

Aron, A., Paris, M., and Aron, E. N. (1995). Falling in love: prospective studies of self-concept change. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 69, 1102–1112. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.69.6.1102

Banaji, M. R., and Prentice, D. A. (1994). The self in social contexts. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 45, 297–332. doi: 10.1146/annurev.ps.45.020194.001501

Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59, 617–645. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639

Bartels, A., and Zeki, S. (2004). The neural correlates of maternal and romantic love. Neuroimage 21, 1155–1166. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2003.11.003

Bartz, J. A., Zaki, J., Bolger, N., Hollander, E., Ludwig, N. N., Kolevzon, A., et al. (2010). Oxytocin selectively improves empathic accuracy. Psychol. Sci. 21, 1426–1428. doi: 10.1177/0956797610383439

Baumeister, R. (ed.). (1999). The Self in Social Psychology . Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.

Baumeister, R. F. (1998). “The self,” in The Handbook of Social Psychology , Vols. 1 and 2, 4th Edn, eds D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, and G. Lindzey (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill), 680–740.

Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., and Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion: is the active self a limited resource? J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 74, 1252–1265. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1252

Baumeister, R. F., Campbell, J. D., Krueger, J. I., and Vohs, K. D. (2003a). Does high self-esteem cause better performance, interpersonal success, happiness, or healthier lifestyles? Psychol. Sci. Public Interest 4, 1–44. doi: 10.1111/1529-1006.01431

Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., Leary, M. R., and Tangney, J. P. (2003b). Self-Regulation and the Executive Function of the Self Handbook of Self and Identity . New York, NY: Guilford Press, 197–217.

Baumeister, R. F., and Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psychol. Bull. 117, 497–529. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.117.3.497

Baumeister, R. F., Tice, D. M., and Hutton, D. G. (1989). Self-presentational motivations and personality differences in self-esteem. J. Pers. 57, 547–579. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1989.tb02384.x

Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., and Tice, D. M. (2007). The strength model of self-control. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 16, 351–355. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8721.2007.00534.x

Bechtel, W. (2008). Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience . New York, NY: Routledge.

Blaine, B., and Crocker, J. (1993). “Self-esteem and self-serving biases in reactions to positive and negative events: an integrative review,” in Self-Esteem: The Puzzle of Low Self-Regard , ed. R. F. Baumeister (New York, NY: Plenum), 55–86.

Bloom, P. (2004). Descartes’ Baby . New York, NY: Basic Books.

Blouw, P., Solodkin, E., Thagard, P., and Eliasmith, C. (forthcoming). Concepts as semantic pointers: a theory and computational model. Cogn. Sci.

Breytspraak, L. M. (1984). The Development of Self in Later Life . Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

Brinthaupt, T. M., and Lipka, R. P. (eds). (1994). Changing the Self: Philosophies, Techniques, and Experiences . Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Brown, J. D., and Smart, S. A. (1991). The self and social conduct: linking self-representations to prosocial behavior. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 60, 368–375. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.60.3.368

Brown, S. L., and Brown, R. M. (2006). Selective investment theory: recasting the functional significance of social relationships. Psychol. Inq. 17, 1–29. doi: 10.1207/s15327965pli1701_01

Burklund, L. J., Eisenberger, N. I., and Lieberman, M. D. (2007). The face of rejection: rejection sensitivity moderates dorsal anterior cingulated activity to disapproving facial expressions. Soc. Neurosci. 2, 238–253. doi: 10.1080/17470910701391711

Campbell, J. D. (1990). Self-esteem and clarity of the self-concept. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 59, 538–549. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.59.3.538

Carter, C. S. (1998). Neuroendocrine perspectives on social attachment and love. Psychoneuroendocrinology 23, 770–818.

PubMed Abstract | Full Text | Google Scholar

Carver, C. S., and Scheier, M. F. (1990). Origins and functions of positive and negative affect: a control-process view. Psychol. Rev. 97, 19–35. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.97.1.19

Colvin, C. R., Block, J., and Funder, D. C. (1995). Overly positive self-evaluations and personality: negative implications for mental health. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 68, 1152–1162. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.68.6.1152

Creswell, J. D., Welch, W. T., Taylor, S. E., Sherman, D. K., Gruenewald, T. L., and Mann, T. (2005). Affirmation of personal values buffers neuroendocrine and psychological stress responses. Psychol. Sci. 16, 846–851. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2005.01624.x

Crocker, J., Niiya, Y., and Mischkowski, D. (2008). Why does writing about important values reduce defensiveness? Self-affirmation and the role of positive other-directed feelings. Psychol. Sci. 19, 740–747. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02150.x

Darley, J. M., and Fazio, R. H. (1980). Expectancy confirmation processes arising in the social interaction sequence. Am. Psychol. 35, 867–881. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.35.10.867

Davis, J. A. (1966). The campus as a frog pond: an application of the theory of relative deprivation to career decisions of college men. Am. J. Soc. 72, 17–31. doi: 10.1086/224257

Deci, E. L., and Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychol. Inq. 11, 227–268. doi: 10.1207/S15327965PLI1104_01

Dickerson, S. S., Gruenewald, T. L., and Kemeny, M. E. (2011). “Physiological effects of social threat: implications for health,” in Handbook of Social Neuroscience , eds J. Cacioppo and J. Decety (New York, NY: Oxford University Press), 787–803.

Ditzen, B., Schaer, M., Gabriel, B., Bodenmann, G., Ehlert, U., and Heinrichs, M. (2009). Intranasal oxytocin increases positive communication and reduces cortisol levels during couple conflict. Biol. Psychiatry 65, 728–731. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2008.10.011

Dodgson, P. G., and Wood, J. V. (1998). Self-esteem and the cognitive accessibility of strengths and weaknesses after failure. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 75, 178–197. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.75.1.178

Dunning, D. (2003). “The relation of self to social perception,” in Handbook of Self and Identity , eds M. R. Leary and J. P. Tangney (New York, NY: Guilford Press), 421–441.

Eisenberger, N. I., Gable, S. L., and Lieberman, M. D. (2007). fMRI responses relate to differences in real-world social experience. Emotion 7, 745–754. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.7.4.745

Eisenberger, N. I., Inagaki, T. K., Muscatell, K. A., Byrne Haltom, K. E., and Leary, M. R. (2011). The neural sociometer: brain mechanisms underlying state self-esteem. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 3448–3455. doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00027

Eisenberger, N. I., Lieberman, M. D., and Williams, K. D. (2003). Does rejection hurt? An FMRI study of social exclusion. Science 302, 290–292. doi: 10.1126/science.1089134

Erber, R., and Erber, M. W. (2000). The self-regulation of moods: second thoughts on the importance of happiness in everyday life. Psychol. Inq. 11, 142–148. doi: 10.1207/S15327965PLI1103_02

Eslinger, P. J., Dennis, K., Moore, P., Antani, S., Hauck, R., and Grossman, M. (2005). Metacognitive deficits in frontotemporal dementia. J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry 76, 1630–1635. doi: 10.1136/jnnp.2004.053157

Fazio, R. H., Effrein, E. A., and Falender, V. J. (1981). Self-perceptions following social interaction. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 41, 232–242. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.41.2.232

Fein, S., and Spencer, S. J. (1997). Prejudice as self-image maintenance: affirming the self through derogating others. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 73, 31–44. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.73.1.31

Feldman, R., Weller, A., Zagoory-Sharon, O., and Levine, A. (2007). Evidence for a neuroendocrinological foundation of human affiliation: plasma oxytocin levels across pregnancy and the postpartum period predict mother-infant bonding. Psychol. Sci. 18, 965–970. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.02010.x

Findlay, S. D., and Thagard, P. (2012). How parts make up wholes. Front. Physiol. 3:455. doi: 10.3389/fphys.2012.00455

Fisher, H. E., Aron, A., and Brown, L. (2006). Romantic love: a mammalian system for mate choice. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B 361, 2173–2186. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2006.1938

Fitzsimons, G. M., and Bargh, J. A. (2003). Thinking of you: nonconscious pursuit of interpersonal goals associated with relationship partners. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 84, 148–164. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.84.1.148

Fitzsimons, G. M., and Fishbach, A. (2010). Shifting closeness: interpersonal effects of personal goal progress. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 98, 535–549. doi: 10.1037/a0018581

Fitzsimons, G. M., and Shah, J. Y. (2008). How goal instrumentality shapes relationship evaluations. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 95, 319–337. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.95.2.319

Gailliot, M. T., Mead, N. L., and Baumeister, R. F. (2008). “Self-regulation,” in Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research , eds O. P. John, R. W. Robbins, and L. A. Pervin (New York, NY: Guilford Press), 472–491.

Goffman, E. (1959). The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life . New York, NY: Anchor Books.

Gonzaga, G. C., Turner, R. A., Keltner, D., Campos, B., and Altemus, M. (2006). Romantic love and sexual desire in close relationships. Emotion 6, 163–179. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.6.2.163

Heimpel, S. A., Wood, J. V., Marshall, M. A., and Brown, J. D. (2002). Do people with low self-esteem really want to feel better? Self-esteem differences in motivation to repair negative moods. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 82, 128–147. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.82.1.128

Holmes, J. G., Cameron, J., and Baldwin, M. W. (2005). An Integrative Review of Theories of Interpersonal Cognition: An Interdependence Theory Perspective Interpersonal Cognition . New York, NY: Guilford Press, 415–447.

Ikemoto, S., and Panksepp, J. (1999). The role of nucleus accumbens dopamine in motivated behavior: a unifying interpretation with special reference to reward-seeking. Brain Res. Rev. 31, 6–41. doi: 10.1016/S0165-0173(99)00023-5

Izuma, K., Saito, D. N., and Sadato, N. (2008). Processing of social and monetary rewards in the human striatum. Neuron 58, 284–294. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2008.03.020

Izuma, K., Saito, D. N., and Sadato, N. (2009). Processing of the incentive for social approval in the ventral striatum during charitable donation. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 22, 621–631. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2009.21228

James, W. (1890). The Principles of Psychology . New York, NY: H. Holt.

Jenkins, A. C., and Mitchell, J. P. (2011). Medial prefrontal cortex subserves diverse forms of self-reflection. Soc. Neurosci. 6, 211–218. doi: 10.1080/17470919.2010.507948

Job, V., Dweck, C. S., and Walton, G. M. (2010). Ego depletion—is it all in your head? Implicit theories about willpower affect self-regulation. Psychol. Sci. 21, 1686–1693. doi: 10.1177/0956797610384745

Johnson, M. L. (ed.). (2005). The Cambridge Handbook of Age and Ageing . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kavaliers, M., and Choleris, E. (2011). Sociality, pathogen avoidance, and the neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin. Psychol. Sci. 22, 1367–1374. doi: 10.1177/0956797611420576

Kunda, Z. (1999). Social Cognition: Making Sense of People . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Kwang, T., and Swann, W. B. Jr. (2010). Do people embrace praise even when they feel unworthy? A review of critical tests of self-enhancement versus self-verification. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 14, 263–280. doi: 10.1177/1088868310365876

Leary, M. R., and Baumeister, R. F. (2000). “The nature and function of self-esteem: sociometer theory,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology , Vol. 32, ed. M. P. Zanna (San Diego, CA: Academic Press), 1–62.

Leary, M. R., and Kowalski, R. M. (1990). Impression management: a literature review and two-component model. Psychol. Bull. 107, 34–47. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.107.1.34

Leary, M. R., and Tangney, J. P. (eds). (2003). Handbook of Self and Identity . New York, NY: Guilford.

Lieberman, M. D. (2010). “Social cognitive neuroscience,” in Handbook of Social Psychology , 5th Edn, eds S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, and G. Lindzey (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill), 143–193.

MacDonald, A. W., Cohen, J. D., Stenger, V. A., and Carter, C. S. (2000). Dissociating the role of the dorsolateral prefrontal and anterior cingulated cortex in cognitive control. Science 288, 1835–1838. doi: 10.1126/science.288.5472.1835

MacDonald, G., and Leary, M. R. (2005). Why does social exclusion hurt? The relationship between social and physical pain. Psychol. Bull. 131, 202–223. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.131.2.202

Machery, E. (2009). Doing without Concepts . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Markus, H., and Kunda, Z. (1986). Stability and malleability of the self-concept. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 51, 858–866. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.51.4.858

Markus, H. R., and Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychol. Rev. 98, 224–253. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.98.2.224

McCullough, K. C., Fitzsimons, G. M., and Chua, S. N. (2010). Vicarious Goal Satisfaction . Moscow, ID: University of Idaho.

McGuire, W. J., and McGuire, C. V. (1996). Enhancing self-esteem by directed-thinking tasks: cognitive and affective positivity asymmetries. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 70, 1117–1125. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.70.6.1117

McGuire, W. J., McGuire, C. V., Child, P., and Fujioka, T. (1978). Salience of ethnicity in the spontaneous self-concept as a function of one’s ethnic distinctiveness in the social environment. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 36, 511–520. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.36.5.511

Mead, G. H. (1967). Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist . Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Mikolajczak, M., Gross, J. J., Lane, A., Corneille, O., de Timary, P., and Lumine, L. (2010). Oxytocin makes people trusting, not gullible. Psychol. Sci. 21, 1072–1074. doi: 10.1177/0956797610377343

Mitchell, J. P. (2009). Inferences about other minds. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. B 364, 1309–1316. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0318

Molden, D. C., Hui, C. M., Scholer, A. A., Meier, B. P., Noreen, E. E., Agostino, P. R., et al. (2012). The motivational versus metabolic effects of carbohydrates on self-control. Psychol. Sci. 23, 1137–1144. doi: 10.1177/0956797612439069

Muraven, M., Collins, R. L., and Neinhaus, K. (2002). Self-control and alcohol restraint: an initial application of the Self-Control Strength Model. Psychol. Addict. Behav. 16, 113–120. doi: 10.1037/0893-164X.16.2.113

Murphy, G. L. (2002). The Big Book of Concepts . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Murray, S. L., Holmes, J. G., and Griffin, D. W. (1996). The self-fulfilling nature of positive illusions in romantic relationships: love is not blind, but prescient. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 71, 1155–1180. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.71.6.1155

Neiss, M. B., Sedikides, C., and Stevenson, J. (2002). Self-esteem: a behavioral genetics perspective. Eur. J. Pers. 16, 351–367. doi: 10.1002/per.456

Northoff, G., and Bermpohl, F. (2004). Cortical midline structures and the self. Trends Cogn. Sci. 8, 102–107. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2004.01.004

Onoda, K., Okamoto, Y., Nakashima, K., Nittono, H., Yoshimura, S., Yamawaki, S., et al. (2010). Does low self-esteem enhance social pain? The relationship between trait self-esteem and anterior cingulate cortex activation induced by ostracism. Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 5, 385–391. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsq002

Ortigue, S., and Bianchi-Demicheli, F. (2010). Overlapping neural systems mediating self-consciousness, mirror neurons, and love: a combined fMRI and 4D EEG neuroimaging approach. Paper Presented at the Society for Personality and Social Psychology Conference, Las Vegas, NV.

Ortigue, S., Bianchi-Demicheli, F., de C. Hamilton, A. F., and Grafton, S. T. (2007). The neural basis of love as a subliminal prime: an event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging study. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 19, 1218–1230. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2007.19.7.1218

Pettigrew, T. F. (1967). Social evaluation theory: convergences and applications. Nebr. Symp. Motiv. 15, 241–311.

Richeson, J. A., Baird, A. A., Gordon, H. L., Heatherton, T. F., Wyland, C. L., Trawalter, S., et al. (2003). An fMRI investigation of the impact of interracial contact on executive function. Nat. Neurosci. 6, 1323–1328. doi: 10.1038/nn1156

Richeson, J. A., and Shelton, J. N. (2003). When prejudice does not pay: effects of interracial contact on executive function. Psychol. Sci. 14, 287–290. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.03437

Rochat, P. (2009). Others in Mind: Social Origins of Self-Consciousness . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rodrigues, S. M., Saslow, L. R., Garcia, N., John, O. P., and Keltner, D. (2009). Oxytocin receptor genetic variation relates to empathy and stress reactivity in humans. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 106, 21437–21441. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0909579106

Rosenthal, R., and Jacobson, L. (1968). Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teacher Expectation and Pupils’ Intellectual Development . New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

Roy, M. A., Neale, M. C., and Kendler, K. S. (1995). The genetic epidemiology of self-esteem. Br. J. Psychiatry 166, 813–820. doi: 10.1192/bjp.166.6.813

Salthouse, T. A. (2004). What and when of cognitive aging. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 140–144. doi: 10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00293.x

Saphire-Bernstein, S., Way, B. M., Kim, H. S., Sherman, D. K., and Taylor, S. E. (2011). Oxytocin receptor gene (OXTR) is related to psychological resources. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 108, 15118–15122. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1113137108

Schlenker, B. R. (2003). “Self-presentation,” in Handbook of Self and Identity , eds M. R. Leary and J. P. Tangney (New York, NY: Guilford Press), 492–518.

Sedikides, C., and Brewer, M. B. (eds). (2001). Individual Self, Relational Self, Collective Self . Hove: Psychology Press.

Sedikides, C., and Spencer, S. (eds). (2007). The Self . New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Shrauger, J. S., and Rosenberg, S. E. (1970). Self-esteem and the effects of success and failure feedback on performance. J. Pers. 38, 404–417. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1970.tb00018.x

Sinclair, L., and Kunda, Z. (2000). Motivated stereotyping of women: she’s fine if she praised me but incompetent if she criticized me. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 26, 1329–1342. doi: 10.1177/0146167200263002

Snyder, M., Tanke, E. D., and Berscheid, E. (1977). Social perception and interpersonal behavior: on the self-fulfilling nature of social stereotypes. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 35, 656–666. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.35.9.656

Somerville, L. H., Heatherton, T. F., and Kelley, W. M. (2006). Anterior cingulate cortex responds differentially to expectancy violation and social rejection. Nat. Neurosci. 9, 1007–1008. doi: 10.1038/nn1728

Somerville, L. H., Kelley, W. M., and Heatherton, T. F. (2010). Self-esteem modulates medial prefrontal cortical responses to evaluative social feedback. Cereb. Cortex 20, 3005–3013. doi: 10.1093/cercor/bhq049

Spencer, S. J., Fein, S., and Lomore, C. D. (2001). Maintaining one’s self-image vis-à-vis others: the role of self-affirmation in the social evaluation of the self. Motiv. Emot. 25, 41–65. doi: 10.1023/A:1010659805978

Steele, C. M. (1988). “The psychology of self-affirmation: sustaining the integrity of the self,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology , Vol. 21, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York, NY: Academic Press), 261–302.

Stinson, D. A., Cameron, J. J., Wood, J. V., Gaucher, D., and Holmes, J. G. (2009). Deconstructing the reign of error: interpersonal warmth explains the self-fulfilling prophecy of anticipated acceptance. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 35, 1165–1178. doi: 10.1177/0146167209338629

Stinson, D. A., Logel, C., Holmes, J. G., Wood, J. V., Hogle, J. V., Gaucher, D., et al. (2010). The regulatory function of self-esteem: testing to the acceptance and epistemic signaling systems. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 99, 993–1013. doi: 10.1037/a0020310

Stinson, D. A., Logel, C., Zanna, M. P., Holmes, J. G., Cameron, J. J., Wood, J. V., et al. (2008a). The cost of lower self-esteem: testing a self- and social-bonds model of health. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 94, 412–428. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.94.3.412

Stinson, D. A., Wood, J. V., and Doxey, J. R. (2008b). In search of clarity: self-esteem and domains of confidence and confusion. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 34, 1541–1555. doi: 10.1177/0146167208323102

Stone, A. A., Schwartz, J. E., Broderick, J. E., and Deaton, A. (2010). A snapshot of the age distribution of psychological well-being in the United States. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107, 9985–9990. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1003744107

Sui, J., and Han, S. (2007). Self-construal priming modulates neural substrates of self-awareness. Psychol. Sci. 18, 861–866. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01992.x

Swann, W. B. Jr. (2012). “Self-verification theory,” in Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology , eds P. Van Lang, A. Kruglanski, and E. T. Higgins (New York, NY: Sage), 23–42.

Swann, W. B., and Schroeder, D. G. (1995). The search for beauty and truth: a framework for understanding reactions to evaluations. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 21, 1307–1318. doi: 10.1177/01461672952112008

Sylwester, P. (2007). The Adolescent Brain: Reaching for Autonomy . Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press.

Tajfel, H. (1974). Social identity and intergroup behavior. Soc. Sci. Inf. 13, 65–93. doi: 10.1177/053901847401300204

Taylor, S. E. (2002). The Tending Instinct: Women, Men, and the Biology of Our Relationships . New York, NY: Holt.

Taylor, S. E., Burklund, L. J., Eisenberger, N. I., Lehman, B. J., Hilmert, C. J., and Lieberman, M. D. (2008). Neural bases of moderation of cortisol stress responses by psychosocial resources. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 95, 197–211. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.197

Taylor, S. E., Lerner, J. S., Sherman, D. K., Sage, R. M., and McDowell, N. K. (2003). Portrait of the self-enhancer: well adjusted and well liked or maladjusted and friendless? J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 84, 165–176. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.84.1.165

Thagard, P. (2006). Hot Thought : Mechanisms and Applications of Emotional Cognition . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Thagard, P. (2010). The Brain and the Meaning of Life . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Thagard, P. (2012). The Cognitive Science of Science: Explanation, Discovery, and Conceptual Change . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Thagard, P. (2014). The self as a system of multilevel interacting mechanisms. Philos. Psychol. 27, 145–163. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2012.725715

Thagard, P., and Aubie, B. (2008). Emotional consciousness: a neural model of how cognitive appraisal and somatic perception interact to produce qualitative experience. Conscious. Cogn. 17, 811–834. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2007.05.014

Thagard, P., and Litt, A. (2008). “Models of scientific explanation,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Computational Psychology , ed. R. Sun (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 549–564.

Tice, D. M., Butler, J. L., Muraven, M. B., and Stillwell, A. M. (1995). When modesty prevails: differential favorability of self-presentation to friends and strangers. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 69, 1120–1138. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.69.6.1120

Tice, D. M., and Wallace, H. M. (2003). “The reflected self: creating yourself as (you think) others see you,” in Handbook of Self and Identity , eds M. R. Leary and J. P. Tangney (New York, NY: Guilford Press), 91–105.

Twenge, J. M., and Campbell, W. K. (2003). “Isn’t it fun to get the respect that we’re going to deserve?” Narcissism, social rejection, and aggression. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 29, 261–272. doi: 10.1177/0146167202239051

Unkelbach, C., Guastella, A. J., and Forgas, J. P. (2008). Oxytocin selectively facilitates recognition of positive sex and relationship words. Psychol. Sci. 19, 1092–1094. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02206.x

Vandekerckhove, M., von Scheve, C., Ismer, S., Jung, S., and Kronast, S. (eds). (2008). Regulating Emotions: Culture, Social Necessity, and Biological Inheritance . Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., and Ciarocco, N. J. (2005). Self-regulation and self-presentation: regulatory resource depletion impairs impression management and effortful self-presentation depletes regulatory resources. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 88, 632–657. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.88.4.632

Walton, G. M., Cohen, G. L., Cwir, D., and Spencer, S. J. (2012). Mere belonging: the power of social connections. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 102, 513–532. doi: 10.1037/a0025731

Watson, D., Suls, J., and Haig, J. (2002). Global self-esteem in relation to structural models of personality and affectivity. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 83, 185–197. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.83.1.185

Way, B. M., Taylor, S. E., and Eisenberger, N. I. (2009). Variation in the k-opioid receptor gene (OPRM1) is associated with dispositional and neural sensitivity to social rejection. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 106, 15079–15084. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0812612106

Wood, J. V. (1989). Theory and research concerning social comparisons of personal attributes. Psychol. Bull. 106, 231–248. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.106.2.231

Wood, J. V., Giordano-Beech, M., and Ducharme, M. J. (1999). Compensating for failure through social comparison. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 25, 1370–1386. doi: 10.1177/0146167299259004

Wood, J. V., Heimpel, S. A., Manwell, L. A., and Whittington, E. J. (2009a). This mood is familiar and I don’t deserve to feel better anyway: mechanisms underlying self-esteem differences in motivation to repair sad moods. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 96, 363–380. doi: 10.1037/a0012881

Wood, J. V., Perunovic, W. Q. E., and Lee, J. W. (2009b). Positive self-statements: power for some, peril for others. Psychol. Sci. 20, 860–866. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02370.x

Wood, J. V., Taylor, S. E., and Lichtman, R. R. (1985). Social comparison in adjustment to breast cancer. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 49, 1169–1183. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.49.5.1169

Zayas, V., Shoda, Y., Mischel, W., Osterhout, L., and Takahashi, M. (2009). Neural responses to partner rejection cues. Psychol. Sci. 20, 813–821. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02373.x

Zeigler-Hill, V., and Jordan, C. H. (2011). “Two faces of self-esteem: implicit and explicit forms of self-esteem,” in Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition: Measurement, Theory, and Applications , eds B. Gawronski and B. K. Payne (New York, NY: Guilford Press), 392–407.

Keywords: self, mechanisms, self-change, self-representation, self-regulation

Citation: Thagard P and Wood JV (2015) Eighty phenomena about the self: representation, evaluation, regulation, and change. Front. Psychol. 6:334. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00334

Received: 19 December 2014; Accepted: 09 March 2015; Published: 27 March 2015.

Reviewed by:

Copyright © 2015 Thagard and Wood. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Paul Thagard, Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada [email protected]

Disclaimer: All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article or claim that may be made by its manufacturer is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

IResearchNet

Self-Presentation

Self-presentation definition.

Self-presentation refers to how people attempt to present themselves to control or shape how others (called the audience) view them. It involves expressing oneself and behaving in ways that create a desired impression. Self-presentation is part of a broader set of behaviors called impression management. Impression management refers to the controlled presentation of information about all sorts of things, including information about other people or events. Self-presentation refers specifically to information about the self.

Self-Presentation History and Modern Usage

Early work on impression management focused on its manipulative, inauthentic uses that might typify a used car salesperson who lies to sell a car, or someone at a job interview who embellishes accomplishments to get a job. However, researchers now think of self-presentation more broadly as a pervasive aspect of life. Although some aspects of self-presentation are deliberate and effortful (and at times deceitful), other aspects are automatic and done with little or no conscious thought. For example, a woman may interact with many people during the day and may make different impressions on each person. When she starts her day at her apartment, she chats with her roommates and cleans up after breakfast, thereby presenting the image of being a good friend and responsible roommate. During classes, she responds to her professor’s questions and carefully takes notes, presenting the image of being a good student. Later that day, she calls her parents and tells them about her classes and other activities (although likely leaving out information about some activities), presenting the image of being a loving and responsible daughter. That night, she might go to a party or dancing with friends, presenting the image of being fun and easygoing. Although some aspects of these self-presentations may be deliberate and conscious, other aspects are not. For example, chatting with her roommates and cleaning up after breakfast may be habitual behaviors that are done with little conscious thought. Likewise, she may automatically hold the door open for an acquaintance or buy a cup of coffee for a friend. These behaviors, although perhaps not done consciously or with self-presentation in mind, nevertheless convey an image of the self to others.

Academic Writing, Editing, Proofreading, And Problem Solving Services

Get 10% off with 24start discount code.

Although people have the ability to present images that are false, self-presentations are often genuine; they reflect an attempt by the person to have others perceive him or her accurately, or at least consistent with how the person perceives himself or herself. Self-presentations can vary as a function of the audience; people present different aspects of themselves to different audiences or under different conditions. A man likely presents different aspects of himself to his close friends than he does to his elderly grandmother, and a woman may present a different image to her spouse than she does to her employer. This is not to say that these different images are false. Rather, they represent different aspects of the self. The self is much like a gem with multiple facets. The gem likely appears differently depending on the angle at which it is viewed. However, the various appearances are all genuine. Even if people present a self-image that they know to be false, they may begin to internalize the self-image and thereby eventually come to believe the self-pres

entation. For example, a man may initially present an image of being a good student without believing it to be genuine, but after attending all his classes for several weeks, visiting the professor during office hours, and asking questions during class, he may come to see himself as truly being a good student. This internalization process is most likely to occur when people make a public commitment to the self-image, when the behavior is at least somewhat consistent with their self-image, and when they receive positive feedback or other rewards for presenting the self-image.

Self-presentation is often directed to external audiences such as friends, lovers, employers, teachers, children, and even strangers. Self-presentation is more likely to be conscious when the presenter depends on the audience for some reward, expects to interact with the audience in the future, wants something from the audience, or values the audience’s approval. Yet self-presentation extends beyond audiences that are physically present to imagined audiences, and these imagined audiences can have distinct effects on behavior. A young man at a party might suddenly think about his parents and change his behavior from rambunctious to reserved. People sometimes even make self-presentations only for themselves. For instance, people want to claim certain identities, such as being fun, intelligent, kind, moral, and they may behave in line with these identities even in private.

Self-Presentation Goals

Self-presentation is inherently goal-directed; people present certain images because they benefit from the images in some way. The most obvious benefits are interpersonal, arising from getting others to do what one wants. A job candidate may convey an image of being hardworking and dependable to get a job; a salesperson may convey an image of being trustworthy and honest to achieve a sale. People may also benefit from their self-presentations by gaining respect, power, liking, or other desirable social rewards. Finally, people make certain impressions on others to maintain a sense of who they are, or their self-concept. For example, a man who wants to think of himself as a voracious reader might join a book club or volunteer at a library, or a woman who wishes to perceive herself as generous may contribute lavishly to a charitable cause. Even when there are few or no obvious benefits of a particular self-presentation, people may simply present an image that is consistent with the way they like to think about themselves, or at least the way they are accustomed to thinking about themselves.

Much of self-presentation is directed toward achieving one of two desirable images. First, people want to appear likeable. People like others who are attractive, interesting, and fun to be with. Thus, a sizable proportion of self-presentation revolves around developing, maintaining, and enhancing appearance and conveying and emphasizing characteristics that others desire, admire, and enjoy. Second, people want to appear competent. People like others who are skilled and able, and thus another sizable proportion of self-presentation revolves around conveying an image of competence. Yet, self-presentation is not so much about presenting desirable images as it is about presenting desired images, and some desired images are not necessarily desirable. For example, schoolyard bullies may present an image of being dangerous or intimidating to gain or maintain power over others. Some people present themselves as weak or infirmed (or exaggerate their weaknesses) to gain help from others. For instance, a member of a group project may display incompetence in the hope that other members will do more of the work, or a child may exaggerate illness to avoid going to school.

Self-Presentation Avenues

People self-present in a variety of ways. Perhaps most obviously, people self-present in what they say. These verbalizations can be direct claims of a particular image, such as when a person claims to be altruistic. They also can be indirect, such as when a person discloses personal behaviors or standards (e.g., “I volunteer at a hospital”). Other verbal presentations emerge when people express attitudes or beliefs. Divulging that one enjoys backpacking through Europe conveys the image that one is a world-traveler. Second, people self-present nonverbally in their physical appearance, body language, and other behavior. Smiling, eye contact, and nods of agreement can convey a wealth of information. Third, people self-present through the props they surround themselves with and through their associations. Driving an expensive car or flying first class conveys an image of having wealth, whereas an array of diplomas and certificates on one’s office walls conveys an image of education and expertise. Likewise, people judge others based on their associations. For example, being in the company of politicians or movie stars conveys an image of importance, and not surprisingly, many people display photographs of themselves with famous people. In a similar vein, high school students concerned with their status are often careful about which classmates they are seen and not seen with publicly. Being seen by others in the company of someone from a member of a disreputable group can raise questions about one’s own social standing.

Self-Presentation Pitfalls

Self-presentation is most successful when the image presented is consistent with what the audience thinks or knows to be true. The more the image presented differs from the image believed or anticipated by the audience, the less willing the audience will be to accept the image. For example, the lower a student’s grade is on the first exam, the more difficulty he or she will have in convincing a professor that he or she will earn an A on the next exam. Self-presentations are constrained by audience knowledge. The more the audience knows about a person, the less freedom the person has in claiming a particular identity. An audience that knows very little about a person will be more accepting of whatever identity the person conveys, whereas an audience that knows a great deal about a person will be less accepting.

People engaging in self-presentation sometimes encounter difficulties that undermine their ability to convey a desired image. First, people occasionally encounter the multiple audience problem, in which they must simultaneously present two conflicting images. For example, a student while walking with friends who know only her rebellious, impetuous side may run into her professor who knows only her serious, conscientious side. The student faces the dilemma of conveying the conflicting images of rebellious friend and serious student. When both audiences are present, the student must try to behave in a way that is consistent with how her friends view her, but also in a way that is consistent with how her professor views her. Second, people occasionally encounter challenges to their self-presentations. The audience may not believe the image the person presents. Challenges are most likely to arise when people are managing impressions through self-descriptions and the self-descriptions are inconsistent with other evidence. For example, a man who claims to be good driver faces a self-presentational dilemma if he is ticketed or gets in an automobile accident. Third, self-presentations can fail when people lack the cognitive resources to present effectively because, for example, they are tired, anxious, or distracted. For instance, a woman may yawn uncontrollably or reflexively check her watch while talking to a boring classmate, unintentionally conveying an image of disinterest.

Some of the most important images for people to convey are also the hardest. As noted earlier, among the most important images people want to communicate are likeability and competence. Perhaps because these images are so important and are often rewarded, audiences may be skeptical of accepting direct claims of likeability and competence from presenters, thinking that the person is seeking personal gain. Thus, people must resort to indirect routes to create these images, and the indirect routes can be misinterpreted. For example, the student who sits in the front row of the class and asks a lot of questions may be trying to project an image of being a competent student but may be perceived negatively as a teacher’s pet by fellow students.

Finally, there is a dark side to self-presentation. In some instances, the priority people place on their appearances or images can threaten their health. People who excessively tan are putting a higher priority on their appearance (e.g., being tan) than on their health (e.g., taking precautions to avoid skin cancer). Similarly, although condoms help protect against sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancy, self-presentational concerns may dissuade partners or potential partners from discussing, carrying, or using condoms. Women may fear that carrying condoms makes them seem promiscuous or easy, whereas men may fear that carrying condoms makes them seem presumptuous, as if they are expecting to have sex. Self-presentational concerns may also influence interactions with health care providers and may lead people to delay or avoid embarrassing medical tests and procedures or treatments for conditions that are embarrassing. For example, people may be reluctant to seek tests or treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, loss of bladder control, mental disorders, mental decline, or other conditions associated with weakness or incompetence. Finally, concerns with social acceptance may prompt young people to engage in risky behaviors such as excessive alcohol consumption, sexual promiscuity, or juvenile delinquency.

References:

• Jones, E. E., Pittman, T. S. (1982). Toward a general theory of strategic self-presentation. In J. Suls (Ed.), Psychological perspectives on the self (Vol. 1, pp. 231-260). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
• Leary, M. R. (1996). Self-presentation: Impression management and interpersonal behavior. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
• Leary, M. R., Tchividjian, L. R., & Kraxberger, B. E. (1994). Self-presentation can be hazardous to your health: Impression management and health risk. Health Psychology, 13, 461-470.
• Schlenker, B. R. (1980). Impression management: The self-concept, social identity, and interpersonal relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Self-Control

When do people think abstinence or moderation is better, how people view a conflict determines the strategy they use to resolve it..

Posted April 10, 2024 | Reviewed by Lybi Ma

• What Is Self-Control?
• Find counselling to help with self-control
• Abstinence means avoiding a behavior and moderation means using a behavior sparingly.
• People prefer abstinence when the goal conflict is seen as inherent in the goals.
• People prefer moderation when the goal conflict is seen as a resource competition.

When advising about self-control , there are dueling approaches. On the one hand, so much advice focuses on moderation (engaging in bad behaviors sparingly) that it was ridiculed in the Oscar Wilde quote (“Everything in moderation, including moderation”). On the other hand, many approaches to self-control—particularly in the area of addiction —focus on abstinence. Avoiding a substance altogether is the cornerstone of 12-step programs like AA, for example.

A paper by Phuong Le, Abigail Scholer, and Kentaro Fujita in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology that was first published online in 2024 explores this distinction. These researchers suggest that whether people think abstinence or moderation is better depends on how they think about the conflict between goals that leads to the dilemma.

One possibility is that people will think about a goal conflict as involving completely incompatible activities. For example, a college student might think that playing video games is completely incompatible with doing well in school so any amount of video game play would badly influence grades. For this student, abstaining from video games is likely the best strategy.

A second possibility is that people think about goal conflicts as involving a competition for resources. Another college student might think that playing video games soaks up time that could be used for studying, if studying requires time, then playing video games would be a bad idea. For this student, playing video games in moderation is likely the best strategy.

The researchers did several types of studies to support this view. In one set of studies, they defined two types of strategies for participants—abstinence versus a “balancing” strategy. Then, they had people read about particular self-control scenarios (like staying sober, working versus spending time with family, and quitting smoking versus hanging out with friends who are smokers).

In one study, the scenarios were selected to be ones that most people would see as incompatible goals versus resource dilemmas. For example, most people are likely to see sobriety as incompatible with drinking, but working and spending time for a resource dilemma. Using ratings, they confirmed how participants were viewing the scenarios. Participants were also asked the strategy (abstinence versus balancing) they would recommend for that goal conflict. People were more likely to recommend abstinence for incompatible conflicts than for resource dilemmas.

Other studies obtained a similar result with scenarios in which the goal conflict was described, and the instructions manipulated whether people were likely to view it as an incompatibility or a resource dilemma. In these studies, participants were once again more likely to recommend abstinence for goals seen as incompatible than for goals competing for a common resource.

Another study found that people can reason from the strategy people adopt to how they think about the conflict. In this study, participants heard about someone who had either adopted abstinence or balancing as a strategy. They had participants disclose the degree to which they thought this individual was thinking about the goal conflict as involving contradictory goals or situational resource competition. They were more likely to rate that a person thought the goals were incompatible when they chose abstinence than when they chose moderation.

Finally, the researchers engaged in a real-world exploration of this issue during the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants were asked whether they saw the likelihood of getting COVID as incompatible with socializing or as a more graded conflict. They had people rate their likelihood of participating in different social engagements. Participants were much more likely to abstain from social behavior when they saw COVID-19 as incompatible with social engagement than when they saw it as more situational.

These studies suggest that people associate goals that are incompatible with a strategy of abstinence and goals that compete for resources with a strategy of moderation. However, these studies do not explore which strategies are most effective in the long run. An important area for future research is to determine whether people who adopt a particular strategy for thinking about goals are more likely to be successful in the long run at achieving those goals. This work may also suggest different domains of experience in which the incompatibility/abstinence or resource-dilemma/moderation strategies are more likely to be effective.

Le, P. Q., Scholer, A. A., & Fujita, K. (2024). The role of conflict representation in abstinence versus moderation in self-control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000381

Art Markman, Ph.D. , is a cognitive scientist at the University of Texas whose research spans a range of topics in the way people think.

• Find a Therapist
• Find a Treatment Center
• Find a Support Group
• International
• New Zealand
• South Africa
• Switzerland
• Asperger's
• Bipolar Disorder
• Chronic Pain
• Eating Disorders
• Passive Aggression
• Personality
• Goal Setting
• Positive Psychology
• Stopping Smoking
• Low Sexual Desire
• Relationships
• Child Development
• Therapy Center NEW
• Diagnosis Dictionary
• Types of Therapy

Understanding what emotional intelligence looks like and the steps needed to improve it could light a path to a more emotionally adept world.

• Coronavirus Disease 2019
• Affective Forecasting
• Neuroscience