causes of korean war essay

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The korean war 101: causes, course, and conclusion of the conflict.

North Korea attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, igniting the Korean War. Cold War assumptions governed the immediate reaction of US leaders, who instantly concluded that Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had ordered the invasion as the first step in his plan for world conquest. “Communism,” President Harry S. Truman argued later in his memoirs, “was acting in Korea just as [Adolf] Hitler, [Benito] Mussolini, and the Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier.” If North Korea’s aggression went “unchallenged, the world was certain to be plunged into another world war.” This 1930s history lesson prevented Truman from recognizing that the origins of this conflict dated to at least the start of World War II, when Korea was a colony of Japan. Liberation in August 1945 led to division and a predictable war because the US and the Soviet Union would not allow the Korean people to decide their own future.

Before 1941, the US had no vital interests in Korea and was largely indifferent to its fate.

Before 1941, the US had no vital interests in Korea and was largely in- different to its fate. But after Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his advisors acknowledged at once the importance of this strategic peninsula for peace in Asia, advocating a postwar trusteeship to achieve Korea’s independence. Late in 1943, Roosevelt joined British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek in signing the Cairo Declaration, stating that the Allies “are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” At the Yalta Conference in early 1945, Stalin endorsed a four-power trusteeship in Korea. When Harry S. Truman became president after Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, however, Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe had begun to alarm US leaders. An atomic attack on Japan, Truman thought, would preempt Soviet entry into the Pacific War and allow unilateral American occupation of Korea. His gamble failed. On August 8, Stalin declared war on Japan and sent the Red Army into Korea. Only Stalin’s acceptance of Truman’s eleventh-hour proposal to divide the peninsula into So- viet and American zones of military occupation at the thirty-eighth parallel saved Korea from unification under Communist rule.

Deterioration of Soviet-American relations in Europe meant that neither side was willing to acquiesce in any agreement in Korea that might strengthen its adversary.

US military occupation of southern Korea began on September 8, 1945. With very little preparation, Washing- ton redeployed the XXIV Corps under the command of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge from Okinawa to Korea. US occupation officials, ignorant of Korea’s history and culture, quickly had trouble maintaining order because al- most all Koreans wanted immediate in- dependence. It did not help that they followed the Japanese model in establishing an authoritarian US military government. Also, American occupation officials relied on wealthy land- lords and businessmen who could speak English for advice. Many of these citizens were former Japanese collaborators and had little interest in ordinary Koreans’ reform demands. Meanwhile, Soviet military forces in northern Korea, after initial acts of rape, looting, and petty crime, implemented policies to win popular support. Working with local people’s committees and indigenous Communists, Soviet officials enacted sweeping political, social, and economic changes. They also expropriated and punished landlords and collaborators, who fled southward and added to rising distress in the US zone. Simultaneously, the Soviets ignored US requests to coordinate occupation policies and allow free traffic across the parallel.

Deterioration of Soviet-American relations in Europe meant that neither side was willing to acquiesce in any agreement in Korea that might strengthen its adversary. This became clear when the US and the Soviet Union tried to implement a revived trusteeship plan after the Moscow Conference in December 1945. Eighteen months of intermittent bilateral negotiations in Korea failed to reach agreement on a representative group of Koreans to form a provisional government, primarily because Moscow refused to consult with anti-Communist politicians opposed to trustee- ship. Meanwhile, political instability and economic deterioration in southern Korea persisted, causing Hodge to urge withdrawal. Postwar US demobilization that brought steady reductions in defense spending fueled pressure for disengagement. In September 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) added weight to the withdrawal argument when they advised that Korea held no strategic significance. With Communist power growing in China, however, the Truman administration was unwilling to abandon southern Korea precipitously, fearing domestic criticism from Republicans and damage to US credibility abroad.

Seeking an answer to its dilemma, the US referred the Korean dispute to the United Nations, which passed a resolution late in 1947 calling for internationally supervised elections for a government to rule a united Korea. Truman and his advisors knew the Soviets would refuse to cooper- ate. Discarding all hope for early reunification, US policy by then had shifted to creating a separate South Korea, able to defend itself. Bowing to US pressure, the United Nations supervised and certified as valid obviously undemocratic elections in the south alone in May 1948, which resulted in formation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in August. The Soviet Union responded in kind, sponsoring the creation of the Democratic People’s Re- public of Korea (DPRK) in September. There now were two Koreas, with President Syngman Rhee installing a repressive, dictatorial, and anti-Communist regime in the south, while wartime guerrilla leader Kim Il Sung imposed the totalitarian Stalinist model for political, economic, and social development on the north. A UN resolution then called for Soviet-American withdrawal. In December 1948, the Soviet Union, in response to the DPRK’s request, removed its forces from North Korea.

South Korea’s new government immediately faced violent opposition, climaxing in October 1948 with the Yosu-Sunchon Rebellion. Despite plans to leave the south by the end of 1948, Truman delayed military withdrawal until June 29, 1949. By then, he had approved National Security Council (NSC) Paper 8/2, undertaking a commitment to train, equip, and supply an ROK security force capable of maintaining internal order and deterring a DPRK attack. In spring 1949, US military advisors supervised a dramatic improvement in ROK army fighting abilities. They were so successful that militant South Korean officers began to initiate assaults northward across the thirty-eighth parallel that summer. These attacks ignited major border clashes with North Korean forces. A kind of war was already underway on the peninsula when the conventional phase of Korea’s conflict began on June 25, 1950. Fears that Rhee might initiate an offensive to achieve reunification explain why the Truman administration limited ROK military capabilities, withholding tanks, heavy artillery, and warplanes.

Pursuing qualified containment in Korea, Truman asked Congress for three-year funding of economic aid to the ROK in June 1949. To build sup- port for its approval, on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean G. Ache- son’s speech to the National Press Club depicted an optimistic future for South Korea. Six months later, critics charged that his exclusion of the ROK from the US “defensive perimeter” gave the Communists a “green light” to launch an invasion. However, Soviet documents have established that Acheson’s words had almost no impact on Communist invasion planning. Moreover, by June 1950, the US policy of containment in Korea through economic means appeared to be experiencing marked success. The ROK had acted vigorously to control spiraling inflation, and Rhee’s opponents won legislative control in May elections. As important, the ROK army virtually eliminated guerrilla activities, threatening internal order in South Korea, causing the Truman administration to propose a sizeable military aid increase. Now optimistic about the ROK’s prospects for survival, Washington wanted to deter a conventional attack from the north.

Stalin worried about South Korea’s threat to North Korea’s survival. Throughout 1949, he consistently refused to approve Kim Il Sung’s persistent requests to authorize an attack on the ROK. Communist victory in China in fall 1949 pressured Stalin to show his support for a similar Korean outcome. In January 1950, he and Kim discussed plans for an invasion in Moscow, but the Soviet dictator was not ready to give final consent. How- ever, he did authorize a major expansion of the DPRK’s military capabilities. At an April meeting, Kim Il Sung persuaded Stalin that a military victory would be quick and easy because of southern guerilla support and an anticipated popular uprising against Rhee’s regime. Still fearing US military intervention, Stalin informed Kim that he could invade only if Mao Zedong approved. During May, Kim Il Sung went to Beijing to gain the consent of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Significantly, Mao also voiced concern that the Americans would defend the ROK but gave his reluctant approval as well. Kim Il Sung’s patrons had joined in approving his reckless decision for war.

On the morning of June 25, 1950, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) launched its military offensive to conquer South Korea. Rather than immediately committing ground troops, Truman’s first action was to approve referral of the matter to the UN Security Council because he hoped the ROK military could defend itself with primarily indirect US assistance. The UN Security Council’s first resolution called on North Korea to accept a cease- fire and withdraw, but the KPA continued its advance. On June 27, a second resolution requested that member nations provide support for the ROK’s defense. Two days later, Truman, still optimistic that a total commitment was avoidable, agreed in a press conference with a newsman’s description of the conflict as a “police action.” His actions reflected an existing policy that sought to block Communist expansion in Asia without using US military power, thereby avoiding increases in defense spending. But early on June 30, he reluctantly sent US ground troops to Korea after General Douglas MacArthur, US Occupation commander in Japan, advised that failure to do so meant certain Communist destruction of the ROK.

Kim Il Sung’s patrons [Stalin and Mao] had joined in approving his reckless decision for war.

On July 7, 1950, the UN Security Council created the United Nations Command (UNC) and called on Truman to appoint a UNC commander. The president immediately named MacArthur, who was required to submit periodic reports to the United Nations on war developments. The ad- ministration blocked formation of a UN committee that would have direct access to the UNC commander, instead adopting a procedure whereby MacArthur received instructions from and reported to the JCS. Fifteen members joined the US in defending the ROK, but 90 percent of forces were South Korean and American with the US providing weapons, equipment, and logistical support. Despite these American commitments, UNC forces initially suffered a string of defeats. By July 20, the KPA shattered five US battalions as it advanced one hundred miles south of Seoul, the ROK capital. Soon, UNC forces finally stopped the KPA at the Pusan Perimeter, a rectangular area in the southeast corner of the peninsula.

On September 11, 1950, Truman had approved NSC-81, a plan to cross the thirty-eighth parallel and forcibly reunify Korea

Despite the UNC’s desperate situation during July, MacArthur developed plans for a counteroffensive in coordination with an amphibious landing behind enemy lines allowing him to “compose and unite” Korea. State Department officials began to lobby for forcible reunification once the UNC assumed the offensive, arguing that the US should destroy the KPA and hold free elections for a government to rule a united Korea. The JCS had grave doubts about the wisdom of landing at the port of Inchon, twenty miles west of Seoul, because of narrow access, high tides, and sea- walls, but the September 15 operation was a spectacular success. It allowed the US Eighth Army to break out of the Pusan Perimeter and advance north to unite with the X Corps, liberating Seoul two weeks later and sending the KPA scurrying back into North Korea. A month earlier, the administration had abandoned its initial war aim of merely restoring the status quo. On September 11, 1950, Truman had approved NSC-81, a plan to cross the thirty-eighth parallel and forcibly reunify Korea.

Invading the DPRK was an incredible blunder that transformed a three-month war into one lasting three years. US leaders had realized that extension of hostilities risked Soviet or Chinese entry, and therefore, NSC- 81 included the precaution that only Korean units would move into the most northern provinces. On October 2, PRC Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai warned the Indian ambassador that China would intervene in Korea if US forces crossed the parallel, but US officials thought he was bluffing. The UNC offensive began on October 7, after UN passage of a resolution authorizing MacArthur to “ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea.” At a meeting at Wake Island on October 15, MacArthur assured Truman that China would not enter the war, but Mao already had decided to intervene after concluding that Beijing could not tolerate US challenges to its regional credibility. He also wanted to repay the DPRK for sending thou- sands of soldiers to fight in the Chinese civil war. On August 5, Mao instructed his northeastern military district commander to prepare for operations in Korea in the first ten days of September. China’s dictator then muted those associates opposing intervention.

On October 19, units of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) under the command of General Peng Dehuai crossed the Yalu River. Five days later, MacArthur ordered an offensive to China’s border with US forces in the vanguard. When the JCS questioned this violation of NSC-81, MacArthur replied that he had discussed this action with Truman on Wake Island. Having been wrong in doubting Inchon, the JCS remained silent this time. Nor did MacArthur’s superiors object when he chose to retain a divided command. Even after the first clash between UNC and CPV troops on October 26, the general remained supremely confident. One week later, the Chinese sharply attacked advancing UNC and ROK forces. In response, MacArthur ordered air strikes on Yalu bridges without seeking Washing- ton’s approval. Upon learning this, the JCS prohibited the assaults, pending Truman’s approval. MacArthur then asked that US pilots receive permission for “hot pursuit” of enemy aircraft fleeing into Manchuria. He was infuriated upon learning that the British were advancing a UN proposal to halt the UNC offensive well short of the Yalu to avert war with China, viewing the measure as appeasement.

On November 24, MacArthur launched his “Home-by-Christmas Offensive.” The next day, the CPV counterattacked en masse, sending UNC forces into a chaotic retreat southward and causing the Truman administration immediately to consider pursuing a Korean cease-fire. In several public pronouncements, MacArthur blamed setbacks not on himself but on unwise command limitations. In response, Truman approved a directive to US officials that State Department approval was required for any comments about the war. Later that month, MacArthur submitted a four- step “Plan for Victory” to defeat the Communists—a naval blockade of China’s coast, authorization to bombard military installations in Manchuria, deployment of Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist forces in Korea, and launching of an attack on mainland China from Taiwan. The JCS, despite later denials, considered implementing these actions before receiving favorable battlefield reports.

Early in 1951, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, new commander of the US Eighth Army, halted the Communist southern advance. Soon, UNC counterattacks restored battle lines north of the thirty-eighth parallel. In March, MacArthur, frustrated by Washington’s refusal to escalate the war, issued a demand for immediate surrender to the Communists that sabotaged a planned cease-fire initiative. Truman reprimanded but did not recall the general. On April 5, House Republican Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin Jr. read MacArthur’s letter in Congress, once again criticizing the administration’s efforts to limit the war. Truman later argued that this was the “last straw.” On April 11, with the unanimous support of top advisors, the president fired MacArthur, justifying his action as a defense of the constitutional principle of civilian control over the military, but another consideration may have exerted even greater influence on Truman. The JCS had been monitoring a Communist military buildup in East Asia and thought a trusted UNC commander should have standing authority to retaliate against Soviet or Chinese escalation, including the use of nuclear weapons that they had deployed to forward Pacific bases. Truman and his advisors, as well as US allies, distrusted MacArthur, fearing that he might provoke an incident to widen the war.

MacArthur’s recall ignited a firestorm of public criticism against both Truman and the war. The general returned to tickertape parades and, on April 19, 1951, he delivered a televised address before a joint session of Congress, defending his actions and making this now-famous assertion: “In war there is no substitute for victory.” During Senate joint committee hearings on his firing in May, MacArthur denied that he was guilty of in- subordination. General Omar N. Bradley, the JCS chair, made the administration’s case, arguing that enacting MacArthur’s proposals would lead to “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.” Meanwhile, in April, the Communists launched the first of two major offensives in a final effort to force the UNC off the peninsula. When May ended, the CPV and KPA had suffered huge losses, and a UNC counteroffensive then restored the front north of the parallel, persuading Beijing and Pyongyang, as was already the case in Washington, that pursuit of a cease-fire was necessary. The belligerents agreed to open truce negotiations on July 10 at Kaesong, a neutral site that the Communists deceitfully occupied on the eve of the first session.

North Korea and China created an acrimonious atmosphere with at- tempts at the outset to score propaganda points, but the UNC raised the first major roadblock with its proposal for a demilitarized zone extending deep into North Korea. More important, after the talks moved to Panmunjom in October, there was rapid progress in resolving almost all is- sues, including establishment of a demilitarized zone along the battle lines, truce enforcement inspection procedures, and a postwar political conference to discuss withdrawal of foreign troops and reunification. An armistice could have been concluded ten months after talks began had the negotiators not deadlocked over the disposition of prisoners of war (POWs). Rejecting the UNC proposal for non-forcible repatriation, the Communists demanded adherence to the Geneva Convention that required return of all POWs. Beijing and Pyongyang were guilty of hypocrisy regarding this matter because they were subjecting UNC prisoners to unspeakable mistreatment and indoctrination.

On April 11, with the unanimous support of top advisors, the presi- dent fired MacArthur.

Truman ordered that the UNC delegation assume an inflexible stand against returning Communist prisoners to China and North Korea against their will. “We will not buy an armistice,” he insisted, “by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery.” Although Truman unquestionably believed in the moral rightness of his position, he was not unaware of the propaganda value derived from Communist prisoners defecting to the “free world.” His advisors, however, withheld evidence from him that contradicted this assessment. A vast majority of North Korean POWs were actually South Koreans who either joined voluntarily or were impressed into the KPA. Thousands of Chinese POWs were Nationalist soldiers trapped in China at the end of the civil war, who now had the chance to escape to Taiwan. Chinese Nationalist guards at UNC POW camps used terrorist “re-education” tactics to compel prisoners to refuse repatriation; resisters risked beatings or death, and repatriates were even tattooed with anti- Communist slogans.

In November 1952, angry Americans elected Dwight D. Eisenhower president, in large part because they expected him to end what had be- come the very unpopular “Mr. Truman’s War.” Fulfilling a campaign pledge, the former general visited Korea early in December, concluding that further ground attacks would be futile. Simultaneously, the UN General Assembly called for a neutral commission to resolve the dispute over POW repatriation. Instead of embracing the plan, Eisenhower, after taking office in January 1953, seriously considered threatening a nuclear attack on China to force a settlement. Signaling his new resolve, Eisenhower announced on February 2 that he was ordering removal of the US Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait, implying endorsement for a Nationalist assault on the mainland. What influenced China more was the devastating impact of the war. By summer 1952, the PRC faced huge domestic economic problems and likely decided to make peace once Truman left office. Major food shortages and physical devastation persuaded Pyongyang to favor an armistice even earlier.

An armistice ended fighting in Korea on July 27, 1953.

Early in 1953, China and North Korea were prepared to resume the truce negotiations, but the Communists preferred that the Americans make the first move. That came on February 22 when the UNC, repeating a Red Cross proposal, suggested exchanging sick and wounded prisoners. At this key moment, Stalin died on March 5. Rather than dissuading the PRC and the DPRK as Stalin had done, his successors encouraged them to act on their desire for peace. On March 28, the Communist side accepted the UNC proposal. Two days later, Zhou Enlai publicly proposed transfer of prisoners rejecting repatriation to a neutral state. On April 20, Operation Little Switch, the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, began, and six days later, negotiations resumed at Panmunjom. Sharp disagreement followed over the final details of the truce agreement. Eisenhower insisted later that the PRC accepted US terms after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles informed India’s prime minister in May that without progress toward a truce, the US would terminate the existing limitations on its conduct of the war. No documentary evidence has of yet surfaced to support his assertion.

Also, by early 1953, both Washington and Beijing clearly wanted an armistice, having tired of the economic burdens, military losses, political and military constraints, worries about an expanded war, and pressure from allies and the world community to end the stalemated conflict. A steady stream of wartime issues threatened to inflict irrevocable damage on US relations with its allies in Western Europe and nonaligned members of the United Nations. Indeed, in May 1953, US bombing of North Korea’s dams and irrigation system ignited an outburst of world criticism. Later that month and early in June, the CPV staged powerful attacks against ROK defensive positions. Far from being intimidated, Beijing thus displayed its continuing resolve, using military means to persuade its adversary to make concessions on the final terms. Before the belligerents could sign the agreement, Rhee tried to torpedo the impending truce when he released 27,000 North Korean POWs. Eisenhower bought Rhee’s acceptance of a cease-fire with pledges of financial aid and a mutual security pact.

An armistice ended fighting in Korea on July 27, 1953. Since then, Koreans have seen the war as the second-greatest tragedy in their recent history after Japanese colonial rule. Not only did it cause devastation and three million deaths, it also confirmed the division of a homogeneous society after thirteen centuries of unity, while permanently separating millions of families. Meanwhile, US wartime spending jump-started Japan’s economy, which led to its emergence as a global power. Koreans instead had to endure the living tragedy of yearning for reunification, as diplomatic tension and military clashes along the demilitarized zone continued into the twenty-first century.

Korea’s war also dramatically reshaped world affairs. In response, US leaders vastly increased defense spending, strengthened the North Atlantic Treaty Organization militarily, and pressed for rearming West Germany. In Asia, the conflict saved Chiang’s regime on Taiwan, while making South Korea a long-term client of the US. US relations with China were poisoned for twenty years, especially after Washington persuaded the United Nations to condemn the PRC for aggression in Korea. Ironically, the war helped Mao’s regime consolidate its control in China, while elevating its regional prestige. In response, US leaders, acting on what they saw as Korea’s primary lesson, relied on military means to meet the challenge, with disastrous results in Việt Nam.

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SUGGESTED RESOURCES

Kaufman, Burton I. The Korean Conflict . Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999.

“Korea: Lessons of the Forgotten War.” YouTube video, 2:20, posted by KRT Productions Inc., 2000. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fi31OoQfD7U.

Lee, Steven Hugh. The Korean War. New York: Longman, 2001.

Matray, James I. “Korea’s War at Sixty: A Survey of the Literature.” Cold War History 11, no. 1 (February 2011): 99–129.

US Department of Defense. Korea 1950–1953, accessed July 9, 2012, http://koreanwar.defense.gov/index.html.

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What Caused the Korean War and Why Did the U.S. Get Involved?

By: Jessica Pearce Rotondi

Updated: June 26, 2023 | Original: May 7, 2021

On June 25, 1950, the Korean War (1950-1953) began when 75,000 members of the North Korean People’s Army crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. It would be the first military action of the Cold War .

In 1945, superpowers drew a line bisecting the Korean peninsula to separate the Soviet-supported Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (today’s North Korea) from the U.S.-supported Republic of Korea to the South. Essentially a civil conflict, the Korean War became a proxy war between superpowers clashing over communism and democracy. Between 2 million and 4 million people died, 70 percent of them civilians . No peace treaty was ever signed, although in December 2021, North and South Korea, the United States and China agreed to declare a formal end to the war.

What Caused the Korean War?

“The Korean War was a civil war,” says Charles Kim, Korea Foundation associate professor, Department of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Korea had been a unified kingdom for centuries before Japan annexed it following its victory in the Russo-Japanese War . The Japanese ruled over Korea with an iron fist from 1910 to 1945. To weaken their colony, they used assimilation tactics like forbidding the Korean language and de-emphasizing Korean history in favor of Japanese culture.

When Japan surrendered to the Allies following the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II, control of the Korean peninsula passed from Japan to the U.S. and the Soviet Union . The superpowers chose to divide Korea between themselves at the 38 th parallel , which roughly bisected the peninsula. “It didn’t correspond to political, cultural, or terrain boundaries,” Kim says. The Soviets set up a communist government to the North, and the United States helped establish a military government in the South.

“At the time, Korean politics ran the gamut from communism on the extreme left to right-wing nationalists, all vying for power,” Kim says. “There was a lot of contention between the Soviet and U.S. occupation forces, and with the polarization of Korean leadership, it was a volatile situation,” says Kim. “Each viewed the other as illegitimate. Both wanted to invade the other to unify Korea.”

Scattered border skirmishes from 1948-50 kept tensions simmering. In 1948, the United States called on the United Nations to sponsor a vote for Koreans to determine their future government. When the North refused to participate, the South formed its own government in Seoul under the anti-communist Syngman Rhee. In retaliation, Kim Il Sung, a former communist guerrilla, was named Premier of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Kim Il Sung went to Moscow in 1949 and again in 1950 to seek Soviet support for invading South Korea. “He was able to get Joseph Stalin to commit to providing support for the invasion of South Korea. He also got a verbal commitment from China ,” Kim says.

When North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, “North Korea was banking on the U.S. not coming back,” says Kim. North Korean forces were strong; they had the aid of experienced veterans of the Chinese Civil War , which had just ended in August of 1949. North Koreans made swift progress southward. The world watched to see what would happen next.

Why Did the U.S. Get Involved in the Korean War?

“The U.S. initially didn’t want to get involved in any kind of invasion. They didn’t want to get tangled up with North Korea, much less China or the Soviet Union,” says Kim. Key events on the world stage caused the United States to change course.

On August 29, 1949, the Soviets detonated their first atomic bomb. Klaus Fuchs, a physicist who had helped the United States build its atomic bomb program, had leaked the blueprint of the “ Fat Man ” atomic bomb to the Soviets. The revelation stoked Cold War paranoia. Then, on October 1, 1949, communist revolutionary Mao Zedong announced the creation of the People’s Republic of China following the defeat of the U.S.-supported Chinese nationalists led by Chiang Kai-shek. “‘The loss of China’ was a phrase used by Republican critics of the Truman administration,” says Kim.

Thousands of Chinese troops were sent to aid the North Koreans. “Mao Zedong was adamant about helping out his North Korean allies. He wanted to improve China’s prestige in the communist world by what he saw as freeing South Koreans from U.S. imperialist rule,” Kim says.

President Truman Orders US Forces to South Korea

On April 14, 1950, Truman received a document called National Security Council Paper Number 68 ( NSC-68 ). Created by the Defense Department, the State Department, the CIA , and other agencies, it advised the president to grow the defense industry to counter what these agencies saw as the threat of global communism. The recommendations cemented Truman’s next move.

On June 27, 1950 , President Truman ordered U.S. forces to South Korea to repulse the North’s invasion. “Democrats needed to look tough on communism,” Kim says. “Truman used Korea to send a message that the U.S. will contain communism and come to the aid of their allies.”

The United States never formally declared war on North Korea. Instead, Truman referred to the addition of ground troops as a “police action.” U.S. General Douglas MacArthur ’s Inch’on landing on September 8, 1950, turned the tide of the war and enabled Southern forces to push Northward beyond the 38 th parallel.

On December 16, 1950, U.S. President Harry Truman declared a state of emergency , proclaiming that “communist imperialism” was a threat to democracy. 

Impact of the Korean War

The Korean War armistice , signed on July 27, 1953, drew a new border between North Korea and South Korea , granting South Korea some additional territory and demilitarizing the zone between the two nations. A formal peace treaty was never signed.

Over 2.5 million people died in the Korean War. Despite two prisoner-of-war exchanges , Operation Little Switch and Operation Big Switch, 7,800 Americans are still missing in action, while South Korea is still searching for over 124,000 servicemen .

“The absence of a final conclusion to the Korean War has kept it alive as a major influence on Asian affairs,” says Sheila Miyoshi Jager, professor of East Asian Studies at Oberlin and author of Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea . 

She argues the Korean War directly influenced President Lyndon B. Johnson’s policy in Vietnam : “Here was a successful sovereign nation, divided by the Cold War, being threatened by its communist neighbor backed by China and the Soviet Union. Korea was now seen as a war that had successfully stopped the Chinese communist expansion in Asia.”

Sandwiched between World War II and the Vietnam War, the Korean War was nicknamed “The Forgotten War.” But to Jager, it’s not over: “The Korean War continues to influence events in East Asia,” she says. Tensions between the United States and North Korea remain.

HISTORY Vault: Korea: The Forgotten War

Five years after WWII, America is once again plunged into bloody battle. Robert Stack hosts this penetrating documentary about the war in Korea.

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Korean War, a ‘Forgotten’ Conflict That Shaped the Modern World

By Liam Stack

• Jan. 1, 2018

The Korean War has been called “the Forgotten War” in the United States, where coverage of the 1950s conflict was censored and its memory decades later is often overshadowed by World War II and the Vietnam War.

But the three-year conflict in Korea, which pitted communist and capitalist forces against each other, set the stage for decades of tension among North Korea, South Korea and the United States.

It also helped set the tone for Soviet-American rivalry during the Cold War, profoundly shaping the world we live in today, historians said.

As tensions between North Korea and the United States continue to mount amid missile tests and taunts, here is a brief guide to the Korean War and the impacts that linger more than 60 years after its end.

How did the Korean War start?

The Korean War began when North Korean troops pushed into South Korea on June 25, 1950, and it lasted until 1953. But experts said the military conflict could not be properly understood without considering its historical context.

Korea, a Japanese colony from 1910 until 1945, was occupied by the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The United States proposed temporarily dividing the country along the 38th Parallel as a way to maintain its influence on the peninsula, which bordered Russia, said Charles K. Armstrong, a professor of Korean history at Columbia University.

“A divided Korea was something unprecedented,” he said.

But the divide lasted in part because of competing visions among Koreans for the country’s future. “Fundamentally it was a civil war, fought over issues going back into Korea’s colonial experience,” said Bruce Cumings, a professor of history at the University of Chicago.

In 1948, the American-backed, anti-communist southern administration, based in Seoul, declared itself the Republic of Korea. It was led by Syngman Rhee, who lived in exile in the United States for many years and was installed as the South Korean leader by the Office of Strategic Services, a predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency, Professor Cumings said.

Soon after, the Soviet-backed, communist northern administration, based in Pyongyang, declared itself the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Its leader was Kim Il-sung, who fought alongside communist forces during the Chinese civil war and was the grandfather of North Korea’s current dictator, Kim Jong-un.

Each regime was unstable, rejected the legitimacy of the other and considered itself to be Korea’s sole rightful ruler. Border skirmishes between the two were frequent before the Korean War began.

Who were the combatants?

The war pitted South Korea and the United States, fighting under the auspices of the United Nations, against North Korea and China.

Other nations contributed troops, too, but American forces did most of the fighting. “The South Korean Army virtually collapsed” at the start of the war, Professor Cumings said.

The Soviet Union supported North Korea at the beginning of the war, giving it arms, tanks and strategic advice. But China soon emerged as its most important ally, sending soldiers to fight in Korea as a way to keep the conflict away from its border.

The Chinese leader, Mao Zedong, also saw China’s participation in the war as a way to thank Korean Communists who fought in the Chinese civil war, Professor Cumings said.

“There was a lot of field contact between American and Chinese forces,” Professor Armstrong said. “In a sense, this was the first and only war between China and the United States, so far.”

How damaging was it?

The war devastated Korea. Historians said that between three million and four million people were killed, although firm figures have never been produced, particularly by the North Korean government. As many as 70 percent of the dead may have been civilians.

Destruction was particularly acute in the North, which was subjected to years of American bombing, including with napalm. Roughly 25 percent of its prewar population was killed, Professor Cumings said, and many of the survivors lived underground by the war’s end.

“North Korea was flattened,” he said. “The North Koreans see the American bombing as a Holocaust, and every child is taught about it.”

Damage was also widespread in South Korea, where Seoul changed hands four times. But most combat took place in the northern or central parts of the peninsula around the current Demilitarized Zone, which divides the countries, Professor Cumings said.

How did it end?

Technically, the Korean War did not end.

The fighting stopped when North Korea, China and the United States reached an armistice in 1953. But South Korea did not agree to the armistice, and no formal peace treaty was ever signed.

“There is still a technical state of war between the combatants,” Professor Cumings said.

Neither North nor South Korea had achieved its goal: the destruction of the opposing regime and reunification of the divided peninsula.

Since 1953 there has been an uneasy coexistence between North and South Korea, which hosts over 20,000 American troops. At one time hundreds of American nuclear weapons were based there.

“It was from the Korean War onward that we had a permanent, global American military presence that we had never had before,” Professor Armstrong said. Other countries that host American troops include Qatar, Japan, Italy and Germany. “It was a real turning point for America’s global role.”

In the decades after the war, South Korea transformed into an economic powerhouse. Professor Cumings said many of its citizens now know little about the conflict and have “a fatalistic orientation” toward the economically isolated North.

Meanwhile, North Korea became “the world’s most amazing garrison state with the fourth largest army in the world.”

“Its generals are still fighting the war,” Professor Cumings said. “For them it has never ended.”

Decoding the Origins and Complexities of the Korean War

This essay about the Korean War explores the intricate factors that led to the conflict on the Korean Peninsula from 1950 to 1953. Emerging from the aftermath of World War II, Korea became a battleground for the competing interests of the United States and the Soviet Union. The division of the peninsula along the 38th parallel, intended as a temporary measure, laid the groundwork for the protracted conflict. Fueled by Cold War tensions, ideological differences solidified the separation, with the North under Kim Il-sung’s communist rule and the South led by Syngman Rhee with an anti-communist stance. The escalation in 1949, marked by the Soviet Union’s atomic bomb test, intensified the strategic significance of Korea, prompting increased U.S. support for South Korea. The outbreak of war in 1950, initiated by North Korean forces, led to a complex and bloody conflict, resulting in an uneasy armistice in 1953. The causes encompassed ideological divides, geopolitical power struggles, and intricate global dynamics, leaving a lasting impact on East Asia’s geopolitical landscape. Also at PapersOwl you can find more free essay examples related to Identity.

How it works

This essay delves into the complex web of events and factors that led to the outbreak of the Korean War, an intense conflict that unfolded on the Korean Peninsula from 1950 to 1953. The origins of the war are rooted in the aftermath of World War II, as the Korean Peninsula became a geopolitical chessboard for the competing interests of the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the waning days of World War II, the Allied forces, led by the United States and the Soviet Union, liberated Korea from Japanese occupation.

The peninsula, previously a Japanese colony, was divided along the 38th parallel into two occupation zones, with the Soviet Union administering the northern part and the United States overseeing the southern part. This division, intended as a temporary measure, set the stage for the protracted conflict that would follow.

As the Cold War intensified, ideological differences between the two superpowers further solidified the division of Korea. The Soviet Union established a communist government in the north under Kim Il-sung, while the United States supported the establishment of a separate government in the south, led by Syngman Rhee, with an anti-communist orientation. This ideological chasm heightened tensions, creating a volatile environment on the peninsula.

The situation escalated in 1949 when the Soviet Union successfully tested its first atomic bomb, ending the United States’ monopoly on nuclear weapons. This development intensified the arms race between the two superpowers, increasing the strategic significance of regions like Korea. The United States, fearing the spread of communism, reinforced its commitment to South Korea, providing military and economic aid to bolster its defense against potential aggression from the North.

On June 25, 1950, the delicate balance in Korea was shattered when North Korean forces, under Kim Il-sung’s command, invaded the South, launching a full-scale attack across the 38th parallel. The swift and aggressive move caught the international community off guard, and the United Nations quickly condemned the invasion as a breach of international peace. The UN Security Council, with the notable absence of the Soviet Union due to a boycott over the representation of the People’s Republic of China, passed a resolution authorizing military intervention to repel the North Korean invasion.

The United States, viewing the Korean conflict through the lens of containment, committed a sizable military force to support South Korea. Under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, UN forces launched a counteroffensive, pushing North Korean forces back across the 38th parallel and reclaiming territory in the South. However, the tides of the war shifted dramatically when Chinese forces, fearing the encroachment of Western influence, intervened on behalf of North Korea. This intervention led to a protracted and bloody stalemate along the 38th parallel, as both sides struggled for dominance.

The Korean War witnessed brutal battles and significant human suffering, as the frontlines shifted back and forth along the peninsula. The conflict, often characterized by trench warfare and harsh winter conditions, exacted a heavy toll on the civilian population. The devastation of cities and the loss of life further underscored the tragic consequences of the geopolitical struggle playing out on Korean soil.

The Korean War came to an uneasy halt in 1953 with the signing of an armistice agreement, effectively ending the fighting and establishing the Korean Demilitarized Zone along the 38th parallel. However, no formal peace treaty was ever signed, leaving the Korean Peninsula technically in a state of war to this day.

The causes of the Korean War are multifaceted, encompassing the ideological divide between communism and anti-communism, geopolitical power struggles between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the complex interplay of regional and global dynamics. The war’s legacy endures, shaping the geopolitical landscape of East Asia and leaving an indelible mark on the collective memory of those who experienced its tumultuous and tragic events.

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The Causes of Korea War and How It Epitomized Cold War Essay

Introduction, causes of the korean war, how it epitomized cold war, works cited.

The Korean War was fought in Korean Peninsula between armies from North and those from South Korea. The war began in the wake of June 25, 1950 at 4:30 AM and fighting proceeded until July 27, 1953. It is estimated that two million Koreans perished, majority of who were northerners. There was blame from both sides as to who might have started the war. The north, having been led by communist Kim Il-Sung, got help mostly from People’s Republic of China, and the USSR.

The south, led by nationalist Syngman Rhee, got support from many countries in the United Nations, and especially the United States. The war ended with a truce and with devastating consequences. Even now in the 21 st Century, South Korea and North Korea are still officially and technically at war and United States still keeps troops in South Korea in case North Korea ever invades again. North and South Korea are separated by the 38th parallel.

As for any war, its root causes can always be classified as tangible and intangible. The Korean War had both of these elements. The only and main cause of the Korean War was the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950. The annexation of the Korean peninsula in the early 1910 by Japan was also a possible cause because they might have developed some sections of Korea leaving other sections marginalized.

After World War II ended, American and British forces set up a pro-Western country in the southern part of the peninsula while the Soviet Union set up a Communist government in the north (Hunt 35). The war, then, as can be construed was an attempt to use force to unify the entire peninsula under Communist rule.

The Cold War was an important cause in the Korean War to be ignored when intangible causes are discussed. Relationship between the United States and the USSR had badly been damaged after the war. China joined Communism in October 1949. The President of the United States of America, Harry Truman, was very worried that other countries around China might also become Communist, such as Japan (Hunt 55).

Thus in trying to maintain reputation, Truman spent a lot of money to make the American Army much bigger and Americans wanted to see this new powerful Army in action. Joseph Stalin’s people also wanted to see Stalin get better results in his conquests for popularization of communism. Stalin had just lost the fight for the Berlin Wall and wanted another chance to prove that he could beat United States; the Korean War was his chance and opportunity.

The Korean War can be judged to have epitomized the cold war in very many aspects. The cold war was characterized by war of words and propaganda, economic sanctions and supremacy, the arms race and nuclear proliferation, space race and exploration. Even though the United States rejected MacArthur’s suggestion for use of nuclear weapons against Chinese troops, the North has been struggling to adopt the technology to possibly use it to disturb neighbors (Hunt 75).

The emergence of South Korea as an economic power perhaps indicates that capitalism is far more superior to communism which has left the North in a mismanaged economic wasteland. The solidification of the political policy of containment which made United States to invade Vietnam is also testimony.

Hunt, Michael. The World Transformed: 1945 to the Present . Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2004. Print.

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IvyPanda. (2024, February 23). The Causes of Korea War and How It Epitomized Cold War. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-causes-of-korea-war-and-how-it-epitomized-cold-war/

"The Causes of Korea War and How It Epitomized Cold War." IvyPanda , 23 Feb. 2024, ivypanda.com/essays/the-causes-of-korea-war-and-how-it-epitomized-cold-war/.

IvyPanda . (2024) 'The Causes of Korea War and How It Epitomized Cold War'. 23 February.

IvyPanda . 2024. "The Causes of Korea War and How It Epitomized Cold War." February 23, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-causes-of-korea-war-and-how-it-epitomized-cold-war/.

1. IvyPanda . "The Causes of Korea War and How It Epitomized Cold War." February 23, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-causes-of-korea-war-and-how-it-epitomized-cold-war/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "The Causes of Korea War and How It Epitomized Cold War." February 23, 2024. https://ivypanda.com/essays/the-causes-of-korea-war-and-how-it-epitomized-cold-war/.

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The Causes of the Korean War

• ❖ The Cold War .
• ❖ The US policy of containment.
• ❖ The division of Korea .
• ❖ Different governments in Korea.
• ❖ The development of communism in China .
• ❖ Interference from other countries.
• ❖ The Korean War was a proxy of the Cold War . The world's two leading superpowers - the USA and the USSR - were in an ideological conflict, competing for dominance. However, they could only fight through proxy wars due to the threat of nuclear warfare.
• ❖ When communist North Korea invaded South Korea, the USA was able to fight communist Russia without direct confrontation. The Korean War was an extension of the Cold War .
• ❖ The Cold War rivalry between the USSR and the USA was a critical cause of the Korean War , as North Korea would not invade South Korea without Stalin's permission. He gave it as it strengthened his position in the context of the Cold War.
• ❖ In 1947 the President of the USA, Harry S Truman, committed to helping any country under threat from a communist takeover. This was known as the Truman Doctrine and meant that, when North Korea invaded South Korea, America helped the south.
• ❖ Until 1950, most of the USA's efforts in fighting the spread of communism were focused on Europe. However, in 1949, the communists came to power in China despite America's efforts to support the anti-communist government.
• ❖ Truman and the US government believed communism would spread throughout Asia. The USA was worried the fall of China would lead to neighbouring countries following suit - South Korea and then Japan.
• ❖ Stalin's support of the invasion alone did not bring about the war. The USA was determined to prevent any more nations in Asia falling to communism.
• ❖ The division of Korea along the 38th parallel was supposed to be temporary. North and South Korea both wanted to unite, but had different ideas about the style of government. The North wanted a united communist nation, while the South wanted a united capitalist nation.
• ❖ The division of Korea , and the different styles of government, meant the USA and the USSR were both committed to supporting opposing sides. It was, therefore, an extension of the Cold War .
• ❖ North Korea was controlled by the communist Kim II-Sung , who had strong links to the USSR .
• ❖ Kim II-Sung was committed to uniting Korea as a communist nation.
• ❖ Kim II-Sung persuaded Stalin , leader of the USSR , and Mao Zedong , ruler of China , to back an invasion of South Korea. Stalin saw this as an opportunity to continue the Cold War through proxy.
• ❖ South Korea was controlled by anti-communist Syngman Rhee , who had boasted about planning an attack to take over the north and unite Korea as a capitalist nation. This was the excuse Kim II-Sung needed to invade.
• ❖ The USA intervened to support South Korea. President Truman sent warships and offered advisers and supplies. Without this, the South would not have been able to fight the war.
• ❖ Kim II-Sung had asked for Stalin's support to invade the south in 1949, but Stalin had refused. Kim II-Sung could not launch an invasion without aid from the USSR or China . Even though Stalin gave permission in 1950, he made it clear his troops would not fight in the conflict directly, and any reinforcements must come from China.
• ❖ In 1949 the communists won the civil war in China , against Chiang Kai-shek's non-communist government. China became a communist country.
• ❖ Because of its policy of containment , the US had supported Chiang Kai-shek's efforts, trying to prevent China from turning Communist. This strategy failed when Chiang Kai-shek lost the civil war.
• ❖ When China became communist , America was scared communism would spread through Asia, as it believed in the domino theory . The USA was committed to ensuring communism did not take hold in South Korea.

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The Causes of the Korean War Essay Example

There were many factors that contributed to the start of the Korean war but 

-> China

Were the most substantial 

The first reason Stalin's actions were the greatest contributor to the Korean war was that he gave permission for North Korea to invade South Korea, in April 1950 Stalin gave the leader of North Korea - Kim Il Sung - permission to invade South Korea and then in June 1950 North Korea went through with the invasion.

This led to the start of the Korean war because the koreans wouldn't have been able to invade South Korea without USSR support seeing as they were too weak to fight them alone and would need support from a greater power. 

Consequently,Stalin giving permission to North Korea to invade South Korea was the biggest factor in causing the outbreak of the Korean War.

A second reason is that the USA was the biggest factor in causing the Korean War was that the USA went against Stalin's plans, in 1949 a meeting was help to discuss who would take the chinese seat on the UN board, the USA supported Kai-shek [a chinese nationalist] to take the chinese sea instead of Mao zedong [a chinese communist].

This led to the start of the Korean War because this act angered Stalin as he wanted a communist leader on the UN board alongside him, so after USA vetoed the decision to let Mao zedong take the seat Stalin storms out the UN meeting in anger and frustration, this caused more tension between the 2 superpowers as Stalin could have seen this as an attack on communism as he already knew that the US hated communism.

Consequently the US going against Stalin's plans was the biggest factor in causing the outbreak of the Korean War.

The final reason was that China was the most important factor in starting the Korean War was that China sided with the USSR in helping North Korea.

When the Chinese civil war came to an end and Mao Zedong - leader of the People's Republic of China [a Chinese communist party] - won he turned China into a communist country. This led to the start of the Korean war because once Mao zedong won, he became close allies with the USSR and later supported North Korea with their invasion of the south by providing them with military aid, troops and financial aid, this meant that North Korea had the support of 2 superpowers in their plan to spread communism.

Consequently China siding with the USSR was the biggest factor in causing the outbreak of the Korean War.

In conclusion, i agree that stalin was the most important factor in causing the outbreak of the Korean War, but out of the points i have made i think that Stalin giving North Korea permission to invade South Korea was the most important because if Stalin had not have giving his permission Kim Il Sung would have never been able to go on with his plan - because he didn't have a big enough army or the support of a greater country - This also would have created tension between the US and USSR seeing as they control either sides of Korea, stalin probably knew this forwell and would have liked to push USA to their limit seeing as the USA had angered the USSR when they didn't let Mao zedong take the chinese seat at the UN meetings.

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