assignment on right to equality

14th Amendment

The Fourteenth Amendment addresses many aspects of citizenship and the rights of citizens. The most commonly used -- and frequently litigated -- phrase in the amendment is " equal protection of the laws ", which figures prominently in a wide variety of landmark cases, including Brown v. Board of Education (racial discrimination), Roe v. Wade (reproductive rights), Bush v. Gore (election recounts), Reed v. Reed (gender discrimination), and University of California v. Bakke (racial quotas in education). See more ...

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Amendment xiv.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Representatives shall be apportioned among the several states according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each state, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a state, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age , and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such state.

No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any state, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any state legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any state, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.

The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

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• Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a milestone document in the history of human rights. Drafted by representatives with different legal and cultural backgrounds from all regions of the world, the Declaration was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 ( General Assembly resolution 217 A ) as a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations. It sets out, for the first time, fundamental human rights to be universally protected and it has been translated into over 500 languages . The UDHR is widely recognized as having inspired, and paved the way for, the adoption of more than seventy human rights treaties, applied today on a permanent basis at global and regional levels (all containing references to it in their preambles). 

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, therefore,

The General Assembly,

Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction. 

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

• Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
• No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

• Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
• Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
• Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.
• This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
• Everyone has the right to a nationality.
• No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.
• Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
• Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
• The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
• Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.
• No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

• Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.
• No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
• Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
• Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
• The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

• Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.
• Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.
• Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.
• Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

• Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
• Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.
• Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
• Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.
• Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.
• Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.
• Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

• Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.
• In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
• These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

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2023: UDHR turns 75

What is the Declaration of Human Rights? Narrated by Morgan Freeman.

UN digital ambassador Elyx animates the UDHR

To mark the 75th anniversary of the UDHR in December 2023, the United Nations has partnered once again with French digital artist YAK (Yacine Ait Kaci) – whose illustrated character Elyx is the first digital ambassador of the United Nations – on an animated version of the 30 Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

UDHR Illustrated

Read the Illustrated edition of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UDHR in 80+ languages

Watch and listen to people around the world reading articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in more than 80 languages.

Women Who Shaped the Declaration

Women delegates from various countries played a key role in getting women’s rights included in the Declaration. Hansa Mehta of India (standing above Eleanor Roosevelt) is widely credited with changing the phrase "All men are born free and equal" to "All human beings are born free and equal" in Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

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This article is concerned with social and political equality. In its prescriptive usage, ‘equality’ is a highly contested concept. Its normally positive connotation gives it a rhetorical power suitable for use in political slogans (Westen 1990). At least since the French Revolution, equality has served as one of the leading ideals of the body politic; in this respect, it is at present probably the most controversial of the great social ideals. There is controversy concerning the precise notion of equality, the relation of justice and equality (the principles of equality), the material requirements and measure of the ideal of equality (equality of what?), the extension of equality (equality among whom?), and its status within a comprehensive (liberal) theory of justice (the value of equality). This article will discuss each of these issues in turn.

1. Defining the Concept

2.1 formal equality, 2.2 proportional equality, 2.3 moral equality, 2.4 presumption of equality, 3.1 simple equality and objections to equality in general, 3.2 libertarianism, 3.3 utilitarianism, 3.4 equality of welfare, 3.5 equality of resources, 3.6 responsibility and luck-egalitarianism, 3.7 equality of opportunity for welfare or advantage, 3.8 capabilities approaches, 4. relational equality, 5. equality among whom, 6.1. kinds of egalitarianism, 6.2 equality vs. priority or sufficiency, other internet resources, related entries.

‘Equality’ is a contested concept: “People who praise it or disparage it disagree about what they are praising or disparaging” (Dworkin 2000, p. 2). Our first task is therefore to provide a clear definition of equality in the face of widespread misconceptions about its meaning as a political idea. The terms ‘equality’ (Greek: isotes ; Latin: aequitas , aequalitas ; French: égalité ; German Gleichheit ), ‘equal’, and ‘equally’ signify a qualitative relationship. ‘Equality’ (or ‘equal’) signifies correspondence between a group of different objects, persons, processes or circumstances that have the same qualities in at least one respect, but not all respects, i.e., regarding one specific feature, with differences in other features. ‘Equality’ must then be distinguished from ‘identity’, which refers to one and the same object corresponding to itself in all its features. For the same reason, it needs to be distinguished from ‘similarity’ – the concept of merely approximate correspondence (Dann 1975, p. 997; Menne 1962, p. 44 ff.; Westen 1990, pp. 39, 120). Thus, to say that men are equal, for example, is not to say that they are identical. Equality implies similarity rather than ‘sameness’.

Judgements of equality presume a difference between the things compared. According to this definition, the notion of ‘complete’ or ‘absolute’ equality may be seen as problematic because it would violate the presumption of a difference. Two non-identical objects are never completely equal; they are different at least in their spatiotemporal location. If things do not differ they should not be called ‘equal’, but rather, more precisely, ‘identical’, such as the morning and the evening star. Here usage might vary. Some authors do consider absolute qualitative equality admissible as a borderline concept (Tugendhat & Wolf 1983, p. 170).

‘Equality’ can be used in the very same sense both to describe and prescribe, as with ‘thin’: “you are thin” and “you are too thin”. The approach taken to defining the standard of comparison for both descriptive and prescriptive assertions of equality is very important (Oppenheim 1970). In the descriptive case, the common standard is itself descriptive, for example when two people are said to have the same weight. In the prescriptive use, the standard prescribes a norm or rule, for example when it is said people ought to be equal before the law. The standards grounding prescriptive assertions of equality contain at least two components. On the one hand, there is a descriptive component, since the assertions need to contain descriptive criteria, in order to identify those people to which the rule or norm applies. The question of this identification – who belongs to which category? – may itself be normative, as when we ask to whom the U.S. laws apply. On the other hand, the comparative standards contain something normative – a moral or legal rule, such as the U.S. laws – specifying how those falling under the norm are to be treated. Such a rule constitutes the prescriptive component (Westen 1990, chap. 3). Sociological and economic analyses of (in-)equality mainly pose the questions of how inequalities can be determined and measured and what their causes and effects are. In contrast, social and political philosophy is in general concerned mainly with the following questions: what kind of equality, if any, should obtain, and with respect to whom and when ? Such is the case in this article as well.

‘Equality’ and ‘equal’ are incomplete predicates that necessarily generate one question: equal in what respect? (Rae 1980,p. 132 f.) Equality essentially consists of a tripartite relation between two (or several) objects or persons and one (or several) qualities. Two objects A and B are equal in a certain respect if, in that respect, they fall under the same general term. ‘Equality’ denotes the relation between the objects compared. Every comparison presumes a tertium comparationis , a concrete attribute defining the respect in which the equality applies – equality thus referring to a common sharing of this comparison-determining attribute. This relevant comparative standard represents a ‘variable’ (or ‘index’) of the concept of equality that needs to be specified in each particular case (Westen 1990, p. 10); differing conceptions of equality here emerge from one or another descriptive or normative moral standard. There is another source of diversity as well: As Temkin (1986, 1993, 2009) argues, various different standards might be used to measure inequality, with the respect in which people are compared remaining constant. The difference between a general concept and different specific conceptions (Rawls 1971, p. 21 f.) of equality may explain why some people claim ‘equality’ has no unified meaning – or is even devoid of meaning. (Rae 1981, p. 127 f., 132 f.)

For this reason, it helps to think of the idea of equality or inequality, in the context of social justice, not as a single principle, but as a complex group of principles forming the basic core of today’s egalitarianism. Different principles yield different answers. Both equality and inequality are complex and multifaceted concepts (Temkin 1993, chap. 2). In any real historical context, it is clear that no single notion of equality can sweep the field (Rae 1981, p. 132). Many egalitarians concede that much of our discussion of the concept is vague, but they believe there is also a common underlying strain of important moral concerns implicit in it (Williams 1973). Above all, it serves to remind us of our common humanity, despite various differences (cf. 2.3. below). In this sense, egalitarianism is often thought of as a single, coherent normative doctrine that embraces a variety of principles. Following the introduction of different principles and theories of equality, the discussion will return in the last section to the question how best to define egalitarianism and its core value.

2. Principles of Equality and Justice

Equality in its prescriptive usage is closely linked to morality and justice, and distributive justice in particular. Since antiquity equality has been considered a constitutive feature of justice. (On the history of the concept, cf. Albernethy 1959, Benn 1967, Brown 1988, Dann 1975, Thomson 1949.) People and movements throughout history have used the language of justice to contest inequalities. But what kind of role does equality play in a theory of justice? Philosophers have sought to clarify this by defending a variety of principles and conceptions of equality. This section introduces four such principles, ranging from the highly general and uncontroversial to the more specific and controversial. The next section reviews various conceptions of the ‘currency’ of equality. Different interpretations of the role of equality in a theory of justice emerge according to which of the four principles and metrics have been adopted. The first three principles of equality hold generally and primarily for all actions upon others and affecting others, and for their resulting circumstances. From the fourth principle onward, i.e., starting with the presumption of equality, the focus will be mainly on distributive justice and the evaluation of distribution.

When two persons have equal status in at least one normatively relevant respect, they must be treated equally with regard in this respect. This is the generally accepted formal equality principle that Aristotle articulated in reference to Plato: “treat like cases as like” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , V.3. 1131a10–b15; Politics , III.9.1280 a8–15, III. 12. 1282b18–23). The crucial question is which respects are normatively relevant and which are not. Some authors see this formal principle of equality as a specific application of a rule of rationality: it is irrational, because inconsistent, to treat equal cases unequally without sufficient reasons (Berlin 1955–56). But others claim that what is at stake here is a moral principle of justice, one reflecting the impartial and universalizable nature of moral judgments. On this view, the postulate of formal equality demands more than consistency with one’s subjective preferences: the equal or unequal treatment in question must be justifiable to the relevantly affected parties, and this on the sole basis of a situation’s objective features.

According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of equality, numerical and proportional (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , 1130b–1132b; cf. Plato, Laws , VI.757b–c). A way of treating others, or a distribution arising from it, is equal numerically when it treats all persons as indistinguishable, thus treating them identically or granting them the same quantity of a good per capita. That is not always just. In contrast, a way of treating others or a distribution is proportional or relatively equal when it treats all relevant persons in relation to their due. Just numerical equality is a special case of proportional equality. Numerical equality is only just under special circumstances, namely when persons are equal in the relevant respects so that the relevant proportions are equal. Proportional equality further specifies formal equality; it is the more precise and comprehensive formulation of formal equality. It indicates what produces an adequate equality.

Proportional equality in the treatment and distribution of goods to persons involves at least the following concepts or variables: Two or more persons \((P_1, P_2)\) and two or more allocations of goods to persons \((G)\) and \(X\) and \(Y\) as the quantity in which individuals have the relevant normative quality \(E\). This can be represented as an equation with fractions or as a ratio. If \(P1\) has \(E\) in the amount of \(X\) and if \(P_2\) has \(E\) in the amount \(Y\), then \(P_1\) is due \(G\) in the amount of \(X'\) and \(P_2\) is due \(G\) in the amount of \(Y'\), so that the ratio \(X/Y = X'/Y'\) is valid. (For the formula to be usable, the potentially large variety of factors involved have to be both quantifiable in principle and commensurable, i.e., capable of synthesis into an aggregate value.)

When factors speak for unequal treatment or distribution, because the persons are unequal in relevant respects, the treatment or distribution proportional to these factors is just. Unequal claims to treatment or distribution must be considered proportionally: that is the prerequisite for persons being considered equally.

This principle can also be incorporated into hierarchical, inegalitarian theories. It indicates that equal output is demanded with equal input. Aristocrats, perfectionists, and meritocrats all believe that persons should be assessed according to their differing deserts, understood in the broad sense of fulfillment of some relevant criterion. Reward and punishment, benefits and burdens, should be proportional to such deserts. Since this definition leaves open who is due what, there can be great inequality when it comes to presumed fundamental (natural) rights, deserts, and worth -– this is apparent in both Plato and Aristotle.

Aristotle’s idea of justice as proportional equality contains a fundamental insight. The idea offers a framework for a rational argument between egalitarian and non-egalitarian ideas of justice, its focal point being the question of the basis for an adequate equality (Hinsch 2003). Both sides accept justice as proportional equality. Aristotle’s analysis makes clear that the argument involves those features that decide whether two persons are to be considered equal or unequal in a distributive context.

On the formal level of pure conceptual explication, justice and equality are linked through these formal and proportional principles. Justice cannot be explained without these equality principles, which themselves only receive their normative significance in their role as principles of justice.

Formal and proportional equality is simply a conceptual schema. It needs to be made precise – i.e., its open variables need to be filled out. The formal postulate remains empty as long as it is unclear when, or through what features, two or more persons or cases should be considered equal. All debates over the proper conception of justice – over who is due what – can be understood as controversies over the question of which cases are equal and which unequal (Aristotle, Politics , 1282b 22). For this reason, equality theorists are correct in stressing that the claim that persons are owed equality becomes informative only when one is told what kind of equality they are owed (Nagel 1979; Rae 1981; Sen 1992, p. 13). Every normative theory implies a certain notion of equality. In order to outline their position, egalitarians must thus take account of a specific (egalitarian) conception of equality. To do so, they need to identify substantive principles of equality, which are discussed below.

Until the eighteenth century, it was assumed that human beings are unequal by nature. This postulate collapsed with the advent of the idea of natural right, which assumed a natural order in which all human beings were equal. Against Plato and Aristotle, the classical formula for justice according to which an action is just when it offers each individual his or her due took on a substantively egalitarian meaning in the course of time: everyone deserved the same dignity and respect. This is now the widely held conception of substantive, universal, moral equality. It developed among the Stoics, who emphasized the natural equality of all rational beings, and in early New Testament Christianity, which envisioned that all humans were equal before God, although this principle was not always adhered to in the later history of the church. This important idea was also taken up both in the Talmud and in Islam, where it was grounded in both Greek and Hebraic elements. In the modern period, starting in the seventeenth century, the dominant idea was of natural equality in the tradition of natural law and social contract theory. Hobbes (1651) postulated that in their natural condition, individuals possess equal rights, because over time they have the same capacity to do each other harm. Locke (1690) argued that all human beings have the same natural right to both (self-)ownership and freedom. Rousseau (1755) declared social inequality to be the result of a decline from the natural equality that characterized our harmonious state of nature, a decline catalyzed by the human urge for perfection, property and possessions (Dahrendorf 1962). For Rousseau (1755, 1762), the resulting inequality and rule of violence can only be overcome by binding individual subjectivity to a common civil existence and popular sovereignty. In Kant’s moral philosophy (1785), the categorical imperative formulates the equality postulate of universal human worth. His transcendental and philosophical reflections on autonomy and self-legislation lead to a recognition of the same freedom for all rational beings as the sole principle of human rights (Kant 1797, p. 230). Such Enlightenment ideas stimulated the great modern social movements and revolutions, and were taken up in modern constitutions and declarations of human rights. During the French Revolution, equality, along with freedom and fraternity, became a basis of the Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen of 1789.

The principle that holds that human beings, despite their differences, are to be regarded as one another’s equals, is often also called ‘human equality’ or ‘basic equality’ or ‘equal worth’ or ‘human dignity’ (William 1962, Vlastos 1962, Kateb 2014, Waldron 2017, Rosen 2018). Whether these terms are synonyms is a matter of interpretation, but “they cluster together to form a powerful body of principle” (Waldron 2017, p. 3).

This fundamental idea of equal respect for all persons and of the equal worth or equal dignity of all human beings (Vlastos 1962) is widely accepted (Carter 2011, but see also Steinhoff 2015). In a period in which there is not agreement across the members of a complex society to any one metaphysical, religious, or traditional view (Habermas 1983, p. 53, 1992, pp. 39–44), it appears impossible to peacefully reach a general agreement on common political aims without accepting that persons must be treated as equals. As a result, moral equality constitutes the ‘egalitarian plateau’ for all contemporary political theories (Kymlicka 1990, p. 5).

Fundamental equality means that persons are alike in important relevant and specified respects alone, and not that they are all generally the same or can be treated in the same way (Nagel 1991). In a now commonly posed distinction, stemming from Dworkin (1977, p. 227), moral equality can be understood as prescribing treatment of persons as equals, i.e., with equal concern and respect, and not the often implausible principle of providing all persons with equal treatment. Recognizing that human beings are all equally individual does not mean treating them uniformly in any respects other than those in which they clearly have a moral claim to be treated alike.

Disputes arise, of course, concerning what these claims amount to and how they should be resolved. Philosophical debates are concerned with the kind of equal treatment normatively required when we mutually consider ourselves persons with equal dignity. The principle of moral equality is too abstract and needs to be made concrete if we are to arrive at a clear moral standard. Nevertheless, no conception of just equality can be deduced from the notion of moral equality. Rather, we find competing philosophical conceptions of equal treatment serving as interpretations of moral equality. These need to be assessed according to their degree of fidelity to the deeper ideal of moral equality (Kymlicka 1990, p. 44).

Many conceptions of equality operate along procedural lines involving a presumption of equality . More materially concrete, ethical approaches, as described in the next section below, are concerned with distributive criteria – the presumption of equality, in contrast, is a formal, procedural principle of construction located on a higher formal and argumentative level. What is at stake here is the question of the principle with which a material conception of justice should be constructed, particularly once the approaches described above prove inadequate. The presumption of equality is a prima facie principle of equal distribution for all goods politically suited for the process of public distribution. In the domain of political justice, all members of a given community, taken together as a collective body, have to decide centrally on the fair distribution of social goods, as well as on the distribution’s fair realization. Any claim to a particular distribution, including any existing distributive scheme, has to be impartially justified, i.e., no ownership should be recognized without justification. Applied to this political domain, the presumption of equality requires that everyone should get an equal share in the distribution unless certain types of differences are relevant and justify, through universally acceptable reasons, unequal shares. (With different terms and arguments, this principle is conceived as a presumption by Benn & Peters (1959, 111) and by Bedau (1967, 19); as a relevant reasons approach by Williams (1973); as a conception of symmetry by Tugendhat (1993, 374; 1997, chap. 3); as default option by Hinsch (2002, chap. 5); for criticism of the presumption of equality, cf. Westen (1990, chap. 10).) This presumption results in a principle of prima facie equal distribution for all distributable goods. A strict principle of equal distribution is not required, but it is morally necessary to justify impartially any unequal distribution. The burden of proof lies on the side of those who favor any form of unequal distribution. (For a justification of the presumption in favor of equality s. Gosepath 2004, II.8.; Gosepath 2015.)

The presumption of equality provides an elegant procedure for constructing a theory of distributive justice (Gosepath 2004). One has only to analyze what can justify unequal treatment or unequal distribution in different spheres. To put it briefly, the following postulates of equality are at present generally considered morally required.

Strict equality is called for in the legal sphere of civil freedoms, since – putting aside limitation on freedom as punishment – there is no justification for any exceptions. As follows from the principle of formal equality, all citizens must have equal general rights and duties, which are grounded in general laws that apply to all. This is the postulate of legal equality. In addition, the postulate of equal freedom is equally valid: every person should have the same freedom to structure his or her life, and this in the most far-reaching manner possible in a peaceful and appropriate social order.

In the political sphere, the possibilities for political participation should be equally distributed. All citizens have the same claim to participation in forming public opinion, and in the distribution, control, and exercise of political power. This is the postulate – requiring equal opportunity – of equal political power sharing. To ensure equal opportunity, social institutions have to be designed in such a way that persons who are disadvantaged, e.g. have a stutter or a low income, have an equal chance to make their views known and to participate fully in the democratic process.

In the social sphere, equally gifted and motivated citizens must have approximately the same chances to obtain offices and positions, independent of their economic or social class and native endowments. This is the postulate of fair equality of social opportunity. Any unequal outcome must nevertheless result from equality of opportunity, i.e., qualifications alone should be the determining factor, not social background or influences of milieu.

The equality required in the economic sphere is complex, taking account of several positions that – each according to the presumption of equality – justify a turn away from equality. A salient problem here is what constitutes justified exceptions to equal distribution of goods, the main subfield in the debate over adequate conceptions of distributive equality and its currency. The following factors are usually considered eligible for justified unequal treatment: (a) need or differing natural disadvantages (e.g. disabilities); (b) existing rights or claims (e.g. private property); (c) differences in the performance of special services (e.g. desert, efforts, or sacrifices); (d) efficiency; and (e) compensation for direct and indirect or structural discrimination (e.g. affirmative action).

These factors play an essential, albeit varied, role in the following alternative egalitarian theories of distributive justice. These offer different accounts of what should be equalized in the economic sphere. Most can be understood as applications of the presumption of equality (whether they explicitly acknowledge it or not); only a few (like strict equality, libertarianism, and sufficiency) are alternatives to the presumption.

3. Conceptions of Distributive Equality: Equality of What?

Every effort to interpret the concept of equality and to apply the principles of equality mentioned above demands a precise measure of the parameters of equality. We need to know the dimensions within which the striving for equality is morally relevant. What follows is a brief review of the seven most prominent conceptions of distributive equality, each offering a different answer to one question: in the field of distributive justice, what should be equalized, or what should be the parameter or “currency” of equality?

Simple equality, meaning everyone being furnished with the same material level of goods and services, represents a strict position as far as distributive justice is concerned. It is generally rejected as untenable.

Hence, with the possible exception of Babeuf (1796) and Shaw (1928), no prominent author or movement has demanded strict equality. Since egalitarianism has come to be widely associated with the demand for economic equality, and this in turn with communistic or socialistic ideas, it is important to stress that neither communism nor socialism – despite their protest against poverty and exploitation and their demand for social security for all citizens – calls for absolute economic equality. The orthodox Marxist view of economic equality was expounded in the Critique of the Gotha Program (1875). Marx here rejects the idea of legal equality, on three grounds. First, he indicates, equality draws on a limited number of morally relevant perspectives and neglects others, thus having unequal effects. In Marx’s view, the economic structure is the most fundamental basis for the historical development of society, and is thus the point of reference for explaining its features. Second, theories of justice have concentrated excessively on distribution instead of the basic questions of production. Third, a future communist society needs no law and no justice, since social conflicts will have vanished.

As an idea, simple equality fails because of problems that are raised in regards to equality in general. It is useful to review these problems, as they require resolution in any plausible approach to equality.

(i) We need adequate indices for the measurement of the equality of the goods to be distributed. Through what concepts should equality and inequality be understood? It is thus clear that equality of material goods can lead to unequal satisfaction. Money constitutes a typical, though inadequate, index; at the very least, equal opportunity has to be conceived in other terms.

(ii) The time span needs to be indicated for realizing the desired model of equal distribution (McKerlie 1989, Sikora 1989). Should we seek to equalize the goods in question over complete individual lifetimes, or should we seek to ensure that various life segments are as equally provisioned as possible?

(iii) Equality distorts incentives promoting achievement in the economic field, and the administrative costs of redistribution produce wasteful inefficiencies (Okun 1975). Equality and efficiency need to be balanced. Often, Pareto-optimality is demanded in this respect, usually by economists. A social condition is Pareto-optimal or Pareto-efficient when it is not possible to shift to another condition judged better by at least one person and worse by none (Sen 1970, chap. 2, 2*). A widely discussed alternative to the Pareto principle is the Kaldor-Hicks welfare criterion. This stipulates that a rise in social welfare is always present when the benefits accruing through the distribution of value in a society exceed the corresponding costs. A change thus becomes desirable when the winners in such a change could compensate the losers for their losses, and still retain a substantial profit. In contrast to the Pareto-criterion, the Kaldor-Hicks criterion contains a compensation rule (Kaldor 1939). For purposes of economic analysis, such theoretical models of optimal efficiency make a great deal of sense. However, the analysis is always made relative to a starting situation that can itself be unjust and unequal. A society can thus be (close to) Pareto-optimality – i.e., no one can increase his or her material goods or freedoms without diminishing those of someone else – while also displaying enormous inequalities in the distribution of the same goods and freedoms. For this reason, egalitarians claim that it may be necessary to reduce Pareto-optimality for the sake of justice, if there is no more egalitarian distribution that is also Pareto-optimal. In the eyes of their critics, equality of whatever kind should not lead to some people having to make do with less, when this equalizing down does not benefit any of those who are in a worse position.

(iv) Moral objections : A strict and mechanical equal distribution between all individuals does not sufficiently take into account the differences among individuals and their situations. In essence, since individuals desire different things, why should everyone receive the same goods? Intuitively, for example, we can recognize that a sick person has other claims than a healthy person, and furnishing each with the same goods would be mistaken. With simple equality, personal freedoms are unacceptably limited and distinctive individual qualities insufficiently acknowledged; in this way they are in fact unequally regarded. Furthermore, persons not only have a moral right to their own needs being considered, but a right and a duty to take responsibility for their own decisions and the resulting consequences.

Working against the identification of distributive justice with simple equality, a basic postulate of many present-day egalitarians is as follows: human beings are themselves responsible for certain inequalities resulting from their free decisions; aside from minimum aid in emergencies, they deserve no recompense for such inequalities (but cf. relational egalatarians, discussed in Section 4 ). On the other hand, they are due compensation for inequalities that are not the result of self-chosen options. For egalitarians, the world is morally better when equality of life conditions prevail. This is an amorphous ideal demanding further clarification. Why is such equality an ideal, and what precise currency of equality does it involve?

By the same token, most egalitarians do not advocate an equality of outcome, but different kinds of equality of opportunity, due to their emphasis on a pair of morally central points: that individuals are responsible for their decisions, and that the only things to be considered objects of equality are those which serve the real interests of individuals. The opportunities to be equalized between people can be opportunities for well-being (i.e. objective welfare), or for preference satisfaction (i.e., subjective welfare), or for resources. It is not equality of objective or subjective well-being or resources themselves that should be equalized, but an equal opportunity to gain the well-being or resources one aspires to. Such equality depends on their being a realm of options for each individual equal to the options enjoyed by all other persons, in the sense of the same prospects for fulfillment of preferences or the possession of resources. The opportunity must consist of possibilities one can really take advantage of. Equal opportunity prevails when human beings effectively enjoy equal realms of possibility.

(v) Simple equality is very often associated with equality of results (although these are two distinct concepts). However, to strive only for equality of results is problematic. To illustrate the point, let us briefly limit the discussion to a single action and the event or state of affairs resulting from it. Arguably, actions should not be judged solely by the moral quality of their results, as important as this may be. One must also consider the way in which the events or circumstances to be evaluated have come about. Generally speaking, a moral judgement requires not only the assessment of the results of the action in question (the consequentialist aspect) but, first and foremost, the assessment of the intention of the actor (the deontological aspect). The source and its moral quality influence the moral judgement of the results (Pogge 1999, sect. V). For example, if you strike me, your blow will hurt me; the pain I feel may be considered bad in itself, but the moral status of your blow will also depend on whether you were (morally) allowed such a gesture (perhaps through parental status, although that is controversial) or even obliged to execute it (e.g. as a police officer preventing me from doing harm to others), or whether it was in fact prohibited but not prevented. What is true of individual actions (or their omission) has to be true mutatis mutandis of social institutions and circumstances like distributions resulting from collective social actions (or their omission). Social institutions should therefore be assessed not only on the basis of information about how they affect individual quality of life. A society in which people starve on the streets is certainly marked by inequality; nevertheless, its moral quality, i.e., whether the society is just or unjust with regard to this problem, also depends on the suffering’s causes. Does the society allow starvation as an unintended but tolerable side effect of what its members see as a just distributive scheme? Indeed, does it even defend the suffering as a necessary means, as with forms of Social Darwinism? Or has the society taken measures against starvation which have turned out to be insufficient? In the latter case, whether the society has taken such steps for reasons of political morality or efficiency again makes a moral difference. Hence even for egalitarians, equality of results is too narrow and one-sided a focus.

(vi) Finally, there is a danger of (strict) equality leading to uniformity, rather than to a respect for pluralism and democracy (Cohen 1989; Arneson 1993). In the contemporary debate, this complaint has been mainly articulated in feminist and multiculturalist theory. A central tenet of feminist theory is that gender has been and remains a historically variable and internally differentiated relation of domination. The same holds for so-called racial and ethnic differences, which are often still conceived of as marking different values. The different groups involved here rightly object to their discrimination, marginalization, and domination, and an appeal to equality of status thus seems a solution. However, as feminists and multiculturalists have pointed out, equality, as usually understood and practiced, is constituted in part by a denial and ranking of differences; as a result it seems less useful as an antidote to relations of domination. “Equality” can often mean the assimilation to a pre-existing and problematic ‘male’ or ‘white’ or ‘middle class’ norm. In short, domination and a fortiori inequality often arises out of an inability to appreciate and nurture differences, not out of a failure to see everyone as the same. To recognize these differences should however not lead to an essentialism grounded in sexual or cultural characteristics. There is a crucial debate between those who insist that sexual, racial, and ethnic differences should become irrelevant, on the one hand, and those believing that such differences, even though culturally relevant, should not furnish a basis for inequality: that one should rather find mechanisms for securing equality, despite valued differences. Neither of these strategies involves rejecting equality. The dispute is about how equality is to be attained (McKinnon 1989, Taylor 1992).

Proposing a connection between equality and pluralism, Michael Walzer’s theory (1983) aims at what he calls “complex equality”. According to Walzer, relevant reasons can only speak in favor of distributing specific types of goods in specific spheres, not in several or all spheres. Against a theory of simple equality promoting equal distribution of dominant goods, which underestimates the complexity of the criteria at work in each given sphere, the dominance of particular goods needs to be ended. For instance, purchasing power in the political sphere through means derived from the economic sphere (i.e., money) must be prevented. Walzer’s theory of complex equality is not actually aimed at equality per se, but at the separation of spheres of justice; the theory’s designation is misleading. Any theory of equality should, however, as per Walzer, avoid monistic conceptions and recognize instead the complexity of life and the plurality of criteria for justice.

The preceding considerations yield the following desideratum: instead of simple equality, a more complex equality needs to be conceptualized. That concept should resolve the problems discussed above through a distinction of various classes of goods, a separation of spheres, and a differentiation of relevant criteria.

Libertarianism and economic liberalism represent minimalist positions in relation to distributive justice. Citing Locke, they both postulate an original right to freedom and property, thus arguing against redistribution and social rights and for the free market (Nozick 1974; Hayek 1960). They assert an opposition between equality and freedom: the individual (natural) right to freedom can be limited only for the sake of foreign and domestic peace. For this reason, libertarians consider maintaining public order the state’s only legitimate duty. They assert a natural right to self-ownership (the philosophical term for “ownership of oneself” – i.e., one’s will, body, work, etc.) that entitles everybody to hitherto unowned bits of the external world by means of mixing their labor with it. All individuals can thus claim property if “enough and as good” is left over for others (Locke’s proviso). Correspondingly, they defend market freedoms and oppose the use of redistributive taxation schemes for the sake of egalitarian social justice. A principal objection to libertarian theory is that its interpretation of the Lockean proviso – nobody’s situation should be worsened through an initial acquisition of property – leads to an excessively weak requirement and is thus unacceptable (Kymlicka 1990, pp.108–117). However, with a broader and more adequate interpretation of what it means for one a situation to be worse than another, it is much more difficult to justify private appropriation and, a fortiori , all further ownership rights. If the proviso recognizes the full range of interests and alternatives that self-owners have, then it will not generate unrestricted rights over unequal amounts of resources. Another objection is that precisely if one’s own free accomplishment is what is meant to count, as the libertarians argue, success should not depend strictly on luck, extraordinary natural gifts, inherited property, and status. In other words, equal opportunity also needs to at least be present as a counterbalance, ensuring that the fate of human beings is determined by their decisions and not by unavoidable social circumstances. Equal opportunity thus seems to be the frequently vague minimal formula at work in every egalitarian conception of distributive justice. Many egalitarians, however, wish for more – namely, an equality of (at least basic) life conditions .

In any event, with a shift away from a strictly negative idea of freedom, economic liberalism can indeed itself point the way to more social and economic equality. For with such a shift, what is at stake is not only assuring an equal right to self-defense, but also furnishing everyone more or less the same chance to actually make use of the right to freedom (e.g. Van Parijs 1995, Steiner 1994, Otsuka 2005). In other words, certain basic goods need to be furnished to assure the equitable or “fair value of the basic liberties” (Rawls 1993, pp. 356–63).

It is possible to interpret utilitarianism as concretizing moral equality – and this in a way meant to offer the same consideration to the interests of all human beings (Kymlicka 1990, pp. 31f., Hare 1981, p. 26, Sen 1992, pp. 13f.). From the utilitarian perspective, since everyone counts as one and no one as more than one (Bentham), the interests of all should be treated equally without consideration of contents of interest or an individual’s material situation. For utilitarianism, this means that all enlightened personal interests have to be fairly aggregated. The morally proper action is the one that maximizes utility (Hare 1984). This conception of equal treatment has been criticized as inadequate by many opponents of utilitarianism. At least in utilitarianism’s classical form – so the critique reads – the hoped for moral equality is flawed, because all desires are taken up by the utilitarian calculation, including “selfish” and “external” preferences (Dworkin 1977, p. 234) that are meant to all have equal weight, even when they diminish the ‘rights’ and intentions of others. This conflicts with our everyday understanding of equal treatment. What is here at play is an argument involving “offensive” and “expensive” taste: a person cannot expect others to sustain his or her desires at the expense of their own (Kymlicka 1990, p. 40 f.). Rather, according to generally shared conviction, equal treatment consistently requires a basis of equal rights and resources that cannot be taken away from one person, whatever the desire of others. In line with Rawls (1971, pp. 31, 564, cf. 450), many hold that justice entails according no value to interests insofar as they conflict with justice. According to this view, unjustified preferences will not distort the mutual claims people have on each other. Equal treatment has to consist of everyone being able to claim a fair portion, and not in all interests having the same weight in disposal over my portion. Utilitarians cannot admit any restrictions on interests based on morals or justice. As long as utilitarian theory lacks a concept of justice and fair allocation, it must fail in its goal of treating everyone as equals. As Rawls (1971, pp. 27) also famously argues, utilitarianism that involves neglecting the separateness of persons does not contain a proper interpretation of moral equality as equal respect for each individual.

The concept of welfare equality is motivated by an intuition that when it comes to political ethics, what is at stake is individual well-being. The central criterion for justice must consequently be equalizing the level of welfare. But taking welfare as what is to be equalized leads to difficulties resembling those of utilitarianism. If one contentiously identifies subjective welfare with preference satisfaction, it seems implausible to count all individual preferences as equal, some – such as the desire to do others wrong – being inadmissible on grounds of justice (the offensive taste argument). Any welfare-centered concept of equality grants people with refined and expensive taste more resources – something distinctly at odds with our moral intuitions (the expensive taste argument) (Dworkin 1981a). However, satisfaction in the fulfillment of desires cannot serve as a standard, since we wish for more than a simple feeling of happiness. A more viable standard for welfare comparisons would seem to be success in the fulfillment of preferences. A fair evaluation of such success cannot be purely subjective, but requires a standard of what should or could have been achieved. This itself involves an assumption regarding just distribution, so it cannot stand as an independent criterion for justice. Another serious problem with any welfare-centered concept of equality is that it cannot take account of either desert (Feinberg 1970) or personal responsibility for one’s own well-being, to the extent this is possible and reasonable.

Represented above all by both Rawls and Dworkin, resource equality avoids such problems (Rawls 1971; Dworkin 1981b). It holds individuals responsible for their decisions and actions, but not for circumstances beyond their control, such as race, sex, skin-color, intelligence, and social position, thus excluding these as distributive criteria. Equal opportunity is insufficient because it does not compensate for unequal innate gifts. What applies for social circumstances should also apply for such gifts, as both are purely arbitrary from a moral point of view.

According to Rawls, human beings should have the same initial expectations of “basic goods,” i.e., all-purpose goods; this in no way precludes ending up with different quantities of such goods or resources, as a result of personal economic decisions and actions. When prime importance is accorded an assurance of equal basic freedoms and rights, inequalities are just when they fulfill two provisos: on the one hand, they have to be linked to offices and positions open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; on the other hand, they have to reflect the famous ‘difference principle’ in offering the greatest possible advantage to the least advantaged members of society (Rawls 1993, p. 5 f.; 1971, § 13). Otherwise, the economic order requires revision. Due to the argument of the moral arbitrariness of talents, the commonly accepted criteria for merit (like productivity, working hours, effort) are clearly relativized. The difference principle only allows the talented to earn more to the extent this raises the lowest incomes. According to Rawls, with regard to the basic structure of society, the difference principle should be opted for under a self-chosen “veil of ignorance” regarding personal and historical circumstances and similar factors: the principle offers a general assurance of not totally succumbing to the hazards of a free market situation; and everyone does better than with inevitably inefficient total equal distribution, whose level of well-being is below that of those worst off under the difference principle.

Since Rawls’ Theory of Justice is the classical focal point of present-day political philosophy, it is worth noting the different ways his theory claims to be egalitarian. First, Rawls upholds a natural basis for equal human worth: a minimal capacity for having a conception of the good and a sense of justice. Second, through the device of the “veil of ignorance,” people are conceived as equals in the “original position.” Third, the idea of sharing this “original position” presupposes the parties having political equality, as equal participants in the process of choosing the principles by which they would be governed. Fourth, Rawls proposes fair equality of opportunity. Fifth, he maintains that all desert must be institutionally defined, depending on the goals of the society. No one deserves his or her talents or circumstances, which are products of the natural lottery. Finally, the difference principle tends toward equalizing holdings. However, it is important to keep in mind, as Scheffler (2003) has pointed out, that the main focus of Rawls’ theory is justice as such; it is only secondarily about an egalitarian conception of justice. In addition, since the primary subject is the basic structure, pure procedural justice has priority over distributive or allocative justice Equality is not the only or single value for Rawls.

Dworkin’s equality of resources (1981b), on the other hand, is concerned with equality as such. His theory stakes a claim to being even more ‘ambition- and endowment-insensitive’ than Rawls’ theory. Unequal distribution of resources is considered fair only when it results from the decisions and intentional actions of those concerned. Dworkin proposes a hypothetical auction in which everyone can accumulate bundles of resources through equal means of payment, so that in the end no one is jealous of another’s bundle (the envy test). The auction-procedure also offers a way to precisely measure equality of resources: the measure of resources devoted to a person’s life is defined by the importance of the resources to others (Dworkin 1981b, p. 290). In the free market, how the distribution then develops depends on an individual’s ambitions. The inequalities that thus emerge are justified, since one has to take responsibility for how one’s choices turn out (i.e., one’s “option luck”) in the realm of personal responsibility. In contrast, unjustified inequalities based on different innate provisions and gifts, as well as on brute luck, should be compensated for through a fictive differentiated insurance system: its premiums are established behind Dworkin’s own “veil of ignorance,” in order to then be distributed in real life to everyone and collected in taxes. For Dworkin, this is the key to the natural lottery being balanced fairly, preventing a “slavery of the talented” through excessive redistribution.

Only some egalitarians hold inequality to be bad per se. Most of today’s egalitarians are pluralistic, recognizing other values besides equality. So called luck-egalitarians regard the moral significance of choice and responsibility as one of the most important values besides equality (for an overview over the debate see Lippert-Rasmussen 2015). They hold that it is bad – unjust or unfair – for some to be worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own (Temkin 1993, 13) and therefore strive to eliminate involuntary disadvantages, for which the sufferer cannot be held responsible (Cohen 1989, 916).

The principle of responsibility provides a central normative vantage point for deciding on which grounds one might justify which inequality. The positive formulation of the responsibility principle requires an assumption of personal responsibility and holds that inequalities which are the result of self-chosen options are just. (See above all Dworkin, 1981b, p. 311; contra: Anderson, 1999.) Unequal portions of social goods are thus fair when they result from the decisions and intentional actions of those concerned. Individuals must accept responsibility for the costs of their decisions. Persons are themselves responsible for certain inequalities that result from their voluntary decisions, and they deserve no compensation for such inequalities, aside from minimal provisions in cases of dire need (see below). In its negative formulation , the responsibility principle holds that inequalities which are not the result of self-chosen options are to be rejected as unjust; persons disadvantaged in this way deserve compensation. That which one can do nothing about, or for which one is not responsible, cannot constitute a relevant criterion. Still, the initial assumption remains an ascription of responsibility, and each individual case requires close scrutiny: one is responsible and accountable unless there is an adequate reason for being considered otherwise (but cf. Stemplowska 2013 for a different interpretation)..

If advantages or disadvantages that are due to arbitrary and unearned differences are unfair, this holds for social circumstances as well as natural endowments. The reasons favoring an exclusion of features like skin-color, size, sex, and place of origin as primarily discriminative apply equally to other natural human qualities, like intelligence, appearance, physical strength, and so forth. The kind and the extent of one’s natural abilities are due to a lottery of nature; considered from a moral standpoint, their distribution is purely arbitrary (Rawls, 1971, § 48). To sum up: natural and social endowment must not count, and personal intentions and voluntary decisions should count. Thus, a given social order is just when it equalizes as much as possible, and in a normatively tenable way, all personal disadvantages for which an individual is not responsible, and accords individuals the capacity to bear the consequences of their decisions and actions, as befits their capacity for autonomy.

Objections to all versions of “brute-luck egalitarianism” come from two sides. Some authors criticize its in their view unjustified or excessively radical rejection of merit: The luck-egalitarian thesis of desert only being justifiably acknowledged if it involves desert “all the way down” (Nozick 1974, p. 225) not only destroys the classical, everyday principle of desert, since everything has a basis that we ourselves have not created. In the eyes of such critics, along with the merit-principle this argument also destroys our personal identity, since we can no longer accredit ourselves with our own capacities and accomplishments. (Cf. the texts in Pojman & McLeod 1998, Olsaretti 2003.) Other authors consider the criterion for responsibility to be too strong, indeed inhuman (or “harsh”) in its consequences, since human beings responsible for their own misery would (supposedly) be left alone with their misery (Anderson 1999, also MacLeod 1998, Scheffler 2003, Wolff 1998, Fleurbaey 1995, Voigt 2007, Eyal 2017, Olsaretti 2009, Stemplowska 2009). However, pluralistic egalitarians should be able to argue that there are special cases, in which people are so badly off that they should be helped, even if they got into the miserable situation through their own fault. But even when people are in terrible situations, which did not arise through their own fault (‘bad brute luck’) – for instance, when they are disabled from birth – and egalitarians therefore have reasons to help them, these reasons are supposedly stigmatizing, since in these cases the principles of distribution would be based on pity. In these cases, political institutions have to take certain decisions – for example, in which category a particular case of distress should be placed – and gather relevant information on their citizens. Against such a procedure, one could object that it subjects the citizens to the tutelage of the state and harms their private sphere (Anderson 1999, also Hayek 1960: 85–102).

Approaches based on equality of opportunity can be read as revisions of both welfarism and resourcism. Ranged against welfarism and designed to avoid its pitfalls, they incorporate the powerful ideas of choice and responsibility into various, improved forms of egalitarianism. Such approaches are meant to equalize outcomes resulting from causes beyond a person’s control (i.e., beyond circumstances or endowment), but to allow differential outcomes that result from autonomous choice or ambition. But the approaches are also aimed at maintaining the insight that individual preferences have to count, as the sole basis for a necessary linkage back to the individual perspective: otherwise, there is an overlooking of the person’s value. In Arneson’s (1989, 1990) concept of equal opportunity for welfare , the preferences determining the measure of individual well-being are meant to be conceived hypothetically – i.e., a person would decide on them after a process of ideal reflection. In order to correspond to the morally central vantage of personal responsibility, what should be equalized are not enlightened preferences themselves, but rather real opportunities to achieve or receive a good, to the extent that it is aspired to. G.A. Cohen’s (1989, p. 916 f.) broader conception of equality of access to advantage attempts to integrate the perspectives of welfare equality and resource equality through the overriding concept of advantage. For Cohen, there are two grounds for egalitarian compensation. Egalitarians will be moved to furnish a paralyzed person with a compensatory wheelchair independently of the person’s welfare level. This egalitarian response to disability overrides equality of (opportunity to) welfare. Egalitarians also favor compensation for phenomena such as pain, independent of any loss of capacity – for instance by paying for expensive medicine. But, Cohen claims, any justification for such compensation has to invoke the idea of equality of opportunity to welfare. He thus views both aspects, resources and welfare, as necessary and irreducible. Much of Roemer’s (1998) more technical argument is devoted to constructing the scale to calibrate the extent to which something is the result of circumstances. An incurred adverse consequence is the result of circumstances, not choice, precisely to the extent that it is a consequence that persons of one or another specific type can be expected to incur.

Theories that limit themselves to the equal distribution of basic means, in the hope of doing justice to the different goals of all human beings, are often criticized as fetishistic, because they focus on means as opposed to what individuals gain with these means (Sen 1980). The value that goods have for someone depends on objective possibilities, the natural environment, and individual capacities. Hence, in contrast to the resourcist approach, Amartya Sen proposes orientating distribution around “capabilities to achieve functionings,” i.e., the various things that a person manages to do orbe in leading a life (Sen 1992). In other words, evaluating individual well-being has to be tied to a capability for achieving and maintaining various precious conditions and “functionings” constitutive of a person’s being, such as adequate nourishment, good health, the ability to move about freely or to appear in public without shame. The real freedom to acquire well-being is also important here, a freedom represented in the capability to oneself choose forms of achievement and the combination of “functionings.” For Sen, capabilities are thus the measure of an equality of capabilities human beings enjoy to lead their lives. A problem consistently raised with capability approaches is the ability to weigh capabilities in order to arrive at a metric for equality. The problem is intensified by the fact that various moral perspectives are blended in the concept of capability (Cohen 1993, p. 17–26, Williams 1987). Martha Nussbaum (1992, 2000) has linked the capability approach to an Aristotelian, essentialistic, “thick” theory of the good – a theory meant to be, as she puts it, “vague,” incomplete, and open-ended enough to leave place for individual and cultural variation. On the basis of such a “thick” conception of necessary and universal elements of a good life, certain capabilities and functionings can be designated as foundational. In this manner, Nussbaum can endow the capability approach with a precision that furnishes an index of interpersonal comparison, but at the risk of not being neutral enough regarding the plurality of personal conceptions of the good, a neutrality normally required by most liberals (most importantly Rawls 1993; but see Robeyns 2009 for a different take on the comparison with Rawls). For further discussion, see the entry on the capability approach .

Since the late 1990s, social relations egalitarianism has appeared in philosophical discourse as an increasingly important competitor to distribuitivist accounts of justice, especially its luck egalitarian versions (cf. Lippert-Rassmussen 2018). Proponents of social relations egalitarianism include Anderson (1999), Miller (1997), Scanlon (1996, 2018), Scheffler (2003, 2005, 2015), Wolff (1998, 2010) and Young (1990). Negatively, they are united in a rejection of the view that justice is a matter of eliminating differential luck. Positively, they claim that society is just if, and only if, individuals within it relate to one another as equals. Accordingly, the site of justice (i.e. that to which principles of justice apply) is society, not distributions. Relational Egalitarianism has a certain overlap with many theories of recognition and non-domination. Certain status differences are at the core of their objections, like those stigmatizing differences in status, whereby the badly off are caused to experience themselves as inferior, and are treated as inferiors, or when inequalities create objectionable relations of power(Honneth/Fraser 2003) and domination (Pettit 2001).

What does it mean that (and when do) individuals within a society relate to one another as equals? Racial discrimination, for example, is a paradigmatic instance of this condition?s violation. But once we move beyond a handful of such examples things become much less clear.

These claims to social and political equality exclude all unequal, hierarchical forms of social relationships, in which some people dominate, exploit, marginalize, demean, and inflict violence upon others:

As a social ideal, it holds that a human society must be conceived of as a cooperative arrangement among equals, each of whom enjoys the same social standing. As a political ideal, it highlights the claims that citizens are entitled to make on one another by virtue of their status as citizens, without any need for a moralized accounting of the details of their particular circumstances. (Scheffler 2003, p. 22)

However, forms of differentiation that do not violate moral equality (see above) are not per se excluded from social equality, if they are compatible with the recognition of the equal social status of concerned parties, as with differences relating to merit, need, and, if appropriate, race, gender, and social background (as in cases of affirmative action or fair punishment).

Where there is social equality, people feel that each member of the community enjoys an equal standing with all the rest that overrides their unequal ratings along particular dimensions. (Miller, 1997, p. 232)

Thus the question has to be answered whether – and if so, why – other dimensions, such as a person’s natural talents, creativity, intelligence, innovative skills or entrepreneurial ability, can be the basis for legitimate inequalities.

Relational egalitarians need a certain conception of what an equal standing in society amounts to and implies in terms of rights and goods. One way to offer such an account would be to rely (like Anderson 1999) on the capabilities approach (§3.8) and sufficitarianism (§6.2.): In a democratic community that preserves the free and equal status of persons, at least three sets of conditions have to be fulfilled.

First, certain political conditions are necessary to allow citizens to participate as equals in democratic deliberation. These include, among others, the capabilities to vote, hold office, assemble, petition the government, speak freely, and move about freely (Rawls 1999, p.53). The principle of democratic equality (as asked for by Anderson 1999) requires us to eliminate social hierarchies that prevent a democratically organized society, a society in which we cooperate and decide upon state action as equals. Persons morally owe each other the capabilities and conditions to live as equals in a democratic community (Christiano 2008, Kolodny 2014). Democracy can be interpreted as realizing public equality in collective decision-making.

Second, to participate as an equal in civil society, certain civil conditions must obtain. These include the conditions that make it robustly likely that injustices such as marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism (Anderson 1999 with reference to Young 1990), or domination (Pettit 2001) can be to avoided. Third, certain social conditions and personal capabilities have to obtain that enable people to enjoy equal standing in society. Citizens need, in this regard, adequate nutrition, shelter, clothing, education, and medical care. This last point leads into the debate over whether a relational egalitarian conception of social justice yields intrinsic and instrumental reasons of justice to care about distributive inequality in socially produced goods, despite its emphasis on just social relationships and not the distribution of goods per se (Schemmel 2011, Elford 2017).

Justice is primarily related to individual actions. Individual persons are the primary bearers of responsibility (the key principle of ethical individualism). This raises two controversial issues in the contemporary debate.

One could regard the norms of distributive equality as applying to groups rather than individuals. It is often groups that rightfully raise the issue of an inequality between themselves and the rest of society, as with women and racial and ethnic groups. The question arises of whether inequality among such groups should be considered morally objectionable in itself, or whether even in the case of groups, the underlying concern should be how individuals (as members of such groups) fare in comparative terms. If there is a worry about inequalities between groups of individuals, why does this not translate into a worry about inequalities between members of the group?

A further question concerns whether the norms of distributive equality (whatever they are) apply to all individuals, regardless of where (and when) they live. Or rather, do they only hold for members of communities within states and nations? Most theories of equality deal exclusively with distributive equality among people in a single society. There does not, however, seem to be any rationale for that limitation. Can the group of the entitled be restricted prior to the examination of concrete claims? Many theories seem to imply this, especially when they connect distributive justice or the goods to be distributed with social cooperation or production. For those who contribute nothing to cooperation, such as the disabled, children, or future generations, would have to be denied a claim to a fair share. The circle of persons who are to be the recipients of distribution would thus be restricted from the outset. Other theories are less restrictive, insofar as they do not link distribution to actual social collaboration, yet nonetheless do restrict it, insofar as they bind it to the status of citizenship. In this view, distributive justice is limited to the individuals within a society. Those outside the community have no entitlement to social justice. Unequal distribution among states and the social situations of people outside the particular society could not, in this view, be a problem of social distributive justice (Nagel 2005). Yet here too, the universal morality of equal respect and the principle of equal distribution demand that all persons consider one another as prima facie equally entitled to the goods, unless reasons for an unequal distribution can be advanced. It may be that in the process of justification, reasons will emerge for privileging those who were particularly involved in the production of a good, but there is no prima facie reason to exclude from the outset other persons, such as those from other countries, from the process of distribution and justification (Pogge 2002). That may seem most intuitively plausible in the case of natural resources (e.g. oil) that someone discovers by chance on or beneath the surface of his or her property. Why should such resources belong to the person who discovers them, or on whose property they are located? Nevertheless, in the eyes of many if not most people, global justice, i.e., extending egalitarian distributive justice globally, demands too much from individuals and their states (Miller 1998; but cf. Caney 2005). Alternatively, one might argue that there are other ‘special relations’ between members of one society that do not exist between members of different societies. Nationalism is an example for such a (controversial) thesis that may provide a case for a kind of local equality (Miller 1995). For further discussion, see the entry on global justice.

Another issue is the relationship between generations. Does the present generation have an egalitarian obligation towards future generations regarding equal living conditions? One argument in favor of this conclusion might be that people should not end up unequally well off as a result of morally arbitrary factors. However, the issue of justice between generation is notoriously complex (Temkin 1992). For further discussion, see the entry on intergenerational justice .

6. The Value of Equality: Why Equality?

Does equality play a major role in a theory of justice, and if so, what is this role? A conception of justice is egalitarian when it views equality as a fundamental goal of justice. Temkin has put it as follows:

… an egalitarian is any person who attaches some value to equality itself (that is, any person that cares at all about equality, over and above the extent it promotes other ideals). So, equality needn’t be the only value, or even the ideal she values most… . Egalitarians have the deep and (for them) compelling view that it is a bad thing – unjust and unfair – for some to be worse off than others through no fault of their own. (Temkin 1986, p. 100, cf. 1993, p. 7)

In general, the focus of the modern egalitarian effort to realize equality is on the possibility of a good life, i.e., on an equality of life prospects and life circumstances – interpreted in various ways according to various positions in the “equality of what” debate (see above).

It is apparent that there are three sorts of egalitarianism: intrinsic, instrumental and constitutive. (For a twofold distinction cf. Parfit 1997, Temkin 1993, p. 11, McKerlie, 1996, p. 275.)

Intrinsic egalitarians view equality as a good in itself. As pure egalitarians, they are concerned solely with equality, most of them with equality of social circumstances, according to which it is intrinsically bad if some people are worse off than others through no fault of their own. But it is in fact the case that people do not always consider inequality a moral evil. Intrinsic egalitarians regarde quality as desirable even when the equalization would be of no use to any of the affected parties, such as when equality can only be produced through depressing the level of well being of everyone’s life. But something can only have an intrinsic value when it is good for at least one person, when it makes one life better in some way or another.

The following “ leveling-down ” objection indicates that doing away within equality in fact ought to produce better circumstances; it is otherwise unclear why equality should be desired. (For such an objection, cf. Nozick 1974, p. 229, Raz 1986, chap. 9, p. 227, 235, Temkin 1993, pp. 247–8.) Sometimes inequality can only be ended by depriving those who are better off of their resources, rendering them as poorly off as everyone else. (For anyone looking for a drastic literary example, Kurt Vonnegut’s 1950 science-fiction story Harrison Bergeron is recommended.) This would have to be an acceptable approach according to the intrinsic conception. But would it be morally good if, in a group consisting of both blind and sighted persons, those with sight were rendered blind because the blind could not be offered sight? That would be morally perverse. Doing away with inequality by bringing everyone down contains – so the objection goes – nothing good. Such leveling-down objections would of course only be valid if there were indeed no better and equally egalitarian alternatives available, but there are nearly always such alternatives: e.g. those who can see should have to help the blind, financially or otherwise. When there are no alternatives, in order to avoid such objections, intrinsic egalitarianism cannot be strict, but needs to be pluralistic . Then intrinsic egalitarians could say there is something good about the change, namely greater equality, although they would concede that much is bad about it. Pluralistic egalitarians do not have equality as their only goal; they also admit other values and principles, above all the principle of welfare, according to which it is better when people are doing better. In addition, pluralistic egalitarianism should be moderate enough to not always grant equality victory in the case of conflict between equality and welfare. Instead, they must accept reductions in equality for the sake of a higher quality of life for all (as with Rawls’ difference principle).

At present, many egalitarians are ready to concede that equality in the sense of equality of life circumstances has no compelling value in itself, but that, in a framework of liberal concepts of justice, its meaning emerges in pursuit of other ideals, like universal freedom, the full development of human capacities and the human personality, the mitigation of suffering and defeat of domination and stigmatization, the stable coherence of modern and freely constituted societies, and so forth (Scanlon 1996, 2018). For those who are worse off, unequal circumstances often mean considerable (relative) disadvantages and many (absolute) evils; as a rule, these (relative) disadvantages and (absolute) evils are the source of our moral condemnation of unequal circumstances. But this does not mean that inequality as such is an evil. Hence, the argument goes, fundamental moral ideals other than equality stand behind our aspiring for equality. To reject inequality on such grounds is to favor equality either as a byproduct or as a means, and not as a goal or intrinsic value. In its treatment of equality as a derived virtue, the sort of egalitarianism – if the term is actually suitable – here at play is instrumental .

As indicated, there is also a third, more suitable approach to the equality ideal: a constitutive egalitarianism. According to this approach, to the aspiration to equality is rooted in other moral grounds, namely because certain inequalities are unjust. Equality has value, but this is an extrinsic value, since it derives from another, higher moral principle of equal dignity and respect. But it is not instrumental for this reason, i.e., it is not only valued on account of moral equality, but also on its own account. (For the distinction between the origin of a value and the kind of value it is, cf. Korsgaard 1996.) Equality stands in relation to justice as does a part to a whole. The requirement of justification is based on moral equality, and in certain contexts, successful justification leads to the above-named principles of equality, i.e., formal, proportional equality and the presumption of equality. Thus, according to constitutive egalitarianism, these principles and the resulting equality are required by justice, and by the same token constitute social justice.

It is important to further distinguish two levels of egalitarianism and non-egalitarianism, respectively. On a first level, a constitutive egalitarian presumes that every explication of the moral standpoint is incomplete without terms such as ‘equal,’ ‘similarly,’ etc. In contrast, a non-egalitarianism operating on the same level considers such terms misplaced or redundant. On a second level, when it comes to concretizing and specifying conceptions of justice, a constitutive egalitarian gives equality substantive weight. On this level, more and less egalitarian positions can be found, according to the chosen currency of equality (the criteria by which just equality is measured) and according to the reasons for unequal distributions (exemptions of the presumption of equality) that the respective theories regard as well grounded. Egalitarianism on the second level thus relates to the kind, quality and quantity of things to be equalized. Because of such variables, a clear-cut definition of second level egalitarianism cannot be formulated. In contrast, non-egalitarians on this second level advocate a non-relational entitlement theory of justice.

Alongside the often-raised objections against equality mentioned in the section on “simple equality” (3.1. above) there is a different and more fundamental critique formulated by first level non-egalitarians: that equality does not have a foundational role in the grounding of claims to justice. While the older version of a critique of egalitarianism comes mainly from the conservative end of the political spectrum, thus arguing in general against “patterned principles of justice” (Nozick 1974, esp. pp. 156–157), the critique’s newer version also often can be heard in progressive circles (Walzer 1983, Raz 1986, chap. 9, Frankfurt 1987, 1997, Parfit 1997, Anderson 1999). This first-level critique of equality poses the basic question of why justice should in fact be conceived relationally and (what is here the same) comparatively. Referring back to Joel Feinberg’s (1974) distinction between comparative and non-comparative justice, non-egalitarians object to the moral requirement to treat people as equals, and the many demands for justice emerging from it. They argue that neither the postulate nor these demands involve comparative principles, let alone any equality principles. They reproach first-level egalitarians for a confusion between “equality” and “universals.” As the non-egalitarians see things, within many principles of justice – at least the especially important ones – the equality-terminology is redundant. Equality is thus merely a byproduct of the general fulfillment of actually non-comparative standards of justice: something obscured through the unnecessary insertion of an expression of equality (Raz 1986, p. 227f.). At least the central standards of dignified human life are not relational but “absolute.” As Harry Frankfurt puts it: “It is whether people have good lives, and not how their lives compare with the lives of others” (Frankfurt 1997, p. 6). And again: “The fundamental error of egalitarianism lies in supposing that it is morally important whether one person has less than another regardless of how much either of them has” (Frankfurt 1987, p. 34).

From the non-egalitarian perspective, what is really at stake in helping those worse off and improving their lot is humanitarian concern , a desire to alleviate suffering. Such concern is not understood as egalitarian, as it is not focused on the difference between the better off and the worse off as such (whatever the applied standard), but on improving the situation of the latter. Their distress constitutes the actual moral foundation. The wealth of those better off only furnishes a means that has to be transferred for the sake of mitigating the distress, as long as other, morally negative consequences do not emerge in the process. The strength of the impetus for more equality lies in the urgency of the claims of those worse off, not in the extent of the inequality. For this reason, instead of equality the non-egalitarian critics favor one or another entitlement theory of justice , such as Nozick’s (1974) libertarianism (cf. 3.2. above) and Frankfurt’s (1987) doctrine of sufficiency , according to which “What is important from the moral point of view is not that everyone should have the same but that each should have enough. If everyone had enough , it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more than others” (Frankfurt 1987, p. 21).

Parfit’s (1997) priority view accordingly calls for a focus on improving the situation of society’s weaker and poorer members, and indeed all the more urgently the worse off they are, even if they can be less helped than others in the process. Parfit (1995) distinguishes between egalitarianism and prioritarianism. According to prioritarians, benefiting people is more important the worse off those people are. This prioritising will often increase equality, but they are two distinct values, since in an important respect equality is a relational value while priority is not. However, egalitarians and prioritarians share an important feature, in that both hold that the best possible distribution of a fixed sum of goods is an equal one. It is thus a matter of debate whether prioritarianism is a sort of egalitarianism or a (decent) inegalitarianism. In any case, entitlement-based non-egalitarian arguments can practically result in an equality of outcome as far-reaching as egalitarian theories. Hence the fulfillment of an absolute or non-comparative standard for everyone (e.g. to the effect that nobody should starve) frequently results in a certain equality of outcome, where such a standard comprises not only a decent but a good life. Consequently, the debate here centers on the basis – is it equality or something else? – and not so much on the outcome – are persons or groups more or less equal, according to a chosen metric? Possibly, the difference lies even deeper, in their respective conceptions of morality in general.

Egalitarians can respond to the anti-egalitarian critique by conceding that it is the nature of some (however certainly far from all) essential norms of morality and justice to be concerned primarily with the adequate fulfillment of the separate claims of individuals. However, whether a claim can itself be considered suitable can be ascertained only by asking whether it can be agreed on by all those affected in hypothetical conditions of freedom and equality. (See, e.g., Casal 2007 for a deeper discussion and critique of the doctrine of sufficiency.) This justificatory procedure is more necessary if it is less evident that what is at stake is actually suffering, distress, or an objective need. In the view of the constitutive egalitarians, all the judgments of distributive justice should be approached relationally, by asking which distributive scheme all concerned parties can universally and reciprocally agree to. As described at some length in the pertinent section above, many egalitarians argue that a presumption in favor of equality follows from this justification requirement. In the eyes of such egalitarians, this is all one needs for the justification and determination of the constitutive value of equality.

Secondly, even if – for the sake of argument – the question is left open as to whether demands for distribution according to objective needs (e.g. alleviating hunger) involve non-comparative entitlement-claims, it is nonetheless always necessary to resolve the question of what needy individuals are owed. And this is tied in a basic way to the question of what persons owe one another in comparable or worse situations, and how scarce resources (money, goods, time, energy) must be invested in light of the sum total of our obligations. While the claim on our aid may well appear non-relational, determining the kind and extent of the aid must always be relational, at least in circumstances of scarcity (and resources are always scarce). Claims are either “satiable” (Raz 1986, p. 235) – i.e., an upper limit or sufficiency level can be indicated, after which each person’s claim to X has been fulfilled – or they are not. For insatiable claims, to stipulate any level at which one is or ought to be sufficiently satisfied is arbitrary. If the standards of sufficiency are defined as a bare minimum, why should persons be content with that minimum? Why should the manner in which welfare and resources are distributed above the poverty level not also be a question of justice? If, by contrast, we are concerned solely with claims that are in principle “satiable,” such claims having a reasonable definition of sufficiency, then these standards of sufficiency will most likely be very high. In Frankfurt’s definition, for example, sufficiency is reached only when persons are satisfied and no longer actively strive for more. Since people find themselves ourselves operating, in practice, in circumstances far beneath such a high sufficiency level, they (of course) live under conditions of (moderate) scarcity. Then the above mentioned argument holds as well – namely, that in order to determine to what extent it is to be fulfilled, each claim has to be judged in relation to the claims of all others and all available resources. In addition, the moral urgency of lifting people above dire poverty cannot be invoked to demonstrate the moral urgency of everyone having enough. In both forms of scarcity – i.e., with satiable and insatiable claims – the social right or claim to goods cannot be conceived as something absolute or non-comparative. Egalitarians may thus conclude that distributive justice is always comparative. This would suggest that distributive equality, especially equality of life-conditions, should play a fundamental role in any adequate theory of justice in particular, and of morality in general.

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2.7: Unalienable Rights

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“We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.” Thomas Jefferson, Preamble to the Declaration of Independence “Inequality will exist as long as liberty exists. It unavoidably results from that very liberty itself. ” Alexander Hamilton. Constitutional Debate, June 26, 1787 “ Government is instituted for those who live under it. It ought therefore to be so constituted as not to be dangerous to their liberties. The more permanency it has the worse if it be a bad.” Roger Sherman, Constitutional Debate, June 26, 1787 “Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.” Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address

Natural rights are often considered unalienable , meaning that are not to be taken away or denied. English philosopher John Locke believed that “Life, Liberty, and Property were the most important natural rights. In the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson defined natural rights as “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.” Both men believed that the purpose of government is to protect these rights through a social contract.

Liberty and equality-- these words have come to represent the basic values of democratic political systems including that of the United States.While rule by absolute monarchs and emperors has often brought peace and order, in many instances it has done so at the cost of personal freedoms. As we have seen, democratic values support the belief that an orderly society can exist in which freedom is preserved. However, order and freedom must be balanced.

It is the seemingly conflictual relationship between liberty and equality that has really formed the root of political conflict and debate since the origins of the first democratic governments. In this section, we will examine the basic concepts of equality and liberty and how modern democratic governments must balance the ideals of equality with the protection of basic liberties and freedoms. In other words, how can everybody be treated as equals, yet still have the freedom to own property and “pursue happiness” when those same basic freedoms may infringe upon the liberties of others?

Defining Liberty, Equality, and Justice

While there are many definitions of liberty , they all share a common feature that is important to our political understanding. That is, the ability to do as one pleases without interference (within the confines of common rules of society and law).

Again, while there are many definitions of equality , perhaps the best way to describe the common political understanding of this word is to describe it as the degree to which people are treated the same and without being “singled out” or restricted with regard to their beliefs, nationalities, cultures, and backgrounds. Black’s Law, the most commonly used law dictionary in the United States, further defines equality as “ the condition of possessing the same rights, privileges, and immunities, and being liable to the same duties.” In other words, from a legal perspective, equality means people are all given the same basic rights and privileges, as well as being held to the same requirements and responsibilities within a society.

As with liberty and equality , there are many definitions of justice , but some common features between these definitions can be seen. This commonality should lead us to an understanding of the term. These features include a set of morals and standards, a system by which people are judged and punished fairly according to a standard set of commonly understood and practiced laws, a common understanding and practice of right or moral conduct, and a standardized application of punishments if the standards or rules of a community are violated.

Does justice always mean fairness? This is a much more complicated question. For instance, it may be fair to apply laws and punishments to all citizens in the same way without considering circumstances or mitigating factors, but is it just ? Do we give a four-year-old the same punishment for stealing a candy bar from a store as we would a young adult who should know better? Is someone who kills a person in the course of self-defense given the same punishment as someone who commits a “cold-blooded” murder? If truly equitable justice was the goal of government then everyone would, indeed, be treated in exactly the same way, but today we would see this not as justice but as being unfair because we often consider a number of factors in determining guilt and punishment.

Economic Arguments

Much of the conflict and debate over the relationship between liberty and equality revolves around the central economic questions of (1) what should be produced, (2) how will it be produced, and (3) for whom will it be produced? If, as John Locke proposed, people should have a natural right to the ownership of property, how can that right to property be balanced with equality? This becomes a question because not everyone will have the same amount of wealth. Just as we have seen several views of political liberty, we can examine economic wealth in the same way.

Distribution of Wealth

There are basically three approaches to the distribution of wealth.

1) Free Market Economies (Capitalism) is the belief that markets should be left alone by governments, and people should be free to make and buy what they wish at a price that is best left open to the forces of an open market. Thinkers such as Adam Smith, the Scottish philosopher and founder of modern economics theory, believed that such free market systems of exchange work to benefit both the producer and the consumer in the most efficient way by offering a variety of choices. Through the “invisible hand” of competition, the most efficient price is determined as a result of the competitive marketplace.

This system has been the root of American economic and political policy from our inception. The benefit is that people are free to make and buy what they want (given a large amount of liberty and freedom of choice), but there is an inherent understanding that, to quote the Rolling Stones, “You Can’t Always Get What You Want …” because not everyone will have the same level of wealth and income.

The counter-argument, of course, is that you are free to be as wealthy as you wish as long as you work hard and follow the rules. Others would argue that the rules do not work for everyone, particularly minorities. So, in the views of many, equality is sacrificed for the sake of economic liberty.

Here is a video (from the 1950s) on the benefit of Capitalism and distribution of wealth in the United States. It’s a little dated, but that’s part of the “charm.” How do you think these ideals apply to our society today?

Click below to watch a video on the distribution of wealth in the United States known as the “one percent problem” This video is a little lengthy, but see if you agree or disagree with the arguments presented in the video and compare them to the ideals expressed in the previous video.

(2) Socialism involves government influence and intervention in the basic economic questions: what to make, how to make it, and who will get it. Most socialist systems revolve around governmental intervention in or direct provision of goods and services. As an example, the government provided healthcare systems are often referred to as socialist by critics because they bypass the open market and require the government to provide a good or service to the public.

The primary argument against this system is that to provide those services, nations who have socialist economic policies often have very high taxes and fewer choices in the marketplace (not to mention the prices for many goods are much higher than they should be because of the lack of competition).

First, let's look at an academic explanation of pure socialism.

Next, let's take a more humorous look at the idea of "socialism."

(3) Communism involves direct governmental ownership and control of all means of production. These economies are often called command or planned economies because the government directly plans for or commands the types and quantities of goods that will be produced. They own or control the factories and workers that will produce the goods and services, and they set the price for those goods themselves (deciding who in society will be able to afford them).

These economies are most directly compared to the former Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and Cuba. While most former European communist countries (and China) have adopted a more capitalist approach to their economies, the effects of planned economies can still be seen. The criticism of these types of economic and political systems is that while there is equality (everyone is theoretically treated as an equal), the sacrifice is in freedom of choice and personal liberty. Most economic critics believe this system to be the least efficient system.

Below is a Khan Academy discussion of Communism.

The American Dream

Surely the conflict between liberty and equality is not just an economic one. Of course, there are more factors to consider in any society than simply the distribution and acquisition of wealth. However, it would seem that in the American system of government, much of the debate revolves around these economic considerations. Our nation has also been one that has considered the relationship between liberty and equality as one that also allows for equal opportunity. This approach would argue that everyone should have the same opportunity to acquire wealth and to improve their standard of living. Many would call this the “American Dream.”

The “American Dream” refers to a set of ideals in which freedom includes the opportunity for prosperity, success, and upward social mobility for the family and the children. The American Dream may be achieved through hard work in a society with few barriers. According to James Truslow Adams in his 1931 definition of the American Dream, "Life should be better and richer and fuller for everyone, with opportunity for each according to ability or achievement" regardless of social class or circumstances of birth.

The question for many of us today is “Can we still achieve the American Dream?” In a June 2014 CBS News Poll, this debate is openly discussed, with six out of ten of those people polled indicating that they believe the “American Dream” is no longer obtainable.

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-most-say-the-american-dream-is-out-of-reach ,

http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-to-revive-your-american-dream/

or examine a 2018 poll here:

today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2018/10/04/american-dream-representation

Do you agree with the polls? Why or Why not?

Balancing Liberty and Equality

Shouldn't governments help preserve some degree of equality for their citizens? If they overemphasize equality, won't they restrict their citizens' liberty? For example, governments can bring about more equality by taxing rich citizens more than the poor, but if they carry their policies too far, won't they restrict the individual's freedom to strive for economic success?

The balance between liberty and equality is an important cornerstone of democratic government. If we view this as a balance between liberties and equal opportunities, then we see what the founding fathers intended (particularly when they mentioned the pursuit of happiness. If we try to view this as a balance between freedom and equal outcomes (where everyone is exactly the same), there is a tremendous tradeoff between the two. It seems one must be sacrificed in exchange for the other.

Understanding these theories and concepts, the Founders created the blueprints for the United States government in an effort to achieve these delicate balances — between liberty and order, and between liberty and equality. Their success is reflected in the continuing efforts to refine them. The formula has changed with time, but the framework provided by the Constitution and the values expressed by the Declaration of Independence remain the same.

Study/Discussion Questions

• What tradeoffs exist between liberty, equality, and justice?
• Why do you think political scientists and economists often view the democratic ideals of liberty, equality, and justice as requiring tradeoffs? Can these democratic ideals all co-exist in their purest forms without tradeoffs between them? Why/why not?
• LIBERTY and EQUALITY:
• LIBERTY and JUSTICE:
• JUSTICE and FAIRNESS:
• What is meant by the term the "American Dream?" Give an example.
• Create a graphic organizer similar to the one below and complete it using your understanding and research on the three basic economic systems:

Writing Assignment

What is your American Dream? What is your plan to attain it? Do you consider the American Dream an attainable objective in your generation? Why/why not?

Write an essay on the above topic. Your essay should use appropriate English language construction, punctuation, grammar, and vocabulary. In addition, show evidence of planning, including an appropriate thesis, an introduction, supporting paragraphs and a summary/conclusion.

Right To Equality: New Dimension and New Version - Part One

• Classification is found on an intelligible differentia
• The Differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by impugned legislative or executive action. [7]

Law violating Article 14 and Arbitrariness

Article 14 in the constitution of india, article 14 interpreted by judiciary, is the state is a person protected by article 14, equality before law & equal protection of laws.

• It is not arbitrary, artificial or evasive. It is based on intelligible differentia, some real and substantial distinction which distinguishes the persons or things grouped together in one class from other who left out of it.
• The Differentia adopted on basis of classification has a rational or reasonable nexus with object sought to be achieved by statute in question.[10]

Interference with executive policy

• A Law may be constitutional even though it relates to single Individual if on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not to others, that single individual may be treated as class by itself but such laws are seen with suspicion, especially when they affect private rights of an individual.
• There is always a presumption of constitutionality and burden is on one who attacks it.
• A Classification need not to be scientifically perfect or logically complete
• While considering the basis of classification, court must look into matter of common knowledge, History of Bill, etc.
• The Court must look beyond the old doctrine and apply the test of palpable arbitrariness in context.
• There is no right to equality in illegal acts.
• The Right to equality is available in grant of favor as well as imposition of burdens.

Single person laws:

Special courts & procedural inequality:, following principles laid down with regard to scope of article 14:.

• If the legislative policy is clear and definite and is an effective method of carrying out that policy, a discretion is vested by statute upon a body of administration to make selective application of law to a certain class of persons, the statute itself cannot be condemn as a piece of discriminatory legislation.
• The Discretionary power is not necessarily a discriminatory power.
• Whether an enactment which cast for special procedure for trial of certain offences is discriminatory or not , depends on each case and no general principle applicable to all cases can be laid down.
• A Rule of procedure laid down by law comes as much within purview of article 14 as of any rule of substantive law.

Procedural fairness:

Substantive equality:, in joseph shine v union of india,[23], in state of west bengal v anwar ali sarkar, [1952] scr 284,, in deepak sibal v punjab university,[24]; subramaniam swamy v union of india,[25], in the words of the scholar etienne mureinik:.

• http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm
• https://constitutionus.com/
• https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
• Thomas J, in Indra Sawhney v UOI, AIR 1993 SC477
• Ashutosh Gupta v State of Rajasthan, (2002) 4 SCC 34
• (1974) 4SCC 3.
• (1981) 1 SCC 722
• Salmond, Jurisprudence IInd edition
• Gauri Shankar v UOI, AIR 1995 SC55
• Laxmi Khandsari v State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 873, : (1981), 2 SCC 600, Test for valid classification restated. State of Haryana v Jai Singh , (2003) 9 SCC 114 : AIR 2003 SC 1696
• People’s Union for civil liberties v UOI, (2004) 2 SCC 476 : AIR 2004 SC 1442
• State of Gujarat v Ambica Mills, AIR 1974 SC 1300
• Directorate of Film Festivals v Gaurav Ashwin Jain, (2007) 4 SCC 737
• AIR 1958 SC 538
• (2008) 5 SCC 1
• This argument was also taken in Venugopal case above
• (1979) 1 SCC 380 : AIR 1979 SC 478
• (2012) 3 SCC 1: AIR 2012 SC 3725
• (2012) 10 SCC 1
• (1978) 1 SCC 248: AIR 1978 SC 597
• (1990) 1 SCC 613 : AIR 1990 SC 1480
• (2018) 10 SCC 1
• (2019) 3 SCC 39
• (1989) 2 SCC 145
• (2014) 8 SCC 682
• (2017) 9 SCC 1
• (1974) 1 SCC 717

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Constituent Assembly Debate on Right to Equality and Prohibition of Discrimination

In this article, we bring you the important points from the Constituent Assembly debates on the topic of Right to Equality for the IAS exam polity, governance, essay and social issues segments.

Constituent Assembly Debate on Right to Equality & Prohibition of Discrimination:- Download PDF Here

CA Debate on Right to Equality & Prohibition of Discrimination

The then Article 9 is the Article 14 as well as Article 15 of the present Constitution of India . Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 was not a standalone provision in the Draft Constitution, 1948. It was initially included in Draft Article 15 which read:

‘Protection of life and liberty and equality before law – No person shall be deprived of his life or liberty except according to procedure established by law, nor shall any person be denied equality before the law or the equal protection of the law within the territory of India.’

Article 14 of the Indian Constitution is – equality before law and Article 15 is – prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Read more on Articles 14 to 18 (right to equality) in the linked article.

Article 9 further states that –

In particular, no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of them, be subjected to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to – assess to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public entertainments.

For this purpose, Mr. C. Subramaniam suggested that the State has no power to discriminate in the above-mentioned matters.

• He proposed to remove the words “In particular‟ and also suggested using a separate clause i.e. 9(1a). It must be read as, “No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or any of them be subjected to any disability.”

Thereafter Mr. Syed Abdur Rouf suggested inserting the words “place of birth” instead of the word “sex”.

• He was afraid that there may remain chances of discrimination to be done on the basis of place of birth.
• The said amendment was adopted. He also explained that the word “race” is used in a very comprehensive manner.
• He explained his point of view that if anybody wants to discriminate against a person belonging to a particular province then such discrimination is not done on the basis of race but it is done on the basis of place of birth and under the guise of local patriotism.

• He further suggested that there is no need to give or mention the list of different kinds of public places.
• He connoted the word “public place” in a wide sense.
• He admitted that in the past, discrimination was done with certain communities and castes regarding their entry at different public places.
• He admitted that the Constitution of India is based on the principle of democratic equality. So, he considered useless to mention the names of each and every public place in the said Article.
• He further admitted that due to the introduction of certain exceptions in the said Article, there are chances of the flourishing of denominational, sectarian, and communal institutions. He feared that it may finish the real democracy.
• He further specifically insisted that in order to stop sectarian or denominational exclusiveness, schools, hospitals, asylums, etc. shall not be reserved for any reason and for any given sect or community.
• All public places must be made open and accessible to all citizens of the country. This shows that he wanted to promote perfect and real equality among the citizens of India.
• He then adhered that opening up of any institution that benefits only a given community or given members or fund providers, in reality, lacks civic sense. According to him such a concept or idea is against the equality of citizenship.
• He told that the Constitution of India has expressively made clear that all citizens of India are equal. For this purpose, he gave an example that – if any institution is founded and maintained exclusively by any particular person and at the same time, it receives any public recognition, protection, safeguards, etc. from any public authority then such institutions are covered under the said article.
• He was of the view that there shall not be any sort of vested interest in application as well as in the interpretation of the said article. The said amendment was later on negatived.

Mr. H.V. Kamath , proposed to substitute the words “State Funds” for the “revenues of the state”. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar agreed with it.

Read more Constituent Assembly debates in the linked article.

Thereafter, Mr. Mohammad Tahir proposed, through an amendment that, for the words “state or dedicated to the use of the general public”, the words “state or any legal authority or dedicated to the use of the general public and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with the law” be substituted.

• He proposed so, for the complete realization of equality of human beings. He told so because of the miserable condition of many scheduled castes and low caste groups in India. The said amendment was adopted.

For the debate regarding the use of the words “place of” before the word “birth”, Mr. Raj Bahadur was of the view that it gives restricted meaning to the entire amendment.

• He was of the opinion that the word “birth” is not only applied to “residence‟ but also to “descent”.
• According to him if the word “descent” is only taken into consideration then it may lead to more discriminations in the future.
• He wanted to remove all sorts of discrimination through the Constitution.
• He wished that not only the distinction regarding religion, caste, sex, etc. be abolished but discrimination based on the basis of family, descent, etc. must be abolished through the Constitution.
• He wished that not only distinctions should be removed but all possibilities of chances of discrimination, favouritism or nepotism on the basis of birth or descent be removed.

Shri S. Nagappa was of the opinion that it is necessary for the population of India to be politically free as well as socially free.

• According to him, freedom means political, social and economic freedom.
• He wished that social rights must be given to a particular community under the present article.
• He admitted that obtaining social rights are more expansive and explanatory.
• He wanted to focus on the issue of the economic evaluation of the downtrodden classes of Indians.
• He admitted that “Most of our courts are courts of law and not justice.”
• He meant that if economic rights are given to downtrodden people then they need not have to approach courts frequently for accessing justice.

Sardar Bhopinder Singh Man suggested that “at the time of deciding about the fundamental rights , it would be incomplete if places of worship are not included in the list of such rights.”

• According to him places of worship must be kept open for all and such places must be in the custody of ultimate custodians or pujaris. He wanted that the barriers of religion must be removed permanently.

The framers of the Indian Constitution aimed at non-discrimination by the state against any citizen on grounds of race, religion, caste, sex or any of them. The said article is framed for the citizens of India. The protection of the said article is given only to the citizens. They have specifically mentioned that there must be no chances of flourishment of denominational, sectarian and communal institutions. They wanted the flourishment of real democracy. They wanted that any social institution founded by any particular community must benefit the entire society and not only the particular community. In other words, the beneficiary of the social institutions must be the society at large.

Moreover, they wanted to bring complete equality for women and children. For this, they wanted that nothing should prevent the state from making any special provisions for women and children. They wanted to promote and implement the concept of equal citizenship. They didn’t want to create a special class of scheduled castes and backward tribes. They covered all under the one head i.e. citizen. They wanted the policy of the state to be non-discriminatory. They have extended the scope of the said article by non-discrimination policy. The said policy is to be adopted by hotels, dharmasalas, musafirkhanas whether managed or not managed by public funds. The word public used in the said article is used in a generic sense i.e. it is restricted only to citizens of India. They have treated all public places uniformly including hospitals, educational institutions, etc. They wanted no special status to be accorded to any person including royal families, dynasties, rich persons, etc. They wanted the non-existence of financial inequality, social inequality, economic inequality and religious inequality. They also intended for equality before the law.

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Right to Equality (Article 14 to 18): Meaning, Provisions & Significance

The Right to Equality , enshrined as a fundamental right in the Indian Constitution, plays a crucial role in building a just and equitable society. The provisions under this right collectively form the bedrock upon which the edifice of Indian democracy is built. This article of NEXT IAS delves into the nuances of provisions related to the Right to Equality, their meaning, significance, exceptions, and more.

Meaning of Right to Equality

The Right to Equality in the Indian Constitution is a fundamental human right that signifies that all people should be treated equally and without discrimination. This principle is foundational to human rights law and is enshrined in various international treaties and national constitutions around the world. The essence of this right is to ensure that no individual or group is denied societal opportunities or privileges that are available to others based on arbitrary criteria such as race, gender, age, sexual orientation, nationality, religion, or any other status.

Right to Equality in India

The Right to Equality is a Fundamental Right enshrined in the Constitution of India. The detailed provisions related to the Right to Equality contained in Articles 14 to 18 of the Constitution form the cornerstone of justice and fairness in society. Together they ensure that everyone is treated equally before the law, given equal opportunities in certain matters, and is not discriminated against on grounds such as religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth, etc.

Right to Equality: Provisions Under the Indian Constitution

Equality before law and equal protection of laws (article 14).

• This provision mandates that the State shall not deny to any person Equality before the Law or the Equal Protection of the Laws within the territory of India.
• This right is extended to citizens, foreigners as well as legal persons such as companies.

Equality before Law

• the absence of any special privileges in favor of any person,
• the equal subjection of all persons to the ordinary law of the land,
• no person is above the law.

Equal Protection of Laws

• equality of treatment under equal circumstances, both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed by the laws,
• the similar application of the same laws to all persons who are similarly situated,
• the like should be treated alike without any discrimination.
• A simple comparison of the concepts of ‘Equality before Law’ and ‘Equal Protection of Laws’ tells that the former is a negative concept , while the latter is a positive concept. However, they both align in their common aim to establish equality of legal status, opportunity, and justice.

Rule of Law

• Absence of arbitrary power i.e. no man can be punished except for a breach of law.
• Equality before law i.e. equal subjection of all citizens to the laws of the land.
• The primacy of the rights of the individual i.e. constitution is the result of the rights of the individual as defined and enforced by the courts of law, rather than the constitution being the source of the individual rights.
• The concept of ‘ Equality before Law ’ is an element of the concept of ‘Rule of Law’.
• In the case of the Indian system, only the 1st and 2nd elements of the ‘Rule of Law’ are applicable, and not the 3rd one. This is because, in India, the constitution is the source of the individual rights.
• The Supreme Court has ruled that the ‘Rule of Law’ as embodied in Article 14 is a ‘basic feature’ of the constitution , and hence cannot be destroyed by a constitutional amendment.

Exceptions to Equality

The rule of equality before the law has certain exceptions. These exceptions are mentioned below:

• As ruled by the Supreme Court, while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it permits the reasonable classification of persons, objects, and transactions by law. However, the classification should not be arbitrary, artificial, or evasive.
• As per Article 361 , the President of India and the Governor of States enjoy certain immunities.
• As per Article 361-A , no person shall be liable for any proceedings in any court for publication of a true report of any proceedings of Parliament or State Legislature.
• Article 105 provides that no member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given in Parliament or any committee thereof. Article 194 makes a similar provision for members of the State Legislature.
• Article 31-C provides that laws made by the state for implementing DPSPs contained in Article 39 (b) and (c) cannot be challenged on the grounds of being violative of Article 14.
• Immunity to foreign sovereigns, ambassadors, and diplomats from criminal and civil proceedings.
• UNO and its agencies also enjoy diplomatic immunity from certain proceedings.

Prohibition of Discrimination on Certain Grounds (Article 15)

• The state shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth.
• No citizen shall be subjected to any disability, liability, restriction, or condition on grounds only of religion, race, case, sex, or place of birth w.r.t. access to public places.
• The first provision prohibits discrimination only by the state , while the second provision prohibits discrimination both by the state and private individuals.
• The crucial term here is ‘only’, which connotes that discrimination on grounds other than those mentioned in the provisions is not prohibited.
• The state is authorized to enact special provisions for the benefit of women and children, such as reserving seats in local bodies or providing free education for children.
• The state is empowered to enact special measures for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes, as well as scheduled castes and scheduled tribes such as seat reservations or fee concessions in public educational institutions.
• The state has the authority to enact special measures for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes, scheduled castes, or scheduled tribes in matters of admission to educational institutions, including private ones, whether aided or unaided by the state, excluding minority educational institutions.
• The state is empowered to enact special measures for the advancement of economically weaker sections of society. Additionally, the state may reserve up to 10% of seats for such sections in educational institutions, excluding minority educational institutions. A. This reservation is in addition to existing reservations and is determined based on family income and other indicators of economic disadvantage, as notified by the state.

Equality of Opportunity in Public Employment (Article 16)

• This provision provides for equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters of employment or appointment to any office under the State.
• The citizens cannot be discriminated against or be ineligible for any employment or office under the State only on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, or residence.
• Parliament may prescribe residence as a condition for certain employment positions under the State, Union Territory, Local Authority, or other authority.
• The State can provide for the reservation of appointments or posts in favor of the backward classes that are inadequately represented in the state services.
• A law can provide that certain religious institutions or denominations may require officeholders to belong to a particular religion or denomination.
• The state can reserve up to 10% of appointments for economically weaker sections, in addition to existing reservations, based on criteria such as family income or other indicators of economic disadvantage. A. This reservation has been added by the 103rd Amendment Act of 2019.

Abolition of Untouchability (Article 17)

• This provision has abolished ‘untouchability’ and forbids its practice in any form.
• Any act enforcing disability based on untouchability shall be deemed as an offense punishable by law.
• Untouchability refers to social disabilities imposed on certain classes of persons because of their birth in certain castes. Hence, it does not cover the social boycott of a few individuals or their exclusions from religious services, etc.
• However, the term ‘untouchability’ has not been defined in the Constitution or the Protection of Civil Rights Act of 1955 (the act enacted to enforce this provision).

Abolition of Titles ( Article 18)

• It prohibits the state from granting any title, except for military or academic distinctions, to any individual, whether a citizen or a foreigner.
• It prohibits Indian citizens from accepting titles from any foreign state.
• A foreigner holding any office of profit or trust under the state cannot accept titles from any foreign state without the President’s consent.
• Neither citizens nor foreigners holding any office of profit or trust under the State are allowed to accept any gift, salary, or position from or under any foreign state without the President’s consent.
• Hereditary titles of nobility e.g. Maharaja, Deewan, etc which were conferred by colonial states are banned by this Article.
• National Awards e.g. Bharat Ratna, Padma Vibhushan, Padma Bhushan, and Padma Sri are not banned by this Article. However, they should not be used as suffixes or prefixes to the names of awardees. Otherwise, they should forfeit the awards.

Significance of Right to Equality

The right to equality holds immense significance as it serves as the foundation for a just and inclusive society. Its importance lies in several key aspects:

• Fairness and Justice – It ensures that all individuals are treated equally under the law, irrespective of their background, race, religion, caste, gender, or economic status. This fosters a sense of fairness and justice in society.
• Non-Discrimination – This right prohibits discrimination in all spheres of life, including employment, education, housing, and public services. It creates a level playing field for everyone, regardless of their differences.
• Inclusivity – This right promotes inclusivity by recognizing the dignity and worth of every individual. It encourages respect for diversity and the participation of all members of society in civic and political life.
• Social Cohesion – This right helps in building social cohesion by reducing social tensions and disparities. When individuals feel that they are treated fairly and have equal opportunities, it fosters a sense of belonging and unity within society.
• Human Rights – This is a fundamental human right enshrined in various international and national legal instruments. Protecting this right is essential for upholding the broader framework of human rights and dignity.

In conclusion, equality lies at the heart of the Indian Constitution, serving as the cornerstone of justice, fairness, and social cohesion. This principle of equality ensures that all individuals are treated fairly before the law, without any unreasonable discrimination. By upholding this fundamental right, India strives to build a society where every citizen has equal opportunities and rights, fostering inclusivity and empowering each individual to contribute to the nation’s progress and prosperity.

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On the other hand, in a socialist and Marxian framework emphasis is more on economic equality. A feminist would argue that gender equality is vital while in a caste divided society like India, it could be argued that social equality is more essential, if other dimensions are to be meaningful.

Learning Objectives

·               Establishing egalitarian society may look utopian but neglecting it may lead to chaos and anarchy will make welfare states meaningless.

·               Students from various background is given an opportunity to understand the concept of equality and inequality in a balanced manner.

·               The relevance of struggle made by women, minorities, dalits and linguistic groups for equality is explored.

·               Participation of an individual as a citizen of a nation in streamlining the thought of doing justice to equality as a common national goal is pertinent.

Meaning of Equality

Equality, which means state of being equal, is derived from aequs/ aequalis, meaning fair. It signifies ‘having the same rights, privileges, treatments, status, and opportunities’. Equality is treated as something that relates to distributive principle because of which rights, treatments, and opportunities are distributed amongst the beneficiaries in a fair manner. Fairness does not mean all to be treated equally in all circumstances. In fact it very well means unequal treatment for those who are unequal. Essentially it relates to the principle of justice because it requires fair distributive principle .

However those who are equal should not be treated as unequal and the unequal as equal.

Importance of Equality

Why equality is important.

The most powerful moral and political ideal that has inspired and guided human society for several centuries is equality. Every all faith and religion invariably proclaim that all human beings are creation of God. The concept of equality as a political ideal invokes the idea that all human beings have an equal worth regardless of their color, gender, race, or nationality. It urges among human beings equal consideration and respect because of the common humanity. The belief in this notion of humanity led us to the declaration of universal human rights.

Equality became the slogan in the struggle against states and social institutions which uphold inequalities of rank, wealth, status or privilege, among people during the modern period. In the eighteenth century, the French revolutionaries used the slogan ‘Liberty, Equality and Fraternity’ to revolt against the landed feudal aristocracy and the monarchy. The demand for equality was also raised during anti-colonial struggle in Asia and Africa during the twentieth century. It continues to be raised by struggling group such as women or dalits who feel marginalized in our society.

Equality now has become a widely accepted ideal which is embodied in the constitutions and laws in the world. However the most visible and disturbing factor around us in the world and as well in our society is inequality. We can see in country slums existing side by side with luxury housing, schools which may lack even drinking water facilities or toilets, waste of food as well as starvation. There are visible difference between what law promises and what we see around us.

India through its constitution attempts to fill the gap between equal and unequal with the principle of equality as enshrined in the constitution.

Dimensions of Equality

What is equality.

We live amidst distinctions between human beings on the ground of race and color, knowing well it is unacceptable. In fact such distinctions violate our intuitive understanding of equality which tells us that all human beings are entitled to similar respect and consideration because of their common humanity. No society treats all its members in exactly the same way under all circumstances. There can be no identity of treatment so long as men are different in wants, capacities, and needs. Injustice arises much from treating unequal’s equally as from treating equals unequally. And most importantly apart from the natural inequalities, there are inequalities created by the society- inequality based upon birth, wealth, knowledge and religion.

The movement of history is not towards greater equality because as fast as we eliminate one inequality, we create another one: the difference being that the one we discard is unjustifiable while the one we create seems reasonable. Hence the social political, educational equalities are always in need of reinforcement and reinterpretation by every new generation. Like liberty, equality can also be understood in its negative and positive aspects. Negative equality was associated with the end of such privileges and positively it meant the availability of opportunity.

According to Laski equality means:

·               Absence of privileges. It means that will of one is equal to the will of any other. It means equality of rights

·               Adequate opportunities are laid open to all. Opportunities should be given to all to realize the implications of his personality.

·               All must have access to social benefits and no one should be restricted on any ground. The inequalities by birth or because of parentage and hereditary causes are unreasonable

·               Absence of economic and social exploitation

A state divided into a small number of rich and large number of poor will always develop a government manipulated by the rich to protect the amenities represented by their property.

                                                                             - Harold laski

According to Barker , the concept of equality means

v    Fundamental equalities of all

v    Equality of opportunity

v    Equality of conditions where there is an attempt to make the conditions of life equal

v    Equality of outcome of results

MUKILAN TOO HAS A DREAM …

Mukilan works in a Brickkiln in Silaiman, near Madurai. The following is an extract of the interview:

Correspondent: What is your day life?

I wake up at 6.00 a.m. and go to the Brickkiln to help my parents. from 11.00 a.m. to 1.00 p.m. I am at Bridge Course entry (run by a non-government organization) Then after lunch at about 3.00 p.m. I again to help my parents at the Brickkiln and by 6.30 p.m. I return to my nut. I have been enrolled in the school nearby, so now days I go to school by 10.00 a.m. come back by 3.00 p.m. It is difficult for me to attend school regularly, as our family income is very low and sometimes I have to sell peas and nuts.

Correspondent:

Tell us about your family. What do your parents do?

My mother is a homemaker/ my father works in a Brickkiln. I feel sad that I cannot spend time with my two elder brothers, since they stay in Kolkata. They are day laborers. My brothers, Raja Pandi(19 years) and Muniasamy(16 years) left school. When they were in Std’s IV and VI respectively. Both had worked in Brickkilns before me. I have two sisters also. Tamil Selvi(10 years), who is studying in Std III at the Government School. My other sister, Yazhini , is now 22 years and is married. She studied up to Std V.

When you grow up, What would you like to be?

I always wanted to be a doctor or to work in a pharmaceutical company, since that helps people.

Correspondent: Do you have dreams?

My dream to be live in a good house and to travel in a car.

Equality of opportunities

The concept of equality implies that all people as human being are entitled to the same rights and opportunities to develop the skills and talents, to pursue their goals and ambitions. However, it is not the lack of equality of status or wealth or privilege that is significant but the inequality in peoples access to such basic goods, as education, health care, safe housing that make for an unequal and unjust society.

Natural inequality and social inequality

Natural inequalities are those that emerge between people as a result of their different capabilities and talents. These kinds of inequalities are different from socially produced inequalities which emerge as a consequence of inequalities of opportunity or the exploitation of some groups in a society by others. Natural inequalities are considered to be the result of the different characteristics and abilities with which people are born with. Social inequalities on the other hand are those created by society. Unequal treatment in society based on race, color, gender and caste are of social inequalities. Women were denied equal rights for centuries similarly, Blacks were treated as slaves until the institution of slavery was questioned . Even people born with disability with modern technological innovations are able to contribute like any other normal person. Stephen Hawkings, contribution despite his disability is remarkable. Political philosophers have contributed various theories, philosophies and ideologies for further understanding and innovation to place society on equal platform.

Read the cartoon and identify the context of what type of inequalities are represented in this cartoon?

Let us know the dimensions of equality

What are the different types of equality?

Civil Equality

·                No discrimination (religion, belief, etc)

Political Equality

·                Access to authority

·                Voting

Social Equality

·                Opportunity

·                Privileges

Natural Equality

·                Natural rights

Economic Equality

·                Wealth

  (i) Social Equality

Social equality means no one should be discriminated in the distribution of rights, privileges and opportunities based on birth, caste, religion, race, colour, gender or social status. Each one should be given equal opportunity to develop his personality. Social equality implies few important aspects. They are: removal of discrimination based on social status, absence of special privileges to few and finally ensuring equal opportunity in terms of acquiring education. History reveals that certain forms of social inequality world over were rejected and the demand for social equality are being raised. Slavery in South Africa, west Asia and America, untouchability in India, Racial discrimination n in USA against Blacks, Policy of Hitler against Jews and gender related inequalities and discrimination are few examples of social inequalities with countries world over are trying to redress with the policy of government. Civil rights movement in United States of America for Blacks by Martin Luther king Jr and Dr.B.R.Ambedkar’s effort for the social equality for the lower caste in India are few examples that set movement for social equality in motion.

Martin Luther king Jr. was an unquestioned leader of nonviolent civil Rights movement in USA.

Civil right movement was a struggle for social justice happened during the 1950s and 1960s for blacks to gain equal rights under the law in the United states. Similarly Dr.B.R.Ambedkars liberation movement for millions of dalits was a historic movement in India. A seed for the movement for social equality.

The American declaration announced that ‘all men are created equal’, French declaration of Rights of Man and citizens declared that ‘men are born and always continue free and equal in their rights. The United Nations organization on 10th December, 1948, declared the charter of human rights which laid stress on social equality. However according to the report of Amnesty International, these rights have been violated frequently by a number of countries in the past and still efforts are being made to address the issues of social inequality world over.

(ii) Civil Equality

The word ‘civil’ is derived from the Latin word civilis or civis, which means citizen. Civil equality means equality in which each citizen is provided with equal civil rights and liberties. Civil equality consists of similar civil liberties and civil  rights by all the citizens. Civil laws should treat all the individuals equally.

There should not be any discrimination of superior and inferior, the rich and the poor, caste and creed, colour and race, clans and tribes, groups and classes. In England, Rule of law is in force and in the eyes of the rule of law all are equal. Equal treatment is given to all by the rule of law. It is from the British constitution India had adopted the rule of law.

(iii) Political Equality

Political Equality means equal right of all citizens, without any distinction, allowed to participate in the affairs of the state. Political right of all citizen is ensured through universal adult franchise. The other factors that ensure the political rights of citizens are:

·               Right to vote

·               Right to contest in election

·               Right to hold public office

·               Right to petition the government and criticize public policy

Political equality guarantees the enjoyment of similar political rights to all citizens. Universal adult franchise is a means to this end. Political equality is actually the test on the experiments of democracy. It is also believed that political equality in itself is not adequate to disperse political power, it also needs socio-economic equality to achieve political equality.

(iv) Economic Equality

Economic equality is justifiable only when all people have reasonable opportunities to develop themselves fully. Economic equality is meaningful only when there is an adequate scope for employment, reasonable wages, adequate leisure and equal share in the management of economic concern. Professor Laski explains economic equality, “Political equality is, therefore, never real unless it is accompanied with virtual economic liberty; political power otherwise is bound to be the hand-maid of economic power”.

Economic equality here means the provision of equal opportunities to all so that they may be able to make their economy progress. Ideologically this is possible in Socialism and not in Capitalism.

(v) Equality of opportunity and education

Equality of opportunity and education means, all the citizens should be given equal and similar opportunities by the state. All the citizens should have similar chances to receive education and equal opportunities be given to develop their personality. Social inequalities such as race, caste, religion, language, rich, poor and gender based discrimination should be eradicated. In India, constitution provides provisions for equal opportunities and equal education.

Relation between Liberty and Equality

There is no value of liberty in the absence of equality. They are understood from different perspectives by political thinkers such as Lord Acton , De Tocqueville and Harold . J.Laski. Lord Acton and Alexis De Tocqueville were the ardent advocates of liberty. They were of the opinion that where there is liberty, there is no equality and vice versa. “The passion for equality made vain the hope for liberty.” - Lord Acton Professor H.J. Laski believed that liberty and equality should go together. If an individual is given unrestrained liberty to do whatever he likes, he may cause harm to others. Unrestrained liberty will bring only chaos in the society. In the nineteenth century, the Individualists wrongly interpreted the term Liberty. They did not attach any importance to economic equality and laid stresses on Laissez Faire to be adopted by the government said Laski .

Professor H.J. Laski in his remark said that ‘Where there are rich and poor, educated and uneducated, we always find a relation of master and servant’.

Laissez faire is an economic system in which transaction between private parties are free from government intervention such as regulation, privileges, tariffs and subsidies.

Adam Smith was the ardent supporter of the view that the Individualists maintained that there should be a free competition between the capitalists and labor leaders. They did not want the government to involve in the economic matters. Formula of Demand and Supply was adopted. It was expected that the economic difficulties will be removed by this formula, but resulted in dangerous consequences in Europe.

The capitalists exploited the opportunity to the core and as a result of it, the gap between rich poor got wider. The labor class was worst affected and the reaction against individualism resulted in the dawn of Socialism. Socialism rose to condemn and refute the principles of Individualism. The transition made clear that Liberty is meaningless in the absence of economic equality.

Individualism is a political and social philosophy that emphasizes the moral worth of the individual.

Socialism is a political and economic theory the advocates the means of production, distribution and exchange should be owned or regulated by the community as a whole.

Economic equality is essential for the existence of political freedom. Otherwise it will be a capitalist democracy in which the laborers will have right to vote but they will not get their purpose served. Hence liberty is possible only in socialistic democracy where liberty and equality go together. There is only one solution to liberty. It lies in equality. Thus liberty and equality are complimentary to each other said Pollard.

Problems with Equality

·               Variety of meanings: equal treatment, equal outcomes, equal opportunities (and lots of shades of meaning within these broad categories)

·               Conflicts between each type: equal treatment prevents equal outcomes; equal outcomes violates equal treatment.

·               Equal opportunities conceptually flawed by problem of regression: is education and training an outcomes or an opportunity? Is an entry level job an outcome or an opportunity?

·               Equal treatment reinforces difference in opportunities and lacks a theory of what should count as a relevant difference and irrelevant differences eg obesity.

·               Equal outcomes are not in fact generally desired as a goal: fairness rather than egalitarianism is the model of social justice being sought. Equality is an aspect of fairness, but also inequality is desired on the ground of fairness to reward ‘merit’ and to accommodate to choose a way of life.

How Equality can be promoted

The difference as we understood between liberals and socialist lead us to the desirable way of achieving the goal of equality. The wide debate on the means of promoting equality may lead us to few methods. They are,

·               Establishing formal equality

·               Equality through Differential Treatment

·               Affirmative action

Perspectives of various Ideologies on Equality by Andrew Heywood

Liberals believe that people are ‘born’ equal in the sense that they are of equal moral worth. This implies formal equality, notably Legal and political equality of opportunity, but social equality is likely to be purchased at the expense of freedom and through the penalizing of tablet. Nevertheless, whereas classical liberals emphasize the need for strict meritocracy and economic incentives, modern liberals have argued that genuine equal opportunities require relative social equality.

Conservatives have traditionally viewed society as natural hierarchical and have thus dismissed equality as an abstract and unachievable goal. Nevertheless, the new right evinces a strong industrialist belief in equality of opportunity while emphasizing the economic benefits of material inequality.  

Socialist regards equality as a fundamental value and in particular, endorse social equality. Despite shifts within social democracy towards a liberal belief of opportunity, social equality, whether in its relative (social democratic) or absolute (communist) sense, has been seen as essential to ensuring social cohesion and fraternity, establishing justice or equity and enlarging freedom in a positive sense.

Anarchists place a particular stress upon political equality, understood as an equality and absolute right to personal autonomy, implying that all forms of political inequality amount to oppression.

Anarcho-communists believe in absolute social equality achieved through the collective ownership of productive wealth.

Fascists believe that humankind is marked by racial inequality, both between leaders and followers and between the various nations or race of the world. Nevertheless, the emphasis on the nation or race implies that all members are equal, at least in terms of their core identity.

Feminists take equality to mean sexual equality, in the sense of equal rights and equal opportunities (liberal feminism) or equal social, economic power (social feminism?) irrespective of gender. However, some radical feminists argued that the demand for equality may simply lead to women being ‘male-identified’.

Ecologist advance the notion of bio centric equality, which emphasizes that all life forms have an equal right to ‘live and blossom’. Conventional notions of equality are therefore seen as anthropocentric, in that they exclude the interest of all organisms and entities other than humankind.

Heywood, Andrew. (2004) Political Ideologies: An Introduction, 4th ed. New York: Macmillan.

Ways of establishing formal equality.

Social, economic and political inequalities all over the world have been protected by customs and legal systems that prohibited some sections of society from enjoying certain kinds of opportunities and rewards. Poor were denied of right to vote. Women were not allowed to be a carrier oriented women in some part of the world. The caste system in india prevented people from the lower castes from doing anything except manual labour. In some countries only some families can occupy important positions. Equality cannot be achieved unless these privileges are stalled.

For ages these systems have the sanction of law, hence for achieving equality government intervention is needed by means of law. Our constitution as a fundamental or supreme law of the land does it. The constitution of India prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth. Our constitution also abolishes untouchability. Most of the modern states and democratic governments have incorporated in their constitution the principle of equality.

Equality in Indian Constitution

The concept of equality in indian constitution.

The Indian constitution under article 14 provides for equality before law or the equal protection of laws to all persons. This is a statement of formal equality and gives meaning to what preamble seeks to ensure in terms of ‘equality of status and of opportunity’. This also means that laws of the land will apply to all equally and there should not be discrimination on grounds of birth, caste, color, gender, language, race, religion, etc. in fact article 15 of the constitution substantiates article 14 further by prohibiting any such discrimination.

Equality before law and equal protection of law have been further strengthened in the Indian constitution under article 21. It ensures that ‘No Person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. This means that a reasonable fair and just procedure should be followed for depriving a person of his personal liberty and life. It admits no arbitrariness, discriminatory procedure or unequal treatment for different individuals’.

Right to Equality (Article 14-18)

v    Equality before law (Article 14)

v    Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion (Article 15)

v    Equality of opportunity in matters of public employments(Article 16)

v    Abolition of Untouchability (Article 17)

v    Abolition of titles (Article 18)

How Equality can be achieved through differential treatment?

It is necessary sometime to treat people differently in order to ensure that they can enjoy equal rights. Certain differences may have to be taken into account for this  need.  

Some special consideration for the disabled and protection for women employees especially in the corporate and IT industries when they travel amidst work in the night are provided. These acts should not be treated as an infringement of equality but an enhancement of equality. Similarly some of the policies are needed to overcome the hindrances of equality by the government. For example, India follows the principle of reservation and other countries follow affirmative action.

Affirmative action Perception of Affirmative action

Affirmative action implies that it is not sufficient to establish formal equality by law. In order to eliminate deep rooted inequalities, some positive measures are necessary and such positive measures could minimize and eliminate slowly the entrenched forms of social inequalities. Most of the policies of affirmative action are thus designed to correct the cumulative effect of past inequalities. In our country we have adopted a policy of quotas or reserved seats in education and jobs to provide equality of opportunity to deprived groups, and this has been the subject of considerable debate and disagreement.

Affirmative Action Definition

A policy or program providing advantage for people of a minority group who are seen to have traditionally been discriminated against, with the aim of creating a more egalitarian society through preferential access to education, employment, health care, social welfare, etc

The policy has been defended on the grounds that certain groups have been victims of social prejudice and discrimination in the form of exclusion and segregation. Therefore in the interest of creating an egalitarian and just society they need to be given special protection and help. However these measures of affirmative actions are time bound and temporary. It is expected that these special consideration will enable these communities to overcome existing disadvantages with others on equal terms.

The critics of positive discrimination contend that the provision of reservation and quota arbitrarily denies  the rights of other sections right to equal treatment. They think that reservations are of reverse discrimination where the principle of equality remained questioned. Equality is meant for treating all equals instead it creates a distinction among individuals on the basis of caste and racial prejudices. Hence this theorist wants to do away with social distinctions that divide society. Whatever the debate may be the fact is health and education for rural and slum children are glaringly deprived while comparing with the children in elite schools.

These students face hurdles in gaining access to special coaching and fees for professional courses may also be high. Hence they cannot compete on equal terms with the more privileged sections. We all know that such social and economic inequalities of this kind remain as hinder to equal opportunities. Theorists of today acknowledge this but what they contest is not the goal of equal opportunity but the policies that the state should pursue to achieve the goal of equality.

Economic Inequality and Arab Uprising

Issues like illness, hunger and thirst are often both cause and consequences. The cause of poverty are often related: one problem causes other. For example lack of safe clean water causes bad sanitation, which causes disease and disease can result in inability to work, which leads to poverty, hunger and so on.

Poverty is an issue that can threaten the stab ility of the country. For example, the Jasmine Revolution takes the authoritarian rulers in Tunisia by surprise and triggers anti-government protests across the Arab world. The 29-day-long struggle ended Ben Ali’s 23- year rule. The self-immolation by Mohammad Bouazizi, an unemployed man who was harassed by the police in the Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid on December 17, 2010 was the spark the ignited the Arab street. It first started the “Jasmine “Revolution (Jasmine is Tunisia’s national flower). The residents of the sleepy town, who were already angry about routine police brutality and the lack of economic opportunities, took to the streets spontaneously with “a rock in one hand and a cellphone” in the other…

A great wave of anger, frustration, defiance and democratic demand is sweeping across the Arab world. The upsurge in Arab world is not simply about democracy versus dictatorship. It is also a revolt against a manifestly unjust economic order.

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Right to Equality under the Indian Constitution

Meaning of the term ‘equality’ .

Equality is regarded as the basis of Democracy. The concept of equality is also closely associated with the theory of natural rights. The beginning of the principle of equality may be traced to the theory of natural equality because it was said by Thomas Jefferson “all men are born equal and it is the man himself who creates differences between individuals.” Equality implies the treatment and opportunities of all people alike. Equality presumes that there must not be any discrimination when it comes to opportunities. Therefore, the Right to Equality is essential for all individuals for their development.  However, equality is a broad term and contains many exceptions in our Constitution.

Right to Equality under the Indian Constitution [1] –

Article 14-18 of the Constitution of India provides the Right to Equality. It is one of the six fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution of India.

“The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”

Prima facie, the term ‘equality before the law’ and ‘equal protection of the laws’ may look similar, but they are different. Equality before the law is a negative concept implying the absence of any special privilege based on birth, creed, colour, sex, or the like whereas, equal protection of laws is a more positive concept implying the right of treatment in similar situations.

Article 15 

Article 15 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.

Sub-clause (1) says that the State shall not discriminate on the above-mentioned grounds.

Sub-clause (2) says that no citizen on the above-mentioned grounds is subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regards to public places such as restaurants, shops, etc.

Sub-clause (3) empowers the State to make provisions for women and children.

Sub-clause (4) empowers the State to make special provisions for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.

Sub-clause (5) was inserted by the 93rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 2005 and it allows reservation for socially and educationally backward classes in State or State-aided educational institutions subject to the exclusion of the “creamy layer” from OBCs.

Article 16 –

Article 16 talks about equality of opportunities in matters of public employment.

Sub-clause (1) says that there must be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. The term “in matters relating to employment or appointment” denotes all matters in relation to employment both prior and after the employment which is incidental to the employment and form a part of the T&Cs of the employment. The crux of equality of opportunity is not just the maintenance of legal equality but on the presence of abilities and opportunity of excellence in each cadre or grade. Thus, all persons situated similarly must be treated in a like manner.

Sub-clause (2) says that no citizen, on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth be ineligible for any office under the State. This provision only applies to public employment.

In K.C. Vasanth Kumar v. the State of Karnataka [2] , the Supreme Court held that reservation in favour of backward classes must be based on the mean test. It further suggested that the policy of reservation should be reviewed after every five years and the class reaches a level wherein they do not require a reservation, its name must be deleted from that list.

Sub-clause (3) empowers the Parliament to make laws regarding a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office. In M.R. Balaji v. Mysore [3] , the apex court had put a 50% cap on reservations in all states except Tamil Nadu and Rajasthan.

Sub-clause (4) empowers the State to make provisions for reservation of appointments or posts in favour of a backward class of citizens, which in the opinion of the State are not represented in the services under the State.  Reservation under Article 16(4) included promotions which were overruled by the Supreme Court in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India [4] .

The judgment had a very significant impact on Article 16(4). It held –

• Backwardness under Article 16(4) is mainly social. It need not be social or educational.
• For reservation under Article 16(4), the limit cannot exceed 50%.
• Identification of a class as “backward classes” is subject to judicial review.

Article 16(4) confers a discretionary power on the State to make a reservation if the need is but no constitutional right upon the members of the backward classes to claim the same. [5]

Article 17 –

Article 17 abolishes the evil practice of untouchability. Untouchability was an evil practice carried out on members of the lowest rungs of the society such as Dalits. Parliament is also authorized to make laws prescribing punishment for the same.

Article 18 – 

‘Title’ is something that goes along with one’s name. For example, during the British rule in India, titles such as Lord, Lady, King, Queen were used. But, this has been done away with by the Constitution of India. This prohibition operates only against the State, and it does not prohibit public institutions to award titles. The State also isn’t debarred from awarding titles for say, excellence in some field. For example, Bharat Ratna, Padma Vibhushan and Padma Bhushan are titles awarded by the Government, which are legal.

CONCLUSION – 

Right to Equality is a necessity for every individual living in any democratic set-up. In countries such as India, right to equality is essential due to the significant economic, social and political disparities. Some have benefitted from the system of reservation while a specific section of the society doesn’t accept reservation in today’s time. Barring reservation, equality attempts to put everyone on a level playing field, which is a man’s natural right. Nobody is born equal physically or mentally, and some are very good and some not so good. One can overcome these if equality is there in society. To achieve equality in the practical sense, one has to do away with discrimination.

[1] Durga Das Basu, Introduction to the constitution of India (2015).

[2] AIR 1985 S.C. 1495

[3] AIR 1963 SC 649

[4] AIR 1993 SC 477

[5] S.Pushpa v. Sivachanmugavelu, AIR 2005 SC 1038

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Equality: Meaning, Aspects and Theories

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Meaning and Definition :

Equality originates from aequalis, aequus and aequalitas. These are all old French or Latin words. These French/Latin words mean even, level and equal. Thus the meaning of the word equality used in political science corresponds to the meaning from which it originates.

The term equality used in political science differs from uniformity, identity and sameness. Some people, of course, want to use it to denote uniformity. But this does not convey the meaning when it is used by political scientists. Equality does not mean obliteration of diversity.

Number of political scientists has defined the concept and Prof. Laski is one of them. We shall mention his definition because of its special approach. According to Laski equality means “coherence of ideas”.

In the treatment meted out to different individuals there shall persist coherence. While privileges are distributed among the individuals justice and reason must be maintained so that no individual can think that he is neglected or is deprived of his due share. In the distribution of privileges attention shall be paid to the development of personality.

This definition leads us to find out another meaning (definition) of equality. It means the absence of special privileges. Individual’s claim for the privileges rests on the ground that without it he cannot develop his personality and because of this reason an individual’s claim for something is logical and legitimate.

In that case, if some individuals are deliberately made to suffer that will be a gross violation of equality. Of course, the deprived person must prove that others have been given more than what is reasonably his due.

Mere providing privileges or opportunities is not all. This does not bear the complete meaning of equality. Laski further says that privileges provided by the authority must be adequate. Individuals, with the help of inadequate opportunities, cannot develop personality. It is difficult to ascertain what is exactly meant by the term adequate. What is adequate to one may be inadequate to other and we all admit this.

Still we hold the view that adequacy will be determined by the person claiming opportunities. And at the same time that state must have the capability to provide opportunities. It may not be possible for the government of a poor country to provide all the requirements for the research of atomic energy. Again, providing privileges depends upon the mentality of the party in power.

All these factors enter into the consideration while analysing the term adequate. But this controversy need not be an obstacle for the authority in charge of distributing opportunities (we use opportunities and privileges alternatively though there is a very subtle difference).

We collect three different meanings of equality from D. D. Raphael’s analysis:

The first is equal consideration. There is a second meaning and it is equal opportunities. Finally, equal satisfaction of basic needs. The term equal considerations is not satisfactory because it may not always be justified. Equal opportunities, in the opinion of Raphael, are an acceptable term but it is cautioned here that it should not lead one to conclude that it is identical opportunity.

Basic needs are a good term and everybody wants its fulfillment. Here the problem is what is actually basic needs differs from person to person. The criterion of basic needs is to be determined at first. The different senses of equality designated by Raphael, though controversial, are mean­ingful and many subscribe to these meanings.

Instead of attributing any clear meaning to the concept of equality Dorothy Pickles (Introduction to Politics) draws our attention to the fact that it is used in most of the cases ambiguously. To the French revolutionaries it was meant equality before law. Irrespective of any differences all classes and groups of persons are to be treated equally by law. Nobody is above law and outside the purview of law.

Equality has another meaning and this is everybody can claim equal protection of law. Law will protect all persons equally and it will make no discrimination. Some people still hold the view that equality denotes equal economic opportunities. There is still another meaning of equality which means property should be distributed equally among all persons. These are the different connotations attributed to the concept of equality.

Analysis of Equality :

We now turn to a detailed analysis of the various aspects of equality:

1. Everybody admits that equality is a very complex notion; there is no single meaning and no single notion about equality. We here note some well-known meanings or notions such as political equality, economic equality, social equality, racial equality and sexual equality or equality in respect of gender. All these forms are important and they have relevance in the social and political structures.

2. Benn and Peters have said that the concept is more often prescriptive than descriptive. The exponents of the doctrine, through the idea of equality, want to prescribe some norms or ideals. For example, they want to say that there shall be political or racial or economic equality or it is suggested that both women and men shall be on equal footing. While prescribing something in the form of equality it is generally addressed to the persons in power, policy-makers and general public that the principle of equality should be strictly adhered to.

3. In the analysis of equality we very often refer to egalitarianism, and in political theory both equality and egalitarianism are profusely used. Egalitarianism refers to the belief in the principle that all men are equal because they are created by God equal and, therefore, they deserve equal rights and opportunities. No discrimination is allowed. Particularly Christianity worked behind the propagation of this concept.

It is also defined as a theory or practice based on the desire to promote equality or the belief that establishment of equality is the primary objective of any society, Egalitarianism, we can say, aims at extreme or strict equality. It says that in all spheres of social, political cultural, economic and other fields there shall exist equality.

It thinks of no concession or relaxation of equality principle—viewed thus, equality, at least in some respects, differs from egalitarianism. It believes that all men are created equal. But that does not mean that the differences in intelligence, ability etc. cannot be recognised. It is believed by some that the maximisation of equality will result in egalitarianism. Egalitarianism has for long canvassed in favour of equalities in income, wealth, opportunities etc. It has been asserted that without all these equalities the inherent qualities of men cannot thrive at all.

4. The progress towards attainment of equality has not been uniform in all states. For example, in the USA the legislature and the judiciary have been found very active in the fields of social and political equality; it has been less active in economic equality. Not only the USA, in other liberal democracies more stress is given to political equality and less to economic equality. Whereas in socialist countries much importance is paid to economic equality. But egalitarianism calls it a violation that all types of equality are to be treated adequately.

Formal Equality :

Nowadays a term is frequently used and it is formal equality. The political scientists do not especially use this term but it is manifest from their analysis that the idea of formal equality is quite fresh in their minds. It is believed that formal equality is legal equality. The inner idea is that every citizen is a legal member of the state which is a legal association.

As a legal member of the legal association every person has certain claims to equality. There are two very important forms of legal or formal equality. One is equality before law and equal protection of law. We have already mentioned these two. What is to be noted here is that the legal member of the legal association (Barker calls a state a legal association) can legitimately claim that all the citizens (including him) must be treated equally by law and no discrimination is to be allowed. In the British system of administration and politics this was especially emphasised and Dicey spoke a lot about it. Violation of this principle will be treated as violation of equality.

There is another type of formal equality and it is equal protection of law. It is the primary function of law to give protection to all citizens and while doing this it makes no distinction between rank, position and wealth. Legal or formal equality, to speak the truth, constitutes the very core of rule of law. In this sense the formal equality comes to be associated with equality.

It has been pointed out by Heywood that the formal equality is basically negative because the state authority takes special care in regard to the distribution of opportunities. The objective shall always be not to allow awarding special privileges to few persons.

Naturally to attain this goal the state must impose restriction in one form or other upon the distributing machinery or the state must take policy to that extent. We have already noted that Laski has observed that equality means the absence of ‘special privileges.

Formal or legal equality has received almost universal approval from conservatives, liberals and even socialists. It is absolutely irrational, unjustified and even bigotry to deprive some persons of their legitimate share in wealth, income and manifold privileges on the ground of accidental birth in poor families or in so called neglected religious groups.

The white rulers of South Africa adopted a policy of segregation or apartheid for the black people who were the original inhabitants of the land. Even in the USA the Negroes were not allowed to sit with the white students in public schools or to dine in the famous restaurants.

The blacks were not even allowed to enjoy other privileges which the white people had the right to enjoy. This type of discrimination was irrational and against equality, liberty and justice. It is ridiculous to think of the rule of law in a society which gleefully practices all forms of discriminations.

Equality and Justice:

Equality is the principle of justice :.

In our analysis of Rawls’ theory of justice we have noted that he treats attainment of equality in the distribution of rights as a basic principle of justice. He writes “Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties of others”.

Every individual has the right to claim equal liberties with others and when the state authority can ensure this, it will be assumed that justice will no longer be far away. The state must see that in regard to the allotment of rights and liberties the principle of equality has been most scrupulously observed. If equality is violated justice will not be achieved. Justice is always hand in glove with equality.

Rawls further maintains that for the sake of justice inequalities may be allowed to reign in society. Rawls writes, “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage”. In a state all the opportunities and position shall be opened to all. There shall be no place of discrimination. Rawls also says that even the inequalities shall create no disadvantage to anybody.

In this way Rawls has suggested that equalities and inequalities will build up a foundation for justice. Distribution of all values, rights and liberties will be based on the above principles and all institutions shall be modelled on the same principles.

Liberal Equality, Democratic Equality and Justice :

Liberal equality, democratic equality and justice all are closely linked. Rawls says formal equality, through the distribution of all opportunities to all eligible persons, shall be ascertained. Rawls admits that in almost all societies there are misdistribution of opportunities and advantages at the initial stages and that must be rectified through deliberate efforts.

This should be done in such a manner as it will enable to flourish and utilise their talents properly. But Rawls points out a condition. Formal declaration of policies or processes is not sufficient; care should be taken as to the fact that all are capable of attaining the opportunities. If necessary the structural changes of the society are to be effected. “Free market arrangements must be set within a framework of political and legal institution”.

Rawls suggests that democratic equality is achieved by combining the means of the principle of fair equality of opportunity with the difference principle. Let us explain it. We have already noted that whatever opportunities are available, that must be fairly distributed among the legitimate claimants.

In the process of distribution, if necessary, difference is to be accepted. That is, unequal distribution of opportunities is to be admitted. He says that behind this policy there shall be consent of the society and it shall aim at the advantage or benefit or welfare of all. Even the expectations of the least advantaged shall find realisation.

Basis of Equality and Justice :

How justice is related to equality or vice versa will be explained in the following way: Rawls says that the relation between these two concepts can be explained from various standpoints. In the first place, the administration of public institutions is to be so arranged as to ensure both equality and justice. All the rules of the society are to be applied impartially and the rule of law shall prevail in every sphere of human life and society.

The rights of persons are to be protected by the rule of law. The citizens will be able to realise that rule of law is not violated. The rule of law and equality travel side by side and both help the realisation of justice. We here find that Rawls was immensely influenced by the British systems of rule of law and he considered it as the basis of justice and equality.

Rawls mentions about the ”substantive structure” of institutions. He repeatedly emphasises the restructuring of institutions because of the fact that, in democracy people’s rights, liberties and equalities are realised mainly through these institutions. These are not generally controlled by the state. But mere non-interference with the functioning of institutions is not enough.

The structure must be helpful for equality and justice. The structures of institutions will have no function for discriminating among the citizens and thereby devaluing justice. It is the duty of institutions to impart justice and ensure equality. Thus, Rawls concludes that justice and equality are not separate concepts.

Marxist Theory of Equality :

Part of marx’s political philosophy :.

Like his other political concepts, equality is also a part of his entire .political philosophy which is primarily linked with the unmasking the real nature of capitalist system, its abolition and emancipation of working class. From the study of various aspects of society Marx concluded that there were number of inequalities in capitalist system.

For example, social, political, economic etc.; and these were due to the bourgeois structure. In any capitalist state there were inequalities between men and women, rich and poor, there were discriminations among various religious groups.

Even the inequalities were institutionalised by the capitalists. Theoretically the bourgeois scholars and political scientists propagate for equality and strongly argue for formal or legal equality. Even the bourgeois constitutions (constitutions framed by the bourgeois scholars to meet the needs of a particular class) pontifically announce the inclusions of rights, liberties and equalities as parts of the constitution and also make provision for their protection.

But in actual situation most of the rights, liberties and equalities remain unfulfilled. Marxists claim that all “these allegations against the bourgeois society are not based on any concoction or emotion. It is their claim that Marx and Engels studied the capitalist society from a very close distance.” In the second half of the nineteenth century the capitalist systems of Britain, Germany and France were matured.

How to Achieve Equality?

On the Jewish Question Marx dealt with several issues and one of these is equality. He had said that it was mere farce to think of emancipation of all exploited people through the declaration of equal civil rights and liberties. To Marx such declaration amounted to political emancipation.

But people’s equal rights and privileges could never be obtained through the announcement of political emancipation. According to Marx it was merely partial emancipation. For achievement of all forms of equality (also of rights and liberties) human emancipation was necessary. By human emancipation he meant emancipation of all men and women from every type of bondage created and imposed by the capitalists. Emancipation only of the Jews could not achieve that ambitious objective.

So Marx on the Jewish Question ridiculed the emancipation only of the Jews. Marx believed that the institution of private property was the chief evil and it always acted for the creation of inequalities and differences among people. For this reason he recommended the abolition of private property through the seizure of political power. Prevalence of market economy was another factor for the growing menace of inequality and exploitation.

The weaker sections of the body politic were gradually being eliminated from the market because of money power exercised by the capitalists. Therefore, the abolition of capitalism was the first precondition for the attainment of universal political values such as equality, right and liberty, also justice.

Two Principles of Equality :

A serious analysis of Marxist thought reveals that Marx had two types of equality in his mind though an unambiguous conclusion cannot be drawn. The writer of the essay published in Dictionary of Marxist Thought has said that the two principles of equality are—”From each according to his abilities, to each according to the amount of work performed”.

There is another principle: “Each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs”. This principle indicates that each person in the society will perform his duties as far as his abilities permit him to do. That is, none will be asked to do any work beyond his capacity.

On the basis of these two criteria the remuneration will be decided. It is believed by the Marxists that if this criterion is strictly adhered to that will lay the foundation of equality because none will be deprived of his due share of wealth. But the Marxists believe that only in a post-revolutionary society such an aim can be realised.

In the first stage of the post-revolutionary society, Marx claimed, this objective or principle could be achieved. Marxists did not treat this stage as the stage of just equality. It was apprehended that due to differences in ability and talent there might appear differences among men in many respects. Nevertheless, this principle might be regarded as the stepping stone to equality.

There is another principle delineated by Marxists: “From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs”. Marxists (including Lenin) stressed this principle and held that only in a communist society this principle could be achieved. Explaining this principle the author of the above-noted article has said, “This principle corresponds with the higher communist phase of post-revolutionary society. Under communism will there be equal treatment of unequal human beings with all their necessarily unequal needs”.

A musician needs musical instruments for the performance of music. A physicist requires huge amount of money to purchase sophisticated instruments for his research. All these are not always for the large scale public benefit. However, these expenditures are to be met. Some people call it Utopian approach to the concept of equality because all the legitimate and rational require­ments cannot be met by the society. Naturally the system of private property is essential.

But the Marxists do not share this view. They are of opinion that when everybody in the society is assured of satisfactory activities and requirements there shall not arise the urge for private property. This will clear the way for the emergence of equality. A good social relation will develop among all persons in the body-politic. Marxists have further said that, in communism, when such a situation will arise, nobody will try to acquire private property because that will appear to them a useless venture.

Related Articles:

• Rights, Liberty and Equality (Comparative Analysis)
• Essay on Equality: Meaning and Kinds of Equality
• Political Ideas of Cicero: Natural Law, Equality and Idea of State
• Theories on the Origin of State | Essay | Theories | Political Science

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