research paper on media and violence

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

• Publications
• Account settings

Preview improvements coming to the PMC website in October 2024. Learn More or Try it out now .

• Advanced Search
• Journal List
• HHS Author Manuscripts
• PMC10177625

Violent Media in Childhood and Seriously Violent Behavior in Adolescence and Young Adulthood

Michele l. ybarra.

Center for Innovative Public Health Research, San Clemente, California

Kimberly J. Mitchell

Crimes against Children Research Center, University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire

Jay Koby Oppenheim

Independent Consultant, New York, New York

Associated Data

To quantify the relative odds of self-reported seriously violent behavior in adolescence and young adulthood given one’s self-reported violent media diet in childhood.

Baseline data were collected nationally online from 1,586 youth 10–15 years of age in 2006. Follow-up data were collected in 2010–2011 and 2016. Children reported the amount of music, video games, television, websites with real people, and cartoons that depicted “physical fighting, hurting, shooting, or killing.” Seriously violent behavior was assessed 5 and 10 years later.

887 adolescents completed the survey at baseline and 5-year follow-up. The relative odds of reporting seriously violent behavior over time were 2.45-fold higher ( P <.001) with each incremental increase in one’s baseline violent media diet. After adjusting for other potentially influential characteristics, results persisted (aOR = 1.70, P =.01). The relative odds also were elevated for those frequently exposed to violence in music (aOR = 3.28, p=0.03), television (aOR = 3.51, p<0.001), and video games (aOR = 3.27, p=0.02). 760 young adults completed measures at baseline and 10-year follow-up. The relative odds of seriously violent behavior increased 2.18-fold ( P =.001) with each incremental increase in one’s baseline violent media diet. After adjusting for other factors, the association persisted (aOR = 1.72, P=.03). Frequent exposure to violence in video games (aOR = 3.28, p=0.03) and television (aOR = 3.14, p=0.02) also were implicated.

Discussion:

Exposure to violent media in childhood may be one modifiable influence on seriously violent behavior in adolescence and adulthood, even for those who have other risk factors.

Youth violence is a significant public health issue that negatively affects individuals, families, and communities. 1 , 2 Estimated costs associated with youth violence in the United States is more than $20 billion anually. 3 Although juvenile arrests in 2019 were down 58% since 2010, 4 youth nonetheless account for a sizable proportion of perpetrators: 9% of all violent crimes were committed by juveniles, and 21% by 18–24-year-olds. 5

No single risk factor causes violent behavior. Instead, an accumulation of exposures increases one’s risk at each level of the social ecology (e.g., exposure to spousal abuse). 2 , 6 – 9 Because it could easily be modified, exposure to violent media has been researched for decades as a potential contributor to aggressive behavior. Cross-sectional and laboratory research frequently document linkages. 10 – 12 Studies that measure violent behaviors report similar effect sizes to those that measure aggression. 10 Although fewer in number, longitudinal studies also report linkages: Huesmann and Eron found that adult criminal and violent behavior was associated with exposure to television violence 15 years prior. 13 Findings were replicated in a Finnish sample. 14 Further, Anderson and colleagues found that frequent violent video game play predicted physical aggression three to six months later for children and adolescents in three separate cohorts, two from Japan and one from the United States. 15 Some exceptions are noted. 16 Coyne and colleagues looked at longer term associations between externalizing behavior and violent video game play and did not find a linkage over the 5-year observation period. 17 This may be because the measure reflecting externalizing behavior included items that did meet the definition of aggression.

Youth media use is nearly ubiquitous 18 : Music is by far the most widely used medium in adolescence: 82% listen to music daily. 19 Most - 83% of adolescent girls and 97% of boys 13–17 years of age – also play video games; 95% own or have access to a smartphone, and 85% say they go online and exchange content. 20 Cross-sectional research by Ybarra and colleagues suggests that one’s general media violence diet may explain the increased odds of engaging in seriously violent behavior. 21 As such, it is important not just to examine the association that specific media may have but also the association that one’s violent media ‘diet’ across media may have with violent behavior over time.

The current study aims to fill noted research gaps. First, while extant research examines exposure to violence on television and in video games, exposures through other media, such as music, are less well studied yet constitute a large part of youth media diets. Second, much of the literature focuses on aggressive rather than violent behavior. Aggression is any behavior enacted by someone who intends to harm the other person when the other person does not want to be harmed. 22 , 23 Violence is a more severe type of aggression that carries with it the possibility of serious physical harm to the other individual. All violent behaviors are aggressive, whereas not all aggressive behaviors are violent. Third, few studies examine these linkages longitudinally, particularly between 5 and 10 years postexposure. Based on previous literature, we posit that violent media will predict violent behavior over time and that this will be particularly true for a general media diet as it reflects an accumulation of exposures.

Growing up with Media is a longitudinal study designed to study the association between violent media exposure in childhood and adolescence - particularly exposures to new media, including the Internet and seriously violent behavior. The survey protocol was reviewed and approved by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Institutional Review Board (IRB) for Waves 1–3 and by Chesapeake IRB for Waves 4–7 (subsequently acquired by Advarra IRB). Parents provided informed consent for their participation and permission for their child’s participation, and youth provided informed assent by reading the assent information and then clicking either “Yes, I want to take the survey” or “No, I do not want to take the survey.”

In 2006, 1,586 child-caregiver pairs were recruited through an email sent to randomly identified adult Harris Poll OnLine (HPOL) panel members who reported having a child living in their household. HPOL was the largest online panel at the time of recruitment, including four million members. Members were recruited through online advertising, advertising at conferences and events, and referrals.

Eligible adult caregivers reported having a child 10–15 years of age living in the household, speaking English, and being equally or more knowledgeable than other adults living in the household about their youth’s daily activities. Eligible youth participants were 10–15-year-olds who read English, lived in the household at least 50% of the time, and had used the Internet at least once in the last six months. Recruitment was balanced on youth age and sex; once a demographic ‘bin’ was filled (e.g., for 10–12-year-old girls), subsequent youth who met those criteria were marked ineligible.

Seriously violent behavior.

Seriously violent behavior, as defined by the US Department of Justice, 24 includes murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and sexual violence. Youth were coded as having engaged in past-year seriously violent behavior if they endorsed any of the following five behaviors: (1) behaviors that would likely result in murder (i.e., stabbing or shooting someone); (2) aggravated assault (i.e., threatening someone with a weapon; attacking someone resulting in the need for medical care); (3) robbery (i.e., using a knife or gun or some other kind of weapon like a bat to get something from someone else); and (4) sexual assault (kissing, touching, or doing anything sexual with another person when it was not wanted by that person). This last item was written to be developmentally appropriate for 10–15-year-olds. Because it may include behaviors that extend beyond rape, a sensitivity analysis was conducted to examine the results when this measure of sexual assault was excluded.

Exposure to violent media.

Youth reported the amount of violence they were exposed to across five different types of media: Television, computer and video games, music, websites of real people, and websites of cartoons. A similar question format was used for each medium: “When you [engage with media type], how many of them [show/talk about] physical fighting, hurting, shooting, or killing?” 25 Response options were captured on a four-point Likert scale [1 (almost none/none of them) – 4 (almost all / all of them)].

To reflect a general violent media diet, a factor score that included all five media, was estimated using maximum likelihood [Eigenvalue = 1.69, factor loadings ranged from .47 - .69, α = 0.70, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin ranges from 0.71 – 0.78].

For specific mediums, a categorical measure was created based upon data distributions to reflect those who reported that: (1) none/almost none, (2) some, or (3) many or almost all/all of each of the medium they consumed depicted violence. Because of low cell stability, for all longitudinal analyses, baseline exposure to violence on television was dichotomized to compare none/almost none or some versus many or almost all/all; baseline exposures to real people engaging in violence online was dichotomized to none/almost none versus some, many, almost all/all. Wave 7 longitudinal analyses included a measure of baseline exposures to cartoons engaging in violence online dichotomized to none/almost none versus some, many, almost all/all.

Background variables.

Youth age and sex were reported by caregivers; race and ethnicity were reported by youth. At the individual level, because trait anger can be increased by media violence 26 , we include youths’ self-reported baseline propensity to respond with anger, measured by the 10-item State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI-CA) T-Anger scale (α = 0.86). 27 At the peer level, baseline exposure to externalizing peers was measured by asking youth the number of close friends they had who “have been arrested or done things that could get them in trouble with the police.” 28 At the family level, youth were asked if: “Ever, in real life, have you seen one of your parents get hit, slapped, punched, or beat up by your other parent, or their boyfriend or girlfriend?” 29

Randomly identified adults were emailed a link to a brief online survey that assessed their eligibility. Ineligible adults were thanked for their participation; eligible adults were invited to complete a longer 5-minute survey after obtaining informed consent. They then forwarded their survey link to their child, who provided assent and completed the, on average, 21-minute survey. Youth were encouraged to return to the survey later if they were not in a space where their responses could be kept private from others, including their caregiver.

Data were collected online in 2006 (Wave 1), 2007–2008 (Wave 2), 2008 (Wave 3), 2010–2011 (Wave 4), 2011–2012 (Wave 5), 2012–2013 (Wave 6), and 2016 (Wave 7). In this paper, we examine data from baseline (Wave 1) and five years later (Wave 4, n=887); and baseline and 10 years later (Wave 7, n=779). Incentives were $10 in Wave 1 and increased to $40 in Wave 7. The Wave 1 survey response rate (31%) is consistent with well-conducted surveys using online panels at the time of baseline recruitment. The response rate at Wave 4 was 56% (i.e., 887/1586), and at Wave 7, 49% (i.e., 779/1586).

As the recruitment target, data were weighted statistically to reflect the population of adults with children ages 10 to 15 years old in the United States according to adult age, sex, race/ethnicity, region, education, household income, and child age and sex. Using data collected from random digit dial samples, propensity score weighting also was applied to adjust for adult respondents’ propensity to be online. The weight also adjusted for nonresponse across waves.

Plan of analysis

Rates of within-wave missingness were very low: Race (1.2%) had the highest rate of declination to answer. For all dichotomous variables, “decline to answer” was recoded as “symptom absent” (e.g., not having been in a physical fight). Those who declined to answer the question about race were coded as White, the majority race. For continuous variables, “decline to answer” was recoded to the cohort mean. As a sensitivity analysis, models also were estimated with missing data imputed. Youth who did not respond to Wave 4 or Wave 7, respectively, were excluded from that specific longitudinal analysis.

Analyses were conducted using Stata 15. 30 First, co-relations of violent exposure across media were explored using a correlation matrix and Cronbach’s alpha, which reflects the inter-relatedness of the items. We also examined the percent of youth who reported varying patterns of exposure across media types. Next, to understand the long-term association between media violence and later violent behavior, we first estimated direct, unadjusted logistic regression odds (Model 1). We then estimated logistic regression odds that adjusted for baseline levels of seriously violent behavior, one’s propensity to respond to stimuli with anger, exposure to externalizing peers, exposure to caregiver spousal abuse, sex, age, race, ethnicity, and self-reported dishonesty in answering survey questions (Model 2). For each time point, six unadjusted and adjusted models were estimated: One for violent media diet and five for each of the specific types of violent media of interest.

On average, youth were 12.6 years of age (SE: 0.05) at baseline, 16.7 years of age (SE: 0.07) at 5-year and 22.1 years of age (SE: 0.07) at 10-year follow-up. As shown in Table 1 , those who completed Waves 4 and 7, respectively, versus those who did not, respectively, generally had similar baseline demographic characteristics; exposure to externalizing peers was of exception.

Responses at Wave 1 (baseline) for completers and noncompleters of Wave 4 (5 years) and Wave 7 (10 years), respectively; weighted data

Co-relation of violence exposure across media

The five indicators of exposure to violence in specific media were interrelated: Cronbach’s alpha, Wave 1 = 0.70 (unweighted data given the computation ability of Stata). As shown in Supplemental Table 1 , all media were significantly interrelated. The strongest correlations were noted for violence exposure in television and video games (0.46), and television and music (0.44). Although still significantly interrelated, violence exposure in video games and websites with real people was the least correlated (0.22).

As shown in Figure 1 , more than half (56%) of youth said that none of the media they consumed was mostly violent (i.e., many, almost all, or all of it depicted physical violence).

The percent of youth who reported a specific amount of exposure to physical fighting, shooting, or killing across media types for 10–15-year-olds in the United States (n = 1,586). Different colored bars denote the number of media to which a youth were exposed to a certain level of violence. Five media were aggregated: television, video games, music, websites with real people, and websites with cartoon figures.

Relative odds of seriously violent behavior five years after exposure to youth’s general violent media diet

A factor score was estimated to reflect one’s “violent media diet,” that is, the intensity within and across youth exposures to violent content in five mediums. As shown in Table 2 and Supplemental Figure 1 , the relative odds of reporting seriously violent behavior five years later were 2.45-fold higher ( p <0.001) with each incremental increase in one’s baseline violent media diet. After adjusting for other potentially influential characteristics, the relative odds of seriously violent behavior five years later rose 1.70-fold ( p =0.01) with each incremental increase in one’s violent media diet at baseline.

The relative odds of seriously violent behavior 5 years after exposure to violence by media type and overall media diet, weighted data (n=887)

OR: Odds ratio; aOR: Adjusted odds ratio. Models are adjusted for youth age, sex, race, ethnicity; and baseline seriously violent behavior and exposure to caregiver spousal abuse, propensity to respond to stimuli with anger, externalizing peers, and self-reported honesty in answering survey questions. Bolded text denotes p<0.05; italicized text denotes p<0.20.

Specific types of media also were implicated: Frequent childhood exposure to violence in television (OR = 4.44, p<0.001), music (OR = 5.91, p<0.001), video games (OR=6.73, p<0.001), websites with real people (OR = 2.39, p=0.03) and websites with cartoons (OR = 3.35, p=0.03) each was associated with significantly elevated odds of seriously violent behavior in adolescence. Findings persisted for music (aOR = 3.28, p=0.03), television (aOR = 3.51, p<0.001) and video games (aOR = 3.27, p=0.02) even after adjusting for other childhood influences on violent behavior. Importantly, too, “some” exposure in childhood was associated with seriously violent behavior in adolescence for both music (aOR = 2.34, p=0.05) and video games (aOR = 2.72, p=0.02).

Longitudinal associations a decade later

As shown in Table 3 and Supplemental Figure 1 , the relative odds of seriously violent behavior 10 years after one’s exposure in childhood increased 2.18-fold ( p =0.001) with each incremental increase in one’s violent media diet. After adjusting for other factors, the association persisted (aOR = 1.72, p=0.03). As with adolescence, frequent childhood exposure to violence in music (OR = 4.48, p=0.008), television (OR = 4.26, p=0.001) and video games (OR = 5.38, p=0.001) each were associated with seriously violent behavior in adulthood. This longitudinal association persisted for video games (aOR = 3.28, p=0.03) and television (OR = 3.14, p=0.02) even after taking into account other potentially influential factors; violence depicted in music also was implicated (aOR = 2.85, p=0.13).

The relative odds of seriously violent behavior 10 years after exposure to violence by media type, weighted data (n=760)

RG: Reference group; OR: Odds ratio; aOR: Adjusted odds ratio. Models are adjusted for youth age, sex, race, ethnicity, baseline seriously violent behavior, concurrent propensity to respond to stimuli with anger and self-reported honesty in answering survey questions. Bolded text denotes p<0.05; italicized text denotes p<0.20.

Contrary to other trends observed, exposure to violent websites that depicted cartoons at baseline was associated with lower odds of seriously violent behavior a decade later (aOR = 0.48, p=0.09). Given that this is in the opposite direction of other violent media exposures examined, it seems likely that this may be a statistical anomaly.

Findings were replicated when seriously violent behavior was defined without the measure of sexual assault ( Supplemental Table 2 ), and when missing data were imputed ( Supplemental Table 3 ).

In this national, longitudinal study of children initially 10–15 years of age, findings suggest that exposure to violence in specific mediums and a general diet of violent media across media in childhood are associated with seriously violent behavior in adolescence and adulthood. Measured both in intensity and diversity of exposure, as one’s violent media diet increases incrementally, so too do the odds of seriously violent behavior by 70%, over time. The increased odds are evident even after taking into account other factors that could explain violent behavior later in life, such as one’s violent behaviors in childhood, exposure to caregiver spousal abuse, one’s propensity to respond with anger, and association with peers who engage in activities that could get them in trouble with the police. Pediatricians should work with parents to identify a media consumption plan for their children that is realistic and associated with the least amount of violence as possible across the online, television, game, and music content they consume. Efforts to co-view content and talk with youth about what they are being exposed to in the media they are consuming also are likely useful. 31

Youth do not experience media in a vacuum: Exposure to violence in one medium correlates highly with exposure in another medium. This saturation of messaging may be reinforcing the idea that violence is an appropriate and common tool to address situational anger across environments and stimuli. Understanding how individual types of media are affecting youth behavior is important. Current findings suggest that it may be equally important to understand how influences across media together are affecting behavior. Findings further suggest that early, intense exposure to violence in specific media, namely music, video games, and television, may be related to seriously violent behavior in adolescence and adulthood. There appears to be a stepwise association such that those who report “some” exposure in childhood are differentially at risk than those with more intense (i.e., many, almost all/all) exposures. This suggests that if parents are unable to eliminate their children’s violent media exposure entirely, pediatricians could encourage them to reduce their exposure as much as possible, and that this may still have a positive impact.

Much of the research on exposure to violent media has focused on visual media, such as television, movies, and video games; 17 , 32 , 33 or aggregated exposure across types. 34 Less is known about aural influences, like violent music, although studies exist: In one longitudinal study of adolescents, listening to aggression in music was associated with increased aggression one year later. 35 The current study builds upon this nascent research by noting associations at 5- and 10-years post-exposure, and suggests that more research attention could be focused on the content of the music to which adolescents are listening. Given the ease of digital download of music combined with the widespread ownership of smart phones among today’s adolescents, this exposure may be more hidden and require additional effort by adults to co-experience and manage their children’s consumption.

Limitations

Self-report is a less rigorous measure than objective measures of exposure to violent media. Given the length of the survey and the multitude of questions and topics queried however, it seems unlikely that youth were able to determine the study hypotheses, thereby introducing demand characteristics. Additionally, youth report the intensity of exposure to, and not the amount of time spent with, violent media. For example, some youth who primarily play violent video games may do so for 2 hours a week, whereas others may do so for 40 hours a week. This may result in an underestimate of the association between exposure and behavior. 36

Although community-based research facilitates a wider view into youth behavior than other sources, such as juvenile justice data, self-report is vulnerable to misreporting, particularly of behaviors deemed undesirable. Efforts were made to increase the validity of self-report (e.g., surveying youth online vs in person or over the telephone, reminding them their answers were private, adjusting for self-reported dishonesty in answering survey questions). The inclusion of a social desirability scale might have facilitated a more direct examination of the prevalence and impact of misreporting in the data. That said, one in twenty youth (5%) reported at least one of the seriously violent behaviors queried at baseline. This is generally consistent with base rates observed in other large self-reported surveys, 37 suggesting that under-reporting may not have been an issue in the present study.

Additionally, the multivariate models may be over-adjusting for confounders and report artificially attenuated effect sizes. 38 For example, trait anger can be increased by media violence exposure, 26 and is therefore likely interrelated with media violence exposure. Including trait anger in the multi-variate model, therefore, partially controls for prior effects that this exposure has had on behavior. Also, controlling for prior violent behavior also essentially adjusts for prior predictors of violent behavior. Moreover, youth who consume high levels of media violence may be more likely to spend time with externalizing peers. If true, then the current models may underestimate the association between media violence and violent behavior given that youth who were associating with such peers at baseline were less likely to participate in subsequent waves.

Moreover, although the data are national, they may not be representative. Survey weights were applied to adjust for this possibility. The national reach nonetheless affords a broader view of youth experiences than might not have been observed in a local setting. Moreover, given the study’s focus on mechanism, internal validity is more important than external validity. Finally, rates of attrition are suboptimal, although differential attrition generally was not apparent.

Implications

Since 2006, when baseline data were collected, technology has changed dramatically. A growing body of literature suggests that newer, peer-to-peer, and immersive technologies may positively affect health behavior change. 39 , 40 It stands to reason that a similar learning effect could be observed if content encouraged unhealthy behaviors, including violence. The current study supports this hypothesis with older technology. Future research should both replicate the current study and examine whether newer technologies are associated with an enhanced learning effect.

During childhood, exposure to violence across a variety of media, operationalized as one’s violent media “diet,” appears to be related to engaging in seriously violent behavior in adolescence and adulthood, even beyond one’s propensity to respond to situations with anger, having peers who are engaging in behaviors that could get them in trouble with the police, being exposed to caregiver spousal abuse, and engaging in violent behaviors as a child. Specific exposures to video games and television also appear to be associated with violent behavior over time; similar linkages are suggested for music. While findings should be replicated in other community-based samples, it seems reasonable to suggest that pediatricians might work with parents to identify a media consumption plan that minimizes children’s exposure to violence across media types and is realistic within the family milieu.

Implications and Contribution

In this national, longitudinal study, exposure to violent media at 10–15 years-old was associated with increased odds of seriously violent behavior 5 and 10 years later, adjusting for aggression, externalizing peers, and caregiver spousal abuse. This was true for a general ‘violent media diet;’ and video games, television and music.

Supplementary Material

Acknowledgements:.

We would like to thank the entire Growing up with Media study team from the Center for Innovative Public Health Research, Princeton Survey Research Associates International, Harris Interactive, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, who contributed to different parts of the planning and implementation of the study. Finally, we thank the families and youth for their time and willingness to participate in this study.

Funding/support

Research reported in this publication was supported by the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health & Human Development of the National Institutes of Health under Award Number R01HD083072, and by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention under Award Numbers U49 CE000206; R01 CE001543. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Neither funder was involved in data analysis or manuscript preparation.

Conflict of interest disclosure:

The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare.

Publisher's Disclaimer: This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

Contributor Information

Michele L. Ybarra, Center for Innovative Public Health Research, San Clemente, California.

Kimberly J. Mitchell, Crimes against Children Research Center, University of New Hampshire, Durham, New Hampshire.

Jay Koby Oppenheim, Independent Consultant, New York, New York.

Twenty Questions (and Answers) About Media Violence and Cyberbullying

Affiliations.

• 1 Department of Pediatrics, University of Minnesota, Hennepin County Medical Center, 701 Park Avenue, Green 7, Minneapolis, MN 55415, USA. Electronic address: [email protected].
• 2 University of New Mexico School of Medicine, Albuquerque, NM, USA.
• PMID: 32122560
• DOI: 10.1016/j.pcl.2019.12.002

For decades, pediatricians have been concerned about the impact of media on the health and well-being of children and adolescents. Robust research has found an association between exposure to media violence and real-life aggression in children and teens. Other effects include desensitization, fear, and attitudes that violence is a means of resolving conflict. Ongoing research finds similar associations between exposure to video game violence and real-life attitude and behavior. Cyberbullying is an emerging threat to youth. Parents, pediatricians, schools, and government all have roles to play to mitigate the potential harmful effects of violent media on children and teens.

Keywords: Cyberbullying; Media violence; Video game violence.

Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Publication types

• Child Behavior / psychology*
• Cyberbullying*
• Discrimination, Psychological
• Mass Casualty Incidents
• Mass Media*
• Motion Pictures
• Risk Factors
• Video Games*

Media Violence and Children: Applying Research to Advocacy

• First Online: 01 January 2013

Cite this chapter

• John P. Murray Ph.D. 2 , 3  

Part of the book series: Issues in Clinical Child Psychology ((ICCP))

2310 Accesses

Research and advocacy concerning children and media violence has a long and conflicted history. In recent times, the focus of discussion has been on video games. However, the history of concern began in the early 1900s with questions about the effects of comics and comic books, and their stories of crime and violence. The same concern continued with questions about the effects of radio programs of crime and mystery and the influence of violence in films. By the late 1940s, however, a new medium bursts on the scene in America: television!

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

• Available as PDF
• Read on any device
• Instant download
• Own it forever
• Available as EPUB and PDF
• Compact, lightweight edition
• Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
• Free shipping worldwide - see info
• Durable hardcover edition

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Action for Children’s Television. (1971). The first national symposium on the effect of television programming and advertising on children . New York, NY: Avon Books.

Google Scholar  

American Academy of Pediatrics. (1990). Children, adolescents, and television. Pediatrics, 85 , 1119–1120.

Baker, R. K., & Ball, S. J. (1969). Mass media and violence: A staff report to the national commission on the causes and prevention of violence . Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63 , 575–582.

Article   PubMed   Google Scholar  

Barnouw, E. (1982). Tube of plenty : The evolution of American television (Rev. ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Berkkowitz, L. (1962). Aggression: A social psychological analysis . New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.

Brown, Governor of California, et al v Entertainment Merchants Association, et al., No. 08-1448. Argued November 2, 2010. Decided June 27, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/08-1448.pdf .

Cole, B. (1981). Television today: Readings from TV guide . New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Condry, J. (1989). The psychology of television . Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Ferguson, C. J., & Kilburn, J. (2009). The public health risks of media violence: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Pediatrics, 154 (5), 759–763.

Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry. (1982). The child and television drama: The psychosocial impact of cumulative viewing . New York, NY: Mental Health Materials Center.

Gruel Brief. (2010). Brief of Amicus Curia of California State Senator Leland Y . Yee , Ph . D ., The California chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics and the California Psychological Association in Support of the Petitioners , Arnold Schwarzenegger , Governor of California , et al , v Entertainment Merchants Association , et al . No. 08-1448 (2010). (U.S. July, 19, 2010) 2010 WL 2937557.

Himmelweit, H. T., Oppenheim, A. N., & Vince, P. (1958). Television and the child: An empirical study of the effects of television on the young . London: Oxford University Press.

Huston, A. C., Donnerstein, E., Fairchild, H., Feshbach, N. D., Katz, P. A., Murray, J. P., et al. (1992). Big world, small screen: The role of television in American society . Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Kunkel, D. (1991). Crafting media policy: The genesis and implications of the Children’s Television Act of 1990. American Behavioral Science, 35 , 181–202.

Article   Google Scholar  

Lazarsfeld, P. F. (1955). Why is so little known about the effects of television and what can be done? Public Opinion Quarterly, 19 , 243–251.

Maccoby, E. E. (1954). Why do children watch television? Public Opinion Quarterly, 18 , 239–244.

Mathews, V. P., Kronenberger, W. G., Wang, Y., Lurito, J. T., Lowe, M. J., & Dunn, D. W. (2005). Media violence exposure and frontal lobe activation measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging in aggressive and nonaggressive adolescents. Journal of Computer Assisted Tomography, 29 , 287–292.

Minow, N. N., & LaMay, C. L. (1995). Abandoned in the wasteland: Children, television, and the first amendment . New York, NY: Hill & Wang.

Murray, J. P. (1973). Television and violence: Implications of the Surgeon General’s research program. American Psychologist, 28 (6), 472–478.

Murray, J. P. (1980). Television & youth: 25 Years of research & controversy . Boys Town, NE: The Boys Town Center for the Study of Youth Development.

Murray, J. P. (2010). Advocacy—The terminator meets SCOTUS. The Advocate, 33 (2), 16–18.

Murray, J. P. (2011). Pulling their punches: The supreme court and video game violence. The Advocate, 34 (3), 24–28.

Murray, J. P., Biggins, B., Donnerstein, E., Kunkel, D., Menninger, R. W., Rich, M., et al. (2011). A plea for concern regarding violent video games. Mayo Clinic Proceedings, 86 (8), 818–820.

Murray, J. P. (October, 2001). TV violence and brainmapping in children. Psychiatric Times , 70–71

Murray, J. P., Liotti, M., Ingmundson, P., Mayberg, H. S., Pu, Y., Zamarripa, F., et al. (2006). Children’s brain response to TV violence: Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) of video viewing in 8-13 year-old boys and girls. Media Psychology, 8 , 25–37.

National Institute of Mental Health. (1982). Television and behavior : Ten years of scientific progress and implications for the eighties : Vol . 1 . Summary Report . Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office. Retrieved from http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED222186.pdf

Pecora, N., Murray, J. P., & Wartella, E. A. (2007). Children and television: Fifty years of research . Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Schramm, W., Lyle, J., & Parker, E. B. (1961). Television in the lives of our children . Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.

Tseng, V. (2012). The uses of research in policy and practice. Social Policy Report , 26 (2). www.srcd.org

United States Congress, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. (1952). Investigation of radio and television programs , hearings and report , 82nd Congress , 2nd session , June 3 – December 5 , 1952 . Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

United States Congress, Senate Committee of the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency. (1955). Juvenile delinquency ( television programs ), hearings , 83rd Congress , 2nd Session , June 5 – October 20 , 1954 . Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Surgeon General’s Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Social Behavior. (1972). Television and growing up : The impact of televised violence . Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office. Retrieved from http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBCGX.pdf

Weber, R., Ritterfeld, U., & Mathiak, K. (2006). Does playing violent video games induce aggression? Empirical evidence of a functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Media Psychology, 8 (1), 39–60.

Download references

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Department of Psychology, Washington College, Chestertown, MD, USA

John P. Murray Ph.D.

Center on Media and Child Health, Children’s Hospital, Boston, MA, USA

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to John P. Murray Ph.D. .

Editor information

Editors and affiliations.

, Dept. Child, Family, and Community, University of Central Florida, Orlando, 32816, Florida, USA

Anne McDonald Culp

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Murray, J.P. (2013). Media Violence and Children: Applying Research to Advocacy. In: Culp, A. (eds) Child and Family Advocacy. Issues in Clinical Child Psychology. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7456-2_10

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7456-2_10

Published : 27 May 2013

Publisher Name : Springer, New York, NY

Print ISBN : 978-1-4614-7455-5

Online ISBN : 978-1-4614-7456-2

eBook Packages : Behavioral Science Behavioral Science and Psychology (R0)

Share this chapter

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research

Essay on Media and Violence

Introduction

Research studies indicate that media causes violence and plays a role in desensitization, aggressive behavior, fear of harm, and nightmares. Examples of media platforms include movies, video games, television, and music. Violence in media has also been associated with health concerns. The youth have been the most common victims of media exposure and thus stand higher chances of exposure to violence (Anderson, 2016). In the contemporary world, violence in media platforms has been growing, reaching heightened levels, which is dangerous for society. When you turn on the television, there is violence, social media platforms; there is violence when you go to the movies; there is violence. Studies indicate that an average person in the United States watches videos for nearly five hours in a day. In addition, three-quarters of television content contain some form of violence, and the games being played today have elements of violence. This paper intends to evaluate the concept of media messages and their influence on violent and deviant behaviors. Television networks and video games will be considered.

The Netflix effect involves the behavior of staying home all day, ordering food, and relaxing the couch to watch Netflix programs (McDonald & Smith-Rowsey, 2016). Netflix and binge-watching have become popular among the younger generation and thus are exposed to different kinds of content being aired. Studies indicate that continuous exposure to violent materials has a negative effect on the aggressive behavior of individuals. Netflix is a global platform in the entertainment industry (Lobato, 2019). Although, the company does not have the rights to air in major countries such as China, India, and Japan, it has wide audience. One of the reasons for sanctions is the issues of content being aired by the platform, which may influence the behaviors of the young generation. The primary goal of Netflix is entertainment; it’s only the viewers who have developed specific effects that affect their violent behaviors through imitation of the content.

Television Networks

Television networks focus on feeding viewers with the latest updates on different happenings across the globe. In other instances, they focus on bringing up advertisements and entertainment programs. There is little room for violent messages and content in the networks unless they are airing movie programs, which also are intended for entertainment. However, there has been evidence in the violence effect witnessed in television networks. Studies called the “Marilyn Monroe effect” established that following the airing of many suicidal cases, there has been a growth in suicides among the population (Anderson, Bushman, Donnerstein, Hummer, & Warburton, 2015). Actual suicide cases increased by 2.5%, which is linked to news coverage regarding suicide. Additionally, some coverages are filled with violence descriptions, and their aftermath with may necessitate violent behaviors in the society. For instance, if televisions are covering mass demonstrations where several people have been killed, the news may trigger other protests in other parts of the country.

Communications scholars, however, dispute these effects and link the violent behaviors to the individuals’ perception. They argue that the proportion of witnessing violent content in television networks is minimal. Some acts of violence are associated with what the individual perceives and other psychological factors that are classified into social and non-social instigators (Anderson et al., 2015). Social instigators consist of social rejection, provocation, and unjust treatment. Nonsocial instigators are physical objects present, which include weapons or guns. Also, there are environmental factors that include loud noises, overcrowding, and heat. Therefore, there is more explanation of the causes of aggressive behaviors that are not initiated by television networks but rather a combination of biological and environmental factors.

Video games

Researchers have paid more attention to television networks and less on video games. Children spend more time playing video games. According to research, more than 52% of children play video games and spend about 49 minutes per day playing. Some of the games contain violent behaviors. Playing violent games among youth can cause aggressive behaviors. The acts of kicking, hitting, and pinching in the games have influenced physical aggression. However, communication scholars argue that there is no association between aggression and video games (Krahé & Busching, 2015). Researchers have used tools such as “Competition Reaction Time Test,” and “Hot Sauce Paradigm” to assess the aggression level. The “Hot Sauce Paradigm” participants were required to make hot sauce tor tasting. They were required to taste tester must finish the cup of the hot sauce in which the tester detests spicy products. It was concluded that the more the hot sauce testers added in the cup, the more aggressive they were deemed to be.

The “Competition Reaction Time Test” required individuals to compete with another in the next room. It was required to press a button fast as soon as the flashlight appeared. Whoever won was to discipline the opponent with loud noises. They could turn up the volume as high as they wanted. However, in reality, there was no person in the room; the game was to let individuals win half of the test. Researchers intended to test how far individuals would hold the dial. In theory, individuals who punish their opponents in cruel ways are perceived to be more aggressive. Another way to test violent behaviors for gamer was done by letting participants finish some words. For instance, “M_ _ _ ER,” if an individual completes the word as “Murder” rather than “Mother,” the character was considered to possess violent behavior (Allen & Anderson, 2017). In this regard, video games have been termed as entertainment ideologies, and the determination of the players is to win, no matter how brutal the game might be.

In this paper, fixed assumptions were used to correlate violent behaviors and media objects. But that was not the case with regards to the findings. A fixed model may not be appropriate in the examination of time-sensitive causes of dependent variables. Although the model is applicable for assessing specific entities in a given industry, the results may not be precise.

Conclusion .

Based on the findings of the paper, there is no relationship between violent behaviors and media. Netflix effect does not influence the behavior of individuals. The perceptions of the viewers and players is what matters, and how they understand the message being conveyed. Individuals usually play video games and watch televisions for entertainment purposes. The same case applies to the use of social media platforms and sports competitions. Even though there is violent content, individuals focus on the primary objective of their needs.

Analysis of sources

The sources have been thoroughly researched, and they provide essential information regarding the relationship between violent behaviors and media messages. Studies conducted by various authors like Krahé & Busching did not establish any relationship between the two variables. Allen & Anderson (2017) argue that the models for testing the two variables are unreliable and invalid. The fixed assumptions effect model was utilized, and its limitations have been discussed above. Therefore, the authors of these references have not been able to conclude whether there is a connection between violence and media messages.

Allen, J. J., & Anderson, C. A. (2017). General aggression model.  The International Encyclopedia of Media Effects , 1-15.

Anderson, C. A. (2016). Media violence effects on children, adolescents and young adults.  Health Progress ,  97 (4), 59-62.

Anderson, C. A., Bushman, B. J., Donnerstein, E., Hummer, T. A., & Warburton, W. (2015). SPSSI research summary on media violence.  Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy ,  15 (1), 4-19.

Krahé, B., & Busching, R. (2015). Breaking the vicious cycle of media violence use and aggression: A test of intervention effects over 30 months.  Psychology of Violence ,  5 (2), 217.

Lobato, R. (2019).  Netflix nations: the geography of digital distribution . NYU Press.

McDonald, K., & Smith-Rowsey, D. (Eds.). (2016).  The Netflix effect: Technology and entertainment in the 21st century . Bloomsbury Publishing USA.

Cite this page

Similar essay samples.

• Essay on Homeostasis
• Essay on Bilingual Acquisition
• Argument Essay Against Online Censorship by Tech Companies
• Essay on Bolshevik Seizure of Power in Russia in October 1917
• The Impact of Breaking the Fourth Wall in Different Mediums
• The influence of anxiety: the motivations of awareness

An official website of the United States government, Department of Justice.

Here's how you know

Official websites use .gov A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.

Secure .gov websites use HTTPS A lock ( Lock A locked padlock ) or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

Five Things About the Role of the Internet and Social Media in Domestic Radicalization

Research on the role of social media and other online spaces in facilitating or motivating terrorism and radicalization has grown exponentially over the past decades. Online technologies and internet platforms are integrated in day-to-day life, and the roles these play in terrorism, violent extremism, and radicalization are cause for concern. The five findings below, derived from research sponsored by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), provide insight into how the internet and social media may both promote and prevent radicalization outcomes.

1. The connection between radicalization and the internet is complex and depends on individual and offline factors.

NIJ-sponsored research suggests that virtual engagement and exploitation may be both a cause and a consequence of radicalization and will vary based on the individual. While one individual’s radical ideology may be largely developed through internet activity, another’s ideology may have been radicalized before engaging with online material. [1] Limited research related to radicalization among women, for example, found that internet use and engagement varied based on the severity of their offenses: considerably more women who engaged in activities considered “medium” risk (plotters, recruiters, or material disseminators) interacted with virtual communities versus those who engaged in low risk (travelers, agents, or supporters) or high-risk activities (direct action). [2] This finding is counter-intuitive if we assume risk level rises in parallel with connection to virtual communities, and it highlights the complexity of assessing the role of virtual networks in the radicalization process. It also underscores the importance of considering offline and individual-level factors in addition to online engagement.

2. Individuals engage with violent extremist materials and online networks for various reasons.

Individuals associated with extremist ideologies use and interact within virtual spaces for many reasons and with different goals. Some engage to gain information, others engage to disseminate information, and others engage to be social and interact with others. For example, research on engagement in far-right online forums demonstrates that while some individuals actively engaged with others, some did not, which suggests a difference in the use of online forums for information or socialization purposes. [3] Because there is much diversity in how people express their ideological beliefs and activities online, interventions and activities aimed at preventing and intervening in the radicalization processes should be tailored to the reasons behind online engagement and the nature of the online spaces where that engagement occurs.

3. Spending more time online and on specific platforms may increase an individual’s risk of engaging with hateful content.

Research shows that individuals (especially youths) who spend more time online and use certain websites (e.g., YouTube) may face an increased likelihood of being exposed to or engaging with hateful or potentially radicalizing content. [4] Other NIJ-sponsored research suggests that the use of specific social media platforms by individuals convicted of ideological crimes varies based on ideology but otherwise mirrors the general population’s use of social media platforms more broadly. [5] Research also finds that associating with others who share similar extremist beliefs online contributes to more radical beliefs over time. [6]

4. An individual’s online interactions with others may increase their risk of exposure to hateful or potentially radicalizing content.

Online interaction with both friends and strangers increases the risk of exposure to hateful content. Research on youths finds that online interaction with close friends was associated with an individual being more likely to see hate content. [7] Moreover, research focused on specific youth populations finds that the odds of viewing racist content online are higher among youths who interact with strangers than those who do not. [8]

In addition, research on a women-only Ku Klux Klan forum suggests that online communities that implicitly promote violence and racism may use coded language. Coded language in this context refers to the use of neutral terms to negatively describe identity (e.g., Blue Pill is used in some extremist online forums as a derogatory term for people with conventional views that are considered “ignorant.”)

In this way, online communities lure in non-extremist individuals and then facilitate their recruitment and radicalization into extremist ideology. [9] Future research should examine how violent extremists exploit specific social media platforms to engage and communicate with new followers or tailor their online propaganda and information dissemination strategies to target specific online communities and users.

5. An individual’s beliefs, characteristics, and behaviors may increase their risk of exposure to hateful or potentially radicalizing content.

Certain individual factors — race, political views, and awareness of what constitutes hateful content and risky internet behaviors — may affect the extent to which individuals (and youths in particular) recognize the potential harm in the content they consume online and their reaction to and level of engagement with it. [10] In addition to broader, federal-level efforts to promote digital literacy and resilience, [11] developing appropriately nuanced educational and preventive strategies are of the utmost importance. Targeted counter-narrative campaigns that debunk misinformation and appeal to different groups’ emotions or grievances is a good first step. These should include targeting specific platforms (e.g., Facebook for far-right extremist forums), [12] disrupting “echo chambers” to challenge old/recycled beliefs (e.g., anti-Black sentiments), [13] increasing the frequency of targeted campaigns after an act of violence, [14] and tailoring campaigns by demographic characteristics (e.g., race, gender, geographic region, and population density). [15]

Learn more:

Radicalization on the Internet: Virtual Extremism in the U.S. from 2012-2017

The Creation of Muhajirat in America: Social Media as a Platform for Crafting Gender-Specific Interventions for the Domestic Radicalization of Women 

Assessment of Extremist Groups Use of Web Forums, Social Media, and Technology to Enculturate and Radicalize Individuals to Violence

Opinions or points of view expressed in this document represent a consensus of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position, policies, terminology, or posture of the U.S. Department of Justice on domestic violent extremism. The content is not intended to create, does not create, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or criminal.

[note 1] Colleen E. Mills, et al., “Social Learning and Social Control in the Off and Online Pathways to Hate Crime and Terrorist Violence,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 44, no. 9 (2021): 701-29, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/256024.pdf ; Thomas J. Holt, Steve Chermak, and Joshua D. Freilich, “An Assessment of Extremist Groups Use of Web Forums, Social Media, and Technology to Enculturate and Radicalize Individuals to Violence,” Final report to the National Institute of Justice, 2014-ZA-BX-0004, NCJ 256038, 2021, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/256038.pdf.

[note 2] Janet I. Warren et al., “The Creation of Muhajirat in America: Social Media as a Platform for Crafting Gender-Specific Interventions for the Domestic Radicalization of Women,” Final report to the National Institute of Justice, grant number 2016-ZA-BX-K001, September 2020, NCJ 255237, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/255237.pdf. 3 Holt, Chermak, and Freilich, “Assessment of Extremist Groups Use of Web Forums.”

[note 4] Matthew Costello et al., “Radicalization on the Internet: Virtual Extremism in the U.S. from 2012-2017,” Final report to the National Institute of Justice, award number 2014-ZA-BX-0014, January 2021, NCJ 256036, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ grants/256036.pdf .

[note 5] Gary LaFree, “Social Learning and Social Control in the Off and Online Pathways to Hate and Extremist Violence,” Final report to the National Institute of Justice, award number 2015-ZA-BX-0004, January 2021, NCJ 256024, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ grants/256024.pdf .

[note 6] Holt, Chermak, and Freilich, “Assessment of Extremist Groups Use of Web Forums.”

[note 7] Matthew Costello et al., “Predictors of Viewing Online Extremism Among America’s Youth,” Youth & Society 52 no. 5 (2020): 710-727, https://doi.org/10.1177/0044118X18768115 .

[note 8] Nigel Harriman et al., “Youth Exposure to Hate in the Online Space: An Exploratory Analysis,” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 17 no. 2 (2020): 8531, https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17228531.

[note 9] Shuki Cohen et al., “Invisible Empire of Hate: Implicit Ideological Justifications for Violence and Hate in a Female Ku Klux Klan Online Forum,” Violence and Gender 5 no. 4 (2018): 209-225, https://doi.org/10.1089/vio.2017.0072.

[note 10] Costello et al., “Predictors of Viewing Online Extremism.”

[note 11] National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism, National Security Council report, June 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/National- Strategy-for-Countering-Domestic-Terrorism.pdf .

[note 12] Mills, et al., “Social Learning and Social Control.”

[note 13] Holt, Chermak, and Freilich, “Assessment of Extremist Groups Use of Web Forums.”

[note 14] Holt, Chermak, and Freilich, “Assessment of Extremist Groups Use of Web Forums.”

[note 15] Costello et al., “Radicalization on the Internet.”

Cite this Article

Read more about:.

Find more titles in NIJ's Five Things series:

• The Role of Social Networks in Domestic Radicalization
• Community-Based Terrorism Prevention Programs
• Individuals Who Engage in Violence Extremism and Similar Offenses

View the full list .

Help | Advanced Search

Computer Science > Computation and Language

Title: realm: reference resolution as language modeling.

Abstract: Reference resolution is an important problem, one that is essential to understand and successfully handle context of different kinds. This context includes both previous turns and context that pertains to non-conversational entities, such as entities on the user's screen or those running in the background. While LLMs have been shown to be extremely powerful for a variety of tasks, their use in reference resolution, particularly for non-conversational entities, remains underutilized. This paper demonstrates how LLMs can be used to create an extremely effective system to resolve references of various types, by showing how reference resolution can be converted into a language modeling problem, despite involving forms of entities like those on screen that are not traditionally conducive to being reduced to a text-only modality. We demonstrate large improvements over an existing system with similar functionality across different types of references, with our smallest model obtaining absolute gains of over 5% for on-screen references. We also benchmark against GPT-3.5 and GPT-4, with our smallest model achieving performance comparable to that of GPT-4, and our larger models substantially outperforming it.

Submission history

Access paper:.

• HTML (experimental)
• Other Formats

References & Citations

• Google Scholar
• Semantic Scholar

BibTeX formatted citation

Bibliographic and Citation Tools

Code, data and media associated with this article, recommenders and search tools.

• Institution

arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs .

Trump's so-called "Virtues": More threats of violence against his enemies

Trump's "astonishing" propaganda video gets short shrift in mainstream media. is it cowardice or complacency, by chauncey devega.

Last weekend, Donald Trump issued a new barrage of threats against Americans who decline to vote for him or who otherwise resist the resurgence of the MAGA movement.

This came in the form of a  new video repeatedly shared on Trump's personal disinformation platform, Truth Social. Titled “Trump’s Virtues Part II,” it extols the virtues Trump notably lacks, basically declaring that the manifestly corrupt and multiply-indicted ex-president should be followed and obeyed unquestioningly and implying that dissent is unpatriotic because Trump is a warlord facing a state of emergency. This video was reportedly created by Tom Klingenstein , partner in a Wall Street investment firm and board chairman of the Claremont Institute, who is waging what he calls a personal “war” against “the existential threat of the woke regime.”

Hardly any of the agenda-setting news media devoted any significant coverage to this propaganda video. I found no obvious mention of it in the New York Times or Washington Post, for example. That reflects a much larger pattern of the American press neglecting its basic responsibilities in the Age of Trump.

Salon columnist  Heather Digby Parton quoted an extended excerpt from the video's narration: 

We shouldn’t much care whether our commander-in-chief is a real conservative, whether he is a role model for children or says lots of silly things, or whether he is modest or dignified. What we should care about is whether he knows we are in a war, knows who the enemy is, and knows how to win. Trump does. ...  His policies are important, but not as important as the rest of him. Trump grasps the essential things. He understands that the group quota regime is evil and will not stop until it destroys America. He is a fighter — bold, brave, and decisive — who has confidence in himself and his country. ... His enemies hate him with an indescribable fierceness. “Another Hitler,” they say, “elect him and he will be a dictator.” We should take this hysteria as reason for hope. The America-haters rightly fear that he and his party are on the threshold of a successful counterrevolution. ... Trump hates his enemies every bit as much as they hate him. His enemies are America’s enemies."

In a post on X/Twitter, former federal prosecutor Joyce Vance described the video as “an utterly astonishing message for a candidate for the presidency to embrace. And, just a clue, it's not about virtues":

It starts with a command — even if you can't stand Trump, you must get behind him. Has any candidate ever run like that? It gets worse. GOP voters shouldn't care if he's a conservative, a role model for children, or modest & dignified ... The tone & pacing of the video carries an echo of WWII fascism that makes me feel queasy. The important message Trump endorses about himself? "He knows we're in a war. He knows how to win." Who is the enemy? It's us. You and me. It's Democrats. It's anyone who doesn't support Trump, anyone who is [the] Other. Believe him when he tells us who he is before it's too late.

Another former federal prosecutor, Barbara McQuade, described Trump’s video in a post on X as a "a master class in disinformation tactics. Demonizing and scapegoating others, embodying every man yet claiming to be godly in ability, exploiting patriotism, portraying the most extreme parts of the left as equal to the whole, and suggesting that desperate times call for desperate measures."

Trump's latest propaganda video reveals much more than evidence that he is a bad person who does bad things. That framing has been embraced by the professional centrists and careerists of mainstream media.

Seen in a larger context, Trump’s sharing of this dangerous propaganda becomes even more ominous. Trump has repeatedly demonstrated his affinity for violence, his  God complex  and his antipathy for democracy. Numerous mental health professionals have argued since 2015 that he is an apparent sociopath, if not a full-on psychopath.

Furthermore, Trump’s pathological behavior does not exist in a vacuum: Public opinion polls show that a large percentage of Americans believe that Trump was chosen by God and has the status of a prophet or messiah. Trump's admiration for Vladimir Putin, Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping is well-known; as former White House chief of staff John Kelly has reported, Trump has even spoken highly of Adolf Hitler.

We need your help to stay independent

Trump has repeatedly threatened political enemies and rivals with violence, imprisonment or death. He has a clear pattern of referring to Black and brown people, especially immigrants or those with immigrant roots, as "vermin," "snakes" or subhuman "animals." It is reasonable to describe that as eliminationist language, which legitimates or encourages genocide.

Dahlia Lithwick of Slate recently interviewed national security expert Juliette Kayyem about Trump’s use of "stochastic terrorism" and the likely scenarios for right-wing political violence surrounding this year's presidential election Election Day. Kayyem said there were "three periods" of time that especially concern her: 

Now until November. This we know already because we’ve been promised it, which is going to be violence or the threat of violence as the extension of the electoral process. That’s going to focus on election workers, judges, and others. We’re already seeing this; he’s already trying to do this. We’re not seeing anything organized—it’s the randoms. The randoms can be scary, but it’s not a movement that is unmanageable. So that just means greater efforts to protect courthouses and judges. It involves federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, including intelligence-sharing, including threat assessments. Now, the good news is this is likely confined to six states. It’s going to be Arizona and North Carolina and Georgia and Michigan and a few other swing states. Period two is between Election Day and when [a winner] is called. If it’s not called the first day, that’s going to be insane. Biden is in charge of the federal apparatus; governors have their own law enforcement statuses, and we’d better be ready for that. We’d better be ready to take states to court that are using state law enforcement in violation of due process and the protection of laws of equal access. We need Biden to own this. The third period is [about] who wins. So let’s say it’s Trump. Do the institutions hold? I doubt it. I think that this is a once-in-a-lifetime election, a once-in-a-nationtime election. If Biden wins, then we have to anticipate that Trump only has two narratives left. One is: He’s in jail. The other is: He’s the victim. He’s going to pick the latter. The one way that you create this narrative is to create a lot of mayhem. And that scenario, we’re not talking about enough. I know it’s hard for people to imagine, but Biden could very much win. Trump continues to be Trump, and the only thing he has is to bring it all down, right? 

Trump's latest propaganda video reveals much more than further evidence that he is a bad person who does bad things. That framing is embraced by the professional centrists and careerists of mainstream media as a way to rationalize their failure to pay consistent and close attention to Trump and his allies’ increasingly dangerous behavior. To many in the media, Trump's pathological behavior is no longer "news"; everyone who matters already knows about it. That is a false, self-serving and deeply irresponsible assumption, which only serves to smooth Trump's potential path to dictatorial power.

Want a daily wrap-up of all the news and commentary Salon has to offer? Subscribe to our morning newsletter , Crash Course.

As Dan Pfeiffer recently explained in his newsletter The Message Box, most of the American media "have yet to accept the reality that this is not a normal election between a Republican and a Democrat":

Donald Trump and his enablers represent an extraordinary threat to democracy. This industry, which prizes objectivity above all else, is incapable of accurately covering an election where one candidate is a normal politician and the other is a dishonest, corrupt insurrectionist. To accurately portray events would make the press out to be biased and they would rather stumble into autocracy than take a side.

There is another dimension to Trump’s repeated threats of violence and chaos that merits closer attention.

Aspiring authoritarians and autocrats use a variety of means to train and socialize the public, including media and cultural elites, into compliance and submission. The threat of severe negative consequences such as violent retribution, coupled with the promise of positive rewards for loyalty and “patriotism,” is one of the most important such tactics. In effect, Trump is authorizing his MAGA followers to act on his behalf, and to do their utmost to ensure his return to power. 

Ignoring or avoiding Trump’s dangerous behavior will not stop it. In a better world, the American news media would fulfill its basic obligation to report on Trump’s escalating threats in a consistent and accurate fashion. To this point, that mostly has not happened. It is not too late for media decision-makers to change their approach and stand up for democracy, but it seems increasingly unlikely they will ever do so. 

about Trump and the 2024 election

• A total eclipse of Donald Trump: First felony trial could finally humble him
• Trump's MAGA rallies have morphed
• A dangerous return to denial: Trump's threats against Biden met by familiar media shrug

Chauncey DeVega is a senior politics writer for Salon. His essays can also be found at  Chaunceydevega.com . He also hosts a weekly podcast,  The Chauncey DeVega Show . Chauncey can be followed on  Twitter  and  Facebook .

Related Topics ------------------------------------------

Related articles.

Cookie banner

We use cookies and other tracking technologies to improve your browsing experience on our site, show personalized content and targeted ads, analyze site traffic, and understand where our audiences come from. To learn more or opt-out, read our Cookie Policy . Please also read our Privacy Notice and Terms of Use , which became effective December 20, 2019.

By choosing I Accept , you consent to our use of cookies and other tracking technologies.

Follow The Ringer online:

• Follow The Ringer on Twitter
• Follow The Ringer on Instagram
• Follow The Ringer on Youtube

Site search

• What to Watch
• Bill Simmons Podcast
• 24 Question Party People
• 60 Songs That Explain the ’90s
• Against All Odds
• Bachelor Party
• The Bakari Sellers Podcast
• Beyond the Arc
• The Big Picture
• Black Girl Songbook
• Book of Basketball 2.0
• Boom/Bust: HQ Trivia
• Counter Pressed
• The Dave Chang Show
• East Coast Bias
• Every Single Album: Taylor Swift
• Extra Point Taken
• Fairway Rollin’
• Fantasy Football Show
• The Fozcast
• The Full Go
• Gambling Show
• Gene and Roger
• Higher Learning
• The Hottest Take
• Jam Session
• Just Like Us
• Larry Wilmore: Black on the Air
• Last Song Standing
• The Local Angle
• Masked Man Show
• The Mismatch
• Mint Edition
• Morally Corrupt Bravo Show
• New York, New York
• Off the Pike
• One Shining Podcast
• Philly Special
• Plain English
• The Pod Has Spoken
• The Press Box
• The Prestige TV Podcast
• Recipe Club
• The Rewatchables
• Ringer Dish
• The Ringer-Verse
• The Ripple Effect
• The Rugby Pod
• The Ryen Russillo Podcast
• Sports Cards Nonsense
• Slow News Day
• Speidi’s 16th Minute
• Somebody’s Gotta Win
• Sports Card Nonsense
• This Blew Up
• Trial by Content
• Wednesday Worldwide
• What If? The Len Bias Story
• Wrighty’s House
• Wrestling Show
• Latest Episodes
• All Podcasts

Filed under:

O.J. Simpson Lived and Died in Infamy, Never Out of the Spotlight

Simpson died Wednesday at age 76. His murder trial nearly three decades ago, with its confluence of celebrity and violence and cable news, changed modern media forever.

Share this story

• Share this on Facebook
• Share this on Twitter
• Share All sharing options

Share All sharing options for: O.J. Simpson Lived and Died in Infamy, Never Out of the Spotlight

I never watched O.J. Simpson play football. I just watched him do everything else. His death on Wednesday, at age 76 from cancer, concludes a strange period of American life: when O.J.—it seems strange to call him Simpson —was impossible to evict from our newspapers, our TVs, and, finally, our social media feeds. It’s hard to think of a person who was more around , in the media sense of the term, except for a certain former and possibly future American president.

Consider the people whose careers were enriched, or made, by covering Simpson. At his 1995 trial for the murders of Nicole Brown and Ron Goldman: Geraldo Rivera, Jeffrey Toobin, Greta Van Susteren, and Larry King. After the jury at that trial found Simpson not guilty: Toobin again, for his book The Run of His Life ; Chris Myers, who conducted a gonzo interview with Simpson on ESPN ; Pablo Fenjves, who wrote Simpson’s craven pseudo-memoir, If I Did It ; and comedian Norm Macdonald, who hounded O.J. on Saturday Night Live . In recent years, after Simpson was sent to prison for kidnapping and armed robbery in Las Vegas, there was O.J.: Made in America director Ezra Edelman (who won an Oscar for the film), The Athletic ’s Tim Graham (who scored an interview), and whoever turned O.J. on to social media. (“Hey, Twitter world!”)

I grew up watching the O.J. of the late ’80s and early ’90s. It was hard not to. O.J.’s career as a Heisman winner at USC and Hall of Fame running back in the NFL was long behind him, and while he had few acting parts outside of the Naked Gun movies, O.J. had simply become a media entity. He was a star of Hertz ads, an NFL commentator on NBC. During those years, it was possible to know that O.J. was famous without knowing exactly what he was famous for.

Simpson’s sports TV career was its own mini-parable of the industry. In 1983, he joined the cast of Monday Night Football and became the first Black announcer on a network’s no. 1 NFL team. By the ’84 season, ABC executives had gotten tired of him. The following January, in the type of demotion that has never happened since, the network removed Simpson from its Super Bowl booth and replaced him with Joe Theismann, an active player.

Nicole Brown and Ronald Goldman were murdered on June 12, 1994. Five days later, I went to the Ballpark in Arlington to watch the Texas Rangers play. A handful of fans had brought small, portable TVs to watch the NBA Finals during the game. Soon, all of us were peeking over these fans’ shoulders to catch a glimpse of O.J.’s Bronco chase through the freeways of Los Angeles. The television audience for the chase was 95 million people; those are nearly Super Bowl numbers. The kind of eavesdropping we did in the stadium that night became the dominant form of American entertainment for the next year.

No movie or documentary can describe the hammerlock the O.J. trial had on the American media. The trial was a competitive beat for upscale publications like The New York Times and The New Yorker . It was an object of obsession for the tabloids, one of which found Simpson wearing the famous Bruno Magli shoes. It juiced up cable news and helped create the modern “legal analyst.” Because Judge Lance Ito allowed cameras into the courtroom, the trial became a kind of streaming event for the analog age. On October 3, 1995, my high school class was herded into the library so we could watch the verdict be delivered live.

When the jury declared Simpson not guilty, our teachers didn’t have to start a discussion about what it meant . They figured the O.J. trial was a mega-event of American history, like a moon landing, that students should not miss.

On the one hand, the lure of the O.J. trial—and its sequel two years later, when he was found liable for wrongful death and battery in civil court—was a mix of violence and celebrity. The O.J. coverage was one of the many fathers of the true crime podcast.

But the trial also touched on issues of race, of violence against women, of modern Los Angeles and its police department. It was the rare event that bridged the chasm between National Enquirer and The New Yorker . Any sense of media shame quickly melted away. The trial was content for everybody.

O.J.’s last tweet came in February, on Super Bowl Sunday. It was as if he didn’t want to miss a window for content. In the embedded video, O.J. picked his hometown 49ers to win the game. He assured fans (onlookers? enemies? an uncategorizable group of us that still watched O.J. for reasons we could not fully explain?) that his health was good. “God bless,” O.J. said with a wave and a smile. “Take care.”

Next Up In Media

• Young Voters, Blackface, and O.J.’s Past and Passing
• Hollywood Vs. Big Tech in the Age of Consolidation
• A Psychologist Explains Four Reasons the Internet Feels So Broken
• The Post-Norby Era at ESPN, the Magic of Ian Eagle, Eclipse Talk, and Caleb Williams Takes With Chicago Radio Host Danny Parkins
• Geoff Shreeves: The Art of the Interview
• Why The Cut Goes Viral, The New York Times Becomes a Gaming Company, Reporters Steal From Air Force One, and the New Netflix Movie ‘Scoop’ With Amanda Dobbins

Sign up for the The Ringer Newsletter

Thanks for signing up.

Check your inbox for a welcome email.

Oops. Something went wrong. Please enter a valid email and try again.

Will Caitlin Clark Dominate in the WNBA?

Seerat Sohi talks Caitlin Clark’s WNBA transition and possible landing spots for draft prospects

Rihanna Wants Monica Back on ‘RHOSLC’? Plus, ‘Summer House: Martha’s Vineyard,’ ‘Summer House,’ ‘The Valley,’ and ‘Vanderpump Rules.’

Rachel and Callie discuss the Bravo news of the week and dive into some recent episodes. Then, Jodi hops on to talk ‘The Valley’ and ‘Vanderpump Rules.’

Why AEW Airing the CM Punk Footage Was a Bad Look. Plus, the Beginning of the Maj Era.

Drew McIntyre is maj, Rosenberg sounds off on AEW airing the backstage CM Punk footage, and Dip gives his take on WrestleMania

Our Season Awards and Takeaways

Austin and Pausha are back to hand out season awards for Rookie of the Year, Best Defender, Favorite Play of the Season, and more

“I’m Here for It”

Jason talks about how the Chicago Bulls clinched a play-in spot and why Billy Donovan has leverage

Discussing Momofuku Chili Crunch, With Marguerite Mariscal

Dave is joined by Momofuku CEO Marguerite Mariscal to talk about challenges and next steps with the name "chili crunch"

• Share full article

Advertisement

Supported by

NPR in Turmoil After It Is Accused of Liberal Bias

An essay from an editor at the broadcaster has generated a firestorm of criticism about the network on social media, especially among conservatives.

By Benjamin Mullin and Katie Robertson

NPR is facing both internal tumult and a fusillade of attacks by prominent conservatives this week after a senior editor publicly claimed the broadcaster had allowed liberal bias to affect its coverage, risking its trust with audiences.

Uri Berliner, a senior business editor who has worked at NPR for 25 years, wrote in an essay published Tuesday by The Free Press, a popular Substack publication, that “people at every level of NPR have comfortably coalesced around the progressive worldview.”

Mr. Berliner, a Peabody Award-winning journalist, castigated NPR for what he said was a litany of journalistic missteps around coverage of several major news events, including the origins of Covid-19 and the war in Gaza. He also said the internal culture at NPR had placed race and identity as “paramount in nearly every aspect of the workplace.”

Mr. Berliner’s essay has ignited a firestorm of criticism of NPR on social media, especially among conservatives who have long accused the network of political bias in its reporting. Former President Donald J. Trump took to his social media platform, Truth Social, to argue that NPR’s government funding should be rescinded, an argument he has made in the past.

NPR has forcefully pushed back on Mr. Berliner’s accusations and the criticism.

“We’re proud to stand behind the exceptional work that our desks and shows do to cover a wide range of challenging stories,” Edith Chapin, the organization’s editor in chief, said in an email to staff on Tuesday. “We believe that inclusion — among our staff, with our sourcing, and in our overall coverage — is critical to telling the nuanced stories of this country and our world.” Some other NPR journalists also criticized the essay publicly, including Eric Deggans, its TV critic, who faulted Mr. Berliner for not giving NPR an opportunity to comment on the piece.

In an interview on Thursday, Mr. Berliner expressed no regrets about publishing the essay, saying he loved NPR and hoped to make it better by airing criticisms that have gone unheeded by leaders for years. He called NPR a “national trust” that people rely on for fair reporting and superb storytelling.

“I decided to go out and publish it in hopes that something would change, and that we get a broader conversation going about how the news is covered,” Mr. Berliner said.

He said he had not been disciplined by managers, though he said he had received a note from his supervisor reminding him that NPR requires employees to clear speaking appearances and media requests with standards and media relations. He said he didn’t run his remarks to The New York Times by network spokespeople.

When the hosts of NPR’s biggest shows, including “Morning Edition” and “All Things Considered,” convened on Wednesday afternoon for a long-scheduled meet-and-greet with the network’s new chief executive, Katherine Maher , conversation soon turned to Mr. Berliner’s essay, according to two people with knowledge of the meeting. During the lunch, Ms. Chapin told the hosts that she didn’t want Mr. Berliner to become a “martyr,” the people said.

Mr. Berliner’s essay also sent critical Slack messages whizzing through some of the same employee affinity groups focused on racial and sexual identity that he cited in his essay. In one group, several staff members disputed Mr. Berliner’s points about a lack of ideological diversity and said efforts to recruit more people of color would make NPR’s journalism better.

On Wednesday, staff members from “Morning Edition” convened to discuss the fallout from Mr. Berliner’s essay. During the meeting, an NPR producer took issue with Mr. Berliner’s argument for why NPR’s listenership has fallen off, describing a variety of factors that have contributed to the change.

Mr. Berliner’s remarks prompted vehement pushback from several news executives. Tony Cavin, NPR’s managing editor of standards and practices, said in an interview that he rejected all of Mr. Berliner’s claims of unfairness, adding that his remarks would probably make it harder for NPR journalists to do their jobs.

“The next time one of our people calls up a Republican congressman or something and tries to get an answer from them, they may well say, ‘Oh, I read these stories, you guys aren’t fair, so I’m not going to talk to you,’” Mr. Cavin said.

Some journalists have defended Mr. Berliner’s essay. Jeffrey A. Dvorkin, NPR’s former ombudsman, said Mr. Berliner was “not wrong” on social media. Chuck Holmes, a former managing editor at NPR, called Mr. Berliner’s essay “brave” on Facebook.

Mr. Berliner’s criticism was the latest salvo within NPR, which is no stranger to internal division. In October, Mr. Berliner took part in a lengthy debate over whether NPR should defer to language proposed by the Arab and Middle Eastern Journalists Association while covering the conflict in Gaza.

“We don’t need to rely on an advocacy group’s guidance,” Mr. Berliner wrote, according to a copy of the email exchange viewed by The Times. “Our job is to seek out the facts and report them.” The debate didn’t change NPR’s language guidance, which is made by editors who weren’t part of the discussion. And in a statement on Thursday, the Arab and Middle Eastern Journalists Association said it is a professional association for journalists, not a political advocacy group.

Mr. Berliner’s public criticism has highlighted broader concerns within NPR about the public broadcaster’s mission amid continued financial struggles. Last year, NPR cut 10 percent of its staff and canceled four podcasts, including the popular “Invisibilia,” as it tried to make up for a $30 million budget shortfall. Listeners have drifted away from traditional radio to podcasts, and the advertising market has been unsteady.

In his essay, Mr. Berliner laid some of the blame at the feet of NPR’s former chief executive, John Lansing, who said he was retiring at the end of last year after four years in the role. He was replaced by Ms. Maher, who started on March 25.

During a meeting with employees in her first week, Ms. Maher was asked what she thought about decisions to give a platform to political figures like Ronna McDaniel, the former Republican Party chair whose position as a political analyst at NBC News became untenable after an on-air revolt from hosts who criticized her efforts to undermine the 2020 election.

“I think that this conversation has been one that does not have an easy answer,” Ms. Maher responded.

Benjamin Mullin reports on the major companies behind news and entertainment. Contact Ben securely on Signal at +1 530-961-3223 or email at [email protected] . More about Benjamin Mullin

Katie Robertson covers the media industry for The Times. Email:  [email protected]   More about Katie Robertson

Matt Walsh admits that conservative positions on abortion, immigration, and gun violence are extremist: “It's not where most people are”

Matt Walsh admitted right-wing positions are out of step with the American people while condemning Kari Lake's “reprehensible, disgusting” and “politically suicidal” flip-flop on abortion

Written by Media Matters Staff

Published 04/12/24 2:49 PM EDT

As many people have pointed out, Lake is now trying to distance herself from the draconian Arizona abortion law she supported in 2022.

Citation From the April 12, 2024, edition of The Daily Wire's The Matt Walsh Show

MATT WALSH (HOST): First of all, you know, there there are some conservatives that are defending what you just watched there. If she did the same thing on immigration or gun control, you know, I don't think those conservatives would be defending her. And guess what? The most right-wing, most conservative position on those topics is also not the mainstream. It's not where most people are. So, now — most Americans want immigration laws to be enforced. Most Americans want — don't want illegal immigrants taking our jobs. Most Americans want, you know, basically want gun rights. But if you're truly conservative on these issues, you most likely take that farther. I know I certainly do. You take that principle farther than the mainstream does. That's why we differ -- that's why it's the mainstream. And I think that if Kari Lake had, say, looked at the polls and then put out this little squishy video with the music in the background and the piano music and explaining why her — she's moderated her positions on any other topic, I don't think it would be found acceptable by almost any conservative. And yet this is supposed to be acceptable on abortion? It's not.

So here's the problem. Number one, this is just wrong. It's just — it's wrong. It's — you know, if you care about that sort of thing, it is morally wrong. It's wrong on principle to come out and in support of, well, women have to make — sometimes you have to make the choice to kill your baby. It's just a choice has to be made. It's a personal, it's a very personal difficult choice to kill the baby, and sometimes you have to do that. It's actually a reprehensible, disgusting view. And also it is politically suicidal. It is not going to work. So even if you don't care about the morality of it, even if you scoff at that, and you say, oh, yeah, you Matt's just being a purist. He's trying to be one of those true conservative types. Fine. Then let's talk about the politics of it. Politically, it's a dumb strategy. It's all — it is the strategy the Republican establishment has been using for decades. It is not new. This is what — this is no different from what John McCain would do or Mitt Romney or any of the Bushes. OK? Jeb, George, any of the Georges. It's the same thing. It's the exact same strategy, exact same position. Was it a brilliant politically — political strategy when they did it? Has it been a path to conservative dominance in government at any point in the last 30, 40 years, huh? No. This has always been the establishment Republican view that the only way you win is by moderating your views, by adopt — by looking at where the left is on a topic and coming as close as you can to them while still pretending to be conservative. By getting as far away as you can from the right-wing on every topic — that has been the Republican establishment strategy forever. And it has not worked.

So what do you achieve here? What does Kari Lake achieve with this video? Where she is, again, condemning a state ban on abortion. So this is not — you cannot hide behind state's rights. The — Arizona has the right, the state right to pass this law. She's saying she doesn't want the law. It's a pro-life law she doesn't want. And the law even carves out cases where the life of the mother is jeopardized, even though you never really need abortion to save the life of the mother, it's not real. But, OK, if it was real, it's that's — you know, that has been carved out. That's an exception that's granted. She still doesn't like it. And instead, we get this ridiculous video. Everything she's saying here, this is Clinton-era Democrat talking points. This is Republican establishment talking points, which means that it is Clinton era, mid-nineties Democrat talking points on abortion. Safe, legal, and rare is what she's talking about. She might as well have just said that directly because that was the mantra of the pro-abortion movement for years and years and that's what she's saying now.