characteristics of argumentative speech

Persuasive Speeches — Types, Topics, and Examples

What is a persuasive speech?

In a persuasive speech, the speaker aims to convince the audience to accept a particular perspective on a person, place, object, idea, etc. The speaker strives to cause the audience to accept the point of view presented in the speech.

The success of a persuasive speech often relies on the speaker’s use of ethos, pathos, and logos.

Ethos is the speaker’s credibility. Audiences are more likely to accept an argument if they find the speaker trustworthy. To establish credibility during a persuasive speech, speakers can do the following:

Use familiar language.

Select examples that connect to the specific audience.

Utilize credible and well-known sources.

Logically structure the speech in an audience-friendly way.

Use appropriate eye contact, volume, pacing, and inflection.

Pathos appeals to the audience’s emotions. Speakers who create an emotional bond with their audience are typically more convincing. Tapping into the audience’s emotions can be accomplished through the following:

Select evidence that can elicit an emotional response.

Use emotionally-charged words. (The city has a problem … vs. The city has a disease …)

Incorporate analogies and metaphors that connect to a specific emotion to draw a parallel between the reference and topic.

Utilize vivid imagery and sensory words, allowing the audience to visualize the information.

Employ an appropriate tone, inflection, and pace to reflect the emotion.

Logos appeals to the audience’s logic by offering supporting evidence. Speakers can improve their logical appeal in the following ways:

Use comprehensive evidence the audience can understand.

Confirm the evidence logically supports the argument’s claims and stems from credible sources.

Ensure that evidence is specific and avoid any vague or questionable information.

Types of persuasive speeches

The three main types of persuasive speeches are factual, value, and policy.

A factual persuasive speech focuses solely on factual information to prove the existence or absence of something through substantial proof. This is the only type of persuasive speech that exclusively uses objective information rather than subjective. As such, the argument does not rely on the speaker’s interpretation of the information. Essentially, a factual persuasive speech includes historical controversy, a question of current existence, or a prediction:

Historical controversy concerns whether an event happened or whether an object actually existed.

Questions of current existence involve the knowledge that something is currently happening.

Predictions incorporate the analysis of patterns to convince the audience that an event will happen again.

A value persuasive speech concerns the morality of a certain topic. Speakers incorporate facts within these speeches; however, the speaker’s interpretation of those facts creates the argument. These speeches are highly subjective, so the argument cannot be proven to be absolutely true or false.

A policy persuasive speech centers around the speaker’s support or rejection of a public policy, rule, or law. Much like a value speech, speakers provide evidence supporting their viewpoint; however, they provide subjective conclusions based on the facts they provide.

How to write a persuasive speech

Incorporate the following steps when writing a persuasive speech:

Step 1 – Identify the type of persuasive speech (factual, value, or policy) that will help accomplish the goal of the presentation.

Step 2 – Select a good persuasive speech topic to accomplish the goal and choose a position .

Step 3 – Locate credible and reliable sources and identify evidence in support of the topic/position. Revisit Step 2 if there is a lack of relevant resources.

Step 4 – Identify the audience and understand their baseline attitude about the topic.

Step 5 – When constructing an introduction , keep the following questions in mind:

What’s the topic of the speech?

What’s the occasion?

Who’s the audience?

What’s the purpose of the speech?

Step 6 – Utilize the evidence within the previously identified sources to construct the body of the speech. Keeping the audience in mind, determine which pieces of evidence can best help develop the argument. Discuss each point in detail, allowing the audience to understand how the facts support the perspective.

Step 7 – Addressing counterarguments can help speakers build their credibility, as it highlights their breadth of knowledge.

Step 8 – Conclude the speech with an overview of the central purpose and how the main ideas identified in the body support the overall argument.

Persuasive speech outline

One of the best ways to prepare a great persuasive speech is by using an outline. When structuring an outline, include an introduction, body, and conclusion:

Introduction

Attention Grabbers

Ask a question that allows the audience to respond in a non-verbal way; ask a rhetorical question that makes the audience think of the topic without requiring a response.

Incorporate a well-known quote that introduces the topic. Using the words of a celebrated individual gives credibility and authority to the information in the speech.

Offer a startling statement or information about the topic, typically done using data or statistics.

Provide a brief anecdote or story that relates to the topic.

Starting a speech with a humorous statement often makes the audience more comfortable with the speaker.

Provide information on how the selected topic may impact the audience .

Include any background information pertinent to the topic that the audience needs to know to understand the speech in its entirety.

Give the thesis statement in connection to the main topic and identify the main ideas that will help accomplish the central purpose.

Identify evidence

Summarize its meaning

Explain how it helps prove the support/main claim

Evidence 3 (Continue as needed)

Support 3 (Continue as needed)

Restate thesis

Review main supports

Concluding statement

Give the audience a call to action to do something specific.

Identify the overall importan ce of the topic and position.

Persuasive speech topics

The following table identifies some common or interesting persuasive speech topics for high school and college students:

Persuasive speech examples

The following list identifies some of history’s most famous persuasive speeches:

John F. Kennedy’s Inaugural Address: “Ask Not What Your Country Can Do for You”

Lyndon B. Johnson: “We Shall Overcome”

Marc Antony: “Friends, Romans, Countrymen…” in William Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar

Ronald Reagan: “Tear Down this Wall”

Sojourner Truth: “Ain’t I a Woman?”

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IV. Types of Argumentation

4.1 Features of an Argument

Terri Pantuso

Argument is not the loud, assertive, unwavering statement of your opinion in the hopes of conquering the opposition. Argument is the careful consideration of numerous positions and the careful development of logically sound, carefully constructed assertions that, when combined, offer a worthwhile perspective in an ongoing debate. Certainly you want to imagine yourself arguing with others—and certainly you want to believe your ideas have superior qualities to theirs—but the purpose of argument in the college setting is not to solve a practical problem or shut down a conversation. Rather, it’s to illuminate, expand, and further inform a debate happening on a worthwhile subject between reasonable, intelligent people. In other words, calling the opposition stupid is not good argument, it’s an ad hominem attack. For a review of this and other logical fallacies, refer to section 3.6 of this text.

Some of the key tools of argument are the strategies that students are asked to consider when doing a rhetorical analysis. Before beginning an argument of your own, review the basic concepts of rhetorical appeals below. As you plan and draft your own argument, carefully use the following elements of rhetoric to your own advantage.

Rhetorical Appeals

The use of data, statistical evidence, and sufficient support to establish the practicality and rationality of your claims should be the strongest element of your argument. To have a logically sound argument, you should include:

• A debatable and supportable claim
• Logical reasoning to support your claim
• Sound evidence and examples to justify the reasoning
• Reasonable projections
• Concessions & rebuttals
• Avoid logical fallacies

The ethical and well-balanced use of all of the strategies above will help you to present yourself as trustworthy and intelligent in your consideration of the topic and in the development of your argument. This balance should include the use of credible, relevant sources which can be accomplished through research methods utilizing the strategies governing your discipline. Following those strategies will build your credibility as a writer of argument, particularly in the college setting, as you pay attention to the needs of the audience with regard to presentation and style. In college, this means that you have used the style manual (MLA, APA, Chicago, etc.) required for the assignment and appropriate to the audience. In so doing, make certain to cite the sources you have used according to the style manual you are using.

The use of examples and language that evoke an appropriate emotional response in your reader—that gets them to care about your topic—can be helpful in argument. For academic essays, pathos may be useful in introductory sections, concluding sections, or as ways to link various parts of the paper together. However, if your argument is based solely or primarily upon emotional appeals, it will be viewed as weak in an academic setting, especially when data or ethical sources can disprove your claims. Therefore, college writing often puts more emphasis on logos and ethos.

Approaches to Argument

A well-structured argument is one that is carefully and optimally planned. It is organized so that the argument has a continuous building of ideas, one upon the other or in concert with the other, in order to produce the most persuasive impact or effect on the reader. For clarity, avoid repeating ideas, reasons, or evidence. Instead, consider how each idea in your argument connects to the others. Should some ideas come before others? Should you build your reasons from simple to complex or from complex to simple? Should you present the counterargument before your reasons? Or, would it make more sense for you to present your reasons and then the concessions and rebuttals ? How can you use clear transitional phrases to facilitate reader comprehension of your argument? Consider these questions while constructing and revising your argument.

Simple to Complex/Complex to Simple

Whether structuring a paragraph or a research paper, the simple to complex (or reverse) method can be an effective way to build cohesion throughout your writing. Just as the phrase implies, simple to complex is when a writer introduces a simple concept then builds upon it to heighten interest. Sometimes, the opposite structure works to move the reader through your position. For example, if you choose to write on the topic of pollution as it impacts the world, you might begin with the concept of straws and sea turtles. Your simple topic of sea turtles swallowing straws thrown away might then move to the complex issues of consumption, consumerism and disposal. Conversely, if you begin with the broad, complex topic of consumerism, you could then move to the story of the sea turtles as a way of building pathos in the reader. Whichever method you choose, make sure that the relationship between the topics is logical and clear so that readers find validity in your position.

Cause/Effect

The cause/effect method is a way of establishing a reason, or reasons, why something has occurred. For example, if you live in south Texas, then you understand the problem that mosquitoes cause in the hot, humid summer months. While there is no way to eliminate all mosquitoes, there are ways to minimize their growth in your backyard. If you research the ways in which mosquitoes are born, you would understand the importance of things such as emptying containers of all stagnant water so that they cannot incubate or keeping your grass mowed to eliminate areas for them to populate. The process by which you go through to determine the cause of mosquito infestations is the cause and effect method. In argumentation, you might use this method to support a claim for community efforts to prevent mosquitoes from growing in your neighborhood. Demonstrating that process is effective for a logos based argument.

Chronological

Sometimes an argument is presented best when a sequential pattern is used. Oftentimes, that pattern will be based on the pattern of time in which the sequence occurs. For example, if you are writing an argumentative essay in which you are calling for a new stop light to be installed at a busy intersection, you might utilize a chronological structure to demonstrate the rate of increased accidents over a given period of time at that intersection. If your pattern demonstrates a marked increase in accidents, then your data would show a logical reason for supporting your position. Oftentimes, a chronological pattern involves steps indicated by signal words such as first, next, and finally. Utilizing this pattern will walk readers through your line of reasoning and guide them towards reaching your proposed conclusion.

Another method for organizing your writing is by order of importance. This method is often referred to as emphatic because organization is done based upon emphasis. The direction you choose to go is yours whether you begin with the strongest, most important point of your argument, or the weakest. In either case, the hierarchy of ideas should be clear to readers. The emphatic method is often subjectively based upon the writer’s beliefs. If, for example, you want to build an argument for a new rail system to be used in your city, you will have to decide which reason is most important and which is simply support material. For one writer, the decrease in the number of cars on the road might be the most important aspect as it would result in a reduction of toxic emissions. For another writer, the time saved for commuters might be the most important aspect. The decision to start with your strongest or weakest point is one of style.

Style/ Eloquence

When we discuss style in academic writing, we generally mean the use of formal language appropriate for the given academic audience and occasion. Academics generally favor Standard American English and the use of precise language that avoids idioms , clichés , or dull, simple word choices. This is not to imply that these tropes are not useful; however, strong academic writing is typically objective and frequently avoids the use of first-person pronouns unless the disciplinary style and conventions suggest otherwise.

Some writing assignments allow you to choose your audience. In that case, the style in which you write may not be the formal, precise Standard American English that the academy prefers. For some writing assignments, you may even be asked to use, where appropriate, poetic or figurative language or language that evokes the senses. Additionally, instructors should be cognizant of second language learners and the variations in style when writing in a non-native language.

In all cases, it is important to understand what style of writing your audience expects, as delivering your argument in that style could make it more persuasive.

This section contains material from:

“Arguing.” In A Guide to Rhetoric, Genre, and Success in First-Year Writing , by Melanie Gagich and Emilie Zickel. Cleveland: MSL Academic Endeavors. Accessed July 2019. https://pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu/csu-fyw-rhetoric/chapter/8-2-arguing/ . Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License .

Pronouncement, affirmation, or endorsement; a declaration or statement of belief, usually positive in nature.

An acknowledgement of at least one aspect of the other side of the argument  that admits or accepts validity or legitimacy.

A counterstatement or counterargument; to offer evidence that opposes the argument that is being made.

Motionless, inactive, idle, or sluggish; a lack of development, growth, or advancement.

A system involving rank. Hierarchical refers to a system that involves a hierarchy. For example, the military is a hierarchical system in which some people outrank others.

To take the position or side of the subject (rather than the object) which is the one doing the observing (rather than being observed); the belief, preference, or understanding of an individual.

A phrase that is not traditionally associated with the meaning that the words provide; idioms cannot be literally translated into another language. For example, when someone is “feeling under the weather,” they are feeling ill.

A stereotyped or corny phrase, expression, or idea that has lost its original meaning from overuse, usually over a long period of time. The saying “time flies when you’re having fun” is an example of a cliché.

A stereotypical or predictable literary convention or device such as a plot point (the damsel in distress), a figure of speech (metaphor, idiom, etc.), or theme or motif (red roses represent true love).

Impartiality or fairness; dispassionate or detached. Also refers to the goal, aim, or intention that someone or a group of people hope to achieve.

Having awareness.

4.1 Features of an Argument Copyright © 2022 by Terri Pantuso is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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11.2 Persuasive Speaking

Learning objectives.

• Explain how claims, evidence, and warrants function to create an argument.
• Identify strategies for choosing a persuasive speech topic.
• Identify strategies for adapting a persuasive speech based on an audience’s orientation to the proposition.
• Distinguish among propositions of fact, value, and policy.
• Choose an organizational pattern that is fitting for a persuasive speech topic.

We produce and receive persuasive messages daily, but we don’t often stop to think about how we make the arguments we do or the quality of the arguments that we receive. In this section, we’ll learn the components of an argument, how to choose a good persuasive speech topic, and how to adapt and organize a persuasive message.

Foundation of Persuasion

Persuasive speaking seeks to influence the beliefs, attitudes, values, or behaviors of audience members. In order to persuade, a speaker has to construct arguments that appeal to audience members. Arguments form around three components: claim, evidence, and warrant. The claim is the statement that will be supported by evidence. Your thesis statement is the overarching claim for your speech, but you will make other claims within the speech to support the larger thesis. Evidence , also called grounds, supports the claim. The main points of your persuasive speech and the supporting material you include serve as evidence. For example, a speaker may make the following claim: “There should be a national law against texting while driving.” The speaker could then support the claim by providing the following evidence: “Research from the US Department of Transportation has found that texting while driving creates a crash risk that is twenty-three times worse than driving while not distracted.” The warrant is the underlying justification that connects the claim and the evidence. One warrant for the claim and evidence cited in this example is that the US Department of Transportation is an institution that funds research conducted by credible experts. An additional and more implicit warrant is that people shouldn’t do things they know are unsafe.

Figure 11.2 Components of an Argument

The quality of your evidence often impacts the strength of your warrant, and some warrants are stronger than others. A speaker could also provide evidence to support their claim advocating for a national ban on texting and driving by saying, “I have personally seen people almost wreck while trying to text.” While this type of evidence can also be persuasive, it provides a different type and strength of warrant since it is based on personal experience. In general, the anecdotal evidence from personal experience would be given a weaker warrant than the evidence from the national research report. The same process works in our legal system when a judge evaluates the connection between a claim and evidence. If someone steals my car, I could say to the police, “I’m pretty sure Mario did it because when I said hi to him on campus the other day, he didn’t say hi back, which proves he’s mad at me.” A judge faced with that evidence is unlikely to issue a warrant for Mario’s arrest. Fingerprint evidence from the steering wheel that has been matched with a suspect is much more likely to warrant arrest.

As you put together a persuasive argument, you act as the judge. You can evaluate arguments that you come across in your research by analyzing the connection (the warrant) between the claim and the evidence. If the warrant is strong, you may want to highlight that argument in your speech. You may also be able to point out a weak warrant in an argument that goes against your position, which you could then include in your speech. Every argument starts by putting together a claim and evidence, but arguments grow to include many interrelated units.

Choosing a Persuasive Speech Topic

As with any speech, topic selection is important and is influenced by many factors. Good persuasive speech topics are current, controversial, and have important implications for society. If your topic is currently being discussed on television, in newspapers, in the lounges in your dorm, or around your family’s dinner table, then it’s a current topic. A persuasive speech aimed at getting audience members to wear seat belts in cars wouldn’t have much current relevance, given that statistics consistently show that most people wear seat belts. Giving the same speech would have been much more timely in the 1970s when there was a huge movement to increase seat-belt use.

Many topics that are current are also controversial, which is what gets them attention by the media and citizens. Current and controversial topics will be more engaging for your audience. A persuasive speech to encourage audience members to donate blood or recycle wouldn’t be very controversial, since the benefits of both practices are widely agreed on. However, arguing that the restrictions on blood donation by men who have had sexual relations with men be lifted would be controversial. I must caution here that controversial is not the same as inflammatory. An inflammatory topic is one that evokes strong reactions from an audience for the sake of provoking a reaction. Being provocative for no good reason or choosing a topic that is extremist will damage your credibility and prevent you from achieving your speech goals.

You should also choose a topic that is important to you and to society as a whole. As we have already discussed in this book, our voices are powerful, as it is through communication that we participate and make change in society. Therefore we should take seriously opportunities to use our voices to speak publicly. Choosing a speech topic that has implications for society is probably a better application of your public speaking skills than choosing to persuade the audience that Lebron James is the best basketball player in the world or that Superman is a better hero than Spiderman. Although those topics may be very important to you, they don’t carry the same social weight as many other topics you could choose to discuss. Remember that speakers have ethical obligations to the audience and should take the opportunity to speak seriously.

You will also want to choose a topic that connects to your own interests and passions. If you are an education major, it might make more sense to do a persuasive speech about funding for public education than the death penalty. If there are hot-button issues for you that make you get fired up and veins bulge out in your neck, then it may be a good idea to avoid those when speaking in an academic or professional context.

Choose a persuasive speech topic that you’re passionate about but still able to approach and deliver in an ethical manner.

Michael Vadon – Nigel Farage – CC BY-SA 2.0.

Choosing such topics may interfere with your ability to deliver a speech in a competent and ethical manner. You want to care about your topic, but you also want to be able to approach it in a way that’s going to make people want to listen to you. Most people tune out speakers they perceive to be too ideologically entrenched and write them off as extremists or zealots.

You also want to ensure that your topic is actually persuasive. Draft your thesis statement as an “I believe” statement so your stance on an issue is clear. Also, think of your main points as reasons to support your thesis. Students end up with speeches that aren’t very persuasive in nature if they don’t think of their main points as reasons. Identifying arguments that counter your thesis is also a good exercise to help ensure your topic is persuasive. If you can clearly and easily identify a competing thesis statement and supporting reasons, then your topic and approach are arguable.

Review of Tips for Choosing a Persuasive Speech Topic

• Not current. People should use seat belts.
• Current. People should not text while driving.
• Not controversial. People should recycle.
• Controversial. Recycling should be mandatory by law.
• Not as impactful. Superman is the best superhero.
• Impactful. Colleges and universities should adopt zero-tolerance bullying policies.
• Unclear thesis. Homeschooling is common in the United States.
• Clear, argumentative thesis with stance. Homeschooling does not provide the same benefits of traditional education and should be strictly monitored and limited.

Adapting Persuasive Messages

Competent speakers should consider their audience throughout the speech-making process. Given that persuasive messages seek to directly influence the audience in some way, audience adaptation becomes even more important. If possible, poll your audience to find out their orientation toward your thesis. I read my students’ thesis statements aloud and have the class indicate whether they agree with, disagree with, or are neutral in regards to the proposition. It is unlikely that you will have a homogenous audience, meaning that there will probably be some who agree, some who disagree, and some who are neutral. So you may employ all of the following strategies, in varying degrees, in your persuasive speech.

When you have audience members who already agree with your proposition, you should focus on intensifying their agreement. You can also assume that they have foundational background knowledge of the topic, which means you can take the time to inform them about lesser-known aspects of a topic or cause to further reinforce their agreement. Rather than move these audience members from disagreement to agreement, you can focus on moving them from agreement to action. Remember, calls to action should be as specific as possible to help you capitalize on audience members’ motivation in the moment so they are more likely to follow through on the action.

There are two main reasons audience members may be neutral in regards to your topic: (1) they are uninformed about the topic or (2) they do not think the topic affects them. In this case, you should focus on instilling a concern for the topic. Uninformed audiences may need background information before they can decide if they agree or disagree with your proposition. If the issue is familiar but audience members are neutral because they don’t see how the topic affects them, focus on getting the audience’s attention and demonstrating relevance. Remember that concrete and proxemic supporting materials will help an audience find relevance in a topic. Students who pick narrow or unfamiliar topics will have to work harder to persuade their audience, but neutral audiences often provide the most chance of achieving your speech goal since even a small change may move them into agreement.

When audience members disagree with your proposition, you should focus on changing their minds. To effectively persuade, you must be seen as a credible speaker. When an audience is hostile to your proposition, establishing credibility is even more important, as audience members may be quick to discount or discredit someone who doesn’t appear prepared or doesn’t present well-researched and supported information. Don’t give an audience a chance to write you off before you even get to share your best evidence. When facing a disagreeable audience, the goal should also be small change. You may not be able to switch someone’s position completely, but influencing him or her is still a success. Aside from establishing your credibility, you should also establish common ground with an audience.

Build common ground with disagreeable audiences and acknowledge areas of disagreement.

Chris-Havard Berge – Shaking Hands – CC BY-NC 2.0.

Acknowledging areas of disagreement and logically refuting counterarguments in your speech is also a way to approach persuading an audience in disagreement, as it shows that you are open-minded enough to engage with other perspectives.

Determining Your Proposition

The proposition of your speech is the overall direction of the content and how that relates to the speech goal. A persuasive speech will fall primarily into one of three categories: propositions of fact, value, or policy. A speech may have elements of any of the three propositions, but you can usually determine the overall proposition of a speech from the specific purpose and thesis statements.

Propositions of fact focus on beliefs and try to establish that something “is or isn’t.” Propositions of value focus on persuading audience members that something is “good or bad,” “right or wrong,” or “desirable or undesirable.” Propositions of policy advocate that something “should or shouldn’t” be done. Since most persuasive speech topics can be approached as propositions of fact, value, or policy, it is a good idea to start thinking about what kind of proposition you want to make, as it will influence how you go about your research and writing. As you can see in the following example using the topic of global warming, the type of proposition changes the types of supporting materials you would need:

• Proposition of fact. Global warming is caused by increased greenhouse gases related to human activity.
• Proposition of value. America’s disproportionately large amount of pollution relative to other countries is wrong .
• Proposition of policy. There should be stricter emission restrictions on individual cars.

To support propositions of fact, you would want to present a logical argument based on objective facts that can then be used to build persuasive arguments. Propositions of value may require you to appeal more to your audience’s emotions and cite expert and lay testimony. Persuasive speeches about policy usually require you to research existing and previous laws or procedures and determine if any relevant legislation or propositions are currently being considered.

“Getting Critical”

Persuasion and Masculinity

The traditional view of rhetoric that started in ancient Greece and still informs much of our views on persuasion today has been critiqued for containing Western and masculine biases. Traditional persuasion has been linked to Western and masculine values of domination, competition, and change, which have been critiqued as coercive and violent (Gearhart, 1979).

Communication scholars proposed an alternative to traditional persuasive rhetoric in the form of invitational rhetoric. Invitational rhetoric differs from a traditional view of persuasive rhetoric that “attempts to win over an opponent, or to advocate the correctness of a single position in a very complex issue” (Bone et al., 2008). Instead, invitational rhetoric proposes a model of reaching consensus through dialogue. The goal is to create a climate in which growth and change can occur but isn’t required for one person to “win” an argument over another. Each person in a communication situation is acknowledged to have a standpoint that is valid but can still be influenced through the offering of alternative perspectives and the invitation to engage with and discuss these standpoints (Ryan & Natalle, 2001). Safety, value, and freedom are three important parts of invitational rhetoric. Safety involves a feeling of security in which audience members and speakers feel like their ideas and contributions will not be denigrated. Value refers to the notion that each person in a communication encounter is worthy of recognition and that people are willing to step outside their own perspectives to better understand others. Last, freedom is present in communication when communicators do not limit the thinking or decisions of others, allowing all participants to speak up (Bone et al., 2008).

Invitational rhetoric doesn’t claim that all persuasive rhetoric is violent. Instead, it acknowledges that some persuasion is violent and that the connection between persuasion and violence is worth exploring. Invitational rhetoric has the potential to contribute to the civility of communication in our society. When we are civil, we are capable of engaging with and appreciating different perspectives while still understanding our own. People aren’t attacked or reviled because their views diverge from ours. Rather than reducing the world to “us against them, black or white, and right or wrong,” invitational rhetoric encourages us to acknowledge human perspectives in all their complexity (Bone et al., 2008).

• What is your reaction to the claim that persuasion includes Western and masculine biases?
• What are some strengths and weaknesses of the proposed alternatives to traditional persuasion?
• In what situations might an invitational approach to persuasion be useful? In what situations might you want to rely on traditional models of persuasion?

Organizing a Persuasive Speech

We have already discussed several patterns for organizing your speech, but some organization strategies are specific to persuasive speaking. Some persuasive speech topics lend themselves to a topical organization pattern, which breaks the larger topic up into logical divisions. Earlier, in Chapter 9 “Preparing a Speech” , we discussed recency and primacy, and in this chapter we discussed adapting a persuasive speech based on the audience’s orientation toward the proposition. These concepts can be connected when organizing a persuasive speech topically. Primacy means putting your strongest information first and is based on the idea that audience members put more weight on what they hear first. This strategy can be especially useful when addressing an audience that disagrees with your proposition, as you can try to win them over early. Recency means putting your strongest information last to leave a powerful impression. This can be useful when you are building to a climax in your speech, specifically if you include a call to action.

Putting your strongest argument last can help motivate an audience to action.

Celestine Chua – The Change – CC BY 2.0.

The problem-solution pattern is an organizational pattern that advocates for a particular approach to solve a problem. You would provide evidence to show that a problem exists and then propose a solution with additional evidence or reasoning to justify the course of action. One main point addressing the problem and one main point addressing the solution may be sufficient, but you are not limited to two. You could add a main point between the problem and solution that outlines other solutions that have failed. You can also combine the problem-solution pattern with the cause-effect pattern or expand the speech to fit with Monroe’s Motivated Sequence.

As was mentioned in Chapter 9 “Preparing a Speech” , the cause-effect pattern can be used for informative speaking when the relationship between the cause and effect is not contested. The pattern is more fitting for persuasive speeches when the relationship between the cause and effect is controversial or unclear. There are several ways to use causes and effects to structure a speech. You could have a two-point speech that argues from cause to effect or from effect to cause. You could also have more than one cause that lead to the same effect or a single cause that leads to multiple effects. The following are some examples of thesis statements that correspond to various organizational patterns. As you can see, the same general topic area, prison overcrowding, is used for each example. This illustrates the importance of considering your organizational options early in the speech-making process, since the pattern you choose will influence your researching and writing.

Persuasive Speech Thesis Statements by Organizational Pattern

• Problem-solution. Prison overcrowding is a serious problem that we can solve by finding alternative rehabilitation for nonviolent offenders.
• Problem–failed solution–proposed solution. Prison overcrowding is a serious problem that shouldn’t be solved by building more prisons; instead, we should support alternative rehabilitation for nonviolent offenders.
• Cause-effect. Prisons are overcrowded with nonviolent offenders, which leads to lesser sentences for violent criminals.
• Cause-cause-effect. State budgets are being slashed and prisons are overcrowded with nonviolent offenders, which leads to lesser sentences for violent criminals.
• Cause-effect-effect. Prisons are overcrowded with nonviolent offenders, which leads to increased behavioral problems among inmates and lesser sentences for violent criminals.
• Cause-effect-solution. Prisons are overcrowded with nonviolent offenders, which leads to lesser sentences for violent criminals; therefore we need to find alternative rehabilitation for nonviolent offenders.

Monroe’s Motivated Sequence is an organizational pattern designed for persuasive speaking that appeals to audience members’ needs and motivates them to action. If your persuasive speaking goals include a call to action, you may want to consider this organizational pattern. We already learned about the five steps of Monroe’s Motivated Sequence in Chapter 9 “Preparing a Speech” , but we will review them here with an example:

• Hook the audience by making the topic relevant to them.
• Imagine living a full life, retiring, and slipping into your golden years. As you get older you become more dependent on others and move into an assisted-living facility. Although you think life will be easier, things get worse as you experience abuse and mistreatment from the staff. You report the abuse to a nurse and wait, but nothing happens and the abuse continues. Elder abuse is a common occurrence, and unlike child abuse, there are no laws in our state that mandate complaints of elder abuse be reported or investigated.
• Cite evidence to support the fact that the issue needs to be addressed.
• According to the American Psychological Association, one to two million elderly US Americans have been abused by their caretakers. In our state, those in the medical, psychiatric, and social work field are required to report suspicion of child abuse but are not mandated to report suspicions of elder abuse.
• Offer a solution and persuade the audience that it is feasible and well thought out.
• There should be a federal law mandating that suspicion of elder abuse be reported and that all claims of elder abuse be investigated.
• Take the audience beyond your solution and help them visualize the positive results of implementing it or the negative consequences of not.
• Elderly people should not have to live in fear during their golden years. A mandatory reporting law for elderly abuse will help ensure that the voices of our elderly loved ones will be heard.
• Call your audience to action by giving them concrete steps to follow to engage in a particular action or to change a thought or behavior.
• I urge you to take action in two ways. First, raise awareness about this issue by talking to your own friends and family. Second, contact your representatives at the state and national level to let them know that elder abuse should be taken seriously and given the same level of importance as other forms of abuse. I brought cards with the contact information for our state and national representatives for this area. Please take one at the end of my speech. A short e-mail or phone call can help end the silence surrounding elder abuse.

Key Takeaways

• Arguments are formed by making claims that are supported by evidence. The underlying justification that connects the claim and evidence is the warrant. Arguments can have strong or weak warrants, which will make them more or less persuasive.
• Good persuasive speech topics are current, controversial (but not inflammatory), and important to the speaker and society.
• When audience members agree with the proposal, focus on intensifying their agreement and moving them to action.
• When audience members are neutral in regards to the proposition, provide background information to better inform them about the issue and present information that demonstrates the relevance of the topic to the audience.
• When audience members disagree with the proposal, focus on establishing your credibility, build common ground with the audience, and incorporate counterarguments and refute them.
• Propositions of fact focus on establishing that something “is or isn’t” or is “true or false.”
• Propositions of value focus on persuading an audience that something is “good or bad,” “right or wrong,” or “desirable or undesirable.”
• Propositions of policy advocate that something “should or shouldn’t” be done.
• Persuasive speeches can be organized using the following patterns: problem-solution, cause-effect, cause-effect-solution, or Monroe’s Motivated Sequence.
• Getting integrated: Give an example of persuasive messages that you might need to create in each of the following contexts: academic, professional, personal, and civic. Then do the same thing for persuasive messages you may receive.
• To help ensure that your persuasive speech topic is persuasive and not informative, identify the claims, evidence, and warrants you may use in your argument. In addition, write a thesis statement that refutes your topic idea and identify evidence and warrants that could support that counterargument.
• Determine if your speech is primarily a proposition of fact, value, or policy. How can you tell? Identify an organizational pattern that you think will work well for your speech topic, draft one sentence for each of your main points, and arrange them according to the pattern you chose.

Bone, J. E., Cindy L. Griffin, and T. M. Linda Scholz, “Beyond Traditional Conceptualizations of Rhetoric: Invitational Rhetoric and a Move toward Civility,” Western Journal of Communication 72 (2008): 436.

Gearhart, S. M., “The Womanization of Rhetoric,” Women’s Studies International Quarterly 2 (1979): 195–201.

Ryan, K. J., and Elizabeth J. Natalle, “Fusing Horizons: Standpoint Hermenutics and Invitational Rhetoric,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 31 (2001): 69–90.

Communication in the Real World Copyright © 2016 by University of Minnesota is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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59 Introduction to Argumentative Writing

Joel Gladd and Amy Minervini

by Joel Gladd and Amy Minervini

Argumentative writing, also referred to as persuasive writing, is a cornerstone of any first-year writing course. We encounter arguments on daily basis, in both formal and informal contexts. Most of the time, however, we don’t realize how the arguments are actually working. This example developed by Ohio State’s University Library shows how a relatively informal argument may unfold. The dialogue has been annotated to show what kinds of rhetorical elements tend to appear in casual arguments.

As the example above shows, a number of elements typically play a role in most well-developed arguments:

• a question that doesn’t have a straightforward answer
• a claim that responds to the question
• one or more reasons  for accepting the claim
• evidence  that backs each reason
• objections & response to objections

We often employ many or all of these elements in everyday life, when debating current issues with friends and family. It just unfolds in a messier way than your academic essay will need to structure the conversation. However, even though academic persuasive essays rely on some techniques you’re already familiar with, certain strategies are less well-known, and even certain obvious elements, such as using “evidence” to back a claim, has a certain flavor in more formal environments that some students may not find obvious.

Different models have been proposed for how to best package the elements above. The three models most commonly employed in academic writing are the Aristotelian (classical) , Toulmin , and Rogerian , covered in this chapter. The proposal method is also included though this strategy focuses on solutions rather than problems.

Key Characteristics:

Argumentative writing generally exhibits the following:

• Presents a particular position/side of an issue
• Attempts to persuade the reader to the writer’s side
• Uses elements of rhetoric and strategies that include the integration of logos, pathos, ethos, and kairos in intentional and meaningful ways
• Presents information, data, and research as part of the evidence/support (logos)
• Relies on real-world stories and examples to nurture empathy (pathos)
• Leans on experts in their fields to cultivate credibility (ethos)
• Enlists or elicits a call to action (kairos)
• Presents and acknowledges opposing views

Contents within this Chapter:

• Elements of an Argument Essay
• Aristotelian (Classical) Argument Model
• Rogerian Argument Model
• Toulmin Argument Model
• Proposal Argument Model
• Counterargument and Response
• Generating Antithetical Points in Five Easy Steps
• Tips for Writing Argument Essays

Choosing & Using Sources: A Guide to Academic Research  by Teaching & Learning, Ohio State University Libraries is licensed under a  Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

Introduction to Argumentative Writing Copyright © 2020 by Joel Gladd and Amy Minervini is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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Argument and Argumentation

Argument is a central concept for philosophy. Philosophers rely heavily on arguments to justify claims, and these practices have been motivating reflections on what arguments and argumentation are for millennia. Moreover, argumentative practices are also pervasive elsewhere; they permeate scientific inquiry, legal procedures, education, and political institutions. The study of argumentation is an inter-disciplinary field of inquiry, involving philosophers, language theorists, legal scholars, cognitive scientists, computer scientists, and political scientists, among many others. This entry provides an overview of the literature on argumentation drawing primarily on philosophical sources, but also engaging extensively with relevant sources from other disciplines.

1. Terminological Clarifications

2.1 deduction, 2.2 induction, 2.3 abduction, 2.4 analogy, 2.5 fallacies, 3.1 adversarial and cooperative argumentation, 3.2 argumentation as an epistemic practice, 3.3 consensus-oriented argumentation, 3.4 argumentation and conflict management, 3.5 conclusion, 4.1 argumentation theory, 4.2 artificial intelligence and computer science, 4.3 cognitive science and psychology, 4.4 language and communication, 4.5 argumentation in specific social practices, 5.1 argumentative injustice and virtuous argumentation, 5.2 emotions and argumentation, 5.3 cross-cultural perspectives on argumentation, 5.4 argumentation and the internet, 6. conclusion, references for the main text, references for the historical supplement, other internet resources, related entries.

An argument can be defined as a complex symbolic structure where some parts, known as the premises, offer support to another part, the conclusion. Alternatively, an argument can be viewed as a complex speech act consisting of one or more acts of premising (which assert propositions in favor of the conclusion), an act of concluding, and a stated or implicit marker (“hence”, “therefore”) that indicates that the conclusion follows from the premises (Hitchcock 2007). [ 1 ] The relation of support between premises and conclusion can be cashed out in different ways: the premises may guarantee the truth of the conclusion, or make its truth more probable; the premises may imply the conclusion; the premises may make the conclusion more acceptable (or assertible).

For theoretical purposes, arguments may be considered as freestanding entities, abstracted from their contexts of use in actual human activities. But depending on one’s explanatory goals, there is also much to be gained from considering arguments as they in fact occur in human communicative practices. The term generally used for instances of exchange of arguments is argumentation . In what follows, the convention of using “argument” to refer to structures of premises and conclusion, and “argumentation” to refer to human practices and activities where arguments occur as communicative actions will be adopted.

Argumentation can be defined as the communicative activity of producing and exchanging reasons in order to support claims or defend/challenge positions, especially in situations of doubt or disagreement (Lewiński & Mohammed 2016). It is arguably best conceived as a kind of dialogue , even if one can also “argue” with oneself, in long speeches or in writing (in articles or books) for an intended but silent audience, or in groups rather than in dyads (Lewiński & Aakhus 2014). But argumentation is a special kind of dialogue: indeed, most of the dialogues we engage in are not instances of argumentation, for example when asking someone if they know what time it is, or when someone shares details about their vacation. Argumentation only occurs when, upon making a claim, someone receives a request for further support for the claim in the form of reasons, or estimates herself that further justification is required (Jackson & Jacobs 1980; Jackson, 2019). In such cases, dialogues of “giving and asking for reasons” ensue (Brandom, 1994; Bermejo Luque 2011). Since most of what we know we learn from others, argumentation seems to be an important mechanism to filter the information we receive, instead of accepting what others tell us uncritically (Sperber, Clément, et al. 2010).

The study of arguments and argumentation is also closely connected to the study of reasoning , understood as the process of reaching conclusions on the basis of careful, reflective consideration of the available information, i.e., by an examination of reasons . According to a widespread view, reasoning and argumentation are related (as both concern reasons) but fundamentally different phenomena: reasoning would belong to the mental realm of thinking—an individual inferring new information from the available information by means of careful consideration of reasons—whereas argumentation would belong to the public realm of the exchange of reasons, expressed in language or other symbolic media and intended for an audience. However, a number of authors have argued for a different view, namely that reasoning and argumentation are in fact two sides of the same coin, and that what is known as reasoning is by and large the internalization of practices of argumentation (MacKenzie 1989; Mercier & Sperber 2017; Mercier 2018). For the purposes of this entry, we can assume a close connection between reasoning and argumentation so that relevant research on reasoning can be suitably included in the discussions to come.

2. Types of Arguments

Arguments come in many kinds. In some of them, the truth of the premises is supposed to guarantee the truth of the conclusion, and these are known as deductive arguments. In others, the truth of the premises should make the truth of the conclusion more likely while not ensuring complete certainty; two well-known classes of such arguments are inductive and abductive arguments (a distinction introduced by Peirce, see entry on C.S. Peirce ). Unlike deduction, induction and abduction are thought to be ampliative: the conclusion goes beyond what is (logically) contained in the premises. Moreover, a type of argument that features prominently across different philosophical traditions, and yet does not fit neatly into any of the categories so far discussed, are analogical arguments. In this section, these four kinds of arguments are presented. The section closes with a discussion of fallacious arguments, that is, arguments that seem legitimate and “good”, but in fact are not. [ 2 ]

Valid deductive arguments are those where the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the conclusion: the conclusion cannot but be true if the premises are true. Arguments having this property are said to be deductively valid . A valid argument whose premises are also true is said to be sound . Examples of valid deductive arguments are the familiar syllogisms, such as:

All humans are living beings. All living beings are mortal. Therefore, all humans are mortal.

In a deductively valid argument, the conclusion will be true in all situations where the premises are true, with no exceptions. A slightly more technical gloss of this idea goes as follows: in all possible worlds where the premises hold, the conclusion will also hold. This means that, if I know the premises of a deductively valid argument to be true of a given situation, then I can conclude with absolute certainty that the conclusion is also true of that situation. An important property typically associated with deductive arguments (but with exceptions, such as in relevant logic), and which differentiates them from inductive and abductive arguments, is the property of monotonicity : if premises A and B deductively imply conclusion C , then the addition of any arbitrary premise D will not invalidate the argument. In other words, if the argument “ A and B ; therefore C ” is deductively valid, then the argument “ A , B and D ; therefore C ” is equally deductively valid.

Deductive arguments are the objects of study of familiar logical systems such as (classical) propositional and predicate logic, as well as of subclassical systems such as intuitionistic and relevant logics (although in relevant logic the property of monotonicity does not hold, as it may lead to violations of criteria of relevance between premises and conclusion—see entry on relevance logic ). In each of these systems, the relation of logical consequence in question satisfies the property of necessary truth-preservation (see entry on logical consequence ). This is not surprising, as these systems were originally designed to capture arguments of a very specific kind, namely mathematical arguments (proofs), in the pioneering work of Frege, Russell, Hilbert, Gentzen, and others. Following a paradigm established in ancient Greek mathematics and famously captured in Euclid’s Elements , argumentative steps in mathematical proofs (in this tradition at least) must have the property of necessary truth preservation (Netz 1999). This paradigm remained influential for millennia, and still codifies what can be described as the “classical” conception of mathematical proof (Dutilh Novaes 2020a), even if practices of proof are ultimately also quite diverse. (In fact, there is much more to argumentation in mathematics than just deductive argumentation [Aberdein & Dove 2013].)

However, a number of philosophers have argued that deductive validity and necessary truth preservation in fact come apart. Some have reached this conclusion motivated by the familiar logical paradoxes such as the Liar or Curry’s paradox (Beall 2009; Field 2008; see entries on the Liar paradox and on Curry’s paradox ). Others have defended the idea that there are such things as contingent logical truths (Kaplan 1989; Nelson & Zalta 2012), which thus challenge the idea of necessary truth preservation. It has also been suggested that what is preserved in the transition from premises to conclusions in deductive arguments is in fact warrant or assertibility rather than truth (Restall 2004). Yet others, such as proponents of preservationist approaches to paraconsistent logic, posit that what is preserved by the deductive consequence relation is the coherence, or incoherence, of a set of premises (Schotch, Brown, & Jennings 2009; see entry on paraconsistent logic ). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the view that deductive validity is to be understood primarily in terms of necessary truth preservation is still the received view.

Relatedly, there are a number of pressing philosophical issues pertaining to the justification of deduction, such as the exact nature of the necessity involved in deduction (metaphysical, logical, linguistic, epistemic; Shapiro 2005), and the possibility of offering a non-circular foundation for deduction (Dummett 1978). Furthermore, it is often remarked that the fact that a deductive argument is not ampliative may entail that it cannot be informative, which in turn would mean that its usefulness is quite limited; this problem has been described as “the scandal of deduction” (Sequoiah-Grayson 2008).

Be that as it may, deductive arguments have occupied a special place in philosophy and the sciences, ever since Aristotle presented the first fully-fledged theory of deductive argumentation and reasoning in the Prior Analytics (and the corresponding theory of scientific demonstration in the Posterior Analytics ; see Historical Supplement ). The fascination for deductive arguments is understandable, given their allure of certainty and indubitability. The more geometrico (a phrase introduced by Spinoza to describe the argumentative structure of his Ethics as following “a geometrical style”—see entry on Spinoza ) has been influential in many fields other than mathematics. However, the focus on deductive arguments at the expense of other types of arguments has arguably skewed investigations on argument and argumentation too much in one specific direction (see (Bermejo-Luque 2020) for a critique of deductivism in the study of argumentation).

In recent decades, the view that everyday reasoning and argumentation by and large do not follow the canons of deductive argumentation has been gaining traction. In psychology of reasoning, Oaksford and Chater were the first to argue already in the 1980s that human reasoning “in the wild” is essentially probabilistic, following the basic canons of Bayesian probabilities (Oaksford & Chater 2018; Elqayam 2018; see section 5.3 below). Computer scientists and artificial intelligence researchers have also developed a strong interest in non-monotonic reasoning and argumentation (Reiter 1980), recognizing that, outside specific scientific contexts, human reasoning tends to be deeply defeasible (Pollock 1987; see entries on non-monotonic logic and defeasible reasoning ). Thus seen, deductive argumentation might be considered as the exception rather than the rule in human argumentative practices taken as a whole (Dutilh Novaes 2020a). But there are others, especially philosophers, who still maintain that the use of deductive reasoning and argumentation is widespread and extends beyond niches of specialists (Shapiro 2014; Williamson 2018).

Inductive arguments are arguments where observations about past instances and regularities lead to conclusions about future instances and general principles. For example, the observation that the sun has risen in the east every single day until now leads to the conclusion that it will rise in the east tomorrow, and to the general principle “the sun always rises in the east”. Generally speaking, inductive arguments are based on statistical frequencies, which then lead to generalizations beyond the sample of cases initially under consideration: from the observed to the unobserved. In a good, i.e., cogent , inductive argument, the truth of the premises provides some degree of support for the truth of the conclusion. In contrast with a deductively valid argument, in an inductive argument the degree of support will never be maximal, as there is always the possibility of the conclusion being false given the truth of the premises. A gloss in terms of possible worlds might be that, while in a deductively valid argument the conclusion will hold in all possible worlds where the premises hold, in a good inductive argument the conclusion will hold in a significant proportion of the possible worlds where the premises hold. The proportion of such worlds may give a measure of the strength of support of the premises for the conclusion (see entry on inductive logic ).

Inductive arguments have been recognized and used in science and elsewhere for millennia. The concept of induction ( epagoge in Greek) was understood by Aristotle as a progression from particulars to a universal, and figured prominently both in his conception of the scientific method and in dialectical practices (see entry on Aristotle’s logic, section 3.1 ). However, a deductivist conception of the scientific method remained overall more influential in Aristotelian traditions, inspired by the theory of scientific demonstration of the Posterior Analytics . It is only with the so-called “scientific revolution” of the early modern period that experiments and observation of individual cases became one of the pillars of scientific methodology, a transition that is strongly associated with the figure of Francis Bacon (1561–1626; see entry on Francis Bacon ).

Inductive inferences/arguments are ubiquitous both in science and in everyday life, and for the most part quite reliable. The functioning of the world around us seems to display a fair amount of statistical regularity, and this is referred to as the “Uniformity Principle” in the literature on the problem of induction (to be discussed shortly). Moreover, it has been argued that generalizing from previously observed frequencies is the most basic principle of human cognition (Clark 2016).

However, it has long been recognized that inductive inferences/arguments are not unproblematic. Hume famously offered the first influential formulation of what became known as “the problem of induction” in his Treatise of Human Nature (see entries on David Hume and on the problem of induction ; Howson 2000). Hume raises the question of what grounds the correctness of inductive inferences/arguments, and posits that there must be an argument establishing the validity of the Uniformity Principle for inductive inferences to be truly justified. He goes on to argue that this argument cannot be deductive, as it is not inconceivable that the course of nature may change. But it cannot be probable either, as probable arguments already presuppose the validity of the Uniformity Principle; circularity would ensue. Since these are the only two options, he concludes that the Uniformity Principle cannot be established by rational argument, and hence that induction cannot be justified.

A more recent influential critique of inductive arguments is the one offered in (Harman 1965). Harman argues that either enumerative induction is not always warranted, or it is always warranted but constitutes an uninteresting special case of the more general category of inference to the best explanation (see next section). The upshot is that, for Harman, induction should not be considered a warranted form of inference in its own right.

Given the centrality of induction for scientific practice, there have been numerous attempts to respond to the critics of induction, with various degrees of success. Among those, an influential recent response to the problem of induction is Norton’s material theory of induction (Norton 2003). But the problem has not prevented scientists and laypeople alike from continuing to use induction widely. More recently, the use of statistical frequencies for social categories to draw conclusions about specific individuals has become a matter of contention, both at the individual level (see entry on implicit bias ) and at the institutional level (e.g., the use of predictive algorithms for law enforcement [Jorgensen Bolinger 2021]). These debates can be seen as reoccurrences of Hume’s problem of induction, now in the domain of social rather than of natural phenomena.

An abductive argument is one where, from the observation of a few relevant facts, a conclusion is drawn as to what could possibly explain the occurrence of these facts (see entry on abduction ). Abduction is widely thought to be ubiquitous both in science and in everyday life, as well as in other specific domains such as the law, medical diagnosis, and explainable artificial intelligence (Josephson & Josephson 1994). Indeed, a good example of abduction is the closing argument by a prosecutor in a court of law who, after summarizing the available evidence, concludes that the most plausible explanation for it is that the defendant must have committed the crime they are accused of.

Like induction, and unlike deduction, abduction is not necessarily truth-preserving: in the example above, it is still possible that the defendant is not guilty after all, and that some other, unexpected phenomena caused the evidence to emerge. But abduction is significantly different from induction in that it does not only concern the generalization of prior observation for prediction (though it may also involve statistical data): rather, abduction is often backward-looking in that it seeks to explain something that has already happened. The key notion is that of bringing together apparently independent phenomena or events as explanatorily and/or causally connected to each other, something that is absent from a purely inductive argument that only appeals to observed frequencies. Cognitively, abduction taps into the well-known human tendency to seek (causal) explanations for phenomena (Keil 2006).

As noted, deduction and induction have been recognized as important classes of arguments for millennia; the concept of abduction is by comparison a latecomer. It is important to notice though that explanatory arguments as such are not latecomers; indeed, Aristotle’s very conception of scientific demonstration is based on the concept of explaining causes (see entry on Aristotle ). What is recent is the conceptualization of abduction as a special class of arguments, and the term itself. The term was introduced by Peirce as a third class of inferences distinct from deduction and induction: for Peirce, abduction is understood as the process of forming explanatory hypotheses, thus leading to new ideas and concepts (whereas for him deduction and induction could not lead to new ideas or theories; see the entry on Peirce ). Thus seen, abduction pertains to contexts of discovery , in which case it is not clear that it corresponds to instances of arguments, properly speaking. In its modern meaning, however, abduction pertains to contexts of justification , and thus to speak of abductive arguments becomes appropriate. An abductive argument is now typically understood as an inference to the best explanation (Lipton 1971 [2003]), although some authors contend that there are good reasons to distinguish the two concepts (Campos 2011).

While the main ideas behind abduction may seem simple enough, cashing out more precisely how exactly abduction works is a complex matter (see entry on abduction ). Moreover, it is not clear that abductive arguments are always or even generally reliable and cogent. Humans seem to have a tendency to overshoot in their quest for causal explanations, and often look for simplicity where there is none to be found (Lombrozo 2007; but see Sober 2015 on the significance of parsimony in scientific reasoning). There are also a number of philosophical worries pertaining to the justification of abduction, especially in scientific contexts; one influential critique of abduction/inference to the best explanation is the one articulated by van Fraassen (Fraassen 1989). A frequent concern pertains to the connection between explanatory superiority and truth: are we entitled to conclude that the conclusion of an abductive argument is true solely on the basis of it being a good (or even the best) explanation for the phenomena in question? It seems that no amount of philosophical a priori theorizing will provide justification for the leap from explanatory superiority to truth. Instead, defenders of abduction tend to offer empirical arguments showing that abduction tends to be a reliable rule of inference. In this sense, abduction and induction are comparable: they are widely used, grounded in very basic human cognitive tendencies, but they give rise to a number of difficult philosophical problems.

Arguments by analogy are based on the idea that, if two things are similar, what is true of one of them is likely to be true of the other as well (see entry on analogy and analogical reasoning ). Analogical arguments are widely used across different domains of human activity, for example in legal contexts (see entry on precedent and analogy in legal reasoning ). As an example, take an argument for the wrongness of farming non-human animals for food consumption: if an alien species farmed humans for food, that would be wrong; so, by analogy, it is wrong for us humans to farm non-human animals for food. The general idea is captured in the following schema (adapted from the entry on analogy and analogical reasoning ; S is the source domain and T the target domain of the analogy):

• S is similar to T in certain (known) respects.
• S has some further feature Q .
• Therefore, T also has the feature Q , or some feature Q * similar to Q .

The first premise establishes the analogy between two situations, objects, phenomena etc. The second premise states that the source domain has a given property. The conclusion is then that the target domain also has this property, or a suitable counterpart thereof. While informative, this schema does not differentiate between good and bad analogical arguments, and so does not offer much by way of explaining what grounds (good) analogical arguments. Indeed, contentious cases usually pertain to premise 1, and in particular to whether S and T are sufficiently similar in a way that is relevant for having or not having feature Q .

Analogical arguments are widely present in all known philosophical traditions, including three major ancient traditions: Greek, Chinese, and Indian (see Historical Supplement ). Analogies abound in ancient Greek philosophical texts, for example in Plato’s dialogues. In the Gorgias , for instance, the knack of rhetoric is compared to pastry-baking—seductive but ultimately unhealthy—whereas philosophy would correspond to medicine—potentially painful and unpleasant but good for the soul/body (Irani 2017). Aristotle discussed analogy extensively in the Prior Analytics and in the Topics (see section 3.2 of the entry on analogy and analogical reasoning ). In ancient Chinese philosophy, analogy occupies a very prominent position; indeed, it is perhaps the main form of argumentation for Chinese thinkers. Mohist thinkers were particularly interested in analogical arguments (see entries on logic and language in early Chinese philosophy , Mohism and the Mohist canons ). In the Latin medieval tradition too analogy received sustained attention, in particular in the domains of logic, theology and metaphysics (see entry on medieval theories of analogy ).

Analogical arguments continue to occupy a central position in philosophical discussions, and a number of the most prominent philosophical arguments of the last decades are analogical arguments, e.g., Jarvis Thomson’s violinist argument purportedly showing the permissibility of abortion (Thomson 1971), and Searle’s Chinese Room argument purportedly showing that computers cannot display real understanding (see entry on the Chinese Room argument ). (Notice that these two arguments are often described as thought experiments [see entry on thought experiments ], but thought experiments are often based on analogical principles when seeking to make a point that transcends the thought experiment as such.) The Achilles’ heel of analogical arguments can be illustrated by these two examples: both arguments have been criticized on the grounds that the purported similarity between the source and the target domains is not sufficient to extrapolate the property of the source domain (the permissibility of disconnecting from the violinist; the absence of understanding in the Chinese room) to the target domain (abortion; digital computers and artificial intelligence).

In sum, while analogical arguments in general perhaps confer a lesser degree of conviction than the other three kinds of arguments discussed, they are widely used both in professional circles and in everyday life. They have rightly attracted a fair amount of attention from scholars in different disciplines, and remain an important object of study (see entry on analogy and analogical reasoning ).

One of the most extensively studied types of arguments throughout the centuries are, perhaps surprisingly, arguments that appear legitimate but are not, known as fallacious arguments . From early on, the investigation of such arguments occupied a prominent position in Aristotelian logical traditions, inspired in particular by his book Sophistical Refutations (see Historical Supplement ). The thought is that, to argue well, it is not sufficient to be able to produce and recognize good arguments; it is equally (or perhaps even more) important to be able to recognize bad arguments by others, and to avoid producing bad arguments oneself. This is particularly true of the tricky cases, namely arguments that appear legitimate but are not, i.e., fallacies.

Some well-know types of fallacies include (see entry on fallacies for a more extensive discussion):

• The fallacy of equivocation, which occurs when an arguer exploits the ambiguity of a term or phrase which has occurred at least twice in an argument to draw an unwarranted conclusion.
• The fallacy of begging the question, when one of the premises and the conclusion of an argument are the same proposition, but differently formulated.
• The fallacy of appeal to authority, when a claim is supported by reference to an authority instead of offering reasons to support it.
• The ad hominem fallacy, which involves bringing negative aspects of an arguer, or their situation, to argue against the view they are advancing.
• The fallacy of faulty analogy, when an analogy is used as an argument but there is not sufficient relevant similarity between the source domain and the target domain (as discussed above).

Beyond their (presumed?) usefulness in teaching argumentative skills, the literature on fallacies raises a number of important philosophical discussions, such as: What determines when an argument is fallacious or rather a legitimate argument? (See section 4.3 below on Bayesian accounts of fallacies) What causes certain arguments to be fallacious? Is the focus on fallacies a useful approach to arguments at all? (Massey 1981) Despite the occasional criticism, the concept of fallacies remains central in the study of arguments and argumentation.

3. Types of Argumentation

Just as there are different types of arguments, there are different types of argumentative situations, depending on the communicative goals of the persons involved and background conditions. Argumentation may occur when people are trying to reach consensus in a situation of dissent, but it may also occur when scientists discuss their findings with each other (to name but two examples). Specific rules of argumentative engagement may vary depending on these different types of argumentation.

A related point extensively discussed in the recent literature pertains to the function(s) of argumentation. [ 3 ] What’s the point of arguing? While it is often recognized that argumentation may have multiple functions, different authors tend to emphasize specific functions for argumentation at the expense of others. This section offers an overview of discussions on types of argumentation and its functions, demonstrating that argumentation is a multifaceted phenomenon that has different applications in different circumstances.

A question that has received much attention in the literature of the past decades pertains to whether the activity of argumentation is primarily adversarial or primarily cooperative. This question in fact corresponds to two sub-questions: the descriptive question of whether instances of argumentation are on the whole primarily adversarial or cooperative; and the normative question of whether argumentation should be (primarily) adversarial or cooperative. A number of authors have answered “adversarial” to the descriptive question and “cooperative” to the normative question, thus identifying a discrepancy between practices and normative ideals that must be remedied (or so they claim; Cohen 1995).

A case in point: recently, a number of far-right Internet personalities have advocated the idea that argumentation can be used to overpower one’s opponents, as described in the book The Art of the Argument: Western Civilization’s Last Stand (2017) by the white supremacist S. Molyneux. Such aggressive practices reflect a vision of argumentation as a kind of competition or battle, where the goal is to “score points” and “beat the opponent”. Authors who have criticized (overly) adversarial practices of argumentation include (Moulton 1983; Gilbert 1994; Rooney 2012; Hundleby 2013; Bailin & Battersby 2016). Many (but not all) of these authors formulated their criticism specifically from a feminist perspective (see entry on feminist perspectives on argumentation ).

Feminist critiques of adversarial argumentation challenge ideals of argumentation as a form of competition, where masculine-coded values of aggression and violence prevail (Kidd 2020). For these authors, such ideals encourage argumentative performances where excessive use of forcefulness is on display. Instances of aggressive argumentation in turn have a number of problematic consequences: epistemic consequences—the pursuit of truth is not best served by adversarial argumentation—as well as moral/ethical/political consequences—these practices exclude a number of people from participating in argumentative encounters, namely those for whom displays of aggression do not constitute socially acceptable behavior (women and other socially disadvantaged groups in particular). These authors defend alternative conceptions of argumentation as a cooperative, nurturing activity (Gilbert 1994; Bailin & Battersby 2016), which are traditionally feminine-coded values. Crucially, they view adversarial conceptions of argumentation as optional , maintaining that the alternatives are equally legitimate and that cooperative conceptions should be adopted and cultivated.

By contrast, others have argued that adversariality, when suitably understood, can be seen as an integral and in fact desirable component of argumentation (Govier 1999; Aikin 2011; Casey 2020; but notice that these authors each develop different accounts of adversariality in argumentation). Such authors answer “adversarial” both to the descriptive and to the normative questions stated above. One overall theme is the need to draw a distinction between (excessive) aggressiveness and adversariality as such. Govier, for example, distinguishes between ancillary (negative) adversariality and minimal adversariality (Govier 1999). The thought is that, while the feminist critique of excessive aggression in argumentation is well taken, adversariality conceived and practiced in different ways need not have the detrimental consequences of more extreme versions of belligerent argumentation. Moreover, for these authors, adversariality in argumentation is simply not optional: it is an intrinsic feature of argumentative practices, but these practices also require a background of cooperation and agreement regarding, e.g., the accepted rules of inference.

But ultimately, the presumed opposition between adversarial and cooperative conceptions of argumentation may well be merely apparent. It may be argued for example that actual argumentative encounters ought to be adversarial or cooperative to different degrees, as different types of argumentation are required for different situations (Dutilh Novaes forthcoming). Indeed, perhaps we should not look for a one-fits-all model of how argumentation ought to be conducted across different contexts and situation, given the diversity of uses of argumentation.

We speak of argumentation as an epistemic practice when we take its primary purpose to be that of improving our beliefs and increasing knowledge, or of fostering understanding. To engage in argumentation can be a way to acquire more accurate beliefs: by examining critically reasons for and against a given position, we would be able to weed out weaker, poorly justified beliefs (likely to be false) and end up with stronger, suitably justified beliefs (likely to be true). From this perspective, the goal of engaging in argumentation is to learn , i.e., to improve one’s epistemic position (as opposed to argumentation “to win” (Fisher & Keil 2016)). Indeed, argumentation is often said to be truth-conducive (Betz 2013).

The idea that argumentation can be an epistemically beneficial process is as old as philosophy itself. In every major historical philosophical tradition, argumentation is viewed as an essential component of philosophical reflection precisely because it may be used to aim at the truth (indeed this is the core of Plato’s critique of the Sophists and their excessive focus on persuasion at the expense of truth (Irani 2017; see Historical Supplement ). Recent proponents of an epistemological approach to argumentation include (Goldman 2004; Lumer 2005; Biro & Siegel 2006). Alvin Goldman captures this general idea in the following terms:

Norms of good argumentation are substantially dedicated to the promotion of truthful speech and the exposure of falsehood, whether intentional or unintentional. […] Norms of good argumentation are part of a practice to encourage the exchange of truths through sincere, non-negligent, and mutually corrective speech. (Goldman 1994: 30)

Of course, it is at least in theory possible to engage in argumentation with oneself along these lines, solitarily weighing the pros and cons of a position. But a number of philosophers, most notably John Stuart Mill, maintain that interpersonal argumentative situations, involving people who truly disagree with each other, work best to realize the epistemic potential of argumentation to improve our beliefs (a point he developed in On Liberty (1859; see entry on John Stuart Mill ). When our ideas are challenged by engagement with those who disagree with us, we are forced to consider our own beliefs more thoroughly and critically. The result is that the remaining beliefs, those that have survived critical challenge, will be better grounded than those we held before such encounters. Dissenters thus force us to stay epistemically alert instead of becoming too comfortable with existing, entrenched beliefs. On this conception, arguers cooperate with each other precisely by being adversarial, i.e., by adopting a critical stance towards the positions one disagrees with.

The view that argumentation aims at epistemic improvement is in many senses appealing, but it is doubtful that it reflects the actual outcomes of argumentation in many real-life situations. Indeed, it seems that, more often than not, we are not Millians when arguing: we do not tend to engage with dissenting opinions with an open mind. Indeed, there is quite some evidence suggesting that arguments are in fact not a very efficient means to change minds in most real-life situations (Gordon-Smith 2019). People typically do not like to change their minds about firmly entrenched beliefs, and so when confronted with arguments or evidence that contradict these beliefs, they tend to either look away or to discredit the source of the argument as unreliable (Dutilh Novaes 2020c)—a phenomenon also known as “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998).

In particular, arguments that threaten our core beliefs and our sense of belonging to a group (e.g., political beliefs) typically trigger all kinds of motivated reasoning (Taber & Lodge 2006; Kahan 2017) whereby one outright rejects those arguments without properly engaging with their content. Relatedly, when choosing among a vast supply of options, people tend to gravitate towards content and sources that confirm their existing opinions, thus giving rise to so-called “echo chambers” and “epistemic bubbles” (Nguyen 2020). Furthermore, some arguments can be deceptively convincing in that they look valid but are not (Tindale 2007; see entry on fallacies ). Because most of us are arguably not very good at spotting fallacious arguments, especially if they are arguments that lend support to the beliefs we already hold, engaging in argumentation may in fact decrease the accuracy of our beliefs by persuading us of false conclusions with incorrect arguments (Fantl 2018).

In sum, despite the optimism of Mill and many others, it seems that engaging in argumentation will not automatically improve our beliefs (even if this may occur in some circumstances). [ 4 ] However, it may still be argued that an epistemological approach to argumentation can serve the purpose of providing a normative ideal for argumentative practices, even if it is not always a descriptively accurate account of these practices in the messy real world. Moreover, at least some concrete instances of argumentation, in particular argumentation in science (see section 4.5 below) seem to offer successful examples of epistemic-oriented argumentative practices.

Another important strand in the literature on argumentation are theories that view consensus as the primary goal of argumentative processes: to eliminate or resolve a difference of (expressed) opinion. The tradition of pragma-dialectics is a prominent recent exponent of this strand (Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). These consensus-oriented approaches are motivated by the social complexity of human life, and the attribution of a role of social coordination to argumentation. Because humans are social animals who must often cooperate with other humans to successfully accomplish certain tasks, they must have mechanisms to align their beliefs and intentions, and subsequently their actions (Tomasello 2014). The thought is that argumentation would be a particularly suitable mechanism for such alignment, as an exchange of reasons would make it more likely that differences of opinion would decrease (Norman 2016). This may happen precisely because argumentation would be a good way to track truths and avoid falsehoods, as discussed in the previous section; by being involved in the same epistemic process of exchanging reasons, the participants in an argumentative situation would all come to converge towards the truth, and thus the upshot would be that they also come to agree with each other. However, consensus-oriented views need not presuppose that argumentation is truth-conducive: the ultimate goal of such instances of argumentation is that of social coordination, and for this tracking truth is not a requirement (Patterson 2011).

In particular, the very notion of deliberative democracy is viewed as resting crucially on argumentative practices that aim for consensus (Fishkin 2016; see entry on democracy ). (For present purposes, “deliberation” and “argumentation” can be treated as roughly synonymous). In a deliberative democracy, for a decision to be legitimate, it must be preceded by authentic public deliberation—a discussion of the pros and cons of the different options—not merely the aggregation of preferences that occurs in voting. Moreover, in democratic deliberation, when full consensus does not emerge, the parties involved may opt for a compromise solution, e.g., a coalition-based political system.

A prominent theorist of deliberative democracy thus understood is Jürgen Habermas, whose “discourse theory of law and democracy” relies heavily on practices of political justification and argumentation taking place in what he calls “the public sphere” (Habermas 1992 [1996]; 1981 [1984]; see entry on Habermas ). He starts from the idea that politics allows for the collective organization of people’s lives, including the common rules they will live by. Political argumentation is a form of communicative practice, so general assumptions for communicative practices in general apply. However, additional assumptions apply as well (Olson 2011 [2014]). In particular, deliberating participants must accept that anyone can participate in these discursive practices (democratic deliberation should be inclusive), and that anyone can introduce and challenge claims that are made in the public sphere (democratic deliberation should be free). They must also see one another as having equal status, at least for the purposes of deliberation (democratic deliberation should be equal). In turn, critics of Habermas’s account view it as unrealistic, as it presupposes an ideal situation where all citizens are treated equally and engage in public debates in good faith (Mouffe 1999; Geuss 2019).

More generally, it seems that it is only under quite specific conditions that argumentation reliably leads to consensus (as also suggested by formal modeling of argumentative situations (Betz 2013; Olsson 2013; Mäs & Flache 2013)). Consensus-oriented argumentation seems to work well in cooperative contexts, but not so much in situations of conflict (Dutilh Novaes forthcoming). In particular, the discussing parties must already have a significant amount of background agreement—especially agreement on what counts as a legitimate argument or compelling evidence—for argumentation and deliberation to lead to consensus. Especially in situations of deep disagreement (Fogelin 1985), it seems that the potential of argumentation to lead to consensus is quite limited. Instead, in many real-life situations, argumentation often leads to the opposite result; people disagree with each other even more after engaging in argumentation (Sunstein 2002). This is the well-documented phenomenon of group polarization , which occurs when an initial position or tendency of individual members of a group becomes more extreme after group discussion (Isenberg 1986).

In fact, it may be argued that argumentation will often create or exacerbate conflict and adversariality, rather than leading to the resolution of differences of opinions. Furthermore, a focus on consensus may end up reinforcing and perpetuating existing unequal power relations in a society.

In an unjust society, what purports to be a cooperative exchange of reasons really perpetuates patterns of oppression. (Goodwin 2007: 77)

This general point has been made by a number of political thinkers (e.g., Young 2000), who have highlighted the exclusionary implications of consensus-oriented political deliberation. The upshot is that consensus may not only be an unrealistic goal for argumentation; it may not even be a desirable goal for argumentation in a number of situations (e.g., when there is great power imbalance). Despite these concerns, the view that the primary goal of argumentation is to aim for consensus remains influential in the literature.

Finally, a number of authors have attributed to argumentation the potential to manage (pre-existing) conflict. In a sense, the consensus-oriented view of argumentation just discussed is a special case of conflict management argumentation, based on the assumption that the best way to manage conflict and disagreement is to aim for consensus and thus eliminate conflict. But conflict can be managed in different ways, not all of them leading to consensus; indeed, some authors maintain that argumentation may help mitigate conflict even when the explicit aim is not that of reaching consensus. Importantly, authors who identify conflict management (or variations thereof) as a function for argumentation differ in their overall appreciation of the value of argumentation: some take it to be at best futile and at worst destructive, [ 5 ] while others attribute a more positive role to argumentation in conflict management.

To this category also belong the conceptualizations of argumentation-as-war discussed (and criticized) by a number of authors (Cohen 1995; Bailin & Battersby 2016); in such cases, conflict is not so much managed but rather enacted (and possibly exacerbated) by means of argumentation. Thus seen, the function of argumentation would not be fundamentally different from the function of organized competitive activities such as sports or even war (with suitable rules of engagement; Aikin 2011).

When conflict emerges, people have various options: they may choose not to engage and instead prefer to flee; they may go into full-blown fighting mode, which may include physical aggression; or they may opt for approaches somewhere in between the fight-or-flee extremes of the spectrum. Argumentation can be plausibly classified as an intermediary response:

[A]rgument literally is a form of pacifism—we are using words instead of swords to settle our disputes. With argument, we settle our disputes in ways that are most respectful of those who disagree—we do not buy them off, we do not threaten them, and we do not beat them into submission. Instead, we give them reasons that bear on the truth or falsity of their beliefs. However adversarial argument may be, it isn’t bombing. […] argument is a pacifistic replacement for truly violent solutions to disagreements…. (Aikin 2011: 256)

This is not to say that argumentation will always or even typically be the best approach to handle conflict and disagreement; the point is rather that argumentation at least has the potential to do so, provided that the background conditions are suitable and that provisions to mitigate escalation are in place (Aikin 2011). Versions of this view can be found in the work of proponents of agonistic conceptions of democracy and political deliberation (Wenman 2013; see entry on feminist political philosophy ). For agonist thinkers, conflict and strife are inevitable features of human lives, and so cannot be eliminated; but they can be managed. One of them is Chantal Mouffe (Mouffe 2000), for whom democratic practices, including argumentation/deliberation, can serve to contain hostility and transform it into more constructive forms of contest. However, it is far from obvious that argumentation by itself will suffice to manage conflict; typically, other kinds of intervention must be involved (Young 2000), as the risk of argumentation being used to exercise power rather than as a tool to manage conflict always looms large (van Laar & Krabbe 2019).

From these observations on different types of argumentation, a pluralistic picture emerges: argumentation, understood as the exchange of reasons to justify claims, seems to have different applications in different situations. However, it is not clear that some of the goals often attributed to argumentation such as epistemic improvement and reaching consensus can in fact be reliably achieved in many real life situations. Does this mean that argumentation is useless and futile? Not necessarily, but it may mean that engaging in argumentation will not always be the optimal response in a number of contexts.

4. Argumentation Across Fields of Inquiry and Social Practices

Argumentation is practiced and studied in many fields of inquiry; philosophers interested in argumentation have much to benefit from engaging with these bodies of research as well.

To understand the emergence of argumentation theory as a specific field of research in the twentieth century, a brief discussion of preceding events is necessary. In the nineteenth century, a number of textbooks aiming to improve everyday reasoning via public education emphasized logical and rhetorical concerns, such as those by Richard Whately (see entry on fallacies ). As noted in section 3.2 , John Stuart Mill also had a keen interest in argumentation and its role in public discourse (Mill 1859), as well as an interest in logic and reasoning (see entries on Mill and on fallacies ). But with the advent of mathematical logic in the final decades of the nineteenth century, logic and the study of ordinary, everyday argumentation came apart, as logicians such as Frege, Hilbert, Russell etc. were primarily interested in mathematical reasoning and argumentation. As a result, their logical systems are not particularly suitable to study everyday argumentation, as this is simply not what they were designed to do. [ 6 ]

Nevertheless, in the twentieth century a number of authors took inspiration from developments in formal logic and expanded the use of logical tools to the analysis of ordinary argumentation. A pioneer in this tradition is Susan Stebbing, who wrote what can be seen as the first textbook in analytic philosophy, and then went on to write a number of books aimed at a general audience addressing everyday and public discourse from a philosophical/logical perspective (see entry on Susan Stebbing ). Her 1939 book Thinking to Some Purpose , which can be considered as one of the first textbooks in critical thinking, was widely read at the time, but did not become particularly influential for the development of argumentation theory in the decades to follow.

By contrast, Stephen Toulmin’s 1958 book The Uses of Argument has been tremendously influential in a wide range of fields, including critical thinking education, rhetoric, speech communication, and computer science (perhaps even more so than in Toulmin’s own original field, philosophy). Toulmin’s aim was to criticize the assumption (widely held by Anglo-American philosophers at the time) that any significant argument can be formulated in purely formal, deductive terms, using the formal logical systems that had emerged in the preceding decades (see (Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 4). While this critique was met with much hostility among fellow philosophers, it eventually gave rise to an alternative way of approaching argumentation, which is often described as “informal logic” (see entry on informal logic ). This approach seeks to engage and analyze instances of argumentation in everyday life; it recognizes that, while useful, the tools of deductive logic alone do not suffice to investigate argumentation in all its complexity and pragmatic import. In a similar vein, Charles Hamblin’s 1970 book Fallacies reinvigorated the study of fallacies in the context of argumentation by re-emphasizing (following Aristotle) the importance of a dialectical-dialogical background when reflecting on fallacies in argumentation (see entry on fallacies ).

Around the same time as Toulmin, Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca were developing an approach to argumentation that emphasized its persuasive component. To this end, they turned to classical theories of rhetoric, and adapted them to give rise to what they described as the “New Rhetoric”. Their book Traité de l’argumentation: La nouvelle rhétorique was published in 1958 in French, and translated into English in 1969. Its key idea:

since argumentation aims at securing the adherence of those to whom it is addressed, it is, in its entirety, relative to the audience to be influenced. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958 [1969: 19])

They introduced the influential distinction between universal and particular audiences: while every argument is directed at a specific individual or group, the concept of a universal audience serves as a normative ideal encapsulating shared standards of agreement on what counts as legitimate argumentation (see Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 5).

The work of these pioneers provided the foundations for subsequent research in argumentation theory. One approach that became influential in the following decades is the pragma-dialectics tradition developed by Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, 2004). They also founded the journal Argumentation , one of the flagship journals in argumentation theory. Pragma-dialectics was developed to study argumentation as a discourse activity, a complex speech act that occurs as part of interactional linguistic activities with specific communicative goals (“pragma” refers to the functional perspective of goals, and “dialectic” to the interactive component). For these authors, argumentative discourse is primarily directed at the reasonable resolution of a difference of opinion. Pragma-dialectics has a descriptive as well as a normative component, thus offering tools both for the analysis of concrete instances of argumentation and for the evaluation of argumentation correctness and success (see Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 10).

Another leading author in argumentation theory is Douglas Walton, who pioneered the argument schemes approach to argumentation that borrows tools from formal logic but expands them so as to treat a wider range of arguments than those covered by traditional logical systems (Walton, Reed, & Macagno 2008). Walton also formulated an influential account of argumentation in dialogue in collaboration with Erik Krabbe (Walton & Krabbe 1995). Ralph Johnson and Anthony Blair further helped to consolidate the field of argumentation theory and informal logic by founding the Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation, and Rhetoric in Windsor (Ontario, Canada), and by initiating the journal Informal Logic . Their textbook Logical Self-Defense (Johnson & Blair 1977) has also been particularly influential.

The study of argumentation within computer science and artificial intelligence is a thriving field of research, with dedicated journals such as Argument and Computation and regular conference series such as COMMA (International Conference on Computational Models of Argument; see Rahwan & Simari 2009 and Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 11 for overviews).

The historical roots of argumentation research in artificial intelligence can be traced back to work on non-monotonic logics (see entry on non-monotonic logics ) and defeasible reasoning (see entry on defeasible reasoning ). Since then, three main different perspectives have emerged (Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: ch. 11): the theoretical systems perspective, where the focus is on theoretical and formal models of argumentation (following the tradition of philosophical and formal logic); the artificial systems perspective, where the aim is to build computer programs that model or support argumentative tasks, for instance, in online dialogue games or in expert systems; the natural systems perspective, which investigates argumentation in its natural form with the help of computational tools (e.g., argumentation mining [Peldszus & Stede 2013; Habernal & Gurevych 2017], where computational methods are used to identify argumentative structures in large corpora of texts).

An influential approach in this research tradition is that of abstract argumentation frameworks , initiated by the pioneering work of Dung (1995). Before that, argumentation in AI was studied mostly under the inspiration of concepts coming from informal logic such as argumentation schemes, context, stages of dialogues and argument moves. By contrast, the key notion in the framework proposed by Dung is that of argument attack , understood as an abstract formal relation roughly intended to capture the idea that it is possible to challenge an argument by means of another argument (assertions are understood as a special case of arguments with zero premises). Arguments can then be represented in networks of attacks and defenses: an argument A can attack an argument B , and B in turn may attack further arguments C and D (the connection with the notion of defeaters is a natural one, which Dung also addresses).

Besides abstract argumentation, three other important lines of research in AI are: the (internal) structure of arguments; argumentation in multi-agent systems; applications to specific tasks and domains (Rahwan & Siwari 2009). The structural approach investigates formally features such as argument strength/force (e.g., a conclusive argument is stronger than a defeasible argument), argument schemes (Bex, Prakken, Reed, & Walton 2003) etc. Argumentation in multi-agent systems is a thriving subfield with its own dedicated conference series (ArgMAS), based on the recognition that argumentation is a particularly suitable vehicle to facilitate interaction in the artificial environments studied by AI researchers working on multi-agent systems (see a special issue of the journal Argument & Computation [Atkinson, Cerutti, et al. 2016]). Finally, computational approaches in argumentation have also thrived with respect to specific domains and applications, such as legal argumentation (Prakken & Sartor 2015). Recently, as a reaction to the machine-learning paradigm, the idea of explainable AI has gotten traction, and the concept of argumentation is thought to play a fundamental role for explainable AI (Sklar & Azhar 2018).

Argumentation is also an important topic of investigation within cognitive science and psychology. Researchers in these fields are predominantly interested in the descriptive question of how people in fact engage in argumentation, rather than in the normative question of how they ought to do it (although some of them have also drawn normative conclusions, e.g., Hahn & Oaksford 2006; Hahn & Hornikx, 2016). Controlled experiments are one of the ways in which the descriptive question can be investigated.

Systematic research specifically on argumentation within cognitive science and psychology has significantly increased over the last 10 years. Before that, there had been extensive research on reasoning conceived as an individual, internal process, much of which had been conducted using task materials such as syllogistic arguments (Dutilh Novaes 2020b). But due to what may be described as an individualist bias in cognitive science and psychology (Mercier 2018), these researchers did not draw explicit connections between their findings and the public acts of “giving and asking for reasons”. It is only somewhat recently that argumentation began to receive sustained attention from these researchers. The investigations of Hugo Mercier and colleagues (Mercier & Sperber 2017; Mercier 2018) and of Ulrike Hahn and colleagues (Hahn & Oaksford 2007; Hornikx & Hahn 2012; Collins & Hahn 2018) have been particularly influential. (See also Paglieri, Bonelli, & Felletti 2016, an edited volume containing a representative overview of research on the psychology of argumentation.) Another interesting line of research has been the study of the development of reasoning and argumentative skills in young children (Köymen, Mammen, & Tomasello 2016; Köymen & Tomasello 2020).

Mercier and Sperber defend an interactionist account of reasoning, according to which the primary function of reasoning is for social interactions, where reasons are exchanged and receivers of reasons decide whether they find them convincing—in other words, for argumentation (Mercier & Sperber 2017). They review a wealth of evidence suggesting that reasoning is rather flawed when it comes to drawing conclusions from premises in order to expand one’s knowledge. From this they conclude, on the basis of evolutionary arguments, that the function of reasoning must be a different one, indeed one that responds to features of human sociality and the need to exercise epistemic vigilance when receiving information from others. This account has inaugurated a rich research program which they have been pursuing with colleagues for over a decade now, and which has delivered some interesting results—for example, that we seem to be better at evaluating the quality of arguments proposed by others than at formulating high-quality arguments ourselves (Mercier 2018).

In the context of the Bayesian (see entry on Bayes’ theorem ) approach to reasoning that was first developed by Mike Oaksford and Nick Chater in the 1980s (Oaksford & Chater 2018), Hahn and colleagues have extended the Bayesian framework to the investigation of argumentation. They claim that Bayesian probabilities offer an accurate descriptive model of how people evaluate the strength of arguments (Hahn & Oaksford 2007) as well as a solid perspective to address normative questions pertaining to argument strength (Hahn & Oaksford 2006; Hahn & Hornikx 2016). The Bayesian approach allows for the formulation of probabilistic measures of argument strength, showing that many so-called “fallacies” may nevertheless be good arguments in the sense that they considerably raise the probability of the conclusion. For example, deductively invalid argument schemes (such as affirming the consequent (AC) and denying the antecedent (DA)) can also provide considerable support for a conclusion, depending on the contents in question. The extent to which this is the case depends primarily on the specific informational context, captured by the prior probability distribution, not on the structure of the argument. This means that some instances of, say, AC, may offer support to a conclusion while others may fail to do so (Eva & Hartmann 2018). Thus seen, Bayesian argumentation represents a significantly different approach to argumentation from those inspired by logic (e.g., argument schemes), but they are not necessarily incompatible; they may well be complementary perspectives (see also [Zenker 2013]).

Argumentation is primarily (though not exclusively) a linguistic phenomenon. Accordingly, argumentation is extensively studied in fields dedicated to the study of language, such as rhetoric, linguistics, discourse analysis, communication, and pragmatics, among others (see Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: chs 8 and 9). Researchers in these areas develop general theoretical models of argumentation and investigate concrete instances of argumentation in specific domains on the basis of linguistic corpora, discourse analysis, and other methods used in the language sciences (see the edited volume Oswald, Herman, & Jacquin [2018] for a sample of the different lines of research). Overall, research on argumentation within the language sciences tends to focus primarily on concrete occurrences of arguments in a variety of domains, adopting a largely descriptive rather than normative perspective (though some of these researchers also tackle normative considerations).

Some of these analyses approach arguments and argumentation primarily as text or self-contained speeches, while others emphasize the interpersonal, communicative nature of “face-to-face” argumentation (see Eemeren, Garssen, et al. 2014: section 8.9). One prominent approach in this tradition is due to communication scholars Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs. They have drawn on speech act theory and conversation analysis to investigate argumentation as a disagreement-relevant expansion of speech acts that, through mutually recognized reasons, allows us to manage disagreements despite the challenges they pose for communication and coordination of activities (Jackson & Jacobs 1980; Jackson 2019). Moreover, they perceive institutionalized practices of argumentation and concrete “argumentation designs”—such as for example randomized controlled trials in medicine—as interventions aimed at improving methods of disagreement management through argumentation.

Another communication scholar, Dale Hample, has further argued for the importance of approaching argumentation as an essentially interpersonal communicative activity (Hample 2006, 2018). This perspective allows for the consideration of a broader range of factors, not only the arguments themselves but also (and primarily) the people involved in those processes: their motivations, psychological processes, and emotions. It also allows for the formulation of questions pertaining to individual as well as cultural differences in argumentative styles (see section 5.3 below).

Another illuminating perspective views argumentative practices as inherently tied to broader socio-cultural contexts (Amossy 2009). The Journal of Argumentation in Context was founded in 2012 precisely to promote a contextual approach to argumentation. Once argumentation is no longer only considered in abstraction from concrete instances taking place in real-life situations, it becomes imperative to recognize that argumentation does not take place in a vacuum; typically, argumentative practices are embedded in other kinds of practices and institutions, against the background of specific socio-cultural, political structures. The method of discourse analysis is particularly suitable for a broader perspective on argumentation, as shown by the work of Ruth Amossy (2002) and Marianne Doury (2009), among others.

Argumentation is crucial in a number of specific organized social practices, in particular in politics, science, law, and education. The relevant argumentative practices are studied in each of the corresponding knowledge domains; indeed, while some general principles may govern argumentative practices across the board, some may be specific to particular applications and domains.

As already mentioned, argumentation is typically viewed as an essential component of political democratic practices, and as such it is of great interest to political scientists and political theorists (Habermas 1992 [1996]; Young 2000; Landemore 2013; Fishkin 2016; see entry on democracy ). (The term typically used in this context is “deliberation” instead of “argumentation”, but these can be viewed as roughly synonymous for our purposes.) General theories of argumentation such as pragma-dialectic and the Toulmin model can be applied to political argumentation with illuminating results (Wodak 2016; Mohammed 2016). More generally, political discourse seems to have a strong argumentative component, in particular if argumentation is understood more broadly as not only pertaining to rational discourse ( logos ) but as also including what rhetoricians refer to as pathos and ethos (Zarefsky 2014; Amossy 2018). But critics of argumentation and deliberation in political contexts also point out the limitations of the classical deliberative model (Sanders 1997; Talisse 2019).

Moreover, scientific communities seem to offer good examples of (largely) well-functioning argumentative practices. These are disciplined systems of collective epistemic activity, with tacit but widely endorsed norms for argumentative engagement for each domain (which does not mean that there are not disagreements on these very norms). The case of mathematics has already been mentioned above: practices of mathematical proof are quite naturally understood as argumentative practices (Dutilh Novaes 2020a). Furthermore, when a scientist presents a new scientific claim, it must be backed by arguments and evidence that her peers are likely to find convincing, as they follow from the application of widely agreed-upon scientific methods (Longino 1990; Weinstein 1990; Rehg 2008; see entry on the social dimensions of scientific knowledge ). Other scientists will in turn critically examine the evidence and arguments provided, and will voice objections or concerns if they find aspects of the theory to be insufficiently convincing. Thus seen, science may be viewed as a “game of giving and asking for reasons” (Zamora Bonilla 2006). Certain features of scientific argumentation seem to ensure its success: scientists see other scientists as prima facie peers, and so (typically at least) place a fair amount of trust in other scientists by default; science is based on the principle of “organized skepticism” (a term introduced by the pioneer sociologist of science Robert Merton [Merton, 1942]), which means that asking for further reasons should not be perceived as a personal attack. These are arguably aspects that distinguish argumentation in science from argumentation in other domains in virtue of these institutional factors (Mercier & Heintz 2014). But ultimately, scientists are part of society as a whole, and thus the question of how scientific and political argumentation intersect becomes particularly relevant (Kitcher 2001).

Another area where argumentation is essential is the law, which also corresponds to disciplined systems of collective activity with rules and principles for what counts as acceptable arguments and evidence. legal reasoning ).--> In litigation (in particular in adversarial justice systems), there are typically two sides disagreeing on what is lawful or just, and the basic idea is that each side will present its strongest arguments; it is the comparison between the two sets of arguments that should lead to the best judgment (Walton 2002). Legal reasoning and argumentation have been extensively studied within jurisprudence for decades, in particular since Ronald Dworkin’s (1977) and Neil MacCormick’s (1978) responses to HLA Hart’s highly influential The Concept of Law (1961). A number of other views and approaches have been developed, in particular from the perspectives of natural law theory, legal positivism, common law, and rhetoric (see Feteris 2017 for an overview). Overall, legal argumentation is characterized by extensive uses of analogies (Lamond 2014), abduction (Askeland 2020), and defeasible/non-monotonic reasoning (Bex & Verheij 2013). An interesting question is whether argumentation in law is fundamentally different from argumentation in other domains, or whether it follows the same overall canons and norms but applied to legal topics (Raz 2001).

Finally, the development of argumentative skills is arguably a fundamental aspect of (formal) education (Muller Mirza & Perret-Clermont 2009). Ideally, when presented with arguments, a learner should not simply accept what is being said at face value, but should instead reflect on the reasons offered and come to her own conclusions. Argumentation thus fosters independent, critical thinking, which is viewed as an important goal for education (Siegel 1995; see entry on critical thinking ). A number of education theorists and developmental psychologists have empirically investigated the effects of emphasizing argumentative skills in educational settings, with encouraging results (Kuhn & Crowell 2011). There has been in particular much emphasis on argumentation specifically in science education, based on the assumption that argumentation is a key component of scientific practice (as noted above); the thought is that this feature of scientific practice should be reflected in science education (Driver, Newton, & Osborne 2000; Erduran & Jiménez-Aleixandre 2007).

5. Further Topics

Argumentation is a multi-faceted phenomenon, and the literature on arguments and argumentation is massive and varied. This entry can only scratch the surface of the richness of this material, and many interesting, relevant topics must be left out for reasons of space. In this final section, a selection of topics that are likely to attract considerable interest in future research are discussed.

In recent years, the concept of epistemic injustice has received much attention among philosophers (Fricker 2007; McKinnon 2016). Epistemic injustice occurs when a person is unfairly treated qua knower on the basis of prejudices pertaining to social categories such as gender, race, class, ability etc. (see entry on feminist epistemology and philosophy of science ). One of the main categories of epistemic injustice discussed in the literature pertains to testimony and is known as testimonial injustice : this occurs when a testifier is not given a degree of credibility commensurate to their actual expertise on the relevant topic, as a result of prejudice. (Whether credibility excess is also a form of testimonial injustice is a moot point in the literature [Medina 2011].)

Since argumentation can be viewed as an important mechanism for sharing knowledge and information, i.e., as having significant epistemic import (Goldman 2004), the question arises whether there might be instances of epistemic injustice pertaining specifically to argumentation, which may be described as argumentative injustice , and which would be notably different from other recognized forms of epistemic injustice such as testimonial injustice. Bondy (Bondy 2010) presented a first articulation of the notion of argumentative injustice, modeled after Fricker’s notion of epistemic injustice and relying on a broadly epistemological conception of argumentation. However, Bondy’s analysis does not take into account some of the structural elements that have become central to the analysis of epistemic injustice since Fricker’s influential work, so it seems further discussion of epistemic injustice in argumentation is still needed. For example, in situations of disagreement, epistemic injustice can give rise to further obstacles to rational argumentation, leading to deep disagreement (Lagewaard 2021).

Moreover, as often noted by critics of adversarial approaches, argumentation can also be used as an instrument of domination and oppression used to overpower and denigrate an interlocutor (Nozick 1981), especially an interlocutor of “lower” status in the context in question (Moulton 1983; see entry on feminist approaches to argumentation ). From this perspective, it is clear that argumentation may also be used to reinforce and exacerbate injustice, inequalities and power differentials (Goodwin 2007). Given this possibility, and in response to the perennial risk of excessive aggressiveness in argumentative situations, a normative account of how argumentation ought to be conducted so as to avoid these problematic outcomes seem to be required.

One such approach is virtue argumentation theory . Drawing on virtue ethics and virtue epistemology (see entries on virtue ethics and virtue epistemology ), virtue argumentation theory seeks to theorize how to argue well in terms of the dispositions and character of arguers rather than, for example, in terms of properties of arguments considered in abstraction from arguers (Aberdein & Cohen 2016). Some of the argumentative virtues identified in the literature are: willingness to listen to others (Cohen 2019), willingness to take a novel viewpoint seriously (Kwong 2016), humility (Kidd 2016), and open-mindedness (Tanesini 2020).

By the same token, defective argumentation is conceptualized not (only) in terms of structural properties of arguments (e.g., fallacious argument patterns), but in terms of the vices displayed by arguers such as arrogance and narrow-mindedness, among others (Aberdein 2016). Virtue argumentation theory now constitutes a vibrant research program, as attested by a special issue of Topoi dedicated to the topic (see [Aberdein & Cohen 2016] for its Introduction). It allows for a reconceptualization of classical themes within argumentation theory while also promising to provide concrete recommendations on how to argue better. Whether it can fully counter the risk of epistemic injustice and oppressive uses of argumentation is however debatable, at least as long as broader structural factors related to power dynamics are not sufficiently taken into account (Kukla 2014).

On some idealized construals, argumentation is conceived as a purely rational, emotionless endeavor. But the strong connection between argumentative activities and emotional responses has also long been recognized (in particular in rhetorical analyses of argumentation), and more recently has become the object of extensive research (Walton 1992; Gilbert 2004; Hample 2006: ch. 5). Importantly, the recognition of a role for emotions in argumentation does not entail a complete rejection of the “rationality” of argumentation; rather, it is based on the rejection of a strict dichotomy between reason and emotion (see entry on emotion ), and on a more encompassing conception of argumentation as a multi-layered human activity.

Rather than dispassionate exchanges of reasons, instances of argumentation typically start against the background of existing emotional relations, and give rise to further affective responses—often, though not necessarily, negative responses of aggression and hostility. Indeed, it has been noted that, by itself, argumentation can give rise to conflict and friction where there was none to be found prior to the argumentative engagement (Aikin 2011). This occurs in particular because critical engagement and requests for reasons are at odds with default norms of credulity in most mundane dialogical interactions, thus creating a perception of antagonism. But argumentation may also give rise to positive affective responses if the focus is on coalescence and cooperation rather than on hostility (Gilbert 1997).

The descriptive claim that instances of argumentation are typically emotionally charged is not particularly controversial, though it deserves to be further investigated; the details of affective responses during instances of argumentation and how to deal with them are non-trivial (Krabbe & van Laar 2015). What is potentially more controversial is the normative claim that instances of argumentation may or should be emotionally charged, i.e., that emotions may or ought to be involved in argumentative processes, even if it may be necessary to regulate them in such situations rather than giving them free rein (González, Gómez, & Lemos 2019). The significance of emotions for persuasion has been recognized for millennia (see entry on Aristotle’s rhetoric ), but more recently it has become clear that emotions also have a fundamental role to play for choices of what to focus on and what to care about (Sinhababu 2017). This general point seems to apply to instances of argumentation as well. For example, Howes and Hundleby (Howes & Hundleby 2018) argue that, contrary to what is often thought, anger can in fact make a positive contribution to argumentative encounters. Indeed, anger may have an important epistemological role in such encounters by drawing attention to relevant premises and information that may otherwise go unnoticed. (They recognize that anger may also derail argumentation when the encounter becomes a full-on confrontation.)

In sum, the study of the role of emotions for argumentation, both descriptively and normatively speaking, has attracted the interest of a number of scholars, traditionally in connection with rhetoric and more recently also from the perspective of argumentation as interpersonal communication (Hample 2006). And yet, much work remains to be done on the significance of emotions for argumentation, in particular given that the view that argumentation should be a purely rational, dispassionate endeavor remains widely (even if tacitly) endorsed.

Once we adopt the perspective of argumentation as a communicative practice, the question of the influence of cultural factors on argumentative practices naturally arises. Is there significant variability in how people engage in argumentation depending on their sociocultural backgrounds? Or is argumentation largely the same phenomenon across different cultures? Actually, we may even ask ourselves whether argumentation in fact occurs in all human cultures, or whether it is the product of specific, contingent background conditions, thus not being a human universal. For comparison: it had long been assumed that practices of counting were present in all human cultures, even if with different degrees of complexity. But in recent decades it has been shown that some cultures do not engage systematically in practices of counting and basic arithmetic at all, such as the Pirahã in the Amazon (Gordon 2004; see entry on culture and cognitive science ). By analogy, it seems that the purported universality of argumentative practices should not be taken for granted, but rather be treated as a legitimate empirical question. (Incidentally, there is some anecdotal evidence that the Pirahã themselves engage in argumentative exchanges [Everett 2008], but to date their argumentative skills have not been investigated systematically, as is the case with their numerical skills.)

Of course, how widespread argumentative practices will be also depends on how the concept of “argumentative practices” is defined and operationalized in the first place. If it is narrowly defined as corresponding to regimented practices of reason-giving requiring clear markers and explicit criteria for what counts as premises, conclusions and relations of support between them, then argumentation may well be restricted to cultures and subcultures where such practices have been explicitly codified. By contrast, if argumentation is defined more loosely, then a wider range of communicative practices will be considered as instances of argumentation, and thus presumably more cultures will be found to engage in (what is thus viewed as) argumentation. This means that the spread of argumentative practices across cultures is not only an empirical question; it also requires significant conceptual input to be addressed.

But if (as appears to be the case) argumentation is not a strictly WEIRD phenomenon, restricted to Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan 2010), then the issue of cross-cultural variability in argumentative practices gives rise to a host of research questions, again both at the descriptive and at the normative level. Indeed, even if at the descriptive level considerable variability in argumentative practices is identified, the normative question of whether there should be universally valid canons for argumentation, or instead specific norms for specific contexts, remains pressing. At the descriptive level, a number of researchers have investigated argumentative practices in different WEIRD as well as non-WEIRD cultures, also addressing questions of cultural variability (Hornikx & Hoeken 2007; Hornikx & de Best 2011).

A foundational work in this context is Edwin Hutchins’ 1980 book Culture and Inference , a study of the Trobriand Islanders’ system of land tenure in Papua New Guinea (Hutchins 1980). While presented as a study of inference and reasoning among the Trobriand Islanders, what Hutchins in fact investigated were instances of legal argumentation in land courts by means of ethnographic observation and interviews with litigants. This led to the formulation of a set of twelve basic propositions codifying knowledge about land tenure, as well as transfer formulas governing how this knowledge can be applied to new disputes. Hutchins’ analysis showed that the Trobriand Islanders had a sophisticated argumentation system to resolve issues pertaining to land tenure, in many senses resembling argumentation and reasoning in so-called WEIRD societies in that it seemed to recognize as valid simple logical structures such as modus ponens and modus tollens .

More recently, Hugo Mercier and colleagues have been conducting studies in countries such as Japan (Mercier, Deguchi, Van der Henst, & Yama 2016) and Guatemala (Castelain, Girotto, Jamet, & Mercier 2016). While recognizing the significance and interest of cultural differences (Mercier 2013), Mercier maintains that argumentation is a human universal, as argumentative capacities and tendencies are a result of natural selection, genetically encoded in human cognition (Mercier 2011; Mercier & Sperber 2017). He takes the results of the cross-cultural studies conducted so far as confirming the universality of argumentation, even considering cultural differences (Mercier 2018).

Another scholar who has been carrying out an extensive research program on cultural differences in argumentation is communication theorist Dale Hample. With different sets of colleagues, he has conducted studies by means of surveys where participants (typically, university undergraduates) self-report on their argumentative practices in countries such as China, Japan, Turkey, Chile, the Netherlands, Portugal, the United States (among others; Hample 2018: ch. 7). His results overall show a number of similarities, which may be partially explained by the specific demographic (university students) from which participants are usually recruited. But interesting differences have also been identified, for example different levels of willingness to engage in argumentative encounters.

In a recent book (Tindale 2021), philosopher Chris Tindale adopts an anthropological perspective to investigate how argumentative practices emerge from the experiences of peoples with diverse backgrounds. He emphasizes the argumentative roles of place, orality, myth, narrative, and audience, also assessing the impacts of colonialism on the study of argumentation. Tindale reviews a wealth of anthropological and ethnographic studies on argumentative practices in different cultures, thus providing what is to date perhaps the most comprehensive study on argumentation from an anthropological perspective.

On the whole, the study of differences and commonalities in argumentative practices across cultures is an established line of research on argumentation, but arguably much work remains to be done to investigate these complex phenomena more thoroughly.

So far we have not yet considered the question of the different media through which argumentation can take place. Naturally, argumentation can unfold orally in face-to-face encounters—discussions in parliament, political debates, in a court of law—as well as in writing—in scientific articles, on the Internet, in newspaper editorials. Moreover, it can happen synchronically, with real-time exchanges of reasons, or asynchronically. While it is reasonable to expect that there will be some commonalities across these different media and environments, it is also plausible that specific features of different environments may significantly influence how argumentation is conducted: different environments present different kinds of affordances for arguers (Halpern & Gibbs 2013; Weger & Aakhus 2003; see entry on embodied cognition for the concept of affordance). Indeed, if the Internet represents a fundamentally novel cognitive ecology (Smart, Heersmink, & Clowes 2017), then it will likely give rise to different forms of argumentative engagement (Lewiński 2010). Whether these new forms will represent progress (according to some suitable metric) is however a moot point.

In the early days of the Internet in the 1990s, there was much hope that online spaces would finally realize the Habermasian ideal of a public sphere for political deliberation (Hindman 2009). The Internet was supposed to act as the great equalizer in the worldwide marketplace of ideas, finally attaining the Millian ideal of free exchange of ideas (Mill 1859). Online, everyone’s voice would have an equal chance of being heard, everyone could contribute to the conversation, and everyone could simultaneously be a journalist, news consumer, engaged citizen, advocate, and activist.

A few decades later, these hopes have not really materialized. It is probably true that most people now argue more —in social media, blogs, chat rooms, discussion boards etc.—but it is much less obvious that they argue better . Indeed, rather than enhancing democratic ideals, some have gone as far as claiming that instead, the Internet is “killing democracy” (Bartlett 2018). There is very little oversight when it comes to the spreading of propaganda and disinformation online (Benkler, Faris, & Roberts 2018), which means that citizens are often being fed faulty information and arguments. Moreover, it seems that online environments may lead to increased polarization when polemic topics are being discussed (Yardi & Boyd 2010), and to “intellectual arrogance” (Lynch 2019). Some have argued that online discussions lead to more overly emotional engagement when compared to other forms of debate (Kramer, Guillory, & Hancock 2014). But not everyone is convinced that the Internet has only made things worse when it comes to argumentation, or in any case that it cannot be suitably redesigned so as to foster rather than destroy democratic ideals and deliberation (Sunstein 2017).

Be that as it may, the Internet is here to stay, and online argumentation is a pervasive phenomenon that argumentation theorists have been studying and will continue to study for years to come. In fact, if anything, online argumentation is now more often investigated empirically than other forms of argumentation, among other reasons thanks to the development of argument mining techniques (see section 4.2 above) which greatly facilitate the study of large corpora of textual material such as those produced by online discussions. Beyond the very numerous specific case studies available in the literature, there have been also attempts to reflect on the phenomenon of online argumentation in general, for example in journal special issues dedicated to argumentation in digital media such as in Argumentation and Advocacy (Volume 47(2), 2010) and Philosophy & Technology (Volume 30(2), 2017). However, a systematic analysis of online argumentation and how it differs from other forms of argumentation remains to be produced.

Argument and argumentation are multifaceted phenomena that have attracted the interest of philosophers as well as scholars in other fields for millennia, and continue to be studied extensively in various domains. This entry presents an overview of the main strands in these discussions, while acknowledging the impossibility of fully doing justice to the enormous literature on the topic. But the literature references below should at least provide a useful starting point for the interested reader.

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• –––, 1997, Coalescent Argumentation , Mahwah, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates.
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• Prets, Ernst, 2001, “Futile and False Rejoinders, Sophistical Arguments and Early Indian Logic”, Journal of Indian Philosophy , 29(5/6): 545–558. doi:10.1023/A:1013894810880
• Siderits, Mark, 2003, “Deductive, Inductive, Both or Neither?”, Journal of Indian Philosophy , 31(1/3): 303–321. doi:10.1023/A:1024691426770
• Solomon, Esther Abraham, 1976, Indian Dialectics: Methods of Philosophical Discussion , Ahmedabad: B.J. Institute of Learning and Research.
• Taber, John A., 2004, “Is Indian Logic Nonmonotonic?”, Philosophy East and West , 54(2): 143–170. doi:10.1353/pew.2004.0009
• Wolfsdorf, David, 2013, “Socratic Philosophizing”, in The Bloomsbury Companion to Socrates , John Bussanich and Nicholas D. Smith (eds.), London; New York: Continuum, pp. 34–67.
• Young, Walter Edward, 2017, The Dialectical Forge , (Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning 9), Cham: Springer International Publishing. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-25522-4

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Merel Talbi, Elias Anttila, César dos Santos, Hein Duijf, Silvia Ivani, Caglar Dede, Colin Rittberg, Marcin Lewiński, Andrew Aberdein, Malcolm Keating, Maksymillian Del Mar, and an anonymous referee for suggestions and/or comments on earlier drafts. This research was supported by H2020 European Research Council [771074-SEA].

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Module 10: Persuasive Speaking

Structure of a persuasive speech, learning objectives.

Identify characteristic structures of a persuasive speech.

In many ways, a persuasive speech is structured like an informative speech. It has an introduction with an attention-getter and a clear thesis statement. It also has a body where the speaker presents their main points and it ends with a conclusion that sums up the main point of the speech.

The biggest difference is that the primary purpose of an informative speech is to explain whereas the primary purpose of a persuasive speech is to advocate the audience adopt a point of view or take a course of action. A persuasive speech, in other words, is an argument  supported by well-thought-out reasons and relevant, appropriate, and credible supporting evidence.

We can classify persuasive speeches into three broad categories:

• The widely used pesticide Atrazine is extremely harmful to amphibians.
• All house-cats should  be kept indoors to protect the songbird population.
• Offshore tax havens, while legal, are immoral and unpatriotic .

The organizational pattern we select and the type of supporting material we use should support the overall argument we are making.

The informative speech organizational patterns we covered earlier can work for a persuasive speech as well. In addition, the following organization patterns are especially suited to persuasive speeches (these are covered in more detail in Module 6: Organizing and Outlining Your Speech):

• Causal : Also known as cause-effect, the causal pattern describes some cause and then identifies what effects resulted from the cause. This can be a useful pattern to use when you are speaking about the positive or negative consequences of taking a particular action.
• Problem-solution : With this organizational pattern, you provide two main points. The first main point focuses on a problem that exists and the second details your proposed solution to the problem. This is an especially good organization pattern for speeches arguing for policy changes.
• Problem-cause-solution: This is a variation of the problem-solution organizational pattern. A three-step organizational pattern where the speaker starts by explaining the problem, then explains the causes of the problem, and lastly proposes a solution to the problem.
• Comparative advantage : A speaker compares two or more things or ideas and explains why one of the things or ideas has more advantages or is better than the other.
• Monroe’s motivated sequence : An organizational pattern that is a more elaborate variation of the problem-cause-solution pattern.  We’ll go into more depth on Monroe’s motivated sequence on the next page.
• Structure of a Persuasive Speech. Authored by : Mike Randolph with Lumen Learning. License : CC BY: Attribution

How to Write and Structure a Persuasive Speech

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The purpose of a persuasive speech is to convince your audience to agree with an idea or opinion that you present. First, you'll need to choose a side on a controversial topic, then you will write a speech to explain your position, and convince the audience to agree with you.

You can produce an effective persuasive speech if you structure your argument as a solution to a problem. Your first job as a speaker is to convince your audience that a particular problem is important to them, and then you must convince them that you have the solution to make things better.

Note: You don't have to address a real problem. Any need can work as the problem. For example, you could consider the lack of a pet, the need to wash one's hands, or the need to pick a particular sport to play as the "problem."

As an example, let's imagine that you have chosen "Getting Up Early" as your persuasion topic. Your goal will be to persuade classmates to get themselves out of bed an hour earlier every morning. In this instance, the problem could be summed up as "morning chaos."

A standard speech format has an introduction with a great hook statement, three main points, and a summary. Your persuasive speech will be a tailored version of this format.

Before you write the text of your speech, you should sketch an outline that includes your hook statement and three main points.

Writing the Text

The introduction of your speech must be compelling because your audience will make up their minds within a few minutes whether or not they are interested in your topic.

Before you write the full body you should come up with a greeting. Your greeting can be as simple as "Good morning everyone. My name is Frank."

After your greeting, you will offer a hook to capture attention. A hook sentence for the "morning chaos" speech could be a question:

• How many times have you been late for school?
• Does your day begin with shouts and arguments?
• Have you ever missed the bus?

Or your hook could be a statistic or surprising statement:

• More than 50 percent of high school students skip breakfast because they just don't have time to eat.
• Tardy kids drop out of school more often than punctual kids.

Once you have the attention of your audience, follow through to define the topic/problem and introduce your solution. Here's an example of what you might have so far:

Good afternoon, class. Some of you know me, but some of you may not. My name is Frank Godfrey, and I have a question for you. Does your day begin with shouts and arguments? Do you go to school in a bad mood because you've been yelled at, or because you argued with your parent? The chaos you experience in the morning can bring you down and affect your performance at school.

Add the solution:

You can improve your mood and your school performance by adding more time to your morning schedule. You can accomplish this by setting your alarm clock to go off one hour earlier.

Your next task will be to write the body, which will contain the three main points you've come up with to argue your position. Each point will be followed by supporting evidence or anecdotes, and each body paragraph will need to end with a transition statement that leads to the next segment. Here is a sample of three main statements:

• Bad moods caused by morning chaos will affect your workday performance.
• If you skip breakfast to buy time, you're making a harmful health decision.
• (Ending on a cheerful note) You'll enjoy a boost to your self-esteem when you reduce the morning chaos.

After you write three body paragraphs with strong transition statements that make your speech flow, you are ready to work on your summary.

Your summary will re-emphasize your argument and restate your points in slightly different language. This can be a little tricky. You don't want to sound repetitive but will need to repeat what you have said. Find a way to reword the same main points.

Finally, you must make sure to write a clear final sentence or passage to keep yourself from stammering at the end or fading off in an awkward moment. A few examples of graceful exits:

• We all like to sleep. It's hard to get up some mornings, but rest assured that the reward is well worth the effort.
• If you follow these guidelines and make the effort to get up a little bit earlier every day, you'll reap rewards in your home life and on your report card.

Tips for Writing Your Speech

• Don't be confrontational in your argument. You don't need to put down the other side; just convince your audience that your position is correct by using positive assertions.
• Use simple statistics. Don't overwhelm your audience with confusing numbers.
• Don't complicate your speech by going outside the standard "three points" format. While it might seem simplistic, it is a tried and true method for presenting to an audience who is listening as opposed to reading.
• How to Write a Persuasive Essay
• 5 Tips on How to Write a Speech Essay
• Tips on How to Write an Argumentative Essay
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• Ethos, Logos, Pathos for Persuasion
• What Is Expository Writing?
• Audience Analysis in Speech and Composition
• Definition and Examples of Analysis in Composition
• 100 Persuasive Speech Topics for Students
• What an Essay Is and How to Write One
• How to Write a Good Thesis Statement
• 100 Persuasive Essay Topics
• How to Write a Graduation Speech as Valedictorian

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6.8: Basic Structure and Content of Argument

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• Terri Pantuso, Emilie Zickel, Amanda Lloyd, Robin Jeffery, & Robin Jeffrey
• Texas A&M Univesrity

When you are tasked with crafting an argumentative essay, it is likely that you will be expected to craft your argument based upon a given number of sources–all of which should support your topic in some way. Your instructor might provide these sources for you, ask you to locate these sources, or provide you with some sources and ask you to find others. Whether or not you are asked to do additional research, an argumentative essay should contain the following basic components.

Claim: What Do You Want the Reader to Believe?

In an argument paper, the thesis is often called a claim. This claim is a statement in which you take a stand on a debatable issue. A strong, debatable claim has at least one valid counterargument, an opposite or alternative point of view that is as sensible as the position that you take in your claim. In your thesis statement, you should clearly and specifically state the position you will convince your audience to adopt. One way to accomplish this is via either a closed or open thesis statement.

A closed thesis statement includes sub-claims or reasons why you choose to support your claim.

Example of Closed Thesis Statement

The city of Houston has displayed a commitment to attracting new residents by making improvements to its walkability, city centers, and green spaces.

In this instance, walkability, city centers, and green spaces are the sub-claims, or reasons, why you would make the claim that Houston is attracting new residents.

An open thesis statement does not include sub-claims and might be more appropriate when your argument is less easy to prove with two or three easily-defined sub-claims.

Example of Open Thesis Statement

The city of Houston is a vibrant metropolis due to its walkability, city centers, and green spaces.

The choice between an open or a closed thesis statement often depends upon the complexity of your argument. Another possible construction would be to start with a research question and see where your sources take you.

A research question approach might ask a large question that will be narrowed down with further investigation.

Example of Research Question Approach

What has the city of Houston done to attract new residents and/or make the city more accessible?

As you research the question, you may find that your original premise is invalid or incomplete. The advantage to starting with a research question is that it allows for your writing to develop more organically according to the latest research. When in doubt about how to structure your thesis statement, seek the advice of your instructor or a writing center consultant.

A Note on Context: What Background Information About the Topic Does Your Audience Need?

Before you get into defending your claim, you will need to place your topic (and argument) into context by including relevant background material. Remember, your audience is relying on you for vital information such as definitions, historical placement, and controversial positions. This background material might appear in either your introductory paragraph(s) or your body paragraphs. How and where to incorporate background material depends a lot upon your topic, assignment, evidence, and audience. In most cases, kairos, or an opportune moment, factors heavily in the ways in which your argument may be received.

Evidence or Grounds: What Makes Your Reasoning Valid?

To validate the thinking that you put forward in your claim and sub-claims, you need to demonstrate that your reasoning is based on more than just your personal opinion. Evidence, sometimes referred to as grounds, can take the form of research studies or scholarship, expert opinions, personal examples, observations made by yourself or others, or specific instances that make your reasoning seem sound and believable. Evidence only works if it directly supports your reasoning — and sometimes you must explain how the evidence supports your reasoning (do not assume that a reader can see the connection between evidence and reason that you see).

Warrants: Why Should a Reader Accept Your Claim?

A warrant is the rationale the writer provides to show that the evidence properly supports the claim with each element working towards a similar goal. Think of warrants as the glue that holds an argument together and ensures that all pieces work together coherently.

An important way to ensure you are properly supplying warrants within your argument is to use topic sentences for each paragraph and linking sentences within that connect the particular claim directly back to the thesis. Ensuring that there are linking sentences in each paragraph will help to create consistency within your essay. Remember, the thesis statement is the driving force of organization in your essay, so each paragraph needs to have a specific purpose (topic sentence) in proving or explaining your thesis. Linking sentences complete this task within the body of each paragraph and create cohesion. These linking sentences will often appear after your textual evidence in a paragraph.

Counterargument: But What About Other Perspectives?

Later in this section, we have included an essay by Steven Krause who offers a thorough explanation of what counterargument is (and how to respond to it). In summary, a strong arguer should not be afraid to consider perspectives that either challenge or completely oppose his or her own claim. When you respectfully and thoroughly discuss perspectives or research that counters your own claim or even weaknesses in your own argument, you are showing yourself to be an ethical arguer. The following are some things of which counter arguments may consist:

• summarizing opposing views;
• explaining how and where you actually agree with some opposing views;
• acknowledging weaknesses or holes in your own argument.

You have to be careful and clear that you are not conveying to a reader that you are rejecting your own claim. It is important to indicate that you are merely open to considering alternative viewpoints. Being open in this way shows that you are an ethical arguer – you are considering many viewpoints.

Types of Counterarguments

Counterarguments can take various forms and serve a range of purposes such as:

• Could someone disagree with your claim? If so, why? Explain this opposing perspective in your own argument, and then respond to it.
• Could someone draw a different conclusion from any of the facts or examples you present? If so, what is that different conclusion? Explain this different conclusion and then respond to it.
• Could a reader question any of your assumptions or claims? If so, which ones would they question? Explain and then respond.
• Could a reader offer a different explanation of an issue? If so, what might their explanation be? Describe this different explanation, and then respond to it.
• Is there any evidence out there that could weaken your position? If so, what is it? Cite and discuss this evidence and then respond to it.

If the answer to any of these questions is yes, that does not necessarily mean that you have a weak argument. It means ideally, and as long as your argument is logical and valid, that you have a counterargument. Good arguments can and do have counterarguments; it is important to discuss them. But you must also discuss and then respond to those counterarguments.

Response to Counterargument: I See That, But…

Just as it is important to include counterargument to show that you are fair-minded and balanced, you must respond to the counterargument so that a reader clearly sees that you are not agreeing with the counterargument and thus abandoning or somehow undermining your own claim. Failure to include the response to counterargument can confuse the reader. There are several ways to respond to a counterargument such as:

• Concede to a specific point or idea from the counterargument by explaining why that point or idea has validity. However, you must then be sure to return to your own claim, and explain why even that concession does not lead you to completely accept or support the counterargument;
• Reject the counterargument if you find it to be incorrect, fallacious, or otherwise invalid;
• Explain why the counterargument perspective does not invalidate your own claim.

A Note About Where to Put the Counterargument

It is certainly possible to begin the argument section (after the background section) with your counterargument + response instead of placing it at the end of your essay. Some people prefer to have their counterargument first where they can address it and then spend the rest of their essay building their own case and supporting their own claim. However, it is just as valid to have the counterargument + response appear at the end of the paper after you have discussed all of your reasons.

What is important to remember is that wherever you place your counterargument, you should:

• Explain what the counter perspectives are;
• Describe them thoroughly;
• Cite authors who have these counter perspectives;
• Quote them and summarize their thinking.
• Make it clear to the reader of your argument why you concede to certain points of the counterargument or why you reject them;
• Make it clear that you do not accept the counterargument, even though you understand it;
• Be sure to use transitional phrases that make this clear to your reader.

Responding to Counterarguments

You do not need to attempt to do all of these things as a way to respond. Instead, choose the response strategy that makes the most sense to you for the counterargument that you find:

• “However, this information does not apply to our topic because…”
• If the counterargument perspective is one that contains different evidence than you have in your own argument, you can explain why a reader should not accept the evidence that the counterarguer presents;
• If the counterargument perspective is one that contains a different interpretation of evidence than you have in your own argument, you can explain why a reader should not accept the interpretation of the evidence that your opponent (counterarguer) presents.

If the counterargument is an acknowledgement of evidence that threatens to weaken your argument, you must explain why and how that evidence does not, in fact, invalidate your claim.

It is important to use transitional phrases in your paper to alert readers when you’re about to present a counterargument. It’s usually best to put this phrase at the beginning of a paragraph such as:

• Researchers have challenged these claims with…
• Critics argue that this view…
• Some readers may point to…
• A perspective that challenges the idea that…

Transitional phrases will again be useful to highlight your shift from counterargument to response:

• Indeed, some of those points are valid. However, . . .
• While I agree that . . . , it is more important to consider . . .
• These are all compelling points. Still, other information suggests that . .
• While I understand . . . , I cannot accept the evidence because . . . [1]

In the section that follows, the Toulmin method of argumentation is described and further clarifies the terms discussed in this section.

Practice Activity

The original version of this chapter contained H5P content. You may want to remove or replace this element.

This section contains material from:

Amanda Lloyd and Emilie Zickel. “Basic Structure of Arguments.” In A Guide to Rhetoric, Genre, and Success in First-Year Writing , by Melanie Gagich and Emilie Zickel. Cleveland: MSL Academic Endeavors. Accessed July 2019. https://pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu/csu-fyw-rhetoric/chapter/basic-argument-components/ . Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License .

Jeffrey, Robin. “Counterargument and Response.” In A Guide to Rhetoric, Genre, and Success in First-Year Writing , by Melanie Gagich and Emilie Zickel. Cleveland: MSL Academic Endeavors. Accessed July 2019. https://pressbooks.ulib.csuohio.edu/csu-fyw-rhetoric/chapter/questions-for-thinking-about-counterarguments/ . Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License .

OER credited the texts above includes:

Jeffrey, Robin. About Writing: A Guide . Portland, OR: Open Oregon Educational Resources. Accessed December 18, 2020. https://openoregon.pressbooks.pub/aboutwriting/ . Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License .

• This section originally contained the following attribution: This page contains material from “About Writing: A Guide” by Robin Jeffrey, OpenOregon Educational Resources, Higher Education Coordination Commission: Office of Community Colleges and Workforce Development is licensed under CC BY 4.0. ↵

Argumentative Style: A Complex Notion

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• Published: 08 February 2019
• Volume 33 , pages 153–171, ( 2019 )

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• Frans H. van Eemeren   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-6694-3488 1 , 2  

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This theoretical expose explores the complex notion of argumentative style, which has so far been largely neglected in argumentation theory. After an introduction of the problems involved, the theoretical tools for identifying the properties of the discourse in which an argumentative style manifests itself are explained from a pragma-dialectical perspective and a theoretical definition of argumentative style is provided that does full justice to its role in argumentative discourse. The article concludes with a short reflection upon the next steps that need to be taken in argumentation theory in further substantiating the notion of argumentative style.

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Introduction: Rhetoricians on Argumentation

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A Variety of Contributions to Argumentation Theory

Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.

1 Introduction

The way in which arguers go about defending their standpoints to others often leads to remarks from bystanders as well as analysts concerning the “style” in which the argumentative discourse is conducted. Footnote 1 All kinds of comments are given, varying from general characterisations of the arguer’s argumentative conduct and descriptions of striking properties to judgments of its appropriateness. Although the concept of style also applies to visual and other non-verbal modes of communication, the remarks about argumentative style tend to concentrate on spoken and written discourse. Usually the characterisations and other verdicts in the literature are given from a linguistic background. In “stylistics”, the twentieth century successor of the rhetorical study of elocutio , this is certainly the dominant perspective. Wales ( 1991 ), for one, states in her Dictionary of Stylistics that “stylistic features are basically features of language” (p. 436) and Fahnestock ( 2011 ) concentrates in her prominent study Rhetorical Style on “features of language that might enhance its power over the audience” (p. 6). Footnote 2

“Style” is by all accounts an elusive notion. As Wales ( 1991 ) says in her dictionary, “Although style is used very frequently in literary criticism and especially stylistics […], it is very difficult to define” (p. 435). “At its simplest”, she states, “style refers to the manner of expression in writing or speaking, just as there is a manner of doing things, like playing squash or painting” (p. 435). Claes and Hulsens ( 2015 : 129) observe in their dictionary of rhetoric that style was in the past seen as literary adornment ( ornatus ), later as a deviation of ordinary language use and nowadays as a choice between language variants. Among the factors involved in stylistic variation mentioned in the literature are the medium that is used for expressing oneself, the degree of formality of the occasion, the norms that are being played with and the contextual domain (or the situation in the case of “registers”) in which the discourse takes place. Sometimes the discussion of style concentrates on the style that is used in a particular speech event (e.g. in Trump’s inaugural address of 20 January 2017), sometimes on the individual style of a certain speaker or writer (e.g. Kennedy or Nabokov), and sometimes on the general characteristics of the style used in a certain type of communicative activity (e.g. love letters) or period (e.g. editorials in the 19th century)—usually viewed in comparison with other communicative activity types or periods.

These general observations may apply equally well to the notion of “argumentative style” that I am concerned with, but for dealing with argumentative style a different kind of perspective is needed. Although, of course, the presentational aspect of argumentative discourse is to be given its due, argumentative style should in my view be analysed for its instrumentality in trying to resolve a difference of opinion by convincing the intended audience or readership by means of argumentative discourse of the acceptability of the standpoint at issue. This means that in my approach the treatment of style will concentrate primarily on its argumentative function. In line with the gist of my general approach to argumentation, my treatment will be at the same time pragmatic in the linguistic sense and dialectical in the philosophical sense. In dealing with argumentative style I will make use of the theoretical insights provided by the extended pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (van Eemeren 2018 ), in particular those concerning the determining aspects of strategic manoeuvring, the use of argumentative moves, the choice of dialectical routes and the implementation of strategic considerations.

Starting from the view that argumentative style is a complex notion that is instrumental in the pursuit of effectiveness in convincing the addressee of a certain standpoint, this article is aimed at capturing the notion of argumentative style in a working definition that relates argumentative style to the properties of argumentative discourse in which it manifests itself in the discourse. In order to get to this definition, I shall in Sect.  2 discuss the concepts that need to be put in a theoretical perspective in describing these properties: the argumentative moves that are used, the dialectical routes that have been chosen and the strategic considerations that have been implemented. Against this background, I shall in Sect.  3 situate the notion of argumentative style conceptually in the framework of pragma-dialectics by providing a definition that covers all dimensions of argumentative style that are relevant from this theoretical perspective and relates argumentative style to the properties of argumentative discourse just mentioned. In Sect.  4 , I shall conclude this article with a brief reflection upon the next steps to be taken in argumentation theory in further substantiating the notion of argumentative style.

2 The Manifestation of Argumentative Style in Argumentative Discourse

2.1 the argumentative moves that are made.

The first property of argumentative discourse relevant to determining its argumentative style consists of the argumentative moves that are made in the discourse. In pragma-dialectics the various kinds of argumentative moves that can be instrumental in resolving a difference of opinion on the merits are represented in a model of a critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004 : 42–68). In this theoretical model it is for each stage of the critical discussion indicated in terms of speech acts which types of argumentative moves can be contributions to the resolution process (van Eemeren 2018 : 33–50). Due to their potentially constructive role in the resolution process, these argumentative moves are at a particular point in the discourse considered to be “analytically relevant” (van Eemeren 2018 : 74, 92). Which options for making such argumentative moves are available to each of the parties in the difference of opinion is portrayed in full detail in “dialectical profiles” (van Eemeren 2018 : 42–49).

In argumentative discourse particular argumentative moves are made at every point in the discourse. In all these cases the argumentative moves concerned involve certain choices regarding the way in which the argumentative discourse is conducted on the part of the arguer. This goes in principle for every argumentative move that is made in the discourse in any of the real-life counterparts of the four stages of a critical discussion: the confrontation stage, the opening stage, the argumentation stage, and the concluding stage. In the pragma-dialectical approach, based on a systematic reconstruction of the discourse, in an “analytic overview” a survey is provided of all analytically relevant argumentative moves that are made in an argumentative discourse (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992 : 93–94). The analytic overview gives a description of all argumentative moves in the discourse that are pertinent to an adequate evaluation (van Eemeren 2018 : 96–100).

A complex argumentative move in the conduct of argumentative discourse that is crucial to the resolution of the difference of opinion is the use of argumentation in support of the standpoint at issue. Various types of argumentation can be advanced to enhance the acceptability of a standpoint, each of them characterized by the employment of a specific argument scheme. The argument schemes of “symptomatic”, “comparison” and “causal” argumentation distinguished in pragma-dialectics have a pragmatic basis in the arguers’ human experience regarding the justificatory principles appealed upon in legitimizing the transfer of acceptance from the arguments constituting the argumentation to the standpoints that are defended. In symptomatic argumentation the argument scheme is used to establish a relation of concomitance between the argument concerned and the standpoint that is supported, in comparison argumentation to establish a relation of comparability, and in causal argumentation to establish a relation of causality (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992 : 94–102).The dialectical rationale of the distinction lies in the different kinds of interactional follow-up instigated by the critical questions that are to be dealt with when the various argument schemes are employed. The rationale for distinguishing between subtypes of the three main types of argumentation is in pragma-dialectics also both pragmatic and dialectical.

The first relevant critical reaction to the use of a particular type of argumentation consists of asking the “basic” critical question whether the relationship that the argument scheme employed claims to exist does indeed exist (van Eemeren and Garssen 2019 ). Because the justificatory principle appealed to varies according to the argument scheme that is employed, the basic critical question will be different for each type of argumentation. The basic critical question associated with the use of symptomatic argumentation is whether what is stated in the standpoint is indeed a sign or token of what is mentioned in the argumentation; the basic critical question associated with the use of comparison argumentation is whether what is stated in the standpoint is indeed comparable to what is mentioned in the argumentation; and the basic critical question associated with the use of causal argumentation is whether what is mentioned in the argumentation does indeed lead to what is stated in the standpoint. Other relevant critical questions may relate specifically to the justificatory point of the particular subtype of argumentation that is used, to certain qualities of the premises or to vital presuppositions. Footnote 3

In establishing a relationship between the arguments conveyed in argumentation and the standpoint at issue in order to promote a transfer of acceptance, the arguer employs according to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca ( 1969 ) the argumentative technique of “association” (pp. 190–191). Another argumentative technique they distinguish that can be exploited in making argumentative moves is “dissociation”. Dissociation consists of making a distinction between the use of a certain word or expression (“term”) the arguer considers lacking and what he or she considers its proper use and replacing the criticized meaning of the term by a notion denoting the latter. Footnote 4 In pragma-dialectics analytically relevant argumentative moves involving the use of dissociation are realized by means of (language) usage declaratives aimed at clarifying the meaning of vital terms by providing a definition, a precization, etc. (van Eemeren 2018 : 41). As van Rees ( 2009 ) emphasizes, dissociations are generally brought to bear in order to resolve a contradiction or an incompatibility.

In making a dissociation the existing problem of usage is solved by splitting up the problematic concept conveyed by the use of a certain word or expression and introducing next to the original concept a new concept. Such a dissociation may lead to giving a new name to the new concept, to the old concept or even to both, but this is neither necessary nor typical. In the “purest” cases of dissociation the original term is without any renaming maintained in another meaning (e.g. “THAT is not what ‘democratic’ means; ‘democratic’ is THIS’). Footnote 5 Dissociation may mean that, compared with its original meaning, the meaning of a term is reduced, because a specification or precization is given so that in the new use of the term only part of the original meaning is maintained, Footnote 6 but the new meaning given to a term can also be broader, more extensive or otherwise richer than the one that is criticized, so that in its new use the term refers to a more elaborate or otherwise different concept. Footnote 7 Wu ( 2019 ) distinguishes in a recent study on strategic manoeuvring by Chinese spokespersons responding to questions of journalists at press conferences between four different subtypes of dissociation: (1) the allegedly “distorted” meaning of a term is replaced by its “authentic” meaning; (2) the “ambiguous” meaning given to a term is replaced by the “univocal” meaning it allegedly has; (3) the allegedly “broadened” meaning of a term is replaced by its “exact” meaning; (4) the allegedly “narrowed” meaning of a term is replaced by its “exact” meaning.

Argumentative styles manifest themselves in the empirical counterparts of the four stages of a critical discussion in argumentative discourse first of all in the argumentative moves made in introducing the standpoints at issue and defining the difference of opinion, in establishing the material and procedural starting points of the discourse, in advancing the arguments constituting the argumentation in support of the standpoints at issue, and in presenting the outcome of the argumentative process. In determining the argumentative style of the discourse, when considering the manifestation of analytically relevant argumentative moves in the discourse both the associative and the dissociative uses of argumentative moves must be taken into account. The analytic overview of the argumentative discourse concerned is the most appropriate point of departure in this endeavour, because it provides a survey of the implementation of the various types of argumentative moves that have been put to good use in the discourse.

2.2 The Dialectical Route that is Chosen

The specific critical questions elicited by the use of the various types of argumentation in the argumentative discourse open up different kinds of “dialectical routes”, depending on the argument scheme involved. By specifying the critical questions associated with the argument scheme that has been activated, the dialectical routes instigated by the use of a particular (sub)type of argumentation can be portrayed in a dialectical profile. Such a dialectical profile describes the potential ways of going through the process of resolving a difference of opinion that are initiated by the choice of a particular (sub)type of argumentation in defending the standpoint at issue. The dialectical route that is chosen in the discourse is the second property of argumentative discourse, next to the argumentative moves that are made, that is relevant to determining the argumentative style that is used in the discourse.

When in argumentative discourse the one (sub)type of argumentation is chosen instead of the other the dialectical routes that are available will be different from the dialectical routes that may become the options in the other case. The choice of argument schemes in the main argumentation, advanced at the first level of the defence of a standpoint, will depend primarily on the type of standpoint that is at issue, while the continuation of the dialectical route that is chosen at the next levels of the defence is in the first place dependent on the critical questions associated with the argument scheme employed in the main argumentation to defend the standpoint. The different sets of critical questions going with the various types of argumentation that can be chosen will induce the arguer to make different kinds of argumentative moves to anticipate or respond to the different kinds of critical reactions. Choosing a certain dialectical route in the conduct of argumentative discourse results in this way always in the development of a particular kind of “argumentative pattern” that is manifested in the discourse (van Eemeren 2017 : 17–22). Thus the argumentative pattern characterizing the discourse provides a description of the dialectical route that is chosen in an argumentative discourse.

An argumentative pattern consists of a particular constellation of argumentative moves in which in dealing with a particular kind of difference of opinion in defence of a particular type of standpoint a particular argument scheme or combination of argument schemes is used in a particular kind of argumentation structure (van Eemeren 2018 : 150). The various argumentative patterns coming about in different kinds of discourse practices can be identified with the help of the theoretical instruments for analysing argumentative discourse developed in pragma-dialectics: the typology of standpoints (descriptive/evaluative/prescriptive), the typology of differences of opinions (single/multiple; non-mixed/mixed), the typology of argument schemes (symptomatic/comparison/causal), and the typology of argumentation structures (single/multiple/coordinative/subordinative) (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992 : 13–89). The categories and subcategories distinguished in these typologies can be put to good use in describing the way in which argumentative patterns manifest themselves in particular speech events in specific constellations of argumentative moves (van Eemeren 2018 : 163–165).

Because each of the three argument schemes calls out its own set of critical questions, the uses of symptomatic argumentation, comparison argumentation and causal argumentation are associated with different dialectical routes that can be taken in resolving a difference of opinion. The differences between the dialectical routes instigated by the use of argumentation in which one of these argument schemes is employed are in the first place determined by the basic critical question connected with the type of argumentation concerned. In case specific subtypes of the various types of argumentation are used, other differences result from the need to respond to the additional question pertaining to the subtype concerned that complements the basic question. Still further differences ensue in the various cases from the critical questions relating to the premises or to vital presuppositions. The responses given to all these critical questions manifest themselves systematically in the discourse in particular kinds of argumentative patterns.

Because it depends partly on the macro-context in which the argumentation takes place exactly which critical questions are pertinent and need to be responded to, the specific conventions of the various communicative activity types established in a certain domain determine to some extent which critical questions will be dealt with in the discourse. Since in a communicative activity type the answers to certain critical questions have in some cases already been agreed upon from the start, dealing with these questions is then superfluous. Footnote 8 This applies, for instance, to a political debate in which pragmatic argumentation is advanced to put an end to the problem of unemployment. The (positive) answer to the critical question whether solving the problem of unemployment is indeed desirable is then already presupposed as a point of departure of the exchange. In other words, the critical questions that need to be dealt with in checking the acceptability of the use of a certain (sub)type of argumentation not only need to be specified, supplemented or otherwise amended to make them applicable to a specific (cluster of) communicative activity type(s) (van Eemeren 2018 : 140–143), but they also need to be implemented in accordance with the specific institutional preconditions of that (cluster of) communicative activity type(s) (van Eemeren 2018 : 137–140).

When the argumentative patterns coming into being in argumentative discourse result from the use of modes of strategic manoeuvring that are pre-eminently instrumental in realising the institutional point of a certain communicative activity type and this strategic manoeuvring reflects directly the influence of the institutional preconditions constraining the strategic manoeuvring in that (cluster of) communicative activity type(s), these argumentative patterns can be considered “prototypical” (van Eemeren 2018 : 151). The fact that they are prototypical means that these argumentative patterns are characteristic of the argumentative discourse that is carried out in that particular communicative activity type or cluster of communicative activity types (van Eemeren 2017 : 20–22). Footnote 9 Since the institutional point to be realized in the strategic manoeuvring and the institutional conventions and preconditions that are to be taken into account are related to the various kinds of institutionalized macro-contexts, the prototypical argumentative patterns that come into being in the various communicative activity types will vary to a greater or lesser extent.

Although it may be expected that argumentative patterns that are prototypical of a communicative activity type will be found regularly in speech events that are specimens of the kind of argumentative practice concerned, they need not occur frequently, let alone always be present (van Eemeren 2017 : 22). Certain prototypical argumentative patterns may in certain argumentative practices occur frequently while other prototypical argumentative patterns may not. Only when its frequency of occurrence is relatively high, can a prototypical argumentative pattern be regarded as “stereotypical” (van Eemeren 2017 : 22). The fact that it is stereotypical means that it is a prototypical argumentative pattern that occurs more frequently in the same (cluster of) communicative activity type(s) than some other argumentative patterns or that its frequency of occurrence in this (cluster of) communicative activity type(s) is higher than in other (clusters of) communicative activity types—or both. Footnote 10

Next to the basic argumentative patterns developed in argumentative discourse at the first level of the defence of the standpoints at issue, extended argumentative patterns will develop at the next level(s) of the defence when the critical questions that are anticipated or responded to give occasion to lend support to the main argumentation. In principle the basic argumentative pattern of the discourse represents the main line of defence, but this main line can sometimes be reinforced by subordinative argumentation included in the extended argumentative pattern. In such cases the argumentative style of the discourse may manifest itself both in the basic argumentative pattern of the discourse and in (certain parts of) the extended argumentative pattern. In examining the way in which the argumentative style that is used in the discourse manifests itself in the discourse not only the basic argumentative pattern indicating the main line of defence must therefore be taken into account but sometimes also the extended argumentative pattern.

2.3 The Implementation of Strategic Considerations

Starting from the assumption that, in principle, protagonists may be expected to be out to make the strongest possible case for their standpoints in the macro-context in which the argumentative discourse takes place, I will now pay attention to the strategic rationale of the conduct of argumentative discourse. Making the best of argumentative discourse means that in every argumentative move they make arguers may be assumed to be out to ensure that this move is not only considered reasonable but also effective in gaining acceptance from the audience they want to reach. Because of the tension inevitably involved in the simultaneous pursuit of these two aims, in making argumentative moves the arguers always have to manoeuvre strategically to keep the balance. Footnote 11

The arguer’s strategic manoeuvring will manifest itself in every argumentative move in three different but interrelated aspects (van Eemeren 2010 : 93–96). First, strategic manoeuvring involves a specific selection from the available “topical potential” of the argumentative moves that could be made at a certain point in the discourse. The selection from the topical potential may result, for instance, in the choice of a particular starting point or a particular (sub)type of argumentation. Second, strategic manoeuvring involves a specific adaptation to “audience demand”, i.e. to the frame of reference and preferences of the listeners or readers the arguer intends to reach. Adaptation to audience demand boils down, for example, to the use of a particular starting point or (sub)type of argumentation that the intended audience is likely to accept. Third, strategic manoeuvring involves making use of a specific “presentational device”, i.e. choosing a particular way of expressing oneself in carrying out the argumentative move concerned. The exploitation of presentational devices can, for instance, amount to formulating a crucial starting point explicitly in a formal way or—just the opposite—leaving the conclusion of the argumentation implicit. In argumentative reality the three analytically distinguished aspects of strategic manoeuvring are interdependent and come simultaneously to the fore in every argumentative move.

The argumentative moves made by the arguers in argumentative discourse may all be supposed to have been aimed at realizing their dialectical and rhetorical aims of resolving the difference of opinion in their own favour. The various strategic manoeuvres the arguers carry out in the discourse may therefore be expected to be as much as possible coordinated in a way that is optimally helpful to achieving this aim. This coordination of strategic manoeuvres is to take place both at the level of the three aspects of the individual manoeuvres and at the level of the succession of the various manoeuvres in the discourse. If the coordination is realized in such a way that the strategic manoeuvres involved systematically cohere and constitute together a combined effort to achieve the dialectical and rhetorical aims pursued by the arguer in the discourse, the argumentative moves involved may be considered an “argumentative strategy” (van Eemeren 2010 : 45–47; 2018 : 116–120). Footnote 12 The implementation of strategic considerations is the third property of argumentative discourse that is relevant to determining the argumentative style that is used in the discourse.

Some argumentative strategies that are used pertain exclusively to a particular stage of the process of resolving a difference of opinion and are only carried out in that stage (van Eemeren 2010 : 46–47). “Confrontational strategies”, to begin with, are aimed at influencing the definition of the difference of opinion in the confrontation stage. A well-recognized confrontational strategy provisionally named humpty - dumptying consists, for example, of choosing standpoints by making self-serving arbitrary choices from the available disagreement space and treating them as the standpoints that are to be dealt with in the discourse (van Eemeren 2018 : 117). “Opening strategies” are aimed at influencing the choice of the starting points that constitute the point of departure of the argumentative exchange. The opening strategy known as creating a smokescreen , for instance, consists of adding irrelevant starting points to the presumed point of departure in order to blur the outlines of the “zone of agreement” and distract the other party’s attention away from starting points that are really relevant (van Eemeren 2018 : 117). “Argumentational strategies” are carried out in the argumentation stage to create lines of defence or attack that determine the direction of the resolution process. A so-called problem - solving argumentational strategy used in defending a prescriptive standpoint concerning a recommended action consists, for example, of relying on causal argumentation of a pragmatic (or a more complex) type to suggest that carrying out this action will eventually solve the troublesome problem at issue automatically (Garssen 2017 ). “Concluding strategies” are aimed at guiding the determination of the outcome of the exchange into a particular direction. An example designated as making them bite the bullet consists of getting it through to the other party that a certain outcome needs to be accepted as unavoidable, however undesirable that may be (van Eemeren 2018 : 118).

There are also argumentative strategies that are “general”. They are aimed at achieving the general dialectical and rhetorical aims of the arguer by the coordinated use of similarly-aligned kinds of strategic manoeuvres during the whole discussion and are also known as “discussion strategies”. A familiar example of such a general argumentative strategy used in all discussion stages is playing down the opponent (van Eemeren 2018 : 118). This strategy can, for instance, be implemented by not really acknowledging the other party’s doubts in the confrontation stage, ignoring some of their proposed starting points in the opening stage, denigrating their objections in the argumentation stage and not paying attention to any deviating conclusions they may have reached in the concluding stage. Footnote 13

The notion of argumentative strategy is in pragma-dialectics developed as a tool for laying bare the “strategic design” of an argumentative discourse. The strategic design explains how in the discourse concerned an effort is made to deal with the argumentative predicament of real-life argumentative discourse of having to combine aiming for effectiveness with maintaining reasonableness. The constitutive components of the strategic design of an argumentative discourse are the argumentative moves that are made, the dialectical routes that are chosen and the strategic considerations that are implemented. The strategic design explains how certain strategic considerations are brought to bear in choosing a certain dialectical route in making certain argumentative moves in the discourse. The strategic considerations underlying the strategic design relate, first of all, to how a protagonist expects to be effective in the communicative activity type concerned in gaining in a reasonable way the antagonist’s acceptance of the standpoint at issue by taking a particular dialectical route consisting of argumentative moves that involve the use of particular argument schemes and particular constellations of single or complex argumentation.

By laying bare in the reconstruction of argumentative discourse what the strategic design of the discourse is, the “strategic plan” can be detected that motivated the implementation of strategic considerations in the choice of a dialectical route in the use of argumentative moves. The strategic plan of the discourse explains as it were the arguer’s rationale for the strategic design of the argumentative discourse. It can therefore be regarded to constitute the strategic scenario Footnote 14 underlying the conduct of the argumentative discourse that may be ascribed to the arguer (van Eemeren 2018 : 166–167). Footnote 15 The argumentative style utilized in the argumentative discourse is in my view to be regarded as intended to be instrumental in realizing the arguer’s strategic scenario.

3 The Utilization of Argumentative Style

Style is a notion that denotes a particular way of doing something or dealing with something. In linguistics, where the notion is discussed most intensively, the term style has, due to the nature of the discipline, acquired the limited meaning of a particular way of using language. This meaning has also been adopted when style is put in a rhetorical perspective. Footnote 16 Utilizing a certain argumentative style however means giving a particular shape to one’s argumentative conduct in a much broader sense. For this reason, when dealing with argumentative discourse, it is enlightening, and therefore recommendable, not to treat “style” as merely pertaining to the choice of a particular verbal presentation. It is in that case more productive to define the concept of style in a more encompassing way.

Conducting argumentative discourse means making argumentative moves aimed to be helpful to resolving a difference of opinion and in pursuing this goal more is involved than just using the presentational means of language (or some other means of communication) in a particular way. In my view it is therefore necessary to develop a notion of argumentative style that includes not only the presentational aspect but also other vital aspects of argumentative discourse. This more complex notion of argumentative style should on the one hand be broader and on the other hand be more specific than that of linguistic style. It is to be more specific, to begin with, because it has to focus particularly on the way in which a discourse is conducted that is aimed at resolving a difference of opinion by means of argumentation. As a consequence, it is to be broader, because in using argumentative discourse to resolve a difference of opinion more aspects of the discourse are involved than just the presentational one.

Starting from the basic view of style as a particular way in which something is done or dealt with, the shortest definition of argumentative style we can now provide is: a particular way in which an argumentative discourse is conducted to be helpful in achieving the resolution of the difference of opinion at issue aimed for by the arguer. This definition needs to be made more appropriate for dealing with argumentative discourse by substantiating it theoretically through the use of the conceptual and terminological instruments of argumentation theory. This can be realized by exploiting the pragma-dialectical view that making argumentative moves to resolve a difference of opinion always involves strategic manoeuvring that gives substance to the three aspects of making a selection from the available topical potential, adapting to audience demand and using presentational devices (van Eemeren 2010 : 93–127; 2018 : 112–113). Regarding the three aspects of strategic manoeuvring as different dimensions of argumentative style makes it possible to characterize utilizing a certain argumentative style as shaping these three dimensions in a particular way in the conduct of argumentative discourse.

Crucial to the identification of argumentative styles in the conduct of argumentative discourse is the observation that in making the argumentative moves constituting the discourse certain choices concerning argumentative style have been made for which the arguer can be held responsible. Footnote 17 A first precondition that needs to be satisfied in order to be able to speak of a fully-fledged argumentative style is that these choices concern, next to the presentational devices that are used, also the selection that is made from the topical potential and the adaptation to audience demand. A second precondition is that the choices made in giving substance to the various argumentative moves are intrinsically related to the goals these argumentative moves are supposedly aimed to achieve in the resolution process. A third precondition is that the choices that are made are strategic by potentially contributing to keeping the balance between reasonableness and effectiveness in the discourse. A fourth precondition is that the choices are systematic in the sense of being consistently shaped is a similar fashion. A fifth precondition is that the choices are made throughout a coherent and substantial part of the argumentative discourse, so that they can be considered sustained.

Utilizing a certain argumentative style in argumentative discourse involves giving a particular shape to the topical choices made in the argumentative moves, to the choices made in adapting these argumentative moves to audience demand and to the choices made in using presentational devices to carry out these argumentative moves. The shaping of these three dimensions of argumentative style is manifested in the argumentative discourse in the use of argumentative moves described in the analytic overview of the discourse, the choice of dialectical routes expressed in the argumentative patterns of the discourse and the implementation of strategic considerations captured in the strategic design of the discourse. The identification of the argumentative styles utilized in argumentative discourse should therefore always start from, and be guided by, an adequate reconstruction of the analytic overview, the argumentative patterns and the strategic design of the discourse. Only then can it be made sure that the argumentative style that is provisionally identified can be considered indicative for the way in which the arguer’s strategic scenario is realized in the discourse through the implementation in the strategic design of the discourse of strategic considerations relating to the argumentative moves that are made in the strategic routes that are chosen.

Taking these observations concerning the constitutive dimensions of argumentative style and the way in which argumentative style manifests itself in the discourse into account, the following theory-related definition of argumentative style can now be provided:

Argumentative style is the particular shape systematically and consistently given to the selection of topical choices, adaptation to audience demand and exploitation of presentational devices in the strategic manoeuvring taking place in a representative part of an argumentative discourse that manifests itself in the argumentative moves included in the analytic overview of the discourse, the argumentative patterns indicating the dialectical routes that are chosen and the strategic design reflecting the implementation of strategic considerations.

The particular shape given to a discourse by the use of a certain argumentative style is sometimes designated the “tone” of the discourse or the “tune” that is sung. Other metaphorical expressions employed to capture argumentative style are, for instance, that the style “colours” the discourse in a particular way or “puts it in a certain light”. Whatever enlightenment the use of these metaphorical expressions may bring, they make argumentative styles not a great deal easier to characterize or to identify. In any case, in talking in such ways about argumentative styles it is as a rule the limited presentational view of style that prevails. When, on the other hand, argumentative style is conceived as the shape in which an argumentative discourse manifests itself in all its three dimensions in the use of argumentative moves, the choice of dialectical routes and the implementation of strategic considerations, the characterization and identification of such an argumentative style will be considerably easier. Even a style that stands out for its ordinariness will then be clearly marked as a tool used for realizing a certain strategic scenario.

A satisfactory inventory of argumentative styles is not yet available. One of the oldest general divisions, stemming from Antiquity, distinguishes between “low”, “middle” and “grand” style. A rather well-known classification of the styles specifically applying to political discourse is Harriman’s ( 1995 ) empirically-based distinction between a “realist”, a “republican”, a “courtly” and a “bureaucratic” style, but this typology sounds odd from a more general perspective. In principle it depends, of course, on the purpose of the classification which kind of division and naming of styles will be appropriate. When it comes to argumentative styles, however, the division and naming should in my view in any case relate to (and if possible even reflect) the ways in which these styles represent in all their dimensions an effort to realize the strategic scenario that, based on the analytic overview of the argumentative moves that are made, the argumentative pattern that has developed and the strategic design of the discourse, can be ascribed to the arguer. Among the possible candidates for being included in such a classification could be such argumentative styles as a “polarizing” and a “reconciliatory” argumentative style, but further reflection is required upon the suitability of these and other candidates before any final decision can be made.

However premature it may be, in order to illustrate the main points of my expose about argumentative style, I will briefly discuss some distinctive features of what I provisionally call a detached argumentative style and an engaged argumentative style. In argumentative reality these two styles, which are contrasting each other in several respects, can be encountered regularly in various kinds of argumentative practices. I shall indicate how the choices made in the selection from the topical potential, the adaptation to audience demand and the exploitation of presentational devices that give shape to the strategic scenario that is to be realized in the argumentative discourse by utilizing these two argumentative styles may manifest themselves in real-life argumentative discourse in the empirical counterparts of the four stages of a critical discussion in the use of argumentative moves, the choice of dialectical routes and the implementation of strategic considerations.

The particular way in which in the initial situation representing the confrontation stage the choice from the topical potential manifests itself in the discourse in the use of argumentative moves may in the case of a detached argumentative style consist, for instance, in a business-like statement of what is to be discussed and in the case of an engaged argumentative style in a selection of issues that shows the arguer’s close involvement. The adaptation to audience demand may in the first case remain accordingly in line with the quasi-neutral preservation of objectivity of a detached argumentative style while in the second case an engaged argumentative style may be displayed by connecting emphatically with the interests of the audience. If the same kind of choices are made in the use of presentational devices, manifested in unadorned matter-of-fact formulations and in charged phrasings respectively, the argumentative style that is used in realizing the confrontational strategic scenario can be said to have in the first case the characteristics of being detached and in the second case of being engaged.

Similar indicators of the two argumentative styles may in actual argumentative discourse be detected in the argumentative conduct in the empirical counterparts of the other three stages of a critical discussion. In the parts of the discourse equivalent with the opening stage a detached argumentative style may manifest itself, for instance, in the shape of topical choices consisting of factual starting points that are easily verifiable and an engaged argumentative style may manifest itself in evaluative starting points demonstrating the arguer’s involvement in the cause concerned. In a detached argumentative style audience adaptation may then come to the fore through the non-conspicuous choice of starting points likely to be considered undisputable by the audience while in an engaged argumentative style the choice of starting points may demonstrate the arguer’s identification with premises close to the heart of the audience. The presentational devices used in shaping the starting points may in a detached argumentative style consist of straightforward factual overviews and enumerations of relevant statistics while in an engaged argumentative style the starting points may be introduced by means of rhetorical questions or other linguistic tools for displaying personal involvement.

In the empirical counterpart of the argumentation stage a detached argumentative style may manifest itself, for instance, in topical choices of pragmatic argumentation indicating certain concrete advantages that ensue automatically from a recommended measure and an engaged argumentative style in the use of analogy argumentation in which the still to be accepted state of affairs referred to in the standpoint is compared with an already familiar or easily recognizable state of affairs. Audience adaptation may in the first case involve arguing quasi-neutrally for a measure that has for the audience an indisputably positive effect and in the second case comparing the situation mentioned in the standpoint with a situation that is fully acceptable to the audience. In a detached argumentative style formalistic expert language may be used as a presentational device to add to the success of the argumentation whereas in an engaged argumentative style the effectiveness might be enhanced by a display of the arguer’s commitment through the use of personal language.

Finally, using a detached argumentative style in establishing the outcome of the resolution process in the empirical counterpart of the concluding stage may involve the shaping of topical choices as divergent as drawing a formally-reached non-subjective conclusion and leaving it to the listeners or readers to reach the inescapable conclusion themselves; using an engaged style could, for instance, consist in embracing the conclusion that is reached emphatically as the favoured outcome of the discussion. In the first case adaptation to audience demand could mean making in a non-obtrusive restrained way clear to the audience that the conclusion is a logical consequence of their starting points and in the second case making them realize that the conclusion is based on an argumentative procedure that the two parties have carried out together. The presentational devices can, for instance, be shaped in accordance with a detached style by phrasing the conclusion that is reached in a reporting non-confrontational way and in accordance with an engaged style by using a captivating metaphor that makes the conclusion that is reached sound appealing.

Although the use of a certain argumentative style may in some cases be limited to a particular part of the discourse, covering only a specific stage of the resolution process, more often than not the argumentative style that is adopted will be utilized throughout the discourse. When it has been established that in the various discussion stages one and the same argumentative style has been systematically utilized in all its three dimensions in the argumentative moves that are made, it is necessary to check whether this style is used consistently and sustained in those argumentative moves that constitute together the argumentative patterns characterizing the discourse—most importantly in the moves made in the basic argumentative patterns containing the main argumentation in defence of the standpoint at issue (van Eemeren 2018 : 151). If the argumentative style that in the first instance had been identified proves to have been used throughout the most pertinent parts of the argumentative pattern, next the argumentative considerations are to be taken into account that determine together with the argumentative moves and the argumentative patterns the strategic design of the discourse. Only if the argumentative style that has been identified agrees with the strategic scenario that may be supposed to have motivated the strategic design of the discourse, can it be safely concluded that the presumed argumentative style is indeed the argumentative style that is utilized in the discourse.

4 Conclusion

The view propounded in this treatise is that argumentative styles represent specific ways in which in strategic manoeuvring in argumentative discourse the choices that are to be made regarding the selection from the available topical potential, the adaption to audience demand and the exploitation of presentational devices are dealt with. The ways in which these three dimensions of argumentative style are shaped manifest themselves systematically and consistently in the discourse in the use of argumentative moves, the choice of dialectical routes and the implementation of strategic considerations—the constitutive components of the strategic design of the discourse. The argumentative styles that are adopted in trying to resolve a difference of opinion by means of argumentative discourse are supposed to reflect the strategic scenarios that may be ascribed to the arguer on the basis of the strategic design of the discourse.

The scope of my current contribution to the study of argumentative styles is limited to trying to create an adequate theoretical starting point for including the notion of argumentative style in the research programme of argumentation theory and making use of this notion in analysing argumentative discourse in argumentative reality. The definition of argumentative style that I have developed for this purpose is embedded in the theoretical framework of pragma-dialectics by making use of some relevant concepts developed in this theory. In this way the term argumentative style has been given a meaning that is theory-related while remaining at the same time rather closely connected with the meaning of this expression in everyday language—acknowledging frankly that in ordinary usage the expression “argumentative style” may sometimes also be used in a more general and wider or in a more specific and narrower meaning.

It goes without saying that, even if in this way an adequate theoretical starting point for the treatment of argumentative style in research and analysis has been developed, this does not mean that, all at once, a solution is offered for all problems involved in dealing with argumentative style. Apart from the remaining theoretical issues that still need to be tackled, further analytical and empirical research must be carried out in order to give substance to the proposed treatment of argumentative style. In these endeavours attention not only needs be paid to argumentative styles that are used in specific speech events (e.g. Searle’s “Chinese Room Argument”), but also to argumentative styles that are characteristic of the argumentative discourse of specific individuals (e.g. Prime Minister Theresa May) or groups (e.g. Human Rights campaigners) and argumentative styles that are characteristic of the argumentative discourse in specific communicative activity types (e.g. an academic discussion or an editorial in a newspaper) or domains (e.g. the field of law or the medical domain).

In tackling the most pressing theoretical issues, first of all, argumentative styles should be systematically classified in an adequate typology, which is to be accompanied by an appropriate nomenclature of the various argumentative styles. In order to find out how a sensible division of argumentative styles can be made, careful reflection is required upon the way in which the three dimensions I have distinguished in this contribution can be duly taken into account in the classification and how exactly they interact in the actual formation of argumentative styles. Although the shaping of the selection of topical choices, the shaping of the adaptation to audience demand and the shaping of the selection of presentational devices are in my view the spinal parts of the typology, which will constitute its backbone, additional factors may play a part in establishing the classification more firmly and refining it where necessary. Some of these factors can be more pertinent in pinning down some argumentative styles than in distinguishing between others—just as we see happen in Searle’s ( 1979 : 1–29) taxonomy of speech acts.

A topic for further theoretical research that is related to the problem of classification is the problem of how to determine when exactly certain observations concerning the use of argumentative moves, the choice of dialectical routes and the implementation of strategic considerations are to lead to attributing the properties that are observed to a particular argumentative style and assigning a specific name to it. The research involved does not only require more detailed theoretical reflection on the precise characteristics of the various kinds of argumentative styles, but it also calls for theoretically-supported empirical research into the features of argumentative discourse corresponding with these characteristics in the various domains of empirical reality. These investigations, which will be both analytical and empirical in nature, can in fact be considered to constitute the core part of the research into argumentative styles that is to take place in the field of argumentation theory.

Although in some cases the argumentative styles used in argumentative discourse may be completely determined by coincidental strategic preferences of the arguers conducting the discourse, argumentative styles can also be prototypical and even stereotypical of a particular individual, a particular group or a particular communicative activity type or domain. This means that the use of such an argumentative style is then not exclusively determined by haphazard inclinations of the arguer but is to some extent also influenced by more permanent “structural” preconditions relating to the arguer’s personality or to the institutional or cultural-ideological environment in which the discourse takes place. If the characteristic shape of an argumentative style can be to a great extent explained by the presence of more permanent structural preconditions, Footnote 18 due to the prominent display of certain more or less fixed argumentative properties in the discourse relating to them, the use of this argumentative style can be regarded as being—in a broad sense—“prototypical” of the individual, the group, the communicative activity type or the domain concerned. If, in addition, in a representative sample of cases the use of this argumentative style proves to reoccur relatively frequently, the prototypical argumentative style concerned proves to be also “stereotypical” of that category of cases. The relationship between argumentative styles and the various kinds of structural institutional preconditions constitutes a topic of research that is urgently in need of further investigation.

I am grateful to Bart Garssen and Wu Peng for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this article.

For some provisional observations concerning the style used in argumentative discourse that is partly or whole conducted by visual means see Tseronis ( 2017 : 348).

The dominant role played by the critical questions associated with the argument schemes that are used in bringing about a particular argumentative pattern in the discourse is a reason for paying special attention to them in the identification of argumentative styles. See Sect.  2.2 .

Dissociation pertains to the use of words and expressions in natural languages, which are in principle always open to various interpretations; in formal languages the possibility of dissociation does not exist because the terms that are used are univocal (or semantically empty).

In all cases of dissociation the criticized meaning of the term remains in principle the same (even though it may not always be crystal clear what exactly this meaning is). If this is helpful to avoid confusion, the parties might also decide to abandon the term in its old use after the distinction has been accepted (“Let’s no longer call THAT democratic , because THIS is the meaning than we intend the term democratic to have”).

This is sometimes indicated by adding a qualifying expression to the original term (e.g. “She is a speed skater, not just a skater”).

The view of dissociation expounded here involves a slight amendment of the definition provided by van Rees ( 2009 : 9). See also Wu ( 2019 : Section 4.2).

In some argumentative practices it is not only decided (or silently agreed upon) in the empirical counterpart of the opening stage which argument schemes can be exploited but also which critical questions need to be answered to test whether the argument schemes that are used have been applied correctly.

Prototypical argumentative patterns that have come into being in agreement with the rules for conducting a critical discussion can be viewed as empirical manifestations in argumentative reality of dialectical routes for resolving a difference of opinion on the merits described in the relevant dialectical profiles. Just as dialectical profiles may allow for more dialectical routes, communicative activity types may be characterized by more than one prototypical argumentative pattern.

Why the prototypical and stereotypical argumentative patterns may systematically differ in different geo-political settings (such as China, the United States and Europe) can be explained by differences in institutional constraints ensuing from the cultural or ideological background in which these communicative activity types have been established.

Keeping the balance involves trying to reach the optimal result in pursuing effectiveness while maintaining reasonableness.

If the coordination of the strategic manoeuvring concerns only one aspect, a topical, adaptational or presentational strategy may have been employed but not a full-blown argumentative strategy.

This argumentative strategy can hardly be expected to convince the actual opponent, but may be effective in persuading a third party viewed as the primary audience by the arguer.

For the terminology of strategic design and strategic scenario see van Eemeren ( 2018 : 165-167).

For determining which strategic plan can be regarded as motivating a certain strategic design a clear understanding is required of the institutional goals and missions of the participants in the domain and the communicative activity type in which the argumentative discourse occurs.

The stringent separation between form and content that has come into being after the disciplinary division between dialectic and rhetoric in early modernity has resulted in a rather sterile rhetorical concept of style that covers only its formalistic presentational aspect.

If the arguer involved cannot be held responsible for such choices made in the conduct of argumentative discourse, he or she is not accountable for the argumentative style that is used and then argumentative style is not used deliberately as a tool for resolving a difference of opinion. When this is the case, studying such an argumentative style does not play a vital role in argumentation theory as a discipline that is out to stimulate the improvement of argumentative practices.

Wu ( 2019 ), for one, indicates along these lines that Chinese spokespersons at press conferences of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign affairs use an argumentative style which is, among other things, characterized by the use of precizating dissociations in dealing with sources cited as authoritative by journalists acting as the spokespersons’ antagonists.

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Persuasive Speech Outline, with Examples

March 17, 2021 - Gini Beqiri

A persuasive speech is a speech that is given with the intention of convincing the audience to believe or do something. This could be virtually anything – voting, organ donation, recycling, and so on.

A successful persuasive speech effectively convinces the audience to your point of view, providing you come across as trustworthy and knowledgeable about the topic you’re discussing.

So, how do you start convincing a group of strangers to share your opinion? And how do you connect with them enough to earn their trust?

Topics for your persuasive speech

We’ve made a list of persuasive speech topics you could use next time you’re asked to give one. The topics are thought-provoking and things which many people have an opinion on.

When using any of our persuasive speech ideas, make sure you have a solid knowledge about the topic you’re speaking about – and make sure you discuss counter arguments too.

Here are a few ideas to get you started:

• All school children should wear a uniform
• Facebook is making people more socially anxious
• It should be illegal to drive over the age of 80
• Lying isn’t always wrong
• The case for organ donation

Read our full list of  75 persuasive speech topics and ideas .

Preparation: Consider your audience

As with any speech, preparation is crucial. Before you put pen to paper, think about what you want to achieve with your speech. This will help organise your thoughts as you realistically can only cover 2-4 main points before your  audience get bored .

It’s also useful to think about who your audience are at this point. If they are unlikely to know much about your topic then you’ll need to factor in context of your topic when planning the structure and length of your speech. You should also consider their:

• Cultural or religious backgrounds
• Shared concerns, attitudes and problems
• Shared interests, beliefs and hopes
• Baseline attitude – are they hostile, neutral, or open to change?

The factors above will all determine the approach you take to writing your speech. For example, if your topic is about childhood obesity, you could begin with a story about your own children or a shared concern every parent has. This would suit an audience who are more likely to be parents than young professionals who have only just left college.

Remember the 3 main approaches to persuade others

There are three main approaches used to persuade others:

The ethos approach appeals to the audience’s ethics and morals, such as what is the ‘right thing’ to do for humanity, saving the environment, etc.

Pathos persuasion is when you appeal to the audience’s emotions, such as when you  tell a story  that makes them the main character in a difficult situation.

The logos approach to giving a persuasive speech is when you appeal to the audience’s logic – ie. your speech is essentially more driven by facts and logic. The benefit of this technique is that your point of view becomes virtually indisputable because you make the audience feel that only your view is the logical one.

• Ethos, Pathos, Logos: 3 Pillars of Public Speaking and Persuasion

Ideas for your persuasive speech outline

1. structure of your persuasive speech.

The opening and closing of speech are the most important. Consider these carefully when thinking about your persuasive speech outline. A  strong opening  ensures you have the audience’s attention from the start and gives them a positive first impression of you.

You’ll want to  start with a strong opening  such as an attention grabbing statement, statistic of fact. These are usually dramatic or shocking, such as:

Sadly, in the next 18 minutes when I do our chat, four Americans that are alive will be dead from the food that they eat – Jamie Oliver

Another good way of starting a persuasive speech is to include your audience in the picture you’re trying to paint. By making them part of the story, you’re embedding an emotional connection between them and your speech.

You could do this in a more toned-down way by talking about something you know that your audience has in common with you. It’s also helpful at this point to include your credentials in a persuasive speech to gain your audience’s trust.

Obama would spend hours with his team working on the opening and closing statements of his speech.

2. Stating your argument

You should  pick between 2 and 4 themes  to discuss during your speech so that you have enough time to explain your viewpoint and convince your audience to the same way of thinking.

It’s important that each of your points transitions seamlessly into the next one so that your speech has a logical flow. Work on your  connecting sentences  between each of your themes so that your speech is easy to listen to.

Your argument should be backed up by objective research and not purely your subjective opinion. Use examples, analogies, and stories so that the audience can relate more easily to your topic, and therefore are more likely to be persuaded to your point of view.

3. Addressing counter-arguments

Any balanced theory or thought  addresses and disputes counter-arguments  made against it. By addressing these, you’ll strengthen your persuasive speech by refuting your audience’s objections and you’ll show that you are knowledgeable to other thoughts on the topic.

When describing an opposing point of view, don’t explain it in a bias way – explain it in the same way someone who holds that view would describe it. That way, you won’t irritate members of your audience who disagree with you and you’ll show that you’ve reached your point of view through reasoned judgement. Simply identify any counter-argument and pose explanations against them.

• Complete Guide to Debating

4. Closing your speech

Your closing line of your speech is your last chance to convince your audience about what you’re saying. It’s also most likely to be the sentence they remember most about your entire speech so make sure it’s a good one!

The most effective persuasive speeches end  with a  call to action . For example, if you’ve been speaking about organ donation, your call to action might be asking the audience to register as donors.

Practice answering AI questions on your speech and get  feedback on your performance .

If audience members ask you questions, make sure you listen carefully and respectfully to the full question. Don’t interject in the middle of a question or become defensive.

You should show that you have carefully considered their viewpoint and refute it in an objective way (if you have opposing opinions). Ensure you remain patient, friendly and polite at all times.

Example 1: Persuasive speech outline

This example is from the Kentucky Community and Technical College.

Specific purpose

To persuade my audience to start walking in order to improve their health.

Central idea

Regular walking can improve both your mental and physical health.

Introduction

Let’s be honest, we lead an easy life: automatic dishwashers, riding lawnmowers, T.V. remote controls, automatic garage door openers, power screwdrivers, bread machines, electric pencil sharpeners, etc., etc. etc. We live in a time-saving, energy-saving, convenient society. It’s a wonderful life. Or is it?

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Example 2: Persuasive speech

Tips for delivering your persuasive speech

• Practice, practice, and practice some more . Record yourself speaking and listen for any nervous habits you have such as a nervous laugh, excessive use of filler words, or speaking too quickly.
• Show confident body language . Stand with your legs hip width apart with your shoulders centrally aligned. Ground your feet to the floor and place your hands beside your body so that hand gestures come freely. Your audience won’t be convinced about your argument if you don’t sound confident in it. Find out more about  confident body language here .
• Don’t memorise your speech word-for-word  or read off a script. If you memorise your persuasive speech, you’ll sound less authentic and panic if you lose your place. Similarly, if you read off a script you won’t sound genuine and you won’t be able to connect with the audience by  making eye contact . In turn, you’ll come across as less trustworthy and knowledgeable. You could simply remember your key points instead, or learn your opening and closing sentences.
• Remember to use facial expressions when storytelling  – they make you more relatable. By sharing a personal story you’ll more likely be speaking your truth which will help you build a connection with the audience too. Facial expressions help bring your story to life and transport the audience into your situation.
• Keep your speech as concise as possible . When practicing the delivery, see if you can edit it to have the same meaning but in a more succinct way. This will keep the audience engaged.

The best persuasive speech ideas are those that spark a level of controversy. However, a public speech is not the time to express an opinion that is considered outside the norm. If in doubt, play it safe and stick to topics that divide opinions about 50-50.

Bear in mind who your audience are and plan your persuasive speech outline accordingly, with researched evidence to support your argument. It’s important to consider counter-arguments to show that you are knowledgeable about the topic as a whole and not bias towards your own line of thought.

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Characteristics of a Persuasive Speech

Persuasive speeches are designed to convince the audience of a speaker's point of view. If you're writing one, every element -- from your opening statement, to the main body and conclusion -- must reinforce that goal. Good persuasive speeches share several common characteristics. Those qualities include an opening statement that grabs interest, evidence that establishes your credibility and a conclusion that compels the listener to support your position or take action.

Attention-getting Introductions

A persuasive speaker engages his audience from the start. One way is to open with a simple declarative statement and details that support your position. For example, a speaker on global warming might begin by saying, "There is little doubt that the planet is warming," states "Presentation" magazine. In your next few sentences, offer statistics to show how the Earth's climate is changing in ways that have negative impacts on human, animal and plant life. Lastly, introduce the consequences by saying something like, "If the ice caps melt, a vast majority of our countries' borders will be underwater."

Authority to Speak

Success in persuasive speaking hinges on how favorably the speaker's audience evaluates his credibility or competence. A speaker can draw on his expertise in an industry or subject to pre-empt common objections that an audience might raise. For example, a climatology professor or meteorologist would draw on his specialized knowledge to refute assertions that sudden climate shifts aren't serious. Credibility also comes from personal experience, which might prove more relevant to an ex-offender arguing the need to reform the criminal justice system, for example.

Logical Presentation

Structure is important for managing the flow of information in persuasive speeches. Most speakers make just two or three main points, with special emphasis on the first and last ones. One common option is problem-solution organization, in which you cite a problem and propose a way of addressing it. For more complex issues, consider the stock issues format of describing the problem, the harms that result and how you might remedy them. In other cases, it may be sufficient to make points sequentially, from beginning to end. Whatever format you use, make sure it's easy to follow.

Smart Pacing

Good speakers recognize the value of a balanced presentation. Many of the best remembered historical speeches are the shortest -- like the Gettysburg Address, which runs only 300 words, according to "Time" magazine. Time your speech while you're practicing it, so you can cut repetitious or unnecessary phrases. Also, make sure you spend roughly the same time on each main point. This approach gives your speech a steady, measured pace that's important in maintaining credibility with an audience.

Stirring Conclusions

The closing paragraph is your last opportunity to persuade listeners. You'll briefly review the main points once more, and then you'll state the actions you want audience members to take. For example, your global warming speech might close with an outline of measures -- such as planting more trees or starting recycling programs -- to ease pressure on the environment. Then finish with a statement that summarizes your purpose.

For example, you might say, "These steps won't solve our problems overnight, but if everyone pitches in, they can change our planet for the better."

• Presentation Magazine: Example of a Persuasive Speech -- Global Warming
• Presentation Magazine: How to Write a Persuasive Speech
• The University of Pittsburgh: Speaking in the Disciplines -- Credibility
• The University of Pittsburgh: Speaking in the Disciplines -- Persuasive Speaking
• The University of Pittsburgh: Speaking in the Disciplines -- The Importance of Organization
• TIME Magazine: 6 Tips for Writing a Persuasive Speech (On Any Topic)

Ralph Heibutzki's articles have appeared in the "All Music Guide," "Goldmine," "Guitar Player" and "Vintage Guitar." He is also the author of "Unfinished Business: The Life & Times Of Danny Gatton," and holds a journalism degree from Michigan State University.

10 Characteristics of Argumentation, its Components and Classification

We explain what argumentation is and what its components are. Also, its general characteristics, how it is classified and more.

What is Argumentation?

Argumentation is  the art of expressing oneself verbally in favor or against a  certain  subject  or position, using examples, reasoning and concrete propositions for the purpose of  persuading  or  convincing  .

Argumentation  has been a topic of human interest since ancient times  , especially in those areas of work that tend to social communication and persuasion of the masses. Philosophers of the stature of Aristotle took care of this, and numerous schools of ancient philosophical thought distinguished themselves from each other on the basis of their argumentative methods and logical customs.

An argument  is distinguished from an opinion in that the latter does not need to be supported with  relevant  reasons  or information, while an argument does. The study of theories of argumentation, thus, allows to discern the logical mechanisms through which conclusions are obtained from a premise.

Characteristics of the argumentation  :

The arguments.

Every argument constitutes  an attempt to convince one or more recipients of the veracity  or convenience of a conclusion, obtained from one or a set of premises, through deductive or inductive processes of a logical, rational order.

Opinions, founded or unfounded  , or feelings, or premonitions  are not arguments  ; Although all this can be used as a premise in a debate, for which they will serve as premises for subsequent arguments.

Components of the argumentation

• Thesis. A main conclusion for or against which will be debated.
• Premises.  A set of propositions that allow the thesis to be approached from a logical perspective.
• Argument. The connection between the premises and the thesis, demonstrating the way in which the former lead to the latter.
• Debate .  Logical and orderly opposition of arguments by those who converse, defending or attacking the positions involved. Examples can be given, hypotheses established, comparisons, etc.
• Conclusion .  A new thesis obtained from the revision of the premises and the initial thesis. It can be the same or different from the latter.

At the end of the debate,  those involved will have reached a number of conclusions  , and they will (or will not) agree on a common view on the issue, whether this is one of the two opposing ones or a third that emerged in the debate.

Plot failures

An argumentative context is called the conditions that accompany the argumentative opposition, that is, the  conditions external to the debate but that also influence it  , such as the culture of the debaters, the place, certain linguistic conventions, the pre-existing relationship between them, etc.

Types of argumentation

• Demonstration.  It starts from premises in search of a conclusion, using deductive mechanisms. It is allegedly "objective": the speaker does not state himself, he speaks of objective facts.
• Argumentation.  Approach the thesis from causes and consequences, using appropriate language for it.
• Description .  It tends towards the intermediate between demonstration and argumentation, since it describes the problem laying the foundations of the debate.

One of the conditions for argumentation implies knowledge of the characteristics of the addressee of the argument, namely:

• that the adversary does not share the argument but can do so,
• that the adversary has the knowledge , intelligence and will to debate fair and square and to be able to be convinced.

• Appointment.  in which the words of another are used to validate one's reasoning.
• Concrete examples.  As factual situations that check the validity of the reasoning.

Without this condition of legitimacy, any debate is futile, since the opposing arguments are rejected a priori.

Negotiation

The term fallacy refers to  an argument that appears to be valid and correct  , but is not. It is commonly used as a synonym for deception, although it is not necessarily so: many logical fallacies are actually faulty reasoning, logical flaws, which should not necessarily be at the service of manipulation and lies.

The above content published at  Collaborative Research Group  is for informational and educational purposes only  and has been developed by referring  reliable sources and recommendations from technology experts. We do not have any contact with official entities nor do we intend to replace the information that they emit.

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Persuasive speech characteristics and examples

Persuasive speech

A persuasive speech  is defined as a statement of reasoning that has the main purpose to influence the actions or thoughts of others. This is based on persuasion: that is, the art of articulating rhetorical arguments in such a way as to convince and influence a listener. Persuasive speech characteristics examples

In this sense, persuasion has been defined as a symbolic process. Through this process, communicators try to convince other people to change their attitudes or behavior with respect to a certain topic in a scenario where there are at least two options to choose from.

Persuasion is said to be a symbolic process due to the type of tools it employs. Among the most used tools, the use of language stands out with its different rich and cultural meanings. Other tools used include non-verbal symbols such as flags, stars , crosses, or trademark logos.

In persuasive speech there are two elements, the persuader (or team of persuaders) and the persuaded (to whom the persuasive strategy is directed). For this discourse to have its effect, there must be the ability of the persuader to recognize that the persuaded has a state of mind susceptible to change.

Another of the necessary conditions for a persuasive speech to exist is the exclusive use of the symbolic tools defined in the previous paragraph .

The use of threat, blackmail or any form of coercion or physical means, distorts it and transforms it into a different type of discourse.

Characteristics of persuasive speech

Direct and precise language from the start.

A persuasive speech engages the audience from the start. Thus, the subject must be presented from the beginning in a direct and precise way. To achieve this end, the speaker relies, among others, on an appropriate bodily attitude. Persuasive speech characteristics examples

Credibility in the exhibition

Success in persuasive speech depends on how favorably the audience evaluates the credibility or competence of the speaker .

A speaker must have experience and knowledge to convince his audience of the validity and relevance of his arguments. Credibility comes from the way the speaker deals with potential objections from the audience.

Logical presentation

Structure is important for managing the flow of information in a persuasive speech . Since, in a sense, this type of speech is intended to manipulate, it must be structured in a way that complies with the thinking scheme of the majority of the audience.

Balanced rhythm

A good speaker recognizes that the length of the speech is as important as the content. These should be calculated to spend approximately the same time at each main point.

This approach gives your speech a steady, measured pace that is important for maintaining credibility with an audience.

Incentive conclusions

In a persuasive speech, the conclusions should appear in the mind of the audience as the speaker develops his themes.

Generally, the final paragraphs are the last chance to persuade listeners. That is why in this part the main points are usually briefly reviewed once more.

Forms of persuasive speech

Two types of persuasive speech are known: dispositional and actuational. In the first, it seeks to influence the audience’s disposition towards a common theme .

On the other hand, the intention of the actuacional is to achieve a determined behavior before the concepts emitted by the speaker .

Martin Luther King Speech (August 28, 1963)

“I am pleased to join you today in what will go down in history as the greatest demonstration of freedom in our nation ‘s history. Five years ago, a great American, in whose symbolic shadow we stand today, signed the Emancipation Proclamation .

This momentous decree came as a great beacon of hope for millions of black slaves who had been burned in the flames of withering injustice. A happy day came to end the long night of his captivity.

But a hundred years later, the Negro is still not free. One hundred years later, the life of the black is sadly paralyzed by the handcuffs of segregation and the chains of discrimination. One hundred years later, the Negro lives on a lonely island of poverty in the middle of a vast ocean of material prosperity.

One hundred years later, the Negro continues to languish in the corners of American society and finds himself in exile in his own land. And so we have come here today to dramatize a shameful condition. Persuasive speech characteristics examples

In a sense, we have come to our nation ‘s capital to cash a check. When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they signed a promissory note to which every American would be the heir… ”.

Jesse Williams, BET Award Acceptance Speech (June 27, 2016)

Now, this award, this is not for me. This is for the real organizers across the country. The activists, the civil rights attorneys, the struggling parents, the families, the teachers, the students who realize that a system built to divide, impoverish, and destroy us cannot be sustained if we stand tall.

All good? It’s a kind of basic math. The more we learn about who we are and how we got here, the more we will mobilize.

Now, this is also particularly true for black women in particular who have spent their lives dedicated to feeding everyone before themselves. We can and will do better for you.

Now what we’ve been doing is looking at the data and we know that the police somehow manage to de-escalate, disarm and not kill white people every day. So what will happen? We will have the same rights and justice in our own country or we will restructure its role.

Yesterday would have been young Tamir Rice ‘s 14th birthday. So I don’t want to know any more about how far we’ve come when public servants paid for by us can shoot a 12-year-old playing alone in a park in broad daylight, kill him on television , and then go home to Make a sandwich…”.

Ghandi (January 12, 1948)

“One fasts for health under the laws that govern health, one fasts as a penance for wrongdoing and feels like one. In these fasts, the fasting person does not need to believe in Ahimsa.

There is, however, a fast that a devotee of nonviolence is sometimes compelled to undertake to protest against some wrong done by society , and this he does when, as a devotee of Ahimsa, he has no other choice. Such an occasion has come my way.

When on September 9, I returned to Delhi from Calcutta, I had to go to Western Punjab. But that was not to be. Gay Delhi looked like a city of the dead. When I got off the train, I saw sadness on every face I saw. Even the Sardar, to whom humor and the joy that humor offers is never deserted, this time was no exception.

The cause of this he did not know. He was on the platform to greet me. He wasted no time in bringing me the sad news of the riots that took place in the Union Metropolis. Right away I saw that I had to be in Delhi and ‘do or die’… ”. Persuasive speech characteristics examples

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