alienation essay introduction

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The concept of alienation identifies a distinct kind of psychological or social ill; namely, one involving a problematic separation between a self and other that belong together. So understood, alienation appears to play a largely diagnostic or critical role, sometimes said to suggest that something is awry with both liberal societies and liberal political philosophy. Theories of alienation typically pick out a subset of these problematic separations as being of particular importance, and then offer explanatory accounts of the extent of, and prognosis for, alienation, so understood. Discussions of alienation are especially, but not uniquely, associated with Hegelian and Marxist intellectual traditions.

The present entry clarifies the basic idea of alienation. It distinguishes alienation from some adjacent concepts; in particular, from ‘fetishism’ and ‘objectification’. And it elucidates some conceptual and normative complexities, including: the distinction between subjective and objective alienation; the need for a criterion by which candidate separations can be identified as problematic; and (some aspects of) the relation between alienation and ethical value. The empirical difficulties often generated by ostensibly philosophical accounts of alienation are acknowledged, but not resolved.

1.1 Introduced

1.2 elaborated, 1.3 modesty of, 2.1 introduced, 2.2 fetishism, 2.3 objectification.

• 3.1 The Distinction Between Subjective and Objective Alienation

3.2 Diagnostic Schema

3.3 applications, 4.1 criteria of ‘impropriety’, 4.2 essential human nature, 4.3 an alternative criterion, 5.1 negative element, 5.2 positive element, 5.3 morality as alienating, 6.1 content, 6.3 prognosis, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the basic idea.

The term ‘alienation’ is usually thought to have comparatively modern European origins. In English, the term had emerged by the early fifteenth century, already possessing an interesting cluster of associations. ‘Alienation’, and its cognates, could variously refer: to an individual’s estrangement from God (it appears thus in the Wycliffe Bible); to legal transfers of ownership rights (initially, especially in land); and to mental derangement (a historical connection that survived into the nineteenth-century usage of the term ‘alienist’ for a psychiatric doctor). It is sometimes said that ‘alienation’ entered the German language via English legal usage, although G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831), for one, typically uses ‘ Entäusserung ’, and not ‘ Entfremdung ’ to refer to property transfer (Hegel 1991a: §65). (It is only the latter term which has an etymological link to ‘ fremd ’ or ‘alien’.) Moreover, perhaps the first philosophical discussion of alienation, at least of any sophistication, was in French. In the Second Discourse , Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) diagnoses ‘inflamed’ forms of amour propre —a love of self (which is sometimes rendered as ‘pride’ or ‘vanity’ in older English translations)—whose toxicity is amplified by certain social and historical developments, as manifesting themselves in alienated forms of self; that is, in the actions and lives of individuals who have somehow become divided from their own nature (see Rousseau 1997, and Forst 2017, 526–30).

There are limits to what can usefully be said about the concept of alienation in general; that is, what can usefully be said without getting involved in the complexities of particular accounts, advanced by particular authors, or associated with particular intellectual traditions. However, there is a basic idea here which seems to capture many of those authors and traditions, and which is not unduly elusive or difficult to understand.

This basic idea of alienation picks out a range of social and psychological ills involving a self and other. More precisely, it understands alienation as consisting in the problematic separation of a subject and object that belong together.

That formulation of the basic idea is perhaps too abbreviated to be easily intelligible, and certainly benefits from a little elaboration. The characterisation of alienation offered here—as a social or psychological ill involving the problematic separation of a subject and object that belong together—involves three constituent elements: a subject, an object, and the relation between them. It will be helpful to say a little more about each of these in turn.

First, the subject here is a self; typically, but not necessarily, a person, an individual agent. ‘Not necessarily’ because the subject could also be, for instance, a group of some kind. There seems to be no good reason to deny that a collective as well as an individual agent might be alienated from some object. For instance, as well as Anna being alienated from her government, it might be that women or citizens find themselves alienated from their government.

Second, the relevant object can take a variety of forms. These include: entities which are not a subject; another subject or subjects; and oneself. The object here might be an entity which is not a subject; for example, Beatrice might be alienated from the natural world, from a social practice, from an institution, or from a social norm, where none of those entities are understood as agents of any kind. In addition, the object might be an entity which is another subject, another person or group; for example, Beatrice might be alienated from her childhood friend Cecile, and Beatrice might also be alienated from her own family. Lastly, the object here might be the original subject; that is, there might be reflexive variants of the relation, for example, in which Beatrice is alienated from herself.

Third, the relation is one of problematic separation between a subject and object that belong together. All of these elements are required: there has to be a separation; the separation has to be problematic; and it has to obtain between a subject and object that properly belong together.

The idea of separation is important. Not all problematic relations between relevant entities involve alienation. For instance, being overly integrated into some other object might also be a problematic or dysfunctional relation but it is not what is typically thought of as alienation. Imagine, for instance, that Cecile has no life, no identity, finds no meaning, outside of her family membership. It is tempting, at least for modern individuals, to say that she has an ‘unhealthy’ relationship with her family, but it would seem odd to say that she was alienated from it. Alienation typically involves a separation from something.

These problematic separations can be indicated by a wide variety of words and phrases. No particular vocabulary seems to be required by the basic idea. The linguistic variety here might include words suggesting: breaks (‘splits’, ‘ruptures’, ‘bifurcations’, ‘divisions’, and so on); isolation (‘indifference’, ‘meaninglessness’, ‘powerlessness’, ‘disconnection’, and so on); and hostility (‘conflicts’, ‘antagonism’, ‘domination’, and so on). All these, and more, might be ways of indicating problematic separations of the relevant kind. Of course, particular authors may use language more systematically, but there seems little reason to insist that a specific vocabulary is required by the basic idea.

The idea of the relevant separation having to be, in some way, problematic , is also important. Separations between a subject and object do not necessarily appear problematic. Relations of indifference, for example, might or might not be problematic. For an unproblematic instance, consider Daniela, a distinguished Spanish architect, who—when it is brought to her attention—discovers that she is unconcerned with, and apathetic towards, the complex constitutional relationship between the Pacific islands of Niue and New Zealand. Her indifference in this case looks unproblematic. Less obviously perhaps, the same might be true of relations of hostility; that is, that hostility also might or might not be problematic. For an unproblematic instance, consider Enid and Francesca, two highly competitive middleweight boxers competing in the Olympics for the first time. It may well be that a certain amount of antagonism and rancour between these two individual sportswomen is entirely appropriate; after all, if Enid identifies too closely with Francesca—imagine her experiencing every blow to Francesca’s desires and interests as a defeat for her own—she is not only unlikely to make it to the podium, but is also, in some way, failing qua boxer.

The suggestion here is that to be appropriately problematic—appropriate, that is, to constitute examples of alienation—the separations have to obtain between a subject and object that properly belong together (Wood 2004: 3). More precisely, that the candidate separations have to frustrate or conflict with the proper harmony or connectedness between that subject and object. Imagine, for instance, that both the indifference of Daniela, and the hostility of Enid, now also take appropriately problematic forms. Perhaps we discover that Daniela has become increasingly indifferent to her lifelong vocation, that she no longer cares about the design and construction issues over which she had previously always enthused and obsessed; whilst Enid has started to develop feelings of loathing and suspicion for her domestic partner who she had previously trusted and loved. What makes these examples of separation (indifference and hostility) appear appropriately problematic is that they violate some baseline condition of harmony or connectedness between the relevant entities. (A baseline condition that does not seem to obtain in the earlier examples of un problematic separation.) Alienation obtains when a separation between a subject and object that properly belong together, frustrates or conflicts with that baseline connectedness or harmony. To say that they properly belong together is to suggest that the harmonious or connected relation between the subject and object is rational, natural, or good. And, in turn, that the separations frustrating or conflicting with that baseline condition, are correspondingly irrational, unnatural, or bad. (For some resistance to this characterisation, see Gilabert 2020, 55–56.) Of course, that is not yet to identify what might establish this baseline harmony as, say, rational, natural, or good. Nor is it to claim that the disruption of the baseline harmony is all-things-considered bad, that alienation could never be a justified or positive step. (These issues are discussed further in sections 4.1 and 5.2, respectively.)

This basic idea of alienation appears to give us a diverse but distinct set of social and psychological phenomena; picking out a class of entities which might have little in common other than this problematic separation of subject and object. The problematic separations here are between the self (including individual and collective agents) and other (including other selves, one’s own self, and entities which are not subjects). So understood, the basic idea of alienation seems to play largely a diagnostic or critical role; that is, the problematic separations might indicate that something is awry with the self or social world, but do not, in themselves, offer an explanation of, or suggest a solution to, those ills.

On this account, the basic idea of alienation looks conceptually rather modest. In particular, this idea is not necessarily committed to certain stronger claims that might sometimes be found in the literature. That all these social and psychological ills are characterised by a problematic separation, for example, does not make alienation a natural kind, anymore than—to borrow an example associated with John Stuart Mill—the class of white objects is a natural kind (Wood 2004: 4). Nor, for instance, need there be any suggestion that the various forms of alienation identified by this account are necessarily related to each other; that, for example, they are all explained by the same underlying factor. Of course, particular theorists may have constructed—more or less plausible—accounts of alienation that do advance those, or similar, stronger claims. For instance, the young Karl Marx (1818–1883) is often understood to have suggested that one of the systematic forms of alienation somehow explains all the other ones (Wood 2004: 4). The claim here is simply that these, and other, stronger claims are not required by the basic idea.

That said, the basic idea of alienation appears to require only a few additions in order to extend its critical reach significantly. Consider two further suggestions often made in this context: that alienation picks out an array of non-trivial social and psychological ills that are prevalent in modern liberal societies; and that the idea of ‘alienation’ is distinct from that of ‘injustice’ on which much modern liberal political philosophy is focused. These familiar claims are not extravagant, but, so understood, the concept of alienation would appear to have some critical purchase on both contemporary liberal societies (for containing alienation) and contemporary liberal political philosophy (for neglecting alienation). The implied critical suggestion—that the concept of alienation reveals that something significant is awry with both liberal society and liberal understandings—looks far from trivial. (Of course, establishing that those purported failings reveal fundamental flaws in either liberal society, or liberal political philosophy, is rather harder to accomplish.)

Particular theories of alienation typically restrict the range of problematic separations that they are interested in, and introduce more explanatory accounts of the extent and prognosis of alienation so characterised. They might, for instance, focus on social rather than psychological ills, and maintain that these are caused by certain structural features—particular aspects of its economic arrangements, for instance—of the relevant society. Such explanatory claims are of considerable interest. After all, understanding the cause of a problem looks like a helpful step towards working out whether, and how, it might be alleviated or overcome. However, these explanatory claims are not readily open to general discussion, given the significant disagreements between particular thinkers and traditions that exist in this context. Note also that introducing these various restrictions of scope, and various competing explanatory claims, increases the complexity of the relevant account. However, these complexities alone scarcely explain the—somewhat undeserved—reputation that the concept of alienation has for being unduly difficult or elusive. It might be that their impact is compounded—at least in the intellectual traditions with which the concept of alienation is most often associated (Hegelianism and Marxism)—by language and argumentative structures that are unfamiliar to some modern readers.

2. Adjacent Concepts

It may be helpful to say something about the relation of alienation to what can be called ‘adjacent’ concepts. The two examples discussed here are both drawn from Hegelian and Marxist traditions; namely, the concepts of fetishism and objectification. Disambiguating the relationship between these various concepts can help clarify the general shape of alienation. However, they are also discussed because particular accounts of alienation, both within and beyond those two traditions, are sometimes said—more or less plausibly—to conflate alienation either with fetishism, or with objectification. Even if some particular treatments of alienation do equate the relevant concepts with each other, alienation is better understood as synonymous with neither fetishism nor objectification. Rather, fetishism is only one form that alienation can take, and not all objectification involves alienation.

The first of these adjacent ideas is fetishism. ‘Fetishism’ refers here to the idea of human creations which have somehow escaped (we might say that they have inappropriately separated out from) human control, achieved the appearance of independence, and come to enslave or dominate their creators.

Within Hegelian and Marxist traditions, a surprisingly wide range of social phenomena—including religion, the state, and private property—have been characterised as having the character of a fetish. Indeed, Marx sometimes treats the phenomenon of fetishism as a distinguishing feature of modernity; where previous historical epochs were characterised by the rule of persons over persons, capitalist society is characterised by the rule of things over persons. ‘Capital’, we might say, has come to replace the feudal lord. Consider, for instance, the frequency with which ‘market forces’ are understood and represented within modern culture as something outside of human control, as akin to natural forces which decide our fate. In a famous image—from the Communist Manifesto —Marx portrays modern bourgeois society as ‘like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells’ (Marx and Engels 1976: 489).

In order to elaborate this idea of fetishism, consider the example of Christian religious consciousness, as broadly understood in the writings of Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872). (Feuerbach was a contemporary of, and important influence on, the young Marx, amongst others.) The famous, and disarmingly simple, conclusion of Feuerbach’s philosophical analysis of religious consciousness is that, in Christianity, individuals are worshipping the predicates of human nature, freed of their individual limitations and projected onto an ideal entity. For Feuerbach, however, this is no purely intellectual error, but is rather ripe with social, political, and psychological consequences, as this ‘deity’ now comes to enslave and dominate us. Not least, the Christian God demands real world sacrifices from individuals, typically in the form of a denial or repression of their essential human needs. For instance, the Christian idea of marriage is portrayed as operating in a way that represses and punishes, rather than hallows and satisfies, the flesh of humankind (Leopold 2007: 207–210).

Religious consciousness, on this Feuerbachian account, looks to be a case where alienation takes the form of fetishism. That is, there is both a problematic separation here between subject and object (individuals and their own human nature), and it takes the form of a human creation (the idea of the species embodied in God) escaping our control, achieving the appearance of independence, and coming to enslave and dominate us. The same looks to be true, on Marx’s account, of production in contemporary capitalist societies. Capital takes on the appearance of an independent social power which determines what is produced, how it is produced, and the economic (and other) relations between producers. Marx himself was struck by the parallel, and in the first volume of Capital , offers the following analogy: ‘As, in religion, man is governed by the products of his own brain, so in capitalistic production, he is governed by the products of his own hand’ (Marx 1996: 616). However, rather than equating alienation and fetishism, fetishism is better thought of as a particular form that alienation might take. (To be clear, there looks to be no reason to think that Marx would, or should, disagree with this claim.)

Note, in particular, that although Marx’s discussions of alienation often utilise the language of fetishism, not all of them take that form. Consider, for instance, the problematic separation sometimes said to exist between modern individuals and the natural world, as the former think of themselves and behave as if they were isolated, or cut off, or estranged, from the latter. The idea here is reflected in the less ‘Promethean’ moments of Marx’s work, for example, in the suggestion that the appropriate relation between humankind and nature would involve not our instrumental domination of ‘the other’, but rather a sympathetic appreciation of our complex interdependence with the natural world of which we are, in reality, a part. Those moments are perhaps most evident in Marx’s discussion of contemporary ‘ecological’ threats—including deforestation, pollution, and population growth—and typically involve his ‘metabolic’ account of the appropriate relation between humankind and nature (Foster 1999). The inappropriate modern relation between humankind and nature here looks like an example of alienation—there is a problematic separation of self and other—but certain central characteristics of fetishism would appear to be absent. Most obviously, the natural world is not a human creation which has escaped our control; not least, because nature is not a human creation. Moreover, the impact on humankind of this particular separation does not comfortably suit the language of enslavement and domination. Indeed, if anything, our inappropriate separation from the natural world seems to find expression in our own ruthlessly instrumental treatment of nature, rather than in nature’s tyranny over us.

The second of these adjacent ideas is objectification. The concept in question is not the idea of objectification—familiar from certain feminist and Kantian traditions—which concerns the moral impropriety of systematically treating a human being as if she were an object, thing, or commodity (Nussbaum 1995). That is a distinct and important phenomenon, but it is not the one that is relevant here. In the present context, objectification refers rather to the role of productive activity in mediating the evolving relationship between humankind and the natural world. This association is most familiar from certain Hegelian and Marxist traditions, with Marx often using the German term ‘ Vergegenständlichung ’ to capture what is here called ‘objectification’ (e.g., 1975: 272).

Humankind is seen as being part of, and dependent upon, the natural world. However, nature is initially somewhat stingy with its blessings; as a result, human beings confront the natural world from an original position of scarcity, struggling through productive activity of various kinds to change the material form of nature—typically through making things—in ways that make it better reflect and satisfy their own needs and interests. In that evolving process, both the natural world and humankind come to be transformed. Through this collective shaping of their material surroundings, and their increasing productivity, the natural world is made to be, and seem, less ‘other’, and human beings thereby come to objectify themselves, to express their essential powers in concrete form. These world transforming productive activities, we might say, embody the progressive self-realisation of humankind.

On this account, all productive activity would seem to involve objectification. However, Marx insists that not all productive activity involves alienation. Moreover, some other forms of alienation—unrelated to productive activity—have no obvious connection with objectification.

Marx maintains that productive activity might or might not take an alienated form. For instance, productive activity in capitalist societies is typically said to take an alienated form; whereas productive activity in communist societies is typically predicted to take an unalienated or meaningful form. Schematically, we might portray alienated labour (characteristic of capitalist society) as: being forced; not involving self-realisation (not developing and deploying essential human powers); not intended to satisfy the needs of others; and not appropriately appreciated by those others. And, schematically, we might portray unalienated or meaningful work (characteristic of communist society) as: being freely chosen; involving self-realisation (the development and deployment of essential human powers); being intended to satisfy the needs of others; and being appropriately appreciated by those others (Kandiyali 2020). Productive activity mediates the relationship between humankind and the natural world in both of these societies, but alienation is found only in the former (capitalist) case.

For an example of a view which might be said to equate objectification with alienation, consider what is sometimes called the ‘Christian’ view of work. On this account, work is seen as a necessary evil, an unpleasant activity unfortunately required for our survival. It owes its name to Christianity’s embrace of the claim that alienated work is part of the human condition: at least since the Fall, human beings are required to work by the sweat of their brows (see Genesis 31:9). On Marx’s account, or something like it, one might characterise this Christian view as mistakenly equating objectification and alienation, confusing productive activity as such with its stunted and inhuman forms. Indeed, one might go further and suggest that this kind of confusion reflects the alienated social condition of humankind, embodying an emblematic failure to understand that material production is a central realm in which human beings can express, in free and creative ways, the kind of creatures that they are.

In addition, according to the basic idea defended here, equating alienation and objectification fails to appreciate that certain forms of alienation might have nothing at all to do with productive activity. Their mutual hostility and undisguised contempt confirm that Gillian and her sister Hanna are alienated from each other, but there seems little reason to assume that their estrangement is necessarily related to the world of work or their respective place in it. The sisters’ engagement in productive activity and the forms that it takes, might well have nothing to do with the problematic separation here. Imagine that the latter arose from a combination of sibling rivalry, stubbornness, and a chance misunderstanding at a time of family crisis involving the death of a parent. This possibility gives us another reason not to equate alienation and objectification.

In short, neither fetishism, nor objectification, are best construed as identical with alienation. Rather than being synonymous, these concepts only partially overlap. Fetishism can be understood as picking out only a subset—on some accounts perhaps a large subset—of cases of alienation. And there are forms of objectification which do not involve alienation (the meaningful work in communist societies, for instance), as well as forms of alienation—outside of productive activity—with no obvious connection to objectification.

3. Subjective and Objective Alienation

3.1 the distinction between subject and objective alienation.

The basic idea of alienation may not be unduly elusive or difficult to understand. However, it obviously does not follow that there are no complexities or slippery issues here, perhaps especially once we venture further into the relevant literature.

Three interesting complexities are introduced here. They concern, respectively: the distinction between subjective and objective alienation; the need for a criterion identifying candidate separations as problematic; and the relation between alienation and value.

This section provides an introduction to, and some initial reflections on, the first of these interesting complexities; namely, the division of alienation into subjective and objective varieties (Hardimon 1994: 119–122). Not all theorists or traditions operate (either, explicitly or implicitly) with this distinction, but it can be a considerable help in understanding the diagnosis offered by particular authors and in handling particular cases.

First, alienation is sometimes characterised in terms of how subjects feel, or think about, or otherwise experience, the problematic separation here. This can be called subjective alienation. For instance, Ingrid might be said to be alienated because she feels estranged from the world, because she experiences her life as lacking meaning, because she does not feel ‘at home [ zu Hause ]’ in the world—to adopt the evocative shorthand sometimes used by Hegel—and so on (e.g. 1991a: §4A, §187A, and §258A).

Second, alienation is sometimes characterised in terms which make no reference to the feelings, thoughts, or experience of subjects. This can be called objective alienation. For instance, Julieta might be said to be alienated because some separation prevents her from developing and deploying her essential human characteristics, prevents her from engaging in self-realising activities, and so on. Such claims are controversial in a variety of ways, but they assume alienation is about the frustration of that potential, and they make no reference to whether Julieta herself experiences that lack as a loss. Maybe Julieta genuinely enjoys her self-realisation-lacking life, and even consciously rejects the goal of self-realisation as involving an overly demanding and unattractive ideal.

Subjective alienation is sometimes disparaged – treated, for example, as concerning ‘merely’ how an individual ‘feels’ about ‘real’ alienation. However, subjective alienation is better understood as a full-blown, meaningful, variety of alienation, albeit not the only one. If you genuinely feel alienated, then you really are (subjectively) alienated.

This distinction between subjective and objective alienation can give us a useful diagnostic schema. Let us assume—no doubt controversially—that all combinations of these two forms of alienation are possible. That gives us four social outcomes to discuss:

Social Situation: Subjective Alienation: Objective Alienation: (i) ◼ ◼ (ii) ◻ ◼ (iii) ◼ ◻ (iv) ◻ ◻ Where: ◻ = Absent and ◼ = Present

These various alternative combinations—numbered (i) to (iv) above—correspond, very roughly, to the ways in which particular authors have characterised particular kinds of social arrangement or types of society. Consider, for example, the different views of modern class-divided society taken by Hegel and Marx.

Marx can be characterised as diagnosing contemporary capitalist society as corresponding to situation (i); that is, as being a social world which contains both objective and subjective alienation. On what we might call his standard view, Marx allows that objective and subjective alienation are conceptually distinct, but assumes that in capitalist societies they are typically found together sociologically (perhaps with the subjective forms tending to track the objective ones). However, there are passages where he deviates from that standard view, and—without abandoning the thought that objective alienation is, in some sense, more fundamental—appears to allow that, on occasion, subjective and objective alienation can also come apart sociologically. At least, that is one way of reading a well-known passage in The Holy Family which suggests that capitalists might be objectively but not subjectively alienated. In these remarks, Marx recognises that capitalists do not get to engage in self-realising activities of the right kind (hence their objective alienation), but observes that—unlike the proletariat—the capitalists are content in their estrangement; not least, they feel ‘at ease’ in it, and they feel ‘strengthened’ by it (Marx and Engels 1975: 36).

In contrast, Hegel maintains that the modern social world approximates to something more like situation (iii); that is, as being a social world not containing objective alienation, but still containing subjective alienation. That is, for Hegel, the social and political structures of the modern social world do constitute a home, because they enable individuals to realise themselves, variously as family members, economic agents, and citizens. However, those same individuals fail to understand or appreciate that this is the case, and rather feel estranged from, and perhaps even consciously reject, the institutions of the modern social world. The resulting situation has been characterised as one of ‘pure subjective alienation’ (Hardimon 1994: 121).

That Hegel and Marx diagnose modern society in these different ways helps to explain their differing strategic political commitments. They both aim to bring society closer to situation (iv)—that is, a social world lacking systematic forms of both objective and subjective alienation—but, since they disagree about where we are starting from, they propose different routes to that shared goal. For Marx, since we start from situation (i), this requires that the existing world be overturned; that is, that both institutions and attitudes need to be revolutionised (overcoming objective and subjective alienation). For Hegel, since we start from situation (iii), this requires only attitudinal change: we come to recognise that the existing world is already objectively ‘a home’, and in this way ‘reconcile’ ourselves to that world, overcoming pure subjective alienation in the process.

Situation (ii) consists of a social world containing objective, but not subjective, alienation – a situation that can be characterised as one of ‘pure objective alienation’ (Hardimon 1994: 120). It is perhaps not too much of a stretch to think of this situation as corresponding, very roughly, to one of the Frankfurt School’s more nightmarish visions of contemporary capitalist society. (The Frankfurt School is the colloquial label given to several generations of philosophers and social theorists, in the Western Marxist tradition, associated—more or less closely—with the Institute for Social Research founded in 1929–1930.) For example, in the pessimistic diagnosis of Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), articulated in One-Dimensional Man (1964), individuals in advanced capitalist societies appear happy in their dysfunctional relationships—they ‘identify themselves’ with their estranged circumstances and gain ‘satisfaction’ from them (2002: 13). Objective alienation still obtains, but no longer generates social conflict, since the latter is assumed—not implausibly—to require agents who feel, or experience, some form of hostility or rebelliousness towards existing social arrangements.

That latter assumption raises the wider issue of the relation between alienation and, what might be called ‘revolutionary motivation’. Let us assume that radical social change requires, amongst other conditions, an agent—typically a collective agent—with both the strength and the desire to bring that change about. The role of alienation in helping to form that latter psychological prerequisite—the desire to bring about change on the part of the putative revolutionary agent—looks complicated. First, it would seem that the mere fact of objective alienation cannot play the motivating role, since it does not involve or require any feeling, or thinking about, or otherwise experiencing, the problematic separation here. It remains possible, of course, that a subject’s knowledge of that alienation might—depending, not least, on one’s views on the connections between reasons and motivations—provide an appropriately psychological incentive to revolt. Second, the relation between subjective alienation and motivation looks more complex than it might initially seem. Note, in particular, that some of the experiential dimensions of subjective alienation look less likely than others to generate the psychological prerequisites of action here. Feelings of powerlessness and isolation, for instance, might well generate social withdrawal and individual atomism, rather than radical social engagement and cooperative endeavour, on the part of the relevant agents. In short, whether subjective alienation is a friend or an enemy of revolutionary motivation would seem to depend on the precise form that it takes.

Interestingly, situation (ii)—that is, the case of ‘pure objective alienation’—might also be thought to approximate to the social goal of certain thinkers in the tradition of existentialism (the tradition of Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980), Albert Camus (1913–1960), and others). Some interpretative generosity may be needed here, but existentialists appear to think of (something like) objective alienation as a permanent feature of all human societies. Rejecting both substantive accounts of essential human nature, and the ethical embrace of social relations that facilitate the development and deployment of those human characteristics, they rather maintain that the social world will always remain ‘other’, can never be a ‘home’. However, although this ‘otherness’ can never be overcome, there do look to be better and worse ways of dealing with it. What is essential to each individual is what they make of themselves, the ways in which they choose to engage with that other. The preferred outcome here seems to involve individuals embodying a norm of ‘authenticity’, which amongst other conditions—such as choosing, or committing, to their own projects—may require that they have the ‘courage’ to ‘grasp, accept, and, perhaps even affirm’ the fact that the social world is not a home for them (Hardimon 1994: 121).

This also clarifies that situation (iv)—which contains systematic forms of neither objective or subjective alienation—is the social goal of some but not all of these authors (of Hegel and Marx, for instance, but not the existentialists). Of course, (iv) might also be a characterisation of the extant social world according to a hypothetical, and over-optimistic, apologist for the present.

4. What Makes a Separation Problematic?

The second of the interesting complexities broached here concerns what we can call the need for a criterion of ‘impropriety’ – that is, a criterion by which candidate separations might be identified as problematic or not. Recall the earlier suggestion that accounts of alienation require some benchmark condition of harmony or connectedness against which separations might be assessed as problematic or not.

Historically, this role—identifying whether candidate separations are problematic—has often been played by accounts of our essential human nature. However, motivated by suspicion of that latter idea, theorists of alienation have sometimes sought alternatives to fulfil that role.

To see how the appeal to human nature works, imagine two hypothetical theorists—Katerina and Laura—seeking to assess whether alienation exists in a particular society. We can stipulate that the institutions and culture of this particular society are individualistic—in the sense that they systematically frustrate cooperation and sociability—and that the two theorists share many, but not all, of the same views. In particular, assume that our two theorists agree that: alienation is a coherent and useful concept; the account of alienation given here is, broadly speaking, plausible; the only serious candidate for a problematic separation in this particular society are those arising from its individualism; and our essential human nature provides the benchmark of ‘propriety’ for assessing separations. Simply put, separations are problematic if they frustrate, and unproblematic if they facilitate, ‘self-realisation’. Self-realisation is understood here as a central part of the good life and as consisting in the development and deployment of an individual’s essential human characteristics. However, assume also that Katerina and Laura disagree about what comprises human nature. In particular, they disagree about whether cooperation and sociability are essential human characteristics, with Katerina insisting that they are and Laura insisting that they are not. It seems to follow that Katerina will conclude, and Laura will deny, that this society is one containing alienation. For Katerina, the widespread lack of cooperation and sociability confirm that the basic social institutions here frustrate our self-realisation. For Laura, the very same widespread lack of cooperation and sociability confirm that the basic social institutions facilitate , or at least do not frustrate, our self-realisation.

Note that in sub-section 1.2, where the basic idea of alienation was elaborated, various relations between subject and object were distinguished, only one of which was characterised as reflexive. However, in the light of the present discussion, we might now think it more accurate to say that—on this kind of account, which uses our essential human nature to identify alienation—only one of them was directly reflexive, because there is some sense in which all of those dimensions of alienation involve a separation from some aspect of our own human nature. After all, this is precisely what picks out the relevant separation as problematic. For example, the separation of individuals from each other is, for Katerina, indirectly also a separation from human nature, from the cooperation and sociability that characterises our essential humanity.

As already noted, this benchmark—by which candidate separations are assessed as problematic or not—is often, but not always, played by accounts of our essential human nature. Given the widespread contemporary suspicion of such accounts—not least, by those opposed to what is sometimes called ‘essentialism’ about human nature—it might be helpful to sketch a recent account of alienation which is not dependent on such assumptions (or, at least, consciously strives to avoid them). There is also a potential benefit here for those of us who do not fully share that suspicion, namely, that such an example might provide some sense of the diversity of available theories of alienation.

Rahel Jaeggi offers an account of alienation of this kind, and situates it explicitly in the tradition of Critical Theory – the kind of emancipatory theory associated with the Frankfurt School. On this account, the idea of alienation has the potential to help us understand and change the world, but only if it receives some significant conceptual reconstruction. Alienation is still associated with the frustration of freedom, with disruptions to something like ‘self-realisation’. However, this account—unlike its forerunners and associates—is said not to be fatally compromised by a commitment to either ‘strongly objectivistic’ theories of the good life or ‘essentialist’ conceptions of the self (Jaeggi 2014: 40).

The crucial term of art here is ‘appropriation’, which Jaeggi uses to refer to the capacity for, and process of, relating to our own actions and projects in ways which engage ‘something like self-determination and being the author of one’s own life’ (2014: 39). Appropriation is successful—and alienation is absent—when ‘one is present in one’s actions, steers one’s life instead of being driven by it, independently appropriates social roles and is able to identify with one’s desires, and is involved in the world’ (Jaeggi 2014: 155). In contrast, appropriation is unsuccessful—and alienation is present—when there is ‘an inadequate power and a lack of presence in what one does, a failure to identify with one’s own actions and desires and to take part in one’s own life’ (Jaeggi 2014: 155). Alienation is thus identified with systematic disruptions of the process of appropriation – in particular, in those systematic disruptions which lead us to fail to experience our actions and projects as our own. These disruptions are said typically to take one of four forms: first, ‘powerlessness’ or the experience of losing control over one’s own life; second, ‘loss of authenticity’ especially when one is unable to identify with one’s own social roles; third, ‘internal division’ where one experiences some of one’s own desires and impulses as alien; and fourth, ‘indifference’ or a detachment from one’s own previous projects and self-understandings.

This model fits happily enough with our basic idea of alienation as consisting in a problematic separation between self and other that belong together. However, the conditions for identifying the relevant dysfunctional relation here are intended to be less demanding and controversial than those involving claims about our essential human nature. There is a kindred notion of freedom as self-realisation, but it is said to be the realisation of a thin kind of self-determining agency and not the actualisation of some thick ‘pre-given’ identity of an essentialist sort. A normative dimension remains, but it is presented as expansive and broadly procedural. It is expansive in that a wide range of actions and projects might be included within its remit. And it is procedural in that the benchmark for judging the success of these various actions and projects is that they were brought about in the right kind of self-determination delivering way, and not that their content reflects a narrow and controversial account of what human beings are ‘in essence’.

Modern culture is said to recognise and value the kind of freedom at the heart of this picture of appropriation. As a result, this account of alienation can be presented as a form of immanent critique – that is, as utilising a standpoint which judges individuals and forms of life according to standards that those individuals have themselves propounded or which those forms of life presuppose. At the individual level, this critique might involve identifying potential tensions between the conditions for treating people as responsible agents, and the obstructions to such agency that characterise alienated selves – for instance, the feelings of powerlessness that prevent individuals from directing and embracing their own lives. And at the social level, this critique might involve identifying potential discrepancies between modern ideals of freedom and their actual realisation in the contemporary world – for instance, the existence of social or political roles that an individual can never make their own (Jaeggi 2014: 41–42).

Of course, there remain questions about this account, and three are broached here. First, one might doubt whether the contrast between essentialist accounts of human nature, on the one hand, and a thinner kind of self-governing agency, on the other, can either be sustained or play the role intended. Second, one might wonder about the ground(s) of normativity; after all, that the kind of subjectivity or self-determination which appropriation embodies is recognised and valued in modern culture does not in itself establish its ethical worth. (More generally, it can seem easier to dismiss Hegelian teleology, or Marxist perfectionism, than it is to find wholly satisfactory replacements for them.) Third, one might be sceptical about the degree of social criticism here, since both the sources of, and solutions to, Jaeggi’s paradigmatic examples of unsuccessful appropriation (‘powerless’, ‘loss of authenticity’, ‘internal division’, and ‘indifference’) seem to focus on the ‘thoughts and dispositions’ of individuals rather than the structures of particular societies (Haverkamp 2016, 69). Of course, there might be plausible responses to these critical worries, some of which could draw on Jaeggi’s own subsequent work (see espcially 2018).

5. Alienation and Value

The third of these interesting complexities concerns the ethical dimension of alienation. The connections between alienation and ethics are many and diverse, and there is no attempt here to sketch that wider landscape in its entirety. Instead, attention is drawn to two topographical features: the claim that alienation is necessarily a negative, but not a wholly negative, phenomenon, is elaborated and defended; and the suggestion that some forms of moral theory or even morality itself might encourage or embody alienation is briefly outlined.

The claim that alienation is necessarily a negative, but not a wholly negative, phenomenon can be addressed in two parts. Defending the first part of that claim looks straightforward enough. Alienation, on the present account, consists in the separation of certain entities – a subject and some object—that properly belong together. As a result, alienation always involves a loss or lack of something of value, namely, the ‘proper’—rational, natural, or good—harmony or connectedness between the relevant subject and object.

It is the second part of the claim which looks less obvious: that alienation is not a wholly negative phenomena, that is, that the loss or lack here may not always be the whole story, ethically speaking. Note, in particular, that some well-known accounts also locate an achievement of something of value in the moment of alienation. The resulting ethical ‘gains’ and ‘losses’ would then need to be weighed and judged overall.

In order to illustrate this possibility—that alienation can involve the achievement of something of value—consider the nuanced and critical celebration of capitalism found, but not always recognised, in Marx’s writings. One pertinent way of introducing this account involves locating the moment of alienation within a pattern of development that we might call ‘dialectical’ in one sense of that slippery term.

The dialectical pattern here concerns the developing relationship between a particular subject and object: the individual, on the one hand, and their social role and community, on the other. By a dialectical progression is meant only a movement from a stage characterised by a relationship of ‘undifferentiated unity’, through a stage characterised by a relationship of ‘differentiated disunity’, to a stage characterised by a relationship of ‘differentiated unity’. There are no further claims made here about the necessity, the naturalness, or the prevalence, of such progressions (Cohen 1974: 237).

The dialectical progression here involves three historical stages:

First, past (pre-capitalist) societies are said to embody undifferentiated unity. In this stage, individuals are buried in their social role and community, scarcely conceptualising, still less promoting, their own identity and interests as distinguishable from those of the wider community.

Second, present (capitalist) societies are said to embody differentiated disunity. In this stage, independence and separation predominate, and individuals care only for themselves, scarcely thinking of the identity and interests of the wider community. Indeed, they are typically isolated from, and indifferent or even hostile towards, the latter.

Third, future (communist) societies are said to embody differentiated unity. In this stage, desirable versions of community and individuality flourish together. Indeed, in their new forms, communal and individual identities and communal and individual interests presuppose and reinforce each other. It is sometimes said that the contents of the first two stages (community and individuality, respectively) have thereby been ‘sublated’—that is, elevated, cancelled, and preserved—in this third stage. ‘Sublated’ is an attempted English translation of the German verb ‘ aufheben ’and its cognates, which Hegel occasionally uses to suggest this elusive combination of ideas (e.g. Hegel 1991b: §24A3, §81A1).

In the present context, the crucial historical stage is the second one. This is the stage of alienation, the stage of disunity which emerges from a simple unity before reconciliation in a higher (differentiated) unity (Inwood 1992: 36). This is the stage associated with present (capitalist) societies involving the problematic separation of individuals from their social role and community. In the first historical stage (of past pre-capitalist societies) there is a problematic relation, but no separation. And in the third historical stage (of future communist societies) there is a separation but it is a healthy rather than problematic one. In this second historical stage of alienation, there is a loss, or lack, of something of value; roughly speaking, it is the loss or lack of the individuals’ attachment to their social role and community. (More precisely, we might say that they have lost a sense of, and connection to, the community, and that they lack a healthy sense of, and connection to, the community.)

However, this disvalue is not the whole of the historical story, ethically speaking. In comparison with the first stage, the second stage also involves a liberation of sorts from the object in which subjects were previously ‘engulfed’ (Cohen 1974: 239). The ‘of sorts’ is a way of acknowledging that this is a rather distinctive kind of liberation. The individual here is not necessarily rid of the constraints of the other (of their social position and community), but they do now at least identify and experience them as such—that is, as constraints on the individual—whereas previously the individual was engulfed by that other and failed to think of themselves as having any identity and interests outside of their social position. In short, the loss or lack of something of value is not the only feature of the second stage of alienation. There is also an important gain here, namely, the achievement of what we can call ‘individuality’. This significant good was missing in the first pre-capitalist stage, and—freed from its present distorting capitalist form—it will be preserved and developed in the communist future of the third historical stage.

This claim goes beyond the familiar suggestion that alienation forms a necessary step in certain Hegelian and Marxist developmental narratives. The suggestion here is that internal to the second stage, the stage of alienation, there is both a problematic separation from community and a positive liberation from engulfment. Those who see only the negative thread in alienation, and fail to see ‘what is being achieved within in and distorted by it’, will miss an important, albeit subtle, thread in Marx’s account of the progressive character of capitalism (Cohen 1974: 253).

There is a lot going on in this schematic discussion of historical stages. The point emphasised here is that theorists—even critics—of alienation need not assume that it is a wholly negative phenomena, ethically speaking. Marx, for example, recognises that the moment of alienation, for all its negative features, also involves the emergence of a good (individuality), which, in due course (and freed from the limitations of its historical origins), will be central to the human flourishing achieved in communist society.

This claim—that alienation might not be a wholly negative phenomenon—concerns the normative dimensions of alienation. However, it is sometimes suggested that the concept of alienation might provide a standpoint from which morality itself, or at least some forms of it, can be criticised. This looks to be a very different kind of thought.

The broad suggestion is that morality, or certain conceptions of morality, might embody, or encourage, alienation. More precisely, morality, or certain conceptions of morality, might embody or encourage a problematic division of self and a problematic separation from much that is valuable in our lives. Consider, for example, accounts of the moral standpoint as requiring universalisation and equal consideration of all persons (Railton 1984: 138). It could seem that adopting such a standpoint requires individuals to disown or downplay the relevance of their more personal or partial (as opposed to impartial) beliefs and feelings. The picture of persons divided into cognitive and affective parts, with the partial and personal relegated to the downgraded sphere of the latter (perhaps conceptualised as something closer to mere sentiment than reason) is a familiar one. In addition to that problematic bifurcation of the self, such accounts might seem to cut us off from much that is valuable in our lives. If these impersonal kinds of moral consideration are to dominate our practical reasoning, then it seems likely that an individual’s particular attachments, loyalties, and commitments will have, at best, a marginal place (Railton 1984: 139). In aspiring to adopt ‘the point of view of the universe’—to use the well-known phrase of Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) – there can sometimes seem to be precious little security or space remaining for, say, friendship, love, and family (Sidgwick 1907: 382). So understood, morality, or certain conceptions of morality, are charged with embodying and encouraging alienation in the form of both a divided self, and a separation of self and world.

The weight and scope of these kinds of concerns about alienation can obviously vary; that is, they might be thought to have more or less critical purchase on a wider or narrower range of targets. There are various possibilities here. These concerns might, for example, be said to apply: first, only to certain kinds of personality types inclined to adopt particular moral theories, and not to the theories themselves (Piper 1987); second, only to certain ways of formulating particular moral theories (the objections here being overcome by a more adequate formulation of the particular theories in question); third, only to particular moral theories (such as act utilitarianism, certain forms of consequentialism, or all impartial moral theories) to which they constitute foundational objections (but not to morality as such); and, fourth, as a foundational objection that counts against ‘the peculiar institution’ of morality itself (Williams 1985: 174). Given both that variety and the subject matter of this entry, it may not be helpful to generalise much more here. However, the point is hopefully made that the ethical dimensions of the present topic extend beyond the normative assessment of the relevant separations. Indeed, taking alienation seriously might lead us to think more critically about some familiar moral standpoints and theories.

6. Some (Unresolved) Empirical Issues

The above discussion of the concept of alienation—clarifying its basic shape, sketching some of its theoretical forms, and introducing a few complexities—still leaves many issues unresolved. These include many empirical and quasi-empirical issues. The present section is concerned with some of the empirical assumptions and claims that appear in what might be called broadly philosophical accounts of alienation of the kind discussed above. It is not directly concerned with the extensive social scientific literature on alienation. That latter literature is often preoccupied with ‘operationalising’ the concept—for instance, treating job satisfaction or absenteeism as proxies of alienated work—in order to engineer predictive models in disciplines (including education, psychology, sociology, and management studies) dealing with a variety of real world contexts (see e.g. Chiaburu et al 2014).

As an example of some of the empirical dimensions of broadly philosophical accounts of alienation, consider Marx’s characterisation of capitalist society as characterised by separations which frustrate self-realisation, especially self-realisation in work. To come to a considered judgement about the plausibility of his views on this topic, one would have to be in a position to assess, amongst other issues, whether work in capitalist societies is necessarily alienated. One would need to judge not only whether existing work is rightly characterised as alienated (as forced, frustrating self-realisation, not intended to satisfy the needs of others, and not appropriately appreciated by those others), but also, if so, whether it could be made meaningful and unalienated without undermining the very features which made the relevant society a capitalist one. (There are, of course, also many more normative-looking issues here regarding that account of human flourishing: whether, for example, Marx overestimates the value of creative and fulfilling work, and underestimates the value of, say, leisure and intellectual excellence.) Reaching anything like a considered judgment on these empirical and quasi-empirical issues would clearly require some complicated factual assessments of, amongst other issues, the composition and functioning of human nature and the extant social world.

A range of complex empirical and quasi-empirical issues also look to be woven into Marx’s views about the historical extent of alienation. Consider the various claims about the historical location and comparative intensity of alienation that can be found in his writings (and in certain secondary interpretations of those writings). These include: first, that certain systematic forms of alienation—including alienation in work—are not a universal feature of human society (not least, they will not be a feature of a future communist order); second, that at least some systematic forms of alienation—presumably including the alienation that Marx identifies as embodied in religious belief —are widespread in pre-capitalist societies; and third, that systematic forms of alienation are greater in contemporary capitalist societies than in pre-capitalist societies. There seems no good textual or theoretical reason to lumber Marx with the view that less systematic forms of alienation—such as the hypothetical estrangement of Gillian from her sister Hanna (which arose from sibling rivalry, stubbornness, and a chance misunderstanding at a time of family crisis)—could never exist under communism.

Take the last of these assorted empirical claims attributed to Marx – the comparative verdict about the extent or intensity of systematic forms of alienation in capitalist societies. Its plausibility is scarcely incontrovertible given the amount of sheer productive drudgery, and worse, in pre-capitalist societies. Nor is it obvious how one might attempt to substantiate the empirical dimensions of the claim. The empirical difficulties of measuring subjective alienation look considerable enough (especially given the limitations of historical data), but alienation for Marx is fundamentally about the frustration of objective human potentials, those separations that prevent self-realisation, perhaps especially self-realisation in work. One suggestion, made in this context, is that the scale of alienation in a particular society might be indicated by the gap between the liberating potential of human productive powers, on the one hand, and the extent to which that potential is reflected in the lives actually lived by producers, on the other (Wood 2004: 44–48). Whatever the appeal of that suggestion, the social scientific details of how one might actually apply that kind of measure in particular historical cases remain unclear.

Related worries might also apply to claims about the prognosis for alienation, in particular, about whether and how alienation might be overcome. Consider, for instance, Marx’s view that communist society will be free of certain systematic forms of alienation, such as alienation in work. Marx’s view about communism rests crucially on the judgement that it is the social relations of capitalist society, and not its material or technical arrangements, which are the cause of systematic forms of alienation. For instance, he holds that it is not the existence of science, technology, and industrialisation, as such, which are at the root of the social and psychological ills of alienation, but rather how those factors tend to be organised and used in a capitalist society. (For present purposes, just assume that a society is capitalist when its economic structure is based on a particular class division – in which producers can only access means of production by selling their labour power—and when production, and much else, is driven by a remorseless search for profit.) In volume one of Capital , Marx writes approvingly of workers who, through time and experience, had learnt ‘to distinguish between machinery and its employment by capital, and to direct their attacks, not against the material instruments of production, but against the mode in which they are used’ (1996: 432). If this had not been his view, Marx could not have, consistently, also suggested that communist society – which, on his account, is similarly technologically advanced and industrial—could avoid this kind of alienation. This suggestion is, nonetheless, strikingly sanguine. Marx is confident, for instance, that the considerable gulf between the gloomy results of adopting machinery in the capitalist present (where it increases the repetitiveness of tasks, narrows talents, promotes ‘deskilling’, and so on) and the bright promise of its adoption in the communist future (where it will liberate us from uncreative tasks, create greater wealth, develop all-round abilities, and so on) is easily bridged. However, Marx’s ‘utopophobia’—that is, his reluctance to say very much, in any close detail, about the future shape of socialist society – prevents him from offering any serious discussion about how precisely this might be done (Leopold 2016). As a result, even the mildest of sceptics could reasonably worry that a range of difficult empirical and other questions are evaded rather than answered here.

This issue—whether, and to what extent, alienation can be overcome in modern societies—is sometimes conflated with the issue of whether, and to what extent, alienation is a historically universal phenomena. To see that these are distinct questions, imagine that alienation only emerges in economically developed societies, that it is a necessary feature of economically developed societies, and that economically developed societies never revert voluntarily to economically undeveloped ones. These are not implausible claims, but together they seem to entail that, although only a subset of historical societies are scarred by alienation, if you happen to live in an economically developed society, then—involuntary Armageddon apart—alienation will remain the fate of you and your successors.

My aim here is not to make significant progress in resolving any of these empirical and quasi-empirical issues, but rather to acknowledge their existence and extent. Since the concept of alienation diagnoses a complex range of social ills involving self and other, it is perhaps not surprising that a variety of such issues are implicated in these various accounts of its proper characterisation, its historical scope, and the possibilities for overcoming it. Nonetheless, it remains important to acknowledge the existence and complexity of these empirical and quasi-empirical threads, not least because they are not always adequately recognised or dealt with in the broadly philosophical discussions of alienation which are the focus of the discussion here.

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existentialism | feminist philosophy, topics: perspectives on class and work | Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich | Marx, Karl | Rousseau, Jean Jacques | socialism

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Jan Kandiyali, Paul Lodge, Lucinda Rumsey, and two anonymous SEP referees, for comments on a previous version of this entry.

Copyright © 2022 by David Leopold < david . leopold @ politics . ox . ac . uk >

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1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology

Philosophy, One Thousand Words at a Time

Karl Marx’s Conception of Alienation

Author: Dan Lowe Category: Social and Political Philosophy , Ethics , Historical Philosophy Word Count: 1000

Listen here , video below

Karl Marx’s thought is wide-ranging and has had a massive influence, especially in philosophy and sociology.

Marx is best known for his unsparing criticism of capitalism. His first major critique maintains that capitalism is essentially  alienating . The second major critique maintains that capitalism is essentially  exploitative . [1]

This essay focuses specifically on Marx’s theory of alienation, which rests on Marx’s specific claims about both economics and human nature.

1. Marx’s Analysis of Capitalism

For Marx, the idea of the  means of production  is a crucial economic category. The means of production include nearly everything needed to produce commodities, including natural resources, factories, and machinery. In a capitalist economy, as opposed to a communist or socialist economy, the means of production are privately owned, as when a businessperson owns a factory. 

The key element  not  included as part of the means of production is labor. [2]  As a result, members of the capitalist economy find themselves divided into two distinct classes: those who own the means of production (the capitalist class [3]  or  bourgeoisie ) and those workers who do not (the  proletariat ).

2. Marx’s Concept of Species-Being

For Marx, whether capitalism and its class-division is a suitable arrangement for human beings depends on human nature.

Because humans are biological beings, and not merely free-floating immaterial minds, we must interact with and transform the natural world in order to survive. [4]  But what distinguishes us from all other animals, like bees, spiders, or beavers, which all transform the world based on instinct, is that we transform the world consciously and freely. [5]

Thus, the essence of a human being – what Marx calls our  species-being  – is to consciously and freely transform the world in order to meet our needs. Like many other philosophers, Marx believes that excellently doing what makes us distinctively human is the true source of fulfillment.

3. Alienation in Capitalist Society

We can now make clear Marx’s claim that capitalism is alienating.

The general idea of alienation is simple: something is  alienating  when what is (or should be) familiar and connected comes to seem foreign or disconnected. Because our species-being is our essence as human beings, it should be something that is familiar. To the extent that we are unable to act in accordance with our species-being, we become disconnected from our own nature. So if work in a capitalist society inhibits the realization of our species-being, then work is to that extent alienating. [6]  And since we are being alienated from our own nature, alienation is not merely a subjective feeling, but is about an objective reality.

So how are workers alienated from their species-being under capitalism? Marx distinguishes three specific ways. [7]

A. Workers are alienated from other human beings. In a capitalist economy, workers must compete with each other for jobs and raises. But just as competition between businesses brings down the price of commodities, competition between workers brings down wages. And so it is not the proletariat who benefits from this competition, but capitalists. This is not only materially damaging to workers, it estranges them from each other. Humans are free beings and can cooperate in order to transform the world in more sophisticated and helpful ways. As such, they should see each other as allies, especially in the face of a capitalist class that seeks to undermine worker solidarity for its own benefit. But under capitalism workers see each other as opposing competition.

B. Workers are alienated from the products of their labor. Capitalists need not do any labor themselves – simply by owning the means of production, they control the profit of the firm they own, and are enriched by it. But they can only make profit by selling commodities, which are entirely produced by workers. [8] Thus, the products of the worker’s labor strengthen the capitalists, whose interests are opposed to that of the proletariat. Workers do this as laborers, but also as consumers: Whenever laborers buy commodities from capitalists, that also strengthens the position of the capitalists. This again stands in opposition to the workers’ species-being. Humans produce in response to our needs; but for the proletariat at least, strengthening the capitalist class is surely not one of those needs.

C. Workers are alienated from the act of labor.  Because capitalists own the firms that employ workers, it is they, not the workers, who decide what commodities are made, how they are made, and in what working conditions they are made. As a result, work is often dreary, repetitive, and even dangerous. Such work may be suitable for machines, or beings without the ability to consciously and freely decide how they want to work, but it is not suitable for human beings. Enduring this for an extended period of time means that one can only look for fulfillment  outside of  one’s work; while “the activity of working, which is potentially the source of human self-definition and human freedom, is … degraded to a necessity for staying alive.” [9]  As Marx puts it in a famous passage:

[I]n his work, therefore, he [the laborer [10] ] does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside of work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home. [11]

If Marx is right about all of this, then contemporary complaints about the degrading nature of work are not hyperbole. Insofar as capitalism prevents us from realizing our own species-being, it is, quite literally, dehumanizing.

4. Conclusion

One may find great inspiration in the idea that true fulfillment can come from creative and meaningful work. Yet most people’s actual experience of work in capitalist economies is characterized by tedium, apathy, and exhaustion. Marx’s theory of alienation provides a conceptual framework for understanding the nature and cause of these experiences, and assures us that these subjective experiences are about an objective reality – and, crucially, a reality we can change.

[1] In general, Marx’s theory of alienation belongs to his earlier philosophy (the chapter “Estranged Labor” in his  Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 , an unfinished work that was unpublished at the time of his death), and his theory of exploitation belongs to his later philosophy (in  Capital ). It is a matter of scholarly debate to what extent this progression in his thinking represented a substantive change in his position, or merely a shift in emphasis.

[2] To keep things simple, I follow Marx in speaking of business being directed primarily at producing commodities. Of course, Marx was writing long before the development of an extensive service sector characteristic of late capitalism. Nevertheless, by tweaking some of the language, his general analysis can also be applied to service industries in capitalist economies.

[3] In classical political economy, a “capitalist” is someone who owns the means of production–not merely someone who is in favor of capitalism.

[4] This emphasis on biological embodiment distinguishes the Marxist conception of human nature from those which count rationality as the distinguishing feature of human beings — a feature which would equally apply to immaterial minds.

[5] Or as Marx puts it, in quasi-Hegelian language, “Conscious life-activity directly distinguishes man from animal life-activity. It is just because of this that he is a species being.” Karl Marx, “Estranged Labor,” in  The Marx-Engels Reader  (ed. Tucker), p. 76.

[6] Here we are focusing on whether workers – the proletariat – are alienated under capitalism. But Marx believes that the bourgeoisie experiences its own form of alienation: see Marx’s “Alienation and Social Classes” in  The Marx-Engels Reade r (ed. Tucker).

[7] Marx is usually interpreted as presenting  four  distinct ways in which workers are alienated under capitalism (see, e.g., Jonathan Wolff’s “Karl Marx,” section 2.3.), and there’s strong support for that within Marx’s own writing. When looked at in that way, the fourth form of alienation just is alienation from one’s species-being. But it is more perspicuous to think of the three ways as  constituting  workers’ alienation from their species-being, rather than being kinds of alienation  in addition to  alienation from species-being. I’m grateful to Jason Wyckoff for pointing out the heterodoxy of my interpretation.

[8] Here we see the seeds of the second critique of capitalism that Marx would develop later: that it is exploitative.

[9] Richard Schmitt,  Introduction to Marx and Engels: A Critical Reconstruction , p. 154.

[10] Marx almost always uses the masculine pronoun to refer to workers. For a discussion of applying Marx’s conceptual framework to women’s labor, both paid and unpaid, see Alison M. Jaggar’s  Feminist Politics and Human Nature , especially chapters 4, 6, 8, and 10.

[11] Karl Marx, “Estranged Labor,” in  The Marx-Engels Reader  (ed. Tucker), p. 74.

Jaggar, Alison M. Feminist Politics and Human Nature . Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1983.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels.  The Marx-Engels Reader (ed. Robert C. Tucker). Second Edition. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978.

Schmitt, Richard. Introduction to Marx and Engels: A Critical Reconstruction . Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.  

Wolff, Jonathan. “Karl Marx.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy , ed. Edward N. Zalta. 2010.

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Marx’s Theory of Alienation In Sociology

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In sociology, alienation is when humans feel disconnected or estranged from some part of their nature or from society. Individuals can be alienated from themselves and from others, often resulting in feeling powerless or without control over their own lives.

The term alienation was conceptualized by Karl Marx when he used alienation to describe the effects of capitalism on the working class. Before this, the meaning of alienation changed over the centuries.

In theology, alienation referred to the distance between humanity and God; in social contact theories, it meant the loss of an individual’s original freedom, whereas, in political economy, it referred to the transfer of property ownership (Musto, 2010).

In Marx”s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, he presented alienation as the phenomenon through which the labor product confronts labor ‘as something alien, as a power independent of the producer.’

According to Marx, the product of a worker’s labor under a capitalist system results in feeling alienated.

The production of labor is felt to belong to someone else and is simply a way for the worker to meet the needs of physical life – purely for wages. Thus, alienation can make an individual or society feel isolated, unworthy, and insignificant (Mukhopadhyay, 2020).

Marx widened the problem of alienation to the economic sphere of material production. Further, he proposed that the economic sphere was essential to understanding and overcoming alienation in other spheres (Musto, 2010).

What Causes Alienation?

According to Marx, workers’ labor was less alienating in past societies. He claimed this was because the workers had more control over their working conditions, the work was highly skilled, and they would make the whole product from start to finish.

This means that the work was more satisfying because the workers could see themselves in what they produced.

However, with the introduction of capitalism and industrial factories in the 19th century, this craftsmanship decreased. Workers had less control over their work, were often unskilled, and were often just part of a production line.

This, according to Marx, generates high levels of alienation, feelings of powerlessness, and not being in control.

According to Marx, the economic system itself is what causes alienation. The introduction of machines increases the division of labor within society; the worker’s task becomes less skilled, capital is accumulated, and thus workers become increasingly fragmented (Boudon & Bourricaud, 1989).

Other sociologists have developed concepts that were later associated with alienation. The economic instability and social upheaval that tends to go along with capitalism lead to what Émile Durkheim coined ‘anomie.’

Anomie is used to indicate a set of phenomena whereby the norms of social structures enter into crisis following an extension of the division of labor (Musto, 2010).

People who experience anomie are more likely to feel isolated from their society. This happens because they no longer see their personal values and norms reflected in the world around them.

Note that alienation and anomie are not the same thing. Alienation occurs when an individual feels disconnected from their work or surroundings. Anomie occurs when there is a lack of shared values and norms in society.

While this can lead to individuals feeling lost and alienated, alienation, in Marx’s sense, is caused by the overlying structure of capitalism, while anomie is a social fact pertaining to individuals.

Marx 4 Types of Alienation

Alienation means the lack of power, control and fulfillment experienced by workers in capitalist societies which the means of producing goods are privately owned and controlled.

According to Karl Marx in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, the capitalist system leads to four distinct ways in which workers are alienated:

Alienation From the Product of Labor

Instead of the workers crafting products from the initial idea to completion, under capitalism, the product is entirely directed by someone else.

The product is highly specific in nature, is repetitive, and workers may only produce one aspect of a larger product on a production line.

Thus, the final product does not feel like the worker’s own and is creatively unrewarding. The product becomes an alien object, one that the worker produces only for the means of wages and survival.

Marx stated:

‘…the object which labor produces – labor’s product – confronts it (the worker) as something alien, as a power independent of the producer… Under these conditions, this realization of labor appears as loss of realization of the workers.’

Alienation From the Process of Labor

Instead of having the freedom to choose how and when they work, workers under a capitalist system must work as and when their employer requires.

They also must complete the tasks set by their employer, meaning that the process of labor is something external to the worker.

According to Marx, the process of labor:

‘does not belong to his intrinsic nature… in his work he does not affirm himself but denies himself… does not freely develop his physical and mental energy.’

Marx perceived the process of labor as directed against the worker as if it ‘does not belong to him.’ While the process of labor is not physically forced upon workers, it is forced in the sense that it becomes non-voluntary.

If the worker does not want to starve and must pay for their home, they feel forced to engage in the process of labor under capitalism.

Alienation From the Self

According to Marx, satisfying work is an essential part of being human. Since workers under capitalism feel alienated from the product and the process, it is not satisfying.

Karl Marx asserted that capitalism is a system that alienates the masses and that workers do not have control over the goods they produce for the market.

Marism is criticial of capitalism because that the people who are the laborers behind the goods and services lose their value over time. When once the workers would have crafted the whole product, they may now be reduced to producing one component on the production line.

Work under capitalism alienated individuals from themselves since work is no longer a joy, but simply a means to earn wages to survive.

Marx implied that the work:

‘…estranges from man… his human aspect.’

Workers become alienated from their true selves, desires, and the pursuit of happiness by the demands placed on them by capitalists.

They are essentially converted into objects by the production method, meaning they are viewed and treated not as humans but as replaceable elements of a system.

Alienation From Other Workers

Under capitalism, workers are encouraged to compete against each other for jobs, better products, and higher profits. This pits individuals against each other in a competition to sell their labor for the lowest possible value.

Instead of seeing and understanding their shared experiences and developing class consciousness, alienation prevents this and instead fosters false consciousnesses.

According to Marx, alienation:

‘(leads to)…the estrangement of man from man… Hence within the relationship of estranged labor each man views the other in accordance with the standard and the relationship in which he finds himself as a worker.’

Under capitalism, workers become profit-maximizing and self-interested individuals. Workers treat others as objects and as instruments to reach an end goal.

How to Overcome Alienation According to Marx

To overcome alienation, Marx suggested that changing perception is not enough. Rather, a reorganization of society is required. According to his historical materialist approach, this is the next step to liberate workers.

Marx predicted that there would be a proletariat revolution that would put an end to capitalism and bring about communism. The continued exploitation of the capitalists would cause the revolution.

A proletariat revolution is a social revolution in which working-class laborers attempt to overthrow the capitalist bourgeoisie. In the Communist Manifesto , written in 1848, Marx and Engels proposed that the proletariat revolution was inevitable and would be caused by the continued exploitation of the capitalists. The workers will eventually revolt due to increasingly worse working conditions and low wages.

In a communist society, there would be shared resources, wealth, and no social classes. The accumulated labor would widen and enrich the laborer’s existence rather than exploit it.

Since there would be no private property, it can be assumed that the workers would have control over their work, meaning that feelings of alienation would lessen.

Frequently Asked Questions

How does alienation affect workers’ sense of control .

Alienation can make workers feel powerless. Alienation in a capitalist society can make individuals believe that what happens in their lives is outside their control and that whatever they do does not matter.

If they feel controlled by the capitalists at work, this may extend into other areas of control in their lives.

Interacting with their boss may increase the lack of a sense of control. If the worker does not feel empowered enough to speak their opinions or give honest feedback, they are less inclined to do so. This can result in less control over their work and more power for the capitalists.

How Does Alienation Influence Job Satisfaction?

Alienation is believed to result in decreased job satisfaction. Specifically, alienation increases need deprivation, resulting in lower job involvement and ultimately decreased identification with their work organization (Efraty et al., 1991).

Other findings indicate that feeling powerless and meaningless in work (work alienation) influences organizational commitment and work effort. When workers feel that they have little to no influence in their labor and feel that their labor is not worthwhile, this can have adverse effects on these outcomes (Tummers & Den Dulk, 2013).

How is Alienation Relevant Today?

A Marxist theory of alienation can explain the paradox of social power and loneliness that is often seen in capitalist societies today (Øversveen, 2021).

There is a global rise in self-reported loneliness, isolation, and mental illness, which may result from cultural, technological, and environmental change, along with the rise of political movements that seek to capitalize on feelings of social frustration in societies (Berardi, 2017)

Berardi, F. (2017).  Futurability: the age of impotence and the horizon of possibility . Verso Books.

Boudon, R., & Bourricaud, F. (1989).  A critical dictionary of sociology . University of Chicago Press.

Efraty, D., Sirgy, M. J., & Claiborne, C. B. (1991). The effects of personal alienation on organizational identification: a quality-of-work-life model.  Journal of Business and Psychology, 6 (1), 57-78.

G. Tummers, L., & Den Dulk, L. (2013). The effects of work alienation on organizational commitment, work effort and work‐to‐family enrichment.  Journal of nursing management, 21 (6), 850-859.

Marx, K. (1992).  Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844 .

Mukhopadhyay, R. (2020). Karl Marx”s Theory of Alienation.  Available at SSRN 3843057.

Musto, M. (2010). Revisiting Marx”s concept of alienation.  Socialism and Democracy, 24 (3), 79-101.

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You are here, socy 151: foundations of modern social theory,  - marx's theory of alienation.

Marx begins his intellectual life as a Young Hegelian, in the company of Bruno Bauer and others. The Young Hegelians, a radical group of scholars, intended to subject Hegel’s theories to critical scrutiny. Eventually, Marx breaks with this tradition altogether by saying that alienation does not come from thoughts and therefore cannot be solved by ideas alone. Alienation comes from material conditions and can only be addressed by changing those conditions. Due to his radical, revolutionary ideas, Marx was forced to move around Europe quite a bit. In his lifetime, he saw his predictions about the uprising of the working classes come to fruition in some places, but he also saw these revolutions fail, including the short-lived Commune in France. Next time, we see how the young Marx who is occupied with Hegelian thought and the concept of alienation transitions to a more mature Marx with the concept of the capitalist mode of production.

Lecture Chapters

• Marx's Early Life
• The Critical Critic
• Marriage and Early Career
• The Paris Commune and Its Aftermath
• The Paris Manuscripts and the Theory of Alienation

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Introduction

Though philosophers and sociologists had been familiar with it for some time, the concept of alienation only entered the discourse of the mental health professions in the mid-1950s. It gained considerable currency through the 1960s and 1970s, spawning a vast and (sometimes) illuminating literature. Some authors of the Cold War era talked loosely of alienation, especially among the young, in purely conventional terms, i.e., as a symptom of disappointment, mistrust, or developmental arrest – of maladjustment to a relatively benign or even admirably “rational” social order. With rare exceptions, literature is quite trivial and of little or no use here. By contrast, those who embraced the idea of alienation in a critical fashion tended to stress the fundamental irrationality of the prevailing social order. They saw the adjusted state of the average individual in late-capitalist society, i.e., normality, as one of self-estrangement and of reification in human relationships....

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Bailly, L. (2009). Lacan: A beginner’s guide . Oxford, England: One World Publications.

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Online Resources

http://www.academia.edu/131509/Frantz_Fanon_Alienation_and_the_Psychology_of_the_Oppressed

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/15408/alienation

http://www.enotes.com/alienation-reference/alienation-187164

http://www.marxists.org/subject/alienation/index.htm

http://www.nosubject.com/index.php?title=Alienation

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What is alienation? The development and legacy of Marx’s early theory

by Hannah Dickinson and Curry Malott

Photo: Glabia Soraia Andrade Silva (Coletiva Caiana). Source: Tricontinental Research Institute (creative commons)

Editor’s note: A Spanish translation of this article is available here .

Introduction

Offering a brief introduction to Marx’s theory of alienation is not a straightforward task. This is due, in part, to conflicting interpretations of key aspects of Marx’s project directly related to alienation, the timing of the publication of Marx’s early manuscripts where the theory is articulated, and the political contexts in which it was taken up. Central to any theory of alienation are questions of the nature of existence, which are often posed this way: Is there a natural or timeless essence from which the human could be alienated? While this question has preoccupied many academics, our most important task is to consider the impact of debates around alienation on our practical, day-to-day organizing.

In this article, we introduce Marx’s writing on alienation as they appear in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 , before discussing the historical context of their publication. We then chart the development of Marx’s thought from the manuscripts to his later work that is grounded in dialectical and historical materialism. Marx’s early works conceive “human nature” as an essential and ahistorical condition from which capital alienates workers, while, as we show, his later work focuses on capital’s process of abstraction and conceives of the human as a process of production , and therefore as dynamic and contingent on the mode of production.

Alienation (or estrangement)

Marx’s writing on alienation appears most explicitly in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 , also known as the Paris Manuscripts, which were written a few years after his doctoral thesis. The German word Marx uses in these manuscripts is entfremden , which is translated as “to estrange” or “to alienate.”

In the manuscripts, Marx was engaging with the recently deceased Hegel and his followers, the Young Hegelians. As the earliest part of Marx’s critical evaluation of Hegel, he wrote that within Hegel’s work there “lie concealed in it all the elements of criticism, already prepared and elaborated” [1]. What Marx finds in Hegel in this early state is “the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle” [2].

One of the errors Marx finds in Hegel early on is “when, for instance, wealth, state-power, etc., are understood by Hegel as entities estranged from the human being” it “only happens in their form as thoughts” [3]. For Hegel, humans are alienated from pure, abstract philosophical thinking. Hegel conceptualized this alienation and the transcendence of this alienation as a process that leads to absolute knowledge and the unity of humanity with a universal truth.

For Hegel, humanity has an original essence, which he conceptualizes as the logical, thinking, speculative mind. In this schema, thought precedes and is independent from action and history. Marx’s later “famous Feuerbachian inversion” demonstrates that it is not the idea of the human essence or nature that produces its concrete existence, but its concrete existence that produces the idea.

Central to Marx’s theory of alienation is a semi-biological or partially-given conception of human nature. Humans, as a part of nature, have certain powers/abilities/faculties that produce certain potentials and needs. Needs refer to that which one feels a desire for, usually for things not immediately obtainable. The feeling of desire for an unmet need, such as the need for food, safety, companionship, play, and “variety” is the mechanism through which one becomes aware of and develops one’s powers [4].

At the same time, man , as a species being, possesses qualities or characteristics that distinguish them from all other species. In other words, we know we are distinct from all other species in the way we smell, sound, taste, feel, and, most importantly for Marx, the way our activity is carried out. Marx wrote that the development of capitalist production alienates the working class from our species being on an extending scale.

In the end of the first manuscript, Marx argues that capitalism alienates “man” or “workers” in four related ways. First, “the worker is related to the product of his labour as to an alien object” [5]. In other words, the result of production belongs to the capitalist (or landlord) rather than to the worker. Second, the worker is alienated “within the producing activity itself” in that the worker’s own relationship to the work being done is “an alien activity not belonging to him” [6]. If the worker is estranged from the object of labor and the labor process, then “estranged labour estranges the species from man” [7]. Finally, “the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labour, from his life-activity, from his species being is the estrangement of man from man ” [8].

The political context of the release of and debates around the manuscripts

Marx’s manuscripts are focused on capitalism, class society, and even communism—although they bear little resemblance to Marx’s later writings, as Marx often uses bourgeois political and economic categories without substantive critique and deploys Hegelian philosophy rather uncritically (it wasn’t until The German Ideology that Marx and Engels broke from Hegel). The manuscripts contain no analysis of class struggle or one of Marx’s first unique discoveries, that class struggle leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Marx never tried to publish his manuscripts. Soviet researchers first edited and published them in the early 1930s, although their real impact emerged after they were more widely translated during the 1950s-60s. Early 20th century Marxist revolutionaries like Lenin, therefore, had no knowledge of them.

Debates around the manuscripts and the concept of alienation they contain emerged between Khrushchev’s famous “secret” speech at the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s 20th Congress in 1956 (which was released by the CIA) and the CPSU’s 22nd Congress in 1961.

The timing of the manuscripts’ dissemination, in other words, coincided with—and to some extent justified—a rightward shift in the Soviet Union and some of the primarily Western socialist states. One can see evidence of Marx’s theory of alienation in Khrushchev’s 1956 speech, which called for a “return to… the most important theses of Marxist-Leninist science about the people… as the creator of all material and spiritual good of humanity” [9]. The 22nd Congress identified the Soviet Union not as a dictatorship of the proletariat but as a “state of the whole people.”

Those who seized on the publication of manuscripts became known as “Marxist humanists.” They claimed to have found in them a way out of what they perceived as the Soviet Union’s “stale orthodoxies,” particularly dialectical materialism. Their theories ultimately enacted and justified as a turn away from class struggle.

Indeed, humanism obscures the fundamental class antagonism that runs throughout society by omitting the category of class. We can see the dangerous political openings humanism provided throughout the last decades of the Soviet Union. In Sam Marcy’s analysis of Perestroika, for instance, he cites a 1988 speech given by Mikhail Gorbachev to the United Nations General Assembly, in which he did not speak once about workers or classes, but about “universal human values” and “universal ideas.” Marcy correctly notes that there “never has been any consensus on what universal human interests are. Each class and each social grouping evaluates human interests from its own point of view” [10].

Among the many critics of the rightward shift represented by Marxist humanism was Louis Althusser, a Marxist philosopher and member of the French Communist Party. Central to this concern amongst revolutionary socialists was the tendency within humanism to sneak Hegelian idealism back into Marxist theory and practice [11].

What remained in the absence of an essentialized notion of human nature was a human history as a process —a dialectical process—without a predetermined subject, and therefore, without a predetermined non-alienated existence to which to return. The basic argument here is that rather than being alienated from the absolute or original essence or spirit, capitalism violently changes workers and alienates them from the process of social production. Any notion of a natural essence to the human, or even nature, was anathema to Marx’s developed theory. He would later critique bourgeois economists for taking the human as an ahistorical given and would instead demonstrate that particular modes of production produce particular kinds of human subjects and social relations.

In other words, Marx would come to place less emphasis on the human as given category, and more on the historically-determined economic, social, and political structures that produce humanity. There cannot be a predetermined Subject or essence because subjects—or people —are produced differently in different modes of production. The only thing given under capitalism is the class struggle. The goal is therefore not to return to some pre-existing state of human nature but rather to produce a new set of social relations, a new world, and a new kind of being.

Historically-determined being

As concrete conditions differ from region to region, so too must the practice of the class struggle. If there is an alienated human essence to return to, then there is a predetermined destination to work toward. If human nature is historical, instead, then there can be no predetermined destination, but an open future endowed with boundless potential. Lenin’s emphasis on creativity and unleashing the potential of the masses in the constantly fluctuating balance of class forces represents this Marxist dialectic, as does the Cuban communist project for a new socialist humanity [12].

For Marx, reality is a totality in perpetual motion and consisting of a series of internally-related parts. The basic premise of internal relations is not only that things are more than they appear to our senses, but that the elements literally contain their relations with other elements. When Marx writes that capital is a relation , it means that it contains the relation to labor and, therefore, class struggle. Things are more than the sum of their qualities but, through their connections to the larger totality, they are also expressions of the whole. Marx’s method was intended to keep the totality or whole in view and while distinguishing and delineating its different parts. The theory of internal relations keeps in view a historically-contingent human character always mediated by the concreteness of actually existing society or social formations.

The same is true for any “essence” of humanity. As Marx said in his sixth thesis on Feuerbach, “human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality it is the ensemble of the social relations” that comprise the human subject [13]. New understandings of the human are possible if we do not take capitalism or human nature as eternal givens.

Marx’s final take: Abstraction

In his most developed work, Capital , Marx doesn’t articulate his theory or methodology of dialectical or historical materialism but rather utilizes it.However, in the afterword to the second German edition, Marx makes a concise statement about his dialectical method. The Marxist dialectic “is a scandal and abomination to bourgeoisdom… because it includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up,” which is why it “is in essence critical and revolutionary” [14]. Although an analysis of the transition of the dialectical method from Hegel to Marx is outside the scope of this article, suffice it to say that it takes on a radically different form.

The practical side of Marx’s dialectical practice is the class struggle. It is the theory intended to correspond to the object of actually existing capitalist relations. The Marxist process of knowledge production, in other words, is intended to be inextricably linked to the practice class struggle.

Marx explores the innermost workings and development of what the capitalist, by definition, alienates from the worker: surplus-value. The source of newly-created surplus value is surplus labor. The dual nature of the source of surplus labor, the difference between the use and exchange value of labor-power, make our alienation from production possible. As a commodity labor power and the surplus it produces exists as such in an alienated form [15].

Marx doesn’t write of alienation in Capital , but of abstraction . Labor is abstracted by capital through the equivalency of distinct concrete forms of labor. Abstract labor is a conceptual abstraction. The concept of the capitalist mode of production is itself an abstraction because no one can “touch” or point to it, although it nonetheless structures our world.

Yet it’s also a real abstraction . The passage from handicraft and manufacture to industrial capitalism takes place through machinery, which transfers the skills and knowledges of workers to capital. “The worker’s activity,” Marx notes, “reduced to a mere abstraction of activity, is determined on all sides by the movement of the machinery, and not the opposite” [16]. Capitalism couldn’t fully emerge without “sweep[ing] away the handicraftsman’s work as the regulating principle of social production” [17].

It is testament to the practical relevance for organizers that the debates around alienation emerged during a historical turning point in the international communist movement. There is much more at stake than academic squabbles removed from the broadest masses of workers. Without an inspiring, hopeful, and correct revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary organization, and certainly no revolutionary movement. Emphasizing the open potentiality of human nature encourages an alluring, attractive, creative, collective imagining of an unrealized future. The resulting revolutionary optimism is fundamental for fostering the motivation necessary to build a mass movement capable of winning. Rather than emphasizing a recovery or a return, focusing on reaching toward an unrealized and largely unknown potential encourages innovation and flexibility in tactics and strategy.

The application of such flexibility for communist organizers has always been critically important, from Lenin and the Bolsheviks to the communist organizers in Alabama in the 1930s [18].  In each instance, practice was informed by the specifics of the local contexts. No predetermined “human essence” factors into the Marxist project.

Through class struggle, and ultimately the dictatorship of the proletariat, the needs and forms of human nature produced by capitalism can begin to wither away and, in their place, can step new needs and new forms of human nature unfettered by the abstraction of value production.

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Social Alienation Essay

Introduction, perceptions of social alienation, theoretical background, how to reduce social alienation.

Social alienation exists in many countries around the world. For example, over the decades, societies have continued to experience marginalization and lower social mobility. Inequalities in education, income, and health highlight the worsening impact of social alienation in the society.

Despite the existence of these social ills, western countries perceive social alienation differently from Eastern countries. America and Europe, for example, perceive social alienation as undesirable. Comparatively, Eastern countries accept social alienation as a normal practice.

This analysis shows that social alienation is perceptual. Based on this analysis, this paper explains the contextual nature of social alienation by demonstrating that, unlike western countries, countries from the East (notably Asia) have learned to embrace alienation as an acceptable social practice.

This view stems from the differences in economic, social, and political structures of western and non-western societies. These structures also inform the existence of social alienation and individualism in contemporary society.

Social alienation refers to the lack of cohesion among groups or individuals. The low level of integration may arise from the lack of common values or beliefs among people (Ilardi, 2009). Social alienation is a growing problem in modern society and it exists in different contexts. Racism and class differentials are the most common denominators for defining social alienation today (Ilardi, 2009).

For example, some sociologists (Immanuel, 2011; Ilardi, 2009) believe racism is the most divisive social factor today. However, other researchers, such as Morrison (2006), say class overrides racism as the most divisive factor in modern society.

For example, many Americans understand social stratification along three lines – the rich, middle class, and the poor (Immanuel, 2011). Gilbert (2010), a sociologist, for example, uses six criteria for defining human societies – upper class, upper middle class, middle class, lower middle class, working class, and lower working class. He says many societies use such divisions to alienate people (Gilbert, 2010).

America leads most countries in practicing social alienation (Immanuel, 2011). Ilardi (2009) quotes a survey from Duke University, which reported that social alienation has worsened in the past two decades. Statistics show that a quarter of the American population feels segregated from the community (Gilbert, 2010).

Such people do not have anyone to confide in. Duke University further reports that 50% of Americans do not have a close “confidant,” besides their family members (Ilardi, 2009).

Statistics collected in 1985 reveal that this trend has worsened over the years because only 10% of the American population felt isolated at the time (Ilardi, 2009). Social alienation has spread to almost all aspects of society. For example, Ilardi (2009) says social alienation exists even in the highest and most prestigious educational institutions.

Although Gilbert (2010) says many people understand the need to eliminate social alienation, non-western societies (notably, Asia) do not have a problem with the practice (Mishra, 2012). For example, social alienation exists as an acceptable social practice in many Asian societies, like China and India (Mishra, 2012).

Moreover, such societies do not experience the same effects of social alienation as western societies do (for example, social alienation does not cause divisions among people in such societies) (Mishra, 2012). The differences between western and non-western perceptions of social alienation arouse curiosity regarding the reasons for this division.

To answer this question, this paper explains that social alienation is contextual. Therefore, unlike western countries, countries from the East (notably, Asia) perceive social alienation as an acceptable practice, while western societies do not.

This study explains these differences by discussing the economic, social and political structures of western and non-western societies, which inform isolation and individualism (or the lack of it) in contemporary society.

The structure of this paper explores the theoretical background of social alienation, eastern and western perceptions of alienation, and measures that both societies could take to reduce the practice. First, it is important to understand the depth of the differences in eastern and western perceptions of social alienation.

Few researchers dispute the fact that social alienation is more severe today than in the past (Mishra, 2012; Immanuel, 2011). This paper already shows that western societies have the highest prevalence of social alienation today.

This section of the paper explains the depth of the differences in eastern and western perceptions of social alienation and how the social, economic, and political structures of the east and the west affect their perceptions of social alienation.

Western Perception

Although studies show that the prevalence of social alienation is higher in Western societies, it is important to point out that social alienation is undesired by western societies. Ilardi (2009) says most western societies consider social alienation as an unwanted and negative practice. In fact, western societies often associate social alienation with personal “emptiness” (Ilardi, 2009).

Szirmai (2005) says specific western liberties and rights have contributed to this perception. Notably, the quest to be free and independent has made most people to be individualistic (Szirmai, 2005). This fact stems from the western view that most people are private citizens and responsible for their destinies.

There is therefore little concern regarding what other people do, or need (Ilardi, 2009). Particularly, this view explains the quest for individual success in western societies (Ilardi, 2009). Individualism is at the center of this analysis because success shares a close relationship with individualism.

Certainly, most westerners believe people should take ownership for their mistakes and success (Szirmai, 2005). To avoid the pitfalls of failure, people therefore strive to make individual decisions, thereby fuelling the spread of social alienation. There is therefore a strong sense of indifference to people in western societies because of this fact.

An example from the work of Pappenheim (2013) highlights an example of indifference towards people in western societies when he explains an incidence where a man attacked a woman with a knife in Kew gardens, New York.

In front of other people, the man wounded a woman with a knife and killed her, without experiencing any opposition from dozens of onlookers who witnessed the incident (Pappenheim, 2013). In fact, Pappenheim (2013) says 38 people witnessed the incident and none of them helped the victim, even as she cried for help.

This example shows the extent that social alienation has permeated western societies and almost like a plague, it has made people less “inhuman.” Consequently, Szirmai (2005) says people who are aware of social alienation in the society (in the western world) are few because many people have become immune to it.

From the extreme nature of social alienation and its undesirable effect on humanity, western societies consider it an undesirable concept (although few people do anything about it) (Pappenheim, 2013).

Nonetheless, as shown through the analysis below, most non-western societies do not experience the extremes of social alienation, as witnessed in western societies, because they have a different view of the practice. Indeed, such societies embrace social alienation as an acceptable social practice.

Eastern Perception

In the context of this study, the Eastern perception of social alienation mainly refers to the social, cultural, and economic systems of Asia, and similar subcultures shared by societies in the geographic Eastern region of the world, which inform their understanding of social alienation. Unlike western countries, most eastern societies support the existence of social alienation in the society.

A deeper comparison of Eastern and Western philosophies show that both paradigms perceive social alienation differently. Western societies conceive social alienation as an undesirable practice, while Eastern societies perceive the same practice as an important tool for self-growth.

These differences manifest in different ways. For example, Henion (2013) replicates the same differences in explaining the American and Chinese lifestyles. He says, Americans love a culture of self-promotion, but China prefers a society that promotes the “collective good.”

A study by Michigan state university affirms the same view after it reported that many Americans preferred having virtual friends, as opposed to spending quality time outside the realms of the virtual world (Henion, 2013). Their comparatively high presence on social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter, shows the extent that mass cultures prevail in the American society.

Comparatively, the same study found that Chinese people preferred to have many real friends, as opposed to virtual friends (hence their fewer numbers in social networking sites, compared to America and other western countries) (Henion, 2013). The same study affirmed that Chinese people dislike a “me too” culture, which characterizes the western society.

Henion (2013) says these differences show the individualistic nature of the American society, which strives to take credit for all good things that happen, while avoiding blame for any wrongdoing that may occur. The Chinese culture fails to mirror the same philosophy because people take responsibility for whatever wrongs that may happen and attribute successes to teamwork and group effort (Henion, 2013).

The public indifference to social alienation in the East stems from the political organization of Eastern States (Gluck, 1991). In China, for example, political mobilization occurs through the creation of an atomized society (Ernest & Breuilly, 2008). This situation is often normal for authoritarian regimes because it enables leaders to consolidate power (Wong & Bo, 2010).

Moreover, in such countries, the government does not recognize the distinction between public and private life. People live in atomized systems that pledge their loyalty to a central power (Henion, 2013).

Therefore, such societies regard any type of social organization that does not follow this structure as subversive to the goal of social cohesion. Wong & Bo (2010) say this situation is conducive to social alienation, but interestingly, he adds that social alienation is a normal characteristic of such societies.

This section of the paper explains the conceptual framework of social alienation. It explores the views of researchers who have greatly contributed to the understanding of social alienation in the western and non-western societies.

The significance of this theoretical framework is the understanding of social, political, and economic structures that differentiate the western and non-western perceptions of social alienation. Therefore, through this understanding, it would be easy to understand the structural differences of western and non-western societies that make both societies perceive social alienation differently.

Similarly, through this theoretical background, it would be easy to understand how the social, economic, and political pillars of non-western countries make them more receptive to social alienation. Notably, the theories of Durkheim, Weber, and Karl Marx contribute to this discussion.

Karl Marx contributed to the understanding of social alienation through the Marxist theory which explains societal structures that support social alienation in the western world. He described social alienation as an antecedent of the industrial revolution (Morrison, 2006). Marx says social alienation affects people because the industrial revolution produces a “mechanized” society (Morrison, 2006).

He attributes this situation to the spread of capitalism in the western world because capitalism denies workers their right to forge fulfilling social relationships (Morrison, 2006). Stated differently, Marx said the capitalist system alienates workers from their humanity by depriving them the power to think (mechanistic lifestyles) (Morrison, 2006).

For example, capitalism reduces people to factors of production (Immanuel, 2011). Most people are therefore at work and rarely get time to spend with their family.

Marx says although the capitalist system recognizes workers as individual entities, the upper class (owners of factors of production) normally dictate their lives (mostly their goals and ambitions) (Immanuel, 2011).

He further says, the bourgeoisie class does not sympathize with the working class because they want to extract maximum value from them (Immanuel, 2011). It is difficult to blame them for pursuing this goal because they are following the rules of business competition, which started from the industrial revolution.

From the Marxist view, a structural analysis of social alienation in the East reveals that its acceptance stems from labor structures of these countries. Certainly, unlike the capitalist system, the communist system broadens the definition of labor by seeking people’s talents and abilities for mass production (Mishra, 2012).

Comparatively, the capitalist system narrows the definition of labor into a small perspective of minimal wage analysis. As opposed to benefitting both the workers and the organizations that employ them, the capitalist system exploits workers by deriving maximum value from them (Kenneth & Topik, 2012).

The communist perception of labor differs from this view because bourgeoisie wishes do not define the relationship between factors of production and production. Instead, communism operates from a classless framework, where the system recognizes worker-inputs, based on the value they create to the society, and not the profits they provide to the ruling class (Mishra, 2012).

Overall, the communist system differs from the capitalist system because communist societies have a collective ownership of production factors, while capitalist systems do not. Workers in the communist system therefore develop identities that mirror the ideals of a communist society. Through the collective ownership of the factors of production, Kenneth & Topik (2012) say Eastern countries embrace social alienation.

Weber and the Theory of Rationalization

Weber explored the role of industrial growth in regulating human interaction. He explored how the influence of the industrial revolution affected people’s happiness (Morrison, 2006). His analysis shows that the industrial revolution rationalized societies in three distinct ways. The first involved a personal cost-benefit calculation of social interactions (Morrison, 2006). To explain this view, Weber said,

“Human beings choose the basis of rational calculi by weighing up advantages and disadvantages with the goal of an optimization. They then estimate a risk, as the product of the extent of the damage threatening and the probability of the event, and weigh it with their personal risk preference” (Hronszky, 2005, p. 59).

His second view of how the industrial revolution rationalized the society involves the transformation of human societies into bureaucracies (Morrison, 2006). Weber believed that bureaucratic principles would have a firm grip on human society.

He made this assertion by associating bureaucracy to rationalization. Through this view, he believed rationalization charts the course of human interaction and societal development (Morrison, 2006). Unlike modern theorists that advocate for the elimination of bureaucracy as a form of institutional governance, Weber did not see an alternative to the concept.

He therefore believed that the bureaucracy would eventually lead to the creation of an “iron-cage” society (Hronszky, 2005). This perception forced Weber to predict a bleak future for human interaction (Morrison, 2006). He said people would eventually be unhappy because capitalism would force them to operate within a narrow realm of rules and control, without the hope of ever changing this situation.

Besides bureaucratization, Weber also perceived rationalization as a process that strives to conceive reality through magic and mystery (Hronszky, 2005). This view was his third explanation of how the industrial revolution rationalized the society.

Although most of Weber’s assertions affirmed Marxist principles, it is important to understand that his views also contradicted the latter. One distinctive difference of their views was the use of profit-maximization and rational calculations, as bases for understanding human relationships.

Marx advocated for the use of profit-maximization, as the basis for understanding human relationships, while Weber said rational calculations could explain the same (Hronszky, 2005). Weber also used the Marxist understanding of capitalism to present a wider conception of bureaucracy (Hronszky, 2005). He said capitalism was a wider long-run social trend of bureaucratizing the society (Morrison, 2006).

Unlike Marx, Weber said the motive to make a profit was not only distinct to the capitalist system. Instead, he said, “new in capitalism is the rational organization of production for sustained profitability, making use of systematic book-keeping records” (Hronszky, 2005, p. 2).

Weber also equated the rise of new and emerging markets (mostly in non-western societies) to the spread of rationalization. He said the emergence of new markets spurred a new way of thinking, in terms of cost and benefits (Morrison, 2006).

Personal concerns and relationships were therefore secondary considerations in this new way of thinking. The emergence of the growth of radical thinking is therefore a new system of harnessing human capabilities for the benefit of corporations and multinationals (with little regard for human relationships). This view explains why many emerging markets (mostly in Asia) accept social alienation.

Durkheim and Solidarity

Durkheim’s principles closely resembled the principles of Marx and Weber. Like his colleagues, he blamed social alienation to the growth of industrialization (Morrison, 2006). Notably, Durkheim feared that the industrial revolution would eventually lead to unhappiness. Stated differently, Durkheim said the most important attribute of human existence was social solidarity.

Some researchers refer to the same concern as “promoting a sense of community” (Hronszky, 2005, p. 5). Durkheim’s beliefs appeared in most of his work.

For example, in his book, Suicide , he said that the lack of social solidarity explains the high incidence of suicide in the society (Hronszky, 2005). He equated the lack of social solidarity to the rising individuality in Protestant churches because Catholics often advocate for social solidarity (Morrison, 2006).

A deeper analysis into the works of Durkheim shows that social solidarity manifests in different clusters. He said the first cluster was the mechanical adoption of social cohesiveness (Morrison, 2006).

A mechanical organic society bonds people through mechanistic attributes like education, religion, and training (Morrison, 2006). Some researchers say this type of social cohesion stems from homogeneous traits that attract people to one another (the prevalence of mechanistic solidarity is higher in small societies) (Hronszky, 2005).

The second cluster of social cohesion is organic solidarity. This type of solidarity stems from the interdependence that binds different societies together. Again, industrialization birthed this interdependence because job specialization formed different interdependent social and professional groups (Morrison, 2006). Unlike mechanical solidarity, the prevalence of organic solidarity is higher in advanced societies.

To further explain this type of social cohesion, Hronszky (2005) says, “Although individuals perform different tasks and often have different values and interest, the order and very solidarity of society depends on their reliance on each other to perform their specified tasks” (p. 5). These three types of social solidarity explain social alienation through the rationalization theory.

Stewart & Barrón (2006) admit that the elimination, or reduction, of social alienation in the society is a difficult and multifaceted issue. From this admission, they advocate for a sensible approach to the formulation of social, economic, or political interventions to solve this issue.

Regardless of this suggestion, both researchers admit that any intervention aimed at stemming out this vice should address group discrimination (Stewart & Barrón, 2006). They also say any intervention for eliminating social alienation should have a political dimension (Stewart & Barrón, 2006). Nonetheless, broad understandings of such interventions highlight similarities with affirmative action.

In fact, both interventions ordinarily include political and economic interventions for allocating political and economic power to vulnerable groups. This action should not discriminate between public and private sectors, but Stewart & Barrón (2006) admit that such interventions are more effective in the public sector. This focus shows that policy interventions present the highest hope for reducing social alienation.

Policy interventions ordinarily cover legislative approaches for empowering disenfranchised groups. Lee (2010) says policy formulators should ensure they consider the political and social sensitivity (described above) when formulating effective policy interventions.

He also says policies should go beyond providing opportunities for marginalized groups because such groups cannot exploit these opportunities with the same effectiveness as other groups would (Lee, 2010). This observation is especially true for groups that have experienced social alienation for long periods. To affirm this view, Stewart & Barrón (2006) argue that,

“Without any overt discrimination, the children of long-term privileged groups may do better in any competitive examinations, and so on. Moreover, disadvantage has many aspects, some of which are unclear. Social networks and information about education, jobs, and economic opportunities are often strongly group-related, so what seems like a level playing field is not” (p. 11).

After acknowledging the weaknesses of general policy interventions, Stewart & Barrón (2006) say policy interventions to eliminate social alienation may take three formats. The first type involves the elimination of policies that promote social alienation.

Changes in such policies should address indirect and direct social alienation. The second category of policy interventions should strive to empower alienated groups to perform better in social, economic, or political contexts (Stewart & Barrón, 2006). The third approach involves the formulation of social, economic, and political targets for the betterment of a person’s abilities.

Lee (2010) believes the second category of policy intervention would be the most effective way of eliminating social alienation because it promotes competition. This advantage makes it easy to rally people to support this cause. The redirection of public expenditure would also achieve the same objective of reducing social alienation by redirecting more resources to marginalized people.

This strategy would solve a perennial problem of capitalism – the failure of the capitalist system to empower everybody. In fact, many pundits say capitalism creates an extremely wealthy society, which thrives under the sweat of an extremely poor society (social alienation) (Morrison, 2006).

The redirection of resources to these vulnerable groups would help to solve some of the problems associated with capitalism because it may give an opportunity for vulnerable groups to enjoy the fruits of capitalism, as people who own factors of production do.

Nonetheless, the possibility that privileged groups would oppose this strategy is high. Similarly, there is a high possibility that some sections of government, which represent these privileged groups, would also oppose the same strategy. One issue that may arise during the process of implementing such a strategy is the public expenditure implications of introducing such a strategy.

The introduction of targets, or quotas, as a measure of reducing social alienation is perhaps the most controversial strategy for reducing social alienation. The controversy surrounds the implementation of the strategy in the private sector. For example, it is easy for governments to implement elements of affirmative action in their policy frameworks.

However, it is very difficult to introduce the same standard in the private sector. The difficulty exists from the fact that introducing extraneous policies in the private sector contravenes the spirit of pro-liberalization of the free market. Despite this difficultly, history shows that some countries have adopted this strategy with relative success.

For example, America, New Zealand, and Northern Ireland (examples of western countries) have used the same strategy to reduce social alienation (Stewart & Barrón, 2006). Fiji, India, and Malaysia are some Eastern countries that have also adopted the same strategy successfully (Stewart & Barrón, 2006). Some of these countries have achieved a reduction of social alienation by promoting the group ownership of assets.

For example, some countries promote group ownership of land, as a strategy for reducing social alienation. The same countries have achieved the same objective by regulating employment policies to promote equal access to employment (Stewart & Barrón, 2006).

Research shows that the adoption of the above strategies reduces social alienation, but does not eliminate the practice from the society (Lee, 2010). The same studies do not guarantee an improvement in the effectiveness of production if societies adopt the same strategies to reduce social alienation (Lee, 2010).

Theoretically, it is important to understand that the adoption of the above strategies should provide both positive and negative effects to the society. One negative effect is the interference with competitive activities in a free-market system.

However, such negative effects do not override the benefit of reducing discrimination and social alienation in the society. In fact, a broader analysis of this issue shows that the existence of social alienation would eventually lead to inefficient resource allocation, thereby eroding the assumption that a free-market system would lead to efficient allocation of resources, if left alone.

Evidence of the adoption of the above strategies in Malaysia undermines concerns that the adoption of the above strategies would introduce inefficiencies in free-market economies. Indeed, Malaysia has adopted strategies that reduce social alienation, while upholding economic growth, at the same time (Stewart & Barrón, 2006).

A deeper analysis of the Malaysian case shows that the country minimized social alienation (associated with capitalism) by adopting the above strategies. For example, Lee (2010) says in 1969, the country experienced ethnic riots that decried the high level of social alienation in the country. Before the riots, race was a function of economic position.

This situation led to poverty and economic imbalance in the country (Lee, 2010). Policy interventions aimed to correct this situation by expanding social services and promoting rural development. The central government also encouraged group land ownership to promote the distribution of national assets to marginalized groups (Stewart & Barrón, 2006).

The formulation and implementation of these policies reduced intergroup inequalities. Income distribution among different groups also improved significantly. Malaysia also experienced political harmony after the introduction of these policies. In fact, Lee (2010) says that after 1969, the country has not witnessed any serious political conflict.

Besides Malaysia, some western countries have also adopted the above strategies to reduce social alienation. Notably, Northern Ireland successfully formulated and adopted inclusionary policies to reduce the high level of social alienation that most Catholics faced in the country.

Stewart & Barrón (2006) say the Northern Ireland society alienated Catholics in the 15 th and 16 th centuries after groups from Protestant churches colonized the country (the Protestants controlled vast economic resources throughout the country). They also ensured they controlled political power by controlling economic activities and maintaining majority representation in government.

The Catholics experienced social alienation on many fronts (political, social, and economic). This marginalization led to the outbreak of violence in the 1970s (Stewart & Barrón, 2006). However, after the British government committed itself to reduce this social inequality by introducing corrective policies, Catholics decided to stop the violence.

The government introduced fair employment acts to stop the high level of unemployment witnessed among the Catholic population. This legislation also reduced inequalities in education and housing. Another agreement between the Catholics and the Protestants (Good Friday Agreement) also corrected economic inequality.

Comprehensively, these legislative changes led to a revolution of the social status of the Catholics in Northern Ireland. To sum them up, Stewart & Barrón (2006) say,

“Inequality in access to higher education was eliminated by the 1990s; inequality in incomes was reduced; the housing inequality was significantly reduced; and the employment profile and unemployment rates became more equal; even the imbalance in recruitment to the RUC was slowly being reversed” (p. 17).

Today, observers say the policy interventions in Northern Ireland stand out among the greatest governmental efforts to reduce social alienation in one generation (Lee, 2010). Evidence of the adoption of inclusive policy interventions therefore shows that they can work in Eastern and Western societies.

After weighing the findings of this study, it is important to acknowledge the differences between Eastern and Western perceptions of social alienation. Both regions acknowledge the existence of social alienation, but western societies consider it an undesirable practice.

However, Eastern societies accept social alienation as an acceptable practice. Social, economic, and political structures explain why such societies embrace the practice.

Although the political view of this analysis shows that most Eastern societies embrace social alienation because it is the main platform for the mass mobilization of people, the economic structures of such societies outline the main reason for the acceptance of social alienation in the East.

The same is true for western societies because economic structures created (and supported) social alienation. Indeed, from an economic standpoint, Weber and Marx say that industrialization has worsened social alienation because it dehumanizes societies by creating social tiers of production.

This paper draws from this understanding and shows that the minimization of social alienation could occur if policy interventions correct the excesses of capitalism. The elimination of policies that promote social alienation should be the first strategy for reducing its effects on the society.

However, the “politically correct” strategy to adopt is empowering alienated groups to compete with privileged groups because this strategy does not interfere with the spirit of fair competition.

The success of such interventions in Malaysia and Northern Ireland shows that such interventions could be successful in reducing social alienation in the East and West. Significant challenges exist with the introduction of these policy interventions, but most of them should correct economic, political, and social imbalances.

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IvyPanda. (2023, December 29). Social Alienation. https://ivypanda.com/essays/social-alienation-essay/

"Social Alienation." IvyPanda , 29 Dec. 2023, ivypanda.com/essays/social-alienation-essay/.

IvyPanda . (2023) 'Social Alienation'. 29 December.

IvyPanda . 2023. "Social Alienation." December 29, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/social-alienation-essay/.

1. IvyPanda . "Social Alienation." December 29, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/social-alienation-essay/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Social Alienation." December 29, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/social-alienation-essay/.

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Translator’s Introduction

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rahel jaeggi’s alienation is one of the most exciting books to have appeared on the German philosophical scene in the last decade. 1 Close It has two significant strengths that are rarely joined in a single book: it presents a rigorous and enlightening analysis of an important but now neglected philosophical concept (alienation), and it illuminates, far better than any purely historical study could do, fundamental ideas of one of the most obscure figures in the history of philosophy (G. W. F. Hegel). That the latter is one of the book’s chief achievements may not be apparent to many of its readers, for Hegel is rarely mentioned by name, and the book does not present itself as a study of his thought. Nevertheless, the philosophical resources that Jaeggi brings to bear on the problem of alienation are thoroughly Hegelian in inspiration. Her book not only rejuvenates a lagging discourse on the topic of alienation; it also shows how an account of subjectivity elaborated two centuries ago can be employed in the service of new philosophical insights.

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