what is morality essay

Bipolar Disorder
Therapy Center
When To See a Therapist
Types of Therapy
Best Online Therapy
Best Couples Therapy
Best Family Therapy
Managing Stress
Sleep and Dreaming
Understanding Emotions
Self-Improvement
Healthy Relationships
Student Resources
Personality Types
Guided Meditations
Verywell Mind Insights
2023 Verywell Mind 25
Mental Health in the Classroom
Editorial Process
Meet Our Review Board
Crisis Support

What Is Morality?

Morality is the behavior and beliefs that a society deems acceptable

Amy Morin, LCSW, is a psychotherapist and international bestselling author. Her books, including "13 Things Mentally Strong People Don't Do," have been translated into more than 40 languages. Her TEDx talk, "The Secret of Becoming Mentally Strong," is one of the most viewed talks of all time.

How Morals Are Established

Morals that transcend time and culture, examples of morals, morality vs. ethics, morality and laws.

Morality refers to the set of standards that enable people to live cooperatively in groups. It’s what societies determine to be “right” and “acceptable.”

Sometimes, acting in a moral manner means individuals must sacrifice their own short-term interests to benefit society. Individuals who go against these standards may be considered immoral.

It may be helpful to differentiate between related terms, such as immoral , nonmoral , and amoral . Each has a slightly different meaning:

Immoral : Describes someone who purposely commits an offensive act, even though they know the difference between what is right and wrong
Nonmoral : Describes situations in which morality is not a concern
Amoral : Describes someone who acknowledges the difference between right and wrong, but who is not concerned with morality

Morality isn’t fixed. What’s considered acceptable in your culture might not be acceptable in another culture. Geographical regions, religion, family, and life experiences all influence morals.

Scholars don’t agree on exactly how morals are developed. However, there are several theories that have gained attention over the years:

Freud’s morality and the superego: Sigmund Freud suggested moral development occurred as a person’s ability to set aside their selfish needs were replaced by the values of important socializing agents (such as a person’s parents).
Piaget’s theory of moral development: Jean Piaget focused on the social-cognitive and social-emotional perspective of development. Piaget theorized that moral development unfolds over time, in certain stages as children learn to adopt certain moral behaviors for their own sake—rather than just abide by moral codes because they don’t want to get into trouble.
B.F. Skinner’s behavioral theory: B.F. Skinner focused on the power of external forces that shaped an individual’s development. For example, a child who receives praise for being kind may treat someone with kindness again out of a desire to receive more positive attention in the future.
Kohlberg’s moral reasoning: Lawrence Kohlberg proposed six stages of moral development that went beyond Piaget’s theory. Through a series of questions, Kohlberg proposed that an adult’s stage of reasoning could be identified.

What Is the Basis of Morality?

There are different theories as to how morals are developed. However, most theories acknowledge the external factors (parents, community, etc.) that contribute to a child's moral development. These morals are intended to benefit the group that has created them.

Most morals aren’t fixed. They usually shift and change over time.

Ideas about whether certain behaviors are moral—such as engaging in pre-marital sex, entering into same-sex relationships, and using cannabis—have shifted over time. While the bulk of the population once viewed these behaviors as “wrong,” the vast majority of the population now finds these activities to be “acceptable.”

In some regions, cultures, and religions, using contraception is considered immoral. In other parts of the world, some people consider contraception the moral thing to do, as it reduces unplanned pregnancy, manages the population, and reduces the risk of STDs.

7 Universal Morals

Some morals seem to transcend across the globe and across time, however. Researchers have discovered that these seven morals seem somewhat universal:

Defer to authority
Help your group
Love your family
Return favors
Respect others’ property

The following are common morality examples that you may have been taught growing up, and may have even passed on to younger generations:

Have empathy
Don't steal
Tell the truth
Treat others as you want to be treated

People might adhere to these principles by:

Being an upstanding citizen
Doing volunteer work
Donating money to charity
Forgiving someone
Not gossiping about others
Offering their help to others

To get a sense of the types of morality you were raised with, think about what your parents, community and/or religious leaders told you that you "should" or "ought" to do.

Some scholars don’t distinguish between morals and ethics. Both have to do with “right and wrong.”

However, some people believe morality is personal while ethics refer to the standards of a community.

For example, your community may not view premarital sex as a problem. But on a personal level, you might consider it immoral. By this definition, your morality would contradict the ethics of your community.

Both laws and morals are meant to regulate behavior in a community to allow people to live in harmony. Both have firm foundations in the concept that everyone should have autonomy and show respect to one another.

Legal thinkers interpret the relationship between laws and morality differently. Some argue that laws and morality are independent. This means that laws can’t be disregarded simply because they’re morally indefensible.

Others believe law and morality are interdependent. These thinkers believe that laws that claim to regulate behavioral expectations must be in harmony with moral norms. Therefore, all laws must secure the welfare of the individual and be in place for the good of the community.

Something like adultery may be considered immoral by some, but it’s legal in most states. Additionally, it’s illegal to drive slightly over the speed limit but it isn’t necessarily considered immoral to do so.

There may be times when some people argue that breaking the law is the “moral” thing to do. Stealing food to feed a starving person, for example, might be illegal but it also might be considered the “right thing” to do if it’s the only way to prevent someone from suffering or dying.

A Word From Verywell

It can be helpful to spend some time thinking about the morals that guide your decisions about things like friendship, money, education, and family. Understanding what’s really important to you can help you understand yourself better and it may make decision making easier.

Merriam-Webster. A lesson on 'unmoral,' 'immoral,' 'nonmoral,' and 'amoral.'

Ellemers N, van der Toorn J, Paunov Y, van Leeuwen T. The psychology of morality: A review and analysis of empirical studies published from 1940 through 2017 . Pers Soc Psychol Rev. 2019;23(4):332-366. doi:10.1177/1088868318811759

Curry OS, Mullins DA, Whitehouse H. Is it good to cooperate? Testing the theory of morality-as-cooperation in 60 societies . Current Anthropology. 2019;60(1):47-69. doi:10.1086/701478

What's the difference between morality and ethics? Encyclopædia Britannica.

Moka-Mubelo W. Law and morality . Reconciling Law and Morality in Human Rights Discourse. Philosophy and Politics - Critical Explorations . 2017;3. Springer, Cham. doi:10.1007/978-3-319-49496-8_3

By Amy Morin, LCSW Amy Morin, LCSW, is a psychotherapist and international bestselling author. Her books, including "13 Things Mentally Strong People Don't Do," have been translated into more than 40 languages. Her TEDx talk, "The Secret of Becoming Mentally Strong," is one of the most viewed talks of all time.

Morality Essay

Morality Of Morality

Everyone wants to be a person of morality. However, as everyone will experience in their lives, that’s no easy task. Throughout everyone’s life, choices arise that are far more complex than simple-answered right and wrong dilemmas. Often a moral pathway may lead to an undesirable outcome, and vice versa. Before examining this in more detail, we must define morality. Morality is the value or extent to which an action is right or wrong. Everyone has their own moral code and sense of right and wrong. Our culture today values the outcome more than the means, however, and will forgive lapses in morality, such as deceit, in order to achieve a favorable outcome. Deceit with immoral or selfish intentions is allowed no wiggle room. Life is much more…

Morality And Morality

Morality is our own way of distinguishing what is right from what is wrong. It is our own understanding of what good and evil is. And, our acts are all based on our understanding of morality. We do and do not do things according to what believe is right and wrong. It is the basis of our actions and all ideas and beliefs regarding it. In short, it is the decision on how we do things that gives great impacts on us. Morality and ethics has no great difference because it is just one. Morality is…

Morality Vs Morality

are doubtless many people in the world that behave morally in some aspects of life and immorally in other scenarios. They choose when to be guided by their moral compass and when to ignore it. How can a person such as this ever become a just person in society? The person can start on the path of being just by not focusing as much on following a moral compass, which may be subjective, but instead on following objective concepts central to nearly all theories of morality. These would be the…

Morality Of Morality In Islam

thinking and their lives. Human beings can not coexist with one another if they do not follow some rules and methods that everyone accepts and make them maintain their relations with others. And good, and all this needs to so-called ethics. Regardless of our morals and beliefs, morals degenerate a human law that applies to all of us. It is widely believed that modern society is in sharp decline. Among the ills cited are skyrocketing rate of crime, divorce, teenage sex, teenage births and drug…

Morality And Morality Essay

Morality The Molality and Morals can differ, and often do, from person to person. This is due to the differing cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds of the people that hold these morals. Religious beliefs often also play a part in shaping one’s morals. Although difficult to define, and often confused with laws, morals can be shaped by culture and religion. The definition of morality varies from each dictionary you may read. The term morality can be defined as “...a code of conduct…” (Gert).…

Difference Between Morality And Morality

Benedict and Midgley The thesis of Benedict’s is that moral relativism is the correct view of the morality. Benedict’s claim that every culture is different from one another. Morality differs from every culture, that’s why what is moral to one culture can be immoral to another. Which culture is right is which one is wrong? it is part of the culture points of view, because if every culture has different standards or right and wrong then we cannot say which one is the one with the total truth.…

Morality And Religion

Morality Exists Independently from Religion Historically, religion and morality have had an influence on each other. The influence of religion has led to the development of some aspects of morality. For example, many abolitionists were religious leaders. On the other hand, morality has had an influence on religion. For example, morality has influenced the Catholic Church’s role over women and abortion. While religion and morality may influence each other, is one necessary for the other? It is a…

Genealogy Of Morality

Morality is one of the most controversial subjects to understand because there is no clear right or wrong answer. It can be one way for somebody and completely different for someone else living in the same area. A majority of people chose their morality based off society or how other people tell them it should be. These people never question why things are considered morally good and evil, rather they unquestionably accepted the values of what’s good and evil dominant in their society. Sigmund…

Biff's Morality

the greatest morality in Death of a Salesman. Biff Loman has the most morality out of any character in Death of a Salesman, and in a big way. He prevented Willy from harming himself with the rubber pipe, he harbored Willy’s affair from Linda to protect their marriage, and finally confessed everything to Willy to get back in his good graces. Biff’s actions probably helped keep Willy alive a few more days and kept Linda and Willy’s marriage alive after the affair. Even though Biff did have some…

Puritan Morality

Do you rely on your own personal experience to decide if something is good or wrong, or do you rely on the Bible to decide what is right or wrong? The definition of Morality explains, “Beliefs about what right behavior is and what wrong behavior is. The degree to which something is right and good: the moral goodness or badness of something” (Dictionary.com). Morality in the time of the Puritans has changed rapidly today from what it once was. How does this change affect us as Christians and what…

Ready To Get Started?

Create Flashcards
Mobile apps
Facebook
Twitter
Cookie Settings

What is Morality? Essay

What is Morality? Philosophers around the world have debated the meaning of morality for centuries. However, it is a word too subjective to be either denoted or defined. Aristotle, often referred to as the father of philosophy, advised that one could determine what is moral by examining the mean between two “less desirable” extremes. For example, courage is a mean between fear and thoughtless rashness; generosity, between extravagance and parsimony. Plato argued that “to know the good is to do the good.” In other words, those who behave immorally due so out of mere ignorance, not defiance. Furthermore, Plato believed that a moral person is a truly happy person; and because people always desire their own happiness, they always …show more content…

This reward system trains us to believe that what is legal is moral. Although a person may be a law-abiding citizen, he or she may not necessarily be moral. The morality of an individual is also based on his or her childhood. Parents have an immense effect on their children’s values. For instance, if parents teach their child at early ages to be a hard-worker, to be honest and true, and to have integrity, then it is likely that the child will grow up with these morals instilled within them. However, some children grow to be the antithesis of their parents. They see that their parents are immoral and so they intentionally grow to think and behave differently. If so, is the child immoral for defying his or her parents, or is the child moral for defying his or her immoral parents? Another factor in determining one’s morals is one’s religiosity. For instance, some religions, such as Hinduism, believe in animal sacrifices as a way of worshiping; however, other religions, such as Catholicism, do not. Thus, to a Catholic, the sacrifice of innocent animals may seem immoral whereas followers of the Hindu religion view the practice as sacred. Therefore, one cannot conclude that simply because a person is religious, he or she is also moral. There are thousands of religions throughout the world; who has the authority to determine whose

Morality, By Joan Didion

Morality in its basic definition, is the knowledge between what is right and what is wrong. In Joan Didion’s essay, “On Morality,” she uses examples to show how morality is used to justify actions and decisions by people. She explains that morality can have a profound effect on the decisions that people chose to make. I think that morality is an idea that is different for every individual based on morals and background.

Frankenstein And Morality By Victor Frankenstein

Morality is a particular system of values and principles of conduct. My interpretation of this is the distinction of right and wrong. Everyone has a personal morals, whether it’s through a group, organization, or just the way their parents brought them up. Morals help create an organized society, they are like unwritten laws. There are so many morals out there the government could not make them all laws, so although morals help govern the world they are not actual laws. Without morals the world would be nothing but chaos. Being honest, fair and just, making the world a better place, respecting others, and being open minded are just a few examples.

Philosophy Hamlet Exam Essay

Plato’s moral theory consisted of the concept of the soul and the concept of virtue as function. To Plato, the soul has three parts; reason, spirit, and appetite. The reason we do things is to reach a goal or value, our spirit drives us to accomplish our goal, and our desire for things is our appetite. The three virtues that must be fulfilled to reach the fourth, general virtue are temperance, courage, and wisdom,

Morality and God Essay

The belief that morality requires God remains a widely held moral maxim. In particular, it serves as the basic assumption of the Christian fundamentalist's social theory. Fundamentalists claim that all of society's troubles - everything from AIDS to out-of-wedlock pregnancies - are the result of a breakdown in morality and that this breakdown is due to a decline in the belief of God. This paper will look at different examples of how a god could be a bad thing and show that humans can create rules and morals all on their own. It will also touch upon the fact that doing good for the wrong reasons can also be a bad thing for the person.

Morality is Relative Essays

James Rachels' article, "Morality is Not Relative," is incorrect, he provides arguments that cannot logically be applied or have no bearing on the statement of contention. His argument, seems to favor some of the ideas set forth in cultural relativism, but he has issues with other parts that make cultural relativism what it is.

Free Will, Nature, And Nurture

The Origins of Morality: How Nature, Nurture, and Especially Free Will Influence One’s Moral Framework

Is Morality Subjective or Objective? Essay examples

12 Works Cited

Morality must be objectively derived because (1) the concepts of good and morality exist; (2) cultures differ regarding certain moral actions, thus there is the need to discover which is right but cultures are similar regarding the existence of and need for morality; (3) relativism is not logical and does not work, (4) for moral principles to be legitimate and consistent, they must be derived external to human societies. Otherwise morality is merely one person's choice or feeling, not an understanding of truth; and (5) the existence of religion. People recognize a moral aspect to the worship of deity; even if the deity does not exist, we still perceive a need for morality to be decreed by Someone

Morality Essay examples

Morality is defined as a system or code that we humans use to differentiate between right and wrong. This system could be derived from a number of factors: religion, culture, and upbringing. It is difficult enough to determine what an individual's morals are, but going further to determine how we came to possess those morals is even more ambitious. Still, regardless of its difficulty, this subject consumes many philosophers and psychologists. One such moral psychologists, Jonathan Haidt, is theorizing the possibility of evolution causing ones morality. Haidt is a moral psychologist at the Universtiy of Virgina further believes that complex social structures such as religion and politics as well as our need for social structures affect

Essay on On the Genealogy of Morality

Friedrich Nietzsche’s “On the Genealogy of Morality” includes his theory on man’s development of “bad conscience.” Nietzsche believes that when transitioning from a free-roaming individual to a member of a community, man had to suppress his “will to power,” his natural “instinct of freedom”(59). The governing community threatened its members with punishment for violation of its laws, its “morality of customs,” thereby creating a uniform and predictable man (36). With fear of punishment curtailing his behavior, man was no longer allowed the freedom to indulge his every instinct. He turned his aggressive focus inward, became ashamed of his natural animal instincts, judged himself as inherently evil, and developed a bad conscience (46).

Essay about The Causes of Crime

A quite popular idea is that a person's childhood has the greatest influence on their personality and their moral standards. As stated by Patrick Crispen in Criminal Minds, a child's morals are learned and set by the age of ten years old (67). Also stated in Criminal Minds, is the assumption that a sixth-grade teacher could look at a class of students and determine who will be successful, who will be a "trouble-maker", and so forth (70). This is a deeper example of how

The Importance Of Ethical Behavior And It 's Significance

These virtuous standards directs our actions in order that nonviolent societies might be. Many individuals acquire ethical standards from their family, their peers at institutes, in religious settings, or in other public locations. While a record amount of societies obtain their logic of that which is

The Doll's House Thesis Statement

Morality is defined as a recognition or belief that explains why some behaviors are bad or good. In simple words, morality refers to values relating to the distinction between wrong and right or good and bad. Few morals are easily accepted and are only questioned by some fringes of society who might disagree with such morals. These individuals on the fringes can be bad or good. The ones who reject socially accepted moral does not necessarily mean that they are good persons. Thus, one can say that each individual has morals that are different from each other (Joseph).

Morals, Values, and Ethics Essays

Many things can contribute to what you think is morally right or wrong. Religion, for example, may create a barrier on to what extent you do something. Some religions set rules, or guidelines on which they limit what people do. Cultures, as well, contribute to people’s decisions. Many times our values and ethics disagree with different people who hold different

The Acquisition of Morality Essay

3 Works Cited

Would you describe a dog as capable of being evil? Or a cat? Or a chimpanzee? Most likely you could not. We humans belong to the taxonomic kingdom of Animalia and are therefore animals. Our species has evolved from animals that looked and acted more like the modern chimpanzee than we do. So at what point did we go from being creatures of instinct do developing the concept of morality? A great deal of literature has been written about morality, examples of which can be located in fiction and non-fiction as well as in scientific, theological and philosophical fields. Specific examples include the bible, as well as the writings of Plato (c. 424-348 BCE), Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) and John Steinbeck (1902-1968). Morality is a trait that

My Values, Morals and Ethics Essay

What is Ethics? In Webster dictionary website define ethic is an area of study that deals with ideas about what is good and bad behavior: a branch of philosophy dealing with what is morally right or wrong. We have ethical training in the military to create a universal standard of behavior because morals are so variable and linked to religious belief. They cannot tell people what religious behaviors to have but they can create a universal ethical guidance. Many people might think of ethic is common sense and may not take it seriously. Sometimes we need the reinforcement like the ethic training to illustrate what is right and wrong look like, and hope people will do the right thing intuitively. I believe everyone has their own ethical

Essay on Morality

Students are often asked to write an essay on Morality in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Morality

What is morality.

Morality is about knowing right from wrong. It’s like an invisible rule book that guides us to be good people. Everyone has different ideas about what is moral because we grow up in different places with different beliefs.

Morals in Our Lives

We use morals every day. When we share our toys, tell the truth, or help someone who is hurt, we are showing good morals. Our family, friends, and teachers help us learn these good actions.

Morals and Society

Morals keep society running smoothly. They are like the glue that holds people together. Without morals, there would be more fighting and unhappiness.

Learning Morals

We learn morals from the people around us. Books, stories, and even movies can teach us what is right and wrong. It’s important to keep learning about morals to become better people.

250 Words Essay on Morality

Morality is about knowing the difference between right and wrong or good and bad behavior. It is like a set of rules that people agree on to live together peacefully. Imagine if no one knew not to steal or hurt others; the world would be very chaotic! Morality helps us live in a way that is fair to everyone.

Why is Morality Important?

Morality is important because it guides us in making choices that are good for everyone. It teaches us to treat others kindly and to be honest. When we follow moral rules, we make our families, schools, and communities better places. It’s like playing a game where everyone knows the rules and plays fairly – the game is more fun that way.

Where Does Morality Come From?

People learn about what is right and wrong from their families, schools, and the society they live in. Some moral rules are written in laws, and others are things we just know in our hearts. For example, sharing with others is not a law, but it is a kind thing to do.

Challenges with Morality

Sometimes it’s hard to know what the right thing to do is. Different people or cultures might have different ideas about morality. The key is to think about how your actions affect others and to choose to be kind and fair.

Morality is like the glue that holds people together. It helps us know how to act so that we can all get along and be happy. It’s important for everyone to try their best to be moral and do the right thing.

500 Words Essay on Morality

Morality is about knowing the difference between right and wrong or good and bad behavior. It is a set of rules that we live by. These rules can come from our family, religion, or society. They guide us to be good people and to treat others well.

Why Morality is Important

Morality is important because it helps us live together in peace. When we follow moral rules, we can trust each other. We know that others won’t hurt us or take our things. This trust lets us make friends, work together, and build a happy community.

Different Kinds of Morals

There are many kinds of morals because people come from different places and have different beliefs. Some people think it’s very important to be honest, while others think being kind is the most important. But most people agree on some basic things, like not hurting others, not stealing, and treating others as we want to be treated.

Learning About Morality

We learn about morality from when we are very young. Our parents teach us to share and to say “sorry” when we do something wrong. At school, teachers tell us about being fair and not cheating. We also learn from stories and movies that show heroes being brave and doing the right thing.

Morality and Choices

Every day, we have to make choices. Some choices are about morality. For example, if you find a lost wallet, you have to choose to return it or keep it. Morality helps us make the right choice. Even when no one is watching, being moral means doing the right thing.

Morality and Feelings

Morality is not just about rules; it’s also about feelings. When we do something good, we feel happy and proud. When we do something bad, we might feel sad or guilty. These feelings help us know if our choices match our morals.

Challenges to Morality

Sometimes, it’s hard to be moral. Maybe we are tempted to do something wrong because it seems easier or because we might get something we want. It can also be hard when people around us are not being moral. But sticking to our morals, even when it’s tough, makes us strong and respected.

Morality in the Future

As we grow up, our understanding of morality can change. We start to see the bigger picture and understand why morals are important for everyone. We learn to think about how our actions affect other people, animals, and even the whole planet. Morality helps us become better people and make the world a better place.

In conclusion, morality is like a compass that guides us through life. It helps us know which way is right and which way is wrong. By following our moral compass, we can live in a way that is good for us and for everyone around us. Remember, being moral is not always easy, but it is always worth it.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

If you’re looking for more, here are essays on other interesting topics:

Essay on Turkey
Essay on Moral Responsibility
Essay on Moral Relativism

Apart from these, you can look at all the essays by clicking here .

Happy studying!

Ethics and Morality

Morality, Ethics, Evil, Greed

Reviewed by Psychology Today Staff

To put it simply, ethics represents the moral code that guides a person’s choices and behaviors throughout their life. The idea of a moral code extends beyond the individual to include what is determined to be right, and wrong, for a community or society at large.

Ethics is concerned with rights, responsibilities, use of language, what it means to live an ethical life, and how people make moral decisions. We may think of moralizing as an intellectual exercise, but more frequently it's an attempt to make sense of our gut instincts and reactions. It's a subjective concept, and many people have strong and stubborn beliefs about what's right and wrong that can place them in direct contrast to the moral beliefs of others. Yet even though morals may vary from person to person, religion to religion, and culture to culture, many have been found to be universal, stemming from basic human emotions.

The Science of Being Virtuous
Understanding Amorality
The Stages of Moral Development

Those who are considered morally good are said to be virtuous, holding themselves to high ethical standards, while those viewed as morally bad are thought of as wicked, sinful, or even criminal. Morality was a key concern of Aristotle, who first studied questions such as “What is moral responsibility?” and “What does it take for a human being to be virtuous?”

We used to think that people are born with a blank slate, but research has shown that people have an innate sense of morality . Of course, parents and the greater society can certainly nurture and develop morality and ethics in children.

Humans are ethical and moral regardless of religion and God. People are not fundamentally good nor are they fundamentally evil. However, a Pew study found that atheists are much less likely than theists to believe that there are "absolute standards of right and wrong." In effect, atheism does not undermine morality, but the atheist’s conception of morality may depart from that of the traditional theist.

Animals are like humans—and humans are animals, after all. Many studies have been conducted across animal species, and more than 90 percent of their behavior is what can be identified as “prosocial” or positive. Plus, you won’t find mass warfare in animals as you do in humans. Hence, in a way, you can say that animals are more moral than humans.

The examination of moral psychology involves the study of moral philosophy but the field is more concerned with how a person comes to make a right or wrong decision, rather than what sort of decisions he or she should have made. Character, reasoning, responsibility, and altruism , among other areas, also come into play, as does the development of morality.

The seven deadly sins were first enumerated in the sixth century by Pope Gregory I, and represent the sweep of immoral behavior. Also known as the cardinal sins or seven deadly vices, they are vanity, jealousy , anger , laziness, greed, gluttony, and lust. People who demonstrate these immoral behaviors are often said to be flawed in character. Some modern thinkers suggest that virtue often disguises a hidden vice; it just depends on where we tip the scale .

An amoral person has no sense of, or care for, what is right or wrong. There is no regard for either morality or immorality. Conversely, an immoral person knows the difference, yet he does the wrong thing, regardless. The amoral politician, for example, has no conscience and makes choices based on his own personal needs; he is oblivious to whether his actions are right or wrong.

One could argue that the actions of Wells Fargo, for example, were amoral if the bank had no sense of right or wrong. In the 2016 fraud scandal, the bank created fraudulent savings and checking accounts for millions of clients, unbeknownst to them. Of course, if the bank knew what it was doing all along, then the scandal would be labeled immoral.

Everyone tells white lies to a degree, and often the lie is done for the greater good. But the idea that a small percentage of people tell the lion’s share of lies is the Pareto principle, the law of the vital few. It is 20 percent of the population that accounts for 80 percent of a behavior.

We do know what is right from wrong . If you harm and injure another person, that is wrong. However, what is right for one person, may well be wrong for another. A good example of this dichotomy is the religious conservative who thinks that a woman’s right to her body is morally wrong. In this case, one’s ethics are based on one’s values; and the moral divide between values can be vast.

Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg established his stages of moral development in 1958. This framework has led to current research into moral psychology. Kohlberg's work addresses the process of how we think of right and wrong and is based on Jean Piaget's theory of moral judgment for children. His stages include pre-conventional, conventional, post-conventional, and what we learn in one stage is integrated into the subsequent stages.

The pre-conventional stage is driven by obedience and punishment . This is a child's view of what is right or wrong. Examples of this thinking: “I hit my brother and I received a time-out.” “How can I avoid punishment?” “What's in it for me?”

The conventional stage is when we accept societal views on rights and wrongs. In this stage people follow rules with a good boy and nice girl orientation. An example of this thinking: “Do it for me.” This stage also includes law-and-order morality: “Do your duty.”

The post-conventional stage is more abstract: “Your right and wrong is not my right and wrong.” This stage goes beyond social norms and an individual develops his own moral compass, sticking to personal principles of what is ethical or not.

The film’s carefully mapped-out confusion seems to reflect director Alex Garland’s key point: War, civil or international, ultimately blurs crucial moral distinctions.

Explore vital strategies to drive transparency and ethical leadership in the era of AI.

Measles—from personal experience to a 21st-century global public health crisis. How did we get here and what can we do about it?

Blind allegiance to consistency can hinder decision-making and reinforce biases. Discover how steadfastness and adaptability shape our moral compass.

What Taylor Swift’s new album, COVID-19 vaccines, and the 2020 election can teach us about patience.

A Personal Perspective: Ten years after its publication, Being Mortal by Atul Gawande remains as relevant as ever. Perhaps more so.

You've just been served a subpoena. You let your client know so they can file a motion to quash the subpoena. The client asks you to file for them. What's your next move?

Personal Perspective: Critics accuse popular books on Stoicism of pandering to a general audience. But what's the harm of the public reading ideas about life and ethics?

Marriage is under siege as more people find no need for it. But there remain some good reasons to consider getting married, one sociological and one psychological.

Facing an enemy in battle takes courage, but standing alone against your friends requires a special kind of courage we don't learn in school.

Find a Therapist
Find a Treatment Center
Find a Psychiatrist
Find a Support Group
Find Teletherapy
United States
Brooklyn, NY
Chicago, IL
Houston, TX
Los Angeles, CA
New York, NY
Portland, OR
San Diego, CA
San Francisco, CA
Seattle, WA
Washington, DC
Asperger's
Bipolar Disorder
Chronic Pain
Eating Disorders
Passive Aggression
Personality
Goal Setting
Positive Psychology
Stopping Smoking
Low Sexual Desire
Relationships
Child Development
Therapy Center NEW
Diagnosis Dictionary
Types of Therapy

Understanding what emotional intelligence looks like and the steps needed to improve it could light a path to a more emotionally adept world.

Coronavirus Disease 2019
Affective Forecasting
Neuroscience

What is morality?

Published: 03 July 2021
Volume 179 , pages 1113–1133, ( 2022 )

Cite this article

Kieran Setiya 1

2366 Accesses

Explore all metrics

In “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Anscombe argued that the moral vocabulary does not correspond to any concept in Aristotelian ethics, that it derives from a confused response to the ethics of divine command, and that it is literally meaningless. This essay contends that Anscombe was wrong. Morality corresponds to Aristotle’s general sense of “justice,” which is complete virtue in relation to others. But Anscombe’s question remains: what is it for an action to be morally wrong, not merely something one should not do? The answer is not that wrongness warrants blame or that an action is wrong when it wrongs another person, but that an action is morally wrong when it is something one should not do that one has no right to do. In the absence of rights, Anscombe’s question has no answer.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price includes VAT (Russian Federation)

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Rent this article via DeepDyve

Institutional subscriptions

[24]Introduction

Moral Agency

The Philosophy and History of the Moral ‘Ought’: Some of Anscombe’s Objections

Terence Irwin

Here I follow Doyle ( 2017 ): Part One.

Again, my account of Anscombe agrees with Doyle ( 2017 ): Part One.

Or we could make do with the concept of virtue alone, following David Hume (1739–1740: Book Three). Note that Hume’s virtues are not distinctively moral: he includes among the virtues of character prudence, industry, assiduity, and enterprise.

See, for instance, Parfit ( 2011 ). The problem may extend to other views, as Kamm argues of Scanlon’s Contractualism (Scanlon, 1998 ; Kamm, 2002 : §1.3).

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics , 1129b11-4, translated by W. D. Ross and Lesley Brown (2009); henceforth cited in the main text as NE .

For a helpful discussion of these issues, on which I have relied, see Kraut ( 2002 : Chap. 4).

“For this same reason justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be ‘another’s good’, because it is related to another; for it does what is advantageous to another, either a ruler or a co-partner” ( NE 1130a3-5, responding to Plato’s Republic ).

For this reading of Aristotle, see Thompson ( 2004 : 5–6).

See Darwall ( 2006 , 2017 ); Wallace ( 2007 , 2012 , 2019 ).

This identification has been disputed. Scanlon defends journalistic freedom and free speech on grounds of public interest. But there is no reason to expect that the strongest complaint against illiberal principles will be that of the speaker, as opposed to his or her audience. Contractualism appears to misidentify who is wronged when a speaker is silenced. On this point, see Wenar ( 2013 : 392–393, 395). More generally, insofar as it appeals to the social effects of a principle’s adoption, Contractualism makes the facts about right and wrong implausibly sensitive to irrelevant features of our environment; see Rosen ( 2009 ).

See Darwall ( 2017 : 5), building on the theory in Darwall ( 2006 ).

For discussion and further argument, see Dorr ( 2016 : 43–45). Note that this does not preclude a “fitting attitude” theory of any ethical property whatsoever. For instance, to be blameworthy is to warrant blame. Such theories are ruled out only when the relevant explanatory claim is true, as it is not in this case: you can’t explain why an action is blameworthy by appeal to the fact that it warrants blame, or the reverse. The problem I am raising is specific to the case of moral wrongness, which does explain why an action warrants blame.

Wallace ( 2019 ); see Wallace ( 2007 ) for an earlier critique of Darwall.

The claim that directed obligation and wrongdoing are correlative has been challenged by Nicolas Cornell, who argues that we can wrong other people without violating a right they have against us or a duty that is owed to them (Cornell, 2015 ; see the discussion of Hart, 1955 at Cornell, 2015 : 115–119). I am not persuaded by Cornell’s arguments, which turn on an unduly circumscribed conception of rights, but discussing them here would take us too far afield.

See Wallace ( 2019 : 173). The complication about disregarding (not just violating) moral obligations is explained at Wallace ( 2019 : 10–11, 73–75); it will not be relevant to us. For what seems to be an earlier endorsement of Moral Wrongness as Directed Wrongdoing, see, ironically, Anscombe ( 1967 ). She infers from the premise that an action wrongs no particular individual that it is not wrong.

On beneficence, see Wallace ( 2019 : 205–208), and on the non-identity problem, Wallace ( 2019 : 211–215).

Niko Kolodny (forthcoming: §14) offers a response: a way to identify those who are wronged in the case of gratuitous waste.

Wallace ( 2019 : 27).

Wallace ( 2019 : 28, 49–51).

See also Wallace ( 2019 : 63–64), which contrasts moral obligations with obligations of love and friendship, which are the subject of Wallace ( 2012 ).

The proposal is schematic: it would take some work to specify the kind of explanation involved in the “because.” Does it simply mean that the right or its ground is among the reasons in virtue of which A should ϕ? That threatens to be too expansive. Others may object that there are directed obligations without corresponding rights, as when I have an obligation to save a drowning child at little cost and would wrong the child if I refused. If we think of claim-rights as protecting our autonomy, not as demanding positive aid, my refusal is a case of directed wrongdoing that does not violate a right. But I see no reason to accept this limited conception: the child has a right against me that I save her at little cost.

See Thomson ( 1990 : Chap. 3).

To establish this would take more argument, but it strikes me as a the germ of truth in a point that is framed by Michael Thompson ( 2004 ) in unhelpfully epistemic terms. Roughly speaking, Thompson argues that, when A is obligated to B, both A and B must be in a position to know that they are joined by this obligation, and that such knowledge is possible only if it has a common ground for each. Hence the need for an external relation between them. For objections to the epistemology behind this argument, see Wallace ( 2019 : 119–121). The point in the main text drops the epistemic framing, the need for a common ground of knowledge, in favour of a practical one: the need for a common ground of practical reasons.

Wallace ( 2019 : 112, 115–116, 157–158, 170–175).

Wallace ( 2019 : 81–85).

It is possible that, when you should not do something and others could simply prevent you without infringing your rights, they should prevent you if they have no reason not to. I am not sure if this follows, but even so, it does not follow that we are morally obligated to simply prevent wrongdoing, whenever we can. For it does not follow that others could simply prevent us from simply preventing wrongdoing without infringing our rights.

What does this imply about children’s autonomy? At a very young age, children are unable to respond to reasons and are not truly subject to “shoulds.” We may address “should”-claims to them proleptically, but no more. Suppose, however, we are past that point. Your child should not eat any more Halloween candy, perhaps, but it would not be morally wrong for them to do so. It follows from my view that you would infringe their rights, perhaps justifiably, by simply preventing them. In other words: as soon as a child is subject to reasons, they have autonomy rights of the same sort we do, and deserve apologies in much the same way. If paternalism is more routine in relation to children, that is not because they lack such rights but because we are more often justified in breaching them.

Again, see Dorr ( 2016 : 43–45).

See also White ( 1984 : 59): “the presence of a duty (or obligation) not to V implies the absence of a right to V”.

My treatment of Charity and Voting is indebted to Renée Bolinger ( 2017 : 45–46); she also replies to Waldron’s theoretical argument for a right to do wrong, which I do not take up here; see Bolinger ( 2017 : 46–51) on Waldron ( 1981 : 35–37).

For a nuanced development of this idea, in relation to Kant, see Ripstein ( 2009 ), though the suggestion in the text is not committed to the details of his account.

For versions of this claim, see Gilbert ( 2018 ) and de Kenessey ( 2020 ).

Hart suggests that this is true of promissory obligation, in general: only the promisee may determine how the promisor shall act (Hart 1955 : 184).

Why not adopt the more inclusive view that an act is morally wrong when someone could simply prevent it without infringing your rights? Because you can give someone permission to prevent you from doing what you should not do without making it morally wrong to do it, as when you give me permission to stop you from drinking too much. What if you give everyone permission to prevent you from drinking? Would you then meet the condition in Moral Wrongness as the Absence of a Right? No: because it is impossible to give permission to an arbitrary individual or third party, as opposed to the particular individuals with whom one interacts.

See Miller ( 1995 ) and Cooper ( 1996 ).

See Cooper ( 1996 ) on the legacy of Hegel’s “principle of subjective freedom”.

For data that would bear on these historical conjectures, see Wolf ( 1982 ); Adams ( 1984 ).

In Setiya ( 2007 ), Setiya ( 2012 ), and Setiya ( 2014b ).

I defend this claim in Setiya ( 2014a ), rejecting Scanlon’s view of “buck-passing” (Scanlon 1998 : 11, 95–100).

Adams, R. M. (1984). Saints. Journal of Philosophy, 81 , 392–401.

Article Google Scholar

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). Modern moral philosophy. Philosophy, 33 , 1–19.

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1967). Who is wronged? Oxford Review, 5 , 16–17.

Google Scholar

Aristotle. (2009). Nicomachean ethics (W. D. Ross & Lesley Brown, Trans.). Oxford University Press.

Bolinger, R. (2017). The right to do wrong revisited. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 95 , 43–57.

Cooper, J. M. (1996). Justice and rights in Aristotle’s Politics . Review of Metaphysics, 49 , 859–872.

Cornell, N. (2015). Wrongs, rights, and third parties. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 43 , 109–143.

Darwall, S. (2006). The second-person standpoint . Harvard University Press.

Darwall, S. (2017). What are moral reasons? Amherst Lecture in Philosophy .

de Kenessey, B. (2020). Promises as proposals in joint practical deliberation. Noûs, 54 , 204–232.

Dorr, C. (2016). To be F is to be G. Philosophical Perspectives, 30 , 39–134.

Doyle, J. (2017). No morality, no self: Anscombe’s radical skepticism . Harvard University Press.

Book Google Scholar

Dworkin, R. (1978). Taking rights seriously . Duckworth.

Feinberg, J. (1973). Social philosophy . Prentice-Hall.

Gilbert, M. (2018). Rights and demands: A foundational inquiry . Oxford University Press.

Godwin, W. (1798). Enquiry concerning political justice . Edited by K. Codell Carter. Oxford University Press, 1971.

Hart, H. L. A. (1955). Are there any natural rights? Philosophical Review, 64 , 175–191.

Hume, D. (1739–1740). A treatise of human nature . Edited by D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton. Oxford University Press, 2000.

Kamm, F. (2002). Owing, justifying, and rejecting. Mind, 111 , 323–354.

Kolodny, N. (forthcoming). Saving posterity from a worse fate. In J. McMahan, T. Campbell, J. Goodrich, & K. Ramakrishnan (Eds.), Ethics and existence: The legacy of Derek Parfit . Oxford University Press.

Kraut, R. (2002). Aristotle: Political philosophy . Oxford University Press.

Mill, J. S. (1861). Utilitarianism . Edited by George Sher. Hackett Publishing, 2001.

Miller, F. D. (1995). Nature, justice, and rights in Aristotle’s politics . Oxford University Press.

Parfit, D. (2011). On what matters: Volume one (Vol. Oxford). Oxford University Press.

Raz, J. (1979). The authority of law: Essays on law and morality . Oxford University Press.

Ripstein, A. (2009). Force and freedom: Kant’s legal and political philosophy . Harvard University Press.

Rosen, G. (2009). Might Kantian contractualism be the supreme principle of morality? Ratio, 22 , 78–97.

Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What we owe to each other . Harvard University Press.

Setiya, K. (2007). Reasons without rationalism . Princeton University Press.

Setiya, K. (2012). Internal reasons. In K. Setiya & H. Paakkunainen (Eds.), Internal reasons: contemporary readings (pp. 1–34). MIT Press.

Setiya, K. (2014a). What is a reason to act? Philosophical Studies, 67 , 221–235.

Setiya, K. (2014b). Intention, plans, and ethical rationalism. In M. Vargas & G. Yaffe (Eds.), Rational and social agency: Essays on the philosophy of Michael Bratman (pp. 56–82). Oxford University Press.

Chapter Google Scholar

Thompson, M. (2004). What is it to wrong someone? A puzzle about justice. In R. J. Wallace, P. Pettit, S. Scheffler, & M. Smith (Eds.), Reason and value: Themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz (pp. 333–384). Oxford University Press.

Thomson, J. J. (1990). The realm of rights . Harvard University Press.

Waldron, J. (1981). A right to do wrong. Ethics, 92 , 21–39.

Wallace, R. J. (2007). Reasons, relations, and commands: Reflections on Darwall. Ethics, 118 , 24–36.

Wallace, R. J. (2012). Duties of love. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary, 86 , 175–198.

Wallace, R. J. (2019). The moral nexus . Princeton University Press.

Wenar, L. (2013). Rights and what we owe to each other. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 10 , 375–399.

White, A. R. (1984). Rights . Oxford University Press.

Wolf, S. (1982). Moral saints. Journal of Philosophy, 79 , 419–439.

Download references

Acknowledgements

Thanks to: Caroline Arruda, Alisabeth Ayers, Sophie Grace Chappell, Rowan Cruft, Sandy Diehl, Jimmy Doyle, Adam Etinson, Max Hayward, Caspar Hare, Brendan de Kenessey, Daniel Muñoz, Sarah Paul, Anni Räty, Gideon Rosen, Cat Saint-Croix, Tamar Schapiro, Matty Silverstein, Eliot Watkins, Eliza Wells, and Alex Worsnip; to students in a fall 2019 seminar at MIT, which I taught with Jimmy Doyle; to audiences at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, New York University, Abu Dhabi, St. Andrews University, and the University of Michigan; and to several anonymous readers.

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

MIT, Cambridge, USA

Kieran Setiya

You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kieran Setiya .

Additional information

Publisher's note.

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Setiya, K. What is morality?. Philos Stud 179 , 1113–1133 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01689-y

Download citation

Accepted : 19 June 2021

Published : 03 July 2021

Issue Date : April 2022

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01689-y

Share this article

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

Directed duty
Find a journal
Publish with us
Track your research

University of Notre Dame

Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Home ›
Reviews ›

The Variety of Values: Essays on Morality, Meaning, and Love

Susan Wolf, The Variety of Values: Essays on Morality, Meaning, and Love , Oxford University Press, 2015, 263pp., $45.00 (pbk), ISBN 9780195332810.

Reviewed by Sara Protasi, University of Puget Sound

Few essays evoke the same enthusiastic praise for their combination of rigorous reasoning, elegant writing style and influential thesis as Susan Wolf's "Moral Saints." [1] Its placement as the inaugural piece in this collection allows one to see that it is not only chronologically but also conceptually prior to Wolf's subsequent essays. It contains the seeds, in Wolf's own metaphor, from which sprouted an impressively cohesive collection of arguments concerning the forcefulness and inescapability of moral demands, and the significance and resilience of nonmoral values.

In the introduction, with a mixture of humility and pride, Wolf calls attention to the systematic nature of these thirteen articles (only one of which is previously unpublished), and details the connections among them. She highlights central, recurrent ideas and explains how the essays relate to the original themes of "Moral Saints," namely how there is more to value than morality, how moral considerations may be less forceful than moral philosophers have often portrayed them, and how different value reasons can pull us in opposite directions. The first part of the book, "Moral and Nonmoral Values," focuses on the nature and importance of nonmoral values, and their relation to moral ones. The connected topic of the structure and importance of morality is discussed in part 4, "The Concept of Duty." In the middle, part 2 ("Meaning in Life") explores the topic of meaningfulness, and part 3 discusses "Love".

Wolf devotes the final section of the introduction to the cover of the book, which features a still life by Willem Heda, the Dutch painter, depicting the remains of a luscious feast. Wolf tells us that she appreciates the Dutch Golden Age genre because of its rich textures, and one cannot help but think of the rich textures of her philosophical writing. Wolf explains that she is attracted by what she considers these paintings' characteristic "ambivalence and ambiguity" (8): in the Calvinist context where they were produced and sold, sensual pleasures and appreciation of material goods were condemned, and still lifes were allegories of transience, warnings against appreciating things that are doomed to decay. But the paintings themselves are magnificent objects, and their melancholic message is obfuscated, contradicted, and possibly nullified by the very means with which it is conveyed.

Wolf is here pointing to a tension that infuses all the essays, one way or the other: the tension between moral demands ("don't value material goods!") and the demands of beauty, of taste, and, in general, of nonmoral value. She constantly shows us how decent, well-rounded agents cannot, and should not, always wholeheartedly comply with their moral obligations, for two reasons. First, because nonmoral values are intrinsically important, and Wolf convincingly articulates this importance throughout the book, highlighting the shallowness of the dichotomy morality vs. self-interest that was characteristic of moral philosophy when "Moral Saints" was published. Second, because morality cannot keep its irreplaceable role of requiring us to take into account the needs and interests of others, if it is too demanding. When we conceive of morality as overriding every other practical consideration, people will not have "the freedom to live lives that they can find to be good and rewarding" (228) and will be less inclined to respect moral imperatives.

Notwithstanding her commitment to the plurality of values, however, Wolf ends up neglecting some crucial aspects of what is symbolized in her beloved Dutch Golden Age paintings: our embodied, emotional nature, our being subject to impulses and unendorsed habits, our being attuned to and appreciative of simple pleasures, such as the pleasures of the table that are the subject of Heda's still lifes.

To start with this last point: Wolf rarely talks in positive terms about the more mundane kinds of nonmoral values that occupy a central role in most people's lives. For instance, in "Good-for-Nothings" (ch. 5), she rejects a welfarist theory of value, arguing that there can be things that are good independently of the fact that they benefit us: "These things are not good because they benefit us; they benefit us because they are good" (76). Her examples of good things are: reading Middlemarch , watching The Wire , practicing the cello, training for a marathon, appreciating seventeenth century Dutch paintings, and more generally "good art, good philosophy, good science" (73). She explicitly contrasts these activities and pursuits with less valuable counterparts: reading The Da Vinci Code , watching Project Runway , and playing Angry Birds.

Wolf's examples of good things are well-chosen to resonate with her audience of professional philosophers in the Anglophone tradition, in its current demographic make-up. Extending Wolf's point to different cultural and socio-economic contexts seems relatively straightforward. For instance, we could talk of reading the Mahabharata , watching Taiwanese puppetry shows, practicing the djembe. However, this expansion would leave unaltered the most significant feature of Wolf's examples: they are all meant to be expressions of excellence . After saying that art, philosophy, and science are among the "things of immeasurable value" (76) with which the world is replete, and that "we may think of our lives as better, and more fortunate, insofar as we are able to be in appreciative touch with some of the most valuable of these" (76), Wolf goes on to say that "a good human life involves 'enjoyment of the excellent'" (77). But having immeasurable value is not the same as being excellent, and treating them as equivalent has two consequences.

First, it makes one more likely to overlook admittedly less complex sources of values, such as those stemming from appreciation of natural beauty, or from sensual activities such as eating, or having sex, the kind of transient but valuable experiences that were shunned by Dutch Calvinists.

Secondly, it risks restricting the chance of a "better, and more fortunate" life to those who are capable of experiencing excellence. Consider a cognitively disabled person. Her impairment prevents her from intellectual excellence: she cannot read Middlemarch , nor understand The Wire , and she could never distinguish a Rembrandt from a Kinkade. She does, however, watch Project Runway , she can read children books, and she really enjoys eating juicy apples and walking in the park. Her impairment also prevents her from moral excellence. While she may be naturally virtuous, in the Aristotelian sense, she cannot achieve practical wisdom, distinguish between hypothetical and categorical imperatives, or maximize utility. Finally, while she is affectionate to her family members, her loving behavior is often immature and self-centered, comparable to that of a toddler. But even though moral, intellectual, and "interpersonal" excellence are bound to be out of her reach, she is in appreciative touch with some things of immeasurable value, and I hesitate to think that her life is less good and less fortunate than mine.

Another context in which Wolf's view could be enriched by taking into consideration a greater variety of psychological profiles is her discussion of personal love. Love is the main topic of chapters 9, 10 and 11, but also comes up in other essays as an exemplary source of "values . . . that compete both motivationally and normatively with moral values" (5). In "The Importance of Love" (ch. 10), Wolf defines love as "caring, deeply and personally, for a person for her own sake" (191). It is an "orientation in the world" that "gives us reasons to live" (191).

Wolf's account is close to the commonsensical understanding of love, and similar to other influential philosophical accounts, such as Harry Frankfurt's. [2] But specific to her approach is how Wolf envisions the role of love's reasons in practical deliberation. In "Morality and Partiality" (ch. 3), for instance, Wolf defends a conception of morality that incorporates what she calls the Impartialist Insight -- "the claim that all persons are equally deserving of well-being and respect" (33) -- in a "moderate" way, so as to be compatible with the demands of partiality "without apology" (35). Her approach on the one hand acknowledges that friendship and love are valuable in themselves, independently of their contribution to morality, but on the other also embraces the possibility of a radical choice in favor of partiality, even at a grave moral cost: the choice of a woman to hide her criminal son from the police, causing an innocent to be imprisoned in his place. Wolf suggests that the woman's hesitation to act according to morality is not only understandable but "positively reasonable . . . . After all, if the meaning of one's life and one's very identity is bound with someone as deeply as a mother's life is characteristically tied to her son's, why should the dictates of impartial morality be regarded as decisive?" (41). She goes on to say that such a woman might be as worthy of admiration and respect as her counterpart who decides not to shelter her son.

While I am sympathetic with Wolf's picture, I worry that she relies on an all-too-rosy picture of motherhood and maternal love, thus implicitly moralizing love itself. To the extent that Wolf convinces us that partiality can reasonably trump impartiality, she succeeds in doing so by describing the mother as engaging in "tortured deliberations" (42), ready to sacrifice her own well-being for the sake of her son's: "Do to me what you like . . . . Judge me as you will. I will go to hell if I have to, but my son is more important to me than my moral salvation." (41). This mother is a selfless martyr. Some readers might in fact take issue with precisely this quasi-fanatical aspect: perhaps she should worry more about the innocent man who will go to jail in her son's place than about her own moral salvation. But even those who feel the pull of Wolf's example, and I am one of them, should bear in mind that there are darker and less valuable ways in which maternal and filial identity are tied up, than pure maternal altruism. Consider the case of a mother who is affected either by narcissistic or borderline personality disorder, or is just plain selfish. [3] Such mothers will be pained at the prospect of their child's going to jail because of the suffering it would cause to them . The shared sense of identity characterizing these relatively common relations is deeply problematic. To the extent that Wolf succeeds in showing that the mother's choice is respectable, or even admirable, she does so by relying not so much on the value of love itself, but on the value of a moralized picture of love.

Consider also Wolf's example in "'One Thought Too Many': Love, Morality, and the Ordering of Commitment" (ch. 9). The essay examines Bernard Williams' famous discussion of the man who rescues his wife instead of another drowning stranger, and who ought not, according to Williams, be motivated by the thought that she is his wife and it is permissible for him to favor her over a stranger. [4] Wolf reviews different interpretations and consequent responses to Williams' thesis, and concludes that the most common reaction is to agree with Williams that "the thought of moral permissibility would be one thought too many if it is understood to occur at the moment of action" (145, original emphases). This view, according to Wolf, is compatible with finding "nothing wrong with a person wondering, in a cool and reflective moment, under what conditions one may give preference to one's loved ones and under what conditions one may not" (146). But -- she argues -- there is in fact something wrong with the husband who reflects, in cold mind, about whether what he did was morally permissible: it is an unappealing personal ideal of a lover. In the essay she offers an alternative ideal, or rather "glimpses of a psychological profile that could be filled out so as to constitute an ideal" (161): a lover who would not constrain his actions to only those that are morally permissible, and who is unlikely to engage in moral deliberation, even hypothetically, over Williams' scenario. Wolf highlights that this is a personal and not a moral ideal, one she wishes she could realize and that she wishes for her children and friends.

Wolf claims to have sketched a psychological profile, but she does not pause to consider whether the husband depicted by Williams is a psychologically ordinary husband. Wolf is clearly sensitive to the constraints imposed on our moral ideals by nonmoral values. But there are also other constraints, imposed by our psychology.

I myself know that I fall short of being the kind of person that Wolf has in mind. I engage in the post-hoc reflections about what morality requires that Wolf deems as obtrusive, and the reason I do is that I sometimes need morality to nudge me to fulfill the demands of love. [5] Lovers are not always capable of putting their beloveds' interests before their own, for a variety of factors: weakness of the will, egoism, and, more relevant to Williams' scenario, primal instincts and emotions such as the hunger that made fathers fight with their sons over a piece of bread in concentration camps, [6] or the panic that makes a man flee in front of an avalanche instead of protecting his wife and children, [7] or, less dramatically, the sleep deprivation and exhaustion that causes petty fights between parents of a newborn.

One might respond on Wolf's behalf that she is explicit about the ideal nature of her lover, so that we should exclude those psychological facts that count as character flaws. But imagine a case in which our husband is a military rescuer. He has been trained to defeat his survival instinct, so there is no risk of him running for his life in front of an avalanche. However, he has also been trained to save perfect strangers. This is not only a deeply engrained habit, but also a part of his identity. When the avalanche approaches, his wife is at 50 meters from him, but another woman, older and less fit than his wife, is closer. It would be physically possible for him to run faster and save his wife. However, his training and professional identity kick in and he runs to save the stranger. Would a post-hoc reflection be inappropriate in this case? Could this person not be a desirable, even ideal love partner?

Wolf's decent human agents are very decent, but sometimes not quite human enough. Reflecting over less idealized profiles of lovers allows us to see also how the very boundaries between normative and axiological domains are sometimes, maybe often, blurry: in real life situations, it is often difficult to distinguish between different kinds of reasons and values. Whether or not a tired woman wakes her husband when the baby needs to be changed may be a complex deliberative act, and the final decision might be justified by a moral reason (he changed the baby earlier in the night, so it's only fair she lets him sleep), a loving one (he is sleeping so well, poor thing), both, or none (there was no time to think, she just instinctively rushed to the crib). Appreciating the variety of values means also appreciating the variety of value , its own internal miscellaneous messiness.

This remark is of course Wolfian in spirit, and I see it showcased by the essay where we find the most psychologically realistic, and thus highly flawed, examples of human agents: "Loving Attention: Lessons in Love from The Philadelphia Story " (ch. 10). Wolf uses the movie The Philadelphia Story as a case study for understanding Iris Murdoch's notion of loving attention as a moral virtue. Wolf's conclusion is that loving attention can be a moral virtue insofar as it is interpreted as "loving of the world" (177). This conclusion is reached through a detailed analysis of the movie and the loving styles of it characters. This method of inquiry, inherently attuned to the complexity of human psychology, not coincidentally leads Wolf to minimize the differences between the domains of value: personal love is argued to be fundamentally analogous to loving the world, including people who are evil and thus unworthy of love, and to love of the arts, and even, maybe, love of chocolate and basketball (cf. footnote 11, 179).

If I had to summarize the gist of my critical remarks in a slogan, it would be: "more chocolate and basketball, please". But I would not be in the position of making such remarks had it not been for Susan Wolf's ground-breaking articulation of the importance of not being saintly.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS For their feedback on this review I thank Aaron Meskin and Shen-yi Liao, and especially Michael Della Rocca and Tyler Doggett for extensive discussions.

[1] Journal of Philosophy 79(8): 419-439 (1982).

[2] It would have been interesting for Wolf to compare her view to Frankfurt's view in The Reasons of Love (Princeton University Press, 2006), especially given their opposite perspectives on the relation between love for others and self-love.

[3] Lydia Davis portrays such a mother in "Selfish" ( The Collected Stories of Lydia Davis , Penguin, 2011, 441-442). The story is chilling because the mother is not depicted as abnormal in a clinical sense, even though of course the distinction between a psychological pathology and a moral flaw may not always be easy to draw.

[4] Bernard Williams, Moral Luck , Cambridge University Press, 1981, 1-19. For simplicity throughout the paper I maintain the husband/wife language, which does not imply endorsing a conventional picture of romantic love, according to which lovers are heterosexual, married, etc.

[5] I do not mean to imply that Wolf is not aware of the existence of conflicts between one's self-interests and the interests of our beloved, as she explicitly talks about these conflicts (see, e.g., the conclusion of ch. 3, p. 46). What I argue here is that the existence of these conflicts should play a larger role in determining what ideals of love are obtainable, and thus desirable.

[6] As recounted by Primo Levi in If This is a Man , Abacus, 2013.

[7] This example is inspired by the movie Force Majeure .

school Campus Bookshelves
menu_book Bookshelves
perm_media Learning Objects
login Login
how_to_reg Request Instructor Account
hub Instructor Commons
Download Page (PDF)
Download Full Book (PDF)
Periodic Table
Physics Constants
Scientific Calculator
Reference & Cite
Tools expand_more
Readability

selected template will load here

This action is not available.

5.1: Moral Philosophy – Concepts and Distinctions

Last updated
Save as PDF
Page ID 86935

Before examining some standard theories of morality, it is important to understand basic terms and concepts that belong to the specialized language of ethical studies. The concepts and distinctions presented in this section will be useful for characterizing the major theories of right and wrong we will study in subsequent sections of this unit. The general area of concepts and foundations of ethics explained here is referred to as meta-ethics .

5.1.1 The Language of Ethics

Ethics is about values, what is right and wrong, or better or worse. Ethics makes claims, or judgments, that establish values. Evaluative claims are referred to as normative, or prescriptive, claims . Normative claims tell us, or affirm, what ought to be the case. Prescriptive claims need to be seen in contrast with descriptive claims , which simply tell us, or affirm, what is the case, or at least what is believed to be the case.

For example, this claim is descriptive:, it describes what is the case:

“Low sugar consumption reduces risk of diabetes and heart failure.”

On the other hand, this claim is normative:

“Everyone ought to reduce consumption of sugar.”

This distinction between descriptive and normative (prescriptive) claims applies in everyday discourse in which we all engage. In ethics, however, normative claims have essential significance. A normative claim may, depending upon other considerations, be taken to be a “moral fact.”

Note: Many philosophers agree that the truth of an “is” statement in itself does not infer an “ought” claim. The fact the low sugar consumption leads to better health does not imply, on its own, that everyone should reduce their sugar intake. A good logical argument would require further reasons (premises) to reach the “ought” conclusion/claim. An “ought” claim inferred directly from an “is” statement is referred to as the naturalistic fallacy .

A supplemental resource is available (bottom of page) on the distinction between descriptive and normative claims.

5.1.2 How Are Moral Facts Real?

When we talk about “moral facts” typically we are referring to claims about values, duties, standards for behavior, and other evaluative prescriptions. The following concepts describe the sense in which moral facts are real in terms of:

the degree of universality, or lack thereof, with which the moral claims are held, and
the extent to which moral facts stand independently of other considerations.

Moral Objectivism

The view that moral facts exist, in the sense that they hold for everyone, is called moral (or ethical) objectivism. From the viewpoint of objectivism, moral facts do not merely represent the beliefs of the person making the claim, they are facts of the world. Furthermore, such moral facts/claims have no dependencies on other claims nor do they have any other contingencies.

Moral Subjectivism

Moral (or ethical) subjectivism holds that moral facts are not universal, they exist only in the sense that those who hold them believe them to exist. Such moral facts sometimes serve as useful devices to support practical purposes. According to the viewpoint of subjectivism, moral facts (values, duties, and so forth) are entirely dependent on the beliefs of those who hold them.

Moral Absolutism

Moral absolutism is an objectivist view that there is only one true moral system with specific moral rules (or facts) that always apply, can never be disregarded. At least some rules apply universally, transcending time, culture. and personal belief. Actions of a specific sort are always right (or wrong) independently of any further considerations, including their consequences.

Moral Relativism

Moral relativism is the view that there are no universal standards of moral value, that moral facts, values, and beliefs are relative to individuals or societies that hold them. The rightness of an action depends on the attitude taken toward it by the society or culture of the person doing the action.

Moral relativism as it relates to an individual is a form of ethical subjectivism.
As it relates to a society or culture, moral relativism is referred to as “cultural relativism” and is also subjectivist in that moral facts depend entirely on the beliefs of those who hold them, they are not universal.

Note that some accounts of meta-ethical concepts do not use both “objectivism” and “absolutism” or use them interchangeably. The important relationship to keep in mind is that both objectivism and absolutism stand in contrast to relativism and subjectivism.

Here are several arguments in support of moral relativism. The “objection” following each one is an argument against moral relativism and in favor of moral objectivism.

Objection: “Is” does not imply “ought.” Further, the fact that there are diverse cultural values does not necessarily imply that there are no objective values.
Objection: That we cannot yet justify objective values does not mean that such a foundation could not be developed.
Objection: This entails that we tolerate oppressive systems that are intolerant themselves. Further, this argument seems to confer objective value on “tolerance” and further still, “tolerance” is not the same as “respect.”

Here are some additional arguments against moral relativism:

If values for right and wrong are relative to a specific moral standpoint or culture, anything can be justified, even practices that seem objectively unconscionable.
Ethical relativism would diminish our possibility for making moral judgments of others and other societies. However, we do make moral judgments of others and believe we are justified in making these moral judgments.
Ethical relativism says that moral values are determined by ‘the group’, but it is difficult to determine who ‘the group’ is. Anyone in the “group” who disagrees is immoral.
If people were ethical relativists in practice (that is, if everyone was a ethical subjectivist), there would be moral chaos.

A supplemental resource is available (bottom of page) on moral relativism.

Do you think that there are objective moral values? Or do you believe that all moral values are relative to either cultures or individuals? Include your reasons.

Note: Submit your response to the appropriate Assignments folder.

5.1.3 How Do We Know What is Right?

The question at hand is about moral epistemology. How do we know what is right or wrong? What prompts our moral sentiments, our values, our actions? Are our moral assessments made on a purely rational basis, or do they stem from our emotional nature? There are contemporary philosophers who support each position, but we will return to some “old” friends we met in our unit on epistemology, Immanuel Kant and David Hume. They were hardly on the “same page” when it came to how and if we can know anything at all, and it’s hardly surprising that we find them at odds on what motivates moral choices, how we know what is right.

When we met Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) in our study of epistemology, we read passages from his Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic (1783). In that work, he applied a slightly less intricate and perplexing presentation of topics from his masterwork on metaphysics and epistemology, the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). His next project involved application of his same rigorous reasoning method to moral philosophy. In 1785, Kant published Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals; it introduced concepts that he expanded subsequently in the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). The short excerpts that follow are from Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals.

Recall that Kant’s epistemology required both reason and empirical experience, each in its proper role. Kant believed that human action could be evaluated only by the logical distinctions based in synthetic a priori judgments.

In the following excerpt, Kant explains that a clear understanding of the moral law is not to be found in the empirical world but is a matter of pure reason.

Everyone must admit that if a law is to have moral force, i.e., to be the basis of an obligation, it must carry with it absolute necessity; that, for example, the precept, “Thou shalt not lie,” is not valid for men alone, as if other rational beings had no need to observe it; and so with all the other moral laws properly so called; that, therefore, the basis of obligation must not be sought in the nature of man, or in the circumstances in the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in the conception of pure reason; and although any other precept which is founded on principles of mere experience may be in certain respects universal, yet in as far as it rests even in the least degree on an empirical basis, perhaps only as to a motive, such a precept, while it may be a practical rule, can never be called a moral law. Thus not only are moral laws with their principles essentially distinguished from every other kind of practical knowledge in which there is anything empirical, but all moral philosophy rests wholly on its pure part.

However, there is some correspondence between the study of natural world and of ethics. Both have an empirical dimension as well as a rational one. When Kant speaks of “anthropology” he refers to the empirical study of human nature.

…there arises the idea of a twofold metaphysic- a metaphysic of nature and a metaphysic of morals. Physics will thus have an empirical and also a rational part. It is the same with Ethics; but here the empirical part might have the special name of practical anthropology, the name morality being appropriated to the rational part.

So, while the nature of moral duty must be sought a priori “in the conception of pure reason,” empirical knowledge of human nature has a supporting role in distinguishing how to apply moral laws and in dealing with “so many inclinations” – the confusing array of emotions, impulses, desires that bombard us and contradict the command of reason. Our emotions (inclinations) are hardly the source of moral knowledge; they interfere with the human capability for practical pure reason.

Thus not only are moral laws with their principles essentially distinguished from every other kind of practical knowledge in which there is anything empirical, but all moral philosophy rests wholly on its pure part.When applied to man, it does not borrow the least thing from the knowledge of man himself (anthropology), but gives laws a priori to him as a rational being. No doubt these laws require a judgment sharpened by experience, in order on the one hand to distinguish in what cases they are applicable, and on the other to procure for them access to the will of the man and effectual influence on conduct; since man is acted on by so many inclinations that, though capable of the idea of a practical pure reason, he is not so easily able to make it effective in concreto in his life.

Kant sees his project on moral law, or “practical reason,” to be a less complicated project than Critique of Pure Reason, his “critical examination of the pure speculative reason, already published.” According to Kant, “moral reasoning can easily be brought to a high degree of correctness and completeness”, whereas speculative reason is “dialectical” – laden with opposing forces. Furthermore, a complete “critique” of practical reason entails “a common principle” that can cover any situation – “for it can ultimately be only one and the same reason which has to be distinguished merely in its application.”

Intending to publish hereafter a metaphysic of morals, I issue in the first instance these fundamental principles. Indeed there is properly no other foundation for it than the critical examination of a pure practical reason; just as that of metaphysics is the critical examination of the pure speculative reason, already published. But in the first place the former is not so absolutely necessary as the latter, because in moral concerns human reason can easily be brought to a high degree of correctness and completeness, even in the commonest understanding, while on the contrary in its theoretic but pure use it is wholly dialectical; and in the second place if the critique of a pure practical Reason is to be complete, it must be possible at the same time to show its identity with the speculative reason in a common principle, for it can ultimately be only one and the same reason which has to be distinguished merely in its application.

In the next section of this unit, we will see where Kant goes with this project and its “common principle” the applies universally. For now, keep in mind that Kant sees moral judgment as a reason-based activity, and that emotions/inclinations diminish our moral judgments. Many philosophers agree that making moral judgments and taking moral actions are rationally contemplated undertakings.

David Hume (1711-1776) , as we learned in our epistemology unit, doubted that the principles of cause and effect and that induction could lead to truth about the natural world. Recall his picture of reason, his version of the distinction between a prior and a posteriori knowledge:

Relations of ideas are beliefs grounded wholly on associations formed within the mind; they are capable of demonstration because they have no external referent.
Matters of fact are beliefs that claim to report the nature of existing things; they are always contingent.

In both his Treatise of Human Nature (1739) and An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) relations-of-ideas and matters-of-fact figure in his position that human agency and moral obligation are best considered as functions of human passions rather than as the dictates of reason. The excerpts that follow are from the Treatise (Book III, Part I, Sections I and II).

If reason were the source of moral sensibility, then either relations of ideas or matters-of-fact would need to be involved:

As the operations of human understanding divide themselves into two kinds, the comparing of ideas, and the inferring of matter of fact; were virtue discovered by the understanding; it must be an object of one of these operations, nor is there any third operation of the understanding. which can discover it.

Relations of ideas involve precision and certainty (as with geometry or algebra) that arise out of pure conceptual thought and logical operations. A relationship between “vice and virtue” cannot be demonstrated in this way.

There has been an opinion very industriously propagated by certain philosophers, that morality is susceptible of demonstration; and though no one has ever been able to advance a single step in those demonstrations; yet it is taken for granted, that this science may be brought to an equal certainty with geometry or algebra. Upon this supposition vice and virtue must consist in some relations; since it is allowed on all hands, that no matter of fact is capable of being demonstrated….. For as you make the very essence of morality to lie in the relations, and as there is no one of these relations but what is applicable… RESEMBLANCE, CONTRARIETY, DEGREES IN QUALITY, and PROPORTIONS IN QUANTITY AND NUMBER; all these relations belong as properly to matter, as to our actions, passions, and volitions. It is unquestionable, therefore, that morality lies not in any of these relations, nor the sense of it in their discovery.

Hume goes on to explain how moral distinctions do not arise from of matters of fact:

Take any action allowed to be vicious: Willful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but it is the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object.

And so, Hume concludes that moral distinctions are not derived from reason, rather they come from our feelings, or sentiments.

Thus the course of the argument leads us to conclude, that since vice and virtue are not discoverable merely by reason, or the comparison of ideas, it must be by means of some impression or sentiment they occasion, that we are able to mark the difference betwixt them……Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judged of”

Hume’s view that our moral judgments and actions arise not from our rational capacities but from our emotional nature and sentiments, is contrary to several of the major normative theories we will explore. However, it is interesting to note that some present-day philosophers regard the domain of emotion as a primary source of moral action, and also that work in neuroscience suggests that Hume may have been on the right track.

Economist Jeremy Rifkin provides an absorbing and fast-moving chalk-talk on human empathy, as demonstrated by neuroscience. (10+ minutes) Note: Cartoon depictions of humans are unclothed RSA Animate . [CC-BY-NC-ND]

Optional Video

Trust, morality – and oxytocin? . [CC-BY-NC-ND] Neuro-economist Paul Zak believe he has identified the “moral molecule” in the brain. (16+ minutes)

An additional supplemental video (bottom of page) explores moral judgments and neuroscience even further.

What do you think about the connection between morality and the neurobiology of our brains? Do you think these findings affect arguments for or against ethical relativism?

Note: Post your response in the appropriate Discussion topic.

5.1.4 Psychological Influences

Various psychological characterizations of human nature have had significant influence on views about morality. We will see in this Ethics unit and the next on Social and Political Philosophy that particular conceptions of human nature may be at the center of theories about moral actions of individuals and about ethical interaction among individuals in social communities.

Egoism is the view that by nature we are selfish, that our actions, even our ostensibly generous ones, are motivated by selfish desire. Ethical egoism is the belief that pursuing ones own happiness is the highest moral value, that moral decisions should be guided by self-interest.

Another view of human nature holds that the primary motivation for all of our actions is pleasure. Hedonism is the view that pleasure is the highest or only good worth seeking, that we should, in fact, seek pleasure.

A different take on human nature is that we have innate capacity for benevolence (empathy) toward other people. (Recall the the mirror neurons in the Jeremy Rifkin video.) Altruism is the view that moral decisions should be guided by consideration for the interests and well-being of other people rather than by self-interest.

5.1.5 The Meaning of “Good”

In Ethics, we refer to what is “good” as a general term of approval, for what is of value, for example, a particular action, a quality, a practice, a way of life. Among the aspects of “good” that philosophers discuss is whether a particular thing is valued because it is good in and of itself, or because it leads to some other “good.”

An intrinsic good is something that is good in and of itself, not because of something else that may result from it. In ethics, a “value” possesses intrinsic worth. For example, with hedonism, pleasure is the only intrinsic good, or value. In some normative theories, a particular type of action may possess intrinsic worth, or good.
An instrumental good , on the other hand, is useful for attaining something else that is good. It is instrumental in that it that leads to another good, but it is not good is and of itself. For example, for an egoist, an action such as generosity to others can be seen as an instrumental good if it leads to to self-fulfillment, which is an intrinsic good valued in and of itself by an egoist.

As we look more closely at some major normative theories, the distinction between intrinsic and instrumental good will be among the considerations of interest. Understanding normative theories, also involves these questions:

How do we determine what the right action is?
What are the standards that we use to judge if a particular action is good or bad?

The following normative theories will be addressed:

Deontology (from the Greek for “obligation, or duty”) is concerned rules and motives for actions.
Utilitarianism, a consequentialist theory, is interested in the good outcomes of actions.
Virtue Ethics values actions in terms of what a person of good character would do.

Supplemental Resources

Descriptive and Normative Claims

Fundamentals: Normative and Descriptive Claims . This 4-minute video is a quick review with examples, on the differences between descriptive and normative claims.

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP). Moral Relativism . Read section “3. Arguments for Moral Relativism” and section “4. Objections to Moral Relativism.”

Moral Judgment and Neuroscience

The Neuroscience behind Moral Judgments . Alan Alda talks with an MIT neuroscientist about neurological connections with moral judgments. (5+ minutes)

5.1 Moral Philosophy - Concepts and Distinctions. Authored by : Kathy Eldred. Provided by : Pima Community College. License : CC BY: Attribution

Morality and Religion: What Is Moral Behavior? Essay

The debate on morality has been described by experts as emotive and controversial. This is partly because different groups have different perceptions of the two concepts that are entrenched in political, social, and cultural biases. For example, the discussion on whether the LGBT group should be granted a free space, similar to the one heterosexuals have in society, has elicited an unending argument in many parts of the world (Appiah, 2010).

Religious groups assert that God created man and woman for them to complement each other sexually, both for enjoyment and reproduction. Such groups continue to argue that if that was not the case, then God would have created two men or two women. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the discussion by attempting to give an insight into what constitutes moral and immoral behavior as well as the relationship that exists between morality and religion.

The Definition of Morality

The concept of morality has been dealt with in great depth by scholars from varied disciplines. Despite this, no consensus has been reached on the precise definition of morality as different people have their own unique views on the topic. Since there is no particular definition that cuts across all disciplines, how a person comprehends or internalizes issues relating to morality is highly determined by, among other factors, where they come from, their expertise, and their religious orientation. Their religious extraction further depends on the extent to which they are rooted in spiritual issues.

Rachels and Rachels (1986) recognize the ambiguity that exists in the definition of morality. While the authors agree that it is difficult to come up with the exact definition of what constitutes morality, they also assert that the subject is closely interlinked with reasoning and impartiality. In this regard, Rachels and Rachels (1986) argue that individual consideration of moral behavior must be backed by sufficient reasons. If the reasons are valid to the other parties involved, then the stand of the first person is deemed moral. On the contrary, any reason or action that is not agreed upon by all parties involved in such a debate must be countered by an opposing view.

The authors use the case of Baby Jane Doe, who was born handicapped, as an example. Doctors, family, and human rights activists could not agree on whether the baby should have undergone surgery to try and repair her deformity or not. Ultimately, the family agreed with the suggestion of one of the consulting doctors to withhold any surgical solution on the handicapped child until more tests were done. According to Rachels and Rachels (1986), one could argue that the decision was a moral one as it upheld the sanctity of life. However, the possible suffering of the baby due to the deformity presents an angle that can be used to claim that the decision was immoral.

Like Rachels and Rachels (1986), Shafer-Landau (2015) admits that there is no widely agreed-upon definition of morality. However, the scholar argues that the concept of morality can be defined by asking ethical questions (such as fairness and service to others) or by comparing moral principles with those that surround the law, self-interest, etiquette, and tradition. Even so, Shafer-Landau (2015) clearly asserts that morality and the law are very distinct because some immoral acts, such as infidelity, are not unlawful and vice versa.

Consequently, Shafer-Landau (2015) concurs with Rachels and Rachels’ (1986) view on moral reasoning. Like any other argument, moral reasoning involves a culmination of reasons and assumptions that these reasons are meant to support a way of doing things. In simple terms, Shafer-Landau (2015) contends that human beings have no moral duties and should be free from moral criticism. Indeed, since humans are moral agents, their behaviors should be guided by the ethical decisions they make. Moreover, these moral decisions should not work against other people as all human lives are sacred.

Morality, Religion and Social Norms

As Rachels and Rachels (1986) point out, it is nearly impossible to distinguish between the tenets of morality and religion as the two are intertwined. As a matter of fact, religious leaders are considered to have better insight into morality than other people in society. This is not merely because they are thought to have good morals but because they are believed to understand the complexities of the same.

What Rachels and Rachels (1986) try to portray is that although religion and morality are related concepts, the choice of behavior lies with an individual and is based mainly on the individual’s social norms. God does not force people to follow his commands, but they must be prepared to bear the consequences of their actions if they do not. Perhaps, it is the fear of the repercussions of immorality that makes some people more committed to Christianity than others.

To sum it all, the definition of the concept of morality is ambiguous. However, given the discussion above, one can elucidate the meaning of morality by using the related concept of moral reasoning. What is considered morally right or wrong depends on the ability to defend one’s actions. Nevertheless, regardless of the reasons, people are generally expected to act with impartiality, recognizing the fact that human life is sacred, and success or happiness must not be obtained at the expense of other people. Further, basic common sense requires people to carry themselves in such a manner that ensures both their dignity and fairness to others.

Appiah, K. A., (2010). What were we thinking? Dallas News. Web.

Rachels, J., & Rachels, S. (1986). The elements of moral philosophy . Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Shafer-Landau, R. (2015). The fundamentals of ethics . London: Oxford University Press.

Chicago (A-D)
Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2022, May 11). Morality and Religion: What Is Moral Behavior? https://ivypanda.com/essays/what-is-morality/

"Morality and Religion: What Is Moral Behavior?" IvyPanda , 11 May 2022, ivypanda.com/essays/what-is-morality/.

IvyPanda . (2022) 'Morality and Religion: What Is Moral Behavior'. 11 May.

IvyPanda . 2022. "Morality and Religion: What Is Moral Behavior?" May 11, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/what-is-morality/.

1. IvyPanda . "Morality and Religion: What Is Moral Behavior?" May 11, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/what-is-morality/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Morality and Religion: What Is Moral Behavior?" May 11, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/what-is-morality/.

Philosophy: Hedonism and Desire Satisfaction Theory
Researching the Aspects of the Ethical Life
James Rachels’ The Challenge of Cultural Relativism Essay
“The Elements of Moral Philosophy” by James Rachel: Moral Controversies
“Active and Passive Euthanasia” by James Rachels
Personal and Professional Ethics Analysis
Managing People in the Bank of America
"Active and Passive Euthanasia" and "Sexual Morality"
Philosophy Prospectus: Why Should We Be Moral?
The Debate Over Utilitarianism
Socrates as a Christian Thinker
Hinduism Beliefs and Western Philosophy of Religion
Human vs. Divine Ego: What Is the Difference?
Philosophy. Existence of God: Moral Arguments
Descartes’ "Discourse on the Method"

Table of Contents
Random Entry
Chronological
Editorial Information
About the SEP
Editorial Board
How to Cite the SEP
Special Characters
Advanced Tools
Support the SEP
PDFs for SEP Friends
Make a Donation
SEPIA for Libraries
Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

Friends PDF Preview
Author and Citation Info
Back to Top

Moral Theory

There is much disagreement about what, exactly, constitutes a moral theory. Some of that disagreement centers on the issue of demarcating the moral from other areas of practical normativity, such as the ethical and the aesthetic. Some disagreement centers on the issue of what a moral theory’s aims and functions are. In this entry, both questions will be addressed. However, this entry is about moral theories as theories , and is not a survey of specific theories, though specific theories will be used as examples.

1.1 Common-sense Morality

1.2 contrasts between morality and other normative domains, 2.1 the tasks of moral theory, 2.2 theory construction, 3. criteria, 4. decision procedures and practical deliberation, other internet resources, related entries, 1. morality.

When philosophers engage in moral theorizing, what is it that they are doing? Very broadly, they are attempting to provide a systematic account of morality. Thus, the object of moral theorizing is morality, and, further, morality as a normative system.

At the most minimal, morality is a set of norms and principles that govern our actions with respect to each other and which are taken to have a special kind of weight or authority (Strawson 1961). More fundamentally, we can also think of morality as consisting of moral reasons, either grounded in some more basic value, or, the other way around, grounding value (Raz 1999).

It is common, also, to hold that moral norms are universal in the sense that they apply to and bind everyone in similar circumstances. The principles expressing these norms are also thought to be general , rather than specific, in that they are formulable “without the use of what would be intuitively recognized as proper names, or rigged definite descriptions” (Rawls 1979, 131). They are also commonly held to be impartial , in holding everyone to count equally.

… Common-sense is… an exercise of the judgment unaided by any Art or system of rules : such an exercise as we must necessarily employ in numberless cases of daily occurrence ; in which, having no established principles to guide us … we must needs act on the best extemporaneous conjectures we can form. He who is eminently skillful in doing this, is said to possess a superior degree of Common-Sense. (Richard Whatley, Elements of Logic , 1851, xi–xii)

“Common-Sense Morality”, as the term is used here, refers to our pre-theoretic set of moral judgments or intuitions or principles. [ 1 ] When we engage in theory construction (see below) it is these common-sense intuitions that provide a touchstone to theory evaluation. Henry Sidgwick believed that the principles of Common-Sense Morality were important in helping us understand the “first” principle or principles of morality. [ 2 ] Indeed, some theory construction explicitly appeals to puzzles in common-sense morality that need resolution – and hence, need to be addressed theoretically.

Features of commons sense morality are determined by our normal reactions to cases which in turn suggest certain normative principles or insights. For example, one feature of common-sense morality that is often remarked upon is the self/other asymmetry in morality, which manifests itself in a variety of ways in our intuitive reactions. For example, many intuitively differentiate morality from prudence in holding that morality concerns our interactions with others, whereas prudence is concerned with the well-being of the individual, from that individual’s point of view.

Also, according to our common-sense intuitions we are allowed to pursue our own important projects even if such pursuit is not “optimific” from the impartial point of view (Slote 1985). It is also considered permissible, and even admirable, for an agent to sacrifice her own good for the sake of another even though that is not optimific. However, it is impermissible, and outrageous, for an agent to similarly sacrifice the well-being of another under the same circumstances. Samuel Scheffler argued for a view in which consequentialism is altered to include agent-centered prerogatives, that is, prerogatives to not act so as to maximize the good (Scheffler 1982).

Our reactions to certain cases also seem to indicate a common-sense commitment to the moral significance of the distinction between intention and foresight, doing versus allowing, as well as the view that distance between agent and patient is morally relevant (Kamm 2007).

Philosophers writing in empirical moral psychology have been working to identify other features of common-sense morality, such as how prior moral evaluations influence how we attribute moral responsibility for actions (Alicke et. al. 2011; Knobe 2003).

What many ethicists agree upon is that common-sense is a bit of a mess. It is fairly easy to set up inconsistencies and tensions between common-sense commitments. The famous Trolley Problem thought experiments illustrate how situations which are structurally similar can elicit very different intuitions about what the morally right course of action would be (Foot 1975). We intuitively believe that it is worse to kill someone than to simply let the person die. And, indeed, we believe it is wrong to kill one person to save five others in the following scenario:

David is a great transplant surgeon. Five of his patients need new parts—one needs a heart, the others need, respectively, liver, stomach, spleen, and spinal cord—but all are of the same, relatively rare, blood-type. By chance, David learns of a healthy specimen with that very blood-type. David can take the healthy specimen's parts, killing him, and install them in his patients, saving them. Or he can refrain from taking the healthy specimen's parts, letting his patients die. (Thomson 1976, 206)

And yet, in the following scenario we intuitively view it entirely permissible, and possibly even obligatory, to kill one to save five:

Edward is the driver of a trolley, whose brakes have just failed. On the track ahead of him are five people; the banks are so steep that they will not be able to get off the track in time. The track has a spur leading off to the right, and Edward can turn the trolley onto it. Unfortunately there is one person on the right-hand track. Edward can turn the trolley, killing the one; or he can refrain from turning the trolley, killing the five. (Thomson 1976, 206).

Theorizing is supposed to help resolve those tensions in a principled way. Theory construction attempts to provide guidance in how to resolve such tensions and how to understand them.

1.2.1 Morality and Ethics

Ethics is generally understood to be the study of “living well as a human being”. This is the topic of works such as Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics , in which the aim of human beings is to exemplify human excellence of character. The sense in which we understand it here is that ethics is broader than morality, and includes considerations of personal development of oneself and loved ones. This personal development is important to a life well lived, intuitively, since our very identities are centered on projects that we find important. Bernard Williams and others refer to these projects as “ground projects”. These are the sources of many of our reasons for acting. For Williams, if an agent seeks to adopt moral considerations, or be guided by them, then important ethical considerations are neglected, such as personal integrity and authenticity (Williams 1977; Wolf 1982). However, Williams has a very narrow view of what he famously termed “the morality system” (Williams 1985).

Williams lists a variety of objectionable features of the morality system, including the inescapability of moral obligations, the overridingness of moral obligation, impartiality , and the fact that in the morality system there is a push towards generalization .

There has been considerable discussion of each of these features of the morality system, and since Williams, a great deal of work on the part of standard moral theorists on how each theory addresses the considerations he raised. Williams’ critique of the morality system was part of a general criticism of moral theory in the 1980s on the grounds of its uselessness, harmfulness, and even its impossibility (Clarke 1987). This anti-theory trend was prompted by the same dissatisfaction with consequentialism and deontology that led to the resurgence of Virtue Ethics.

A major criticism of this view is that it has a very narrow view of what counts as a moral theory. Thus, some of these approaches simply rejected some features of William’s characterization of the morality system, such as impartiality. Others, however, Williams’ included, attacked the very project of moral theory. This is the ‘anti-theory’ attack on moral theorizing. For example, Annette Baier argued that morality cannot be captured in a system of rules, and this was a very popular theme amongst early virtue ethicists. On this view, moral theory which systematizes and states the moral principles that ought to guide actions is simply impossible: “Norms in the form of virtues may be essentially imprecise in some crucial ways, may be mutually referential, but not hierarchically orderable, may be essentially self-referential” (Baier 220).

Robert Louden even argued that the best construal of virtue ethics is not as an ethical theory, but as anti-theory that should not be evaluated as attempting to theorize morality at all. (Louden 1990). According to Louden, moral theories are formulated to a variety of reasons, including to provide solutions to problems, formulas for action, universal principles, etc. Louden notes that this characterization is very narrow and many would object to it, but he views anti-theory not so much as a position against any kind of moral theorizing, but simply the kind that he viewed as predominant prior to the advent of Virtue Ethics. This is a much less severe version of anti-theory as it, for example, doesn’t seem to regard weightiness or importance of moral reasons as a problem.

Some of the problems that Williams and other anti-theorists have posed for morality, based on the above characteristics, are:

Morality is too demanding and pervasive: that is, the view that moral reasons are weighty indicates that we should be giving them priority over other sorts of reasons. Further, they leach into all aspects of our lives, leaving very little morally neutral.

Morality is alienating. There are a variety of ways in which morality can be alienating. As Adrian Piper notes, morality might alienate the agent from herself or might alienate the agent from others – impartiality and universality might lead to this, for example (Piper 1987; Stocker 1976). Another way we can understand alienation is that the agent is alienated from the true justifications of her own actions – this is one way to hold that theories which opt for indirection can lead to alienation (see section 4 below).

Morality, because it is impartial, makes no room for special obligations. That is, if the right action is the one that is impartial between persons, then it does not favor the near and dear. On this picture it is difficult to account for the moral requirements that parents have towards their own children, and friends have towards each other. These requirements are, by their nature, not impartial.

Morality is committed to providing guides for action that can be captured in a set of rules or general principles. That is, morality is codifiable and the rules of morality are general.

Morality requires too much. The basic worry is that the morality system is voracious and is creeping into all aspects of our lives, to the detriment of other important values. The worry expressed by 4 takes a variety of forms. For example, some take issue with a presupposition of 4, arguing that there are no moral principles at all if we think of these principles as guiding action . Some argue that there are no moral principles that are complete, because morality is not something that is codifiable . And, even if morality was codifiable, the ‘principles’ would be extremely specific , and not qualify as principles at all.

Since Williams’ work, philosophers have tried to respond to the alienation worry by, for example, providing accounts of the ways in which a person’s reasons can guide without forming an explicit part of practical deliberation. Peter Railton, for example, argues in favor of a form of objective consequentialism, Sophisticated Consequentialism , in which the rightness of an action is a function of its actual consequences (Railton 1984). On Railton’s view, one can be a good consequentialist without being alienated from loved ones. Though not attempting to defend moral theory per se , other writers have also provided accounts of how agents can act on the basis of reasons – and thus perform morally worthy actions, even though these reasons are not explicitly articulated in their practical deliberations (Arpaly 2002; Markovits 2014). Deontologists have argued that autonomous action needn’t involve explicit invocation of, for example, the Categorical Imperative (Herman 1985). Generally, what characterizes these moves is the idea that the justifying reasons are present in some form in the agent’s psychology – they are recoverable from the agent’s psychology – but need not be explicitly articulated or invoked by the agent in acting rightly.

One way to elaborate on this strategy is to argue that the morally good agent is one who responds to the right sorts of reasons, even though the agent can’t articulate the nature of the response (Arpaly 2002). This strategy makes no appeal to codifiable principles, and is compatible with a wide variety of approaches to developing a moral theory. It relies heavily on the concept, of course, of “reason” and “moral reason,” which many writers on moral issues take to be fundamental or basic in any case.

There has also been debate concerning the proper scope of morality, and how moral theories can address problems relating to impartiality. Kant and the classical utilitarians believed that moral reasons are impartial, what others have termed agent-neutral. Indeed, this is one point of criticism that virtue ethics has made of these two theories. One might argue that moral reasons are impartial, but that there are other reasons that successfully compete with them – reasons relating to the near and dear, for example, or one’s own ground projects. Or, one could hold that morality includes special reasons, arising from special obligations, that also morally justify our actions.

The first strategy has been pursued by Bernard Williams and other “anti-theorists”. Again, Williams argues that morality is a special system that we would be better off without (Williams 1985). In the morality system we see a special sense of “obligation” – moral obligation – which possesses certain features. For example, moral obligation is inescapable according to the morality system. A theory such as Kant’s, for example, holds that we must act in accordance with the Categorical Imperative. It is not optional. This is because morality is represented as having authority over us in ways that even demand sacrifice of our personal projects, of the very things that make our lives go well for us. This seems especially clear for Utilitarianism, which holds that we must maximize the good, and falling short of maximization is wrong . A Kantian will try to avoid this problem by appealing to obligations that are less demanding, the imperfect ones. But, as Williams points out, these are still obligations , and as such can only be overridden by other obligations. Thus, the theories also tend to present morality as pervasive in that morality creeps into every aspect of our lives, making no room for neutral decisions. For example, even decisions about what shoes to wear to work becomes a moral one:

Once the journey into more general obligations has started, we may begin to get into trouble – not just philosophical trouble, but the conscience trouble – with finding room for morally indifferent actions. I have already mentioned the possible moral conclusion that one may take some particular course of action. That means that there is nothing else I am obliged to do. But if we have accepted general and indeterminate obligations to further various moral objectives…they will be waiting to provide work for idle hands… (Williams 1985, 181)

He goes on to write that in order to get out of this problem, “…I shall need one of those fraudulent items, a duty to myself” (Williams 1985, 182). Kantian Ethics does supply this. Many find this counterintuitive, since the self/other asymmetry seems to capture the prudence/morality distinction, but Kantians such as Tom Hill, jr. have made strong cases for at least some moral duties to the self. In any case, for writers such as Williams, so much the worse for morality .

Other writers, also concerned about the problems that Williams has raised argue, instead, that morality does make room for our partial concerns and projects, such as the norms governing our relationships, and our meaningful projects. Virtue ethicists, for example, are often comfortable pointing out that morality is not thoroughly impartial because there are virtues of partiality. Being a good mother involves having a preference for the well-being of one’s own children. The mother who really is impartial would be a very bad mother, lacking in the appropriate virtues.

Another option is to hold that there are partial norms, but those partial norms are themselves justified on impartial grounds. This can be spelled out in a variety of different ways. Consider Marcia Baron’s defense of impartiality, where she notes that critics of impartiality are mistaken because they confuse levels of justification: “Critics suppose that impartialists insisting on impartiality at the level of rules or principles are committed to insisting on impartiality at the level of deciding what to do in one’s day-to-day activities” (Baron 1991). This is a mistake because impartialists can justify partial norms by appealing to impartial rules or principles. She is correct about this. Even Jeremy Bentham believed, for example, that the principle of utility ought not be applied in every case, though he mainly appealed to efficiency costs of using the principle all the time. But one can appeal to other considerations. Frank Jackson uses an analogy with predators to argue that partial norms are strategies for maximizing the good, they offer the best chance of actually doing so given our limitations (Jackson 1991). Similarly, a Kantian such as Tom Hill, jr., as Baron notes, can argue that impartiality is part of an ideal, and ought not govern our day-to-day lives (Hill 1987). Does this alienate people from others? The typical mother shows the right amount of preference for her child, let’s say, but doesn’t herself think that this is justified on the basis of promoting the good, for example. A friend visits another in the hospital and also does not view the partiality as justified by any further principles. But this is no more alienating than someone being able to make good arguments and criticize bad ones without a knowledge of inference rules. Maybe it is better to have an awareness of the underlying justification, but for some theories even that is debatable. For an objective theorist (see below) it may be that knowing the underlying justification can interfere with doing the right thing, in which case it is better not to know. For some theorists, however, such as neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists, a person is not truly virtuous without such knowledge and understanding, though Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) does not make this a requirement of right action.

Recently consequentialists have been approaching this issue through the theory of value itself, arguing that there are agent-relative forms of value. This approach is able to explain the intuitions that support partial moral norms while retaining the general structure of consequentialism (Sen 2000). Douglas Portmore, for example, argues for a form of consequentialism that he terms “commonsense consequentialism” as it is able to accommodate many of our everyday moral intuitions (Portmore 2011). He does so by arguing that (1) the deontic status of an act, whether it is right or wrong, is determined by what reasons the agent has for performing it – if an agent has a decisive reason to perform the act in question, then it is morally required. Combined with (2) a teleological view of practical reasons in which our reasons for performing an action are a function of what we have reason to prefer or desire we are led to a form of act-consequentialism but one which is open to accepting that we have reason to prefer or desire the well-being of the near and dear over others.

Though much of this is controversial, there is general agreement that moral reasons are weighty , are not egoistic – that is, to be contrasted with prudential reasons, and are concerned with issues of value [duty, fittingness].

1.2.2. Morality and Aesthetics

Moral modes of evaluation are distinct from the aesthetic in terms of their content, but also in terms of their authority. So, for example, works of art are evaluated as “beautiful” or “ugly”, and those evaluations are not generally considered as universal or as objective as moral evaluations. These distinctions between moral evaluation and aesthetic evaluation have been challenged, and are the subject of some interesting debates in metaethics on the nature of both moral and aesthetic norms and the truth-conditions of moral and aesthetic claims. But, considered intuitively, aesthetics seems at least less objective than morality.

A number of writers have noted that we need to be cognizant of the distinction between moral norms and the norms specific to other normative areas in order to avoid fallacies of evaluation, and much discussion has centered on a problem in aesthetics termed the “Moralistic Fallacy” (D’Arms and Jacobson 2000).

One challenge that the anti-theorists have raised for morality was to note that in a person’s life there will be certain norm clashes – including clashes between types of norms such as the moral and the aesthetic. It is giving too much prominence to the moral that judges a person’s life as going well relative to the fulfillment or respect of those norms. Can’t a human life go well, even when that life sacrifices morality for aesthetics?

This sort of debate has a long history in moral theory. For example, it arose as a form of criticism of G. E. Moore’s Ideal Utilitarianism, which treated beauty as an intrinsic good, and rendering trade-offs between behaving well towards others and creating beauty at least in principle justified morally (Moore 1903). But the anti-theorists do not pursue this method of accommodating the aesthetic, instead arguing that it is a separate normative realm which has its own weight and significance in human flourishing.

2. Theory and Theoretical Virtues

There is agreement that theories play some kind of systematizing role, and that one function is to examine important concepts relevant to morality and moral practice and the connections, if any, between them. For example, one very common view in the middle of the 20 th century, attributed to John Rawls, was to view moral theory as primarily interested in understanding the ‘right’ and the ‘good’ and connections between the two (Rawls). Priority claims are often a central feature in the systematizing role of moral theory. Related to this is the issue of explanatory, or theoretical, depth . That is, the deeper the explanation goes, the better.

Theories also strive for simplicity , coherence , and accuracy . The fewer epicycles the theory has to postulate the better, the parts of the theory should fit well together. For example, the theory should not contain inconsistent principles, or have inconsistent implications. The theory should cover the phenomena in question. In the case of moral theories, the phenomena in question are thought to be our considered moral intuitions or judgements. Another coherence condition involves the theory cohering with a person’s set of considered judgments, as well.

One last feature that needs stressing, particularly for moral theories, is applicability . One criticism of some normative ethical theories is that they are not applicable. For example, Virtue Ethics has been criticized for not providing an account of what our moral obligations are – appealing to what the virtuous person would do in the circumstances would seem to set a very high bar or doesn’t answer the relevant question about how we should structure laws guiding people on what their social obligations are. Similarly, objective consequentialists, who understand “right action” in terms of actual consequences have been criticized for rendering what counts as a right action in a given circumstance unknowable, and thus useless as a guide to action. Both approaches provide responses to this worry, but this supports the claim that a desideratum of a moral theory is that it be applicable.

One task (though this is somewhat controversial) of a moral theory is to give an account of right actions. Often, this will involve an explication of what counts as good – some theories then get spelled out in terms of how they approach the good, by maximizing it, producing enough of it, honoring it, etc. In addition, some theories explicate the right in terms of acting in accordance with one’s duties, or acting as a virtuous person would act. In these cases the notions of ‘duty’ and ‘virtue’ become important to the overall analysis, and one function of moral theory is to explore the systematic connections between duty or virtue and the right and the good.

Moral theories also have both substantive and formal aims. Moral theories try to provide criteria for judging actions. It might be that the criterion is simple, such as right actions maximize the good, or it may be complex, such as the right action is the one that gives adequate weight to each competing duty. Sometimes, in recognition that there is not always “the” right action, the theory simply provides an account of wrongness, or permissibility and impermissibility, which allows that a range of actions might count as “right”.

In addition to simply providing criteria for right or virtuous action, or for being a virtuous person, a given moral theory, for example, will attempt to explain why something, like an action or character trait, has a particular moral quality, such as rightness or virtuousness. Some theories view rightness as grounded in or explained by value . Some view rightness as a matter of reasons that are prior to value. In each case, to provide an explanation of the property of ‘rightness’ or ‘virtuousness’ will be to provide an account of what the grounding value is, or an account of reasons for action.

In addition, moral theories may also provide decision-procedures to employ in determining how to act rightly or virtuously, conditions on being good or virtuous, or conditions on morally appropriate practical deliberation. Thus, the theory provides substance to evaluation and reasons. However, moral theories, in virtue of providing an explanatory framework, help us see connections between criteria and decision-procedures, as well as provide other forms of systemization. Thus, moral theories will be themselves evaluated according to their theoretical virtues: simplicity, explanatory power, elegance, etc. To evaluate moral theories as theories , each needs to be evaluated in terms of how well it succeeds in achieving these theoretical goals.

There are many more specialized elements to moral theories as well. For example, a moral theory often concerns itself with features of moral psychology relevant to action and character, such as motives, intentions, emotions, and reasons responsiveness. A moral theory that incorporates consideration of consequences into the determination of moral quality, will also be concerned with issues surrounding the proper aggregation of those consequences, and the scope of the consequences to be considered.

There’s been a long history of comparing moral theories to other sorts of theories, such as scientific ones. For example, in meta-ethics one issue has to do with the nature of moral “evidence” on analogy with scientific evidence. On what Ronald Dworkin terms the “natural model” the truths of morality are discovered, just as the truths of science are (Dworkin 1977, 160). It is our considered intuitions that provide the clues to discover these moral truths, just as what is observable to us provides the evidence to discover scientific truths. He compared this model with the “constructive model” in which the intuitions themselves are features of the theory being constructed and are not analogous to observations of the external world.

Yet, even if we decide that morality lacks the same type of phenomena to be accounted for as science, morality clearly figures into our normative judgments and reactions. One might view these – our intuitions about moral cases, for example – to provide the basic data that needs to be accounted for by a theory on either model.

One way to “account for” our considered intuitions would be to debunk them. There is a long tradition of this in moral philosophy as well. When scholars provided genealogies of morality that explained our considered intuitions in terms of social or evolutionary forces that are not sensitive the truth, for example, they were debunking morality by undercutting the authority of our intuitions to provide insight into it (Nietzsche 1887 [1998], Joyce 2001, Street 2006). In this entry, however, we consider the ways in which moral theorists have constructed their accounts by taking the intuitions seriously as something to be systematized, explained, and as something that can be applied to generate the correct moral decisions or outcomes.

Along these lines, one method used in theory construction would involve the use of reflective equilibrium and inference to the best explanation. For example, one might notice an apparent inconsistency in moral judgements regarding two structurally similar cases and then try to figure out what principle or set of principles would achieve consistency between them. In this case, the theorist is trying to figure out what best explains both of those intuitions. But one also might, after thinking about principles one already accepts, or finds plausible, reject one of those intuitions on the basis of it not cohering with the rest of one’s considered views. But full theory construction will go beyond this because of the fully theoretical virtues discussed earlier. We want a systematic account that coheres well not only with itself, but with other things that we believe on the basis of good evidence.

Consider the following:

Malory has promised to take Chris grocery shopping. Unfortunately, as Malory is leaving the apartment, Sam calls with an urgent request: please come over to my house right now, my pipes have broken and I need help! Torn, Malory decides to help Sam, and thus breaks a promise to Chris.

Has Malory done the right thing? The virtuous thing? Malory has broken a promise, which is pro tanto wrong, but Sam is in an emergency and needs help right away. Even if it is clear that what Malory did was right in the circumstances, it is an interesting question as to why it is right. What can we appeal to in making these sorts of judgments? This brings to light the issue of how one morally justifies one’s actions. This is the task of understanding what the justifying reasons are for our actions. What makes an action the thing to do in the circumstances? This is the criterion of rightness (or wrongness). We will focus on the criterion of rightness, though the criterion issue comes up with other modes of moral evaluation, such as judging an action to be virtuous, or judging it to be good in some respect, even if not right. Indeed, some writers have argued that ‘morally right’ should be jettisoned from modern secular ethics, as it presupposes a conceptual framework left over from religiously based accounts which assume there is a God (Anscombe 1958). We will leave these worries aside for now, however, and focus on standard accounts of criteria.

The following are some toy examples that exhibit differing structural features for moral theories and set out different criteria:

Consequentialism . The right action is the action that produces good amongst the options open to the agent at the time of action (Singer). The most well-known version of this theory is Classical Utilitarianism, which holds that the right action promotes pleasure (Mill). Kantian Deontology . The morally worthy action is in accordance with the Categorical Imperative, which requires an agent refrain from acting in a way that fails to respect the rational nature of other persons (Kant). Rossian Deontology . The right action is the action that best accords with the fulfillment and/or non-violation of one’s prima facie duties (Ross). Contractualism . An action is morally wrong if it is an act that would be forbidden by principles that rational persons could not reasonably reject (Scanlon). Virtue Ethics . The right action is the action that a virtuous person would characteristically perform in the circumstances (Hursthouse 1999).

These principles set out the criterion or standard for evaluation of actions. They do not necessarily tell us how to perform right actions, and are not, in themselves, decision-procedures, though they can easily be turned into decision procedures, such as: you ought to try to perform the action that maximizes the good amongst the options available to you at the time of action. This might not be, and in ordinary circumstance probably isn’t, a very good decision-procedure, and would itself need to be evaluated according to the criterion set out by the theory.

These theories can be divided, roughly, into the deontological, consequentialist, and virtue ethical categories. There has been a lively debate about how, exactly, to delineate these categories. Some have held that deontological theories were just those theories that were not consequentialist. A popular conception of consequentialist theories is that they are reductionist in a particular way – that is, in virtue of reducing deontic features of actions (e.g. rightness, obligatoriness) to facts about an agent’s options and the consequences of those options (Smith 2009). If that is the case, then it seems that deontological approaches are just the ones that are not reductive in this manner. However, this fails to capture the distinctive features of many forms of virtue ethics, which are neither consequentialist nor necessarily concerned with what we ought to do , our duties as opposed to what sorts of persons we should be.

One way to distinguish consequentialist from deontological theories is in terms of how each approaches value. Philip Pettit has suggested that while consequentialist theories required promotion of value, deontological theories recommend that value be honored or respected. On each of these views, value is an important component of the theory, and theories will be partially delineated according to their theory of value. A utilitarian such as Jeremey Bentham believes that hedonism is the correct theory of value, whereas someone such as G. E. Moore, a utilitarian but a pluralist regarding value, believes that hedonism is much too narrow an account. A Kantian, on the other hand, views value as grounded in rational nature, in a will conforming to the Categorical Imperative.

Because of the systematizing function of moral theory discussed earlier, the simplest account is to be preferred and thus there is a move away from endorsing value pluralism. Of course, as intuitive pressure is put on each of the simpler alternatives, a pluralistic account of criteria for rightness and wrongness has the advantage of according best with moral intuitions.

Reasons-first philosophers will delineate the theories somewhat differently. For example, one might understand goodness as a matter of what we have reason to desire, in which case what we have reason to desire is prior to goodness rather than the other way around. Value is still an important component of the theories, it is simply that the value is grounded in reasons.

Another distinction between normative theories is that between subjective and objective versions of a type of theory. This distinction cuts across other categories. For example, there are subjective forms of all the major moral theories, and objective versions of many. An objective standard of right holds that the agent must actually meet the standard – and meeting the standard is something ‘objective’, not dependent on the agent’s psychological states – in order to count as right or virtuous. Subjective standards come in two broad forms:

Psychology sensitive : are the justifying reasons part of the agent’s deliberative processes? Or, more weakly, are they “recoverable” from the agent’s psychology [perhaps, for example, the agent has a commitment to the values that provide the reasons].
Evidence sensitive : the right action isn’t the one that actually meets the standard, but instead, is the action that the agent could foresee would meet that standard. [there are many different ways to spell this out, depending on the degree of evidence that is relevant: in terms of what the agent actually foresees, what is foreseeable by the agent given what the agent knows, is foreseeable by someone in possession of a reasonable amount of evidence, etc.]

Of course, these two can overlap. For theorists who are evaluational internalists , evidence-sensitivity doesn’t seem like a plausible way of spelling out the standard, except, perhaps, indirectly. The distinction frequently comes up in Consequentialism, where the Objective standard is taken to be something like: the right action is the action that actually promotes the good and the Subjective standard is something like: the right action is the action that promotes the good by the agent’s own lights (psychology sensitive) or the right action is the action that promotes the foreseeable good, given evidence available at the time of action (evidence sensitive standard). It is certainly possible for other moral standards to be objective. For example, the right action is the action that the virtuous person would perform, even though the agent does not realize it is what the virtuous agent would do in the circumstances, and even if the person with the best available evidence couldn’t realize it is what the virtuous person would do in the circumstances.

We certainly utter locutions that support both subjective and objective uses of what we ‘ought’ to do, or what is ‘right’. Frank Jackson notes this when he writes:

…we have no alternative but to recognize a whole range of oughts – what she ought to do by the light of her beliefs at the time of action, …what she ought to do by the lights of one or another onlooker who has different information on the subject, and, what is more, what she ought to do by God’s lights…that is, by the lights of one who knows what will and would happen for each and every course of action. (Jackson 1991, 471).

For Jackson, the primary ought, the primary sense of ‘rightness’ for an action, is the one that is “most immediately relevant to action” since, otherwise, we have a problem of understanding how the action is the agent’s. Thus, the subjective ‘ought’ is primary in the sense that this is the one that ethical theory should be concerned with (Jackson 1991). Each type of theorist makes use of our ordinary language intuitions to make their case. But one desideratum of a theory is that it not simply reflect those intuitions, but also provides the tools to critically analyze them. Given that our language allows for both sorts of ‘ought,’ the interesting issue becomes which, if either, has primacy in terms of actually providing the standard by which other things are evaluated? Moral theory needn’t only be concerned with what the right action is from the agent’s point of view.

There are three possibilities:

neither has primacy
the subjective has primacy
the objective has primacy

First off we need to understand what we mean by “primacy”. Again, for Frank Jackson, the primary sense of ‘right’ or ‘ought’ is subjective, since what we care about is the ‘right’ that refers to an inward story, the story of our agency, so to speak. On this view, the objective and subjective senses may have no relationship to each other at all, and which counts as primary simply depends upon our interests. However, the issue that concerns us here is whether or not one sense can be accounted for in terms of the other. Option 1 holds that there is no explanatory connection. That is not as theoretically satisfying. Option 2 holds either there really is no meaningful objective sense, just the subjective sense, or the objective sense is understood in terms of the subjective.

Let’s look at the objective locution again “He did the right thing, but he didn’t know it at the time (or he had no way of knowing it at the time)”. Perhaps all this means is “He did what someone with all the facts and correct set of values would have judged right by their own lights” – this would be extensionally the same as “He performed the action with the best actual consequences”. This is certainly a possible account of what objective right means which makes use of a subjective standard. But it violates the spirit of the subjective standard, since it ties rightness neither to the psychology of the agent, or the evidence that is actually available to the agent. For that reason, it seems more natural to opt for 3. An advantage of this option is that gives us a nice, unified account regarding the connection between the objective and the subjective. Subjective standards, then, are standards of praise and blame, which are themselves evaluable according to the objective standard. Over time, people are in a position to tell whether or not a standard actually works in a given type of context. Or, perhaps it turns out that there are several standards of blame that differ in terms of severity. For example, if someone acts negligently a sensible case can be made that the person is blameworthy but not as blameworthy as if they had acted intentionally.

As to the worry that the objective standard doesn’t provide action guidance, the objective theorist can hold that action guidance is provided by the subjective standards of praise/blameworthiness. Further, the standard itself can provide what we need for action guidance through normative review (Driver 2012). Normative review is a retrospective look at what does in fact meet the standard, and under what circumstances.

Now, consider a virtue ethical example. The right action is the action that is the actual action that a virtuous person would perform characteristically, in the circumstances, rather than the action that the agent believes is the one the virtuous person would perform. Then we evaluate an agent’s “v-rules” in terms of how close they meet the virtuous ideal.

Another function of moral theory is to provide a decision procedure for people to follow so as to best insure they perform right actions. Indeed, some writers, such as R. M. Hare hold action guidance to be the function of the moral principles of the theory (Hare 1965). This raises the question of what considerations are relevant to the content of such principles – for example, should the principles be formulated taking into account the epistemic limitations of most human beings? The requirement that moral principles be action guiding is what Holly Smith terms the “Useability Demand”: “…an acceptable moral principle must be useable for guiding moral decisions…” (Smith 2020, 11). Smith enumerates different forms satisfaction of this demand can take, and notes that how one spells out a principle in order to meet the demand will depend upon how the moral theorist views moral success. For example, whether or not success is achieved in virtue of simply making the right decision or if, in addition to making the right decision, the agent must also have successful follow-through on that decision.

There has been enormous debate on the issue of what is involved in following a rule or principle, and some skepticism that this is in fact what we are doing when we take ourselves to be following a rule. (Kripke 1982) Some virtue theorists believe that it is moral perception that actually does the guiding, and that a virtuous person is able to perceive what is morally relevant and act accordingly (McDowell 1979).

As discussed earlier in the section on criteria, however, this is also controversial in that some theorists believe that decision procedures themselves are not of fundamental significance. Again, objective consequentialist who believes that the fundamental task of theory is to establish a criterion for right argues that decision procedures will themselves be established and evaluated on the basis of how well they get us to actually achieving the right. Thus, the decision-procedures are derivative. Others, such as subjective consequentialists, will argue that the decision-procedures specify the criterion in the sense that following the decision-procedure itself is sufficient for meeting the criterion. For example, an objective consequentialist will hold that the right action maximizes the good, whereas the subjective consequentialist might hold that the right action is to try to maximize the good, whether or not one actually achieves it (Mason 2003 and 2019). Following the decision-procedure itself, then, is the criterion.

The distinction between criterion and decision-procedure has been acknowledged and discussed at least since Sidgwick, though it was also mentioned by earlier ethicists. This distinction allows ethical theories to avoid wildly implausible implications. For example, if the standard that the theory recommends is ‘promote the good’ it would be a mistake to think that ‘promote the good’ needs to be part of the agent’s deliberation. The consequentialist might say that, instead, it is an empirical issue as to what the theory is going to recommend as a decision-procedure, and that recommendation could vary from context to context. There will surely be circumstances in which it would be best to think in terms of meeting the standard itself, but again that is an empirical issue. Likewise, it is open to a Virtue Ethicist to hold that the right action is the one the virtuous agent would perform in the circumstances, but also hold that the agent’s deliberative processes need not make reference to the standard. Pretty much all theories will want to make some space between the standard and the decision-procedure in order to avoid a requirement that agent’s must think in terms of the correct standard, in order to act rightly, or even act with moral worth. There is a distinction to be made between doing the right thing, and doing the right thing for the right reasons . Doing the right thing for the right reasons makes the action a morally worthy one, as it exhibits a good quality of the will. It is possible for a theory to hold that the ‘good will’ is one that understands the underlying justification of an action, but that seems overly demanding. If consequentialism is the correct theory, then demanding that people must explicitly act intentionally to maximize the good would result in fewer morally worthy actions than seems plausible. The ‘for the right reasons’ must be understood as allowing for no explicit invocation of the true justifying standard.

This has led to the development of theories that advocate indirection. First, we need to distinguish two ways that indirection figures into moral philosophy.

Indirection in evaluation of right action.
Indirection in that the theory does not necessarily advocate the necessity of aiming for the right action.

To use Utilitarianism as an example again, Rule Utilitarianism is an example of the first sort of indirection (Hooker 2000), Sophisticated Consequentialism is an example of the second sort of indirection (Railton 1984). One might hold that some versions of Aristotelian Virtue ethics, such as Rosalind Hursthouse’s version, also are of the first type, since right action is understood in terms of virtue. One could imagine an indirect consequentialist view with a similar structure: the right action is the action that the virtuous person would perform, where virtue is understood as a trait conducive to the good, instead of by appeal to an Aristotelian notion of human flourishing.

The second sort relies on the standard/decision-procedure distinction. Railton argues that personal relationships are good for people, and explicitly trying to maximize the good is not a part of our relationship norms, so it is likely good that we develop dispositions to focus on and pay special attention to our loved ones. The account is open to the possibility that people who don’t believe in consequentialism have another way of deciding how to act that is correlated with promotion of the good. If the criteria a theory sets out need not be fulfilled by the agent guiding herself with the reasons set out by the criteria, then it is termed self-effacing . When a theory is self-effacing, it has the problem of alienating a person from the justification of her own actions. A middle ground, which is closer to Railton’s view, holds that the correct justification is a kind of “touchstone” to the morally good person – consulted periodically for self-regulation, but not taken explicitly into consideration in our ordinary, day-to-day lives. In this way, the theory would not be utterly self-effacing and the agent would still understand the moral basis for her own actions.

Alicke, Mark, David Rose and Dori Bloom, 2011, “Causation, Norm Violation, and Culpable Control,” Journal of Philosophy , 108(12): 670–696.
Annas, Julia, 2011, Intelligent Virtue , New York: Oxford University Press.
Arpaly, Nomy, 2002, Unprincipled Virtue , New York: Oxford University Press.
Baier, Annette, 1985, Postures of the Mind , Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Baron, Marcia, 1991, “Impartiality and Friendship,” Ethics , 101(4): 836–857.
–––, 1995, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology , Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Clarke, Stanley G, 1987, “Anti-Theory in Ethics,” American Philosophical Quarterly , 24(3): 237–244.
D’Arms, Justin and Daniel Jacobson, 2000 , “The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 61(1): 65–90.
Darwall, Stephen, 2006, The Second-Person Standpoint , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dreier, Jamie, 1993, “Structures of Normative Theories,” The Monist , 76(1): 22–40.
Driver, Julia, 2012, “What the Objective Standard is Good For,” in Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics , New York: Oxford University Press, 28–44.
Dworkin, Ronald, 1977, Taking Rights Seriously , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Foot, Philippa, 1967, “Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect,” Oxford Review , 5: 5–15.
Graham, Peter, 2010, “In Defense of Objectivism About Moral Obligation,” Ethics , 121(1): 88–115.
Hare, R. M., 1965, Freedom and Reason , New York: Oxford University Press.
Herman, Barbara, 1985, “The Practice of Moral Judgment,” Journal of Philosophy , 82(8): 414–436.
Hill, jr., Thomas E., 1987, “The Importance of Autonomy,” in Eva Kittay and Diana Meyers (ed.) Women and Moral Theory , Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 129–138.
Hooker, Brad, 2000, Ideal Code, Real World , New York: Oxford University Press.
Hurka, Thomas, 2001, Virtue, Vice, and Value , New York: Oxford University Press.
Hursthouse, Rosalind, 1999, On Virtue Ethics , New York: Oxford University Press.
Jackson, Frank, 1991, “Decision-theoretic Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection,” Ethics , 101(3): 461–482.
Jeske, Diane, 2008, Rationality and Moral Theory: How Intimacy Generates Reasons , New York: Routledge.
Joyce, Richard, 2001, The Myth of Morality , New York: Cambridge University Press.
Keas, Michael, 2018, “Systematizing the Theoretical Virtues,” Synthese , 195: 2761–2793.
Kagan, Shelley, 1989, The Limits of Morality , New York: Oxford University Press.
Kamm, Frances, 2007, Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm , New York: Oxford University Press.
Kant, Immanuel, 1785 [2012], Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , tr. by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmerman, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Knobe, Joshua, 2003, “Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation,” Philosophical Psychology , 16(2): 309–325.
Kripke, Saul, 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Louden, Robert, 1990, “Virtue Ethics and Anti-Theory,” Philosophia , 20(1–2): 93–114.
Markovits, Julia, 2014, Moral Reason , New York: Oxford University Press.
Mason, Elinor, 2003, “Consequentialism and the ‘Ought Implies Can’ Principle,” American Philosophical Quarterly , 40(4): 319–331.
–––, 2019, Ways to Be Blameworthy: Rightness, Wrongness, and Responsibility , New York: Oxford University Press.
McDowell, John, 1979, “Virtue and Reason,” The Monist , 62(3): 331–350.
Moody-Adams, Michelle, 2002, Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture, and Philosophy , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Moore, G. E., 1903 [1993], Principia Ethica , ed. Thomas Baldwin, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Nagel, Thomas, 1979, “The Fragmentation of Value,” in Mortal Questions , New York: Cambridge University Press, 128–141.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1887 [1998], On the Genealogy of Morality , Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen (trans.), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.
Norcross, Alastair, 2020, Morality By Degrees , New York: Oxford University Press.
Olson, Jonas, 2004, “Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons,” Philosophical Quarterly , 54(215): 295–300.
Parfit, Derek, 1984, Reasons and Persons , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Pettit, Phillip, 1997, “The Consequentialist Perspective,” in The Three Methods of Ethics , by Marcia Baron, Phillip Pettit, and Michael Slote, Oxford: Blackwell, 92–174.
Pettit, Phillip, and Michael Smith, 2000, “Global Consequentialism,” in Brad Hooker, et al. (eds.), Morality, Rules, and Consequences , Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 121–133.
Phillips, David, 2019, Rossian Ethics , New York: Oxford University Press.
Piper, Adrian, 1987, “Moral Theory and Moral Alienation,” Journal of Philosophy , 82(2): 102–118.
Portmore, Douglas, 2011, Commonsense Consequentialism , New York: Oxford University Press.
Rabinowicz, Wlodek and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, 2004, “The Strike of the Demon: on Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value,” Ethics , 114(3): 391–423.
Railton, Peter, 1984, “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs , 13(2): 134–171.
Rawls, John, 1971, A Theory of Justice , Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Scanlon, T. M., 1998, What We Owe to Each Other , Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
–––, 2008, Moral Dimensions , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Scheffler, Samuel, 1982, The Rejection of Consequentialism , New York: Oxford University Press.
Schneewind, J. B., 1963, “First Principles and Common-sense Morality in Sidgwick’s Ethics,” Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie , 45(2): 137–156.
–––, 1990, “The Misfortunes of Virtue,” Ethics , 101(1): 42–63.
Schofield, Paul, 2021, Duty to Self: Moral, Political, and Legal Self-Relation , New York: Oxford University Press.
Sen, Amartya, 2000, “Consequential Evaluation and Practical Reason,” The Journal of Philosophy , 47(9): 477–502.
Sidgwick, Henry, 1874 [1907], The Methods of Ethics , London: Macmillan. [The seventh edition was published in 1907.]
Singer, Marcus, 1986, “Ethics and Common Sense,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie , 40(158): 221–258.
Slote, Michael, 1985, Common-Sense Morality and Consequentialism , New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
–––, 2007, The Ethics of Care and Empathy , New York: Routledge.
Smith, Holly, 2018, Making Morality Work , New York: Oxford University Press.
Smith, Michael, 2009, “Two Kinds of Consequentialism,” Philosophical Issues , 19(1): 257–272.
Stark, Cynthia, 1997, “Decision Procedures, Standards of Rightness and Impartiality,” Noûs , 31(4): 478–495.
Stocker, Michael, 1976, “The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories,” Journal of Philosophy , 73(14): 453–466.
Strawson, Peter, 1961, “Social Morality and Individual Ideal,” Philosophy , 36(136): 1–17.
Street, Sharon, 2006, “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value,” Philosophical Studies , 127(1): 109–166.
Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 1976, “Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem,” The Monist , 59(2): 204–217.
Wiland, Eric J, “The Incoherence Objection in Moral Theory,” Acta Analytica , 25(3): 279–284.
Williams, Bernard, 1985, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy , New York: Oxford University Press.
Wolf, Susan, 1982, “Moral Saints,” Journal of Philosophy , 79(8): 419–439.
–––, 2014, “Loving Attention: Lessons in Love from The Philadelphia Story ,” in Susan Wolf and Christopher Grau (eds.), Understanding Love: Philosophy, Film, and Fiction , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 369–386.
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkhaus, 2017, Exemplarist Moral Theory , New York: Oxford University Press.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

[Please contact the author with suggestions.]

consequentialism | ethics: deontological | ethics: virtue | morality, definition of | value theory

Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

Info about mirror sites

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

The Cinematic Adaptation of “Rikki-Tikki-Tavi”: a Study in Animation and Morality

This essay about the animated movie adaptation of “Rikki-Tikki-Tavi” explores how the film brings Rudyard Kipling’s story to life, focusing on its visual appeal through animation and the portrayal of moral themes. It discusses the narrative’s emphasis on courage, loyalty, and the dichotomy of good versus evil, noting how these universal themes are made accessible to a younger audience. The essay also touches on the film’s updates to the original story to appeal to contemporary viewers, including an emphasis on ecological balance. Moreover, it addresses the challenges of adapting violent elements for a child-friendly audience, highlighting the filmmakers’ success in maintaining the story’s integrity while ensuring suitability. Overall, the essay presents the “Rikki-Tikki-Tavi” movie as a successful adaptation that not only honors Kipling’s work but also introduces the tale’s lessons on bravery and moral righteousness to a new generation.

How it works

The animated adaptation of Rudyard Kipling’s “Rikki-Tikki-Tavi” brings to life the vivid storytelling and rich moral landscape found in the original short story. As part of Kipling’s larger work, “The Jungle Book,” this tale follows the adventures of a brave mongoose, Rikki-Tikki-Tavi, who becomes the unlikely protector of a British family living in India. This essay delves into the nuances of the film’s adaptation, examining how animation enhances the narrative and the ways in which the movie navigates the story’s moral complexities.

At its core, “Rikki-Tikki-Tavi” is a tale of courage, loyalty, and the battle between good and evil. The film adaptation, through its expressive animation, brings these themes to life in a manner that is both engaging and visually compelling. The use of vibrant colors and fluid movements captures the lush, dangerous environment of the Indian jungle, setting a picturesque backdrop for the high-stakes drama that unfolds. Animation allows for a dynamic portrayal of characters, making Rikki’s valiant efforts against the snakes Nag and Nagaina more dramatic and emotionally resonant.

The movie also excels in its ability to communicate the story’s moral lessons to a younger audience. Through Rikki’s journey, viewers are introduced to the concepts of bravery in the face of danger and the importance of standing up for what is right. These themes are universal, but the animated format makes them accessible and impactful for children. The visual storytelling, complemented by the narrative, ensures that the moral of the story is not lost in translation but is instead highlighted in a way that is both entertaining and instructive.

Furthermore, the adaptation takes liberties with Kipling’s text to ensure the story’s relevance to contemporary audiences. While it remains faithful to the spirit of the original tale, the film introduces elements that resonate with modern sensibilities, such as the emphasis on ecological balance and the portrayal of Rikki as not just a protector of humans but as a guardian of the natural world. This subtle shift adds depth to the narrative, encouraging viewers to consider the interdependence of all living creatures.

However, the transition from text to animation is not without its challenges. The need to visually depict the story’s more violent elements, such as Rikki’s battles with the cobras, required a careful balancing act. The film manages to portray these scenes with enough intensity to convey the danger and heroism involved, but without crossing the line into gratuitous violence. This approach ensures that the movie remains suitable for its intended audience, preserving the story’s integrity while making it accessible to children.

In conclusion, the animated movie “Rikki-Tikki-Tavi” is a remarkable adaptation that brings Rudyard Kipling’s beloved story to life in a new and vibrant way. Through its thoughtful use of animation, the film enhances the narrative’s visual appeal and emotional depth, making the tale’s moral lessons more palpable and impactful. By staying true to the spirit of the original story while adapting its themes for a modern audience, the movie offers a timeless tale of courage and morality that resonates with viewers of all ages. In doing so, it not only preserves the legacy of Kipling’s work but also introduces it to a new generation, ensuring that the story of Rikki’s bravery and the importance of standing up for what is right continue to inspire and entertain.

Cite this page

The Cinematic Adaptation of "Rikki-Tikki-Tavi": A Study in Animation and Morality. (2024, Mar 25). Retrieved from https://papersowl.com/examples/the-cinematic-adaptation-of-rikki-tikki-tavi-a-study-in-animation-and-morality/

"The Cinematic Adaptation of "Rikki-Tikki-Tavi": A Study in Animation and Morality." PapersOwl.com , 25 Mar 2024, https://papersowl.com/examples/the-cinematic-adaptation-of-rikki-tikki-tavi-a-study-in-animation-and-morality/

PapersOwl.com. (2024). The Cinematic Adaptation of "Rikki-Tikki-Tavi": A Study in Animation and Morality . [Online]. Available at: https://papersowl.com/examples/the-cinematic-adaptation-of-rikki-tikki-tavi-a-study-in-animation-and-morality/ [Accessed: 12 Apr. 2024]

"The Cinematic Adaptation of "Rikki-Tikki-Tavi": A Study in Animation and Morality." PapersOwl.com, Mar 25, 2024. Accessed April 12, 2024. https://papersowl.com/examples/the-cinematic-adaptation-of-rikki-tikki-tavi-a-study-in-animation-and-morality/

"The Cinematic Adaptation of "Rikki-Tikki-Tavi": A Study in Animation and Morality," PapersOwl.com , 25-Mar-2024. [Online]. Available: https://papersowl.com/examples/the-cinematic-adaptation-of-rikki-tikki-tavi-a-study-in-animation-and-morality/. [Accessed: 12-Apr-2024]

Don't let plagiarism ruin your grade

Hire a writer to get a unique paper crafted to your needs.

Our writers will help you fix any mistakes and get an A+!

Please check your inbox.

You can order an original essay written according to your instructions.

Trusted by over 1 million students worldwide

1. Tell Us Your Requirements

2. Pick your perfect writer

3. Get Your Paper and Pay

Hi! I'm Amy, your personal assistant!

Don't know where to start? Give me your paper requirements and I connect you to an academic expert.

short deadlines

100% Plagiarism-Free

Certified writers

Share full article

Supported by

Guest Essay

José Andrés: Let People Eat

A woman wearing a head scarf sits on a cart next to a box of food marked “World Central Kitchen.”

By José Andrés

Mr. Andrés is the founder of World Central Kitchen.

In the worst conditions you can imagine — after hurricanes, earthquakes, bombs and gunfire — the best of humanity shows up. Not once or twice but always.

The seven people killed on a World Central Kitchen mission in Gaza on Monday were the best of humanity. They are not faceless or nameless. They are not generic aid workers or collateral damage in war.

Saifeddin Issam Ayad Abutaha, John Chapman, Jacob Flickinger, Zomi Frankcom, James Henderson, James Kirby and Damian Sobol risked everything for the most fundamentally human activity: to share our food with others.

These are people I served alongside in Ukraine, Turkey, Morocco, the Bahamas, Indonesia, Mexico, Gaza and Israel. They were far more than heroes.

Their work was based on the simple belief that food is a universal human right. It is not conditional on being good or bad, rich or poor, left or right. We do not ask what religion you belong to. We just ask how many meals you need.

From Day 1, we have fed Israelis as well as Palestinians. Across Israel, we have served more than 1.75 million hot meals. We have fed families displaced by Hezbollah rockets in the north. We have fed grieving families from the south. We delivered meals to the hospitals where hostages were reunited with their families. We have called consistently, repeatedly and passionately for the release of all the hostages.

All the while, we have communicated extensively with Israeli military and civilian officials. At the same time, we have worked closely with community leaders in Gaza, as well as Arab nations in the region. There is no way to bring a ship full of food to Gaza without doing so.

That’s how we served more than 43 million meals in Gaza, preparing hot food in 68 community kitchens where Palestinians are feeding Palestinians.

We know Israelis. Israelis, in their heart of hearts, know that food is not a weapon of war.

Israel is better than the way this war is being waged. It is better than blocking food and medicine to civilians. It is better than killing aid workers who had coordinated their movements with the Israel Defense Forces.

The Israeli government needs to open more land routes for food and medicine today. It needs to stop killing civilians and aid workers today. It needs to start the long journey to peace today.

In the worst conditions, after the worst terrorist attack in its history, it’s time for the best of Israel to show up. You cannot save the hostages by bombing every building in Gaza. You cannot win this war by starving an entire population.

We welcome the government’s promise of an investigation into how and why members of our World Central Kitchen family were killed. That investigation needs to start at the top, not just the bottom.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said of the Israeli killings of our team, “It happens in war.” It was a direct attack on clearly marked vehicles whose movements were known by the Israel Defense Forces.

It was also the direct result of a policy that squeezed humanitarian aid to desperate levels. Our team was en route from a delivery of almost 400 tons of aid by sea — our second shipment, funded by the United Arab Emirates, supported by Cyprus and with clearance from the Israel Defense Forces.

The team members put their lives at risk precisely because this food aid is so rare and desperately needed. According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification global initiative, half the population of Gaza — 1.1. million people — faces the imminent risk of famine. The team would not have made the journey if there were enough food, traveling by truck across land, to feed the people of Gaza.

The peoples of the Mediterranean and Middle East, regardless of ethnicity and religion, share a culture that values food as a powerful statement of humanity and hospitality — of our shared hope for a better tomorrow.

There’s a reason, at this special time of year, Christians make Easter eggs, Muslims eat an egg at iftar dinners and an egg sits on the Seder plate. This symbol of life and hope reborn in spring extends across religions and cultures.

I have been a stranger at Seder dinners. I have heard the ancient Passover stories about being a stranger in the land of Egypt, the commandment to remember — with a feast before you — that the children of Israel were once slaves.

It is not a sign of weakness to feed strangers; it is a sign of strength. The people of Israel need to remember, at this darkest hour, what strength truly looks like.

José Andrés is a chef and the founder of World Central Kitchen.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

Follow the New York Times Opinion section on Facebook , Instagram , TikTok , WhatsApp , X and Threads .

IMAGES

Essay on Moral Values
What is Morality in Simple Terms
35+ Morality Essay Examples Gif
Morality, Ethics, Business Ethics: Basic Definitions and Aspects
Amazing Morality Essay ~ Thatsnotus
Difference between Ethics and Morality Essay Example

VIDEO

10 Difference Between Morals and Morale (With Table)
Landscape, Mimesis, Morality Summary in Tamil
Natural Ethics: Individual Ethical Egoism
10 Lines Essay on Moral Values//English Essay/Moral Values
1. The Genealogy of Morals by Friedrich Nietzsche: First Essay
write an essay on moral education in english || essay on moral education || role of moral education

COMMENTS

Morality: Definition, Formation, and Examples of Morals
Morality refers to the set of standards that enable people to live cooperatively in groups. It's what societies determine to be "right" and "acceptable.". Sometimes, acting in a moral manner means individuals must sacrifice their own short-term interests to benefit society.
The Definition of Morality
The topic of this entry is not—at least directly—moral theory; rather, it is the definition of morality.Moral theories are large and complex things; definitions are not. The question of the definition of morality is the question of identifying the target of moral theorizing. Identifying this target enables us to see different moral theories as attempting to capture the very same thing.
Morality Essay
Morality is the value or extent to which an action is right or wrong. Everyone has their own moral code and sense of right and wrong. Our culture today values the outcome more than the means, however, and will forgive lapses in morality, such as deceit, in order to achieve a favorable outcome. Deceit with immoral or selfish intentions is ...
What is Morality? Essay
Morality in its basic definition, is the knowledge between what is right and what is wrong. In Joan Didion's essay, "On Morality," she uses examples to show how morality is used to justify actions and decisions by people. She explains that morality can have a profound effect on the decisions that people chose to make.
Essay on Morality
Morality helps us become better people and make the world a better place. In conclusion, morality is like a compass that guides us through life. It helps us know which way is right and which way is wrong. By following our moral compass, we can live in a way that is good for us and for everyone around us.
Morality
morality, the moral beliefs and practices of a culture, community, or religion or a code or system of moral rules, principles, or values. The conceptual foundations and rational consistency of such standards are the subject matter of the philosophical discipline of ethics, also known as moral philosophy. In its contemporary usage, the term ...
Ethics and Morality
Morality, Ethics, Evil, Greed. To put it simply, ethics represents the moral code that guides a person's choices and behaviors throughout their life. The idea of a moral code extends beyond the ...
The Concept Of Morality Philosophy Essay
Morality is the differentiation of decisions, actions, and intentions between the ones that are right or good and the ones that are wrong or bad. Morality is also defined as conformity to the right conduct rules. Ethics is the philosophy of morality. Therefore, morality means rightness or goodness.
Ethics
The term ethics may refer to the philosophical study of the concepts of moral right and wrong and moral good and bad, to any philosophical theory of what is morally right and wrong or morally good and bad, and to any system or code of moral rules, principles, or values. The last may be associated with particular religions, cultures, professions, or virtually any other group that is at least ...
What is morality?
In "Modern Moral Philosophy," Anscombe argued that the moral vocabulary does not correspond to any concept in Aristotelian ethics, that it derives from a confused response to the ethics of divine command, and that it is literally meaningless. This essay contends that Anscombe was wrong. Morality corresponds to Aristotle's general sense of "justice," which is complete virtue in ...
The Variety of Values: Essays on Morality, Meaning, and Love
Few essays evoke the same enthusiastic praise for their combination of rigorous reasoning, elegant writing style and influential thesis as Susan Wolf's "Moral Saints." [1] Its placement as the inaugural piece in this collection allows one to see that it is not only chronologically but also conceptually prior to Wolf's subsequent essays.
157 Morality Essay Topics & Examples
In your morality essay, you can cover ethical dilemmas, philosophy, or controversial issues. To decide on your topic, check out this compilation of 138 titles prepared by our experts. We will write. a custom essay specifically for you by our professional experts. 809 writers online.
Kant's Moral Philosophy
1. Aims and Methods of Moral Philosophy. The most basic aim of moral philosophy, and so also of the Groundwork, is, in Kant's view, to "seek out" the foundational principle of a "metaphysics of morals," which Kant understands as a system of a priori moral principles that apply the CI to human persons in all times and cultures. Kant pursues this project through the first two chapters ...
Morality Essay Examples
1. Morality Essay Essay Prompts. Prompt 1: Discuss the role of morality in shaping society and its impact on individuals. Prompt 2: Explore the ethical dilemmas faced by characters in literature and their moral development. Prompt 3: Analyze the moral choices made by historical figures and their consequences. 2. Finding the Perfect Essay Topic. Choosing a compelling topic is half the battle ...
5.1: Moral Philosophy
5.1.1 The Language of Ethics. Ethics is about values, what is right and wrong, or better or worse. Ethics makes claims, or judgments, that establish values. Evaluative claims are referred to as normative, or prescriptive, claims. Normative claims tell us, or affirm, what ought to be the case.
Ethics and Morality Relationship
Ethics and morality are two terms that are closely related and which individuals often tend to refer to synonymously. However, the two are different in that while ethics are sets of principles that guide desirable behavior or conducts, morality is the generally acceptable behavior within a society at a given period of time.
Genealogy of Morals First Essay: Sections 1-9 Summary & Analysis
Whatever the "Christian" anti- Semites might loathe about Judaism, it is even more present in their own Christianity. A summary of First Essay: Sections 1-9 in Friedrich Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals. Learn exactly what happened in this chapter, scene, or section of Genealogy of Morals and what it means. Perfect for acing essays, tests, and ...
The Psychology of Morality: A Review and Analysis of Empirical Studies
Morality indicates what is the "right" and "wrong" way to behave, for instance, that one should be fair and not unfair to others (Haidt & Kesebir, 2010).This is considered of interest to explain the social behavior of individuals living together in groups ().Results from animal studies (e.g., de Waal, 1996) or insights into universal justice principles (e.g., Greenberg & Cropanzano ...
Morality and Religion: What Is Moral Behavior? Essay
What Rachels and Rachels (1986) try to portray is that although religion and morality are related concepts, the choice of behavior lies with an individual and is based mainly on the individual's social norms. God does not force people to follow his commands, but they must be prepared to bear the consequences of their actions if they do not.
Why Is Morality Important? (17 Reasons)
Morality as the lens through which we view character ensures that ethical behavior remains integral to social expectations and personal advancement. Morality Is the Foundation for Trust. When individuals exhibit moral behavior—keeping promises, telling the truth, and acting with fairness—trust naturally develops among community members.
What's the Difference Between Morality and Ethics?
Both morality and ethics loosely have to do with distinguishing the difference between "good and bad" or "right and wrong.". Many people think of morality as something that's personal and normative, whereas ethics is the standards of "good and bad" distinguished by a certain community or social setting. For example, your local ...
Moral Theory
However, this entry is about moral theories as theories, and is not a survey of specific theories, though specific theories will be used as examples. 1. Morality. 1.1 Common-sense Morality. 1.2 Contrasts Between Morality and Other Normative Domains. 2. Theory and Theoretical Virtues. 2.1 The Tasks of Moral Theory.
Historical Analogy and the Role Morality of Reason-Giving
After outlining the role morality of reason-giving by judicial officers in our system of judicial review, this Essay provides an overview of the psychology of reasoning by analogy by both lawyers and lay persons and the role of generality, systematicity, and rules of relevance in constructing such analogies.
The Cinematic Adaptation of "Rikki-Tikki-Tavi": A Study in Animation
Essay Example: The animated adaptation of Rudyard Kipling's "Rikki-Tikki-Tavi" brings to life the vivid storytelling and rich moral landscape found in the original short story. As part of Kipling's larger work, "The Jungle Book," this tale follows the adventures of a brave mongoose, Rikki-Tikki-Tavi
Opinion
Mr. Andrés is the founder of World Central Kitchen. In the worst conditions you can imagine — after hurricanes, earthquakes, bombs and gunfire — the best of humanity shows up. Not once or ...