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Scientific Method

Science is an enormously successful human enterprise. The study of scientific method is the attempt to discern the activities by which that success is achieved. Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories. How these are carried out in detail can vary greatly, but characteristics like these have been looked to as a way of demarcating scientific activity from non-science, where only enterprises which employ some canonical form of scientific method or methods should be considered science (see also the entry on science and pseudo-science ). Others have questioned whether there is anything like a fixed toolkit of methods which is common across science and only science. Some reject privileging one view of method as part of rejecting broader views about the nature of science, such as naturalism (Dupré 2004); some reject any restriction in principle (pluralism).

Scientific method should be distinguished from the aims and products of science, such as knowledge, predictions, or control. Methods are the means by which those goals are achieved. Scientific method should also be distinguished from meta-methodology, which includes the values and justifications behind a particular characterization of scientific method (i.e., a methodology) — values such as objectivity, reproducibility, simplicity, or past successes. Methodological rules are proposed to govern method and it is a meta-methodological question whether methods obeying those rules satisfy given values. Finally, method is distinct, to some degree, from the detailed and contextual practices through which methods are implemented. The latter might range over: specific laboratory techniques; mathematical formalisms or other specialized languages used in descriptions and reasoning; technological or other material means; ways of communicating and sharing results, whether with other scientists or with the public at large; or the conventions, habits, enforced customs, and institutional controls over how and what science is carried out.

While it is important to recognize these distinctions, their boundaries are fuzzy. Hence, accounts of method cannot be entirely divorced from their methodological and meta-methodological motivations or justifications, Moreover, each aspect plays a crucial role in identifying methods. Disputes about method have therefore played out at the detail, rule, and meta-rule levels. Changes in beliefs about the certainty or fallibility of scientific knowledge, for instance (which is a meta-methodological consideration of what we can hope for methods to deliver), have meant different emphases on deductive and inductive reasoning, or on the relative importance attached to reasoning over observation (i.e., differences over particular methods.) Beliefs about the role of science in society will affect the place one gives to values in scientific method.

The issue which has shaped debates over scientific method the most in the last half century is the question of how pluralist do we need to be about method? Unificationists continue to hold out for one method essential to science; nihilism is a form of radical pluralism, which considers the effectiveness of any methodological prescription to be so context sensitive as to render it not explanatory on its own. Some middle degree of pluralism regarding the methods embodied in scientific practice seems appropriate. But the details of scientific practice vary with time and place, from institution to institution, across scientists and their subjects of investigation. How significant are the variations for understanding science and its success? How much can method be abstracted from practice? This entry describes some of the attempts to characterize scientific method or methods, as well as arguments for a more context-sensitive approach to methods embedded in actual scientific practices.

1. Overview and organizing themes

2. historical review: aristotle to mill, 3.1 logical constructionism and operationalism, 3.2. h-d as a logic of confirmation, 3.3. popper and falsificationism, 3.4 meta-methodology and the end of method, 4. statistical methods for hypothesis testing, 5.1 creative and exploratory practices.

• 5.2 Computer methods and the ‘new ways’ of doing science

6.1 “The scientific method” in science education and as seen by scientists

6.2 privileged methods and ‘gold standards’, 6.3 scientific method in the court room, 6.4 deviating practices, 7. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries.

This entry could have been given the title Scientific Methods and gone on to fill volumes, or it could have been extremely short, consisting of a brief summary rejection of the idea that there is any such thing as a unique Scientific Method at all. Both unhappy prospects are due to the fact that scientific activity varies so much across disciplines, times, places, and scientists that any account which manages to unify it all will either consist of overwhelming descriptive detail, or trivial generalizations.

The choice of scope for the present entry is more optimistic, taking a cue from the recent movement in philosophy of science toward a greater attention to practice: to what scientists actually do. This “turn to practice” can be seen as the latest form of studies of methods in science, insofar as it represents an attempt at understanding scientific activity, but through accounts that are neither meant to be universal and unified, nor singular and narrowly descriptive. To some extent, different scientists at different times and places can be said to be using the same method even though, in practice, the details are different.

Whether the context in which methods are carried out is relevant, or to what extent, will depend largely on what one takes the aims of science to be and what one’s own aims are. For most of the history of scientific methodology the assumption has been that the most important output of science is knowledge and so the aim of methodology should be to discover those methods by which scientific knowledge is generated.

Science was seen to embody the most successful form of reasoning (but which form?) to the most certain knowledge claims (but how certain?) on the basis of systematically collected evidence (but what counts as evidence, and should the evidence of the senses take precedence, or rational insight?) Section 2 surveys some of the history, pointing to two major themes. One theme is seeking the right balance between observation and reasoning (and the attendant forms of reasoning which employ them); the other is how certain scientific knowledge is or can be.

Section 3 turns to 20 th century debates on scientific method. In the second half of the 20 th century the epistemic privilege of science faced several challenges and many philosophers of science abandoned the reconstruction of the logic of scientific method. Views changed significantly regarding which functions of science ought to be captured and why. For some, the success of science was better identified with social or cultural features. Historical and sociological turns in the philosophy of science were made, with a demand that greater attention be paid to the non-epistemic aspects of science, such as sociological, institutional, material, and political factors. Even outside of those movements there was an increased specialization in the philosophy of science, with more and more focus on specific fields within science. The combined upshot was very few philosophers arguing any longer for a grand unified methodology of science. Sections 3 and 4 surveys the main positions on scientific method in 20 th century philosophy of science, focusing on where they differ in their preference for confirmation or falsification or for waiving the idea of a special scientific method altogether.

In recent decades, attention has primarily been paid to scientific activities traditionally falling under the rubric of method, such as experimental design and general laboratory practice, the use of statistics, the construction and use of models and diagrams, interdisciplinary collaboration, and science communication. Sections 4–6 attempt to construct a map of the current domains of the study of methods in science.

As these sections illustrate, the question of method is still central to the discourse about science. Scientific method remains a topic for education, for science policy, and for scientists. It arises in the public domain where the demarcation or status of science is at issue. Some philosophers have recently returned, therefore, to the question of what it is that makes science a unique cultural product. This entry will close with some of these recent attempts at discerning and encapsulating the activities by which scientific knowledge is achieved.

Attempting a history of scientific method compounds the vast scope of the topic. This section briefly surveys the background to modern methodological debates. What can be called the classical view goes back to antiquity, and represents a point of departure for later divergences. [ 1 ]

We begin with a point made by Laudan (1968) in his historical survey of scientific method:

Perhaps the most serious inhibition to the emergence of the history of theories of scientific method as a respectable area of study has been the tendency to conflate it with the general history of epistemology, thereby assuming that the narrative categories and classificatory pigeon-holes applied to the latter are also basic to the former. (1968: 5)

To see knowledge about the natural world as falling under knowledge more generally is an understandable conflation. Histories of theories of method would naturally employ the same narrative categories and classificatory pigeon holes. An important theme of the history of epistemology, for example, is the unification of knowledge, a theme reflected in the question of the unification of method in science. Those who have identified differences in kinds of knowledge have often likewise identified different methods for achieving that kind of knowledge (see the entry on the unity of science ).

Different views on what is known, how it is known, and what can be known are connected. Plato distinguished the realms of things into the visible and the intelligible ( The Republic , 510a, in Cooper 1997). Only the latter, the Forms, could be objects of knowledge. The intelligible truths could be known with the certainty of geometry and deductive reasoning. What could be observed of the material world, however, was by definition imperfect and deceptive, not ideal. The Platonic way of knowledge therefore emphasized reasoning as a method, downplaying the importance of observation. Aristotle disagreed, locating the Forms in the natural world as the fundamental principles to be discovered through the inquiry into nature ( Metaphysics Z , in Barnes 1984).

Aristotle is recognized as giving the earliest systematic treatise on the nature of scientific inquiry in the western tradition, one which embraced observation and reasoning about the natural world. In the Prior and Posterior Analytics , Aristotle reflects first on the aims and then the methods of inquiry into nature. A number of features can be found which are still considered by most to be essential to science. For Aristotle, empiricism, careful observation (but passive observation, not controlled experiment), is the starting point. The aim is not merely recording of facts, though. For Aristotle, science ( epistêmê ) is a body of properly arranged knowledge or learning—the empirical facts, but also their ordering and display are of crucial importance. The aims of discovery, ordering, and display of facts partly determine the methods required of successful scientific inquiry. Also determinant is the nature of the knowledge being sought, and the explanatory causes proper to that kind of knowledge (see the discussion of the four causes in the entry on Aristotle on causality ).

In addition to careful observation, then, scientific method requires a logic as a system of reasoning for properly arranging, but also inferring beyond, what is known by observation. Methods of reasoning may include induction, prediction, or analogy, among others. Aristotle’s system (along with his catalogue of fallacious reasoning) was collected under the title the Organon . This title would be echoed in later works on scientific reasoning, such as Novum Organon by Francis Bacon, and Novum Organon Restorum by William Whewell (see below). In Aristotle’s Organon reasoning is divided primarily into two forms, a rough division which persists into modern times. The division, known most commonly today as deductive versus inductive method, appears in other eras and methodologies as analysis/​synthesis, non-ampliative/​ampliative, or even confirmation/​verification. The basic idea is there are two “directions” to proceed in our methods of inquiry: one away from what is observed, to the more fundamental, general, and encompassing principles; the other, from the fundamental and general to instances or implications of principles.

The basic aim and method of inquiry identified here can be seen as a theme running throughout the next two millennia of reflection on the correct way to seek after knowledge: carefully observe nature and then seek rules or principles which explain or predict its operation. The Aristotelian corpus provided the framework for a commentary tradition on scientific method independent of science itself (cosmos versus physics.) During the medieval period, figures such as Albertus Magnus (1206–1280), Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Robert Grosseteste (1175–1253), Roger Bacon (1214/1220–1292), William of Ockham (1287–1347), Andreas Vesalius (1514–1546), Giacomo Zabarella (1533–1589) all worked to clarify the kind of knowledge obtainable by observation and induction, the source of justification of induction, and best rules for its application. [ 2 ] Many of their contributions we now think of as essential to science (see also Laudan 1968). As Aristotle and Plato had employed a framework of reasoning either “to the forms” or “away from the forms”, medieval thinkers employed directions away from the phenomena or back to the phenomena. In analysis, a phenomena was examined to discover its basic explanatory principles; in synthesis, explanations of a phenomena were constructed from first principles.

During the Scientific Revolution these various strands of argument, experiment, and reason were forged into a dominant epistemic authority. The 16 th –18 th centuries were a period of not only dramatic advance in knowledge about the operation of the natural world—advances in mechanical, medical, biological, political, economic explanations—but also of self-awareness of the revolutionary changes taking place, and intense reflection on the source and legitimation of the method by which the advances were made. The struggle to establish the new authority included methodological moves. The Book of Nature, according to the metaphor of Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) or Francis Bacon (1561–1626), was written in the language of mathematics, of geometry and number. This motivated an emphasis on mathematical description and mechanical explanation as important aspects of scientific method. Through figures such as Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, a neo-Platonic emphasis on the importance of metaphysical reflection on nature behind appearances, particularly regarding the spiritual as a complement to the purely mechanical, remained an important methodological thread of the Scientific Revolution (see the entries on Cambridge platonists ; Boyle ; Henry More ; Galileo ).

In Novum Organum (1620), Bacon was critical of the Aristotelian method for leaping from particulars to universals too quickly. The syllogistic form of reasoning readily mixed those two types of propositions. Bacon aimed at the invention of new arts, principles, and directions. His method would be grounded in methodical collection of observations, coupled with correction of our senses (and particularly, directions for the avoidance of the Idols, as he called them, kinds of systematic errors to which naïve observers are prone.) The community of scientists could then climb, by a careful, gradual and unbroken ascent, to reliable general claims.

Bacon’s method has been criticized as impractical and too inflexible for the practicing scientist. Whewell would later criticize Bacon in his System of Logic for paying too little attention to the practices of scientists. It is hard to find convincing examples of Bacon’s method being put in to practice in the history of science, but there are a few who have been held up as real examples of 16 th century scientific, inductive method, even if not in the rigid Baconian mold: figures such as Robert Boyle (1627–1691) and William Harvey (1578–1657) (see the entry on Bacon ).

It is to Isaac Newton (1642–1727), however, that historians of science and methodologists have paid greatest attention. Given the enormous success of his Principia Mathematica and Opticks , this is understandable. The study of Newton’s method has had two main thrusts: the implicit method of the experiments and reasoning presented in the Opticks, and the explicit methodological rules given as the Rules for Philosophising (the Regulae) in Book III of the Principia . [ 3 ] Newton’s law of gravitation, the linchpin of his new cosmology, broke with explanatory conventions of natural philosophy, first for apparently proposing action at a distance, but more generally for not providing “true”, physical causes. The argument for his System of the World ( Principia , Book III) was based on phenomena, not reasoned first principles. This was viewed (mainly on the continent) as insufficient for proper natural philosophy. The Regulae counter this objection, re-defining the aims of natural philosophy by re-defining the method natural philosophers should follow. (See the entry on Newton’s philosophy .)

To his list of methodological prescriptions should be added Newton’s famous phrase “ hypotheses non fingo ” (commonly translated as “I frame no hypotheses”.) The scientist was not to invent systems but infer explanations from observations, as Bacon had advocated. This would come to be known as inductivism. In the century after Newton, significant clarifications of the Newtonian method were made. Colin Maclaurin (1698–1746), for instance, reconstructed the essential structure of the method as having complementary analysis and synthesis phases, one proceeding away from the phenomena in generalization, the other from the general propositions to derive explanations of new phenomena. Denis Diderot (1713–1784) and editors of the Encyclopédie did much to consolidate and popularize Newtonianism, as did Francesco Algarotti (1721–1764). The emphasis was often the same, as much on the character of the scientist as on their process, a character which is still commonly assumed. The scientist is humble in the face of nature, not beholden to dogma, obeys only his eyes, and follows the truth wherever it leads. It was certainly Voltaire (1694–1778) and du Chatelet (1706–1749) who were most influential in propagating the latter vision of the scientist and their craft, with Newton as hero. Scientific method became a revolutionary force of the Enlightenment. (See also the entries on Newton , Leibniz , Descartes , Boyle , Hume , enlightenment , as well as Shank 2008 for a historical overview.)

Not all 18 th century reflections on scientific method were so celebratory. Famous also are George Berkeley’s (1685–1753) attack on the mathematics of the new science, as well as the over-emphasis of Newtonians on observation; and David Hume’s (1711–1776) undermining of the warrant offered for scientific claims by inductive justification (see the entries on: George Berkeley ; David Hume ; Hume’s Newtonianism and Anti-Newtonianism ). Hume’s problem of induction motivated Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) to seek new foundations for empirical method, though as an epistemic reconstruction, not as any set of practical guidelines for scientists. Both Hume and Kant influenced the methodological reflections of the next century, such as the debate between Mill and Whewell over the certainty of inductive inferences in science.

The debate between John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) and William Whewell (1794–1866) has become the canonical methodological debate of the 19 th century. Although often characterized as a debate between inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism, the role of the two methods on each side is actually more complex. On the hypothetico-deductive account, scientists work to come up with hypotheses from which true observational consequences can be deduced—hence, hypothetico-deductive. Because Whewell emphasizes both hypotheses and deduction in his account of method, he can be seen as a convenient foil to the inductivism of Mill. However, equally if not more important to Whewell’s portrayal of scientific method is what he calls the “fundamental antithesis”. Knowledge is a product of the objective (what we see in the world around us) and subjective (the contributions of our mind to how we perceive and understand what we experience, which he called the Fundamental Ideas). Both elements are essential according to Whewell, and he was therefore critical of Kant for too much focus on the subjective, and John Locke (1632–1704) and Mill for too much focus on the senses. Whewell’s fundamental ideas can be discipline relative. An idea can be fundamental even if it is necessary for knowledge only within a given scientific discipline (e.g., chemical affinity for chemistry). This distinguishes fundamental ideas from the forms and categories of intuition of Kant. (See the entry on Whewell .)

Clarifying fundamental ideas would therefore be an essential part of scientific method and scientific progress. Whewell called this process “Discoverer’s Induction”. It was induction, following Bacon or Newton, but Whewell sought to revive Bacon’s account by emphasising the role of ideas in the clear and careful formulation of inductive hypotheses. Whewell’s induction is not merely the collecting of objective facts. The subjective plays a role through what Whewell calls the Colligation of Facts, a creative act of the scientist, the invention of a theory. A theory is then confirmed by testing, where more facts are brought under the theory, called the Consilience of Inductions. Whewell felt that this was the method by which the true laws of nature could be discovered: clarification of fundamental concepts, clever invention of explanations, and careful testing. Mill, in his critique of Whewell, and others who have cast Whewell as a fore-runner of the hypothetico-deductivist view, seem to have under-estimated the importance of this discovery phase in Whewell’s understanding of method (Snyder 1997a,b, 1999). Down-playing the discovery phase would come to characterize methodology of the early 20 th century (see section 3 ).

Mill, in his System of Logic , put forward a narrower view of induction as the essence of scientific method. For Mill, induction is the search first for regularities among events. Among those regularities, some will continue to hold for further observations, eventually gaining the status of laws. One can also look for regularities among the laws discovered in a domain, i.e., for a law of laws. Which “law law” will hold is time and discipline dependent and open to revision. One example is the Law of Universal Causation, and Mill put forward specific methods for identifying causes—now commonly known as Mill’s methods. These five methods look for circumstances which are common among the phenomena of interest, those which are absent when the phenomena are, or those for which both vary together. Mill’s methods are still seen as capturing basic intuitions about experimental methods for finding the relevant explanatory factors ( System of Logic (1843), see Mill entry). The methods advocated by Whewell and Mill, in the end, look similar. Both involve inductive generalization to covering laws. They differ dramatically, however, with respect to the necessity of the knowledge arrived at; that is, at the meta-methodological level (see the entries on Whewell and Mill entries).

3. Logic of method and critical responses

The quantum and relativistic revolutions in physics in the early 20 th century had a profound effect on methodology. Conceptual foundations of both theories were taken to show the defeasibility of even the most seemingly secure intuitions about space, time and bodies. Certainty of knowledge about the natural world was therefore recognized as unattainable. Instead a renewed empiricism was sought which rendered science fallible but still rationally justifiable.

Analyses of the reasoning of scientists emerged, according to which the aspects of scientific method which were of primary importance were the means of testing and confirming of theories. A distinction in methodology was made between the contexts of discovery and justification. The distinction could be used as a wedge between the particularities of where and how theories or hypotheses are arrived at, on the one hand, and the underlying reasoning scientists use (whether or not they are aware of it) when assessing theories and judging their adequacy on the basis of the available evidence. By and large, for most of the 20 th century, philosophy of science focused on the second context, although philosophers differed on whether to focus on confirmation or refutation as well as on the many details of how confirmation or refutation could or could not be brought about. By the mid-20 th century these attempts at defining the method of justification and the context distinction itself came under pressure. During the same period, philosophy of science developed rapidly, and from section 4 this entry will therefore shift from a primarily historical treatment of the scientific method towards a primarily thematic one.

Advances in logic and probability held out promise of the possibility of elaborate reconstructions of scientific theories and empirical method, the best example being Rudolf Carnap’s The Logical Structure of the World (1928). Carnap attempted to show that a scientific theory could be reconstructed as a formal axiomatic system—that is, a logic. That system could refer to the world because some of its basic sentences could be interpreted as observations or operations which one could perform to test them. The rest of the theoretical system, including sentences using theoretical or unobservable terms (like electron or force) would then either be meaningful because they could be reduced to observations, or they had purely logical meanings (called analytic, like mathematical identities). This has been referred to as the verifiability criterion of meaning. According to the criterion, any statement not either analytic or verifiable was strictly meaningless. Although the view was endorsed by Carnap in 1928, he would later come to see it as too restrictive (Carnap 1956). Another familiar version of this idea is operationalism of Percy William Bridgman. In The Logic of Modern Physics (1927) Bridgman asserted that every physical concept could be defined in terms of the operations one would perform to verify the application of that concept. Making good on the operationalisation of a concept even as simple as length, however, can easily become enormously complex (for measuring very small lengths, for instance) or impractical (measuring large distances like light years.)

Carl Hempel’s (1950, 1951) criticisms of the verifiability criterion of meaning had enormous influence. He pointed out that universal generalizations, such as most scientific laws, were not strictly meaningful on the criterion. Verifiability and operationalism both seemed too restrictive to capture standard scientific aims and practice. The tenuous connection between these reconstructions and actual scientific practice was criticized in another way. In both approaches, scientific methods are instead recast in methodological roles. Measurements, for example, were looked to as ways of giving meanings to terms. The aim of the philosopher of science was not to understand the methods per se , but to use them to reconstruct theories, their meanings, and their relation to the world. When scientists perform these operations, however, they will not report that they are doing them to give meaning to terms in a formal axiomatic system. This disconnect between methodology and the details of actual scientific practice would seem to violate the empiricism the Logical Positivists and Bridgman were committed to. The view that methodology should correspond to practice (to some extent) has been called historicism, or intuitionism. We turn to these criticisms and responses in section 3.4 . [ 4 ]

Positivism also had to contend with the recognition that a purely inductivist approach, along the lines of Bacon-Newton-Mill, was untenable. There was no pure observation, for starters. All observation was theory laden. Theory is required to make any observation, therefore not all theory can be derived from observation alone. (See the entry on theory and observation in science .) Even granting an observational basis, Hume had already pointed out that one could not deductively justify inductive conclusions without begging the question by presuming the success of the inductive method. Likewise, positivist attempts at analyzing how a generalization can be confirmed by observations of its instances were subject to a number of criticisms. Goodman (1965) and Hempel (1965) both point to paradoxes inherent in standard accounts of confirmation. Recent attempts at explaining how observations can serve to confirm a scientific theory are discussed in section 4 below.

The standard starting point for a non-inductive analysis of the logic of confirmation is known as the Hypothetico-Deductive (H-D) method. In its simplest form, a sentence of a theory which expresses some hypothesis is confirmed by its true consequences. As noted in section 2 , this method had been advanced by Whewell in the 19 th century, as well as Nicod (1924) and others in the 20 th century. Often, Hempel’s (1966) description of the H-D method, illustrated by the case of Semmelweiss’ inferential procedures in establishing the cause of childbed fever, has been presented as a key account of H-D as well as a foil for criticism of the H-D account of confirmation (see, for example, Lipton’s (2004) discussion of inference to the best explanation; also the entry on confirmation ). Hempel described Semmelsweiss’ procedure as examining various hypotheses explaining the cause of childbed fever. Some hypotheses conflicted with observable facts and could be rejected as false immediately. Others needed to be tested experimentally by deducing which observable events should follow if the hypothesis were true (what Hempel called the test implications of the hypothesis), then conducting an experiment and observing whether or not the test implications occurred. If the experiment showed the test implication to be false, the hypothesis could be rejected. If the experiment showed the test implications to be true, however, this did not prove the hypothesis true. The confirmation of a test implication does not verify a hypothesis, though Hempel did allow that “it provides at least some support, some corroboration or confirmation for it” (Hempel 1966: 8). The degree of this support then depends on the quantity, variety and precision of the supporting evidence.

Another approach that took off from the difficulties with inductive inference was Karl Popper’s critical rationalism or falsificationism (Popper 1959, 1963). Falsification is deductive and similar to H-D in that it involves scientists deducing observational consequences from the hypothesis under test. For Popper, however, the important point was not the degree of confirmation that successful prediction offered to a hypothesis. The crucial thing was the logical asymmetry between confirmation, based on inductive inference, and falsification, which can be based on a deductive inference. (This simple opposition was later questioned, by Lakatos, among others. See the entry on historicist theories of scientific rationality. )

Popper stressed that, regardless of the amount of confirming evidence, we can never be certain that a hypothesis is true without committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Instead, Popper introduced the notion of corroboration as a measure for how well a theory or hypothesis has survived previous testing—but without implying that this is also a measure for the probability that it is true.

Popper was also motivated by his doubts about the scientific status of theories like the Marxist theory of history or psycho-analysis, and so wanted to demarcate between science and pseudo-science. Popper saw this as an importantly different distinction than demarcating science from metaphysics. The latter demarcation was the primary concern of many logical empiricists. Popper used the idea of falsification to draw a line instead between pseudo and proper science. Science was science because its method involved subjecting theories to rigorous tests which offered a high probability of failing and thus refuting the theory.

A commitment to the risk of failure was important. Avoiding falsification could be done all too easily. If a consequence of a theory is inconsistent with observations, an exception can be added by introducing auxiliary hypotheses designed explicitly to save the theory, so-called ad hoc modifications. This Popper saw done in pseudo-science where ad hoc theories appeared capable of explaining anything in their field of application. In contrast, science is risky. If observations showed the predictions from a theory to be wrong, the theory would be refuted. Hence, scientific hypotheses must be falsifiable. Not only must there exist some possible observation statement which could falsify the hypothesis or theory, were it observed, (Popper called these the hypothesis’ potential falsifiers) it is crucial to the Popperian scientific method that such falsifications be sincerely attempted on a regular basis.

The more potential falsifiers of a hypothesis, the more falsifiable it would be, and the more the hypothesis claimed. Conversely, hypotheses without falsifiers claimed very little or nothing at all. Originally, Popper thought that this meant the introduction of ad hoc hypotheses only to save a theory should not be countenanced as good scientific method. These would undermine the falsifiabililty of a theory. However, Popper later came to recognize that the introduction of modifications (immunizations, he called them) was often an important part of scientific development. Responding to surprising or apparently falsifying observations often generated important new scientific insights. Popper’s own example was the observed motion of Uranus which originally did not agree with Newtonian predictions. The ad hoc hypothesis of an outer planet explained the disagreement and led to further falsifiable predictions. Popper sought to reconcile the view by blurring the distinction between falsifiable and not falsifiable, and speaking instead of degrees of testability (Popper 1985: 41f.).

From the 1960s on, sustained meta-methodological criticism emerged that drove philosophical focus away from scientific method. A brief look at those criticisms follows, with recommendations for further reading at the end of the entry.

Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) begins with a well-known shot across the bow for philosophers of science:

History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed. (1962: 1)

The image Kuhn thought needed transforming was the a-historical, rational reconstruction sought by many of the Logical Positivists, though Carnap and other positivists were actually quite sympathetic to Kuhn’s views. (See the entry on the Vienna Circle .) Kuhn shares with other of his contemporaries, such as Feyerabend and Lakatos, a commitment to a more empirical approach to philosophy of science. Namely, the history of science provides important data, and necessary checks, for philosophy of science, including any theory of scientific method.

The history of science reveals, according to Kuhn, that scientific development occurs in alternating phases. During normal science, the members of the scientific community adhere to the paradigm in place. Their commitment to the paradigm means a commitment to the puzzles to be solved and the acceptable ways of solving them. Confidence in the paradigm remains so long as steady progress is made in solving the shared puzzles. Method in this normal phase operates within a disciplinary matrix (Kuhn’s later concept of a paradigm) which includes standards for problem solving, and defines the range of problems to which the method should be applied. An important part of a disciplinary matrix is the set of values which provide the norms and aims for scientific method. The main values that Kuhn identifies are prediction, problem solving, simplicity, consistency, and plausibility.

An important by-product of normal science is the accumulation of puzzles which cannot be solved with resources of the current paradigm. Once accumulation of these anomalies has reached some critical mass, it can trigger a communal shift to a new paradigm and a new phase of normal science. Importantly, the values that provide the norms and aims for scientific method may have transformed in the meantime. Method may therefore be relative to discipline, time or place

Feyerabend also identified the aims of science as progress, but argued that any methodological prescription would only stifle that progress (Feyerabend 1988). His arguments are grounded in re-examining accepted “myths” about the history of science. Heroes of science, like Galileo, are shown to be just as reliant on rhetoric and persuasion as they are on reason and demonstration. Others, like Aristotle, are shown to be far more reasonable and far-reaching in their outlooks then they are given credit for. As a consequence, the only rule that could provide what he took to be sufficient freedom was the vacuous “anything goes”. More generally, even the methodological restriction that science is the best way to pursue knowledge, and to increase knowledge, is too restrictive. Feyerabend suggested instead that science might, in fact, be a threat to a free society, because it and its myth had become so dominant (Feyerabend 1978).

An even more fundamental kind of criticism was offered by several sociologists of science from the 1970s onwards who rejected the methodology of providing philosophical accounts for the rational development of science and sociological accounts of the irrational mistakes. Instead, they adhered to a symmetry thesis on which any causal explanation of how scientific knowledge is established needs to be symmetrical in explaining truth and falsity, rationality and irrationality, success and mistakes, by the same causal factors (see, e.g., Barnes and Bloor 1982, Bloor 1991). Movements in the Sociology of Science, like the Strong Programme, or in the social dimensions and causes of knowledge more generally led to extended and close examination of detailed case studies in contemporary science and its history. (See the entries on the social dimensions of scientific knowledge and social epistemology .) Well-known examinations by Latour and Woolgar (1979/1986), Knorr-Cetina (1981), Pickering (1984), Shapin and Schaffer (1985) seem to bear out that it was social ideologies (on a macro-scale) or individual interactions and circumstances (on a micro-scale) which were the primary causal factors in determining which beliefs gained the status of scientific knowledge. As they saw it therefore, explanatory appeals to scientific method were not empirically grounded.

A late, and largely unexpected, criticism of scientific method came from within science itself. Beginning in the early 2000s, a number of scientists attempting to replicate the results of published experiments could not do so. There may be close conceptual connection between reproducibility and method. For example, if reproducibility means that the same scientific methods ought to produce the same result, and all scientific results ought to be reproducible, then whatever it takes to reproduce a scientific result ought to be called scientific method. Space limits us to the observation that, insofar as reproducibility is a desired outcome of proper scientific method, it is not strictly a part of scientific method. (See the entry on reproducibility of scientific results .)

By the close of the 20 th century the search for the scientific method was flagging. Nola and Sankey (2000b) could introduce their volume on method by remarking that “For some, the whole idea of a theory of scientific method is yester-year’s debate …”.

Despite the many difficulties that philosophers encountered in trying to providing a clear methodology of conformation (or refutation), still important progress has been made on understanding how observation can provide evidence for a given theory. Work in statistics has been crucial for understanding how theories can be tested empirically, and in recent decades a huge literature has developed that attempts to recast confirmation in Bayesian terms. Here these developments can be covered only briefly, and we refer to the entry on confirmation for further details and references.

Statistics has come to play an increasingly important role in the methodology of the experimental sciences from the 19 th century onwards. At that time, statistics and probability theory took on a methodological role as an analysis of inductive inference, and attempts to ground the rationality of induction in the axioms of probability theory have continued throughout the 20 th century and in to the present. Developments in the theory of statistics itself, meanwhile, have had a direct and immense influence on the experimental method, including methods for measuring the uncertainty of observations such as the Method of Least Squares developed by Legendre and Gauss in the early 19 th century, criteria for the rejection of outliers proposed by Peirce by the mid-19 th century, and the significance tests developed by Gosset (a.k.a. “Student”), Fisher, Neyman & Pearson and others in the 1920s and 1930s (see, e.g., Swijtink 1987 for a brief historical overview; and also the entry on C.S. Peirce ).

These developments within statistics then in turn led to a reflective discussion among both statisticians and philosophers of science on how to perceive the process of hypothesis testing: whether it was a rigorous statistical inference that could provide a numerical expression of the degree of confidence in the tested hypothesis, or if it should be seen as a decision between different courses of actions that also involved a value component. This led to a major controversy among Fisher on the one side and Neyman and Pearson on the other (see especially Fisher 1955, Neyman 1956 and Pearson 1955, and for analyses of the controversy, e.g., Howie 2002, Marks 2000, Lenhard 2006). On Fisher’s view, hypothesis testing was a methodology for when to accept or reject a statistical hypothesis, namely that a hypothesis should be rejected by evidence if this evidence would be unlikely relative to other possible outcomes, given the hypothesis were true. In contrast, on Neyman and Pearson’s view, the consequence of error also had to play a role when deciding between hypotheses. Introducing the distinction between the error of rejecting a true hypothesis (type I error) and accepting a false hypothesis (type II error), they argued that it depends on the consequences of the error to decide whether it is more important to avoid rejecting a true hypothesis or accepting a false one. Hence, Fisher aimed for a theory of inductive inference that enabled a numerical expression of confidence in a hypothesis. To him, the important point was the search for truth, not utility. In contrast, the Neyman-Pearson approach provided a strategy of inductive behaviour for deciding between different courses of action. Here, the important point was not whether a hypothesis was true, but whether one should act as if it was.

Similar discussions are found in the philosophical literature. On the one side, Churchman (1948) and Rudner (1953) argued that because scientific hypotheses can never be completely verified, a complete analysis of the methods of scientific inference includes ethical judgments in which the scientists must decide whether the evidence is sufficiently strong or that the probability is sufficiently high to warrant the acceptance of the hypothesis, which again will depend on the importance of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting the hypothesis. Others, such as Jeffrey (1956) and Levi (1960) disagreed and instead defended a value-neutral view of science on which scientists should bracket their attitudes, preferences, temperament, and values when assessing the correctness of their inferences. For more details on this value-free ideal in the philosophy of science and its historical development, see Douglas (2009) and Howard (2003). For a broad set of case studies examining the role of values in science, see e.g. Elliott & Richards 2017.

In recent decades, philosophical discussions of the evaluation of probabilistic hypotheses by statistical inference have largely focused on Bayesianism that understands probability as a measure of a person’s degree of belief in an event, given the available information, and frequentism that instead understands probability as a long-run frequency of a repeatable event. Hence, for Bayesians probabilities refer to a state of knowledge, whereas for frequentists probabilities refer to frequencies of events (see, e.g., Sober 2008, chapter 1 for a detailed introduction to Bayesianism and frequentism as well as to likelihoodism). Bayesianism aims at providing a quantifiable, algorithmic representation of belief revision, where belief revision is a function of prior beliefs (i.e., background knowledge) and incoming evidence. Bayesianism employs a rule based on Bayes’ theorem, a theorem of the probability calculus which relates conditional probabilities. The probability that a particular hypothesis is true is interpreted as a degree of belief, or credence, of the scientist. There will also be a probability and a degree of belief that a hypothesis will be true conditional on a piece of evidence (an observation, say) being true. Bayesianism proscribes that it is rational for the scientist to update their belief in the hypothesis to that conditional probability should it turn out that the evidence is, in fact, observed (see, e.g., Sprenger & Hartmann 2019 for a comprehensive treatment of Bayesian philosophy of science). Originating in the work of Neyman and Person, frequentism aims at providing the tools for reducing long-run error rates, such as the error-statistical approach developed by Mayo (1996) that focuses on how experimenters can avoid both type I and type II errors by building up a repertoire of procedures that detect errors if and only if they are present. Both Bayesianism and frequentism have developed over time, they are interpreted in different ways by its various proponents, and their relations to previous criticism to attempts at defining scientific method are seen differently by proponents and critics. The literature, surveys, reviews and criticism in this area are vast and the reader is referred to the entries on Bayesian epistemology and confirmation .

5. Method in Practice

Attention to scientific practice, as we have seen, is not itself new. However, the turn to practice in the philosophy of science of late can be seen as a correction to the pessimism with respect to method in philosophy of science in later parts of the 20 th century, and as an attempted reconciliation between sociological and rationalist explanations of scientific knowledge. Much of this work sees method as detailed and context specific problem-solving procedures, and methodological analyses to be at the same time descriptive, critical and advisory (see Nickles 1987 for an exposition of this view). The following section contains a survey of some of the practice focuses. In this section we turn fully to topics rather than chronology.

A problem with the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification that figured so prominently in philosophy of science in the first half of the 20 th century (see section 2 ) is that no such distinction can be clearly seen in scientific activity (see Arabatzis 2006). Thus, in recent decades, it has been recognized that study of conceptual innovation and change should not be confined to psychology and sociology of science, but are also important aspects of scientific practice which philosophy of science should address (see also the entry on scientific discovery ). Looking for the practices that drive conceptual innovation has led philosophers to examine both the reasoning practices of scientists and the wide realm of experimental practices that are not directed narrowly at testing hypotheses, that is, exploratory experimentation.

Examining the reasoning practices of historical and contemporary scientists, Nersessian (2008) has argued that new scientific concepts are constructed as solutions to specific problems by systematic reasoning, and that of analogy, visual representation and thought-experimentation are among the important reasoning practices employed. These ubiquitous forms of reasoning are reliable—but also fallible—methods of conceptual development and change. On her account, model-based reasoning consists of cycles of construction, simulation, evaluation and adaption of models that serve as interim interpretations of the target problem to be solved. Often, this process will lead to modifications or extensions, and a new cycle of simulation and evaluation. However, Nersessian also emphasizes that

creative model-based reasoning cannot be applied as a simple recipe, is not always productive of solutions, and even its most exemplary usages can lead to incorrect solutions. (Nersessian 2008: 11)

Thus, while on the one hand she agrees with many previous philosophers that there is no logic of discovery, discoveries can derive from reasoned processes, such that a large and integral part of scientific practice is

the creation of concepts through which to comprehend, structure, and communicate about physical phenomena …. (Nersessian 1987: 11)

Similarly, work on heuristics for discovery and theory construction by scholars such as Darden (1991) and Bechtel & Richardson (1993) present science as problem solving and investigate scientific problem solving as a special case of problem-solving in general. Drawing largely on cases from the biological sciences, much of their focus has been on reasoning strategies for the generation, evaluation, and revision of mechanistic explanations of complex systems.

Addressing another aspect of the context distinction, namely the traditional view that the primary role of experiments is to test theoretical hypotheses according to the H-D model, other philosophers of science have argued for additional roles that experiments can play. The notion of exploratory experimentation was introduced to describe experiments driven by the desire to obtain empirical regularities and to develop concepts and classifications in which these regularities can be described (Steinle 1997, 2002; Burian 1997; Waters 2007)). However the difference between theory driven experimentation and exploratory experimentation should not be seen as a sharp distinction. Theory driven experiments are not always directed at testing hypothesis, but may also be directed at various kinds of fact-gathering, such as determining numerical parameters. Vice versa , exploratory experiments are usually informed by theory in various ways and are therefore not theory-free. Instead, in exploratory experiments phenomena are investigated without first limiting the possible outcomes of the experiment on the basis of extant theory about the phenomena.

The development of high throughput instrumentation in molecular biology and neighbouring fields has given rise to a special type of exploratory experimentation that collects and analyses very large amounts of data, and these new ‘omics’ disciplines are often said to represent a break with the ideal of hypothesis-driven science (Burian 2007; Elliott 2007; Waters 2007; O’Malley 2007) and instead described as data-driven research (Leonelli 2012; Strasser 2012) or as a special kind of “convenience experimentation” in which many experiments are done simply because they are extraordinarily convenient to perform (Krohs 2012).

5.2 Computer methods and ‘new ways’ of doing science

The field of omics just described is possible because of the ability of computers to process, in a reasonable amount of time, the huge quantities of data required. Computers allow for more elaborate experimentation (higher speed, better filtering, more variables, sophisticated coordination and control), but also, through modelling and simulations, might constitute a form of experimentation themselves. Here, too, we can pose a version of the general question of method versus practice: does the practice of using computers fundamentally change scientific method, or merely provide a more efficient means of implementing standard methods?

Because computers can be used to automate measurements, quantifications, calculations, and statistical analyses where, for practical reasons, these operations cannot be otherwise carried out, many of the steps involved in reaching a conclusion on the basis of an experiment are now made inside a “black box”, without the direct involvement or awareness of a human. This has epistemological implications, regarding what we can know, and how we can know it. To have confidence in the results, computer methods are therefore subjected to tests of verification and validation.

The distinction between verification and validation is easiest to characterize in the case of computer simulations. In a typical computer simulation scenario computers are used to numerically integrate differential equations for which no analytic solution is available. The equations are part of the model the scientist uses to represent a phenomenon or system under investigation. Verifying a computer simulation means checking that the equations of the model are being correctly approximated. Validating a simulation means checking that the equations of the model are adequate for the inferences one wants to make on the basis of that model.

A number of issues related to computer simulations have been raised. The identification of validity and verification as the testing methods has been criticized. Oreskes et al. (1994) raise concerns that “validiation”, because it suggests deductive inference, might lead to over-confidence in the results of simulations. The distinction itself is probably too clean, since actual practice in the testing of simulations mixes and moves back and forth between the two (Weissart 1997; Parker 2008a; Winsberg 2010). Computer simulations do seem to have a non-inductive character, given that the principles by which they operate are built in by the programmers, and any results of the simulation follow from those in-built principles in such a way that those results could, in principle, be deduced from the program code and its inputs. The status of simulations as experiments has therefore been examined (Kaufmann and Smarr 1993; Humphreys 1995; Hughes 1999; Norton and Suppe 2001). This literature considers the epistemology of these experiments: what we can learn by simulation, and also the kinds of justifications which can be given in applying that knowledge to the “real” world. (Mayo 1996; Parker 2008b). As pointed out, part of the advantage of computer simulation derives from the fact that huge numbers of calculations can be carried out without requiring direct observation by the experimenter/​simulator. At the same time, many of these calculations are approximations to the calculations which would be performed first-hand in an ideal situation. Both factors introduce uncertainties into the inferences drawn from what is observed in the simulation.

For many of the reasons described above, computer simulations do not seem to belong clearly to either the experimental or theoretical domain. Rather, they seem to crucially involve aspects of both. This has led some authors, such as Fox Keller (2003: 200) to argue that we ought to consider computer simulation a “qualitatively different way of doing science”. The literature in general tends to follow Kaufmann and Smarr (1993) in referring to computer simulation as a “third way” for scientific methodology (theoretical reasoning and experimental practice are the first two ways.). It should also be noted that the debates around these issues have tended to focus on the form of computer simulation typical in the physical sciences, where models are based on dynamical equations. Other forms of simulation might not have the same problems, or have problems of their own (see the entry on computer simulations in science ).

In recent years, the rapid development of machine learning techniques has prompted some scholars to suggest that the scientific method has become “obsolete” (Anderson 2008, Carrol and Goodstein 2009). This has resulted in an intense debate on the relative merit of data-driven and hypothesis-driven research (for samples, see e.g. Mazzocchi 2015 or Succi and Coveney 2018). For a detailed treatment of this topic, we refer to the entry scientific research and big data .

6. Discourse on scientific method

Despite philosophical disagreements, the idea of the scientific method still figures prominently in contemporary discourse on many different topics, both within science and in society at large. Often, reference to scientific method is used in ways that convey either the legend of a single, universal method characteristic of all science, or grants to a particular method or set of methods privilege as a special ‘gold standard’, often with reference to particular philosophers to vindicate the claims. Discourse on scientific method also typically arises when there is a need to distinguish between science and other activities, or for justifying the special status conveyed to science. In these areas, the philosophical attempts at identifying a set of methods characteristic for scientific endeavors are closely related to the philosophy of science’s classical problem of demarcation (see the entry on science and pseudo-science ) and to the philosophical analysis of the social dimension of scientific knowledge and the role of science in democratic society.

One of the settings in which the legend of a single, universal scientific method has been particularly strong is science education (see, e.g., Bauer 1992; McComas 1996; Wivagg & Allchin 2002). [ 5 ] Often, ‘the scientific method’ is presented in textbooks and educational web pages as a fixed four or five step procedure starting from observations and description of a phenomenon and progressing over formulation of a hypothesis which explains the phenomenon, designing and conducting experiments to test the hypothesis, analyzing the results, and ending with drawing a conclusion. Such references to a universal scientific method can be found in educational material at all levels of science education (Blachowicz 2009), and numerous studies have shown that the idea of a general and universal scientific method often form part of both students’ and teachers’ conception of science (see, e.g., Aikenhead 1987; Osborne et al. 2003). In response, it has been argued that science education need to focus more on teaching about the nature of science, although views have differed on whether this is best done through student-led investigations, contemporary cases, or historical cases (Allchin, Andersen & Nielsen 2014)

Although occasionally phrased with reference to the H-D method, important historical roots of the legend in science education of a single, universal scientific method are the American philosopher and psychologist Dewey’s account of inquiry in How We Think (1910) and the British mathematician Karl Pearson’s account of science in Grammar of Science (1892). On Dewey’s account, inquiry is divided into the five steps of

(i) a felt difficulty, (ii) its location and definition, (iii) suggestion of a possible solution, (iv) development by reasoning of the bearing of the suggestions, (v) further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection. (Dewey 1910: 72)

Similarly, on Pearson’s account, scientific investigations start with measurement of data and observation of their correction and sequence from which scientific laws can be discovered with the aid of creative imagination. These laws have to be subject to criticism, and their final acceptance will have equal validity for “all normally constituted minds”. Both Dewey’s and Pearson’s accounts should be seen as generalized abstractions of inquiry and not restricted to the realm of science—although both Dewey and Pearson referred to their respective accounts as ‘the scientific method’.

Occasionally, scientists make sweeping statements about a simple and distinct scientific method, as exemplified by Feynman’s simplified version of a conjectures and refutations method presented, for example, in the last of his 1964 Cornell Messenger lectures. [ 6 ] However, just as often scientists have come to the same conclusion as recent philosophy of science that there is not any unique, easily described scientific method. For example, the physicist and Nobel Laureate Weinberg described in the paper “The Methods of Science … And Those By Which We Live” (1995) how

The fact that the standards of scientific success shift with time does not only make the philosophy of science difficult; it also raises problems for the public understanding of science. We do not have a fixed scientific method to rally around and defend. (1995: 8)

Interview studies with scientists on their conception of method shows that scientists often find it hard to figure out whether available evidence confirms their hypothesis, and that there are no direct translations between general ideas about method and specific strategies to guide how research is conducted (Schickore & Hangel 2019, Hangel & Schickore 2017)

Reference to the scientific method has also often been used to argue for the scientific nature or special status of a particular activity. Philosophical positions that argue for a simple and unique scientific method as a criterion of demarcation, such as Popperian falsification, have often attracted practitioners who felt that they had a need to defend their domain of practice. For example, references to conjectures and refutation as the scientific method are abundant in much of the literature on complementary and alternative medicine (CAM)—alongside the competing position that CAM, as an alternative to conventional biomedicine, needs to develop its own methodology different from that of science.

Also within mainstream science, reference to the scientific method is used in arguments regarding the internal hierarchy of disciplines and domains. A frequently seen argument is that research based on the H-D method is superior to research based on induction from observations because in deductive inferences the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. (See, e.g., Parascandola 1998 for an analysis of how this argument has been made to downgrade epidemiology compared to the laboratory sciences.) Similarly, based on an examination of the practices of major funding institutions such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Biomedical Sciences Research Practices (BBSRC) in the UK, O’Malley et al. (2009) have argued that funding agencies seem to have a tendency to adhere to the view that the primary activity of science is to test hypotheses, while descriptive and exploratory research is seen as merely preparatory activities that are valuable only insofar as they fuel hypothesis-driven research.

In some areas of science, scholarly publications are structured in a way that may convey the impression of a neat and linear process of inquiry from stating a question, devising the methods by which to answer it, collecting the data, to drawing a conclusion from the analysis of data. For example, the codified format of publications in most biomedical journals known as the IMRAD format (Introduction, Method, Results, Analysis, Discussion) is explicitly described by the journal editors as “not an arbitrary publication format but rather a direct reflection of the process of scientific discovery” (see the so-called “Vancouver Recommendations”, ICMJE 2013: 11). However, scientific publications do not in general reflect the process by which the reported scientific results were produced. For example, under the provocative title “Is the scientific paper a fraud?”, Medawar argued that scientific papers generally misrepresent how the results have been produced (Medawar 1963/1996). Similar views have been advanced by philosophers, historians and sociologists of science (Gilbert 1976; Holmes 1987; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Schickore 2008; Suppe 1998) who have argued that scientists’ experimental practices are messy and often do not follow any recognizable pattern. Publications of research results, they argue, are retrospective reconstructions of these activities that often do not preserve the temporal order or the logic of these activities, but are instead often constructed in order to screen off potential criticism (see Schickore 2008 for a review of this work).

Philosophical positions on the scientific method have also made it into the court room, especially in the US where judges have drawn on philosophy of science in deciding when to confer special status to scientific expert testimony. A key case is Daubert vs Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (92–102, 509 U.S. 579, 1993). In this case, the Supreme Court argued in its 1993 ruling that trial judges must ensure that expert testimony is reliable, and that in doing this the court must look at the expert’s methodology to determine whether the proffered evidence is actually scientific knowledge. Further, referring to works of Popper and Hempel the court stated that

ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge … is whether it can be (and has been) tested. (Justice Blackmun, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals; see Other Internet Resources for a link to the opinion)

But as argued by Haack (2005a,b, 2010) and by Foster & Hubner (1999), by equating the question of whether a piece of testimony is reliable with the question whether it is scientific as indicated by a special methodology, the court was producing an inconsistent mixture of Popper’s and Hempel’s philosophies, and this has later led to considerable confusion in subsequent case rulings that drew on the Daubert case (see Haack 2010 for a detailed exposition).

The difficulties around identifying the methods of science are also reflected in the difficulties of identifying scientific misconduct in the form of improper application of the method or methods of science. One of the first and most influential attempts at defining misconduct in science was the US definition from 1989 that defined misconduct as

fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other practices that seriously deviate from those that are commonly accepted within the scientific community . (Code of Federal Regulations, part 50, subpart A., August 8, 1989, italics added)

However, the “other practices that seriously deviate” clause was heavily criticized because it could be used to suppress creative or novel science. For example, the National Academy of Science stated in their report Responsible Science (1992) that it

wishes to discourage the possibility that a misconduct complaint could be lodged against scientists based solely on their use of novel or unorthodox research methods. (NAS: 27)

This clause was therefore later removed from the definition. For an entry into the key philosophical literature on conduct in science, see Shamoo & Resnick (2009).

The question of the source of the success of science has been at the core of philosophy since the beginning of modern science. If viewed as a matter of epistemology more generally, scientific method is a part of the entire history of philosophy. Over that time, science and whatever methods its practitioners may employ have changed dramatically. Today, many philosophers have taken up the banners of pluralism or of practice to focus on what are, in effect, fine-grained and contextually limited examinations of scientific method. Others hope to shift perspectives in order to provide a renewed general account of what characterizes the activity we call science.

One such perspective has been offered recently by Hoyningen-Huene (2008, 2013), who argues from the history of philosophy of science that after three lengthy phases of characterizing science by its method, we are now in a phase where the belief in the existence of a positive scientific method has eroded and what has been left to characterize science is only its fallibility. First was a phase from Plato and Aristotle up until the 17 th century where the specificity of scientific knowledge was seen in its absolute certainty established by proof from evident axioms; next was a phase up to the mid-19 th century in which the means to establish the certainty of scientific knowledge had been generalized to include inductive procedures as well. In the third phase, which lasted until the last decades of the 20 th century, it was recognized that empirical knowledge was fallible, but it was still granted a special status due to its distinctive mode of production. But now in the fourth phase, according to Hoyningen-Huene, historical and philosophical studies have shown how “scientific methods with the characteristics as posited in the second and third phase do not exist” (2008: 168) and there is no longer any consensus among philosophers and historians of science about the nature of science. For Hoyningen-Huene, this is too negative a stance, and he therefore urges the question about the nature of science anew. His own answer to this question is that “scientific knowledge differs from other kinds of knowledge, especially everyday knowledge, primarily by being more systematic” (Hoyningen-Huene 2013: 14). Systematicity can have several different dimensions: among them are more systematic descriptions, explanations, predictions, defense of knowledge claims, epistemic connectedness, ideal of completeness, knowledge generation, representation of knowledge and critical discourse. Hence, what characterizes science is the greater care in excluding possible alternative explanations, the more detailed elaboration with respect to data on which predictions are based, the greater care in detecting and eliminating sources of error, the more articulate connections to other pieces of knowledge, etc. On this position, what characterizes science is not that the methods employed are unique to science, but that the methods are more carefully employed.

Another, similar approach has been offered by Haack (2003). She sets off, similar to Hoyningen-Huene, from a dissatisfaction with the recent clash between what she calls Old Deferentialism and New Cynicism. The Old Deferentialist position is that science progressed inductively by accumulating true theories confirmed by empirical evidence or deductively by testing conjectures against basic statements; while the New Cynics position is that science has no epistemic authority and no uniquely rational method and is merely just politics. Haack insists that contrary to the views of the New Cynics, there are objective epistemic standards, and there is something epistemologically special about science, even though the Old Deferentialists pictured this in a wrong way. Instead, she offers a new Critical Commonsensist account on which standards of good, strong, supportive evidence and well-conducted, honest, thorough and imaginative inquiry are not exclusive to the sciences, but the standards by which we judge all inquirers. In this sense, science does not differ in kind from other kinds of inquiry, but it may differ in the degree to which it requires broad and detailed background knowledge and a familiarity with a technical vocabulary that only specialists may possess.

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Chapter 1 Science and Scientific Research

What is research? Depending on who you ask, you will likely get very different answers to this seemingly innocuous question. Some people will say that they routinely research different online websites to find the best place to buy goods or services they want. Television news channels supposedly conduct research in the form of viewer polls on topics of public interest such as forthcoming elections or government-funded projects. Undergraduate students research the Internet to find the information they need to complete assigned projects or term papers. Graduate students working on research projects for a professor may see research as collecting or analyzing data related to their project. Businesses and consultants research different potential solutions to remedy organizational problems such as a supply chain bottleneck or to identify customer purchase patterns. However, none of the above can be considered “scientific research” unless: (1) it contributes to a body of science, and (2) it follows the scientific method. This chapter will examine what these terms mean.

What is science? To some, science refers to difficult high school or college-level courses such as physics, chemistry, and biology meant only for the brightest students. To others, science is a craft practiced by scientists in white coats using specialized equipment in their laboratories. Etymologically, the word “science” is derived from the Latin word scientia meaning knowledge. Science refers to a systematic and organized body of knowledge in any area of inquiry that is acquired using “the scientific method” (the scientific method is described further below). Science can be grouped into two broad categories: natural science and social science. Natural science is the science of naturally occurring objects or phenomena, such as light, objects, matter, earth, celestial bodies, or the human body. Natural sciences can be further classified into physical sciences, earth sciences, life sciences, and others. Physical sciences consist of disciplines such as physics (the science of physical objects), chemistry (the science of matter), and astronomy (the science of celestial objects). Earth sciences consist of disciplines such as geology (the science of the earth). Life sciences include disciplines such as biology (the science of human bodies) and botany (the science of plants). In contrast, social science is the science of people or collections of people, such as groups, firms, societies, or economies, and their individual or collective behaviors. Social sciences can be classified into disciplines such as psychology (the science of human behaviors), sociology (the science of social groups), and economics (the science of firms, markets, and economies).

The natural sciences are different from the social sciences in several respects. The natural sciences are very precise, accurate, deterministic, and independent of the person m aking the scientific observations. For instance, a scientific experiment in physics, such as measuring the speed of sound through a certain media or the refractive index of water, should always yield the exact same results, irrespective of the time or place of the experiment, or the person conducting the experiment. If two students conducting the same physics experiment obtain two different values of these physical properties, then it generally means that one or both of those students must be in error. However, the same cannot be said for the social sciences, which tend to be less accurate, deterministic, or unambiguous. For instance, if you measure a person’s happiness using a hypothetical instrument, you may find that the same person is more happy or less happy (or sad) on different days and sometimes, at different times on the same day. One’s happiness may vary depending on the news that person received that day or on the events that transpired earlier during that day. Furthermore, there is not a single instrument or metric that can accurately measure a person’s happiness. Hence, one instrument may calibrate a person as being “more happy” while a second instrument may find that the same person is “less happy” at the same instant in time. In other words, there is a high degree of measurement error in the social sciences and there is considerable uncertainty and little agreement on social science policy decisions. For instance, you will not find many disagreements among natural scientists on the speed of light or the speed of the earth around the sun, but you will find numerous disagreements among social scientists on how to solve a social problem such as reduce global terrorism or rescue an economy from a recession. Any student studying the social sciences must be cognizant of and comfortable with handling higher levels of ambiguity, uncertainty, and error that come with such sciences, which merely reflects the high variability of social objects.

Sciences can also be classified based on their purpose. Basic sciences , also called pure sciences, are those that explain the most basic objects and forces, relationships between them, and laws governing them. Examples include physics, mathematics, and biology. Applied sciences , also called practical sciences, are sciences that apply scientific knowledge from basic sciences in a physical environment. For instance, engineering is an applied science that applies the laws of physics and chemistry for practical applications such as building stronger bridges or fuel efficient combustion engines, while medicine is an applied science that applies the laws of biology for solving human ailments. Both basic and applied sciences are required for human development. However, applied sciences cannot stand on their own right, but instead relies on basic sciences for its progress. Of course, the industry and private enterprises tend to focus more on applied sciences given their practical value, while universities study both basic and applied sciences.

Scientific Knowledge

The purpose of science is to create scientific knowledge. Scientific knowledge refers to a generalized body of laws and theories to explain a phenomenon or behavior of interest that are acquired using the scientific method. Laws are observed patterns of phenomena or behaviors, while theories are systematic explanations of the underlying phenomenon or behavior. For instance, in physics, the Newtonian Laws of Motion describe what happens when an object is in a state of rest or motion (Newton’s First Law), what force is needed to move a stationary object or stop a moving object (Newton’s Second Law), and what happens when two objects collide (Newton’s Third Law). Collectively, the three laws constitute the basis of classical mechanics – a theory of moving objects. Likewise, the theory of optics explains the properties of light and how it behaves in different media, electromagnetic theory explains the properties of electricity and how to generate it, quantum mechanics explains the properties of subatomic \particles, and thermodynamics explains the properties of energy and mechanical work. An introductory college level text book in physics will likely contain separate chapters devoted to each of these theories. Similar theories are also available in social sciences. For instance, cognitive dissonance theory in psychology explains how people react when their observations of an event is different from what they expected of that event, general deterrence theory explains why some people engage in improper or criminal behaviors, such as illegally download music or commit software piracy, and the theory of planned behavior explains how people make conscious reasoned choices in their everyday lives.

The goal of scientific research is to discover laws and postulate theories that can explain natural or social phenomena, or in other words, build scientific knowledge. It is important to understand that this knowledge may be imperfect or even quite far from the truth. Sometimes, there may not be a single universal truth, but rather an equilibrium of “multiple truths.” We must understand that the theories, upon which scientific knowledge is based, are only explanations of a particular phenomenon, as suggested by a scientist. As such, there may be good or poor explanations, depending on the extent to which those explanations fit well with reality, and consequently, there may be good or poor theories. The progress of science is marked by our progression over time from poorer theories to better theories, through better observations using more accurate instruments and more informed logical reasoning.

We arrive at scientific laws or theories through a process of logic and evidence. Logic (theory) and evidence (observations) are the two, and only two, pillars upon which scientific knowledge is based. In science, theories and observations are interrelated and cannot exist without each other. Theories provide meaning and significance to what we observe, and observations help validate or refine existing theory or construct new theory. Any other means of knowledge acquisition, such as faith or authority cannot be considered science.

Scientific Research

Given that theories and observations are the two pillars of science, scientific research operates at two levels: a theoretical level and an empirical level. The theoretical level is concerned with developing abstract concepts about a natural or social phenomenon and relationships between those concepts (i.e., build “theories”), while the empirical level is concerned with testing the theoretical concepts and relationships to see how well they reflect our observations of reality, with the goal of ultimately building better theories. Over time, a theory becomes more and more refined (i.e., fits the observed reality better), and the science gains maturity. Scientific research involves continually moving back and forth between theory and observations. Both theory and observations are essential components of scientific research. For instance, relying solely on observations for making inferences and ignoring theory is not considered valid scientific research.

Depending on a researcher’s training and interest, scientific inquiry may take one of two possible forms: inductive or deductive. In inductive research , the goal of a researcher is to infer theoretical concepts and patterns from observed data. In deductive research , the goal of the researcher is to test concepts and patterns known from theory using new empirical data. Hence, inductive research is also called theory-building research, and deductive research is theory-testing research. Note here that the goal of theory-testing is not just to test a theory, but possibly to refine, improve, and extend it. Figure 1.1 depicts the complementary nature of inductive and deductive research. Note that inductive and deductive research are two halves of the research cycle that constantly iterates between theory and observations. You cannot do inductive or deductive research if you are not familiar with both the theory and data components of research. Naturally, a complete researcher is one who can traverse the entire research cycle and can handle both inductive and deductive research.

It is important to understand that theory-building (inductive research) and theory-testing (deductive research) are both critical for the advancement of science. Elegant theories are not valuable if they do not match with reality. Likewise, mountains of data are also useless until they can contribute to the construction to meaningful theories. Rather than viewing these two processes in a circular relationship, as shown in Figure 1.1, perhaps they can be better viewed as a helix, with each iteration between theory and data contributing to better explanations of the phenomenon of interest and better theories. Though both inductive and deductive research are important for the advancement of science, it appears that inductive (theory-building) research is more valuable when there are few prior theories or explanations, while deductive (theory-testing) research is more productive when there are many competing theories of the same phenomenon and researchers are interested in knowing which theory works best and under what circumstances.

Figure 1.1. The Cycle of Research

Theory building and theory testing are particularly difficult in the social sciences, given the imprecise nature of the theoretical concepts, inadequate tools to measure them, and the presence of many unaccounted factors that can also influence the phenomenon of interest. It is also very difficult to refute theories that do not work. For instance, Karl Marx’s theory of communism as an effective means of economic production withstood for decades, before it was finally discredited as being inferior to capitalism in promoting economic growth and social welfare. Erstwhile communist economies like the Soviet Union and China eventually moved toward more capitalistic economies characterized by profit-maximizing private enterprises. However, the recent collapse of the mortgage and financial industries in the United States demonstrates that capitalism also has its flaws and is not as effective in fostering economic growth and social welfare as previously presumed. Unlike theories in the natural sciences, social science theories are rarely perfect, which provides numerous opportunities for researchers to improve those theories or build their own alternative theories.

Conducting scientific research, therefore, requires two sets of skills – theoretical and methodological – needed to operate in the theoretical and empirical levels respectively. Methodological skills (“know-how”) are relatively standard, invariant across disciplines, and easily acquired through doctoral programs. However, theoretical skills (“know-what”) is considerably harder to master, requires years of observation and reflection, and are tacit skills that cannot be “taught” but rather learned though experience. All of the greatest scientists in the history of mankind, such as Galileo, Newton, Einstein, Neils Bohr, Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, and Herbert Simon, were master theoreticians, and they are remembered for the theories they postulated that transformed the course of science. Methodological skills are needed to be an ordinary researcher, but theoretical skills are needed to be an extraordinary researcher!

Scientific Method

In the preceding sections, we described science as knowledge acquired through a scientific method. So what exactly is the “scientific method”? Scientific method refers to a standardized set of techniques for building scientific knowledge, such as how to make valid observations, how to interpret results, and how to generalize those results. The scientific method allows researchers to independently and impartially test preexisting theories and prior findings, and subject them to open debate, modifications, or enhancements. The scientific method must satisfy four characteristics:

• Replicability: Others should be able to independently replicate or repeat a scientific study and obtain similar, if not identical, results.
• Precision: Theoretical concepts, which are often hard to measure, must be defined with such precision that others can use those definitions to measure those concepts and test that theory.
• Falsifiability: A theory must be stated in a way that it can be disproven. Theories that cannot be tested or falsified are not scientific theories and any such knowledge is not scientific knowledge. A theory that is specified in imprecise terms or whose concepts are not accurately measurable cannot be tested, and is therefore not scientific. Sigmund Freud’s ideas on psychoanalysis fall into this category and is therefore not considered a

“theory”, even though psychoanalysis may have practical utility in treating certain types of ailments.

• Parsimony: When there are multiple explanations of a phenomenon, scientists must always accept the simplest or logically most economical explanation. This concept is called parsimony or “Occam’s razor.” Parsimony prevents scientists from pursuing overly complex or outlandish theories with endless number of concepts and relationships that may explain a little bit of everything but nothing in particular.

Any branch of inquiry that does not allow the scientific method to test its basic laws or theories cannot be called “science.” For instance, theology (the study of religion) is not science because theological ideas (such as the presence of God) cannot be tested by independent observers using a replicable, precise, falsifiable, and parsimonious method. Similarly, arts, music, literature, humanities, and law are also not considered science, even though they are creative and worthwhile endeavors in their own right.

The scientific method, as applied to social sciences, includes a variety of research approaches, tools, and techniques, such as qualitative and quantitative data, statistical analysis, experiments, field surveys, case research, and so forth. Most of this book is devoted to learning about these different methods. However, recognize that the scientific method operates primarily at the empirical level of research, i.e., how to make observations and analyze and interpret these observations. Very little of this method is directly pertinent to the theoretical level, which is really the more challenging part of scientific research.

Types of Scientific Research

Depending on the purpose of research, scientific research projects can be grouped into three types: exploratory, descriptive, and explanatory. Exploratory research is often conducted in new areas of inquiry, where the goals of the research are: (1) to scope out the magnitude or extent of a particular phenomenon, problem, or behavior, (2) to generate some initial ideas (or “hunches”) about that phenomenon, or (3) to test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study regarding that phenomenon. For instance, if the citizens of a country are generally dissatisfied with governmental policies regarding during an economic recession, exploratory research may be directed at measuring the extent of citizens’ dissatisfaction, understanding how such dissatisfaction is manifested, such as the frequency of public protests, and the presumed causes of such dissatisfaction, such as ineffective government policies in dealing with inflation, interest rates, unemployment, or higher taxes. Such research may include examination of publicly reported figures, such as estimates of economic indicators, such as gross domestic product (GDP), unemployment, and consumer price index, as archived by third-party sources, obtained through interviews of experts, eminent economists, or key government officials, and/or derived from studying historical examples of dealing with similar problems. This research may not lead to a very accurate understanding of the target problem, but may be worthwhile in scoping out the nature and extent of the problem and serve as a useful precursor to more in-depth research.

Descriptive research is directed at making careful observations and detailed documentation of a phenomenon of interest. These observations must be based on the scientific method (i.e., must be replicable, precise, etc.), and therefore, are more reliable than casual observations by untrained people. Examples of descriptive research are tabulation of demographic statistics by the United States Census Bureau or employment statistics by the Bureau of Labor, who use the same or similar instruments for estimating employment by sector or population growth by ethnicity over multiple employment surveys or censuses. If any changes are made to the measuring instruments, estimates are provided with and without the changed instrumentation to allow the readers to make a fair before-and-after comparison regarding population or employment trends. Other descriptive research may include chronicling ethnographic reports of gang activities among adolescent youth in urban populations, the persistence or evolution of religious, cultural, or ethnic practices in select communities, and the role of technologies such as Twitter and instant messaging in the spread of democracy movements in Middle Eastern countries.

Explanatory research seeks explanations of observed phenomena, problems, or behaviors. While descriptive research examines the what, where, and when of a phenomenon, explanatory research seeks answers to why and how types of questions. It attempts to “connect the dots” in research, by identifying causal factors and outcomes of the target phenomenon. Examples include understanding the reasons behind adolescent crime or gang violence, with the goal of prescribing strategies to overcome such societal ailments. Most academic or doctoral research belongs to the explanation category, though some amount of exploratory and/or descriptive research may also be needed during initial phases of academic research. Seeking explanations for observed events requires strong theoretical and interpretation skills, along with intuition, insights, and personal experience. Those who can do it well are also the most prized scientists in their disciplines.

History of Scientific Thought

Before closing this chapter, it may be interesting to go back in history and see how science has evolved over time and identify the key scientific minds in this evolution. Although instances of scientific progress have been documented over many centuries, the terms “science,” “scientists,” and the “scientific method” were coined only in the 19 th century. Prior to this time, science was viewed as a part of philosophy, and coexisted with other branches of philosophy such as logic, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics, although the boundaries between some of these branches were blurred.

In the earliest days of human inquiry, knowledge was usually recognized in terms of theological precepts based on faith. This was challenged by Greek philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates during the 3 rd century BC, who suggested that the fundamental nature of being and the world can be understood more accurately through a process of systematic logical reasoning called rationalism . In particular, Aristotle’s classic work Metaphysics (literally meaning “beyond physical [existence]”) separated theology (the study of Gods) from ontology (the study of being and existence) and universal science (the study of first principles, upon which logic is based). Rationalism (not to be confused with “rationality”) views reason as the source of knowledge or justification, and suggests that the criterion of truth is not sensory but rather intellectual and deductive, often derived from a set of first principles or axioms (such as Aristotle’s “law of non-contradiction”).

The next major shift in scientific thought occurred during the 16 th century, when British philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626) suggested that knowledge can only be derived from observations in the real world. Based on this premise, Bacon emphasized knowledge acquisition as an empirical activity (rather than as a reasoning activity), and developed empiricism as an influential branch of philosophy. Bacon’s works led to the popularization of inductive methods of scientific inquiry, the development of the “scientific method” (originally called the “Baconian method”), consisting of systematic observation, measurement, and experimentation, and may have even sowed the seeds of atheism or the rejection of theological precepts as “unobservable.”

Empiricism continued to clash with rationalism throughout the Middle Ages, as philosophers sought the most effective way of gaining valid knowledge. French philosopher Rene Descartes sided with the rationalists, while British philosophers John Locke and David Hume sided with the empiricists. Other scientists, such as Galileo Galilei and Sir Issac Newton, attempted to fuse the two ideas into natural philosophy (the philosophy of nature), to focus specifically on understanding nature and the physical universe, which is considered to be the precursor of the natural sciences. Galileo (1564-1642) was perhaps the first to state that the laws of nature are mathematical, and contributed to the field of astronomy through an innovative combination of experimentation and mathematics.

In the 18 th century, German philosopher Immanuel Kant sought to resolve the dispute between empiricism and rationalism in his book Critique of Pure Reason , by arguing that experience is purely subjective and processing them using pure reason without first delving into the subjective nature of experiences will lead to theoretical illusions. Kant’s ideas led to the development of German idealism , which inspired later development of interpretive techniques such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, and critical social theory.

At about the same time, French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798–1857), founder of the discipline of sociology, attempted to blend rationalism and empiricism in a new doctrine called positivism . He suggested that theory and observations have circular dependence on each other. While theories may be created via reasoning, they are only authentic if they can be verified through observations. The emphasis on verification started the separation of modern science from philosophy and metaphysics and further development of the “scientific method” as the primary means of validating scientific claims. Comte’s ideas were expanded by Emile Durkheim in his development of sociological positivism (positivism as a foundation for social research) and Ludwig Wittgenstein in logical positivism.

In the early 20 th century, strong accounts of positivism were rejected by interpretive sociologists (antipositivists) belonging to the German idealism school of thought. Positivism was typically equated with quantitative research methods such as experiments and surveys and without any explicit philosophical commitments, while antipositivism employed qualitative methods such as unstructured interviews and participant observation. Even practitioners of positivism, such as American sociologist Paul Lazarsfield who pioneered large-scale survey research and statistical techniques for analyzing survey data, acknowledged potential problems of observer bias and structural limitations in positivist inquiry. In response, antipositivists emphasized that social actions must be studied though interpretive means based upon an understanding the meaning and purpose that individuals attach to their personal actions, which inspired Georg Simmel’s work on symbolic interactionism, Max Weber’s work on ideal types, and Edmund Husserl’s work on phenomenology.

In the mid-to-late 20 th century, both positivist and antipositivist schools of thought were subjected to criticisms and modifications. British philosopher Sir Karl Popper suggested that human knowledge is based not on unchallengeable, rock solid foundations, but rather on a set of tentative conjectures that can never be proven conclusively, but only disproven. Empirical evidence is the basis for disproving these conjectures or “theories.” This metatheoretical stance, called postpositivism (or postempiricism), amends positivism by suggesting that it is impossible to verify the truth although it is possible to reject false beliefs, though it retains the positivist notion of an objective truth and its emphasis on the scientific method.

Likewise, antipositivists have also been criticized for trying only to understand society but not critiquing and changing society for the better. The roots of this thought lie in Das Capital , written by German philosophers Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, which critiqued capitalistic societies as being social inequitable and inefficient, and recommended resolving this inequity through class conflict and proletarian revolutions. Marxism inspired social revolutions in countries such as Germany, Italy, Russia, and China, but generally failed to accomplish the social equality that it aspired. Critical research (also called critical theory) propounded by Max Horkheimer and Jurgen Habermas in the 20 th century, retains similar ideas of critiquing and resolving social inequality, and adds that people can and should consciously act to change their social and economic circumstances, although their ability to do so is constrained by various forms of social, cultural and political domination. Critical research attempts to uncover and critique the restrictive and alienating conditions of the status quo by analyzing the oppositions, conflicts and contradictions in contemporary society, and seeks to eliminate the causes of alienation and domination (i.e., emancipate the oppressed class). More on these different research philosophies and approaches will be covered in future chapters of this book.

• Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices. Authored by : Anol Bhattacherjee. Provided by : University of South Florida. Located at : http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/oa_textbooks/3/ . License : CC BY-NC-SA: Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike

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Biology library

Course: biology library   >   unit 1, the scientific method.

• Controlled experiments
• The scientific method and experimental design

Introduction

• Make an observation.
• Ask a question.
• Form a hypothesis , or testable explanation.
• Make a prediction based on the hypothesis.
• Test the prediction.
• Iterate: use the results to make new hypotheses or predictions.

Scientific method example: Failure to toast

1. make an observation..

• Observation: the toaster won't toast.

2. Ask a question.

• Question: Why won't my toaster toast?

3. Propose a hypothesis.

• Hypothesis: Maybe the outlet is broken.

4. Make predictions.

• Prediction: If I plug the toaster into a different outlet, then it will toast the bread.

5. Test the predictions.

• Test of prediction: Plug the toaster into a different outlet and try again.
• If the toaster does toast, then the hypothesis is supported—likely correct.
• If the toaster doesn't toast, then the hypothesis is not supported—likely wrong.

Logical possibility

Practical possibility, building a body of evidence, 6. iterate..

• Iteration time!
• If the hypothesis was supported, we might do additional tests to confirm it, or revise it to be more specific. For instance, we might investigate why the outlet is broken.
• If the hypothesis was not supported, we would come up with a new hypothesis. For instance, the next hypothesis might be that there's a broken wire in the toaster.

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Science and the scientific method: Definitions and examples

Here's a look at the foundation of doing science — the scientific method.

The scientific method

Hypothesis, theory and law, a brief history of science, additional resources, bibliography.

Science is a systematic and logical approach to discovering how things in the universe work. It is also the body of knowledge accumulated through the discoveries about all the things in the universe. 

The word "science" is derived from the Latin word "scientia," which means knowledge based on demonstrable and reproducible data, according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary . True to this definition, science aims for measurable results through testing and analysis, a process known as the scientific method. Science is based on fact, not opinion or preferences. The process of science is designed to challenge ideas through research. One important aspect of the scientific process is that it focuses only on the natural world, according to the University of California, Berkeley . Anything that is considered supernatural, or beyond physical reality, does not fit into the definition of science.

When conducting research, scientists use the scientific method to collect measurable, empirical evidence in an experiment related to a hypothesis (often in the form of an if/then statement) that is designed to support or contradict a scientific theory .

"As a field biologist, my favorite part of the scientific method is being in the field collecting the data," Jaime Tanner, a professor of biology at Marlboro College, told Live Science. "But what really makes that fun is knowing that you are trying to answer an interesting question. So the first step in identifying questions and generating possible answers (hypotheses) is also very important and is a creative process. Then once you collect the data you analyze it to see if your hypothesis is supported or not."

The steps of the scientific method go something like this, according to Highline College :

• Make an observation or observations.
• Form a hypothesis — a tentative description of what's been observed, and make predictions based on that hypothesis.
• Test the hypothesis and predictions in an experiment that can be reproduced.
• Analyze the data and draw conclusions; accept or reject the hypothesis or modify the hypothesis if necessary.
• Reproduce the experiment until there are no discrepancies between observations and theory. "Replication of methods and results is my favorite step in the scientific method," Moshe Pritsker, a former post-doctoral researcher at Harvard Medical School and CEO of JoVE, told Live Science. "The reproducibility of published experiments is the foundation of science. No reproducibility — no science."

Some key underpinnings to the scientific method:

• The hypothesis must be testable and falsifiable, according to North Carolina State University . Falsifiable means that there must be a possible negative answer to the hypothesis.
• Research must involve deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning . Deductive reasoning is the process of using true premises to reach a logical true conclusion while inductive reasoning uses observations to infer an explanation for those observations.
• An experiment should include a dependent variable (which does not change) and an independent variable (which does change), according to the University of California, Santa Barbara .
• An experiment should include an experimental group and a control group. The control group is what the experimental group is compared against, according to Britannica .

The process of generating and testing a hypothesis forms the backbone of the scientific method. When an idea has been confirmed over many experiments, it can be called a scientific theory. While a theory provides an explanation for a phenomenon, a scientific law provides a description of a phenomenon, according to The University of Waikato . One example would be the law of conservation of energy, which is the first law of thermodynamics that says that energy can neither be created nor destroyed. 

A law describes an observed phenomenon, but it doesn't explain why the phenomenon exists or what causes it. "In science, laws are a starting place," said Peter Coppinger, an associate professor of biology and biomedical engineering at the Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology. "From there, scientists can then ask the questions, 'Why and how?'"

Laws are generally considered to be without exception, though some laws have been modified over time after further testing found discrepancies. For instance, Newton's laws of motion describe everything we've observed in the macroscopic world, but they break down at the subatomic level.

This does not mean theories are not meaningful. For a hypothesis to become a theory, scientists must conduct rigorous testing, typically across multiple disciplines by separate groups of scientists. Saying something is "just a theory" confuses the scientific definition of "theory" with the layperson's definition. To most people a theory is a hunch. In science, a theory is the framework for observations and facts, Tanner told Live Science.

The earliest evidence of science can be found as far back as records exist. Early tablets contain numerals and information about the solar system , which were derived by using careful observation, prediction and testing of those predictions. Science became decidedly more "scientific" over time, however.

1200s: Robert Grosseteste developed the framework for the proper methods of modern scientific experimentation, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. His works included the principle that an inquiry must be based on measurable evidence that is confirmed through testing.

1400s: Leonardo da Vinci began his notebooks in pursuit of evidence that the human body is microcosmic. The artist, scientist and mathematician also gathered information about optics and hydrodynamics.

1500s: Nicolaus Copernicus advanced the understanding of the solar system with his discovery of heliocentrism. This is a model in which Earth and the other planets revolve around the sun, which is the center of the solar system.

1600s: Johannes Kepler built upon those observations with his laws of planetary motion. Galileo Galilei improved on a new invention, the telescope, and used it to study the sun and planets. The 1600s also saw advancements in the study of physics as Isaac Newton developed his laws of motion.

1700s: Benjamin Franklin discovered that lightning is electrical. He also contributed to the study of oceanography and meteorology. The understanding of chemistry also evolved during this century as Antoine Lavoisier, dubbed the father of modern chemistry , developed the law of conservation of mass.

1800s: Milestones included Alessandro Volta's discoveries regarding electrochemical series, which led to the invention of the battery. John Dalton also introduced atomic theory, which stated that all matter is composed of atoms that combine to form molecules. The basis of modern study of genetics advanced as Gregor Mendel unveiled his laws of inheritance. Later in the century, Wilhelm Conrad Röntgen discovered X-rays , while George Ohm's law provided the basis for understanding how to harness electrical charges.

1900s: The discoveries of Albert Einstein , who is best known for his theory of relativity, dominated the beginning of the 20th century. Einstein's theory of relativity is actually two separate theories. His special theory of relativity, which he outlined in a 1905 paper, " The Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies ," concluded that time must change according to the speed of a moving object relative to the frame of reference of an observer. His second theory of general relativity, which he published as " The Foundation of the General Theory of Relativity ," advanced the idea that matter causes space to curve.

In 1952, Jonas Salk developed the polio vaccine , which reduced the incidence of polio in the United States by nearly 90%, according to Britannica . The following year, James D. Watson and Francis Crick discovered the structure of DNA , which is a double helix formed by base pairs attached to a sugar-phosphate backbone, according to the National Human Genome Research Institute .

2000s: The 21st century saw the first draft of the human genome completed, leading to a greater understanding of DNA. This advanced the study of genetics, its role in human biology and its use as a predictor of diseases and other disorders, according to the National Human Genome Research Institute .

• This video from City University of New York delves into the basics of what defines science.
• Learn about what makes science science in this book excerpt from Washington State University .
• This resource from the University of Michigan — Flint explains how to design your own scientific study.

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Scientia. 2022. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/scientia

University of California, Berkeley, "Understanding Science: An Overview." 2022. ​​ https://undsci.berkeley.edu/article/0_0_0/intro_01  

Highline College, "Scientific method." July 12, 2015. https://people.highline.edu/iglozman/classes/astronotes/scimeth.htm  

North Carolina State University, "Science Scripts." https://projects.ncsu.edu/project/bio183de/Black/science/science_scripts.html  

University of California, Santa Barbara. "What is an Independent variable?" October 31,2017. http://scienceline.ucsb.edu/getkey.php?key=6045  

Encyclopedia Britannica, "Control group." May 14, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/science/control-group  

The University of Waikato, "Scientific Hypothesis, Theories and Laws." https://sci.waikato.ac.nz/evolution/Theories.shtml  

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Robert Grosseteste. May 3, 2019. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/grosseteste/  

Encyclopedia Britannica, "Jonas Salk." October 21, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/ biography /Jonas-Salk

National Human Genome Research Institute, "​Phosphate Backbone." https://www.genome.gov/genetics-glossary/Phosphate-Backbone  

National Human Genome Research Institute, "What is the Human Genome Project?" https://www.genome.gov/human-genome-project/What  

‌ Live Science contributor Ashley Hamer updated this article on Jan. 16, 2022.

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The Scientific Method

Introduction.

There are many scientific disciplines that address topics from medicine and astrophysics to agriculture and zoology. In each discipline, modern scientists use a process called the "Scientific Method" to advance their knowledge and understanding. This publication describes the method scientists use to conduct research and describe and explain nature, ultimately trying prove or disprove theories.

Scientists all over the world conduct research using the Scientific Method. The University of Nevada Cooperative Extension exists to provide unbiased, research-based information on topics important and relevant to society. The scientific research efforts, analyses, and subsequent information disseminated by Cooperative Extension is driven by careful review and synthesis of relevant scientific research. Cooperative Extension presents useful information based on the best science available, and today that science is based on knowledge obtained by application of the Scientific Method.

The Scientific Method – What it’s Not

The Scientific Method is a process for explaining the world we see. It is:

• Not a formula

The Scientific Method – What is it?

The Scientific Method is a process used to validate observations while minimizing observer bias. Its goal is for research to be conducted in a fair, unbiased and repeatable manner.

Long ago, people viewed the workings of nature and believed that the events and phenomena they observed were associated with the intrinsic nature of the beings or things being observed (Ackoff 1962, Wilson 1937). Today we view events and phenomena as having been caused , and science has evolved as a process to ask how and why things and events happen. Scientists seek to understand the relationships and intricacies between cause and effect in order to predict outcomes of future or similar events. To answer these questions and to help predict future happenings, scientists use the Scientific Method - a series of steps that lead to answers that accurately describe the things we observe, or at least improve our understanding of them.

The Scientific Method is not the only way, but is the best-known way to discover how and why the world works, without our knowledge being tainted by religious, political, or philosophical values. This method provides a means to formulate questions about general observations and devise theories of explanation. The approach lends itself to answering questions in fair and unbiased statements, as long as questions are posed correctly, in a hypothetical form that can be tested.

Definitions

It is important to understand three important terms before describing the Scientific Method.

This is a statement made by a researcher that is a working assumption to be tested and proven. It is something "considered true for the purpose of investigation" (Webster’s Dictionary 1995). An example might be “The earth is round.”

general principles drawn from facts that explain observations and can be used to predict new events. An example would be Newton’s theory of gravitation or Einstein’s theory of relativity. Each is based on falsifiable hypotheses of phenomenon we observe.

Falsifiable/ Null Hypothesis

to prove to be false (Webster’s Dictionary 1995). The hypothesis that is generated must be able to be tested, and either accepted or rejected. Scientists make hypotheses that they want to disprove in order that they may prove the working assumption describing the observed phenomena. This is done by declaring the statement or hypothesis as falsifiable . So, we would state the above hypothesis as “the earth is not round,” or “the earth is square” making it a working statement to be disproved.

The Scientific Method is not a formula, but rather a process with a number of sequential steps designed to create an explainable outcome that increases our knowledge base. This process is as follows:

STEP 1. Make an OBSERVATION

gather and assimilate information about an event, phenomenon, process, or an exception to a previous observation, etc.

STEP 2. Define the PROBLEM

ask questions about the observation that are relevant and testable. Define the null hypothesis to provide unbiased results.

STEP 3: Form the HYPOTHESIS

create an explanation, or educated guess, for the observation that is testable and falsifiable.

STEP 4: Conduct the EXPERIMENT

devise and perform an experiment to test the hypothesis.

STEP 5: Derive a THEORY

create a statement based in the outcome of the experiment that explains the observation(s) and predicts the likelihood of future observations.

Replication

Using the Scientific Method to answer questions about events or phenomena we observe can be repeated to fine-tune our theories. For example, if we conduct research using the Scientific Method and think we have answered a question, but different results occur the next time we make an observation, we may have to ask new questions and formulate new hypotheses that are tested by another experiment. Sometimes scientists must perform many experiments over many years or even decades using the Scientific Method to prove or disprove theories that are generated from one initial question. Numerous studies are often necessary to fully test the broad range of results that occur in order that scientists can formulate theories that truly account for the variation we see in our natural environment.

The Scientific Method – Is it worth all the effort?

Scientific knowledge can only advance when all scientists systematically use the same process to discover and disseminate new information. The advantage of all scientific research using the Scientific Method is that the experiments are repeatable by anyone, anywhere. When similar results occur in each experiment, these facts make the case for the theory stronger. If the same experiment is performed many times in many different locations, under a broad range of conditions, then the theory derived from these experiments is considered strong and widely applicable. If the questions are posed as testable hypotheses that rely on inductive reasoning and empiricism – that is, observations and data collection – then experiments can be devised to generate logical theories that explain the things we see. If we understand why the observed results occur, then we can accurately apply concepts derived from the experiment to other situations.

What do we need to consider when using the Scientific Method?

The Scientific Method requires that we ask questions and perform experiments to prove or disprove questions in ways that will lead to unbiased answers. Experiments must be well designed to provide accurate and repeatable (precise) results. If we test hypotheses correctly, then we can prove the cause of a phenomenon and determine the likelihood (probability) of the events to happen again. This provides predictive power. The Scientific Method enables us to test a hypothesis and distinguish between the correlation of two or more things happening in association with each other and the actual cause of the phenomenon we observe.

Correlation of two variables cannot explain the cause and effect of their relationship. Scientists design experiments using a number of methods to ensure the results reveal the likelihood of the observation happening (probability). Controlled experiments are used to analyze these relationships and develop cause and effect relationships. Statistical analysis is used to determine whether differences between treatments can be attributed to the treatment applied, if they are artifacts of the experimental design, or of natural variation.

In summary, the Scientific Method produces answers to questions posed in the form of a working hypothesis that enables us to derive theories about what we observe in the world around us. Its power lies in its ability to be repeated, providing unbiased answers to questions to derive theories. This information is powerful and offers opportunity to predict future events and phenomena.

Bibliography

• Ackoff, R. 1962. Scientific Method, Optimizing Applied Research Decisions. Wiley and Sons, New York, NY.
• Wilson, F. 1937. The Logic and Methodology of Science in Early Modern Thought. University of Toronto Press. Buffalo, NY.
• Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy. Experimental Error. 1995. From: On Being a Scientist: Responsible Conduct in Research. Second Edition.
• The Gale Group. The Scientific Method. 2001. Gale Encyclopedia of Psychology. Second Edition.

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Also of Interest:

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Research Methods vs. Scientific Method

What's the difference.

Research methods and the scientific method are both essential tools used in the field of research to gather and analyze data. While research methods refer to the specific techniques and procedures used to conduct research, the scientific method is a systematic approach to problem-solving that involves making observations, forming hypotheses, conducting experiments, and drawing conclusions based on evidence. Both research methods and the scientific method aim to ensure that research is conducted in a rigorous and systematic manner, leading to reliable and valid results.

Further Detail

Introduction.

Research methods and scientific method are two important concepts in the field of research. While they are often used interchangeably, they have distinct attributes that set them apart. In this article, we will explore the differences between research methods and scientific method, and how they contribute to the process of conducting research.

Research Methods

Research methods refer to the techniques and procedures used by researchers to collect, analyze, and interpret data. There are various research methods available, including qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods. Qualitative research methods focus on understanding human behavior and experiences through methods such as interviews, observations, and case studies. Quantitative research methods, on the other hand, involve collecting and analyzing numerical data to test hypotheses and make predictions. Mixed methods research combines both qualitative and quantitative approaches to provide a comprehensive understanding of a research topic.

Research methods play a crucial role in shaping the research process and determining the validity and reliability of the findings. The choice of research methods depends on the research question, objectives, and the nature of the research topic. Researchers must carefully select the most appropriate research methods to ensure the accuracy and credibility of their research findings.

Scientific Method

The scientific method is a systematic approach to conducting research that involves a series of steps to test hypotheses and draw conclusions. The scientific method typically consists of the following steps: observation, hypothesis formulation, experimentation, data analysis, and conclusion. Through the scientific method, researchers aim to gather empirical evidence to support or refute their hypotheses and theories.

One of the key principles of the scientific method is the concept of falsifiability, which means that hypotheses and theories must be testable and potentially disprovable. This principle ensures that scientific research is objective, verifiable, and replicable. By following the scientific method, researchers can minimize bias, errors, and subjective interpretations in their research process.

While research methods and scientific method are closely related, they differ in their scope and application. Research methods encompass a wide range of techniques and approaches used to conduct research, while the scientific method is a specific framework for testing hypotheses and drawing conclusions based on empirical evidence.

• Research methods can be qualitative, quantitative, or mixed, depending on the nature of the research question and objectives.
• The scientific method follows a structured process of observation, hypothesis testing, experimentation, and data analysis to validate or refute hypotheses.
• Research methods focus on data collection and analysis techniques, while the scientific method emphasizes the importance of objectivity, falsifiability, and replicability in research.

Both research methods and scientific method are essential tools for conducting rigorous and systematic research. Researchers often combine various research methods with the scientific method to gather comprehensive and reliable data, test hypotheses, and draw valid conclusions. By integrating research methods and scientific method, researchers can enhance the quality and credibility of their research findings.

In conclusion, research methods and scientific method are integral components of the research process. While research methods provide a framework for collecting and analyzing data, the scientific method offers a systematic approach to testing hypotheses and drawing conclusions based on empirical evidence. By understanding the differences between research methods and scientific method, researchers can effectively design and conduct research studies that are rigorous, objective, and reliable.

Comparisons may contain inaccurate information about people, places, or facts. Please report any issues.

Scientific Method

Illustration by J.R. Bee. ThoughtCo. 

• Cell Biology
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• B.A., Biology, Emory University
• A.S., Nursing, Chattahoochee Technical College

The scientific method is a series of steps followed by scientific investigators to answer specific questions about the natural world. It involves making observations, formulating a hypothesis , and conducting scientific experiments . Scientific inquiry starts with an observation followed by the formulation of a question about what has been observed. The steps of the scientific method are as follows:

Observation

The first step of the scientific method involves making an observation about something that interests you. This is very important if you are doing a science project because you want your project to be focused on something that will hold your attention. Your observation can be on anything from plant movement to animal behavior, as long as it is something you really want to know more about.​ This is where you come up with the idea for your science project.

Once you've made your observation, you must formulate a question about what you have observed. Your question should tell what it is that you are trying to discover or accomplish in your experiment. When stating your question you should be as specific as possible.​ For example, if you are doing a project on plants , you may want to know how plants interact with microbes. Your question may be: Do plant spices inhibit bacterial growth ?

The hypothesis is a key component of the scientific process. A hypothesis is an idea that is suggested as an explanation for a natural event, a particular experience, or a specific condition that can be tested through definable experimentation. It states the purpose of your experiment, the variables used, and the predicted outcome of your experiment. It is important to note that a hypothesis must be testable. That means that you should be able to test your hypothesis through experimentation .​ Your hypothesis must either be supported or falsified by your experiment. An example of a good hypothesis is: If there is a relation between listening to music and heart rate, then listening to music will cause a person's resting heart rate to either increase or decrease.

Once you've developed a hypothesis, you must design and conduct an experiment that will test it. You should develop a procedure that states very clearly how you plan to conduct your experiment. It is important that you include and identify a controlled variable or dependent variable in your procedure. Controls allow us to test a single variable in an experiment because they are unchanged. We can then make observations and comparisons between our controls and our independent variables (things that change in the experiment) to develop an accurate conclusion.​

The results are where you report what happened in the experiment. That includes detailing all observations and data made during your experiment. Most people find it easier to visualize the data by charting or graphing the information.​

The final step of the scientific method is developing a conclusion. This is where all of the results from the experiment are analyzed and a determination is reached about the hypothesis. Did the experiment support or reject your hypothesis? If your hypothesis was supported, great. If not, repeat the experiment or think of ways to improve your procedure.

• Six Steps of the Scientific Method
• What Is an Experiment? Definition and Design
• Scientific Method Flow Chart
• Scientific Method Lesson Plan
• How To Design a Science Fair Experiment
• How to Do a Science Fair Project
• What Are the Elements of a Good Hypothesis?
• How to Write a Lab Report
• What Is a Hypothesis? (Science)
• Biology Science Fair Project Ideas
• Understanding Simple vs Controlled Experiments
• Null Hypothesis Definition and Examples
• Stove Top Frozen Pizza Science Experiment
• Dependent Variable Definition and Examples
• Kindergarten Science Projects
• What Are Examples of a Hypothesis?

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Research methods--quantitative, qualitative, and more: overview.

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About Research Methods

This guide provides an overview of research methods, how to choose and use them, and supports and resources at UC Berkeley. 

As Patten and Newhart note in the book Understanding Research Methods , "Research methods are the building blocks of the scientific enterprise. They are the "how" for building systematic knowledge. The accumulation of knowledge through research is by its nature a collective endeavor. Each well-designed study provides evidence that may support, amend, refute, or deepen the understanding of existing knowledge...Decisions are important throughout the practice of research and are designed to help researchers collect evidence that includes the full spectrum of the phenomenon under study, to maintain logical rules, and to mitigate or account for possible sources of bias. In many ways, learning research methods is learning how to see and make these decisions."

The choice of methods varies by discipline, by the kind of phenomenon being studied and the data being used to study it, by the technology available, and more.  This guide is an introduction, but if you don't see what you need here, always contact your subject librarian, and/or take a look to see if there's a library research guide that will answer your question. 

Suggestions for changes and additions to this guide are welcome! 

START HERE: SAGE Research Methods

Without question, the most comprehensive resource available from the library is SAGE Research Methods.  HERE IS THE ONLINE GUIDE  to this one-stop shopping collection, and some helpful links are below:

• SAGE Research Methods
• Little Green Books  (Quantitative Methods)
• Little Blue Books  (Qualitative Methods)
• Dictionaries and Encyclopedias  
• Case studies of real research projects
• Sample datasets for hands-on practice
• Streaming video--see methods come to life
• Methodspace- -a community for researchers
• SAGE Research Methods Course Mapping

Library Data Services at UC Berkeley

Library Data Services Program and Digital Scholarship Services

The LDSP offers a variety of services and tools !  From this link, check out pages for each of the following topics:  discovering data, managing data, collecting data, GIS data, text data mining, publishing data, digital scholarship, open science, and the Research Data Management Program.

Be sure also to check out the visual guide to where to seek assistance on campus with any research question you may have!

Library GIS Services

Other Data Services at Berkeley

D-Lab Supports Berkeley faculty, staff, and graduate students with research in data intensive social science, including a wide range of training and workshop offerings Dryad Dryad is a simple self-service tool for researchers to use in publishing their datasets. It provides tools for the effective publication of and access to research data. Geospatial Innovation Facility (GIF) Provides leadership and training across a broad array of integrated mapping technologies on campu Research Data Management A UC Berkeley guide and consulting service for research data management issues

General Research Methods Resources

Here are some general resources for assistance:

• Assistance from ICPSR (must create an account to access): Getting Help with Data , and Resources for Students
• Wiley Stats Ref for background information on statistics topics
• Survey Documentation and Analysis (SDA) .  Program for easy web-based analysis of survey data.

Consultants

• D-Lab/Data Science Discovery Consultants Request help with your research project from peer consultants.
• Research data (RDM) consulting Meet with RDM consultants before designing the data security, storage, and sharing aspects of your qualitative project.
• Statistics Department Consulting Services A service in which advanced graduate students, under faculty supervision, are available to consult during specified hours in the Fall and Spring semesters.

Related Resourcex

• IRB / CPHS Qualitative research projects with human subjects often require that you go through an ethics review.
• OURS (Office of Undergraduate Research and Scholarships) OURS supports undergraduates who want to embark on research projects and assistantships. In particular, check out their "Getting Started in Research" workshops
• Sponsored Projects Sponsored projects works with researchers applying for major external grants.
• Next: Quantitative Research >>
• Last Updated: Apr 3, 2023 3:14 PM
• URL: https://guides.lib.berkeley.edu/researchmethods

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Home » Scientific Research – Types, Purpose and Guide

Scientific Research – Types, Purpose and Guide

Table of Contents

Scientific Research

Definition:

Scientific research is the systematic and empirical investigation of phenomena, theories, or hypotheses, using various methods and techniques in order to acquire new knowledge or to validate existing knowledge.

It involves the collection, analysis, interpretation, and presentation of data, as well as the formulation and testing of hypotheses. Scientific research can be conducted in various fields, such as natural sciences, social sciences, and engineering, and may involve experiments, observations, surveys, or other forms of data collection. The goal of scientific research is to advance knowledge, improve understanding, and contribute to the development of solutions to practical problems.

Types of Scientific Research

There are different types of scientific research, which can be classified based on their purpose, method, and application. In this response, we will discuss the four main types of scientific research.

Descriptive Research

Descriptive research aims to describe or document a particular phenomenon or situation, without altering it in any way. This type of research is usually done through observation, surveys, or case studies. Descriptive research is useful in generating ideas, understanding complex phenomena, and providing a foundation for future research. However, it does not provide explanations or causal relationships between variables.

Exploratory Research

Exploratory research aims to explore a new area of inquiry or develop initial ideas for future research. This type of research is usually conducted through observation, interviews, or focus groups. Exploratory research is useful in generating hypotheses, identifying research questions, and determining the feasibility of a larger study. However, it does not provide conclusive evidence or establish cause-and-effect relationships.

Experimental Research

Experimental research aims to test cause-and-effect relationships between variables by manipulating one variable and observing the effects on another variable. This type of research involves the use of an experimental group, which receives a treatment, and a control group, which does not receive the treatment. Experimental research is useful in establishing causal relationships, replicating results, and controlling extraneous variables. However, it may not be feasible or ethical to manipulate certain variables in some contexts.

Correlational Research

Correlational research aims to examine the relationship between two or more variables without manipulating them. This type of research involves the use of statistical techniques to determine the strength and direction of the relationship between variables. Correlational research is useful in identifying patterns, predicting outcomes, and testing theories. However, it does not establish causation or control for confounding variables.

Scientific Research Methods

Scientific research methods are used in scientific research to investigate phenomena, acquire knowledge, and answer questions using empirical evidence. Here are some commonly used scientific research methods:

Observational Studies

This method involves observing and recording phenomena as they occur in their natural setting. It can be done through direct observation or by using tools such as cameras, microscopes, or sensors.

Experimental Studies

This method involves manipulating one or more variables to determine the effect on the outcome. This type of study is often used to establish cause-and-effect relationships.

Survey Research

This method involves collecting data from a large number of people by asking them a set of standardized questions. Surveys can be conducted in person, over the phone, or online.

Case Studies

This method involves in-depth analysis of a single individual, group, or organization. Case studies are often used to gain insights into complex or unusual phenomena.

Meta-analysis

This method involves combining data from multiple studies to arrive at a more reliable conclusion. This technique can be used to identify patterns and trends across a large number of studies.

Qualitative Research

This method involves collecting and analyzing non-numerical data, such as interviews, focus groups, or observations. This type of research is often used to explore complex phenomena and to gain an understanding of people’s experiences and perspectives.

Quantitative Research

This method involves collecting and analyzing numerical data using statistical techniques. This type of research is often used to test hypotheses and to establish cause-and-effect relationships.

Longitudinal Studies

This method involves following a group of individuals over a period of time to observe changes and to identify patterns and trends. This type of study can be used to investigate the long-term effects of a particular intervention or exposure.

Data Analysis Methods

There are many different data analysis methods used in scientific research, and the choice of method depends on the type of data being collected and the research question. Here are some commonly used data analysis methods:

• Descriptive statistics: This involves using summary statistics such as mean, median, mode, standard deviation, and range to describe the basic features of the data.
• Inferential statistics: This involves using statistical tests to make inferences about a population based on a sample of data. Examples of inferential statistics include t-tests, ANOVA, and regression analysis.
• Qualitative analysis: This involves analyzing non-numerical data such as interviews, focus groups, and observations. Qualitative analysis may involve identifying themes, patterns, or categories in the data.
• Content analysis: This involves analyzing the content of written or visual materials such as articles, speeches, or images. Content analysis may involve identifying themes, patterns, or categories in the content.
• Data mining: This involves using automated methods to analyze large datasets to identify patterns, trends, or relationships in the data.
• Machine learning: This involves using algorithms to analyze data and make predictions or classifications based on the patterns identified in the data.

Application of Scientific Research

Scientific research has numerous applications in many fields, including:

• Medicine and healthcare: Scientific research is used to develop new drugs, medical treatments, and vaccines. It is also used to understand the causes and risk factors of diseases, as well as to develop new diagnostic tools and medical devices.
• Agriculture : Scientific research is used to develop new crop varieties, to improve crop yields, and to develop more sustainable farming practices.
• Technology and engineering : Scientific research is used to develop new technologies and engineering solutions, such as renewable energy systems, new materials, and advanced manufacturing techniques.
• Environmental science : Scientific research is used to understand the impacts of human activity on the environment and to develop solutions for mitigating those impacts. It is also used to monitor and manage natural resources, such as water and air quality.
• Education : Scientific research is used to develop new teaching methods and educational materials, as well as to understand how people learn and develop.
• Business and economics: Scientific research is used to understand consumer behavior, to develop new products and services, and to analyze economic trends and policies.
• Social sciences : Scientific research is used to understand human behavior, attitudes, and social dynamics. It is also used to develop interventions to improve social welfare and to inform public policy.

How to Conduct Scientific Research

Conducting scientific research involves several steps, including:

• Identify a research question: Start by identifying a question or problem that you want to investigate. This question should be clear, specific, and relevant to your field of study.
• Conduct a literature review: Before starting your research, conduct a thorough review of existing research in your field. This will help you identify gaps in knowledge and develop hypotheses or research questions.
• Develop a research plan: Once you have a research question, develop a plan for how you will collect and analyze data to answer that question. This plan should include a detailed methodology, a timeline, and a budget.
• Collect data: Depending on your research question and methodology, you may collect data through surveys, experiments, observations, or other methods.
• Analyze data: Once you have collected your data, analyze it using appropriate statistical or qualitative methods. This will help you draw conclusions about your research question.
• Interpret results: Based on your analysis, interpret your results and draw conclusions about your research question. Discuss any limitations or implications of your findings.
• Communicate results: Finally, communicate your findings to others in your field through presentations, publications, or other means.

Purpose of Scientific Research

The purpose of scientific research is to systematically investigate phenomena, acquire new knowledge, and advance our understanding of the world around us. Scientific research has several key goals, including:

• Exploring the unknown: Scientific research is often driven by curiosity and the desire to explore uncharted territory. Scientists investigate phenomena that are not well understood, in order to discover new insights and develop new theories.
• Testing hypotheses: Scientific research involves developing hypotheses or research questions, and then testing them through observation and experimentation. This allows scientists to evaluate the validity of their ideas and refine their understanding of the phenomena they are studying.
• Solving problems: Scientific research is often motivated by the desire to solve practical problems or address real-world challenges. For example, researchers may investigate the causes of a disease in order to develop new treatments, or explore ways to make renewable energy more affordable and accessible.
• Advancing knowledge: Scientific research is a collective effort to advance our understanding of the world around us. By building on existing knowledge and developing new insights, scientists contribute to a growing body of knowledge that can be used to inform decision-making, solve problems, and improve our lives.

Examples of Scientific Research

Here are some examples of scientific research that are currently ongoing or have recently been completed:

• Clinical trials for new treatments: Scientific research in the medical field often involves clinical trials to test new treatments for diseases and conditions. For example, clinical trials may be conducted to evaluate the safety and efficacy of new drugs or medical devices.
• Genomics research: Scientists are conducting research to better understand the human genome and its role in health and disease. This includes research on genetic mutations that can cause diseases such as cancer, as well as the development of personalized medicine based on an individual’s genetic makeup.
• Climate change: Scientific research is being conducted to understand the causes and impacts of climate change, as well as to develop solutions for mitigating its effects. This includes research on renewable energy technologies, carbon capture and storage, and sustainable land use practices.
• Neuroscience : Scientists are conducting research to understand the workings of the brain and the nervous system, with the goal of developing new treatments for neurological disorders such as Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease.
• Artificial intelligence: Researchers are working to develop new algorithms and technologies to improve the capabilities of artificial intelligence systems. This includes research on machine learning, computer vision, and natural language processing.
• Space exploration: Scientific research is being conducted to explore the cosmos and learn more about the origins of the universe. This includes research on exoplanets, black holes, and the search for extraterrestrial life.

When to use Scientific Research

Some specific situations where scientific research may be particularly useful include:

• Solving problems: Scientific research can be used to investigate practical problems or address real-world challenges. For example, scientists may investigate the causes of a disease in order to develop new treatments, or explore ways to make renewable energy more affordable and accessible.
• Decision-making: Scientific research can provide evidence-based information to inform decision-making. For example, policymakers may use scientific research to evaluate the effectiveness of different policy options or to make decisions about public health and safety.
• Innovation : Scientific research can be used to develop new technologies, products, and processes. For example, research on materials science can lead to the development of new materials with unique properties that can be used in a range of applications.
• Knowledge creation : Scientific research is an important way of generating new knowledge and advancing our understanding of the world around us. This can lead to new theories, insights, and discoveries that can benefit society.

Advantages of Scientific Research

There are many advantages of scientific research, including:

• Improved understanding : Scientific research allows us to gain a deeper understanding of the world around us, from the smallest subatomic particles to the largest celestial bodies.
• Evidence-based decision making: Scientific research provides evidence-based information that can inform decision-making in many fields, from public policy to medicine.
• Technological advancements: Scientific research drives technological advancements in fields such as medicine, engineering, and materials science. These advancements can improve quality of life, increase efficiency, and reduce costs.
• New discoveries: Scientific research can lead to new discoveries and breakthroughs that can advance our knowledge in many fields. These discoveries can lead to new theories, technologies, and products.
• Economic benefits : Scientific research can stimulate economic growth by creating new industries and jobs, and by generating new technologies and products.
• Improved health outcomes: Scientific research can lead to the development of new medical treatments and technologies that can improve health outcomes and quality of life for people around the world.
• Increased innovation: Scientific research encourages innovation by promoting collaboration, creativity, and curiosity. This can lead to new and unexpected discoveries that can benefit society.

Limitations of Scientific Research

Scientific research has some limitations that researchers should be aware of. These limitations can include:

• Research design limitations : The design of a research study can impact the reliability and validity of the results. Poorly designed studies can lead to inaccurate or inconclusive results. Researchers must carefully consider the study design to ensure that it is appropriate for the research question and the population being studied.
• Sample size limitations: The size of the sample being studied can impact the generalizability of the results. Small sample sizes may not be representative of the larger population, and may lead to incorrect conclusions.
• Time and resource limitations: Scientific research can be costly and time-consuming. Researchers may not have the resources necessary to conduct a large-scale study, or may not have sufficient time to complete a study with appropriate controls and analysis.
• Ethical limitations : Certain types of research may raise ethical concerns, such as studies involving human or animal subjects. Ethical concerns may limit the scope of the research that can be conducted, or require additional protocols and procedures to ensure the safety and well-being of participants.
• Limitations of technology: Technology may limit the types of research that can be conducted, or the accuracy of the data collected. For example, certain types of research may require advanced technology that is not yet available, or may be limited by the accuracy of current measurement tools.
• Limitations of existing knowledge: Existing knowledge may limit the types of research that can be conducted. For example, if there is limited knowledge in a particular field, it may be difficult to design a study that can provide meaningful results.

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Methodology

Research Methods | Definitions, Types, Examples

Research methods are specific procedures for collecting and analyzing data. Developing your research methods is an integral part of your research design . When planning your methods, there are two key decisions you will make.

First, decide how you will collect data . Your methods depend on what type of data you need to answer your research question :

• Qualitative vs. quantitative : Will your data take the form of words or numbers?
• Primary vs. secondary : Will you collect original data yourself, or will you use data that has already been collected by someone else?
• Descriptive vs. experimental : Will you take measurements of something as it is, or will you perform an experiment?

Second, decide how you will analyze the data .

• For quantitative data, you can use statistical analysis methods to test relationships between variables.
• For qualitative data, you can use methods such as thematic analysis to interpret patterns and meanings in the data.

Table of contents

Methods for collecting data, examples of data collection methods, methods for analyzing data, examples of data analysis methods, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about research methods.

Data is the information that you collect for the purposes of answering your research question . The type of data you need depends on the aims of your research.

Qualitative vs. quantitative data

Your choice of qualitative or quantitative data collection depends on the type of knowledge you want to develop.

For questions about ideas, experiences and meanings, or to study something that can’t be described numerically, collect qualitative data .

If you want to develop a more mechanistic understanding of a topic, or your research involves hypothesis testing , collect quantitative data .

You can also take a mixed methods approach , where you use both qualitative and quantitative research methods.

Primary vs. secondary research

Primary research is any original data that you collect yourself for the purposes of answering your research question (e.g. through surveys , observations and experiments ). Secondary research is data that has already been collected by other researchers (e.g. in a government census or previous scientific studies).

If you are exploring a novel research question, you’ll probably need to collect primary data . But if you want to synthesize existing knowledge, analyze historical trends, or identify patterns on a large scale, secondary data might be a better choice.

Descriptive vs. experimental data

In descriptive research , you collect data about your study subject without intervening. The validity of your research will depend on your sampling method .

In experimental research , you systematically intervene in a process and measure the outcome. The validity of your research will depend on your experimental design .

To conduct an experiment, you need to be able to vary your independent variable , precisely measure your dependent variable, and control for confounding variables . If it’s practically and ethically possible, this method is the best choice for answering questions about cause and effect.

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Your data analysis methods will depend on the type of data you collect and how you prepare it for analysis.

Data can often be analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively. For example, survey responses could be analyzed qualitatively by studying the meanings of responses or quantitatively by studying the frequencies of responses.

Qualitative analysis methods

Qualitative analysis is used to understand words, ideas, and experiences. You can use it to interpret data that was collected:

• From open-ended surveys and interviews , literature reviews , case studies , ethnographies , and other sources that use text rather than numbers.
• Using non-probability sampling methods .

Qualitative analysis tends to be quite flexible and relies on the researcher’s judgement, so you have to reflect carefully on your choices and assumptions and be careful to avoid research bias .

Quantitative analysis methods

Quantitative analysis uses numbers and statistics to understand frequencies, averages and correlations (in descriptive studies) or cause-and-effect relationships (in experiments).

You can use quantitative analysis to interpret data that was collected either:

• During an experiment .
• Using probability sampling methods .

Because the data is collected and analyzed in a statistically valid way, the results of quantitative analysis can be easily standardized and shared among researchers.

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If you want to know more about statistics , methodology , or research bias , make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples.

• Chi square test of independence
• Statistical power
• Descriptive statistics
• Degrees of freedom
• Pearson correlation
• Null hypothesis
• Double-blind study
• Case-control study
• Research ethics
• Data collection
• Hypothesis testing
• Structured interviews

Research bias

• Hawthorne effect
• Unconscious bias
• Recall bias
• Halo effect
• Self-serving bias
• Information bias

Quantitative research deals with numbers and statistics, while qualitative research deals with words and meanings.

Quantitative methods allow you to systematically measure variables and test hypotheses . Qualitative methods allow you to explore concepts and experiences in more detail.

In mixed methods research , you use both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis methods to answer your research question .

A sample is a subset of individuals from a larger population . Sampling means selecting the group that you will actually collect data from in your research. For example, if you are researching the opinions of students in your university, you could survey a sample of 100 students.

In statistics, sampling allows you to test a hypothesis about the characteristics of a population.

The research methods you use depend on the type of data you need to answer your research question .

• If you want to measure something or test a hypothesis , use quantitative methods . If you want to explore ideas, thoughts and meanings, use qualitative methods .
• If you want to analyze a large amount of readily-available data, use secondary data. If you want data specific to your purposes with control over how it is generated, collect primary data.
• If you want to establish cause-and-effect relationships between variables , use experimental methods. If you want to understand the characteristics of a research subject, use descriptive methods.

Methodology refers to the overarching strategy and rationale of your research project . It involves studying the methods used in your field and the theories or principles behind them, in order to develop an approach that matches your objectives.

Methods are the specific tools and procedures you use to collect and analyze data (for example, experiments, surveys , and statistical tests ).

In shorter scientific papers, where the aim is to report the findings of a specific study, you might simply describe what you did in a methods section .

In a longer or more complex research project, such as a thesis or dissertation , you will probably include a methodology section , where you explain your approach to answering the research questions and cite relevant sources to support your choice of methods.

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Research and the Scientific Method

For a clear perception of the term research, one should know the meaning of scientific method. The two terms, research and scientific method, are closely related. Research, as we have already stated, can be termed as “an inquiry into the nature of, the reasons for, and the consequences of any particular set of circumstances, whether these circumstances are experimentally controlled or recorded just as they occur.

Further, research implies the researcher is interested in more than particular results; he is interested in the repeatability of the results and in their extension to more complicated and general situations.” On the other hand, the philosophy common to all research methods and techniques, although they may vary considerably from one science to another, is usually given the name of scientific method.

Karl Pearson writes, “The scientific method is one and same in the branches (of science) and that method is the method of all logically trained minds … the unity of all sciences consists alone in its methods, not its material; the man who classifies facts of any kind whatever, who sees their mutual relation and describes their sequences, is applying the Scientific Method and is a man of science.” Scientific method is the pursuit of truth as determined by logical considerations.

The ideal of science is to achieve a systematic interrelation of facts. Scientific method attempts to achieve “this ideal by experimentation, observation, logical arguments from accepted postulates and a combination of these three in varying proportions.” In scientific method, logic aid sin formulating propositions explicitly and accurately so that their possible alternatives become clear .Further, logic develops the consequences of such alternatives, and when these are compared with observable phenomena, it becomes possible for the researcher or the scientist to state which alternatives most in harmony with the observed facts. All this is done through experimentation and survey investigations which constitute the integral parts of scientific method.

Experimentation is done to test hypotheses and to discover new relationships. If any, among variables. But the conclusions drawn on the basis of experimental data are generally criticized for either faulty assumptions, poorly designed experiments, badly executed experiments or faulty interpretations. As such the researcher must pay all possible attention while developing the experimental design and must state only probable inferences. The purpose of survey investigations may also be to provide scientifically gathered information to work as a basis for the researchers for their conclusions.

Basic Postulates of Scientific Method

The scientific method is, thus, based on certain basic postulates which can be stated as under:

(i) It relies on empirical evidence;

(ii) It utilizes relevant concepts;

(iii) It is committed to only objective considerations;

(iv) It presupposes ethical neutrality, i.e., it aims at nothing but making only adequate and correct statements about population objects;

(v) It results into probabilistic predictions;

(vi) Its methodology is made known to all concerned for critical scrutiny are for use in testing the conclusions through replication;

(vii) It aims at formulating most general axioms or what can be termed as scientific theories.

Thus, “the scientific method encourages a rigorous, impersonal mode of procedure dictated by the demands of logic and objective procedure.” Accordingly, scientific method implies an objective, logical and systematic method, i.e., a method free from personal bias or prejudice, a method to ascertain demonstrable qualities of a phenomenon capable of being verified, a method wherein the researcher is guided by the rules of logical reasoning, a method wherein the investigation proceeds inane orderly manner and a method that implies internal consistency.

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Julie A. Reynolds

Associated data.

This study empirically examines the relationship between students’ critical-thinking skills and scientific reasoning as reflected in undergraduate thesis writing in biology. Writing offers a unique window into studying this relationship, and the findings raise potential implications for instruction.

Developing critical-thinking and scientific reasoning skills are core learning objectives of science education, but little empirical evidence exists regarding the interrelationships between these constructs. Writing effectively fosters students’ development of these constructs, and it offers a unique window into studying how they relate. In this study of undergraduate thesis writing in biology at two universities, we examine how scientific reasoning exhibited in writing (assessed using the Biology Thesis Assessment Protocol) relates to general and specific critical-thinking skills (assessed using the California Critical Thinking Skills Test), and we consider implications for instruction. We find that scientific reasoning in writing is strongly related to inference , while other aspects of science reasoning that emerge in writing (epistemological considerations, writing conventions, etc.) are not significantly related to critical-thinking skills. Science reasoning in writing is not merely a proxy for critical thinking. In linking features of students’ writing to their critical-thinking skills, this study 1) provides a bridge to prior work suggesting that engagement in science writing enhances critical thinking and 2) serves as a foundational step for subsequently determining whether instruction focused explicitly on developing critical-thinking skills (particularly inference ) can actually improve students’ scientific reasoning in their writing.

INTRODUCTION

Critical-thinking and scientific reasoning skills are core learning objectives of science education for all students, regardless of whether or not they intend to pursue a career in science or engineering. Consistent with the view of learning as construction of understanding and meaning ( National Research Council, 2000 ), the pedagogical practice of writing has been found to be effective not only in fostering the development of students’ conceptual and procedural knowledge ( Gerdeman et al. , 2007 ) and communication skills ( Clase et al. , 2010 ), but also scientific reasoning ( Reynolds et al. , 2012 ) and critical-thinking skills ( Quitadamo and Kurtz, 2007 ).

Critical thinking and scientific reasoning are similar but different constructs that include various types of higher-order cognitive processes, metacognitive strategies, and dispositions involved in making meaning of information. Critical thinking is generally understood as the broader construct ( Holyoak and Morrison, 2005 ), comprising an array of cognitive processes and dispostions that are drawn upon differentially in everyday life and across domains of inquiry such as the natural sciences, social sciences, and humanities. Scientific reasoning, then, may be interpreted as the subset of critical-thinking skills (cognitive and metacognitive processes and dispositions) that 1) are involved in making meaning of information in scientific domains and 2) support the epistemological commitment to scientific methodology and paradigm(s).

Although there has been an enduring focus in higher education on promoting critical thinking and reasoning as general or “transferable” skills, research evidence provides increasing support for the view that reasoning and critical thinking are also situational or domain specific ( Beyer et al. , 2013 ). Some researchers, such as Lawson (2010) , present frameworks in which science reasoning is characterized explicitly in terms of critical-thinking skills. There are, however, limited coherent frameworks and empirical evidence regarding either the general or domain-specific interrelationships of scientific reasoning, as it is most broadly defined, and critical-thinking skills.

The Vision and Change in Undergraduate Biology Education Initiative provides a framework for thinking about these constructs and their interrelationship in the context of the core competencies and disciplinary practice they describe ( American Association for the Advancement of Science, 2011 ). These learning objectives aim for undergraduates to “understand the process of science, the interdisciplinary nature of the new biology and how science is closely integrated within society; be competent in communication and collaboration; have quantitative competency and a basic ability to interpret data; and have some experience with modeling, simulation and computational and systems level approaches as well as with using large databases” ( Woodin et al. , 2010 , pp. 71–72). This framework makes clear that science reasoning and critical-thinking skills play key roles in major learning outcomes; for example, “understanding the process of science” requires students to engage in (and be metacognitive about) scientific reasoning, and having the “ability to interpret data” requires critical-thinking skills. To help students better achieve these core competencies, we must better understand the interrelationships of their composite parts. Thus, the next step is to determine which specific critical-thinking skills are drawn upon when students engage in science reasoning in general and with regard to the particular scientific domain being studied. Such a determination could be applied to improve science education for both majors and nonmajors through pedagogical approaches that foster critical-thinking skills that are most relevant to science reasoning.

Writing affords one of the most effective means for making thinking visible ( Reynolds et al. , 2012 ) and learning how to “think like” and “write like” disciplinary experts ( Meizlish et al. , 2013 ). As a result, student writing affords the opportunities to both foster and examine the interrelationship of scientific reasoning and critical-thinking skills within and across disciplinary contexts. The purpose of this study was to better understand the relationship between students’ critical-thinking skills and scientific reasoning skills as reflected in the genre of undergraduate thesis writing in biology departments at two research universities, the University of Minnesota and Duke University.

In the following subsections, we discuss in greater detail the constructs of scientific reasoning and critical thinking, as well as the assessment of scientific reasoning in students’ thesis writing. In subsequent sections, we discuss our study design, findings, and the implications for enhancing educational practices.

Critical Thinking

The advances in cognitive science in the 21st century have increased our understanding of the mental processes involved in thinking and reasoning, as well as memory, learning, and problem solving. Critical thinking is understood to include both a cognitive dimension and a disposition dimension (e.g., reflective thinking) and is defined as “purposeful, self-regulatory judgment which results in interpretation, analysis, evaluation, and inference, as well as explanation of the evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considera­tions upon which that judgment is based” ( Facione, 1990, p. 3 ). Although various other definitions of critical thinking have been proposed, researchers have generally coalesced on this consensus: expert view ( Blattner and Frazier, 2002 ; Condon and Kelly-Riley, 2004 ; Bissell and Lemons, 2006 ; Quitadamo and Kurtz, 2007 ) and the corresponding measures of critical-­thinking skills ( August, 2016 ; Stephenson and Sadler-McKnight, 2016 ).

Both the cognitive skills and dispositional components of critical thinking have been recognized as important to science education ( Quitadamo and Kurtz, 2007 ). Empirical research demonstrates that specific pedagogical practices in science courses are effective in fostering students’ critical-thinking skills. Quitadamo and Kurtz (2007) found that students who engaged in a laboratory writing component in the context of a general education biology course significantly improved their overall critical-thinking skills (and their analytical and inference skills, in particular), whereas students engaged in a traditional quiz-based laboratory did not improve their critical-thinking skills. In related work, Quitadamo et al. (2008) found that a community-based inquiry experience, involving inquiry, writing, research, and analysis, was associated with improved critical thinking in a biology course for nonmajors, compared with traditionally taught sections. In both studies, students who exhibited stronger presemester critical-thinking skills exhibited stronger gains, suggesting that “students who have not been explicitly taught how to think critically may not reach the same potential as peers who have been taught these skills” ( Quitadamo and Kurtz, 2007 , p. 151).

Recently, Stephenson and Sadler-McKnight (2016) found that first-year general chemistry students who engaged in a science writing heuristic laboratory, which is an inquiry-based, writing-to-learn approach to instruction ( Hand and Keys, 1999 ), had significantly greater gains in total critical-thinking scores than students who received traditional laboratory instruction. Each of the four components—inquiry, writing, collaboration, and reflection—have been linked to critical thinking ( Stephenson and Sadler-McKnight, 2016 ). Like the other studies, this work highlights the value of targeting critical-thinking skills and the effectiveness of an inquiry-based, writing-to-learn approach to enhance critical thinking. Across studies, authors advocate adopting critical thinking as the course framework ( Pukkila, 2004 ) and developing explicit examples of how critical thinking relates to the scientific method ( Miri et al. , 2007 ).

In these examples, the important connection between writing and critical thinking is highlighted by the fact that each intervention involves the incorporation of writing into science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education (either alone or in combination with other pedagogical practices). However, critical-thinking skills are not always the primary learning outcome; in some contexts, scientific reasoning is the primary outcome that is assessed.

Scientific Reasoning

Scientific reasoning is a complex process that is broadly defined as “the skills involved in inquiry, experimentation, evidence evaluation, and inference that are done in the service of conceptual change or scientific understanding” ( Zimmerman, 2007 , p. 172). Scientific reasoning is understood to include both conceptual knowledge and the cognitive processes involved with generation of hypotheses (i.e., inductive processes involved in the generation of hypotheses and the deductive processes used in the testing of hypotheses), experimentation strategies, and evidence evaluation strategies. These dimensions are interrelated, in that “experimentation and inference strategies are selected based on prior conceptual knowledge of the domain” ( Zimmerman, 2000 , p. 139). Furthermore, conceptual and procedural knowledge and cognitive process dimensions can be general and domain specific (or discipline specific).

With regard to conceptual knowledge, attention has been focused on the acquisition of core methodological concepts fundamental to scientists’ causal reasoning and metacognitive distancing (or decontextualized thinking), which is the ability to reason independently of prior knowledge or beliefs ( Greenhoot et al. , 2004 ). The latter involves what Kuhn and Dean (2004) refer to as the coordination of theory and evidence, which requires that one question existing theories (i.e., prior knowledge and beliefs), seek contradictory evidence, eliminate alternative explanations, and revise one’s prior beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence. Kuhn and colleagues (2008) further elaborate that scientific thinking requires “a mature understanding of the epistemological foundations of science, recognizing scientific knowledge as constructed by humans rather than simply discovered in the world,” and “the ability to engage in skilled argumentation in the scientific domain, with an appreciation of argumentation as entailing the coordination of theory and evidence” ( Kuhn et al. , 2008 , p. 435). “This approach to scientific reasoning not only highlights the skills of generating and evaluating evidence-based inferences, but also encompasses epistemological appreciation of the functions of evidence and theory” ( Ding et al. , 2016 , p. 616). Evaluating evidence-based inferences involves epistemic cognition, which Moshman (2015) defines as the subset of metacognition that is concerned with justification, truth, and associated forms of reasoning. Epistemic cognition is both general and domain specific (or discipline specific; Moshman, 2015 ).

There is empirical support for the contributions of both prior knowledge and an understanding of the epistemological foundations of science to scientific reasoning. In a study of undergraduate science students, advanced scientific reasoning was most often accompanied by accurate prior knowledge as well as sophisticated epistemological commitments; additionally, for students who had comparable levels of prior knowledge, skillful reasoning was associated with a strong epistemological commitment to the consistency of theory with evidence ( Zeineddin and Abd-El-Khalick, 2010 ). These findings highlight the importance of the need for instructional activities that intentionally help learners develop sophisticated epistemological commitments focused on the nature of knowledge and the role of evidence in supporting knowledge claims ( Zeineddin and Abd-El-Khalick, 2010 ).

Scientific Reasoning in Students’ Thesis Writing

Pedagogical approaches that incorporate writing have also focused on enhancing scientific reasoning. Many rubrics have been developed to assess aspects of scientific reasoning in written artifacts. For example, Timmerman and colleagues (2011) , in the course of describing their own rubric for assessing scientific reasoning, highlight several examples of scientific reasoning assessment criteria ( Haaga, 1993 ; Tariq et al. , 1998 ; Topping et al. , 2000 ; Kelly and Takao, 2002 ; Halonen et al. , 2003 ; Willison and O’Regan, 2007 ).

At both the University of Minnesota and Duke University, we have focused on the genre of the undergraduate honors thesis as the rhetorical context in which to study and improve students’ scientific reasoning and writing. We view the process of writing an undergraduate honors thesis as a form of professional development in the sciences (i.e., a way of engaging students in the practices of a community of discourse). We have found that structured courses designed to scaffold the thesis-­writing process and promote metacognition can improve writing and reasoning skills in biology, chemistry, and economics ( Reynolds and Thompson, 2011 ; Dowd et al. , 2015a , b ). In the context of this prior work, we have defined scientific reasoning in writing as the emergent, underlying construct measured across distinct aspects of students’ written discussion of independent research in their undergraduate theses.

The Biology Thesis Assessment Protocol (BioTAP) was developed at Duke University as a tool for systematically guiding students and faculty through a “draft–feedback–revision” writing process, modeled after professional scientific peer-review processes ( Reynolds et al. , 2009 ). BioTAP includes activities and worksheets that allow students to engage in critical peer review and provides detailed descriptions, presented as rubrics, of the questions (i.e., dimensions, shown in Table 1 ) upon which such review should focus. Nine rubric dimensions focus on communication to the broader scientific community, and four rubric dimensions focus on the accuracy and appropriateness of the research. These rubric dimensions provide criteria by which the thesis is assessed, and therefore allow BioTAP to be used as an assessment tool as well as a teaching resource ( Reynolds et al. , 2009 ). Full details are available at www.science-writing.org/biotap.html .

Theses assessment protocol dimensions

In previous work, we have used BioTAP to quantitatively assess students’ undergraduate honors theses and explore the relationship between thesis-writing courses (or specific interventions within the courses) and the strength of students’ science reasoning in writing across different science disciplines: biology ( Reynolds and Thompson, 2011 ); chemistry ( Dowd et al. , 2015b ); and economics ( Dowd et al. , 2015a ). We have focused exclusively on the nine dimensions related to reasoning and writing (questions 1–9), as the other four dimensions (questions 10–13) require topic-specific expertise and are intended to be used by the student’s thesis supervisor.

Beyond considering individual dimensions, we have investigated whether meaningful constructs underlie students’ thesis scores. We conducted exploratory factor analysis of students’ theses in biology, economics, and chemistry and found one dominant underlying factor in each discipline; we termed the factor “scientific reasoning in writing” ( Dowd et al. , 2015a , b , 2016 ). That is, each of the nine dimensions could be understood as reflecting, in different ways and to different degrees, the construct of scientific reasoning in writing. The findings indicated evidence of both general and discipline-specific components to scientific reasoning in writing that relate to epistemic beliefs and paradigms, in keeping with broader ideas about science reasoning discussed earlier. Specifically, scientific reasoning in writing is more strongly associated with formulating a compelling argument for the significance of the research in the context of current literature in biology, making meaning regarding the implications of the findings in chemistry, and providing an organizational framework for interpreting the thesis in economics. We suggested that instruction, whether occurring in writing studios or in writing courses to facilitate thesis preparation, should attend to both components.

Research Question and Study Design

The genre of thesis writing combines the pedagogies of writing and inquiry found to foster scientific reasoning ( Reynolds et al. , 2012 ) and critical thinking ( Quitadamo and Kurtz, 2007 ; Quitadamo et al. , 2008 ; Stephenson and Sadler-­McKnight, 2016 ). However, there is no empirical evidence regarding the general or domain-specific interrelationships of scientific reasoning and critical-thinking skills, particularly in the rhetorical context of the undergraduate thesis. The BioTAP studies discussed earlier indicate that the rubric-based assessment produces evidence of scientific reasoning in the undergraduate thesis, but it was not designed to foster or measure critical thinking. The current study was undertaken to address the research question: How are students’ critical-thinking skills related to scientific reasoning as reflected in the genre of undergraduate thesis writing in biology? Determining these interrelationships could guide efforts to enhance students’ scientific reasoning and writing skills through focusing instruction on specific critical-thinking skills as well as disciplinary conventions.

To address this research question, we focused on undergraduate thesis writers in biology courses at two institutions, Duke University and the University of Minnesota, and examined the extent to which students’ scientific reasoning in writing, assessed in the undergraduate thesis using BioTAP, corresponds to students’ critical-thinking skills, assessed using the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (CCTST; August, 2016 ).

Study Sample

The study sample was composed of students enrolled in courses designed to scaffold the thesis-writing process in the Department of Biology at Duke University and the College of Biological Sciences at the University of Minnesota. Both courses complement students’ individual work with research advisors. The course is required for thesis writers at the University of Minnesota and optional for writers at Duke University. Not all students are required to complete a thesis, though it is required for students to graduate with honors; at the University of Minnesota, such students are enrolled in an honors program within the college. In total, 28 students were enrolled in the course at Duke University and 44 students were enrolled in the course at the University of Minnesota. Of those students, two students did not consent to participate in the study; additionally, five students did not validly complete the CCTST (i.e., attempted fewer than 60% of items or completed the test in less than 15 minutes). Thus, our overall rate of valid participation is 90%, with 27 students from Duke University and 38 students from the University of Minnesota. We found no statistically significant differences in thesis assessment between students with valid CCTST scores and invalid CCTST scores. Therefore, we focus on the 65 students who consented to participate and for whom we have complete and valid data in most of this study. Additionally, in asking students for their consent to participate, we allowed them to choose whether to provide or decline access to academic and demographic background data. Of the 65 students who consented to participate, 52 students granted access to such data. Therefore, for additional analyses involving academic and background data, we focus on the 52 students who consented. We note that the 13 students who participated but declined to share additional data performed slightly lower on the CCTST than the 52 others (perhaps suggesting that they differ by other measures, but we cannot determine this with certainty). Among the 52 students, 60% identified as female and 10% identified as being from underrepresented ethnicities.

In both courses, students completed the CCTST online, either in class or on their own, late in the Spring 2016 semester. This is the same assessment that was used in prior studies of critical thinking ( Quitadamo and Kurtz, 2007 ; Quitadamo et al. , 2008 ; Stephenson and Sadler-McKnight, 2016 ). It is “an objective measure of the core reasoning skills needed for reflective decision making concerning what to believe or what to do” ( Insight Assessment, 2016a ). In the test, students are asked to read and consider information as they answer multiple-choice questions. The questions are intended to be appropriate for all users, so there is no expectation of prior disciplinary knowledge in biology (or any other subject). Although actual test items are protected, sample items are available on the Insight Assessment website ( Insight Assessment, 2016b ). We have included one sample item in the Supplemental Material.

The CCTST is based on a consensus definition of critical thinking, measures cognitive and metacognitive skills associated with critical thinking, and has been evaluated for validity and reliability at the college level ( August, 2016 ; Stephenson and Sadler-McKnight, 2016 ). In addition to providing overall critical-thinking score, the CCTST assesses seven dimensions of critical thinking: analysis, interpretation, inference, evaluation, explanation, induction, and deduction. Scores on each dimension are calculated based on students’ performance on items related to that dimension. Analysis focuses on identifying assumptions, reasons, and claims and examining how they interact to form arguments. Interpretation, related to analysis, focuses on determining the precise meaning and significance of information. Inference focuses on drawing conclusions from reasons and evidence. Evaluation focuses on assessing the credibility of sources of information and claims they make. Explanation, related to evaluation, focuses on describing the evidence, assumptions, or rationale for beliefs and conclusions. Induction focuses on drawing inferences about what is probably true based on evidence. Deduction focuses on drawing conclusions about what must be true when the context completely determines the outcome. These are not independent dimensions; the fact that they are related supports their collective interpretation as critical thinking. Together, the CCTST dimensions provide a basis for evaluating students’ overall strength in using reasoning to form reflective judgments about what to believe or what to do ( August, 2016 ). Each of the seven dimensions and the overall CCTST score are measured on a scale of 0–100, where higher scores indicate superior performance. Scores correspond to superior (86–100), strong (79–85), moderate (70–78), weak (63–69), or not manifested (62 and below) skills.

Scientific Reasoning in Writing

At the end of the semester, students’ final, submitted undergraduate theses were assessed using BioTAP, which consists of nine rubric dimensions that focus on communication to the broader scientific community and four additional dimensions that focus on the exhibition of topic-specific expertise ( Reynolds et al. , 2009 ). These dimensions, framed as questions, are displayed in Table 1 .

Student theses were assessed on questions 1–9 of BioTAP using the same procedures described in previous studies ( Reynolds and Thompson, 2011 ; Dowd et al. , 2015a , b ). In this study, six raters were trained in the valid, reliable use of BioTAP rubrics. Each dimension was rated on a five-point scale: 1 indicates the dimension is missing, incomplete, or below acceptable standards; 3 indicates that the dimension is adequate but not exhibiting mastery; and 5 indicates that the dimension is excellent and exhibits mastery (intermediate ratings of 2 and 4 are appropriate when different parts of the thesis make a single category challenging). After training, two raters independently assessed each thesis and then discussed their independent ratings with one another to form a consensus rating. The consensus score is not an average score, but rather an agreed-upon, discussion-based score. On a five-point scale, raters independently assessed dimensions to be within 1 point of each other 82.4% of the time before discussion and formed consensus ratings 100% of the time after discussion.

In this study, we consider both categorical (mastery/nonmastery, where a score of 5 corresponds to mastery) and numerical treatments of individual BioTAP scores to better relate the manifestation of critical thinking in BioTAP assessment to all of the prior studies. For comprehensive/cumulative measures of BioTAP, we focus on the partial sum of questions 1–5, as these questions relate to higher-order scientific reasoning (whereas questions 6–9 relate to mid- and lower-order writing mechanics [ Reynolds et al. , 2009 ]), and the factor scores (i.e., numerical representations of the extent to which each student exhibits the underlying factor), which are calculated from the factor loadings published by Dowd et al. (2016) . We do not focus on questions 6–9 individually in statistical analyses, because we do not expect critical-thinking skills to relate to mid- and lower-order writing skills.

The final, submitted thesis reflects the student’s writing, the student’s scientific reasoning, the quality of feedback provided to the student by peers and mentors, and the student’s ability to incorporate that feedback into his or her work. Therefore, our assessment is not the same as an assessment of unpolished, unrevised samples of students’ written work. While one might imagine that such an unpolished sample may be more strongly correlated with critical-thinking skills measured by the CCTST, we argue that the complete, submitted thesis, assessed using BioTAP, is ultimately a more appropriate reflection of how students exhibit science reasoning in the scientific community.

Statistical Analyses

We took several steps to analyze the collected data. First, to provide context for subsequent interpretations, we generated descriptive statistics for the CCTST scores of the participants based on the norms for undergraduate CCTST test takers. To determine the strength of relationships among CCTST dimensions (including overall score) and the BioTAP dimensions, partial-sum score (questions 1–5), and factor score, we calculated Pearson’s correlations for each pair of measures. To examine whether falling on one side of the nonmastery/mastery threshold (as opposed to a linear scale of performance) was related to critical thinking, we grouped BioTAP dimensions into categories (mastery/nonmastery) and conducted Student’s t tests to compare the means scores of the two groups on each of the seven dimensions and overall score of the CCTST. Finally, for the strongest relationship that emerged, we included additional academic and background variables as covariates in multiple linear-regression analysis to explore questions about how much observed relationships between critical-thinking skills and science reasoning in writing might be explained by variation in these other factors.

Although BioTAP scores represent discreet, ordinal bins, the five-point scale is intended to capture an underlying continuous construct (from inadequate to exhibiting mastery). It has been argued that five categories is an appropriate cutoff for treating ordinal variables as pseudo-continuous ( Rhemtulla et al. , 2012 )—and therefore using continuous-variable statistical methods (e.g., Pearson’s correlations)—as long as the underlying assumption that ordinal scores are linearly distributed is valid. Although we have no way to statistically test this assumption, we interpret adequate scores to be approximately halfway between inadequate and mastery scores, resulting in a linear scale. In part because this assumption is subject to disagreement, we also consider and interpret a categorical (mastery/nonmastery) treatment of BioTAP variables.

We corrected for multiple comparisons using the Holm-Bonferroni method ( Holm, 1979 ). At the most general level, where we consider the single, comprehensive measures for BioTAP (partial-sum and factor score) and the CCTST (overall score), there is no need to correct for multiple comparisons, because the multiple, individual dimensions are collapsed into single dimensions. When we considered individual CCTST dimensions in relation to comprehensive measures for BioTAP, we accounted for seven comparisons; similarly, when we considered individual dimensions of BioTAP in relation to overall CCTST score, we accounted for five comparisons. When all seven CCTST and five BioTAP dimensions were examined individually and without prior knowledge, we accounted for 35 comparisons; such a rigorous threshold is likely to reject weak and moderate relationships, but it is appropriate if there are no specific pre-existing hypotheses. All p values are presented in tables for complete transparency, and we carefully consider the implications of our interpretation of these data in the Discussion section.

CCTST scores for students in this sample ranged from the 39th to 99th percentile of the general population of undergraduate CCTST test takers (mean percentile = 84.3, median = 85th percentile; Table 2 ); these percentiles reflect overall scores that range from moderate to superior. Scores on individual dimensions and overall scores were sufficiently normal and far enough from the ceiling of the scale to justify subsequent statistical analyses.

Descriptive statistics of CCTST dimensions a

a Scores correspond to superior (86–100), strong (79–85), moderate (70–78), weak (63–69), or not manifested (62 and lower) skills.

The Pearson’s correlations between students’ cumulative scores on BioTAP (the factor score based on loadings published by Dowd et al. , 2016 , and the partial sum of scores on questions 1–5) and students’ overall scores on the CCTST are presented in Table 3 . We found that the partial-sum measure of BioTAP was significantly related to the overall measure of critical thinking ( r = 0.27, p = 0.03), while the BioTAP factor score was marginally related to overall CCTST ( r = 0.24, p = 0.05). When we looked at relationships between comprehensive BioTAP measures and scores for individual dimensions of the CCTST ( Table 3 ), we found significant positive correlations between the both BioTAP partial-sum and factor scores and CCTST inference ( r = 0.45, p < 0.001, and r = 0.41, p < 0.001, respectively). Although some other relationships have p values below 0.05 (e.g., the correlations between BioTAP partial-sum scores and CCTST induction and interpretation scores), they are not significant when we correct for multiple comparisons.

Correlations between dimensions of CCTST and dimensions of BioTAP a

a In each cell, the top number is the correlation, and the bottom, italicized number is the associated p value. Correlations that are statistically significant after correcting for multiple comparisons are shown in bold.

b This is the partial sum of BioTAP scores on questions 1–5.

c This is the factor score calculated from factor loadings published by Dowd et al. (2016) .

When we expanded comparisons to include all 35 potential correlations among individual BioTAP and CCTST dimensions—and, accordingly, corrected for 35 comparisons—we did not find any additional statistically significant relationships. The Pearson’s correlations between students’ scores on each dimension of BioTAP and students’ scores on each dimension of the CCTST range from −0.11 to 0.35 ( Table 3 ); although the relationship between discussion of implications (BioTAP question 5) and inference appears to be relatively large ( r = 0.35), it is not significant ( p = 0.005; the Holm-Bonferroni cutoff is 0.00143). We found no statistically significant relationships between BioTAP questions 6–9 and CCTST dimensions (unpublished data), regardless of whether we correct for multiple comparisons.

The results of Student’s t tests comparing scores on each dimension of the CCTST of students who exhibit mastery with those of students who do not exhibit mastery on each dimension of BioTAP are presented in Table 4 . Focusing first on the overall CCTST scores, we found that the difference between those who exhibit mastery and those who do not in discussing implications of results (BioTAP question 5) is statistically significant ( t = 2.73, p = 0.008, d = 0.71). When we expanded t tests to include all 35 comparisons—and, like above, corrected for 35 comparisons—we found a significant difference in inference scores between students who exhibit mastery on question 5 and students who do not ( t = 3.41, p = 0.0012, d = 0.88), as well as a marginally significant difference in these students’ induction scores ( t = 3.26, p = 0.0018, d = 0.84; the Holm-Bonferroni cutoff is p = 0.00147). Cohen’s d effect sizes, which reveal the strength of the differences for statistically significant relationships, range from 0.71 to 0.88.

The t statistics and effect sizes of differences in ­dimensions of CCTST across dimensions of BioTAP a

a In each cell, the top number is the t statistic for each comparison, and the middle, italicized number is the associated p value. The bottom number is the effect size. Correlations that are statistically significant after correcting for multiple comparisons are shown in bold.

Finally, we more closely examined the strongest relationship that we observed, which was between the CCTST dimension of inference and the BioTAP partial-sum composite score (shown in Table 3 ), using multiple regression analysis ( Table 5 ). Focusing on the 52 students for whom we have background information, we looked at the simple relationship between BioTAP and inference (model 1), a robust background model including multiple covariates that one might expect to explain some part of the variation in BioTAP (model 2), and a combined model including all variables (model 3). As model 3 shows, the covariates explain very little variation in BioTAP scores, and the relationship between inference and BioTAP persists even in the presence of all of the covariates.

Partial sum (questions 1–5) of BioTAP scores ( n = 52)

** p < 0.01.

*** p < 0.001.

The aim of this study was to examine the extent to which the various components of scientific reasoning—manifested in writing in the genre of undergraduate thesis and assessed using BioTAP—draw on general and specific critical-thinking skills (assessed using CCTST) and to consider the implications for educational practices. Although science reasoning involves critical-thinking skills, it also relates to conceptual knowledge and the epistemological foundations of science disciplines ( Kuhn et al. , 2008 ). Moreover, science reasoning in writing , captured in students’ undergraduate theses, reflects habits, conventions, and the incorporation of feedback that may alter evidence of individuals’ critical-thinking skills. Our findings, however, provide empirical evidence that cumulative measures of science reasoning in writing are nonetheless related to students’ overall critical-thinking skills ( Table 3 ). The particularly significant roles of inference skills ( Table 3 ) and the discussion of implications of results (BioTAP question 5; Table 4 ) provide a basis for more specific ideas about how these constructs relate to one another and what educational interventions may have the most success in fostering these skills.

Our results build on previous findings. The genre of thesis writing combines pedagogies of writing and inquiry found to foster scientific reasoning ( Reynolds et al. , 2012 ) and critical thinking ( Quitadamo and Kurtz, 2007 ; Quitadamo et al. , 2008 ; Stephenson and Sadler-McKnight, 2016 ). Quitadamo and Kurtz (2007) reported that students who engaged in a laboratory writing component in a general education biology course significantly improved their inference and analysis skills, and Quitadamo and colleagues (2008) found that participation in a community-based inquiry biology course (that included a writing component) was associated with significant gains in students’ inference and evaluation skills. The shared focus on inference is noteworthy, because these prior studies actually differ from the current study; the former considered critical-­thinking skills as the primary learning outcome of writing-­focused interventions, whereas the latter focused on emergent links between two learning outcomes (science reasoning in writing and critical thinking). In other words, inference skills are impacted by writing as well as manifested in writing.

Inference focuses on drawing conclusions from argument and evidence. According to the consensus definition of critical thinking, the specific skill of inference includes several processes: querying evidence, conjecturing alternatives, and drawing conclusions. All of these activities are central to the independent research at the core of writing an undergraduate thesis. Indeed, a critical part of what we call “science reasoning in writing” might be characterized as a measure of students’ ability to infer and make meaning of information and findings. Because the cumulative BioTAP measures distill underlying similarities and, to an extent, suppress unique aspects of individual dimensions, we argue that it is appropriate to relate inference to scientific reasoning in writing . Even when we control for other potentially relevant background characteristics, the relationship is strong ( Table 5 ).

In taking the complementary view and focusing on BioTAP, when we compared students who exhibit mastery with those who do not, we found that the specific dimension of “discussing the implications of results” (question 5) differentiates students’ performance on several critical-thinking skills. To achieve mastery on this dimension, students must make connections between their results and other published studies and discuss the future directions of the research; in short, they must demonstrate an understanding of the bigger picture. The specific relationship between question 5 and inference is the strongest observed among all individual comparisons. Altogether, perhaps more than any other BioTAP dimension, this aspect of students’ writing provides a clear view of the role of students’ critical-thinking skills (particularly inference and, marginally, induction) in science reasoning.

While inference and discussion of implications emerge as particularly strongly related dimensions in this work, we note that the strongest contribution to “science reasoning in writing in biology,” as determined through exploratory factor analysis, is “argument for the significance of research” (BioTAP question 2, not question 5; Dowd et al. , 2016 ). Question 2 is not clearly related to critical-thinking skills. These findings are not contradictory, but rather suggest that the epistemological and disciplinary-specific aspects of science reasoning that emerge in writing through BioTAP are not completely aligned with aspects related to critical thinking. In other words, science reasoning in writing is not simply a proxy for those critical-thinking skills that play a role in science reasoning.

In a similar vein, the content-related, epistemological aspects of science reasoning, as well as the conventions associated with writing the undergraduate thesis (including feedback from peers and revision), may explain the lack of significant relationships between some science reasoning dimensions and some critical-thinking skills that might otherwise seem counterintuitive (e.g., BioTAP question 2, which relates to making an argument, and the critical-thinking skill of argument). It is possible that an individual’s critical-thinking skills may explain some variation in a particular BioTAP dimension, but other aspects of science reasoning and practice exert much stronger influence. Although these relationships do not emerge in our analyses, the lack of significant correlation does not mean that there is definitively no correlation. Correcting for multiple comparisons suppresses type 1 error at the expense of exacerbating type 2 error, which, combined with the limited sample size, constrains statistical power and makes weak relationships more difficult to detect. Ultimately, though, the relationships that do emerge highlight places where individuals’ distinct critical-thinking skills emerge most coherently in thesis assessment, which is why we are particularly interested in unpacking those relationships.

We recognize that, because only honors students submit theses at these institutions, this study sample is composed of a selective subset of the larger population of biology majors. Although this is an inherent limitation of focusing on thesis writing, links between our findings and results of other studies (with different populations) suggest that observed relationships may occur more broadly. The goal of improved science reasoning and critical thinking is shared among all biology majors, particularly those engaged in capstone research experiences. So while the implications of this work most directly apply to honors thesis writers, we provisionally suggest that all students could benefit from further study of them.

There are several important implications of this study for science education practices. Students’ inference skills relate to the understanding and effective application of scientific content. The fact that we find no statistically significant relationships between BioTAP questions 6–9 and CCTST dimensions suggests that such mid- to lower-order elements of BioTAP ( Reynolds et al. , 2009 ), which tend to be more structural in nature, do not focus on aspects of the finished thesis that draw strongly on critical thinking. In keeping with prior analyses ( Reynolds and Thompson, 2011 ; Dowd et al. , 2016 ), these findings further reinforce the notion that disciplinary instructors, who are most capable of teaching and assessing scientific reasoning and perhaps least interested in the more mechanical aspects of writing, may nonetheless be best suited to effectively model and assess students’ writing.

The goal of the thesis writing course at both Duke University and the University of Minnesota is not merely to improve thesis scores but to move students’ writing into the category of mastery across BioTAP dimensions. Recognizing that students with differing critical-thinking skills (particularly inference) are more or less likely to achieve mastery in the undergraduate thesis (particularly in discussing implications [question 5]) is important for developing and testing targeted pedagogical interventions to improve learning outcomes for all students.

The competencies characterized by the Vision and Change in Undergraduate Biology Education Initiative provide a general framework for recognizing that science reasoning and critical-thinking skills play key roles in major learning outcomes of science education. Our findings highlight places where science reasoning–related competencies (like “understanding the process of science”) connect to critical-thinking skills and places where critical thinking–related competencies might be manifested in scientific products (such as the ability to discuss implications in scientific writing). We encourage broader efforts to build empirical connections between competencies and pedagogical practices to further improve science education.

One specific implication of this work for science education is to focus on providing opportunities for students to develop their critical-thinking skills (particularly inference). Of course, as this correlational study is not designed to test causality, we do not claim that enhancing students’ inference skills will improve science reasoning in writing. However, as prior work shows that science writing activities influence students’ inference skills ( Quitadamo and Kurtz, 2007 ; Quitadamo et al. , 2008 ), there is reason to test such a hypothesis. Nevertheless, the focus must extend beyond inference as an isolated skill; rather, it is important to relate inference to the foundations of the scientific method ( Miri et al. , 2007 ) in terms of the epistemological appreciation of the functions and coordination of evidence ( Kuhn and Dean, 2004 ; Zeineddin and Abd-El-Khalick, 2010 ; Ding et al. , 2016 ) and disciplinary paradigms of truth and justification ( Moshman, 2015 ).

Although this study is limited to the domain of biology at two institutions with a relatively small number of students, the findings represent a foundational step in the direction of achieving success with more integrated learning outcomes. Hopefully, it will spur greater interest in empirically grounding discussions of the constructs of scientific reasoning and critical-thinking skills.

This study contributes to the efforts to improve science education, for both majors and nonmajors, through an empirically driven analysis of the relationships between scientific reasoning reflected in the genre of thesis writing and critical-thinking skills. This work is rooted in the usefulness of BioTAP as a method 1) to facilitate communication and learning and 2) to assess disciplinary-specific and general dimensions of science reasoning. The findings support the important role of the critical-thinking skill of inference in scientific reasoning in writing, while also highlighting ways in which other aspects of science reasoning (epistemological considerations, writing conventions, etc.) are not significantly related to critical thinking. Future research into the impact of interventions focused on specific critical-thinking skills (i.e., inference) for improved science reasoning in writing will build on this work and its implications for science education.

Supplementary Material

Acknowledgments.

We acknowledge the contributions of Kelaine Haas and Alexander Motten to the implementation and collection of data. We also thank Mine Çetinkaya-­Rundel for her insights regarding our statistical analyses. This research was funded by National Science Foundation award DUE-1525602.

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Original research article, learning scientific observation with worked examples in a digital learning environment.

• 1 Department Educational Sciences, Chair for Formal and Informal Learning, Technical University Munich School of Social Sciences and Technology, Munich, Germany
• 2 Aquatic Systems Biology Unit, TUM School of Life Sciences, Technical University of Munich, Freising, Germany

Science education often aims to increase learners’ acquisition of fundamental principles, such as learning the basic steps of scientific methods. Worked examples (WE) have proven particularly useful for supporting the development of such cognitive schemas and successive actions in order to avoid using up more cognitive resources than are necessary. Therefore, we investigated the extent to which heuristic WE are beneficial for supporting the acquisition of a basic scientific methodological skill—conducting scientific observation. The current study has a one-factorial, quasi-experimental, comparative research design and was conducted as a field experiment. Sixty two students of a German University learned about scientific observation steps during a course on applying a fluvial audit, in which several sections of a river were classified based on specific morphological characteristics. In the two experimental groups scientific observation was supported either via faded WE or via non-faded WE both presented as short videos. The control group did not receive support via WE. We assessed factual and applied knowledge acquisition regarding scientific observation, motivational aspects and cognitive load. The results suggest that WE promoted knowledge application: Learners from both experimental groups were able to perform the individual steps of scientific observation more accurately. Fading of WE did not show any additional advantage compared to the non-faded version in this regard. Furthermore, the descriptive results reveal higher motivation and reduced extraneous cognitive load within the experimental groups, but none of these differences were statistically significant. Our findings add to existing evidence that WE may be useful to establish scientific competences.

1 Introduction

Learning in science education frequently involves the acquisition of basic principles or generalities, whether of domain-specific topics (e.g., applying a mathematical multiplication rule) or of rather universal scientific methodologies (e.g., performing the steps of scientific observation) ( Lunetta et al., 2007 ). Previous research has shown that worked examples (WE) can be considered particularly useful for developing such cognitive schemata during learning to avoid using more cognitive resources than necessary for learning successive actions ( Renkl et al., 2004 ; Renkl, 2017 ). WE consist of the presentation of a problem, consecutive solution steps and the solution itself. This is especially advantageous in initial cognitive skill acquisition, i.e., for novice learners with low prior knowledge ( Kalyuga et al., 2001 ). With growing knowledge, fading WE can lead from example-based learning to independent problem-solving ( Renkl et al., 2002 ). Preliminary work has shown the advantage of WE in specific STEM domains like mathematics ( Booth et al., 2015 ; Barbieri et al., 2021 ), but less studies have investigated their impact on the acquisition of basic scientific competencies that involve heuristic problem-solving processes (scientific argumentation, Schworm and Renkl, 2007 ; Hefter et al., 2014 ; Koenen et al., 2017 ). In the realm of natural sciences, various basic scientific methodologies are employed to acquire knowledge, such as experimentation or scientific observation ( Wellnitz and Mayer, 2013 ). During the pursuit of knowledge through scientific inquiry activities, learners may encounter several challenges and difficulties. Similar to the hurdles faced in experimentation, where understanding the criteria for appropriate experimental design, including the development, measurement, and evaluation of results, is crucial ( Sirum and Humburg, 2011 ; Brownell et al., 2014 ; Dasgupta et al., 2014 ; Deane et al., 2014 ), scientific observation additionally presents its own set of issues. In scientific observation, e.g., the acquisition of new insights may be somewhat incidental due to spontaneous and uncoordinated observations ( Jensen, 2014 ). To address these challenges, it is crucial to provide instructional support, including the use of WE, particularly when observations are carried out in a more self-directed manner.

For this reason, the aim of the present study was to determine the usefulness of digitally presented WE to support the acquisition of a basic scientific methodological skill—conducting scientific observations—using a digital learning environment. In this regard, this study examined the effects of different forms of digitally presented WE (non-faded vs. faded) on students’ cognitive and motivational outcomes and compared them to a control group without WE. Furthermore, the combined perspective of factual and applied knowledge, as well as motivational and cognitive aspects, represent further value added to the study.

2 Theoretical background

2.1 worked examples.

WE have been commonly used in the fields of STEM education (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) ( Booth et al., 2015 ). They consist of a problem statement, the steps to solve the problem, and the solution itself ( Atkinson et al., 2000 ; Renkl et al., 2002 ; Renkl, 2014 ). The success of WE can be explained by their impact on cognitive load (CL) during learning, based on assumptions from Cognitive Load Theory ( Sweller, 2006 ).

Learning with WE is considered time-efficient, effective, and superior to problem-based learning (presentation of the problem without demonstration of solution steps) when it comes to knowledge acquisition and transfer (WE-effect, Atkinson et al., 2000 ; Van Gog et al., 2011 ). Especially WE can help by reducing the extraneous load (presentation and design of the learning material) and, in turn, can lead to an increase in germane load (effort of the learner to understand the learning material) ( Paas et al., 2003 ; Renkl, 2014 ). With regard to intrinsic load (difficulty and complexity of the learning material), it is still controversially discussed if it can be altered by instructional design, e.g., WE ( Gerjets et al., 2004 ). WE have a positive effect on learning and knowledge transfer, especially for novices, as the step-by-step presentation of the solution requires less extraneous mental effort compared to problem-based learning ( Sweller et al., 1998 ; Atkinson et al., 2000 ; Bokosmaty et al., 2015 ). With growing knowledge, WE can lose their advantages (due to the expertise-reversal effect), and scaffolding learning via faded WE might be more successful for knowledge gain and transfer ( Renkl, 2014 ). Faded WE are similar to complete WE, but fade out solution steps as knowledge and competencies grow. Faded WE enhance near-knowledge transfer and reduce errors compared to non-faded WE ( Renkl et al., 2000 ).

In addition, the reduction of intrinsic and extraneous CL by WE also has an impact on learner motivation, such as interest ( Van Gog and Paas, 2006 ). Um et al. (2012) showed that there is a strong positive correlation between germane CL and the motivational aspects of learning, like satisfaction and emotion. Gupta (2019) mentions a positive correlation between CL and interest. Van Harsel et al. (2019) found that WE positively affect learning motivation, while no such effect was found for problem-solving. Furthermore, learning with WE increases the learners’ belief in their competence in completing a task. In addition, fading WE can lead to higher motivation for more experienced learners, while non-faded WE can be particularly motivating for learners without prior knowledge ( Paas et al., 2005 ). In general, fundamental motivational aspects during the learning process, such as situational interest ( Lewalter and Knogler, 2014 ) or motivation-relevant experiences, like basic needs, are influenced by learning environments. At the same time, their use also depends on motivational characteristics of the learning process, such as self-determined motivation ( Deci and Ryan, 2012 ). Therefore, we assume that learning with WE as a relevant component of a learning environment might also influence situational interest and basic needs.

2.1.1 Presentation of worked examples

WE are frequently used in digital learning scenarios ( Renkl, 2014 ). When designing WE, the application via digital learning media can be helpful, as their content can be presented in different ways (video, audio, text, and images), tailored to the needs of the learners, so that individual use is possible according to their own prior knowledge or learning pace ( Mayer, 2001 ). Also, digital media can present relevant information in a timely, motivating, appealing and individualized way and support learning in an effective and needs-oriented way ( Mayer, 2001 ). The advantages of using digital media in designing WE have already been shown in previous studies. Dart et al. (2020) presented WE as short videos (WEV). They report that the use of WEV leads to increased student satisfaction and more positive attitudes. Approximately 90% of the students indicated an active learning approach when learning with the WEV. Furthermore, the results show that students improved their content knowledge through WEV and that they found WEV useful for other courses as well.

Another study ( Kay and Edwards, 2012 ) presented WE as video podcasts. Here, the advantages of WE regarding self-determined learning in terms of learning location, learning time, and learning speed were shown. Learning performance improved significantly after use. The step-by-step, easy-to-understand explanations, the diagrams, and the ability to determine the learning pace by oneself were seen as beneficial.

Multimedia WE can also be enhanced with self-explanation prompts ( Berthold et al., 2009 ). Learning from WE with self-explanation prompts was shown to be superior to other learning methods, such as hypertext learning and observational learning.

In addition to presenting WE in different medial ways, WE can also comprise different content domains.

2.1.2 Content and context of worked examples

Regarding the content of WE, algorithmic and heuristic WE, as well as single-content and double-content WE, can be distinguished ( Reiss et al., 2008 ; Koenen et al., 2017 ; Renkl, 2017 ). Algorithmic WE are traditionally used in the very structured mathematical–physical field. Here, an algorithm with very specific solution steps is to learn, for example, in probability calculation ( Koenen et al., 2017 ). In this study, however, we focus on heuristic double-content WE. Heuristic WE in science education comprise fundamental scientific working methods, e.g., conducting experiments ( Koenen et al., 2017 ). Furthermore, double-content WE contain two learning domains that are relevant for the learning process: (1) the learning domain describes the primarily to be learned abstract process or concept, e.g., scientific methodologies like observation (see section 2.2), while (2) the exemplifying domain consists of the content that is necessary to teach this process or concept, e.g., mapping of river structure ( Renkl et al., 2009 ).

Depending on the WE content to be learned, it may be necessary for learning to take place in different settings. This can be in a formal or informal learning setting or a non-formal field setting. In this study, the focus is on learning scientific observation (learning domain) through river structure mapping (exemplary domain), which takes place with the support of digital media in a formal (university) setting, but in an informal context (nature).

2.2 Scientific observation

Scientific observation is fundamental to all scientific activities and disciplines ( Kohlhauf et al., 2011 ). Scientific observation must be clearly distinguished from everyday observation, where observation is purely a matter of noticing and describing specific characteristics ( Chinn and Malhotra, 2001 ). In contrast to this everyday observation, scientific observation as a method of knowledge acquisition can be described as a rather complex activity, defined as the theory-based, systematic and selective perception of concrete systems and processes without any fundamental manipulation ( Wellnitz and Mayer, 2013 ). Wellnitz and Mayer (2013) described the scientific observation process via six steps: (1) formulation of the research question (s), (2) deduction of the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis, (3) planning of the research design, (4) conducting the observation, (5) analyzing the data, and (6) answering the research question(s) on this basis. Only through reliable and qualified observation, valid data can be obtained that provide solid scientific evidence ( Wellnitz and Mayer, 2013 ).

Since observation activities are not trivial and learners often observe without generating new knowledge or connecting their observations to scientific explanations and thoughts, it is important to provide support at the related cognitive level, so that observation activities can be conducted in a structured way according to pre-defined criteria ( Ford, 2005 ; Eberbach and Crowley, 2009 ). Especially during field-learning experiences, scientific observation is often spontaneous and uncoordinated, whereby random discoveries result in knowledge gain ( Jensen, 2014 ).

To promote successful observing in rather unstructured settings like field trips, instructional support for the observation process seems useful. To guide observation activities, digitally presented WE seem to be an appropriate way to introduce learners to the individual steps of scientific observation using concrete examples.

2.3 Research questions and hypothesis

The present study investigates the effect of digitally presented double-content WE that supports the mapping of a small Bavarian river by demonstrating the steps of scientific observation. In this analysis, we focus on the learning domain of the WE and do not investigate the exemplifying domain in detail. Distinct ways of integrating WE in the digital learning environment (faded WE vs. non-faded WE) are compared with each other and with a control group (no WE). The aim is to examine to what extent differences between those conditions exist with regard to (RQ1) learners’ competence acquisition [acquisition of factual knowledge about the scientific observation method (quantitative data) and practical application of the scientific observation method (quantified qualitative data)], (RQ2) learners’ motivation (situational interest and basic needs), and (RQ3) CL. It is assumed that (Hypothesis 1), the integration of WE (faded and non-faded) leads to significantly higher competence acquisition (factual and applied knowledge), significantly higher motivation and significantly lower extraneous CL as well as higher germane CL during the learning process compared to a learning environment without WE. No differences between the conditions are expected regarding intrinsic CL. Furthermore, it is assumed (Hypothesis 2) that the integration of faded WE leads to significantly higher competence acquisition, significantly higher motivation, and lower extraneous CL as well as higher germane CL during the learning processes compared to non-faded WE. No differences between the conditions are expected with regard to intrinsic CL.

The study took place during the field trips of a university course on the application of a fluvial audit (FA) using the German working aid for mapping the morphology of rivers and their floodplains ( Bayerisches Landesamt für Umwelt, 2019 ). FA is the leading fluvial geomorphological tool for application to data collection contiguously along all watercourses of interest ( Walker et al., 2007 ). It is widely used because it is a key example of environmental conservation and monitoring that needs to be taught to students of selected study programs; thus, knowing about the most effective ways of learning is of high practical relevance.

3.1 Sample and design

3.1.1 sample.

The study was conducted with 62 science students and doctoral students of a German University (age M  = 24.03 years; SD  = 4.20; 36 females; 26 males). A total of 37 participants had already conducted a scientific observation and would rate their knowledge in this regard at a medium level ( M  = 3.32 out of 5; SD  = 0.88). Seven participants had already conducted an FA and would rate their knowledge in this regard at a medium level ( M  = 3.14 out of 5; SD  = 0.90). A total of 25 participants had no experience at all. Two participants had to be excluded from the sample afterward because no posttest results were available.

3.1.2 Design

The study has a 1-factorial quasi-experimental comparative research design and is conducted as a field experiment using a pre/posttest design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: no WE ( n  = 20), faded WE ( n  = 20), and non-faded WE ( n  = 20).

3.2 Implementation and material

3.2.1 implementation.

The study started with an online kick-off meeting where two lecturers informed all students within an hour about the basics regarding the assessment of the structural integrity of the study river and the course of the field trip days to conduct an FA. Afterward, within 2 weeks, students self-studied via Moodle the FA following the German standard method according to the scoresheets of Bayerisches Landesamt für Umwelt (2019) . This independent preparation using the online presented documents was a necessary prerequisite for participation in the field days and was checked in the pre-testing. The preparatory online documents included six short videos and four PDF files on the content, guidance on the German protocol of the FA, general information on river landscapes, information about anthropogenic changes in stream morphology and the scoresheets for applying the FA. In these sheets, the river and its floodplain are subdivided into sections of 100 m in length. Each of these sections is evaluated by assessing 21 habitat factors related to flow characteristics and structural variability. The findings are then transferred into a scoring system for the description of structural integrity from 1 (natural) to 7 (highly modified). Habitat factors have a decisive influence on the living conditions of animals and plants in and around rivers. They included, e.g., variability in water depth, stream width, substratum diversity, or diversity of flow velocities.

3.2.2 Materials

On the field trip days, participants were handed a tablet and a paper-based FA worksheet (last accessed 21st September 2022). 1 This four-page assessment sheet was accompanied by a digital learning environment presented on Moodle that instructed the participants on mapping the water body structure and guided the scientific observation method. All three Moodle courses were identical in structure and design; the only difference was the implementation of the WE. Below, the course without WE are described first. The other two courses have an identical structure, but contain additional WE in the form of learning videos.

3.2.3 No worked example

After a short welcome and introduction to the course navigation, the FA started with the description of a short hypothetical scenario: Participants should take the role of an employee of an urban planning office that assesses the ecomorphological status of a small river near a Bavarian city. The river was divided into five sections that had to be mapped separately. The course was structured accordingly. At the beginning of each section, participants had to formulate and write down a research question, and according to hypotheses regarding the ecomorphological status of the river’s section, they had to collect data in this regard via the mapping sheet and then evaluate their data and draw a conclusion. Since this course serves as a control group, no WE videos supporting the scientific observation method were integrated. The layout of the course is structured like a book, where it is not possible to scroll back. This is important insofar as the participants do not have the possibility to revisit information in order to keep the conditions comparable as well as distinguishable.

3.2.4 Non-faded worked example

In the course with no-faded WE, three instructional videos are shown for each of the five sections. In each of the three videos, two steps of the scientific observation method are presented so that, finally, all six steps of scientific observation are demonstrated. The mapping of the first section starts after the general introduction (as described above) with the instruction to work on the first two steps of scientific observation: the formulation of a research question and hypotheses. To support this, a video of about 4 min explains the features of scientific sound research questions and hypotheses. To this aim, a practical example, including explanations and tips, is given regarding the formulation of research questions and hypotheses for this section (e.g., “To what extent does the building development and the closeness of the path to the water body have an influence on the structure of the water body?” Alternative hypothesis: It is assumed that the housing development and the closeness of the path to the water body have a negative influence on the water body structure. Null hypothesis: It is assumed that the housing development and the closeness of the path to the watercourse have no negative influence on the watercourse structure.). Participants should now formulate their own research questions and hypotheses, write them down in a text field at the end of the page, and then skip to the next page. The next two steps of scientific observation, planning and conducting, are explained in a short 4-min video. To this aim, a practical example including explanations and tips is given regarding planning and conducting scientific for this section (e.g., “It’s best to go through each evaluation category carefully one by one that way you are sure not to forget anything!”). Now, participants were asked to collect data for the first section using their paper-based FA worksheet. Participants individually surveyed the river and reported their results in the mapping sheet by ticking the respective boxes in it. After collecting this data, they returned to the digital learning environment to learn how to use these data by studying the last two steps of scientific observation, evaluation, and conclusion. The third 4-min video explained how to evaluate and interpret collected data. For this purpose, a practical example with explanations and tips is given regarding evaluating and interpreting data for this section (e.g., “What were the individual points that led to the assessment? Have there been points that were weighted more than others? Remember the introduction video!”). At the end of the page, participants could answer their before-stated research questions and hypotheses by evaluating their collected data and drawing a conclusion. This brings participants to the end of the first mapping section. Afterward, the cycle begins again with the second section of the river that has to be mapped. Again, participants had to conduct the steps of scientific observation, guided by WE videos, explaining the steps in slightly different wording or with different examples. A total of five sections are mapped, in which the structure of the learning environment and the videos follow the same procedure.

3.2.5 Faded worked example

The digital learning environment with the faded WE follow the same structure as the version with the non-faded WE. However, in this version, the information in the WE videos is successively reduced. In the first section, all three videos are identical to the version with the non-faded WE. In the second section, faded content was presented as follows: the tip at the end was omitted in all three videos. In the third section, the tip and the practical example were omitted. In the fourth and fifth sections, no more videos were presented, only the work instructions.

3.3 Procedure

The data collection took place on four continuous days on the university campus, with a maximum group size of 15 participants on each day. The students were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (no WE vs. faded WE vs. non-faded WE). After a short introduction to the procedure, the participants were handed the paper-based FA worksheet and one tablet per person. Students scanned the QR code on the first page of the worksheet that opened the pretest questionnaire, which took about 20 min to complete. After completing the questionnaire, the group walked for about 15 min to the nearby small river that was to be mapped. Upon arrival, there was first a short introduction to the digital learning environment and a check that the login (via university account on Moodle) worked. During the next 4 h, the participants individually mapped five segments of the river using the cartography worksheet. They were guided through the steps of scientific observation using the digital learning environment on the tablet. The results of their scientific observation were logged within the digital learning environment. At the end of the digital learning environment, participants were directed to the posttest via a link. After completing the test, the tablets and mapping sheets were returned. Overall, the study took about 5 h per group each day.

3.4 Instruments

In the pretest, sociodemographic data (age and gender), the study domain and the number of study semesters were collected. Additionally, the previous scientific observation experience and the estimation of one’s own ability in this regard were assessed. For example, it was asked whether scientific observation had already been conducted and, if so, how the abilities were rated on a 5-point scale from very low to very high. Preparation for the FA on the basis of the learning material was assessed: Participants were asked whether they had studied all six videos and all four PDF documents, with the response options not at all, partially, and completely. Furthermore, a factual knowledge test about scientific observation and questions about self-determination theory was administered. The posttest used the same knowledge test, and additional questions on basic needs, situational interest, measures of CL and questions about the usefulness of the WE. All scales were presented online, and participants reached the questionnaire via QR code.

3.4.1 Scientific observation competence acquisition

For the factual knowledge (quantitative assessment of the scientific observation competence), a single-choice knowledge test with 12 questions was developed and used as pre- and posttest with a maximum score of 12 points. It assesses the learners’ knowledge of the scientific observation method regarding the steps of scientific observation, e.g., formulating research questions and hypotheses or developing a research design. The questions are based on Wahser (2008 , adapted by Koenen, 2014 ) and adapted to scientific observation: “Although you are sure that you have conducted the scientific observation correctly, an unexpected result turns up. What conclusion can you draw?” Each question has four answer options (one of which is correct) and, in addition, one “I do not know” option.

For the applied knowledge (quantified qualitative assessment of the scientific observation competence), students’ scientific observations written in the digital learning environment were analyzed. A coding scheme was used with the following codes: 0 = insufficient (text field is empty or includes only insufficient key points), 1 = sufficient (a research question and no hypotheses or research question and inappropriate hypotheses are stated), 2 = comprehensive (research question and appropriate hypothesis or research question and hypotheses are stated, but, e.g., incorrect null hypothesis), 3 = very comprehensive (correct research question, hypothesis and null hypothesis are stated). One example of a very comprehensive answer regarding the research question and hypothesis is: To what extent does the lack of riparian vegetation have an impact on water body structure? Hypothesis: The lack of shore vegetation has a negative influence on the water body structure. Null hypothesis: The lack of shore vegetation has no influence on the water body structure. Afterward, a sum score was calculated for each participant. Five times, a research question and hypotheses (steps 1 and 2 in the observation process) had to be formulated (5 × max. 3 points = 15 points), and five times, the research questions and hypotheses had to be answered (steps 5 and 6 in the observation process: evaluation and conclusion) (5 × max. 3 points = 15 points). Overall, participants could reach up to 30 points. Since the observation and evaluation criteria in data collection and analysis were strongly predetermined by the scoresheet, steps 3 and 4 of the observation process (planning and conducting) were not included in the analysis.

All 600 cases (60 participants, each 10 responses to code) were coded by the first author. For verification, 240 cases (24 randomly selected participants, eight from each course) were cross-coded by an external coder. In 206 of the coded cases, the raters agreed. The cases in which the raters did not agree were discussed together, and a solution was found. This results in Cohen’s κ = 0.858, indicating a high to very high level of agreement. This indicates that the category system is clearly formulated and that the individual units of analysis could be correctly assigned.

3.4.2 Self-determination index

For the calculation of the self-determination index (SDI-index), Thomas and Müller (2011) scale for self-determination was used in the pretest. The scale consists of four subscales: intrinsic motivation (five items; e.g., I engage with the workshop content because I enjoy it; reliability of alpha = 0.87), identified motivation (four items; e.g., I engage with the workshop content because it gives me more options when choosing a career; alpha = 0.84), introjected motivation (five items; e.g., I engage with the workshop content because otherwise I would have a guilty feeling; alpha = 0.79), and external motivation (three items, e.g., I engage with the workshop content because I simply have to learn it; alpha = 0.74). Participants could indicate their answers on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = completely disagree to 5 = completely agree. To calculate the SDI-index, the sum of the self-determined regulation styles (intrinsic and identified) is subtracted from the sum of the external regulation styles (introjected and external), where intrinsic and external regulation are scored two times ( Thomas and Müller, 2011 ).

3.4.3 Motivation

Basic needs were measured in the posttest with the scale by Willems and Lewalter (2011) . The scale consists of three subscales: perceived competence (four items; e.g., during the workshop, I felt that I could meet the requirements; alpha = 0.90), perceived autonomy (five items; e.g., during the workshop, I felt that I had a lot of freedom; alpha = 0.75), and perceived autonomy regarding personal wishes and goals (APWG) (four items; e.g., during the workshop, I felt that the workshop was how I wish it would be; alpha = 0.93). We added all three subscales to one overall basic needs scale (alpha = 0.90). Participants could indicate their answers on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = completely disagree to 5 = completely agree.

Situational interest was measured in the posttest with the 12-item scale by Lewalter and Knogler (2014 ; Knogler et al., 2015 ; Lewalter, 2020 ; alpha = 0.84). The scale consists of two subscales: catch (six items; e.g., I found the workshop exciting; alpha = 0.81) and hold (six items; e.g., I would like to learn more about parts of the workshop; alpha = 0.80). Participants could indicate their answers on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = completely disagree to 5 = completely agree.

3.4.4 Cognitive load

In the posttest, CL was used to examine the mental load during the learning process. The intrinsic CL (three items; e.g., this task was very complex; alpha = 0.70) and extraneous CL (three items; e.g., in this task, it is difficult to identify the most important information; alpha = 0.61) are measured with the scales from Klepsch et al. (2017) . The germane CL (two items; e.g., the learning session contained elements that supported me to better understand the learning material; alpha = 0.72) is measured with the scale from Leppink et al. (2013) . Participants could indicate their answers on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = completely disagree to 5 = completely agree.

3.4.5 Attitudes toward worked examples

To measure how effective participants rated the WE, we used two scales related to the WE videos as instructional support. The first scale from Renkl (2001) relates to the usefulness of WE. The scale consists of four items (e.g., the explanations were helpful; alpha = 0.71). Two items were recoded because they were formulated negatively. The second scale is from Wachsmuth (2020) and relates to the participant’s evaluation of the WE. The scale consists of nine items (e.g., I always did what was explained in the learning videos; alpha = 0.76). Four items were recoded because they were formulated negatively. Participants could indicate their answers on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = completely disagree to 5 = completely agree.

3.5 Data analysis

An ANOVA was used to calculate if the variable’s prior knowledge and SDI index differed between the three groups. However, as no significant differences between the conditions were found [prior factual knowledge: F (2, 59) = 0.15, p  = 0.865, η 2  = 0.00 self-determination index: F (2, 59) = 0.19, p  = 0.829, η 2  = 0.00], they were not included as covariates in subsequent analyses.

Furthermore, a repeated measure, one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), was conducted to compare the three treatment groups (no WE vs. faded WE vs. non-faded WE) regarding the increase in factual knowledge about the scientific observation method from pretest to posttest.

A MANOVA (multivariate analysis) was calculated with the three groups (no WE vs. non-faded WE vs. faded WE) as a fixed factor and the dependent variables being the practical application of the scientific observation method (first research question), situational interest, basic needs (second research question), and CL (third research question).

Additionally, to determine differences in applied knowledge even among the three groups, Bonferroni-adjusted post-hoc analyses were conducted.

The descriptive statistics between the three groups in terms of prior factual knowledge about the scientific observation method and the self-determination index are shown in Table 1 . The descriptive statistics revealed only small, non-significant differences between the three groups in terms of factual knowledge.

Table 1 . Means (standard deviations) of factual knowledge tests (pre- and posttest) and self-determination index for the three different groups.

The results of the ANOVA revealed that the overall increase in factual knowledge from pre- to posttest just misses significance [ F (1, 57) = 3.68, p  = 0.060, η 2  = 0 0.06]. Furthermore, no significant differences between the groups were found regarding the acquisition of factual knowledge from pre- to posttest [ F (2, 57) = 2.93, p  = 0.062, η 2  = 0.09].

An analysis of the descriptive statistics showed that the largest differences between the groups were found in applied knowledge (qualitative evaluation) and extraneous load (see Table 2 ).

Table 2 . Means (standard deviations) of dependent variables with the three different groups.

Results of the MANOVA revealed significant overall differences between the three groups [ F (12, 106) = 2.59, p  = 0.005, η 2  = 0.23]. Significant effects were found for the application of knowledge [ F (2, 57) = 13.26, p  = <0.001, η 2  = 0.32]. Extraneous CL just missed significance [ F (2, 57) = 2.68, p  = 0.065, η 2  = 0.09]. There were no significant effects for situational interest [ F (2, 57) = 0.44, p  = 0.644, η 2  = 0.02], basic needs [ F (2, 57) = 1.22, p  = 0.302, η 2  = 0.04], germane CL [ F (2, 57) = 2.68, p  = 0.077, η 2  = 0.09], and intrinsic CL [ F (2, 57) = 0.28, p  = 0.757, η 2  = 0.01].

Bonferroni-adjusted post hoc analysis revealed that the group without WE had significantly lower scores in the evaluation of the applied knowledge than the group with non-faded WE ( p  = <0.001, M diff  = −8.90, 95% CI [−13.47, −4.33]) and then the group with faded WE ( p  = <0.001, M diff  = −7.40, 95% CI [−11.97, −2.83]). No difference was found between the groups with faded and non-faded WE ( p  = 1.00, M diff  = −1.50, 95% CI [−6.07, 3.07]).

The descriptive statistics regarding the perceived usefulness of WE and participants’ evaluation of the WE revealed that the group with the faded WE rated usefulness slightly higher than the participants with non-faded WE and also reported a more positive evaluation. However, the results of a MANOVA revealed no significant overall differences [ F (2, 37) = 0.32, p  = 0.732, η 2  = 0 0.02] (see Table 3 ).

Table 3 . Means (standard deviations) of dependent variables with the three different groups.

5 Discussion

This study investigated the use of WE to support students’ acquisition of science observation. Below, the research questions are answered, and the implications and limitations of the study are discussed.

5.1 Results on factual and applied knowledge

In terms of knowledge gain (RQ1), our findings revealed no significant differences in participants’ results of the factual knowledge test both across all three groups and specifically between the two experimental groups. These results are in contradiction with related literature where WE had a positive impact on knowledge acquisition ( Renkl, 2014 ) and faded WE are considered to be more effective in knowledge acquisition and transfer, in contrast to non-faded WE ( Renkl et al., 2000 ; Renkl, 2014 ). A limitation of the study is the fact that the participants already scored very high on the pretest, so participation in the intervention would likely not yield significant knowledge gains due to ceiling effects ( Staus et al., 2021 ). Yet, nearly half of the students reported being novices in the field prior to the study, suggesting that the difficulty of some test items might have been too low. Here, it would be important to revise the factual knowledge test, e.g., the difficulty of the distractors in further study.

Nevertheless, with regard to application knowledge, the results revealed large significant differences: Participants of the two experimental groups performed better in conducting scientific observation steps than participants of the control group. In the experimental groups, the non-faded WE group performed better than the faded WE group. However, the absence of significant differences between the two experimental groups suggests that faded and non-faded WE used as double-content WE are suitable to teach applied knowledge about scientific observation in the learning domain ( Koenen, 2014 ). Furthermore, our results differ from the findings of Renkl et al. (2000) , in which the faded version led to the highest knowledge transfer. Despite the fact that the non-faded WE performed best in our study, the faded version of the WE was also appropriate to improve learning, confirming the findings of Renkl (2014) and Hesser and Gregory (2015) .

5.2 Results on learners’ motivation

Regarding participants’ motivation (RQ2; situational interest and basic needs), no significant differences were found across all three groups or between the two experimental groups. However, descriptive results reveal slightly higher motivation in the two experimental groups than in the control group. In this regard, our results confirm existing literature on a descriptive level showing that WE lead to higher learning-relevant motivation ( Paas et al., 2005 ; Van Harsel et al., 2019 ). Additionally, both experimental groups rated the usefulness of the WE as high and reported a positive evaluation of the WE. Therefore, we assume that even non-faded WE do not lead to over-instruction. Regarding the descriptive tendency, a larger sample might yield significant results and detect even small effects in future investigations. However, because this study also focused on comprehensive qualitative data analysis, it was not possible to evaluate a larger sample in this study.

5.3 Results on cognitive load

Finally, CL did not vary significantly across all three groups (RQ3). However, differences in extraneous CL just slightly missed significance. In descriptive values, the control group reported the highest extrinsic and lowest germane CL. The faded WE group showed the lowest extrinsic CL and a similar germane CL as the non-faded WE group. These results are consistent with Paas et al. (2003) and Renkl (2014) , reporting that WE can help to reduce the extraneous CL and, in return, lead to an increase in germane CL. Again, these differences were just above the significance level, and it would be advantageous to retest with a larger sample to detect even small effects.

Taken together, our results only partially confirm H1: the integration of WE (both faded and non-faded WE) led to a higher acquisition of application knowledge than the control group without WE, but higher factual knowledge was not found. Furthermore, higher motivation or different CL was found on a descriptive level only. The control group provided the basis for comparison with the treatment in order to investigate if there is an effect at all and, if so, how large the effect is. This is an important point to assess whether the effort of implementing WE is justified. Additionally, regarding H2, our results reveal no significant differences between the two WE conditions. We assume that the high complexity of the FA could play a role in this regard, which might be hard to handle, especially for beginners, so learners could benefit from support throughout (i.e., non-faded WE).

In addition to the limitations already mentioned, it must be noted that only one exemplary topic was investigated, and the sample only consisted of students. Since only the learning domain of the double-content WE was investigated, the exemplifying domain could also be analyzed, or further variables like motivation could be included in further studies. Furthermore, the influence of learners’ prior knowledge on learning with WE could be investigated, as studies have found that WE are particularly beneficial in the initial acquisition of cognitive skills ( Kalyuga et al., 2001 ).

6 Conclusion

Overall, the results of the current study suggest a beneficial role for WE in supporting the application of scientific observation steps. A major implication of these findings is that both faded and non-faded WE should be considered, as no general advantage of faded WE over non-faded WE was found. This information can be used to develop targeted interventions aimed at the support of scientific observation skills.

Data availability statement

The raw data supporting the conclusions of this article will be made available by the authors, without undue reservation.

Ethics statement

Ethical approval was not required for the study involving human participants in accordance with the local legislation and institutional requirements. Written informed consent to participate in this study was not required from the participants in accordance with the national legislation and the institutional requirements.

Author contributions

ML: Writing – original draft. SM: Writing – review & editing. JP: Writing – review & editing. JG: Writing – review & editing. DL: Writing – review & editing.

The author(s) declare that no financial support was received for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Conflict of interest

The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.

Publisher’s note

All claims expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of their affiliated organizations, or those of the publisher, the editors and the reviewers. Any product that may be evaluated in this article, or claim that may be made by its manufacturer, is not guaranteed or endorsed by the publisher.

Supplementary material

The Supplementary material for this article can be found online at: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/feduc.2024.1293516/full#supplementary-material

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Keywords: digital media, worked examples, scientific observation, motivation, cognitive load

Citation: Lechner M, Moser S, Pander J, Geist J and Lewalter D (2024) Learning scientific observation with worked examples in a digital learning environment. Front. Educ . 9:1293516. doi: 10.3389/feduc.2024.1293516

Received: 13 September 2023; Accepted: 29 February 2024; Published: 18 March 2024.

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Copyright © 2024 Lechner, Moser, Pander, Geist and Lewalter. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) . The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

*Correspondence: Miriam Lechner, [email protected]