politics and war essay

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Between War and Politics: International Relations and the thought of Hannah Arendt (Oxford University Press, 2007/2009)

This is the Introduction to the first book length study of war in the thought of one of the twentieth-century's most important and original political thinkers. Hannah Arendt's writing was fundamentally rooted in her understanding of war and its political significance. But this element of her work has surprisingly been neglected in international and political theory. This book fills an important gap by assessing the full range of Arendt's historical and conceptual writing on war and introduces to international theory the distinct language she used to talk about war and the political world. It builds on her re-thinking of old concepts such as power, violence, greatness, world, imperialism, evil, hypocrisy and humanity and introduces some that are new to international thought like plurality, action, agonism, natality and political immortality. The issues that Arendt dealt with throughout her life and work continue to shape the political world and her approach to political thinking remains a source of inspiration for those in search of guidance not in what to think but how to think about politics and war. Re-reading Arendt's writing, forged through firsthand experience of occupation and struggles for liberation, political founding and resistance in time of war, reveals a more serious engagement with war than her earlier readers have recognised. Arendt's political theory makes more sense when it is understood in the context of her thinking about war and we can think about the history and theory of warfare, and international politics, in new ways by thinking with Arendt.

Related Papers

Patricia Owens

The concepts of power and violence, and politics and war, refer to basically different things. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and analyse Hannah Arendt’s understanding of them. Power springs up between people as they act together; it belongs to the group, and disappears when the group disperses. It is a collective capacity. Until this coming together, it is only a potential. Violence is an instrument. It is the use of implements to multiply strength and command others to obey. Power can be channelled by the state apparatus. Indeed, this is the necessary precondition for the accumulation of the means of violence by the administrative state.When power and violence are combined, Arendt wrote, ‘the result is a monstrous increase in potential force’. It is for this reason that under modern conditions power and force appear to be the same and why violence and power, which is ‘derived from the power of an organized space’, are combined in modern states (PP, 147). This combination is historically contingent rather than intrinsic and necessary. To illustrate the non-identity of power and violence the chapter takes a number of examples from Arendt’s own writing: the Vietnam War; the Hungarian Revolution of 1956; the argument for a Jewish army to face down Hitler; and the French Resistance. Her analysis of partisan activity and unconventional warfare is distinguished from the ideas of the authoritarian German jurist Carl Schmitt and the revolutionary anti-colonial writing of Franz Fanon. Arendt had more in common with Fanon, but she occupies no liberal ‘middle ground’. This is clear when we come to the distinction between politics and war. What is politics, and can it be distinguished from war? Arendt argued that if Marx was right, and ‘we are essentially moving across a field of violent experience’ then the consequences are ‘fatal’ (PP, 192). There can be no politics and indeed no distinction between politics and war necessary for a political theory of war. Arendt’s goal was to salvage politics from brute violence, to show that it is not as meaningless as it might seem. The meaning of politics is the freedom to act in concert with plural equals. The meaning of war is coercion and being coerced, the force of compulsion. Its end is security or conquest. Arendt criticized the two dominant ways of distinguishing politics from war in the West, the ancient Greek and the liberal. But in contrast to a recent trend in the philosophy of war, she maintained that there was indeed a valid distinction between them.

Philosophy & Social Criticism

Keith Breen

Hannah Arendt (1906-75) is one of the most important political thinkers of the twentieth-century. She is well-known for her monumental study The Origins of Totalitarianism (1966 [1951]), her diagnosis of modern politics and society in The Human Condition, and for coining the term 'the banality of evil' to describe a Nazi war criminal in her most controversial book, Eichmann in Jerusalem (1968a [1963]). Arendt did not shy away from controversy in her life-time and some of her most controversial and important ideas continue to shape political discourse. The latest surge of engagement with Arendt's writing - coinciding with the centenary of her birth in 2006 - has occurred at a time that has produced moral and political disasters very similar and in many ways related to those she addressed in the various stages of her life. As international theory has returned to the canon of political thought it is not surprising that Arendt's unique and often idiosyncratic contribution is coming to the fore. Like many others discussed in this volume, serious engagement with Arendt in international political theory is belated and welcome.

Since Hobbes, the capacity to govern through providing 'security' has been understood as the way of producing and organising political order and subjectivity. Hobbes' claim that the security of domestic peace is founded on fear of violent death meant that modern individuals must be taught to love life. The discourse of 'security' is arguably the most powerful discourse of the modern age since it has largely set the parameters of modern thinking about politics and war. However, contra Schmitt and his followers, this is not because 'security' is the political discourse par excellence, allowing the sovereign to decide the law and exceptions to the law. Modern security is an exemplary instance of the rise of the social, as understood by Hannah Arendt. Modern discourses and practices of security have provided the justification and mechanism for the expansion of what Arendt described as the 'life process' of 'society' and the liberal view that 'life is the highest good'. Arendt's unwieldy and strange concept of 'the social' is eccentric, but defensible, both in terms of its origins in her unique form of philosophical anthropology and her socio-historical analysis of capitalism and the modern bureaucratic state.

Jessica Felizardo

Hannah Arendt is no straightforward realist. But in her writing we do find a form of 'realism' in which attentiveness to reality itself and the cultivation of a character trait in which to face and enlarge one's sense of reality are ends in themselves with serious ethical implications. She did not develop a systematic theory of reality. Rather she argued that there is a direct relationship between the political, public realm, the necessary condition of all politics, which is plurality, and our ability to comprehend what is real. This is not a question of reality versus ethics. Arendt offers an ethic of reality. Indeed, she points us in the direction of ethical grounds for action in a world in which reality is in danger of being eclipsed. She offers a tough-minded and 'attentive facing up to, and resisting of, reality - whatever that may be'. This chapter sets out Arendt's engagement with, but distance from, realist understandings of politics, power, and ethics. The fundamental divergence between Arendt and Weber's idea of the 'ethic of responsibility' hinges on her rejection of the categories of means and ends in the political, public sphere and her entirely different understanding of the meanings of politics, power, and violence. The chapter then shows how, by Arendt's account, the public world is constituted by a not fully tangible but nonetheless real inter-subjectivity that emerges between individuals as they speak and act in the public realm. As she put it, 'our feeling for reality depends utterly upon appearance and therefore upon the existence of a public realm into which things can appear'. Finally, we move from one of Arendt's case studies in the avoidance of reality, the Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, to her distinctive grounds for action against what she took to be the greatest mortal sin of politics, genocide or wars of annihilation. However, the grounds for action are not found in the moral imperative to end massive human suffering as such. The effort to destroy a particular group cannot be countenanced because it is a threat to the reality of the public, political world which requires a plurality of peoples.

This article examines the multiple ways in which Hannah Arendt's thought arose historically and in international context, but also how we might think about history and theory in new ways with Arendt. It is commonplace to situate Arendt's political and historical thought as a response to totalitarianism. However, far less attention has been paid to the significance of other specifically and irreducibly international experiences and events. Virtually, all of her singular contributions to political and international thought were influenced by her lived experiences of, and historical reflections on, statelessness and exile, imperialism, trans-national totalitarianism, world wars, the nuclear revolution, the founding of Israel, war crimes trials, and the war in Vietnam. Yet, we currently lack a comprehensive reconstruction of the extent to which Arendt's thought was shaped by the fact of political multiplicity, that there are not one but many polities existing on earth and inhabiting the world. This neglect is surprising in light of the significant " international turn " in the history of thought and intellectual history, the growing interest in Arendt's thought within international theory and, above all, Arendt's own unwavering commitment to plurality not simply as a characteristic of individuals but as an essential and intrinsically valuable effect of distinct territorial entities. The article examines the historical and international context of Arendt's historical method, including her critique of process-and development-oriented histories that remain current in different social science fields, setting out and evaluating her alternative approach to historical writing.

I would like to focus our discussions on the educational implications of three major themes explored throughout Arendt's work: plurality, promise and natality. Plurality, she argued, defines the human condition, which is characterised by both the freedom of the human agent and the unpredictability that necessarily results from the free interplay of human interaction. She further argued that binding promises – from the inter-personal to the interstate and potentially global – are the ways in which we protect ourselves from the unpredictability of the human condition while at the same time recognising one another as free agents. I shall put forward the view that the prime purpose of the university is to fulfil a particular promise: a promise, that is, to transfer the necessarily provisional and contestable inheritance of one generation to the next. But, in order to fulfil that promise, the university must recognise that each new generation – and each new individual within that generation – speaks back to previous generations with the unpredictability of new beginnings: or, in Arendt's terms, with an assurance of its own natality. The university, in other words, is both a bulwark against discontinuity and a space for the unpredictability of self-realisation.

History of European Ideas

David Bates

Hannah Arendt's existential, republican concept of politics spurned Carl Schmitt's idea that enmity constituted the essence of the political. Famously, she isolated the political sphere from social conflict, sovereign regimes, and the realm of military violence. While some critics are now interested in applying Arendt's more abstract political ideas to international affairs, it has not been acknowledged that her original reconceptualization of politics was in fact driven by her analysis of global war, and in particular, the startling new challenges raised by nuclear warfare. Arendt's early, unpublished manuscript on the nature of politics contains important reflections on the nature of war and empire. Surprisingly, these reflections tentatively explore the relationship between war and political freedom. A close reading of this work on war can help explain both her later, more radical non-violent concept of political action, and the difficulties she faced integrating her existential republicanism within the global context of conflict in the Cold War.

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Karina Moxon

October 9th, 2018, essay competition 2018 second place: is war and conflict an inevitable feature of global politics.

1 comment | 1 shares

Estimated reading time: 5 minutes

“Is war and conflict an inevitable feature of global politics?”

This article was written by Dheevesh Mungroo, year 13 student at John Kennedy College, Mauritius.

War and conflict takes several forms; military or non-military and interstate or state versus organisation. I shall use the steps to war  (Vasquez and Henehan, 1999)   and motivated biases (Mercer, 2005) theories to support my argument that war and conflict may be an inevitable feature of global politics. These theories have been chosen due to their seemingly increasing relevance to modern global politics. As explained by steps to war, many present day states have been fighting because of irresolvable matters of territory. As per motivated biases theory, human psychology at a large scale, some argue, leads to in-group cooperation and out-group discrimination, which often leads to war. On the other hand, I shall use the democratic peace theory – suggesting that democracies do not fight each other – to support my argument that in fact, war and conflict may be avoidable in global politics. At the core, these theories attempt to explain the causes of war. Yet, it is fair to assume that if cause is avoidable, then at some point, effect can be avoided too and conversely, if cause is inevitable, then at some point, effect is inevitable too.

Consensus exists that matters such as territory are irresolvable in global politics. It is impossible to increase the amount of land in the world and to change the fact that our wants are unlimited. This scarcity often leads to disputes. While often, the disputes are limited to legal and economic conflict, in other instances, concerned parties resort to using force, particularly when those parties are geographically close. The steps to war theory in fact suggests that war and conflict can arise owing to such reasons.

An example of the steps to war theory applying to present day global politics is the case of Israel and Palestine  disputing  territory  which  has  often  escalated  to  military  conflicts (The New York Times, 2009).  Another relevant example of violent conflict due to irresolvable matters is the case of Iraq and Syria fighting the Islamic State (IS) terror group to reclaim their territory (The New York Times, 2017; US Department of Defense, 2018; Reuters, 2017). This is evidenced in the following map which shows the significant changes in control of territory, from IS to Iraq and Syria following military conflict (BBC, 2018).

It is true that irresolvable problems, of territory at least, are an integral part of global politics. It can also be argued that when the perceived cost to parties of starting military war and conflict over irresolvable matters is lower than perceived gains, which is often the case, then this could lead to war and conflict.So, it follows from these premises that war and conflict is possibly an inevitable feature of global politics.

Motivated biases and political psychology provides further insights on the topic. According to Mercer (2005), humans get a sense of identity in groups which provide a sense of belonging (part of the emotion in identity). While this emotion in identity builds trust and allows cooperative problem solving, Mercer argues that this emotion also creates self- esteem and pride which as a result could lead to a feeling of superiority and discrimination of other groups. Accordingly, it follows that discrimination could become violent. Quoting Mercer,  “Emotion  drives  in-group  cooperation  and  out-group  discrimination” (2005, p. 97). At global scale, this could inevitably lead to war.

Examples of motivated biases leading to discrimination, war and conflict could include:

• several European nations’ invasion and colonisation of countries around the world prior to the 20th century – which implied war, conflict and slavery – possibly on grounds of moral superiority
• Germany under Nazi control, which fought wars, invaded foreign states and which perpetrated the holocaust, allegedly to “reclaim” the superiority of the Nazi “Aryan race”
• wars declared by terror groups against states – arguably on grounds of religious, moral and spiritual superiority as in the case of Al-Qaeda versus the USA and more recently
• several Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, possibly caused by race.

Indeed then, psychology can offer great insight on the inevitability of war and conflict in global politics. Human psychology, generally, may not change much as opposed to the state of politico-economic affairs, tending to be relatively volatile and unpredictable – even for the near future. Hence, predicting human psychology, a relatively easier task, could help answer whether war and conflict is inevitable. While the past may not always be a good indicator of the future in general, because of its seemingly unchanging nature, it seems to be for human psychology. If, then, human psychology remains like it currently is, war and conflict seems inevitable.

However the theory of democratic peace – the belief that democratic nations do not fight each other using force, although they may fight non-democracies – could help argue that war and conflict is avoidable. It may not be democracy, intrinsically, which is the cause of peace between democracies. Rather, the causes of democratic peace are arguably some features of democracy. Such features, according to Russet et al (1993) may include:

• the sharing of global institutions and economic interdependence (e.g. the operations of large multinationals and trading links greatly increases the cost of war),
• the fact that democracies tend to form alliances (e.g. NATO) – making lethal conflict between members irrational in a global politics and power standpoint,
• the commitment of democracies to preserve their political stability and,
• the mutual feeling of liberal values.

The following table (Russett et al, 1993, p.21) exemplifies democratic peace. Dyads, in this context, is a term referring to pair of states close to each other — geographically, politically and/or economically. As it can be seen, during this time period, in no case did a democratic dyad go to war and the number of disputes (conflicts) was far lesser when the dyads were democratic. This could indicate a causal relationship between the features of democracy and democratic peace.

Nonetheless, it would be a fallacy to assume that democracies are absolutely peaceful. While democracies do not use military means to start wars and conflicts among themselves, passive means and intimidation are frequently used. For instance and arguably, economic integration like the creation of the European Union (EU) can be regarded as a form of disguised protectionism against the rest of the world, implying conflict in a more subtle sense. A less subtle example involves the recent tariffs on steel between the USA and the EU (Reuters, 2018a), and the USA’s threatened tariffs on EU car imports (Reuters, 2018b). Moreover, “they  (democracies)  often  initiate  international  disputes  during  economic slowdowns or recessions, or if in economic difficulty respond more aggressively when others initiate disputes” (Russett et al, 1993, p.29). Indeed, there seems to be a correlation between the American economic slowdown during the early 2000s and the Iraq invasion of 2003. It is alleged that this correlation is synonymous with causation, rather than mere coincidence.

Limited resources are available to satisfy unlimited wants. Additionally, while ethics change, human psychology seems unchanging. Therefore, humans will never stop fighting over limited resources. Moreover, believing that all nations will become democratic and that democratic peace will end all wars is believing that Earth will be named Utopia. Much sense lies in saying that while it may become less lethal, war and conflict – at present and in the foreseeable future at least – is an inevitable feature of global politics.

Bibliography

BBC. 2018. ‘Islamic State and the crisis in Iraq and Syria in maps ‘ . BBC. [online] <https://bbc.in/2MFgor2>

Mercer, J. 2005. ‘Rationality and psychology in international relations’. International Organisation. 59:1. pp. 77–106.

Reuters. 2018a. ‘ EU states back measures to limit steel imports after U.S. tariffs ‘. Retrieved from https://reut.rs/2tVO9c8

Reuters. 2017. ‘ Iraq declares final victory over Islamic State ‘. Retrieved from https://reut.rs/2AajWXX

Reuters. 2018b. ‘ Trump relents on EU car tariffs, as U.S.-China fight derails Qualcomm deal ‘. Retrieved from https://reut.rs/2C1hBUr

Russett, B., Antholis, W., Ember, C., Ember, M., and Maoz, Z. 1993. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World . Princeton: Princeton University Press.

The New York Times. 2009. ‘A Brief History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’. The New York Times . [online] <https://nyti.ms/2wwRe2W>

The New York Times. 2017. ‘Iraq Prime Minister Declares Victory Over ISIS.’  The New York Times.  [online] <https://nyti.ms/2CqSKpp>

USA Department of Defense. 2018. ‘Syrian Democratic Forces Announce Drive to Reclaim Last ISIS Territory’. [online] <https://bit.ly/2PQIywT>

Vasquez, J. and Henehan, M. 1999. The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader. Maryland: Lexington Books.

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Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

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The Ethics of War: Essays

Saba Bazargan-Forward and Samuel C. Rickless (eds.), The Ethics of War: Essays , Oxford University Press, 2017, 304pp., $78.00, ISBN 9780199376148.

Reviewed by Uwe Steinhoff, University of Hong Kong

On the back cover the book is advertised as "The authoritative anthology on the ethics and law of war." This might be an overstatement. While the best-edited volumes on just war theory focus on a particular issue (for instance, preventive war, humanitarian intervention, or legitimate authority), this volume does not really form a coherent whole.

In fact, Nancy Sherman's "Moral Recovery After War" has very little to do with either the laws or the ethics of war, dealing instead, as she herself acknowledges, with "philosophical moral psychology" (244). Moreover, the contributions by Adil Ahmad Haque on the principle of discrimination, of Kai Draper on the doctrine of double effect, and of Larry May on the rights of soldiers have appeared in very similar if not almost identical versions in other publications by these authors (as chapters of their books in the first two cases, and as a contribution to another edited volume in the latter case.) There is nothing intrinsically wrong with these three chapters (on the contrary, all are intelligent contributions). But in my view, such extensive recycling would only be justified if the three chapters had either established themselves as classics, which is certainly not the case given that these publications are very recent, or would clearly contribute to an "authoritative" or at least representative picture of the ethics of war. However, I see no indication for this. In any case, given that these chapters have appeared in similar form elsewhere, I will not discuss them further here. Furthermore, I only mention in passing Andrew Altman's very good chapter on the law and morality of targeted killing via drones (which together with Draper's and Haque's contributions is grouped in the laws of war section of the book.) Instead, I focus on the remaining philosophical contributions.

These contributions, according to the editors, belong to a new, allegedly "revisionist" school of just war theory: "Since the writing of the scholastics and jurists of the late Renaissance and Early Modern periods . . . two precepts have underwritten accounts of the morality of war," namely, that war is a "relation not between individuals but between states" and that "the rules governing conduct in war should proceed independently of whether the war fought is just or unjust" (xi). Bazargan-Forward and Rickless provide no textual evidence in support of these claims. This is not surprising as these claims -- although they have for some time now been the basis of self-proclaimed "revisionism -- are simply wrong. [1] Accordingly, the term "revisionism" in this context is a misnomer and should be rejected as misleading. [2] More importantly for present purposes, if the editorial foreword already makes sweeping but mistaken assertions about the just war tradition, then this undermines the volume's claim to be an "authoritative" contribution to this tradition.

Be that as it may, let us have a closer look at some of the individual contributions. Jeff McMahan believes in "liability justifications" for the infliction of harm. That is, he thinks that a person's being liable to the infliction of a certain harm (which means that she has forfeited the right that the harm not be inflicted) provides a defeasible justification for inflicting this harm on her. [3] Given that he also believes that mere moral responsibility -- which need not amount to culpability -- for a threat of unjust harm is the basis of liability to defensive harm, he faces the problem that a defender would, on his account, be justified in killing an infinite number of responsible but morally entirely innocent threats (like drivers who foresaw that driving would impose a tiny risk of harm on pedestrians, and then, through no fault of their own, lose control over their cars and pose a substantial threat to a pedestrian). McMahan's solution to this problem is to suggest a third kind of proportionality. In the past, he has already distinguished between "wide proportionality" and "narrow proportionality," where the former refers to harms inflicted on threats or aggressors, and the latter to harms inflicted on bystanders. Yet these conceptual innovations are unnecessary. The actual distinction, at least in law, is not between different kinds of proportionality, but between different justifications: the self-defense justification on the one hand, and the necessity or choice of evil justification on the other hand. In any case, McMahan now suggests solving the problem by an appeal to " proportionality in the aggregate " (25, emphasis in the original). However, this solution seems to be entirely ad hoc and to rely solely on McMahan's intuitions, without any theoretical foundation or further explanation.

This is precisely David Rodin's charge against McMahan's approach (45). Rodin's own solution to the problem involves what he calls a "lesser evil obligation" (28). Bear in mind that, as already mentioned, a liability justification is supposed to be defeasible . It is, for example, defeasible if acting on the liability justification would have consequences that are bad enough to override the justification. Regarding such consequences, Rodin states that "harm inflicted on a liable person is still an evil from an impersonal view" (36). Accordingly, if the number of liable persons is large enough, the overall evil that would be produced by acting on the liberty to kill all these persons can override this liberty -- thus producing an all-things-considered lesser evil obligation not to do what one has a Hohfeldian liberty to do. Unfortunately, the quite correct idea that harming a person constitutes an evil is incompatible with the very idea of a liability justification: if persons have intrinsic value, then the mere fact that they have forfeited a right not to be harmed does not yet provide a justification to harm them. [4] Your lacking a Hohfeldian right that I not kill you provides me with a Hohfeldian liberty to kill you, but it does not yet provide me with a justification to kill you (and to thereby destroy something of value). [5]

As an aside, while Rodin, to his credit, does not claim that the concept of a lesser evil obligation is a novelty, the editors make this claim in his stead (xiii). Yet, the idea that a "right bearer is all things considered obligated to behave in a certain way toward a person despite the fact that they have the right with respect to that party to behave otherwise" (33) is most definitely not novel at all; it has been known in the German legal literature for at least 200 years. [6] Anglo-Saxon legal scholars are acquainted with this idea too.

Richard Arneson sets out to resolve what Seth Lazar has called "the responsibility dilemma." Yet he apparently misunderstands what solving the dilemma means. Lazar rejects outright McMahan's responsibility account of liability (that is Lazar's external criticism) but makes it very clear that his "critique of McMahan's argument" in terms of the responsibility dilemma "is internal" to that account. [7] The challenge is basically that McMahan's account makes either too many civilians or too few combatants liable to attack. Accordingly, a solution would require a demonstration that McMahan's responsibility account is able to escape the dilemma. [8] Offering a completely different account of liability, in contrast, does not so much solve the dilemma as change the subject. This, however, is precisely what Arneson does. In fact, he offers two different accounts of liability (which are supposed to interact with each other.) . First, he "proposes abandoning" the idea that a right can be overridden although it is still present; that is, he seems to reject the idea that non-liable persons can be permissibly harmed. Instead, he states: "For any moral right not to be treated in certain ways, the right gives way if the ratio of the badness to nonrightholders if the right is not acted against to the badness to rightholders if the right is acted against is sufficiently favorable" (70). In other words, the availability of a lesser evil justification would not give one a justification to override existing rights. Instead, it would show that the harm inflicted on the basis of the lesser-evil justification does not infringe any rights in the first place -- the rights have "given way." This would mean that a war waged in accordance with a lesser-evil justification violates no one's rights, not even the rights of all the innocent people, including children, who have been killed, burned, and mutilated. While this might indeed be a way to avoid contingent pacifism, as Arneson is determined to do, it also leads to not taking rights seriously. Arneson's second account of liability is "fault forfeits first" (85). Since I demonstrate elsewhere that this account has entirely counter-intuitive implications and justifies all kinds of acts that Western jurisdictions quite reasonably qualify as murder, [9] I will not go into it further here. [10]

Victor Tadros's aim is "to show that there are circumstances in which duress can justify killing a person where that killing would otherwise be wrong" (115). He claims: "Duress justifies [an act v ] where X's [the threatener's] threat is sufficiently credible and grave to render it permissible for D to v ." (96) However, it should be quite obvious that it is not duress that is providing a justification here, but the threat's being sufficiently credible and grave to render the act permissible. That is, the actual justification is a lesser-evil justification. So all that Tadros shows is that acts committed under duress can sometimes be justified with a lesser-evil justification. However, first, that is nothing new, and second, the same can be said about acts committed against payment. In short, there is no such thing as a separate and independent "duress justification," just as there is no separate and independent "monetary-reward justification."

Mattias Iser tries to refute Richard Norman's and David Rodin's claim that it is always disproportionate to kill in defense of civil and political rights. (208) He does this in the context of revolutionary violence. However, it would appear that a refutation of the claim would be applicable to both national self-defense (which is the context in which the claim is usually discussed) and revolution. In other words, it is unclear what difference the reference to revolution is supposed to make. In any case, Iser puts heavy emphasis on "respect" and its "expression," and he claims that although individual attacks may "express utter disrespect, they can never humiliate as deeply as an unjust, for example racist, basic structure" (216). Thus, it seems that Iser's strategy is to accept -- at least for the sake of argument -- Norman's and Rodin's claims about individual self-defense, [11] but then to argue that much more is at stake in the case of revolution against an unjust regime. However, it seems to me that Iser is confusing things here. If according to the state's basic structure I have no right to vote, then the state will constantly keep me from voting. It is not so much that the state thereby "expresses" more "disrespect" than an individual who keeps me from voting on a single occasion; rather, the difference lies in constantly being kept from voting on the one hand and occasionally being kept from voting on the other. Moreover, if the state denies everyone the right to vote, it denies them democracy . In contrast, an individual who falsely imprisons me on election day does not deny me democracy. [12] Thus, the material harms are very different, and it is quite reasonable to suppose that this difference, not the expression of disrespect, is doing most of the work. To show that Iser might severely overestimate the evil that is the expression of disrespect, note that merely attempted murder expresses as much disrespect as successful murder, while accidental (non-negligent and non-reckless) killing expresses no disrespect at all. It is safe to assume that people would vastly prefer the former to the latter, and thus are far more concerned with material harm than with expressions of disrespect. After all, people can quite literally live with attempted murder. They cannot live with accidental death.

François Tanguay-Renaud examines the question whether there could be something like corporate state liability to attack. He thinks that the idea is intelligible but that such liability might be "of very limited relevance to the morality of war" (137). I am even more skeptical the Tanguay-Renaud, but his exploration of the question is thoughtful, cautious, and interesting.

Finally, Seth Lazar suggests new ways of structuring just war theory. He suggests that what he calls "Command Ethics" serves to "govern the morality of war as a whole," while "Combatant Ethics governs the morality of specific actions" (231). He rejects the suggestion that this distinction corresponds to the familiar distinction of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, between "analysis of the war as a whole and of individual actions and operations that compose it," as "confused" (231-232). His reasons for this assessment are, first, that "each individual combatant must also consider whether his resort to war is justified," and second, that "we should not confine Command Ethics to focusing only on the resort to war" (323). However, both reasons are unconvincing. The first is unconvincing because an individual combatant's jus in bello consideration of whether his acts of participation in the war are justified is clearly different from an individual combatant's jus ad bellum consideration of whether the collective war effort as a whole is justified. The second is unconvincing because the view that jus ad bellum concerns only the resort to war but not the question as to whether war should be continued is mistaken. [13] Lazar also proposes distinguishing "between the positive justifying reasons that count in favor of fighting, and the constraints that must either be satisfied or overridden for fighting to be permissible" (242). There is nothing wrong with this distinction, but it is unclear why it should affect the structure of just war theory. In any case, once one gives up the obsessive focus on liability common among self-proclaimed "revisionists" and avoids the misleading talk of "liability justifications," one might come to realize that any actual moral or legal justification necessarily comprises both elements.

This volume is not all bad, and some of the contributions are good, but on the whole it leaves much to be desired. It certainly is not "authoritative."

[1] As regards the (mistaken) claim that traditional just war theory saw war as a relation between states, see Gregory M. Reichberg, " Historiography of Just War Theory, " in Seth Lazar and Helen Frowe (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War (Oxford University Press, 2015), Oxford Handbooks Online: DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199943418.013.18, section 1; Daniel Schwartz, " Late Scholastic Just War Theory, " in Lazar and Frowe, op. cit. , DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199943418.013.13, section 2.3; Uwe Steinhoff, " Doing Away with ‘Legitimate Authority,’ " Journal of Military Ethics , forthcoming. As regards the alleged independence of jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the tradition and the related claim that it endorses a " moral equality of combatants " – it should by now be clear that these charges against the tradition are flatly wrong (the claim to be " revisionist " seems to stem from a complete misunderstanding of the tradition). For proof, see, for instance, Cheyney Ryan, " Democratic Duty and the Moral Dilemmas of Soldiers, " Ethics 122 (2011), pp. 10-42, at 13-18; Uwe Steinhoff, " Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants, " Journal of Ethics 13 (2012), pp. 339-366, section 2; Gregory M. Reichberg, " The Moral Equality of Combatants – A Doctrine in Classical Just War Theory? A Response to Graham Parsons, " Journal of Military Ethics 12(2) (2013), pp. 181-194. All the texts just referenced do provide ample textual evidence for their claims.

[2] Seth Lazar suggests that the " revisionists" at least revise Walzer, and that one becomes revisionist by revising something. See http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2015/05/ethics-discussions-at-pea-soup-cecile-fabres-war-exit-with-critical-precis-by-helen-frowe.html . By the same logic, Walzer would also be a revisionist (he revised a lot), and virtually all present-day just war theorists deviate from Walzer in one way or the other (so who would be a non-revisionist?). Also, again by the same logic, all just war theorists would also be conservative at the same time – because they conserve something .

[3] In my view, liability is one thing and justification another. Liability provides no justification at all, neither defeasible nor otherwise. See Uwe Steinhoff, "Self-Defense as Claim Right, Liberty, and Act-Specific Agent-Relative Prerogative," Law and Philosophy 35(2) (2016), pp. 193-209.

[4] See ibid.

[5] To be sure, this problem could be "solved" by redefining liability in such a way that one can only be liable to harm that is inflicted on one for a certain reason. McMahan indeed often talks in this way: "people can be liable to harm only in relation to a goal …" See Killing in War (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 9. However, first, stipulative definitions do not solve substantive moral questions. Second, it is unclear how such a reason-dependent account of liability squares with McMahan's (and Rodin's, for that matter) simultaneously "objectivist," "fact-relative" account of liability. McMahan says that "justification provides exemption from liability only when it is objective ," and something is "objectively … justifiable when what explains its … justifiability are facts that are independent of the agent's beliefs" (ibid., p. 43). Since when, however, are an agent’s goals "facts that are independent of the agent’s beliefs"? McMahan’s account of liability seems to be incoherent: there is no objective and reason-dependent “liability justification” for harming someone – you simply cannot have it both ways.

[6] The now common term Rechtsmißbrauch (rights abuse) was introduced into the German legal literature more than 80 years ago, but the concept is at least 200 years old; in fact, some even trace it back to Roman Law. See Elke Widmann, "Der Rechtsmissbrauch im Markenrecht," dissertation, available at http://kops.unikonstanz.de/handle/123456789/3384;jsessionid=E5CC60B87151CA8B1C77FD3777EC6D24 . Incidentally, I mentioned this idea in a footnote in "Rights, Liability, and the Moral Equality of Combatants", p. 457, n. 15. Elsewhere I talk of a "necessity prohibition," see Uwe Steinhoff, "Shortcomings of and Alternatives to the Rights-Forfeiture Theory of Justified Self-Defense and Punishment," available at https://philpapers.org/rec/STESOA-5 . I took myself to be stating the obvious there, not to be "add[ing] an important resource to the reductive individualist's conceptual arsenal," as Bazargan-Forward and Rickless would have it (xiii).

[7] Seth Lazar, "The Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War: A Review Essay," Philosophy and Public Affairs 38(2) (2010), pp. 180-213, at 189.

[8] McMahan tried on several occasions to show this – unsuccessfully, in my view. Seth Lazar's most recent reply to such attempts looks to me like a coup de grâce. See Lazar's "Liability and the Ethics of War: A Response to Strawser and McMahan," in Christian Coons and Michael Weber, The Ethics of Self-Defense (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 292-304.

[9] See Uwe Steinhoff, "Replies," San Diego Law Review, forthcoming (see the part on Arneson).

[10] Incidentally, Arneson's account is very similar to Gerhard Øverland's in "Moral Taint: On the Transfer of the Implications of Moral Culpability," Journal of Applied Philosophy 28(2) (2011), pp. 122-136 (but Øverland is somewhat more cautious than Arneson). Arneson does not mention Øverland.

[11] There is actually no reason to do so. See Uwe Steinhoff, "Rodin on Self-Defense and the 'Myth' of National Self-Defense: A Refutation", Philosophia (2013), pp. 1017-1036; "Proportionality in Self-Defense," Journal of Ethics 21(3) (2017), pp. 263-289. Accordingly, there are more straightforward ways of refuting Norman's and Rodin's "bloodless invasion" (or a corresponding "bloodless tyranny") argument than Iser's appeal to the "expression of disrespect."

[12] Compare Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 143-145.

[13] See Uwe Steinhoff, "Just Cause and the Continuous Application of Jus ad Bellum ," in Larry May, Shannon Elizabeth Fyfe, and Eric Joseph Ritter (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook on Just War Theory (Cambridge, forthcoming).

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• The Biden administration needs to update its old thinking on Israel-Palestine

A viral essay by Biden’s foreign policy adviser shows why the US needs to rethink its strategy when it comes to Israel and Gaza.

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On September 29, at a festival put on by the Atlantic, Biden’s national security adviser Jake Sullivan boasted of the Middle East’s unprecedented stability . Just a week later, Hamas attacked Israel , and far from being stable, the Middle East hasn’t been this volatile in years.

It’s not quite fair to hold someone to a turn of phrase on a conference panel, but it turns out that Sullivan wasn’t speaking off the cuff. That sentiment encapsulated how the Biden administration ’s key thinker sees the state of the world — or, at least, how he saw it. The sentiment also appears in the print version of Sullivan’s November/December cover story for Foreign Affair s magazine.

Overtaken by events would be a generous way to put this.

“The Middle East is quieter than it has been for decades,” he wrote in an essay that went to print before Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel. Sullivan deleted that passage from the web edition of the article and updated the Middle East portions of the piece. “We are working closely with regional partners to facilitate the sustainable delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians in the Gaza Strip,” Sullivan writes in the online version. “We are alert to the risk that the current crisis could spiral into a regional conflict.”

Israel and Hamas are at war. How did we get here? Vox offers clarity.

• Why did Hamas attack Israel?
• A timeline of Israel and Palestine’s complicated history
• What does the US-Israel relationship mean for the war?
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• All of the times Israel and Palestine tried to make peace

But the print edition of the magazine arrived on doorsteps this week and is now a striking artifact of Biden’s pre-October 7 priorities. And while it would be easy to dunk on some of the now out-of-date passages from Sullivan, which demonstrated how the Biden administration totally missed the possibility of a new Hamas-Israel war, what’s more interesting is how little these events have seemed to change things for the administration.

A read of the web version of his piece shows that the Hamas-Israel war has not fundamentally altered the national security adviser’s assumptions about the world. He remains focused on using unconventional economic tools, like investing in the US industrial base and using export controls to advance US statecraft, and stitching together new alliances to benefit American interests, all while being disciplined about how the US uses its military power. “Americans should be optimistic about the future,” he writes in both versions. “Old assumptions and structures must be adapted to meet the challenges the United States will face between now and 2050.” But what’s noteworthy is that the United States’ approach to the Middle East and Israel, according to Sullivan, is still not one of those areas that needs an update.

Yet the Hamas-Israel war reveals both the limits of Biden’s current foreign policy and the need for new thinking. Even as the administration has prioritized countering China and Russia , the Middle East has pulled the White House back in. For Sullivan, the Biden administration’s approach “frees up resources for other global priorities, reduces the risk of new Middle Eastern conflicts, and ensures that U.S. interests are protected on a far more sustainable basis.” But the US has sent two aircraft carrier groups to the Middle East, militants are attacking US military bases in Iraq and Syria, and a severe humanitarian crisis is spiraling in Gaza, all as the potential for a larger regional war looms. The unconventional diplomatic tools Sullivan touts in other contexts don’t always apply well to Israel: The country’s economic partnerships with Arab states, for example, are not coming in handy.

Biden paid a political price for the Afghanistan withdrawal, and Sullivan stands by the decision to “avoid protracted forever wars ... that do little to actually reduce the threats to the U.S.” But that instinct doesn’t seem sufficiently present here. The administration backs Israel in a war that — for all the US’s pushing for Israel to define its goals — has no clear outcome and that will wear away US credibility in the world. The administration has shown an old instinct to call for a two-state solution without an investment in policies that would lead there.

The last three weeks have shown that the assumption that the Middle East is stable is simply wrong — no one could deny that. But what policymakers should realize is that the old Middle East toolkit of managing conflicts without addressing their root causes does not apply. And on that measure, at least, the Biden administration is not ready to offer a correction.

What Jake Sullivan’s essay says

Sullivan in the essay focuses on the Biden administration’s big themes: countering China (and to a lesser extent Russia), prioritizing industrial policy, reinvigorating alliances and multilateral partnerships, and tackling global development issues like health and the environment, with signposts on how the US will prioritize these and other competing challenges.

“By investing in the sources of domestic strength, deepening alliances and partnerships, delivering results on global challenges, and staying disciplined in the exercise of power, the United States will be prepared to advance its vision of a free, open, prosperous, and secure world no matter what surprises are in store,” Sullivan writes. “We have created, in Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s words, ‘situations of strength.’”

What makes the essay noteworthy is not just the content, but the author. The national security adviser has gotten more powerful in each subsequent presidency, and Sullivan is the zenith of that trend. He’s considered the architect of the administration’s foreign policy, as profile after profile has portrayed him.

It’s also rare for a sitting national security adviser to write at such length for readers. And it’s different from a speech, which Sullivan has delivered at many a think tank and which often serves as an announcement of a new policy; it’s also less technical or in-depth than an academic publication or a policy memo. You might call it a vibes piece, not with actionable foreign policy advice but rather an ideological blueprint for the Biden administration’s worldview.

The main focus is on economic statecraft and alliance-building aimed at pushing back against China, with the Middle East component coming much later on in the article.

What’s interesting is that a war between Israel and Hamas doesn’t alter Jake Sullivan’s fundamental reasoning: The Middle East still falls under the heading of “Pick Your Battles.” That doesn’t seem feasible, nor does it seem to reflect what the administration has done since October 7. The last three weeks have drawn the US in, given Washington’s longtime role as Israel’s security guarantor.

The administration’s Middle East approach “emphasizes deterring aggression, de-escalating conflicts, and integrating the region through joint infrastructure projects and new partnerships, including between Israel and its Arab neighbors,” Sullivan wrote in the original version of the essay. “And it is bearing fruit,” bringing up the example of a “new economic corridor” announced in September that would ultimately connect India to Europe, through the Middle East. The web update changed “bearing fruit” to, “There was material progress,” and cited the relative calm in Yemen’s war. The rest of the text stayed the same.

A lot of lines were cut, like “we have de-escalated crises in Gaza,” referencing the May 2021 conflict there, and “restored direct diplomacy between the parties after years of its absence.” (Israel and the PLO held talks in March, which didn’t go anywhere, and this month the two parties are not talking.)

Biden’s team has only put limited attention to Israel-Palestine in the past two and a half years. When Israel and Hamas fought in May 2021, Sullivan worked with regional partners to negotiate a ceasefire in 10 days. That event does not majorly figure into how the administration sees the Middle East. It seems to have confirmed priors, reinforcing the now-shattered idea that the conflict is manageable.

Palestine has not been a central component of Middle East policy. President Donald Trump shunted aside Palestinians in favor of Israel-Arab normalization deals, and the Biden administration has continued that policy. In July 2022, the White House released a fact sheet on the “ United States-Palestinian Relationship ” that focused on economic initiatives without a larger strategy for addressing the root causes of the conflict. As a senior administration official told journalists that month, “[W]e are not going to come in with a top-down peace plan, because we don’t believe that that would be the best approach and it would set expectations that would probably fall flat.” Ever since, the administration sought a deal that would normalize diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia .

Sullivan does not mention the path toward a Palestinian state in the original essay, but instead emphasizes “integrating the region” through normalization. It’s why the obscure I2U2 partnership (between India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the US) merits a mention, an example that shows how the administration was continuing the Trump policy of pursuing a stability in the region that overlooked Palestinians. That approach has now proved to be unsustainable and even incendiary. And those policies will be increasingly difficult as the Israeli military campaign continues.

The essay has now been updated to say, “We are committed to a two-state solution. In fact, our discussions with Saudi Arabia and Israel toward normalization have always included significant proposals for the Palestinians. If agreed, this component would ensure that a path to two states remains viable, with significant and concrete steps taken in that direction by all relevant parties.”

But there are not strong indications that US leadership can secure an independent, sovereign Palestinian state. It hasn’t been a priority in the past two and a half years, nor is it now a priority for the near or even medium term.

Above all else, and beyond the behind-the-scenes efforts Biden has undertaken to slow a ground invasion of Gaza, the administration stands with Israel. Biden is asking Congress for $14 billion of military aid to the country. US officials have reportedly helped delay a ground incursion into Gaza and marshaled a small supply of humanitarian aid for Palestinians in Gaza. But the Biden administration has not called for a Mideast ceasefire and vetoed a United Nations resolution with softened language on this.

But the situation is so dire — the Israeli military campaign continues — that it’s surprising that the Biden administration sees its policies as durable and its framework as working.

The Biden administration’s Middle East mantra, as both versions of the essay conclude, is, “We have to advance regional integration in the Middle East while continuing to check Iran .” That is, Biden is doubling down on Israel normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia without acknowledging how much has changed in the world. The Hamas-Israel war led the Saudi crown prince and the Iranian president to talk on the phone for the first time since they began a China-led rapprochement . We haven’t yet seen such a course correction from Biden.

The Biden administration is still focused on countering China

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Jake Sullivan was leading White House efforts to write the National Security Strategy. That document guides US policy broadly, and officials delayed publication and rewrote it to stress the threat of Russia alongside the marquee issue of China.

The Biden administration remains focused on that superpower conflict. “The crisis in the Middle East does not change the fact that the United States needs to prepare for a new era of strategic competition—in particular by deterring and responding to great-power aggression,” writes Sullivan in the article. He also discusses China with measured language that reflects the administration’s attempts to break with the Trump administration’s heated China rhetoric while still maintaining some of its hawkish approaches.

Ali Wyne, an analyst at the Eurasia Group, agrees that the Middle East war does not fundamentally affect what the US should focus on today. “Instability in the Middle East and Europe does not invalidate the judgment that the Indo-Pacific’s economic and military centrality in world affairs is poised to grow apace,” he wrote in an email.

The trickier part from a policy perspective is the role of the US military in the world. Sullivan acknowledges that “Washington could no longer afford an undisciplined approach to the use of military force.” Sullivan says the administration seeks to dodge the trap of “protracted forever wars that can tie down US forces and that do little to actually reduce the threats to the United States,” and cites the withdrawal from Afghanistan . But explaining this, Sullivan doesn’t engage with the relatively small but seemingly permanent US troop presence in places like Iraq and Syria , among others. Those US servicemembers are coming under more and more militant attacks and could draw the US even further into Middle East war.

Sullivan argues in the essay that the US has entered a whole new era and that means that the United States has to make significant adjustments. “And yet, much of his prescription looks a lot like inertia,” Stephen Wertheim of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace told me. “None of this is really argued in a way that would give a reader confidence that the US government has a plan to keep costs and risks under control.”

While Sullivan acknowledges in his writing that America’s resources are limited and difficult choices will need to be made, he does not address the trade-offs or how to think about them. A US aircraft carrier — like the two Biden deployed to the waters near Israel in the weeks after Hamas’s attack, out of 11 — can only be in one place at once.

The potential of a long-term entanglement in a new Middle East war imperils Biden’s priorities. It could take not just manpower, but resources and attention away from countering China — which is “America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge,” according to the National Security Strategy. Yet the Biden administration acknowledges, “As we implement this strategy, we will continually assess and reassess our approach to ensure we are best serving the American people.” Now is one of those moments to assess whether this is all working.

A wholesale reassessment of the US relationship with Israel, its closest Middle East ally and a stalwart defense partner, would be unlikely. Hamas is holding Americans and dual citizens hostage, and a wider war would hurt the US’s Middle East partners. The US sees the partnership with Israel based on shared values and cultural connections. American support of Israel is an unquestioned tenet of bipartisan foreign policy.

But that partnership carries risks, too — and not just ones related to this outbreak of violence. “Much of the world sees the United States actively assisting the government of Israel in dispossessing and occupying Palestinian land,” Wertheim told me. Sullivan doesn’t grapple with what that means for US prestige and power in the world that many observers see the US as complicit if not a participant in Israel’s Gaza war, even as the Israeli goals remain undefined.

The essay from Sullivan contrasts that of his former Obama administration colleague Ben Rhodes. Writing in the New York Review of Books , Rhodes cautions that if Israel further escalates its military campaign in Gaza, it risks “igniting a war of undetermined length, cost, and consequences.” Rhodes says there is a need for “genuinely pursuing an Israeli–Palestinian peace as the end of this war.”

That would require intensive US leadership.

The cover of the issue is a frayed and fragmented American flag above Sullivan’s name and the headline “The Sources of American Power.” Previously, that image may have signaled the coming together of the US after the cleavages of the Trump years and the toll it took on American influence in the world. Now, the flag suggests the US is coming apart, unable to calm a Middle East at war and facing internal cracks as it grapples with the threats of Russia and China.

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98.2.11, Polis and Polemos: Essays on Politics, War, and History in Ancient Greece in Honor of Donald Kagan

Janice gabbert , wright state university, dayton, oh 45435, [email protected].

Collections of essays are often disappointing because the contributions are uneven, and frustrating because they often lack a common theme. This book shatters those objections and excels in other respects as well.

The organization of the book is laudable. If any reader does not know of Donald Kagan, he is immediately greeted with a fine full-page photograph, a short informative preface by Hamilton, a biography of Kagan, and a complete bibliography of his works.

The sixteen contributors are all former students of Donald Kagan and their relationship to the honoree is made clear at the beginning of each essay. Donald Kagan’s interests are wide, but his special concern has always been Athens and the Peloponnesian War. The essays here reflect that; the first ten of the sixteen essays aptly fit the title of Part I: “Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War.” The final six essays in Part II: “After the Peloponnesian War,” adhere closely to the subjects of Athens, Sparta, war, and political behavior.

Like their mentor, the contributors have not forgotten that they are not only “ancient historians” but historians-without-adjective who can, should, and do make connections with later periods of history, including the present. That wide-ranging intellectual openness makes these essays valuable beyond the appeal to the specialist.

The pattern of organization of each essay is the same: an opening tribute to Kagan, an introduction stating the thesis of the essay, the argument, a conclusion. The arguments are very rigorous and well-documented (this is not light reading). The reader is assumed to have a good knowledge of ancient history, especially fifth and fourth century Greece, but the Greek is almost always translated; in those few cases where a word or phrase is not translated, the discussion makes the meaning clear. These essays are thus accessible even to advanced under-graduates who may have little or no knowledge of Greek.

This is serious scholarship, and will no doubt generate some disagreement here and there. I will not attempt a detailed analysis and critique of each article (which might make this review almost as long as the book), but indicate only the subject matter so that the reader will know what is contained herein:

1. The first essay by Ronald Legon, “Thucydides and the Case for Contemporary History,” argues that T. had been a serious student of history for some time when the war began and fully intended to write a history in the way he thought it should be written. The summaries in Book I are evidence of his prior research. The outbreak of the war gave him an opportunity to apply better standards of evidence, which would be available in a contemporary event. The speeches are not merely for dramatic effect; they indicate the options available to participants in each case, and why certain choices were made.

2. Elizabeth Meyer in “The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War After 25 Years” summarizes the scholarly opinions as to the cause(s) of the war, beginning with Kagan in 1969. All opinions are carefully analyzed and criticized; she attaches a copious bibliography.

3. Peter Krentz in “The Strategic Culture of Periclean Athens” argues against the agonistic nature of warfare in the fifth century and considers the strategic expectations of both sides and in what way the Spartans might have followed a different strategy.

4. Brooks Manville in “Pericles and the ‘both/and’ Vision for Democratic Athens” explains the success of Pericles by his ability to avoid ‘either-or’ thinking both in his leadership of the democracy and in his war strategy. A detailed analysis of the Funeral Oration reveals a consistent embrace of paradox: the Athenians are … [lovers of beauty] … but not … [soft].

5. In “General Phormio’s Art of War: A Greek Commentary on a Chinese Classic,” John Hale compares aphorisms of Sun Tzu in his famous fifth century B.C. handbook on the Art of War to the actual practices of the contemporary Athenian general Phormio and finds striking similarities. If Phormio had written a manual on warfare, it would have looked a lot like Sun Tzu. The historical realities were similar in both places, and produced similar attitudes and behavior. Both believed in “the ultimate power of knowledge” and “view[ed] the art of war as resting on the mental power of the individual leader” (102).

6. J. E. Lendon offers an analysis of “Spartan Honor” viewed through an anthropological lens of “shame culture.” The Spartan emphasis on obedience seems at odds with the agonistic culture which they otherwise fully embraced. The explanation is that the Spartans were competitive not only in bravery and honor, but also in obedience: it was an honor to be braver than the others, also to be more obedient than others.

7. In a wide-ranging essay, “The Art of Alliance and the Peloponnesian War,” Barry Strauss notes that the freedom and autonomy cherished by Greeks made alliance difficult and hegemony temporary, and offers historical parallels over nearly five millennia—from Sumer and Akkad to Republican Rome and the current twentieth century.

8. Paul Rahe in “Thucydides and Ancient Constitutionalism” notes a difference of emphasis between ancient and modern ideas of the purpose and role of government. The ancients practiced a “politics of trust” (151) based on ‘paideia’: Governments must be structured so that the citizens will be properly educated, especially in character formation, and with widespread good character, people can be trusted to use ‘logos’ to share in the power of the state. Modern ideas of constitutionalism are based on a “politics of distrust” (152) in that proper institutions to control inevitably wicked behavior are more important than character formation. Close attention to the text of Thucydides reveals some skepticism on the part of T. about the ancient model.

9. Theramenes has long been a controversial character in late fifth century Athens. In “The Political Debut of Theramenes,” W.J. McCoy argues that Theramenes was young and naive in 412 when he was brought into the oligarchic revolution because of his family connections. He learned the art of politics the hard way, by being badly used. He eventually learned to play the game rather well himself, and was ultimately a patriot.

10. C. D. Hamilton in “Thucydides on the End of the Peloponnesian War” poses the intriguing question, What if Thucydides had finished his history? H. offers a careful analysis of all extant sources for the events from 411 to 404, as well as the style and methodology of Thucydides, to essentially give us a good end to Thucydides’ history!

11. In the first essay of Part II, which deals with the period after the Peloponnesian War, “Litigation as a Political Weapon: The Case of Timotheus of Athens,” David Rice analyzes the political factions in Athens and the personal rivalry of the pro-Theban Timotheus, against Iphicrates and Callistratus in the first few decades of the fourth century.

12. Valerie French looks at Sparta in the years after the battle of Leuctra in “The Spartan Family and the Spartan Decline: Changes in Child-Rearing Practices and Failure to Reform.” The decline in manpower resulted in a change in the role of women and their attention to child-rearing, with consequent changes in the children and their values and attitudes. She includes a useful appendix on the major sources (Xenophon, Aristotle, and Plutarch).

13. Alvin Bernstein offers a comparison of fourth century Sparta and the twentieth century A.D. Soviet Union in “Imperialism, Ethnicity & Strategy: The Collapse of Spartan (and Soviet) Hegemony.” He has very little specific to say about the fall of the Soviet Union, but a very good summary of fourth century Sparta, with the pertinent observation that autarchy and empire are not compatible (296); the reader is left to draw his own conclusions.

14. “Alexander’s Cavalry Battle at the Granicus” by Kenneth Harl takes a fresh look at this battle with the advantage of personal autopsy of the battlefield site. There are three maps, but one could wish for better topographical maps. Most scholars have concentrated on why the Persians lost; Harl investigates why Alexander won. The Persian deployment was not faulty, but rather sensible under the circumstances (though not brilliant). The Persians had sacrificed mobility for secure flanks; Alexander took advantage of their lack of mobility with speed and timing.

15. In “Ideology & The Constitution of Demetrius of Phalerum,” James Williams argues in favor of ideology. The issue is to what degree Demetrius was a pragmatist and to what degree he was influenced by his philosophic studies. Williams copiously documents the apparent constitutional actions of Demetrius and compares them to theories of Plato and Aristotle; the bibliography is extensive, although his target is primarily the article of H. J. Gehrke in Chiron 1978.

16. Finally, moving far from Athens and the Peloponnesian War, Jay Bregman looks at “The Emperor Julian’s View of Classical Athens.” Julian was “above all a champion of Hellenism, which he understood ultimately in religious terms.” (357) This article is an attempt to carefully define that mix of religion, philosophy, and culture. These essays are all thought-provoking, well-researched, and well-argued. They do have a common theme, very little stretched even at the end: Athens, Sparta, politics, and war. The technical production is good: I found only five typographical errors in the entire text, all of them quite minor (pages 6, 56, 202, 229, 236).

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Guest Essay

The New Movie ‘Civil War’ Matters for Reasons Different Than You Think

By Stephen Marche

Mr. Marche is the author of “The Next Civil War.”

“Not one man in America wanted the Civil War, or expected or intended it,” Henry Adams, grandson of John Quincy Adams, declared at the beginning of the 20th century. What may seem inevitable to us in hindsight — the horrifying consequences of a country in political turmoil, given to violence and rived by slavery — came as a shock to many of the people living through it. Even those who anticipated it hardly seemed prepared for its violent magnitude. In this respect at least, the current division that afflicts the United States seems different from the Civil War. If there ever is a second civil war, it won’t be for lack of imagining it.

The most prominent example arrives this week in the form of an action blockbuster titled “Civil War.” The film, written and directed by Alex Garland, presents a scenario in which the government is at war with breakaway states and the president has been, in the eyes of part of the country, delegitimized. Some critics have denounced the project, arguing that releasing the film in this particular election year is downright dangerous. They assume that even just talking about a future national conflict could make it a reality, and that the film risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is wrong.

Not only does this criticism vastly overrate the power of the written word or the moving image, but it looks past the real forces sending the United States toward ever-deeper division: inequality; a hyperpartisan duopoly; and an antiquated and increasingly dysfunctional Constitution. Mere stories are not powerful enough to change those realities. But these stories can wake us up to the threats we are facing. The greatest political danger in America isn’t fascism, and it isn’t wokeness. It’s inertia. America needs a warning.

The reason for a surge in anxiety over a civil war is obvious. The Republican National Committee, now under the control of the presumptive nominee, has asked job candidates if they believe the 2020 election was stolen — an obvious litmus test. Extremism has migrated into mainstream politics, and certain fanciful fictions have migrated with it. In 1997, a group of Texas separatists were largely considered terrorist thugs and their movement, if it deserved that title, fizzled out after a weeklong standoff with the police. Just a few months ago, Texas took the federal government to court over control of the border. Armed militias have camped out along the border. That’s not a movie trailer. That’s happening.

But politicians, pundits and many voters seem not to be taking the risk of violence seriously enough. There is an ingrained assumption, resulting from the country’s recent history of global dominance coupled with a kind of organic national optimism, that in the United States everything ultimately works out. While right-wing journalists and fiction writers have been predicting a violent end to the Republic for generations — one of the foundational documents of neo-Nazism and white supremacy is “The Turner Diaries” from 1978, a novel that imagines an American revolution that leads to a race war — their writings seem more like wish fulfillment than like warnings.

When I attended prepper conventions as research for my book, I found their visions of a collapsed American Republic suspiciously attractive: It’s a world where everybody grows his own food, gathers with family by candlelight, defends his property against various unpredictable threats and relies on his wits. Their preferred scenario resembled, more than anything, a sort of postapocalyptic “Little House on the Prairie.”

We’ve seen more recent attempts to grapple with the possibility of domestic conflict in the form of sober-minded political analysis. Now the vision of a civil war has come to movie screens. We’re no longer just contemplating a political collapse, we’re seeing its consequences unfold in IMAX.

“Civil War” doesn’t dwell on the causes of the schism. Its central characters are journalists and the plot dramatizes the reality of the conflict they’re covering: the fear, violence and instability that a civil war would inflict on the lives of everyday Americans.

That’s a good thing. Early on when I was promoting my book, I remember an interviewer asking me whether a civil war wouldn’t be that terrible an option; whether it would help clear the air. The naïveté was shocking and, to me, sickening. America lost roughly 2 percent of its population in the Civil War. Contemplating the horrors of a civil war — whether as a thought experiment or in a theatrical blockbuster — helps counteract a reflexive sense of American exceptionalism. It can happen here. In fact, it already has.

One of the first people to predict the collapse of the Republic was none other than George Washington. “I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the state, with particular reference to the founding of them on geographical discriminations,” he warned in his Farewell Address. “This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature.” This founder of the country devoted much of one of his most important addresses, at the apex of his popularity, to warning about the exact situation the United States today finds itself in: a hyper-partisanship that puts party over country and risks political collapse. Washington knew what civil war looked like.

For those Americans of the 1850s who couldn’t imagine a protracted, bloody civil war, the reason is simple enough: They couldn’t bear to. They refused to see the future they were part of building. The future came anyway.

The Americans of 2024 can easily imagine a civil war. The populace faces a different question and a different crisis: Can we forestall the future we have foreseen? No matter the likelihood of that future, the first step in its prevention is imagining how it might come to pass, and agreeing that it would be a catastrophe.

Stephen Marche is the author of “The Next Civil War.”

Source photographs by Yasuhide Fumoto, Richard Nowitz and stilllifephotographer, via Getty Images.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

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This chapter sets out and analyses Arendt's understandings of the basic meanings of politics and war, violence, and power. Her definition of power — a collective capacity that emerges between people as they act together — is supported through a number of historical examples. Her position on partisan warfare and the uses and limitations of revolutionary violence are contrasted with the important writing on these subjects by Schmitt and Fanon. Arendt shared with Clausewitz a view of war as an act of force whose essence is violent combat. However, political action, though sometimes occurring during wartime, is fundamentally different. Politics is full of conflict. But it is also limited by plurality, the very condition for speech and political action among equals. In contrast to post-structuralist accounts, Arendt maintained that a distinction between politics and war was indeed possible and necessary for there to be politics at all.

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Screen Rant

Civil war's political approach & ideas explained.

A24's dark war drama Civil War takes an interesting approach in how it addresses the political lines that might necessitate all-out war in America.

Warning: Major spoilers for Civil War ahead!

• Civil War transcends political divides, focusing on unity over partisanship in the face of a fascist government.
• The film showcases the civilian experience in modern civil war, emphasizing the devastating consequences of deep political divisions.
• An anti-war movie, Civil War aims to start a conversation about the dangers of polarization and the need for compromise.

Civil War departs from A24's typical small-budget model to immerse viewers in the fog of a modern civil war in America, and in doing so it deftly handles the political divisions that might necessitate full-scale combat on domestic soil. Starring Kirsten Dunst, Wagner Moura and Cailee Spaeny, Civil War follows a team of war journalists who are attempting to capture perfect, timeless images and quotes at the end of the war. Given how significant a role politics would play in an actual civil war, it seemed inevitable that Civil War writer and director Alex Garland would need to address them.

Garland chose to focus on members of the press as opposed to soldiers in Civil War , which allows for some of the movie's most disturbing imagery to be viewed literally through a camera lens, elevating the intensity of the film's immersive effects. As journalists, the main characters are not beholden to either side of the conflict, and are typically not targeted as combatants. This actually serves as a perfect analogy for Garland's opaque approach to politics in Civil War , which focuses on the devastating effects of deep-seated division.

Civil War Is Not A Right Vs. Left Political Movie

Neither democrats or republicans are the "heroes".

All the events of Civil War take place in the final days of the conflict between the so-called Loyalist States, who still answer to the federal government, and the various factions that oppose them led by the Western Forces of California and Texas. While Texas and California typically fall on opposite ends of the political spectrum, their unification serves as the primary explanation for the movie's political stance: it's not about right vs. left, Republican or Democrat . Garland explained why Texas and California are allies by pointing to the President, played by Nick Offerman:

The main thing is to do with how the president is presented and what can be inferred from that. Then it’s saying that two states that have a different political position have said, ‘Our political difference is less important than this.’

The two states set aside their political differences to fight against a fascist government led by a president who has forced his way into a third term, violating the very principles America was founded upon. Garland is implying that the real enemies that America faces are not on the other side of any political aisle ; they are the people who would violate our freedom and pursuit of happiness, and those individuals can come from any political background.

It's no accident that it's difficult to tell the varying factions of soldiers apart from one another throughout the movie. In fact, the only people who stand apart are the members of the press, marked by their labeled vehicles and vests. The similarities in the soldiers on both sides ask an uncomfortable question: who, in this war, are the "bad guys?" The answer is that there are no bad guys or good guys in the conflict, there are just combatants , and they can come from either side.

Is Civil War's President Based On Donald Trump?

The movie is not based on the former president.

Naturally, the inflammatory remarks made by former President Donald Trump throughout his political career have spurred questions about whether Nick Offerman's unnamed president is intended to be a stand-in for Trump. That is not the case, as the entire purpose of the treasonous politician is that he violates the freedom of all Americans, regardless of political allegiance . As a far-right Republican, Trump's political allegiance is clear, wheres Offerman's character could be aligned with either Democrats or Republicans.

Civil War is now playing in theaters everywhere.

The President in Civil War shows no such political leanings ; instead, he antagonizes citizens across the political spectrum by violating the Constitution and staying in office for a third term. Offerman's unnamed President is not intended to act as a stand-in for any past president, as each has their own party affiliations. He personifies the type of dictator that the American partisan political system could expose itself to by refusing to cooperate and find a bipartisan compromise to the problems facing the country.

Civil War Is An Anti-War Movie About The Polarization Of Politics

It wants to start a conversation.

In an interview with Time , Garland provided insight into his purpose behind creating Civil War , knowing full-well that it would lead to polarizing opinions in its approach to politics.

"It’s really a film about why polarization is not a great thing,” he says. “It’s trying to have a conversation. It’s trying to find common ground.”

Civil War is by no means a "war film" in the traditional sense. While there are plenty of intense combat scenes throughout the movie, the film's message is intended to act as a warning against the deep divisions that would lead to a civil war. Kirsten Dunst's character, Lee Smith, opines on her role as a war photographer, which has left her deeply haunted and nearly numb to the violence and devastation she's witnessed her entire life. " Every time I survived a war zone, I thought I was sending a warning home. 'Don't do this.' But here we are. "

With a production budget of $50 million, Civil War is A24's most expensive film to date.

Civil War acts as Alex Garland's own warning sent to America. His film is devastatingly effective at showing the gruesome, unconscionable brutality of a war on American soil. It takes images that the average American would see coming out of a far-off conflict like Russia's assault on Ukraine or the violence engulfing Gaza and places them in familiar settings like the Pennsylvania countryside. Civil War confronts America with the potential consequences of its deepening political divisions , and encourages compromise and cooperation – or else.

What Civil War Says About The State Of America

The movie focuses on the civilian experience.

Civil War focuses on what the civilian experience might be like in a modern civil war. Perhaps the most terrifying scene in the movie is when the main characters are questioned at gunpoint by Jesse Plemons' unsettling death squad soldier. When the characters come across him and his fellow soldiers, they are preparing a mass grave and dumping bodies into it.

Civil War states in gruesome, difficult-to-watch detail, that if compromise can not be found on the most important political issues in our country, civilians will experience the fallout.

An essential detail, highlighted when Cailee Spaeny's Jessie is knocked into the mass grave, is that most of the bodies are not in any sort of tactical gear. They were likely killed for aligning with the "wrong" side when confronted by the death squad. Plemons' soldier proves how nothing but a person's allegiance matters by not only asking everyone where they're from, but by killing those who give him an answer he doesn't like.

The scene provides the most haunting look at the civilian experience in the entire movie. The idea is that the people who suffer the most won't be the politicians who bicker on the floor of the House of Representatives, it will be the average citizens who are impacted by the decisions made by elected officials. Civil War states in gruesome, difficult-to-watch detail, that if compromise can not be found on the most important political issues in our country, civilians will experience the fallout.

Source: Time

Civil War is a 2024 action thriller from writer and director Alex Garland. Starring Kirsten Dunst, Wagner Moura, and Stephen McKinley Henderson, Civil War takes place in the near future and shows the United States entering a new Civil War after California and Texas attempt to separate from the country.

NPR reportedly in turmoil after editor accuses outlet of liberal bias in bombshell essay

N PR has reportedly been thrown into turmoil after a bombshell essay penned by a veteran editor claimed the broadcaster allowed liberal bias to affect its coverage — with the editor-in-chief telling furious staffers she did not want him to become a “martyr.”

Uri Berliner, a Peabody Award-winning journalist who has worked at NPR for 25 years, called out journalistic blind spots around major news events, including the origins of COVID-19, the war in Gaza and the Hunter Biden laptop, in an essay published Tuesday on Bari Weiss’ online news site the Free Press.

The senior business editor also said the internal culture at NPR had placed race and identity as ”paramount in nearly every aspect of the workplace.”

Berliner’s essay sparked a firestorm of criticism from prominent conservatives — with former President Donald Trump demanding NPR’s federal funding be yanked — and has led to internal tumult, the New York Times reported Friday.

The essay was brought up at what was described as a “long-scheduled meet-and-greet” with the hosts of NPR’s biggest shows on Wednesday, where NPR editor-in-chief Edith Chapin reportedly said she did not want Berliner to become a “martyr,” according to the Times.

Others took to the internal messaging system to rail against Berliner’s assertions.

“Mr. Berliner’s essay also sent critical Slack messages whizzing through some of the same employee affinity groups focused on racial and sexual identity that he cited in his essay. In one group, several staff members disputed Mr. Berliner’s points about a lack of ideological diversity and said efforts to recruit more people of color would make NPR’s journalism better,” the Times reported. 

NPR managing editor of standards and practices Tony Cavin disputed Berliner’s assumptions and claimed the essay will likely make it “harder for NPR journalists to do their jobs.”

”The next time one of our people calls up a Republican congressman or something and tries to get an answer from them, they may well say, ‘Oh, I read these stories, you guys aren’t fair, so I’m not going to talk to you,”’ Cavin said.

NPR did not immediately return calls for comment.

Berliner told the Times on Thursday that he didn’t regret publishing the essay, saying he loved NPR and hoped to make it better by “airing criticisms that have gone unheeded by leaders for years.”

Calling the broadcaster a “national trust” that people rely on for fair reporting and top-notch storytelling, he said: ”I decided to go out and publish it in hopes that something would change, and that we get a broader conversation going about how the news is covered.”

Berliner said he hasn’t been disciplined for writing the essay, but he did get a note from his supervisor reminding him that NPR requires employees to clear speaking appearances and media requests with standards and media relations teams.

Some former NPR staffers defended Berliner’s essay.

Jeffrey A. Dvorkin, NPR’s former ombudsman, said Berliner was ”not wrong.” Chuck Holmes, a former managing editor at NPR, called Berliner’s essay ”brave.”

After the essay was published, Berliner said, he received “a lot of support from colleagues, and many of them unexpected, who say they agree with me.”

“Some of them say this confidentially,”  Berliner told NewsNation anchor Chris Cuomo on Tuesday.

Chapin had pushed back on Berliner’s claims of a liberal bias, saying: ”We’re proud to stand behind the exceptional work that our desks and shows do to cover a wide range of challenging stories.”