The Difference Between Empathy And Sympathy

Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology. She has previously worked in healthcare and educational sectors.

Learn about our Editorial Process

Saul Mcleod, PhD

Editor-in-Chief for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul Mcleod, PhD., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

Sympathy and empathy are two closely related but distinct emotions. Sympathy involves feeling sorry or pity for someone, whereas empathy involves understanding and sharing someone’s feelings. Sympathy is more of an external expression of emotion, while empathy is an internal emotional response.

Simply put, sympathy is feeling for someone, while empathy is feeling with someone. Understanding the difference between these two emotions can help us communicate and connect with others on a deeper level.

empathy and compassion


The words sympathy, empathy, and compassion are closely related terms that are often used interchangeably.

However, they are different. The definitions of these terms often demonstrate different aspects of intersubjective experience.

  • Sympathy is an emotion experienced in reaction to something that happens to others. When someone understands what another person is going through and feels sorrow or pity toward them, this is sympathy. 
  • Empathy is the ability to intimately feel and see another’s suffering, not just through understanding what they are going through but by being able to put themselves in another’s shoes. When expressing empathy, a person may use their personal experience to relate to another’s suffering. 
  • Compassion means ‘to suffer together,’ which is an expression of caring and warmth. Someone who expresses compassion recognizes the pain in another person and is motivated to help them. 

What’s the difference between Empathy and Sympathy?

While sympathy and empathy are often used interchangeably, there are crucial differences that lead to different outcomes. 

Emotion is the main difference

While sympathy means that someone understands someone else’s suffering, it is more cognitive and keeps a certain distance between the sufferer and the listener.

Being able to emphasize means being able to experience another’s feelings. It requires an emotional component of really feeling what the other person is feeling. 

Difference in levels of understanding

Another difference between empathy and sympathy lies in the desire to understand the experience of a person who is suffering, not necessarily in the drive to stop their suffering.

Empathy is the ability to understand the emotions of another person. In contrast, sympathy is often utilized when a person does not necessarily relate to or fully understand the circumstances that someone is suffering. 

Sympathy does not translate as understanding since the listener may shift focus away from the person in distress to focus on themselves instead. 

sympathy vs empathy 1

The relationship matters

With empathy and sympathy, there is often a difference in the relationship between the listener and the sufferer. 

In certain settings, such as when a co-worker or boss is suffering from loss, sympathy may be more appropriate to maintain particular social dynamics when there is not an intimate connection. 

However, if a lifelong friend experiences a loss, sending a card or flowers may be inadequate. Empathy is usually expected more when the relationship between the sufferer and listener is close and strong. 

Sympathy drives disconnection

Empathy is thought to drive connection, while sympathy is thought to drive disconnection, according to social psychologist Brené Brown.

Thus, while empathy brings people together and builds on strong connections, sympathy can create a divide between people. 

Sympathetic statements such as ‘I’m sorry you feel like that’ or ‘It could have been worse’ can come across as patronizing.

Likewise, statements such as ‘I feel bad for you’ can come across as pitying, which can make the sufferer feel unsupported. 

How do sympathy and empathy relate to compassion?

It is thought that empathy and sympathy can be sensations and open expressions of compassion.

This is based on the condition that empathy and sympathy come from a place of sincerity. 

Compassion and empathy are fueled by an understanding of another human’s emotions. They both come with a desire and ability to connect to someone else and experience their pain.

Compassion, which arises from sincere empathy, can come from sharing similar experiences of suffering with another person.

Equally, compassion, which arises from sympathy, can be just as useful. For instance, someone may research and thus be knowledgeable on the types of abuse people can suffer.

They can then use this to increase their sympathy for people who have been abused , regardless of whether they have ever experienced abuse themselves.

Compassion often goes a step further as someone recognizes the pain in another and is motivated to help them, even if they cannot relate to the pain on a personal level.

To be able to extend emotions beyond an individual’s own personal experience is useful since this compassion allows humans to be motivated to reduce the pain that they have not personally experienced. 

Actively promoting compassion can allow a listener in one situation to be a force for change in many others. Compassionate people can be socially impactful and ignite activism in the service of a cause that one cares about.

Types of Empathy

There are thought to be three parts to empathy that should be increased to become a better empathetic listener. These are: cognitive empathy, emotive empathy, and empathic action. 

Cognitive empathy

This is the thinking part of empathy and a good starting point for becoming a better empathetic listener. This is where one can imagine themselves in the distressing situation of another and think about what that would feel like.

However, if this part is used without the following two parts of empathy, this may only become sympathy.

Emotive empathy

This is the feeling part of empathy. With emotive empathy, an individual stands alongside the person who is suffering and feels distressed with them. This is not feeling from a place outside or apart from the person, but together with them.

Empathic action

This is often the part that is difficult for many to cultivate. Empathic action often means sitting in silence and not doing anything. Many people may default to offering someone advice, solutions, or a diversion to ease their suffering; however, empathy is the opposite.

Acting on empathy by offering an empathic presence to someone is one of the most powerful actions there is. 

How to increase empathy to be an empathetic listener

Below are some other tips for cultivating empathy:

Actively listen

When someone actively listens , they are not just listening to the words that are being said.

They are paying close attention to what the other person is saying, getting a sense of the feelings that the speaker is expressing, and looking out for non-verbal cues. 

Listen patiently instead of focusing on what the response should be. When the person is finished speaking, take a moment to process the information before responding. 

Understand what the other person needs

Resist the urge to leap to conclusions about what someone needs when they tell you what they are going through. 

Use listening skills to figure out what they need, but if this is unclear, it is better to ask the other person what they need rather than provide the wrong kind of support. 

Repeating back to someone what was heard is a good way to find out what someone needs.

For instance, saying, ‘What I am hearing is that you don’t feel valued when X happens, is that right?’ can get to the point of what the other person needs. 

Prioritize emotional intelligence 

Those who have high emotional intelligence tend to be more self-aware, are better able to manage themselves, are aware of social cues, and are more capable of managing relationships.

Practicing ways of being more emotionally intelligent can therefore go hand-in-hand with being an empathic listener. 

What not to do

  • Avoid asking direct questions, arguing with what is being said, and disputing facts. This can only drive a barrier between the listener and the sufferer. Instead, fully concentrate on what is being said and how the speaker feels
  • Do not give your own judgments and opinions unless the speaker has asked for them. Let go of these and focus on the other person’s perspective. The listener does not need to agree with everything the other person says. Rather, it is about letting the speaker know that they are cared for and that they matter.
  • Do not be afraid of silence in the conversation. Sometimes all someone needs is to feel heard and to know that the other person is there to listen. The speaker may be considering what to say next or may need a few silent moments to process their emotions. 

Frequently Asked Questions

Which is stronger: sympathy or empathy.

Sympathy is essentially telling someone, ‘I know how you feel,’ whereas empathy is saying, ‘I feel how you feel.’

Empathy is deeper and more intense than sympathy. It is about acknowledging a person’s feelings and genuinely imaging and trying to feel what it’s like to be in their situation. 

Can you be empathetic without being sympathetic?

Empathy is the ability to feel someone else’s emotions, whereas sympathy means feeling and/or showing a reaction such as sorrow or pity. 

In the same way that sympathy can occur without empathy, it is possible to understand another person’s emotions without being sympathetic. For example, someone who is a narcissist may be able to perceive what others are feeling but lack the sympathy to care about another person. 

Is empathy the same as altruism?

These two terms are related emotions; therefore, many tend to consider them as the same thing. However, someone who is altruistic can practice selfless concern for others’ welfare.

It is the charitable emotion to help others without expecting anything in return. Empathy, on the other hand, is the ability to understand another’s emotions and to share their feelings. 

Empathy and altruism are related since both trigger acts of generosity in someone towards another. Empathy can also be the reason why someone is altruistic. 

What is a dark empath?

Not all empaths have good intentions. Someone who is a dark empath is highly attuned to others’ emotions, but they use their empathic abilities as a weapon.

A dark empath knows how to connect with another person but can use their knowledge to manipulate or take advantage of another person. 

A dark empath can give a false sense of trust to others when first getting to know them since they can portray their empathy in a positive light. This can lead to others thinking highly of them since they clearly show displays of empathy.

This makes it more dangerous later down the line when the dark empath uses their empathy to manipulate others for personal gain, but it may not be recognized until others get hurt.  

Can you have compassion without empathy? 

Compassion is not the same as empathy, although the concepts are related. Empathy refers more generally to the ability to take the perspective of and feel the emotions of another person, whereas compassion is when those feelings and thoughts include the desire to help.

It is possible to display kindness and compassion for practical reasons without any real empathy for others’ suffering. Someone may have the desire to help people in need without attaching deeper emotions and understanding of the suffering they are going through. 

What is more important: empathy or compassion? 

Empathy and compassion are needed in everyday life, especially when interacting with others. Without them, it can be difficult to maintain healthy relationships.

Empathy and compassion can help people to exhibit kind and loving behavior toward people they care about, which helps reinforce relationships.  

As previously mentioned, dark empaths and narcissists can use empathy to manipulate others. A time when empathy may be dangerous on its own is when it comes to leadership .

In times of crisis, having a leader who is only empathetic may understand others’ suffering, but this does not mean they will do anything about it. Being a compassionate leader, on the other hand, can cultivate positive change and unify people. 


Breyer, T. (2020). Empathy, sympathy and compassion. In  The Routledge handbook of phenomenology of emotion  (pp. 429-440). Routledge.

Brown, B., Davis, K., Stephenson, A., & Francis-Sears, A. (2013). Brené Brown on empathy.

Heym, N., Kibowski, F., Bloxsom, C. A., Blanchard, A., Harper, A., Wallace, L., Firth, J. & Sumich, A. (2021). The Dark Empath: Characterising dark traits in the presence of empathy.  Personality and individual differences ,  169 , 110172.

Jeffrey, D. (2016). Empathy, sympathy and compassion in healthcare: Is there a problem? Is there a difference? Does it matter?.  Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine ,  109 (12), 446-452.

Salem, R. (2003). Empathic listening.  Beyond intractability . 

Further information

An animated video that discusses the differences between sympathy and empathy, narrated by Dr Brené Brown

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Sympathy vs. Empathy: What's the Difference?

Sympathy is understanding someone's emotions and empathy is feeling them.

Dr. Sabrina Romanoff, PsyD, is a licensed clinical psychologist and a professor at Yeshiva University’s clinical psychology doctoral program.

empathy vs sympathy essay

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Sympathy vs. Empathy

Which is better—empathy or sympathy.

  • Are Compassion and Empathy the Same Thing?

How to Be More Sympathetic and Empathetic

We often come across the words empathy and sympathy when talking about how we feel. However, sympathy involves understanding someone’s emotions from our perspective and empathy involves feeling their emotions from their perspective.

Although both words are used in situations that involve emotions, they cannot be used interchangeably as they have different meanings.

This article explores the traits, differences, examples and common questions about sympathy and empathy.

The main difference between sympathy and empathy is how we express and experience our emotions toward someone’s situation. 

According to the American Psychology Association Dictionary of Psychology, the definitions of sympathy and empathy are as follows:

  • Sympathy : “feelings of concern or compassion resulting from an awareness of the suffering or sorrow of another.”
  • Empathy : “understanding a person from his or her frame of reference rather than one’s own, or vicariously experiencing that person’s feelings, perceptions, and thoughts."

How to Remember the Difference

An easy way to remember what sympathy refers to is to think of the greeting card section at a store. You feel bad for someone who is going through a hard time and you express your condolences with a sympathy card.

In other words, you aren’t putting yourself in their position and imagining yourself struggling with their situation. Therefore, it is possible to have sympathy but not empathy.

Surface vs. Deep Level Understanding 

When we sympathize with someone’s unfortunate situation, we feel bad for them. We have thoughts and feelings about what they are going through but we don’t have a deep understanding of how they are feeling.

Empathizing with someone’s circumstances means we are taking the time, effort, and mental space to fully appreciate and understand how they feel. 

Understanding From Our vs. Their Perspective

Sympathy means hearing someone’s bad news, sharing our feelings about it, and saying sorry.

When we practice empathy, we dive into the depth of their emotions and envision ourselves in their situation. It’s not about how we feel about their experience but rather we are putting ourselves in their shoes, pretending to go through what they’re going through and feeling their feelings.

For instance, if your friend tells you that their dog recently passed away, you sympathize by saying “I’m sorry for your loss.” 

But if you were to empathize, you would imagine yourself losing a beloved pet and feeling the grief and loss that come with that experience.

Fun Fact: Where Did These Words Originate?

The words sympathy and empathy share the same suffix, “-pathy” which originates from the Greek word “pathos.” Pathos refers to “emotions, feelings, or passion."

Judgement vs. Non-Judgement

Sympathy involves a superficial understanding of someone’s situation; therefore, it is easy to pass judgment. Empathy allows a person to explore another person’s thoughts and feelings which helps them remove judgment.

For instance, if your sibling mentions they are getting a divorce, you sympathize by saying, “That’s terrible. It’s going to be hard on my nephew. He’s going grow up in a broken home.”

An empathetic response would be, “Let me know if you want to talk about it. I’ll be here for you through it all.”

Unsolicited Advice vs. Active Listening

Sympathizing does not involve feeling someone’s emotions; therefore, when we hear about their problem, we immediately feel the urge to fix it because we pity them. We suppress our own emotions. We don’t know exactly what they are going through and it’s easier to focus on the solution rather than validate their experiences.

When we empathize with a close one, we connect deeply to their experience. We ask questions to understand, practice active listening, read their facial expressions and body language and behave sensitively to their needs.

Neither is better; it depends on the context and knowing when to use empathy or sympathy. Both empathy and sympathy are needed for emotional and mental well-being. 

When to Show Empathy

Empathy is essential for building deep and meaningful relationships with others. If you are unable to understand another person’s perspective, it can be challenging to effectively communicate and problem-solve together. 

For instance, if you and your partner are fighting, it can be difficult to resolve the conflict if you are unable to empathize with their point of view. Instead of working as a team toward a solution, you focus on trying to convince the other that you are right which creates a bigger divide in the relationship.

Empathy Fatigue

However, empathy fatigue can occur if you are overly concerned and constantly feel the feelings of others. Your energy becomes depleted and you may feel numb, burnt out, powerless, and less compassionate. You are at an increased risk of empathic distress.

When to Show Sympathy

In the age of mobile phones and social media, we are bombarded with distressing news at our fingertips; it’s easy to become overwhelmed by what’s happening in the world.

Sympathy allows us to learn and stay informed about global issues without being emotionally consumed.

Sympathy has been shown to be associated with moral and prosocial behaviors such as cooperation, sharing, low discrimination, supporting, helping, and protecting others.

Are Compassion and Empathy the Same Thing? 

Compassion and empathy is also terms that are often used interchangeably. Both involve having an understanding of someone’s emotions, connecting deeply, listening without judgment, being patient, and showing respect; however, there is a subtle difference between them. 

Compassion Involves Taking Action

Unlike empathy which is merely about feeling the emotions of others, compassion creates a desire to help others and involves taking action. You want to help relieve their pain and suffering because you truly empathize with their situation.

For instance, your friend is going through cancer treatment. You have compassion by helping them run errands, driving them to their appointments, and being mindful and sensitive about their needs.

Sympathy and empathy are important for relationship-building and mental wellness. Here are some tips to practice these skills to help you be more sympathetic and empathetic:

  • Learn how to read non-verbal cues
  • Instead of jumping to giving unsolicited advice, put yourself in their situation and try to imagine what they need
  • Practice active listening , ask questions, and work on understanding how another person feels
  • Self-reflect on how your conditions shaped your beliefs, values, judgments, and perspectives
  • Emotionally validate someone’s concerns
  • Learn about your own emotions and how to identify them

Therefore, there is a clear difference between sympathy and empathy. While neither is better, it’s important to know when to use each of these emotional tools depending on the situation. 

If you are having a difficult time managing your emotions and connecting with others, therapy can help you work through your emotions, build stronger relationships, improve communication skills, and increase emotional awareness.

APA Dictionary of Psychology. Sympathy .

APA Dictionary of Psychology. Empathy .

Merriam-Webster Dictionary. What’s the difference between “sympathy” and “empathy”?

Chikovani G, Babuadze L, Iashvili N, Gvalia T, Surguladze S. Empathy costs: Negative emotional bias in high empathisers. Psychiatry Research. 2015;229(1–2):340–346.

Yang H, Yang S. Sympathy fuels creativity: The beneficial effects of sympathy on originality. Thinking Skills and Creativity. 2016;21:132–143.

By Katharine Chan, MSc, BSc, PMP Katharine is the author of three books (How To Deal With Asian Parents, A Brutally Honest Dating Guide and A Straight Up Guide to a Happy and Healthy Marriage) and the creator of 60 Feelings To Feel: A Journal To Identify Your Emotions. She has over 15 years of experience working in British Columbia's healthcare system.

What's the difference between 'sympathy' and 'empathy'?

What to Know Sympathy is a feeling of sincere concern for someone who is experiencing something difficult or painful. Empathy involves actively sharing in the person’s emotional experience.


Sympathy is a feeling of sincere concern for someone. Empathy involves stepping into that person's shoes to actively share in their emotional experience.

Sympathy vs. Empathy Difference

Sympathy and empathy both involve feelings of concern for someone, but empathy goes beyond a feeling of concern to include an active sharing in the suffering person’s emotional experience. To illustrate the distinction we present a sad dramatic scenario:

The oven’s failure when Harry the Dog was so close to perfecting his souffle recipe was terrible. Mabel the Cat could see that he was absolutely crestfallen, and offered her sympathy: “Harry,” she said, “I’m so sorry about your oven, and at this particular moment.” “I appreciate your sympathy, Mabel,” he replied. “But I wish you had some empathy—though you’re not a baker, so I understand it’s perhaps impossible.”

Mabel feels and expresses sympathy—that is, a feeling of sincere concern for Harry, who is having a difficult time. But Harry would really like Mabel to show some empathy—that is, to show that she actively shares in his emotional experience.

“Oh Harry,” said Mabel, “I’ve seen you mixing and stirring and baking late into the night for days now and I could sense how close you were to your goal. I was cheering your progress with you. I do, in fact, empathize with you.”

You’ll all be relieved to know that in this fictional world an oven repair is forthcoming.

‘Sym’ means “with”—so why is ‘empathy’ the word about feeling with someone?

We’re glad you asked. The answer is, well, complicated.

Sympathy and empathy share a common root: the Greek noun páthos , meaning “experience, misfortune, emotion, condition.” Sympathy , which has been in use since the 16th century, comes a Greek word that combined páthos with syn-/sym- , meaning “with; together with.”

Empathy was modeled on sympathy ; it was coined in the early 20th century as a translation of the German word Einfühlung (“feeling-in” or “feeling into”), and was first applied in contexts of philosophy, aesthetics, and psychology—and specifically not in general contexts involving such quotidian things as disappointing ovens.

( Páthos also gave us the word pathos , which refers to the evocation of pity or compassion, especially in a work of art or literature.)

So why is it that sympathy comes from páthos plus something that means “with,” but empathy is the word the refers to an active sharing in someone else’s emotional experience?

Well, it’s because empathy stole that job from sympathy . That’s right: from the time when sympathy came on the scene in the 16th century all the way until the mid 20th century, sympathy was the go-to word for the active sharing in someone else’s emotional experience.

She literally wept with those who wept, while in tones of peculiar love, sincerity, and firmness, she lauded them for their noble daring, and freely expressed her entire sympathy with them, and likewise with all in the prison-house. — William Still, The Underground Railroad , 1872 As he mellowed into his plaintive history his tears dripped upon the lantern in his lap, and I cried, too, from sympathy . — Mark Twain, Life on the Mississippi , 1883 … when Mrs. Jennings considered that Marianne might probably be to her what Charlotte was to herself, her sympathy in her sufferings was very sincere. —Jane Austen, Sense and Sensibility , 1811 There was a caress in the soft winds; and the whole mood of the darkness, he thought, was one of sympathy for himself in his distress. —Stephen Crane, The Red Badge of Courage , 1895

When empathy was coined in the early 20th century, it referred to something quite different: the act of imagining one’s own ideas, feelings, or attitudes as fully inhabiting something one is observing, such as a work of art or a natural occurrence. Someone experiencing empathy in this sense was actively projecting their own feelings onto someone or something else—often experiencing a bodily sensation in response to a dance, a painting, a sunset—or a wrestling match.

Most of you have gone to a grunt and groan wrestling match. Get a picture of two fuzzy-chested, mobile-muscled mammoths tugging at each other. Haven't you found yourself helping—twisting and turning in your seat, trying to break the hold? That is empathy —you have by imagination become a wrestler and crawled into the ring. — The Academic Department of the Infantry School, The Infantry School Mailing List , October 1946

This now-technical use persisted, and sympathy and empathy were contrasted accordingly:

The act or capacity of entering into or sharing the feelings of another is known as sympathy . Empathy , on the other hand, not only is an identification of sorts but also connotes an awareness of one's separateness from the observed. One of the most difficult tasks put upon man is reflective commitment to another's problem while maintaining his own identity. — Journal of the American Medical Association , 24 May 1958 A fuller account would clearly require empathy as well as sympathy —a leap of imagination into Leadbelly's racial conflicts that would almost certainly have been facilitated by more candid interviews with surviving African-American witnesses as well as the personal experience of racial bias. —Robert Christgau, The New York Times Book Review , 17 Jan. 1993 Empathy has become a fad word for sympathy , though it was adopted expressly to mean something different from sympathy : 'intellectual insight into another's emotional state without sharing in it.' —John H. Dirckx, The Language of Medicine (2nd Ed.), 1993

By the mid-20th century, however, empathy had developed the meaning we now know today: the action of understanding, being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of another.

But the letters show, as he repeats stories told to him by participants in battle, the kind of imaginative empathy that makes him fully deserve his reputation as a war poet. —Monroe K. Spears, American Ambitions , 1987 Criticism, like fiction, was an act of empathy for Ray, putting yourself in the other guy's shoes. —Jay McInerney, The New York Times Book Review , 6 Aug. 1989

MORE TO EXPLORE : What Is a ‘Bleeding Heart’?

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Empathy vs. Sympathy: What’s the Difference?

Home » Empathy vs. Sympathy: What’s the Difference?

Writers oftentimes confuse the two words empathy and sympathy. They are usually used in similar contexts, a death in the family, a job loss, a robbery, etc., but they aren’t the same and have different meanings. So in order to keep our writing precise, we should be careful not to mix either of them up.

Today I want to illustrate the differences between empathy vs. sympathy, showcase their uses in a sentence, and give you some tips to keep track of them. After reading this post, you shouldn’t have any more trouble with these two words.

When to Use Empathy

sympathy v empathy youtube definition

  • I have empathy for those families who lost their house in the storm. A tornado once destroyed my house.
  • Having been late to work many times himself, the boss had empathy on the employee who was late.

Empathy is putting yourself in someone else’s shoes to understand that person’s situation. In the example above, the boss, having been late to work himself, had empathy for and understood why the employee was late for work.

Empathy is the newer of the two words, with its first use recorded in 1895. Sympathy, on the other hand, has a first recorded use in the late 1500s.

When to Use Sympathy

empathy v sympathy cartoon video

  • I offered my sympathy to the grieving mother.
  • Their sympathy for the victims led them to donate.

So you can clearly see the difference between the two words. Sympathy is a compassion and sorrow one feels for another, but empathy is more focused around personally identifying with or projecting oneself into another’s situation.

You may feel bad for the person who was just laid off from their job, but if you have never been laid off yourself, you cannot have empathy for him or her. You can feel sorry, have compassion, and give them sympathy, but you can’t have empathy for their situation.

Empathize vs. Sympathize

This same thought process underlines the two verb forms of empathy and sympathy, empathize and sympathize. Empathize denotes a stronger, more personal sense of shared feeling than does sympathize.

This doesn’t mean, however, that you cannot use sympathy or sympathize to describe “sharing or understanding the feelings of another.” The word sympathize is 300 years empathy’s senior with this meaning. You can share or even understand the pain someone is going through without going through it yourself.

Empathy, and by extension empathize, is the power of projecting one’s personality into (and so fully comprehending) the object of contemplation. It is much more personal and specific than sympathy.

To give another example, I may sympathize with the person whose house was just burglarized because I can understand how vulnerable it must make one feel, but I cannot have empathy because my house has never been robbed.

Remember the Difference

Here are two tricks to remember which of these words is which:

You can remember that sympathy deals with sorrows and feeling sorry for someone because it starts with an “ S .”

Similarly, you can remember that empathy is more personal and requires you to put yourself in that person’s shoes. Sho e s and e mpathy both have an “ E ” in them.

The two words sympathy vs. empathy cause a bit of confusion in people’s writing, but they have different meanings.

Empathy is more specific and personal than sympathy. It involves personally putting yourself in that persons shoes and knowing what they are going through.

Sympathy is a more general feeling or sorrow for another person’s situation.

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  • Empathy vs Sympathy | Difference & Examples

Empathy vs. Sympathy | Difference & Examples

Published on 25 July 2022 by Eoghan Ryan . Revised on 14 February 2023.

Empathy and sympathy are related words that differ in meaning. Though they’re often used interchangeably, they differ in the kind of emotional involvement they describe.

  • Empathy is a noun describing the ability to relate to another person’s feelings by imagining yourself in their situation.
  • Sympathy is a noun describing compassion for another person who is facing difficult circumstances or negative feelings. It suggests that you feel pity for someone but don’t necessarily fully understand their feelings.

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Table of contents

The meaning of empathy, ‘sympathy’ to mean compassion, ‘sympathy’ to mean ‘unity’, ‘sympathy’ to mean ‘loyalty’, ‘my (deepest) sympathies’, worksheet: sympathy vs empathy, other interesting language articles.

Empathy refers to the ability to imaginatively experience another person’s emotions or thoughts. The emphasis is on relating to another person’s feelings, whether intellectually or by connecting them to your own experiences: putting yourself in their shoes.

The verb form of empathy is empathise , meaning ‘to experience empathy for someone or something’. It’s commonly followed by the preposition ‘with’. The adjectival form of empathy is empathetic (or sometimes empathic ).

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Sympathy is typically used to describe compassion or pity for another person’s negative feelings or circumstances. It suggests that you feel bad for them, but not necessarily that you fully understand their feelings (though it doesn’t exclude this possibility).

The verb form of sympathy is sympathise , meaning ‘to experience sympathy for someone or something’. It’s commonly followed by the word ‘with’. The adjectival form of sympathy is sympathetic .

Sympathy can also be used to describe something as working in harmony or in unity with other components. It’s preceded by the word ‘in’. Sometimes an adjective is added between the words for emphasis.

Sympathy can also be used to describe a state of loyalty or a tendency to support a certain idea or group. In this context, it’s written in the plural form.

My sympathies is an expression commonly used to offer condolences to someone experiencing loss or grief. My deepest sympathies is a common variation of the expression. Either expression can be used on its own or as part of a sentence.

Do you want to test your knowledge of the difference between ’empathy’ and ‘sympathy’? Use the practice worksheet below! Fill in a form of ’empathy’ or ‘sympathy’ in each of the sentences.

  • Practice questions
  • Answers and explanations
  • Sandra’s parents are also divorced, so she feels a lot of _______ for Dajana.
  • Tyra has a lot of _______ for people struggling with poverty. She donates a third of her income to charity.
  • To _______ with someone is to imaginatively experience their feelings.
  • The townspeople worked in _______ with each other to extinguish the fire.
  • I have neither Republican nor Democratic _______.
  • I expressed my deepest _______ to the widow.
  • Here, ’empathy’ is the more appropriate option, showing that Sandra can understand Amy’s feelings because of a similar experience in her own life.
  • Here, ‘sympathy’ makes the most sense . Tyra feels compassion for the people she’s trying to help, but there’s no suggestion that she knows what it feels like to be in their situation.
  • The present verb form of ’empathy’ is ’empathize’.
  • Here, ‘in sympathy’ is used to mean ‘in harmony’ or ‘in unity’.
  • Here, ‘sympathies’ is used to mean ‘loyalties’ or ‘allegiances’.
  • ‘My sympathies’ and ‘my deepest sympathies’ are common expressions used to offer condolences to someone experiencing loss.

If you want to know more about commonly confused words , definitions , and differences between US and UK spellings , make sure to check out some of our other language articles with explanations, examples, and quizzes.

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The Difference Between Empathy and Sympathy

One often leads to the other, but not always..

Posted May 22, 2015 | Reviewed by Kaja Perina

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  • Sympathy is a reaction to the plight of others.
  • Empathy means sharing another person's emotions.
  • Compassion is more engaged than simple empathy because it involves an active desire to relieve the other person's suffering.

[Article revised on 18 October 2022 . ]

In 1909, the psychologist Edward Titchener translated the German Einfühlung (‘feeling into’) into English as ‘empathy’. Empathy can be defined as a person’s ability to recognize and share the emotions of another person, fictional character, or sentient being. It involves, first, seeing someone else’s situation from his perspective, and, second, sharing his emotions, including, if any, his distress.

For me to share in someone else’s perspective, I must do more than merely put myself into his position. Instead, I must imagine myself as him, and, more than that, imagine myself as him in the particular situation in which he finds himself. I cannot empathize with an abstract or detached feeling. To empathize with a particular person, I need to have at least some knowledge of who he is and what he is doing or trying to do. As John Steinbeck wrote, ‘It means very little to know that a million Chinese are starving unless you know one Chinese who is starving.’

Empathy is often confused with pity, sympathy, and compassion, which are each reactions to the plight of others. Pity is a feeling of discomfort at the distress of one or more sentient beings and often has paternalistic or condescending overtones. Implicit in the notion of pity is that its object does not deserve its plight, and, moreover, is unable to prevent, reverse, or overturn it. Pity is less engaged than empathy, sympathy, or compassion, amounting to little more than a conscious acknowledgment of the plight of its object.

Robert Shelton

Sympathy (‘fellow feeling’, ‘community of feeling’) is a feeling of care and concern for someone, often someone close, accompanied by a wish to see him better off or happier. Compared to pity, sympathy implies a greater sense of shared similarities together with a more profound personal engagement. However, sympathy, unlike empathy, does not involve a shared perspective or shared emotions, and while the facial expressions of sympathy do convey caring and concern, they do not convey shared distress. Sympathy and empathy often lead to each other, but not always. For instance, it is possible to sympathize with such things as hedgehogs and ladybirds, but not, strictly speaking, to empathize with them. Conversely, psychopaths with absolutely no sympathy for their victims can nonetheless make use of empathy to ensnare or torture them. Sympathy should also be distinguished from benevolence, which is a much more detached and impartial attitude.

Compassion, or "suffering alongside" someone, is more engaged than simple empathy and is associated with an active desire to alleviate the suffering of its object. With empathy, I share your emotions; with compassion, I not only share your emotions but also elevate them into a universal and transcending experience. Compassion, which builds upon empathy, is one of the main motivators of altruism .

Neel Burton is author of Heaven and Hell: The Psychology of the Emotions .

Facebook image: Drazen Zigic/Shutterstock

Neel Burton M.D.

Neel Burton, M.D. , is a psychiatrist, philosopher, and writer who lives and teaches in Oxford, England.

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Sympathy vs. Empathy | Explained

Sympathy vs. Empathy | Explained

3-minute read

  • 1st September 2023

Are you sympathetic to someone’s feelings…or are you empathetic? Or do they mean the same thing? If you find sympathy vs. empathy confusing – don’t worry! We’re here to help.

While sympathy and empathy both relate to connection and understanding (and are sometimes even used interchangeably), they actually mean different things. In this post, we’ll explain the difference between sympathy and empathy , as well as how both relate to compassion .

The Definition of Sympathy

Sympathy is the act of recognizing and acknowledging another person’s feelings , even if you haven’t personally experienced them yourself. Essentially, being sympathetic means expressing care and concern for someone’s well-being (such as offering comfort during times of hardship), although you can’t directly relate to what that person is experiencing.

For example, it’s possible to be sympathetic toward, and console, a friend who has lost an important tennis match, even if you’ve never played sports yourself or were personally impacted by her loss.

Look at these examples:

The Definition of Empathy

Empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings and perspectives of another person. It goes beyond sympathy (which requires acknowledging someone’s emotions) and involves actually feeling what the other person is feeling.

However, empathy is more than just relating to someone on an emotional level ( emotional empathy ): there is also a cognitive element.

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Cognitive empathy is the ability to understand someone else’s point of view and grasp their emotions without necessarily feeling them on a personal level. In other words, it allows you to mentally step into someone else’s shoes, see the situation from their perspective, and understand what they’re thinking and feeling.

Here’s how to use empathy in a sentence:

Sympathy vs. Empathy vs. Compassion

Compassion is related to both empathy and sympathy – it’s a genuine concern for the well-being of others, which is often accompanied by a desire to alleviate their suffering or difficulties. Compassion goes beyond acknowledging someone’s struggles and compels action. Here’s an example to illustrate:

To summarize sympathy vs. empathy . vs. compassion : Sympathy is acknowledging another’s emotions, empathy is understanding and sharing another’s feelings and perspectives, and compassion is a deep concern for others’ well-being, resulting in action to alleviate their difficulties or suffering.

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Empathy vs. Sympathy: What Is the Difference?

And Why You Should Care

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Is that “empathy” or “sympathy” you're showing? While the two words are often incorrectly used interchangeably, the difference in their emotional impact is important. Empathy, as the ability to actually feel what another person is feeling — literally “walk a mile in their shoes” — goes beyond sympathy, a simple expression of concern for another person’s misfortune. Taken to extremes, deep or extended feelings of empathy can actually be harmful to one’s emotional health.

Sympathy is a feeling and expression of concern for someone, often accompanied by a wish for them to be happier or better off. “Oh dear, I hope the chemo helps.” In general, sympathy implies a deeper, more personal, level of concern than pity, a simple expression of sorrow. 

However, unlike empathy, sympathy does not imply that one’s feelings for another are based on shared experiences or emotions.

As natural as it might seem, feeling sympathy does not occur automatically. Instead, prerequisites for feeling sympathy include:

  • attention to the subject person or group;
  • believing that subject is in a state of need; and
  • knowledge of the specific characteristics of the subjects’ given situation

To feel sympathy for a person or group, one must first pay attention to them. Outside distractions severely limit the ability to produce strong affective responses of sympathy. When not distracted, people can better attend to and respond to a variety of emotional subjects and experiences. Attention enables one to experience sympathy. In many cases, sympathy cannot be experienced without giving the subject undivided attention.

The individual’s or group’s perceived level of need elicits sympathy. Different states of need—such as perceived vulnerability or pain—require different sorts of human reactions, including those that range from attention to sympathy. For example, a person suffering from cancer might draw stronger feelings of sympathy than a person with a cold. A person who is perceived as being “deserving” of help is more likely to get it.

Sympathy is also believed to be based on the principle of the powerful helping the vulnerable. The young and healthy help the elderly and sick, for example. To some extent, the natural maternal-paternal instincts to care for one’s children or family are thought to trigger feelings of sympathy. Similarly, people who live in close geographic proximity—such as neighbors and citizens of a given country—are more likely to experience sympathy towards each other. Social proximity follows the same pattern: Members of certain groups, such as racial groups, tend to be more sympathetic to people who are also members of the group.

As a translation into English of the German word Einfühlung — “feeling into” — made by psychologist Edward Titchener in 1909, “empathy” is the ability to recognize and share another person’s emotions.

Empathy requires the ability to recognize the suffering of another person from their point of view and to openly share their emotions, including painful distress.

Empathy is often confused with sympathy, pity and compassion, which are merely recognition of another person’s distress. Pity typically implies that the suffering person does not “deserve” what has happened to him or her and is powerless to do anything about it. Pity shows a lower degree of understanding and engagement with the suffering person’s situation than empathy, sympathy, or compassion.

Compassion is a deeper level of empathy, demonstrating an actual desire to help the suffering person.

Since it requires shared experiences, people can generally feel empathy only for other people, not for animals. While people may be able to sympathize with a horse, for example, they cannot truly empathize with it.

Psychologists say that empathy is essential in forming relationships and acting compassionately toward others. Since it involves experiencing another person’s point of view—stepping outside one’s self—empathy enables genuinely helping behaviors that come easily and naturally, rather than having to be forced.  

Empathetic people work effectively in groups, make more lasting friendships, and are more likely to step in when they see others being mistreated. It is believed that people begin to show empathy in infancy and develop the trait through childhood and adolescence. Despite their level of concern for others, however, most people tend to feel deeper empathy for people similar to themselves compared to people outside their family, community, race, ethnicity or cultural background.

The Three Types of Empathy

According to psychologist and pioneer in the field of emotions, Paul Ekman, Ph.D. , three distinct types of empathy have been identified:

  • Cognitive Empathy : Also called “perspective taking,” cognitive empathy is the ability to understand and predict the feelings and thoughts of other by imagining one’s self in their situation.
  • Emotional Empathy : Closely related to cognitive empathy, emotional empathy is the ability to actually feel what another person feels or at least feel emotions similar to theirs. In emotional empathy, there is always some level of shared feelings. Emotional empathy can be a trait among persons diagnosed with Asperger syndrome .
  • Compassionate Empathy : Driven by their deep understanding of the other person’s feelings based on shared experiences, compassionately empathic people make actual efforts to help.

While it can give meaning to our lives, Dr. Ekman warns that empathy can also go terribly wrong.

The Dangers of Empathy

Empathy can give purpose to our lives and truly comfort people in distress, but it can also do great harm. While showing an empathetic response to the tragedy and trauma of others can be helpful, it can also, if misdirected, turn us into what Professor James Dawes has called “emotional parasites.”

Empathy Can Lead to Misplaced Anger

Empathy can make people angry — perhaps dangerously so — if they mistakenly perceive that another person is threatening a person they care for.

For example, while at a public gathering, you notice a heavyset, casually dressed man who you think is “staring” at your pre-teenage daughter. While the man has remained expressionless and has not moved from his spot, your empathetic understanding of what he “might” be thinking of doing to your daughter drives you into a state of rage.

While there was nothing in the man’s expression or body language that should have lead you to believe he intended to harm your daughter, your empathetic understanding what was probably “going on inside his head” took you there.

Danish family therapist Jesper Juul has referred to empathy and aggression as “existential twins.”

Empathy Can Drain Your Wallet

For years, psychologists have reported cases of overly empathetic patients endangering the well-being of themselves and their families by giving away their life savings to random needy individuals. Such overly empathetic people who feel they are somehow responsible for the distress of others have developed an empathy-based guilt.

The better-known condition of “survivor guilt” is a form of empathy-based guilt in which an empathic person incorrectly feels that his or her own happiness has come at the cost or may have even caused another person’s misery.

According to psychologist Lynn O’Connor , persons who regularly act out of empathy-based guilt, or “ pathological altruism ,” tend to develop mild depression in later-life.

Empathy Can Harm Relationships

Psychologists warn that empathy should never be confused with love. While love can make any relationship — good or bad — better, empathy cannot and can even hasten the end of a strained relationship. Essentially, love can cure, empathy cannot.

As an example of how even well-intentioned empathy can damage a relationship, consider this scene from the animated comedy television series The Simpsons: Bart, bemoaning the failing grades on his report card, says, “This is the worst semester of my life.” His dad, Homer, based on his own school experience, tries to comfort his son by telling him, “Your worst semester so far.”

Empathy Can Lead to Fatigue

Rehabilitation and trauma counselor Mark Stebnicki coined the term “ empathy fatigue ” to refer to a state of physical exhaustion resulting from repeated or prolonged personal involvement in the chronic illness, disability, trauma, grief, and loss of others.

While more common among mental health counselors, any overly empathetic person can experience empathy fatigue. According to Stebnicki, “high touch” professionals like doctors, nurses, lawyers, and teachers tend to suffer from empathy fatigue.

Paul Bloom, Ph.D. , professor of psychology and cognitive science at Yale University, goes so far as to suggest that due to its inherent dangers, people need less empathy rather than more. 

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Understanding the difference between sympathy and empathy

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Empathy vs sympathy: key characteristics

What's the difference between empathy vs. sympathy?

4 ways to practice empathy

What can seem like empathy but isn’t?

Compassion vs. Empathy

Empathy and sympathy are two terms that are often used interchangeably. But only one of them allows people to connect deeper than surface level.

From a high level, empathy is the ability to understand and share the feelings of others, involving a deep emotional connection. Sympathy is expressing care and concern for someone's feelings without necessarily sharing those emotions yourself, focusing more on compassion and support.

But what are the more nuanced differences between empathy and sympathy? And which should you practice when?

Let’s explore how empathy and sympathy differ and why one of them is a better tool to help you connect with others at work and in life.

Empathy vs sympathy: key characteristics 

Understanding the differences between empathy and sympathy can help you choose the most appropriate one given your circumstances. While empathy supports a deeper connection, there are times when a sympathetic response is more fitting.

To clarify, here is an overview empathy and sympathy and some examples of each.

What is empathy? 

  • Feeling what someone else feels
  • Actively listening to what they have to say
  • Not judging
  • Being aware of nuances and non-verbal cues
  • Discovering their perspective
  • Acknowledging everyone's feelings

Empathy is the ability to understand and share a person’s feelings. If you’re an empathetic person, you can listen to what someone else has to say without judgment.

This ability to connect is not limited by your own experiences. An empathetic person can feel someone else’s emotions, regardless of their personal experiences.

You’re able to discover their perspective with awareness of non-verbal cues. You’re also able to simply listen without feeling forced to provide unwanted advice.

Plus, you can acknowledge everyone’s feelings in a given situation. This is particularly helpful in leadership positions . Looking at the bigger picture can help make more informed decisions.

Practicing empathy, instead of sympathy only, can help you get the emotional clarity you need to build upon important relationships. It can let you see another point of view.

Having empathy can also help you to   improve your communication skills.   That’s because you’re able to listen fully to others and understand their perspectives.

In fact, research shows that empathy can even   help sustain cooperation during social dilemmas.   Other studies have found that in a service setting,   empathy can reduce discrimination and unethical behavior.

This is important to   foster a happier, healthier workplace   and   build a sense of belonging.

What is sympathy?

  • Having thoughts about what someone feels
  • When in conversation, giving unasked advice
  • Passing judgment
  • Only noticing the surface level issue
  • Understanding only from your perspective
  • Ignoring or suppressing your own emotions

Unlike empathy, practicing sympathy doesn’t mean you feel what someone else feels. Instead, you feel pity or sorry for someone else’s feelings.

You feel bad for someone, but you don’t understand how they feel.

A sympathetic approach only provides a surface-level understanding of someone else’s situation. This understanding is typically from your perspective, not theirs.

Sympathy can also lead someone to give unsolicited advice to help the other person deal with their emotions.

When offering this advice, it's common for sympathetic people to pass judgment. Unlike empathy, it’s still possible to pass judgment with sympathy.

What's the difference between empathy vs. sympathy? 

Both empathy and sympathy share the suffix   pathy.   This suffix comes from the Greek word   pathos.

Pathos can mean several things. It can mean “emotion” or “feelings.” But it can also mean “suffering.”

This means that both empathy and sympathy   deal with emotions . However, there’s one big difference between empathy and sympathy.

Empathy involves feeling what someone else feels, while sympathy doesn’t. Sympathy instead involves understanding someone else’s emotions but from your own perspective.

Empathy vs sympathy examples

Let’s look at empathy vs sympathy in similar situations.

First, imagine someone in your place of work was just reprimanded. As a result, they feel sad, nervous, and disappointed in themselves.

If you were to express sympathy, you could tell them that you’re sorry that they’re going through this. However, this wouldn’t stop you from feeling judgment towards their situation.

Perhaps you judge them for having been reprimanded. Some people might even say, “At least you still have your job!”

On the other hand, you wouldn’t say this if you were an empath. With empathy, you feel the sadness, nervousness, and disappointment the other person feels. You care about their well-being.

You can let them know they’re not alone. You don’t need to find a solution to their problem. Instead, you can say something like:

“I’m really sorry. I’m so glad you told me. I’m here for you.”

You resist the urge to try to make it go away.

Empathy is about connecting with the other person instead of trying to find an appropriate response.

Here’s another example. If someone at work tells you they’re having marriage problems, sympathy could look like this:

“Oh, that sucks. Have you tried marriage counseling?”

On the other hand, practicing empathy means fully listening to the other person. If this is someone you're comfortable with, you can ask them if they want to talk about it with you.

There’s no need to try to fix the issue for them. Instead, offer a moment of connection.


Which is better: sympathy or empathy? 

Sympathy doesn’t help you build deep connections with other people. This is because sympathy only offers surface-level understanding. It doesn’t allow you to see from someone else’s perspective.

On the other hand, empathy lets you walk in someone else’s shoes. As a result, you can better provide what they really need.

In the workplace, empathy can help you connect with your peers and get on the same level as them. Doing so can help you   build a high-performance team.

Practicing empathy, especially at work, is no easy feat.

According to Businessolver’s 2021 Empathy Study,   70% of CEOs say they struggle to demonstrate empathy at work consistently .

68% of them also believe they'll be less respected if they show empathy in the workplace.

However, only 25% of employees say that empathy in their organizations is sufficient.

Empathy is becoming a growing priority for employees as more and more Gen Z employees join the workforce. They’re the fastest-growing group in the workforce right now. 

90% of Gen Z employees say that they’re more likely to stay at their jobs if their employer is empathetic.

If you have a leadership position in your organization, practicing empathy and making it a priority is key to building a more resilient workforce.

Here are four ways you can do so:

1. Listen actively instead of focusing on what to say next

Even when listening to someone else, people are often focused on their own thoughts.

It’s easy to think about what to say next instead of focusing on what the other person is saying. This gets in the way of fully and actively listening to the other person. It also makes it difficult to understand the emotions of another person.

Failure to listen will make it difficult to empathize. 

Instead of focusing on your response, pay close attention to what someone is telling you. Listen attentively, not just for their words, but for other non-verbal cues, too.

Watch their body language and tone of voice to understand how they feel. You can easily miss these signals when you’re focused on your own response.

When the other person is finished speaking, take a moment to process the information. Only once you’ve processed all nuances of the conversation should you focus on what you want to say.

If you have a position of leadership, encourage your team to practice active listening.

2. Repeat in your own words

One of the first things you can say after listening to someone is to repeat what they've said but in your own words.

You can phrase this as something that you’ve heard.

Here’s an example:

“What I’m hearing is that you don’t feel valued in the team when Jeremy and Sophia speak over you. Is this right?”

When you present something as what you’ve heard, it places the burden on you, not on the other person. If you heard or understood something wrong, they can correct you.

3. Prioritize emotional intelligence

Emotional intelligence is an important soft skill to practice in your workplace if you want to improve empathy.

People who have high emotional intelligence tend to be:

  • More self-aware
  • Able to manage themselves
  • Aware of social cues
  • More capable of managing relationships

In the workplace, it's crucial to prioritize emotional intelligence in your team. It facilitates strong communicators, collaborators, and leaders.

4. Understand what the other person needs

Everyone is wired differently. We all have different needs.

It’s easy to imagine what you'd need if you were in the same situation as someone else. But what you need isn’t necessarily the same as what they need.

Resist the urge to automatically leap to conclusions about what someone needs when they tell you what they’re going through.

Instead, use your listening skills to figure out what they need. If you’re not sure, ask. It’s better to ask someone what they need than to assume and provide the wrong kind of support.


What can seem like empathy but isn’t? 

Some scenarios can feel like empathy but aren’t really. Here are some examples to look for:

1. Someone in grief

Supporting someone who is grieving is a great example of what could be empathy, but it isn’t always.

When you go see someone in grief and tell them how sorry you are, it can feel like you’re empathetic to their situation. After all, you know it must be terrible to live a loss like that.

Maybe you even take the time to bring them flowers or a card.

However, this is an example of sympathy. That’s why most cards designed for people in grief say “Our Sympathies” on them. They’re also called sympathy cards for a reason. 

Showing empathy requires a lot more than offering your condolences. It takes effort to imagine yourself in the grieving person’s shoes.

It also takes effort to be there for them and offer them the support they need.

2. A coworker struggling to keep up

A coworker comes to you to complain about struggling to focus and catch up with all their tasks.

As a result, you bombard them with your best time-saving techniques to help them get everything done. You feel this is empathetic because you are taking time out of your day to help them through something.

But the next day, you find that this coworker comes to you to complain again. Why is that? Didn’t you already help them?

This can happen because the first scenario didn’t show true empathy. While you did help them, you didn’t take the time to connect with how they felt.

When you take the time to do so, you realize that more is going on than you previously thought. They’re having issues at home, which are getting in the way of their focus.

By listening fully to what they have to say, you help them feel heard and supported. As a result, this coworker is now better able to focus afterward.

3. A friend who needs emotional support

A friend starts to complain about being tired because they struggle to fall asleep at night.

You quickly interrupt them to say, “Oh, I’ve been through that before. I know that’s really hard. What helped me was to take melatonin every night. It works like magic.”

Although it feels like you’re empathizing with them, this isn’t really the case. Instead of focusing on the other person, you redirected the conversation to be about you.

Empathy instead requires you to put your own feelings aside and focus on the other person.

Only by listening will you find out what the other person is looking for.

Compassion vs. empathy 

Compassion and empathy   are often used interchangeably. Though there's a common thread between them, the two concepts are distinctly different.

Both compassion end empathy are fueled by an understanding of another human's emotions. They both come with a desire and ability to connect with someone else and feel their pain.

Compassion goes a step further as an individual recognizes the pain in another and is motivated to help them.

That said, compassion does require a degree of separation. To effectively help someone else, you should be able to manage those empathetic feelings so that they don’t overwhelm you. With these feelings managed, a person has the capacity to find an appropriate response and see it through.

Empathy vs sympathy: know the difference 

Sympathy is an expected sentiment. But empathy goes beyond what people expect.

It helps people connect, both at work and in life.

If you want to learn how to practice empathy, you can try personal coaching through BetterUp.

Schedule a demo today   to see how BetterUp can help you develop emotional intelligence and reach your career potential. 

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Improve your social skills, confidence, and build meaningful relationships through personalized coaching.

Elizabeth Perry, ACC

Elizabeth Perry is a Coach Community Manager at BetterUp. She uses strategic engagement strategies to cultivate a learning community across a global network of Coaches through in-person and virtual experiences, technology-enabled platforms, and strategic coaching industry partnerships. With over 3 years of coaching experience and a certification in transformative leadership and life coaching from Sofia University, Elizabeth leverages transpersonal psychology expertise to help coaches and clients gain awareness of their behavioral and thought patterns, discover their purpose and passions, and elevate their potential. She is a lifelong student of psychology, personal growth, and human potential as well as an ICF-certified ACC transpersonal life and leadership Coach.

Compassion vs. empathy: Understanding the difference

Learn 6 habits of empathetic people to connect deeper, developing cognitive empathy to become a better coworker, learn how to protect yourself from toxic empathy, why are empathy fatigue and compassion fatigue so common, empathetic leadership: are empathetic leaders born or made, what’s an empath the positives and pitfalls, what are the emotional triggers for empaths to watch for, 5 reasons why your company needs real-time feedback, similar articles, the subtle, but important, difference between confidence and arrogance, bravery versus courage: what is the difference, motivation vs. inspiration: the perfect combination for success, how to apologize to someone professionally and with grace, stay connected with betterup, get our newsletter, event invites, plus product insights and research..

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“Empathy” vs. “Sympathy”: Which Word To Use And When

Watch: what is the real difference between "empathy" and "sympathy".

The terms empathy and sympathy are often confused, and with good reason.

Both of the words deal with the relationship a person has to the feelings and experiences of another person. One involves feeling a certain way about a person, and the other involves feeling the same way that another person does.

In this article, we’ll explain the subtle differences between sympathy and empathy , discuss how each term is used, and provide some example sentences that use each term.

What is the difference between sympathy and empathy ?

Both sympathy and empathy have roots in the Greek term páthos meaning “suffering, feeling.” Sympathy is the older of the two terms. It entered English in the mid-1500s with a very broad meaning of “agreement or harmony in qualities between things or people.” Since then, the term has come to be used in a more specific way.

Nowadays,  sympathy is largely used to convey commiseration, pity, or feelings of sorrow for someone else who is experiencing misfortune. This sense is often seen in the category of greeting cards labeled “sympathy” that specialize in messages of support and sorrow for others in a time of need. You feel bad for them … but you don’t know what it is like to be in their shoes.

Consider the following examples:

“I’ve always liked Saturn. But I also have some sympathy for Pluto because I heard it’s been downgraded from a planet, and I think it should remain a planet. Once you’ve given something planetary status it’s kind of mean to take it away.” – Jared Leto

“Pity may represent little more than the impersonal concern which prompts the mailing of a check, but true sympathy is the personal concern which demands the giving of one’s soul.” – Martin Luther King Jr.

Empathy entered English a few centuries after sympathy —in the late 1800s—with a somewhat technical and now obsolete meaning from the field of psychology. Psychologists began using empathy  as a translation for the German term Einfühlung and the concept that a person could project their own feelings onto a viewed object.

Unlike sympathy , empathy has come to be used in a broader way than it was when it was first introduced; the term is now most often used to refer to the capacity or ability to imagine oneself in the situation of another, experiencing the emotions, ideas, or opinions of that person.

“As you get older you have more respect and empathy for your parents. Now I have a great relationship with both of them.” – Hugh Jackman

“I’ve always thought of acting as more of an exercise in empathy , which is not to be confused with sympathy. You’re trying to get inside a certain emotional reality or motivational reality and try to figure out what that’s about so you can represent it.” – Edward Norton

The difference between the most commonly used meanings of these two terms is:

  • sympathy is feeling compassion, sorrow, or pity for the hardships that another person encounters.
  • empathy is putting yourself in the shoes of another, which is why actors often talk about it.

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Empathy vs Sympathy: Which One Are You Feeling?

Helly Douglas

Helly Douglas


Do you think empathy and sympathy mean the same thing? You’re not alone. They are easily confused.

Both words share the same Greek root word pathos meaning experience , suffering or emotion . They explain our reaction to the negative experiences of another person.

  • Sympathy is our ability to share someone else’s feelings when they suffer a misfortune.
  • Empathy means understanding another person’s feelings as if we were having them ourselves.

Let’s look at the difference between the two.

What Is Sympathy?

What is empathy, how to create sympathy and empathy when writing, empathy vs sympathy: conclusion.

Sympathy is often used to describe sharing someone's emotional pain. You’ll find messages of sympathy inside condolence cards.

When you feel bad for someone, you’re feeling sympathy. You feel sad they are suffering a misfortune. These feelings can be towards an individual or a group.

You need not be familiar with the negative experience. You can feel sympathetic for a person whose house has burnt down, despite never having been in a similar situation.

Leaders often express their sympathy in the media for communities damaged by disaster, including:

  • War and conflict, including terrorist attacks.
  • Natural disasters such as flooding, wildfires, and extreme weather.
  • The destruction of important artefacts and buildings.
  • Deaths caused by accidents such as a bridge or building collapsing.

Sympathy is also used to describe feeling a shared opinion or taste, such as in politics or with charities. For example, you might have sympathy with a political party because of shared views on healthcare.

Examples of Sympathy

  • I was sad to hear that Cathy’s husband died. She has my sympathy.
  • We are sympathetic to the plight of children made orphans by the war.
  • Brian has my sympathy. He lost his job last month.
  • Our sympathies are with the families who lost loved ones when the building collapsed.
  • We offered our sympathies to the people of France after Notre Dame burnt down.


Have you heard of the expression ‘putting yourself in someone else’s shoes’? This idiom describes empathy. It is the ability to imagine yourself in the same situation as someone else. The opposite of empathy is a feeling of distance or apathy.

You could think you would act differently to the same situation, but you can understand why someone might feel the way they do. You might not share the same feelings yourself, although you often will.

Unlike sympathy, empathy requires shared experience, feeling, or emotion. It is impossible to feel empathy for a position you can’t relate to.

We normally express empathy in negative situations. You imagine how someone feels, even if those emotions have not been explicitly expressed. Empathy is also used to describe projecting our emotions and feelings, such as onto a piece of art or nature.

Examples of Empathy

  • After losing my mum to cancer last year, I know how it feels to lose a loved one.
  • I also had to change jobs without much time for a handover: it is a stressful experience.
  • As I work from home, I can empathise with how lonely you feel when the kids have gone to school.
  • I can imagine how frightening it must have been when the fire spread.
  • I can empathise with the families who lost everything in a flood as I experienced the same thing when my house burnt down.

Are you a writer? If you want to evoke strong feelings in your reader, empathy and sympathy are important emotions.

Both make engaging characters and a believable story. If someone feels sympathetic, there is often empathy there too. It is hard to feel sorrowful for someone if you have no shared experience.

Empathy with a character means the reader can imagine themselves in that situation but do not necessarily share the same feelings.

It can be hard to create empathy if you are writing about something outside your reader’s understanding. But you can focus on common experiences to evoke it. For example, your reader may never have been a broker on a stock exchange, but they will have experienced high-pressured times in their life when they had to make a snap decision. Focusing on this will evoke empathy as well as sympathy for their plight.

Sympathy is more emotional. You can focus on a sorrowful situation to engage the sympathy of your reader. It is a great way to make a character more likeable or to create a tragic hero .

It is easy to understand why people confuse sympathy and empathy. Both explain our reactions to the misfortunes of others. You will often find them together, and it is common to see them wrongly treated as synonyms .

A simple way to identify which one you are feeling is to look for any commonality with the feeling, situation, or experience. Can you imagine yourself in the same situation? This will show you whether you empathise. If you only feel sad for them, you’re feeling sympathetic. Both emotions can help you create a great piece of writing.

empathy vs sympathy essay

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Helly Douglas is a UK writer and teacher, specialising in education, children, and parenting. She loves making the complex seem simple through blogs, articles, and curriculum content. You can check out her work at or connect on Twitter @hellydouglas. When she’s not writing, you will find her in a classroom, being a mum or battling against the wilderness of her garden—the garden is winning!

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The concept of empathy is used to refer to a wide range of psychological capacities that are thought of as being central for constituting humans as social creatures allowing us to know what other people are thinking and feeling, to emotionally engage with them, to share their thoughts and feelings, and to care for their well–being. Ever since the eighteenth century, due particularly to the influence of the writings of David Hume and Adam Smith, those capacities have been at the center of scholarly investigations into the underlying psychological basis of our social and moral nature. Yet, the concept of empathy is of relatively recent intellectual heritage. Moreover, since researchers in different disciplines have focused their investigations on very specific aspects of the broad range of empathy-related phenomena, one should probably not be surprised by a certain amount of conceptual confusion and a multiplicity of definitions associated with the empathy concept in a number of different scientific and non-scientific discourses. The purpose of this entry is to clarify the empathy concept by surveying its history in various philosophical and psychological discussions and by indicating why empathy was and should be regarded to be of such central importance in understanding human agency in ordinary contexts, in the human sciences, and for the constitution of ourselves as social and moral agents. More specifically, after a short historical introduction articulating the philosophical context within which the empathy concept was coined, the second and third sections will discuss the epistemic dimensions associated with our empathic capacities. They will address the contention that empathy is the primary epistemic means for knowing other minds and that it should be viewed as the unique method distinguishing the human from the natural sciences. Sections 4 and 5 will then focus on claims that view empathy as the fundamental social glue and that understand empathy as the main psychological mechanism enabling us to establish and maintain social relations and taking an evaluative stance towards each other.

1. Historical Introduction

2.1 mirror neurons, simulation, and the discussion of empathy in the contemporary theory of mind debate, 3.1 the critique of empathy in the context of a hermeneutic conception of the human sciences, 3.2 the critique of empathy within the context of a naturalist conception of the human sciences, 4. empathy as a topic of scientific exploration in psychology, 5.1 empathy and altruistic motivation, 5.2 empathy, its partiality, susceptibility to bias, and moral agency, 5.3 empathy, moral judgment, and the authority of moral norms, other internet resources, related entries.

Before the psychologist Edward Titchener (1867–1927) introduced the term “empathy” in 1909 into the English language as the translation of the German term “Einfühlung” (or “feeling into”), “sympathy”was the term commonly used to refer to empathy-related phenomena. If one were to point to a conceptual core for understanding these phenomena, it is probably best to point to David Hume’s dictum that “the minds of men are mirrors to one another,”(Hume 1739–40 [1978], 365) since in encountering other persons, humans can resonate with and recreate that person’s thoughts and emotions on different dimensions of cognitive complexity. While, as we will see, not everybody shares such resonance conception of empathy(some philosophers in the phenomenological tradition emphatically reject it), it certainly constitutes the center of Theodor Lipps’s understanding, who Titchener had in mind in his translation of “Einfühlung” as “empathy.”

Theodor Lipps (1851–1914)was also very familiar with the work of David Hume (see the introduction to Coplan and Goldie 2011 in this respect). More importantly, it was Theodor Lipps, whose work transformed empathy/Einfühlung from a concept of nineteenth century German aesthetics into a central category of the philosophy of the social and human sciences. To understand this transformation we first need to appreciate the reasons why philosophers of the nineteenth century thought it necessary to appeal to empathy in order to account for our ability to appreciate natural objects and artefacts in an aesthetic manner. According to the dominant (even though not universally accepted) positivistic and empiricist conception, sense data constitute the fundamental basis for our investigation of the world. Yet from a phenomenological perspective, our perceptual encounter with aesthetic objects and our appreciation of them as being beautiful—our admiration of a beautiful sunset, for example—seems to be as direct as our perception of an object as being red or square. By appealing to the psychological mechanisms of empathy, philosophers intended to provide an explanatory account of the phenomenological immediacy of our aesthetic appreciation of objects. More specifically, for Lipps, our empathic encounter with external objects trigger inner “processes” that give rise to experiences similar to ones that I have when I engage in various activities involving the movement of my body. Since my attention is perceptually focused on the external object, I experience them—or I automatically project my experiences—as being in the object. If those experiences are in some way apprehended in a positive manner and as being in some sense life-affirming, I perceive the object as beautiful, otherwise as ugly. In the first case, Lipps speaks of positive; in the later of negative empathy. Lipps also characterizes our experience of beauty as “objectified self-enjoyment,” since we are impressed by the “vitality” and “life potentiality” that lies in the perceived object (Lipps 1906, 1903 a,b. For the contemporary discussion of empathy’s role in aesthetics see particularly Breithaupt 2009; Coplan and Goldie 2011 (Part II); Curtis & Koch 2009; and Keen 2007. For a recent history of the empathy concept see also Lanzoni 2018).

In his Aesthetik, Lipps closely links our aesthetic perception and our perception of another embodied person as a minded creature. The nature of aesthetic empathy is always the “experience of another human” (1905, 49) . We appreciate another object as beautiful because empathy allows us to see it in analogy to another human body. Similarly, we recognize another organism as a minded creature because of empathy. Empathy in this context is more specifically understood as a phenomenon of “inner imitation,” where my mind mirrors the mental activities or experiences of another person based on the observation of his bodily activities or facial expressions. Empathy is ultimately based on an innate disposition for motor mimicry, a fact that is well established in the psychological literature and was already noticed by Adam Smith (1853). Even though such a disposition is not always externally manifested, Lipps suggests that it is always present as an inner tendency giving rise to similar kinaesthetic sensations in the observer as felt by the observed target. In seeing the angry face of another person we instinctually have a tendency of imitating it and of “imitating” her anger in this manner. Since we are not aware of such tendencies, we see the anger in her face (Lipps 1907). Despite the fact that Lipps’s primary examples of empathy focus on the recognition of emotions expressed in bodily gestures or facial expressions, his conception of empathy should not be understood as being limited to such cases. As his remarks about intellectual empathy suggest (1903b/05), he regards our recognition of all mental activities—insofar as they are activities requiring human effort—as being based on empathy or on inner imitation (See also the introductory chapter in Stueber 2006).

2. Empathy and the Philosophical Problem of Other Minds

It was indeed Lipps’s claim that empathy should be understood as the primary epistemic means for gaining knowledge of other minds that was the focus of a lively debate among philosophers at the beginning of the 20 th century (Prandtl 1910, Stein 1917, Scheler 1973). Even philosophers, who did not agree with Lipps’s specific explication, found the concept of empathy appealing because his argument for his position was closely tied to a thorough critique of what was widely seen at that time as the only alternative for conceiving of knowledge of other minds, that is, Mill’s inference from analogy. Traditionally, the inference from analogy presupposes a Cartesian conception of the mind according to which access to our own mind is direct and infallible, whereas knowledge of other minds is inferential, fallible, and based on evidence about other persons’ observed physical behavior. More formally one can characterize the inference from analogy as consisting of the following premises or steps.

i.) Another person X manifests behavior of type B . ii.) In my own case behavior of type B is caused by mental state of type M . iii.) Since my and X ’s outward behavior of type B is similar, it has to have similar inner mental causes. (It is thus assumed that I and the other persons are psychologically similar in the relevant sense.) Therefore: The other person’s behavior ( X ’s behavior) is caused by a mental state of type M .

Like Wittgenstein, but predating him considerably, Lipps argues in his 1907 article “Das Wissen von fremden Ichen” that the inference from analogy falls fundamentally short of solving the philosophical problem of other minds. Lipps does not argue against the inference from analogy because of its evidentially slim basis, but because it does not allow us to understand its basic presupposition that another person has a mind that is psychologically similar to our own mind. The inference from analogy thus cannot be understood as providing us with evidence for the claim that the other person has mental states like we do because, within its Cartesian framework, we are unable to conceive of other minds in the first place. For Lipps, analogical reasoning requires the contradictory undertaking of inferring another person’s anger and sadness on the basis of my sadness and anger, yet to think of that sadness and anger simultaneously as something “absolutely different” from my anger and sadness. More generally, analogical inference is a contradictory undertaking because it entails “entertaining a completely new thought about an I, that however is not me, but something absolutely different” (Lipps 1907, 708, my translation).

Yet while Lipps diagnoses the problem of the inference of analogy within the context of a Cartesian conception of the mind quite succinctly, he fails to explain how empathy is able to provide us with an epistemically sanctioned understanding of other minds or why our “feeling into” the other person’s mind is more than a mere projection. More importantly, Lipps does not sufficiently explain why empathy does not encounter similar problems to the ones diagnosed for the inference from analogy and how empathy allows us to conceive of other persons as having a mind similar to our own if we are directly acquainted only with our own mental states(See Stueber 2006). Wittgenstein’s critique of the inference from analogy is in the end more penetrating because he recognizes that its problem depends on a Cartesian account of mental concepts. If my grasp of a mental concept is exclusively constituted by me experiencing something in a certain way, then it is impossible for me to conceive of how that very same concept can be applied to somebody else, given that I cannot experience somebody else’s mental states. I therefore cannot conceive of how another person can be in the same mental state as I am because that would require that I can conceive of my mental state as something, which I do not experience. But according to the Cartesian conception this seems to be a conceptually impossible task. Moreover, if one holds on to a Cartesian conception of the mind, it is not clear how appealing to empathy, as conceived of by Lipps, should help us in conceiving of mental states as belonging to another mind.

Within the phenomenological tradition, the above shortcomings of Lipps’s position of empathy were quite apparent (see for example Stein 1917, 24 and Scheler 1973, 236). Yet despite the fact that they did not accept Lipps’s explication of empathy as being based on mechanisms of inner resonance and projection, authors within the phenomenological tradition of philosophy were persuaded by Lipps’s critique of the inference from analogy. For that very reason, Husserl and Stein, for example, continued using the concept of empathy and regarded empathy as an irreducible “type of experiential act sui generis” (Stein 1917, 10), which allows us to view another person as being analogous to ourselves without this “analogizing apprehension” constituting an inference of analogy (Husserl 1931 [1963], 141). Scheler went probably the furthest in rejecting the Cartesian framework in thinking about the apprehension of other minds, while keeping committed to something like the concept of empathy. [ 1 ] (In order to contrast his position from Lipps, Scheler however preferred to use the term “nachfühlen” rather than “einfühlen.”) For Scheler, the fundamental mistake of the debate about the apprehension of other minds consists in the fact that it does not take seriously certain phenomenological facts. Prima facie, we do not encounter merely the bodily movements of another person. Rather, we are directly recognizing specific mental states because they are characteristically expressed in states of the human body; in facial expressions, in gestures, in the tone of voice, and so on. Empathy within the phenomenological tradition then is not conceived of as a resonance phenomenon requiring the observer to recreate the mental states of the other person in his or her own mind but as a special perceptual act (See Scheler 1973, particularly 232–258; For a succinct explication of the debate about empathy in the phenomenological tradition consult Zahavi 2010)

The idea that empathy understood as inner imitation is the primary epistemic means for understanding other minds has however been revived in the 1980’s by simulation theorists in the context of the interdisciplinary debate about folk psychology; an empirically informed debate about how best to describe the underlying causal mechanisms of our folk psychological abilities to interpret, explain, and predict other agents. (See Davies and Stone 1995). In contrast to theory theory, simulation theorists conceive of our ordinary mindreading abilities as an ego-centric method and as a “knowledge–poor” strategy, where I do not utilize a folk psychological theory but use myself as a model for the other person’s mental life. It is not the place here to discuss the contemporary debate extensively, but it has to be emphasized that contemporary simulation theorists vigorously discuss how to account for our grasp of mental concepts and whether simulation theory is committed to Cartesianism. Whereas Goldman (2002, 2006) links his version of simulation theory to a neo-Cartesian account of mental concepts, other simulation theorists develop versions of simulation theory that are not committed to a Cartesian conception of the mind. (Gordon 1995a, b, and 2000; Heal 2003; and Stueber 2006, 2012).

Moreover, neuroscientific findings according to which so called mirror neurons play an important role in recognizing another person’s emotional states and in understanding the goal-directedness of his behavior have been understood as providing empirical evidence for Lipps’ idea of empathy as inner imitation. With the help of the term “mirror neuron,” scientists refer to the fact that there is significant overlap between neural areas of excitation that underlie our observation of another person’s action and areas that are stimulated when we execute the very same action. A similar overlap between neural areas of excitation has also been established for our recognition of another person’s emotion based on his facial expression and our experiencing the emotion. (For a survey on mirror neurons see Gallese 2003a and b, Goldman 2006, chap. 6; Keysers 2011; Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004; and particularly Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2008). Since the face to face encounter between persons is the primary situation within which human beings recognize themselves as minded creatures and attribute mental states to others, the system of mirror neurons has been interpreted as playing a causally central role in establishing intersubjective relations between minded creatures. For that very reason, the neuroscientist Gallese thinks of mirror neurons as constituting what he calls the “shared manifold of intersubjectivity” (Gallese 2001, 44). Stueber (2006, chap. 4)—inspired by Lipps’s conception of empathy as inner imitation—refers to mirror neurons as mechanisms of basic empathy; [ 2 ] as mechanisms that allow us to apprehend directly another person’s emotions in light of his facial expressions and that enable us to understand his bodily movements as goal-directed actions, that is, as being directed towards an external object like a person reaching for the cup. The evidence from mirror neurons—and the fact that in perceiving other people we use very different neurobiological mechanisms than in the perception of physical objects—does suggest that in our primary perceptual encounter with the world we do not merely encounter physical objects. Rather, even on this basic level, we distinguish already between mere physical objects and objects that are more like us (See also Meltzoff and Brooks 2001). The mechanisms of basic empathy have to be seen as Nature’s way of dissolving one of the principal assumptions of the traditional philosophical discussion about other minds shared by opposing positions such as Cartesianism and Behaviorism; that is, that we perceive other people primarily as physical objects and do not distinguish already on the perceptual level between physical objects like trees and minded creatures like ourselves. Mechanisms of basic empathy might therefore be interpreted as providing us with a perceptual and non-conceptual basis for developing an intersubjectively accessible folk psychological framework that is applicable to the subject and observed other (Stueber 2006, 142–45).

It needs to be acknowledged however that this interpretation of mirror neurons crucially depends on the assumption that the primary function of mirror neurons consists in providing us with a cognitive grasp of another person’s actions and emotions. This interpretation has however been criticized by researchers and philosophers who think that neural resonance presupposes rather than provides us with an understanding of what is going on in the minds of others (Csibra 2007, Hickok 2008 and 2014). They have also pointed out that in observing another person’s emotion or behavior, we never fully “mirror” another person’s neural stimulation. The neuroscientist Jean Decety has argued that in observing another person’s pain our vicariously stimulated pain matrix is not sensitive to the phenomenal quality of pain. Rather it is sensitive to pain as an indicator of “aversion and withdrawal when exposed to danger and threats”(Decety and Cowell 2015, 6 and Decety 2010). At least as far as empathy for pain is concerned, our neural resonance is also modulated by a variety of contextual factors, such as how close we feel to the observed subject, whether we regard the pain to be morally justified (as in the case of punishment, for example) or whether we regard it as unavoidable and necessary, such as in a medical procedure (Singer and Lamm 2009; but see also Allen 2010, Borg 2007, Debes 2010, Gallese 2016, Goldman 2009, Iacoboni 2011, Jacob 2008, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia 2016, and Stueber 2012a).

Yet it should be noted that everyday mindreading is not restricted to the realm of basic empathy. Ordinarily we not only recognize that other persons are afraid or that they are reaching for a particular object. We understand their behavior in more complex social contexts in terms of their reasons for acting using the full range of psychological concepts including the concepts of belief and desire. Evidence from neuroscience shows that these mentalizing tasks involve very different neuronal areas such as the medial prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal cortex, and the cingulate cortex. (For a survey see Kain and Perner 2003; Frith and Frith 2003; Zaki and Ochsner 2012). Low level mindreading in the realm of basic empathy has therefore to be distinguished from higher levels of mindreading (Goldman 2006). It is clear that low level forms of understanding other persons have to be conceived of as being relatively knowledge– poor as they do not involve a psychological theory or complex psychological concepts. How exactly one should conceive of high level mindreading abilities, whether they involve primarily knowledge–poor simulation strategies or knowledge–rich inferences is controversially debated within the contemporary debate about our folk psychological mindreading abilities(See Davies and Stone 1995, Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997, Gordon 1995, Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, Heal 2003, Nichols and Stich 2003, Goldman 2006, and Stueber 2006). Simulation theorists, however, insist that even more complex forms of understanding other agents involve resonance phenomena that engage our cognitively intricate capacities of imaginatively adopting the perspective of another person and reenacting or recreating their thought processes (For various forms of perspective-taking see Coplan 2011 and Goldie 2000). Accordingly, simulation theorists distinguish between different types of empathy such as between basic and reenactive empathy (Stueber 2006) or between mirroring and reconstructive empathy (Goldman 2011). Interestingly, the debate about how to conceive of these more complex forms of mindreading resonates with the traditional debate about whether empathy is the unique method of the human sciences and whether or not one has to strictly distinguish between the methods of the human and the natural sciences. Equally noteworthy is the fact that in the contemporary theory of mind debate voices have grown louder that assert that the contemporary theory of mind debate fundamentally misconceives of the nature of social cognition. In light of insights from the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions in philosophy, they claim that on the most basic level empathy should not be conceived of as a resonance phenomenon but as a type of direct perception. (See particularly Zahavi 2010; Zahavi and Overgaard 2012, but Jacob 2011 for a response). More complex forms of social cognition are also not to be understood as being based on either theory or empathy/simulation, rather they are better best conceived of as the ability to directly fit observed units of actions into larger narrative or cultural frameworks (For this debate see Gallagher 2012, Gallagher and Hutto 2008, Hutto 2008, and Seemann 2011, Stueber 2011 and 2012a, and various articles in Matravers and Waldow 2018). For skepticism about empathic perspective-taking understood as a complete identification with the perspective of the other person see also Goldie 2011). Regardless of how one views this specific debate it should be clear that ideas about mindreading developed originally by proponents of empathy at the beginning of the 20 th century can no longer be easily dismissed and have to be taken seriously.

3. Empathy as the Unique Method of the Human Sciences

At the beginning of the 20 th century, empathy understood as a non-inferential and non-theoretical method of grasping the content of other minds became closely associated with the concept of understanding (Verstehen); a concept that was championed by the hermeneutic tradition of philosophy concerned with explicating the methods used in grasping the meaning and significance of texts, works of arts, and actions. (For a survey of this tradition see Grondin 1994). Hermeneutic thinkers insisted that the method used in understanding the significance of a text or a historical event has to be fundamentally distinguished from the method used in explaining an event within the context of the natural sciences. This methodological dualism is famously expressed by Droysen in saying that “historical research does not want to explain; that is, derive in a form of an inferential argument, rather it wants to understand” (Droysen 1977, 403), and similarly in Dilthey’s dictum that “we explain nature, but understand the life of the soul” (Dilthey 1961, vol. 5, 144). Yet Droysen and authors before him never conceived of understanding solely as an act of mental imitation or solely as an act of imaginatively “transporting” oneself into the point of view of another person. Such “psychological interpretation” as Schleiermacher (1998) used to call it, was conceived of as constituting only one aspect of the interpretive method used by historians. Other tasks mentioned in this context involved critically evaluating the reliability of historical sources, getting to know the linguistic conventions of a language, and integrating the various elements derived from historical sources into a consistent narrative of a particular epoch. The differences between these various aspects of the interpretive procedure were however downplayed in the early Dilthey. For him, grasping the significance of any cultural fact had to be understood as a mental act of “transposition.” (See for example Dilthey 1961, vol. 5, 263–265). .

Ironically, the close association of the concepts of empathy and understanding and the associated claim that empathy is the sole and unique method of the human sciences also facilitated the decline of the empathy concept and its almost utter disregard by philosophers of the human and social sciences later on, in both the analytic and continental/hermeneutic traditions of philosophy. Within both traditions, proponents of empathy were—for very different reasons—generally seen as advocating an epistemically naïve and insufficiently broad conception of the methodological proceedings in the human sciences. As a result, most philosophers of the human and social sciences maintained their distance from the idea that empathy is central for our understanding of other minds and mental phenomena. Notable exceptions in this respect are R.G. Collingwood and his followers, who suggested that reenacting another person’s thoughts is necessary for understanding them as rational agents (Collingwood 1946, Dray 1957 and 1995). Notice however that in contrast to the contemporary debate about folk psychology, the debate about empathy in the philosophy of social science is not concerned with investigating underlying causal mechanisms. Rather, it addresses normative questions of how to justify a particular explanation or interpretation.

Philosophers arguing for a hermeneutic conception of the human and social sciences insist on a strict methodological division between the human and the natural sciences. [ 3 ] Yet they nowadays favor the concept of understanding (Verstehen) and reject the earlier identification of understanding and empathy for two specific reasons. First, empathy is no longer seen as the unique method of the human sciences because facts of significance, which a historian or an interpreter of literary and non-literary texts are interested in, do not solely depend on facts within the individual mind. A historian, for example, is not bound by the agent’s perspective in telling the story of a particular historical time period(Danto 1965). Similarly, philosophers such as Hans Georg Gadamer, have argued that the significance of a text is not tied to the author’s intentions in writing the text. In reading a text by Shakespeare or Plato we are not primarily interested in finding out what Plato or Shakespeare said but what these texts themselves say.(Gadamer 1989; for a critical discussion see Skinner (in Tully 1988); “Introduction” in Kögler and Stueber 2000; and Stueber 2002).

The above considerations, however, do not justify the claim that empathy has no role to play within the context of the human sciences. It justifies merely the claim that empathy cannot be their only method, at least as long as one admits that recognizing the thoughts of individual agents has to play some role in the interpretive project of the human sciences. Accordingly, a second reason against empathy is also emphasized. Conceiving of understanding other agents as being based on empathy is seen as an epistemically extremely naïve conception of the interpretation of individual agents, since it seems to conceive of understanding as a mysterious meeting of two individual minds outside of any cultural context. Individual agents are always socially and culturally embedded creatures. Understanding other agents thus presupposes an understanding of the cultural context within which an agent functions. Moreover, in the interpretive situation of the human sciences, the cultural background of the interpreter and the person, who has to be interpreted, can be very different. In that case, I can not very easily put myself in the shoes of the other person and imitate his thoughts in my mind. If understanding medieval knights, to use an example of Winch (1958), requires me to think exactly as the medieval knight did, then it is not clear how such a task can be accomplished from an interpretive perspective constituted by very different cultural presuppositions. Making sense of other minds has, therefore, to be seen as an activity that is a culturally mediated one; a fact that empathy theorists according to this line of critique do not sufficiently take into account when they conceive of understanding other agents as a direct meeting of minds that is independent of and unaided by information about how these agents are embedded in a broader social environment. (See Stueber 2006, chap.6, Zahavi 2001, 2005; for the later Dilthey see Makreel 2000. For a critical discussion of whether the concept of understanding without recourse to empathy is useful for marking an epistemic distinction between the human and natural sciences consult also Stueber 2012b. Within the context of anthropology, Hollan and Throop argue that empathy is best understood as a dynamic, culturally situated, temporally extended, and dialogical process actively involving not only the interpreter but also his or her interpretee. See Hollan 20012; Hollan and Throop 2008, 2001; Throop 2010).).

Philosophers, who reject the methodological dualism between the human and the natural sciences as argued for in the hermeneutic context, are commonly referred to as naturalists in the philosophy of social science. They deny that the distinction between understanding and explanation points to an important methodological difference. Even in the human or social sciences, the main point of the scientific endeavor is to provide epistemically justified explanations (and predictions) of observed or recorded events (see also Henderson 1993). At most, empathy is granted a heuristic role in the context of discovery. It however can not play any role within the context of justification. As particularly Hempel (1965) has argued, to explain an event involves—at least implicitly—an appeal to law-like regularities providing us with reasons for expecting that an event of a certain kind will occur under specific circumstances. Empathy might allow me to recognize that I would have acted in the same manner as somebody else. Yet it does not epistemically sanction the claim that anybody of a particular type or anybody who is in that type of situation will act in this manner.

Hempel’s argument against empathy has certainly not gone unchallenged. Within the philosophy of history, Dray (1957), following Collingwood, has argued that empathy plays an epistemically irreducible role, since we explain actions in terms of an agent’s reasons. For him, such reason explanations do not appeal to empirical generalizations but to normative principles of actions outlining how a person should act in a particular situation. Similar arguments have been articulated by Jaegwon Kim (1984, 1998). Yet as Stueber (2006, chap. 5) argues such a response to Hempel would require us to implausibly conceive of reason explanations as being very different from ordinary causal explanations. It would imply that our notions of explanation and causation are ambiguous concepts. Reasons that cause agents to act in the physical world would be conceived of as causes in a very different sense than ordinary physical causes. Moreover, as Hempel himself suggests, appealing to normative principles explains at most why a person should have acted in a certain manner. It does not explain why he ultimately acted in that way. Consequently, Hempel’s objection against empathy retain their force as long as one maintains that reason explanations are a form of ordinary causal explanations and as long as one conceives of the epistemic justification of such explanations as implicitly appealing to some empirical generalizations (For Kim’s recent attempt to account for the explanatory character of action explanations by acknowledging the centrality of the first person perspective see also Kim 2010).

Despite these concessions to Hempel, Stueber suggests that empathy (specifically reenactive empathy) has to be acknowledged as playing a central role even in the context of justification. For him, folk psychological explanations have to be understood as being tied to the domain of rational agency. In contrast to explanations in terms of mere inner causes, folk psychological explanations retain their explanatory force only as long as agents’ beliefs and desires can also be understood as reasons for their actions. The epistemic justification of such folk psychological explanations implicitly relies on generalizations involving folk psychological notions such as belief and desire. Yet the existence of such generalizations alone does not establish specific beliefs and desires as reasons for a person’s actions. Elaborating on considerations by Heal (2003) and Collingwood (1946), Stueber suggests that recognizing beliefs and desires as reasons requires the interpreter to be sensitive to an agent’s other relevant beliefs and desires. Individual thoughts function as reasons for rational agency only relative to a specific framework of an agent’s thoughts that are relevant for consideration in a specific situation. Most plausibly—given our persistent inability to solve the frame problem—recognizing which of another agent’s thoughts are relevant in specific contexts requires the practical ability of reenacting another person’s thoughts in one’s own mind. Empathy’s central epistemic role has to be admitted, since beliefs and desires can be understood only in this manner as an agent’s reasons (See Stueber 2006, 2008, 2013. For a related discussion about the role of understanding in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science see Grimm 2016 and Grimm, Baumberger, and Ammon 2017).

The discussion of empathy within psychology has been largely unaffected by the critical philosophical discussion of empathy as an epistemic means to know other minds or as the unique method of the human sciences. Rather, psychologists’ interest in empathy–related phenomena harks back to eighteenth century moral philosophy, particularly David Hume and Adam Smith (See also Wispe 1991). Here empathy, or what was then called sympathy, was regarded to play a central role in constituting human beings as social and moral creatures allowing us to emotionally connect to our human companions and care for their well-being. Throughout the early 20 th century, but particularly since the late 1940’s, empathy has, therefore, been an intensively studied topic of psychological research.

More broadly one can distinguish two psychological research traditions studying empathy–related phenomena; that is, the study of what is currently called empathic accuracy and the study of empathy as an emotional phenomenon in the encounter of others. The first area of study defines empathy primarily as a cognitive phenomenon and conceives of empathy in general terms as “the intellectual or imaginative apprehension of another’s condition or state of mind,” to use Hogan’s (1969) terminology. Within this area of research, one is primarily interested in determining the reliability and accuracy of our ability to perceive and recognize other persons’ enduring personality traits, attitudes and values, and occurrent mental states. One also investigates the various factors that influence empathic accuracy. One has, for example, been interested in determining whether empathic ability depends on gender, age, family background, intelligence, emotional stability, the nature of interpersonal relations, or whether it depends on specific motivations of the observer. (For a survey see Ickes 1993 and 2003; and Taft 1955). A more detailed account of the research on empathic accuracy and some of its earlier methodological difficulties can be found in the

Supplementary document on the Study of Cognitive Empathy and Empathic Accuracy .

Philosophically more influential has been the study of empathy defined primarily as an emotional or affective phenomenon, which psychologists in the middle of the 1950’s started to focus on. In this context, psychologists have also addressed issues of moral motivation that have been traditionally topics of intense discussions among moral philosophers. They were particularly interested in investigating (i) the development of various means for measuring empathy as a dispositional trait of adults and of children and as a situational response in specific situations, (ii) the factors on which empathic responses and dispositions depend, and (iii) the relation between empathy and pro-social behavior and moral development. Before discussing the psychological research on emotional empathy and its relevance for moral philosophy and moral psychology in the next section, it is vital to introduce important conceptual distinctions that one should keep in mind in evaluating the various empirical studies.

Anyone reading the emotional empathy literature has to be struck by the fact that empathy tended to be incredibly broadly defined in the beginning of this specific research tradition. Stotland, one of the earliest researcher who understood empathy exclusively as an emotional phenomenon, defined it as “an observer’s reacting emotionally because he perceives that another is experiencing or is about to experience an emotion” (1969, 272). According to Stotland’s definition very diverse emotional responses such as feeling envy, feeling annoyed, feeling distressed, being relieved about, feeling pity, or feeling what Germans call Schadenfreude (feeling joyful about the misfortune of another) have all to be counted as empathic reactions. Since the 1980’s however, psychologists have fine tuned their understanding of empathy conceptually and distinguished between different aspects of the emotional reaction to another person; thereby implicitly acknowledging the conceptual distinctions articulated by Max Scheler (1973) almost a century earlier. In this context, it is particularly useful to distinguish between the following reactive emotions that are differentiated in respect to whether or not such reactions are self or other oriented and whether they presuppose awareness of the distinction between self and others. (See also the survey in the Introduction to Eisenberg/Strayer 1987 and Batson 2009)

Emotional contagion: Emotional contagion occurs when people start feeling similar emotions caused merely by the association with other people. You start feeling joyful, because other people around you are joyful or you start feeling panicky because you are in a crowd of people feeling panic. Emotional contagion however does not require that one is aware of the fact that one experiences the emotions because other people experience them, rather one experiences them primarily as one’s own emotion (Scheler 1973, 22). A newborn infant’s reactive cry to the distress cry of another, which Hoffman takes as a “rudimentary precursor of empathic distress” (Hoffman 2000, 65), can probably be understood as a phenomenon of emotional contagion, since the infant is not able to properly distinguish between self and other.

Affective and proper Empathy: More narrowly and properly understood, empathy in the affective sense is the vicarious sharing of an affect. Authors however differ in how strictly they interpret the phrase of vicariously sharing an affect. For some, it requires that the empathizers and the persons they empathize with need to be in very similar affective states (Coplan 2011; de Vignemont and Singer 2006; Jacob 2011). For Hoffman, on the other hand, it is an emotional response requiring only “the involvement of psychological processes that make a person have feelings that are more congruent with another’s situation than with his own situation” (Hoffman 2000, 30). According to this definition, empathy does not necessarily require that the subject and target feel similar emotions (even though this is most often the case). Rather the definition also includes cases of feeling sad when seeing a child who plays joyfully but who does not know that it has been diagnosed with a serious illness (assuming that this is how the other person himself or herself would feel if he or she would fully understand his or her situation). In contrast to mere emotional contagion, genuine empathy presupposes the ability to differentiate between oneself and the other. It requires that one is minimally aware of the fact that one is having an emotional experience due to the perception of the other’s emotion, or more generally due to attending to his situation. In seeing a sad face of another and feeling sad oneself, such feeling of sadness should count as genuinely empathic only if one recognizes that in feeling sad one’s attention is still focused on the other and that it is not an appropriate reaction to aspects of one’s own life. Moreover, empathy outside the realm of a direct perceptual encounter involves some appreciation of the other person’s emotion as an appropriate response to his or her situation. To be happy or unhappy because one’s child is happy or sad should not count necessarily as an empathic emotion. It cannot count as a vicarious emotional response if it is due to the perception of the outside world from the perspective of the observer and her desire that her children should be happy. My happiness about my child being happy would therefore not be an emotional state that is more congruent to his situation. Rather, it is an emotional response appropriate to my own perspective on the world. In order for my happiness or unhappiness to be genuinely empathic it has to be happiness or unhappiness about what makes the other person happy. Accordingly, if I share another person’s emotion vicariously I do not merely have to be in an affective state with a similar phenomenal quality. Rather my affective state has to be directed toward the same intentional object. (See Sober and Wilson 1998, 231–237 and Maibom 2007. For a critical discussion of how and whether such vicarious sharing is possible see also Deonna 2007 and Matravers 2018). It should be noted, however, that some authors conceive of proper empathy more broadly as not merely being concerned with the vicarious reenactment of affective states but more comprehensively as including non-affective states such as beliefs and desires. This is especially true if they are influenced by the discussion of of empathy as an epistemic means such as Goldman (2011) and Stueber (2006). However, already Adam Smith (1853) constitutes a good example for such broad understanding of proper empathy. Finally, others suggest that it is best to distinguish between affective sharing and perspective taking (Decety and Cowell 2015).

Sympathy: In contrast to affective empathy, sympathy—or what some authors also refer to as empathic concern—is not an emotion that is congruent with the other’s emotion or situation such as feeling the sadness of the other person’s grieving for the death of his father. Rather, sympathy is seen as an emotion sui generis that has the other’s negative emotion or situation as its object from the perspective of somebody who cares for the other person’s well being (Darwall 1998). In this sense, sympathy consists of “feeling sorrow or concern for the distressed or needy other,” a feeling for the other out of a “heightened awareness of the suffering of another person as something that needs to be alleviated.” (Eisenberg 2000a, 678; Wispe 1986, 318; and Wispe 1991).

Whereas it is quite plausible to assume that empathy—that is, empathy with negative emotions of another or what Hoffman (2000) calls “veridical empathic distress”—under certain conditions (and when certain developmental markers are achieved) can give rise to sympathy, it should be stressed that the relation between affective empathy and sympathy is a contingent one; the understanding of which requires further empirical research. First, sympathy does not necessarily require feeling any kind of congruent emotions on part of the observer, a detached recognition or representation that the other is in need or suffers might be sufficient. (See Scheler 1973 and Nichols 2004). Second, empathy or empathic distress might not at all lead to sympathy. People in the helping professions, who are so accustomed to the misery of others, suffer at times from compassion fatigue. It is also possible to experience empathic overarousal because one is emotionally so overwhelmed by one’s empathic feelings that one is unable to be concerned with the suffering of the other (Hoffman 2000, chap. 8). In the later case, one’s empathic feeling are transformed or give rise to mere personal distress, a reactive emotional phenomenon that needs to be distinguished from emotional contagion, empathy, and sympathy.

Personal Distress: Personal distress in the context of empathy research is understood as a reactive emotion in response to the perception/recognition of another’s negative emotion or situation. Yet, while personal distress is other-caused like sympathy, it is, in contrast to sympathy, primarily self-oriented . In this case, another person’s distress does not make me feel bad for him or her, it just makes me feel bad, or “alarmed, grieved, upset, worried, disturbed, perturbed, distressed,and troubled;” to use the list of adjectives that according to Batson’s research indicates personal distress (Batson et al. 1987 and Batson 1991). And, in contrast to empathic emotions as defined above, my personal distress is not any more congruent with the emotion or situation of another. Rather it wholly defines my own outlook onto the world.

While it is conceptually necessary to differentiate between these various emotional responses, it has to be admitted that it is empirically not very easy to discriminate between them, since they tend to occur together. Think or imagine yourself attending the funeral of the child of a friend or good acquaintance. This is probably one reason why early researchers tended not to distinguish between the above aspects in their study of empathy related phenomena. Yet since the above distinctions refer to very different psychological mechanisms, it is absolutely central to distinguish between them when empirically assessing the impact and contribution of empathy to an agent’s pro-social motivation and behavior. Given the ambiguity of the empathy concept within psychology—particularly in the earlier literature—in evaluating and comparing different empirical empathy studies, it is always crucial to keep in mind how empathy has been defined and measured within the context of these studies. For a more extensive discussion of the methods used by psychologists to measure empathy see the

Supplementary document on Measuring Empathy .

5. Empathy, Moral Philosophy, and Moral Psychology

Moral philosophers have always been concerned with moral psychology and with articulating an agent’s motivational structure in order to explicate the importance of morality for a human life. After all, moral judgments supposedly make demands on an agent’s will and are supposed to provide us with reasons and motivations for acting in a certain manner. Yet moral judgments, at least in the manner in which we conceive of them in modern times, are also regarded to be based on normative standards that, in contrast to mere conventional norms, have universal scope and are valid independent of the features of specific social practices that agents are embedded in. One only needs to think of statements such as “cruelty to innocent children or slavery is morally wrong,” which we view as applying also to social practices where the attitude of its population seem to condone such actions. Moral judgements thus seem to address us from the perspective of the moral stance where we leave behind the perspective of self-love and do not conceive of each other either as friends or foes (see Hume 1987, 75) or as belonging to the in–group or out–group, but where we view each other all to be equal part of a moral community. Finally, and relatedly, in order to view morality as something that is possible for human beings we also seem to require that our motivations based on or associated with moral reasons have a self-less character. Given to charity for merely selfish reasons, for example, seems to clearly diminish its moral worth and implicitly deny the universal character of a moral demand. Philosophically explicating the importance of morality for human life then has to do the following: It has to explain how it is that we humans as a matter of fact do care about morality thusly conceived, it has to address the philosophically even more pertinent question of why it is that we should care about morality or why it is that we should regard judgments issued from the perspective of the moral stance to have normative authority over us; and it has to allow us to understand how it is that we can act self-lessly in a manner that correspond to the demands made on us from the moral stance. Answering all of these questions however necessitates at one point to explain how our moral interests are related to our psychological constitution as human beings and how moral demands can be understood as being appropriately addressed to agents who are psychologically structured in that manner.

Prima facie, the difficulty of this enterprise consists in squaring a realistic account of human psychology with the universal scope and intersubjective validity of moral judgments, since human motivation and psychological mechanisms seem to be always situational, local, and of rather limited scope. Moreover, as evolutionary psychologists tell us in–group bias seems to be a universal trait of human psychology. One of the most promising attempts to solve this problem is certainly due to the tradition of eighteenth century moral philosophy associated with the names of David Hume and Adam Smith who tried to address all of the above philosophical desiderata by pointing to the central role that our empathic and sympathetic capacities have for constituting us as social and moral agents and for providing us with the psychological capacities to make and to respond to moral judgments. While philosophers in the Kantian tradition, who favor reason over sentiments, have generally been skeptical about this proposal, more recently the claim that empathy is central for morality and a flourishing human life has again been the topic of an intense and controversial debate. On the one hand, empathy has been hailed by researchers from a wide range of disciplines and also by some public figures, President Obama most prominently among them. Slote (2010) champions empathy as the sole foundation of moral judgment, de Waal (2006) conceives of it as the unique evolutionary building block of morality, Rifkin (2009) regards it even as a force whose cultivation has unique revolutionary powers to transform a world in crisis, and Baron-Cohen (2011, 194) views it as a “universal solvent” in that “any problem immersed in empathy becomes soluble.” On the other hand, such empathy enthusiasm has encountered penetrating criticism by Prinz (2011 a,b) and Bloom (2016), who emphasize its dark side, that is, its tendency to fall prey to so–called “here and now” biases. The following subsections will address these issues by surveying the relevant empirical research on the question whether empathy motivates us in a self-less manner, the question of whether empathy is inherently biased and partial to the in-group, and it will discuss how we might think of the normative character of moral judgments in light of our empathic capacities.(For a survey of other relevant issues from social psychology, specifically social neuroscience, consult also Decety and Lamm 2006; Decety and Ickes 2009, and Decety 20012. For a discussion of the importance empathy for medical practice see Halpern 2001)

In a series of ingeniously designed experiments, Batson has accumulated evidence for what he calls the empathy-altruism thesis. In arguing for this thesis, Batson conceives of empathy as empathic concern or what others would call sympathy. More specifically, he characterized it in terms of feelings of being sympathetic, moved by, being compassionate, tender, warm and soft-hearted towards the other’s plight (Batson et al. 1987, 26) The task of his experiments consists in showing that empathy/sympathy does indeed lead to genuinely altruistic motivation, where the welfare of the other is the ultimate goal of my helping behavior, rather than to helping behavior because of predominantly egoistic motivations. According to the egoistic interpretation of empathy–related phenomena, empathizing with another person in need is associated with a negative feeling or can lead to a heightened awareness of the negative consequences of not helping; such as feelings of guilt, shame, or social sanctions. Alternatively, it can lead to an enhanced recognition of the positive consequences of helping behavior such as social rewards or good feelings. Empathy according to this interpretation induces us to help through mediation of purely egoistic motivations. We help others only because we recognize helping behavior as a means to egoistic ends. It allows us to reduce our negative feelings (aversive arousal reduction hypothesis), to avoid “punishment,” or to gain specific internal or external “rewards” (empathy-specific punishment and empathy-specific reward hypotheses).

Notice however that in arguing for the empathy-altruism thesis, Batson is not claiming that empathy always induces helping behavior. Rather, he argues against the predominance of an egoistic interpretation of an agent’s motivational structure. He argues for the existence of genuinely altruistic motivations and more specifically for the claim that empathy causes such genuinely altruistic motivation. These genuinely altruistic motives (together with other egoistic motives) are taken into account by the individual agent in deliberating about whether or not to help. Even for Batson, the question of whether the agent will act on his or her altruistic motivations depends ultimately on how strong they are and what costs the agent would incur in helping another person.

The basic set up of Batson’s experiments consists in the manipulation of the situation of the experimental subjects (dependent on the egoistic alternative to be argued against) and the manipulation of empathy/sympathy felt for an observed target in need. The decisive evidence for the empathy/sympathy-altruism thesis is always the recorded behavior of the subject, who is in a high empathy condition and in a situation where his helping behavior can not plausibly be seen as a means for the satisfaction of a personal goal. Since here is not the place to extensively describe the details of Batson’s experiments, a brief description of the experimental set up—focusing on Batson’s argument against the aversive arousal interpretation of empathy—and a brief evaluation of the success of his general argumentative strategy has to suffice (for more details see Batson 1991 and 2011). In all of his experiments, Batson assumes—based on Stotland (1969) and others—that empathy/sympathy can be manipulated either by manipulating the perceived similarity between subjects and targets or by manipulating the perspective taking attitude of the subjects. Empathy according to these assumptions can be increased by enhancing the perceived similarity between subject and target or by asking the subject to imagine how the observed person would feel in his or her situation rather than asking the subject to attend carefully to the information provided. [Note also that instructing the subject to imagine how they themselves would feel in the other’s situation, rather than instructing them to imagine how the other feels, is associated with an increase in personal distress and not only sympathetic feelings. (Batson et al. 1997b and Lamm, Batson, and Decety 2007).]

In trying to argue against the aversive arousal reduction interpretation, Batson also manipulates the ease with which a subject can avoid helping another person (in this case taking his place when they see him getting electric shocks). He reasons that if empathy leads to genuinely altruistic motivations, subjects in the high empathy/easy escape condition should still be willing to help. If they were only helping in order to reduce their own negative feelings, they would be expected to leave in this situation, since leaving is the less costly means for reaching an egoistic goal. As Batson was happy to report, the results confirmed his empathy/sympathy-altruism hypothesis, not only in the above experiments but also in experiments testing other alternative interpretations of empathy such as the empathy- specific punishment and the empathy-specific award hypotheses.

Researchers generally agree in finding Batson’s experimental research program and the accumulated evidence for the empathy-altruism thesis to be impressive. Yet they disagree about how persuasive one should ultimately regard his position. In particular it has been pointed out that his experiments have limited value, since they target only very specific egoistic accounts of why empathy might lead to helping behavior. Batson is not able to dismiss conclusively every alternative egoistic interpretation. In addition, it has been claimed that egoism has the resources to account for the result of his experiments. For example, one might challenge the validity of Batson’s interpretation by speculating whether empathy/sympathy leads to a heightened awareness of the fact that one will be troubled by bad memories of seeing another person in need, if one does nothing to help him or her. In this case even an egoistically motivated person would help in the high empathy/easy escape condition. (For this reply and various other egoistic interpretations of Batson’s experiments see Sober and Wilson 1998, 264–271).

Cialdini and his collaborators have suggested an even more elaborate non-altruistic interpretation of helping behavior in high empathy/easy escape conditions. According to their suggestions, conditions of high empathy are also conditions of increased “interpersonal unity, wherein the conception of self and other are not distinct but are merged to some degree” (Cialdini et al. 1997, 490). It is this increased feeling of oneness rather than empathy that is causally responsible for motivating helping behavior (See however Batson et al. 1997a, Neuberg et al. 1997, and Batson 1997 and 2011 for a plausible reply and May 2018, 144–153 for a probing discussion of the relation between empathic concern and oneness). One therefore has to be cautious in claiming that Batson has conclusively proven that the empathy/sympathy-altruism hypothesis is true, if that means one has logically excluded every egoistic alternative in accounting for helping behavior. But it has to be acknowledged that Batson has radically changed the argumentative dialectic of the egoism-altruism debate by forcing the egoistic account of human agency to come up with ever more elaborate alternative interpretations in order to account for helping behavior within its framework. Egoism was supposed to provide a rather unified and relatively simple account of the motivational structure of human agency. In challenging the predominance and simplicity of this framework in an empirically acute fashion, Batson has at least established altruism—claiming that besides egoistic motivations we are also motivated by genuinely altruistic reasons—as an empirically plausible hypothesis. He has shown it to be a hypothesis one is almost persuaded to believe that it is true, as he himself recently has characterized his own epistemic attitude (Batson 1997, 522.) More positively expressed, Batson’s research has at least demonstrated that empathy/sympathy is a causal factor in bringing about helping behavior. Regardless of the question of the exact nature of the underlying motivation for helping or prosocial behavior, psychologists generally assume that in adults and children a positive, even if weak, correlation between empathy—measured in a variety of ways—and prosocial behavior has been established; and this despite the fact that the above aspects of emotional responding to another person have not always been sufficiently distinguished.(For a survey see Eisenberg and Miller 1987; Eisenberg/Fabes 1998, Spinrad and Eisenberg 2014. For a general survey of the various factors contributing to prosocial behavior see Bierhoff 2002).

Regardless of how exactly one views the strength of Batson’s position, his research alone does not validate the thesis, articulated by various traditional moral philosophers, that sympathy or empathy is the basis of morality or that it constitutes the only source for moral motivation. First, nothing in his research has shown that empathy/sympathy is empirically necessary for moral agency. Second, some of Batson’s own research casts doubt on the claim that sympathy/empathy is the foundation of morality as empathy induced altruism can lead to behavior that conflicts with our principles of justice and fairness. One, for example, tends to assign a better job or a higher priority for receiving medical treatment to persons with whom one has actually sympathized, in violation of the above moral principles (See Batson et al. 1995). For that very reason, Batson himself distinguishes between altruistic motivation concerned with the well-being of another person and moral motivation guided by principles of justice and fairness (Batson 2011). Unfortunately we do not always realize this fact when we abstractly contrast moral motivation broadly with egoistic motivation. For that very reason, we also do not realize that we need to be more conscious in “orchestrating” the relationship between altruistic and moral motivations in order to fully utilize the motivational power of altruism for moral purposes (Batson 2014). Finally, the research discussed so far is not relevant for deciding the question of whether sophisticated mindreading abilities are required for full blown moral agency, since Batson understands empathy primarily as an emotional phenomenon. (See Nichols 2001 and Batson et al. 2003 in this respect.)

Within the psychological literature, one of the most comprehensive accounts of empathy and its relation to the moral development of a person is provided by the work of Martin Hoffman (for a summary see his 2000). Hoffman views empathy as a biologically based disposition for altruistic behavior (Hoffman 1981). He conceives of empathy as being due to various modes of arousal allowing us to respond empathically in light of a variety of distress cues from another person. Hoffman mentions mimicry, classical conditioning, and direct association—where one empathizes because the other’s situation reminds one of one’s own painful experience—as “fast acting and automatic” mechanisms producing an empathic response. As more cognitively demanding modes, Hoffman lists mediated association—where the cues for an empathic response are provided in a linguistic medium—and role taking.

Hoffman distinguishes between six (or more) developmental stages of empathic responses ranging from the reactive newborn cry, egocentric empathic distress, quasi-ego-centric empathic distress, to veridical empathy, empathy for another beyond the immediate situation, and empathy for whole groups of people. Accordingly, empathic responses constitute a developmental continuum that ranges from emotional contagion (as in the case of a reactive newborn cry) to various forms of proper empathy reached at the fourth stage. At the developmentally later stages, the child is able to emotionally respond to the distress of another in a more sophisticated manner due to an increase of cognitive capacities, particularly due to the increased cognitive ability to distinguish between self and other and by becoming aware of the fact that others have mental states that are independent from its own. Only at the fourth stage of empathic development (after the middle of the second year) do children acquire such abilities. They do no longer try to comfort themselves, when emotionally responding to another child’s distress—like seeking comfort from their own mother—, or use helping strategies that are more appropriate to comfort themselves than the other person—like using their own teddy-bear in trying to comfort the other child. Only at the fourth stage does empathy become also transformed or associated with sympathy leading to appropriate prosocial behavior. Hoffman’s developmental view is further supported by Preston and DeWaal’s account of empathy as a phenomenon to be observed across species at various levels of complexities related to different degrees of cognitive development. (Preston and DeWaal 2002a,b. For a discussion of the philosophical relevance of DeWaal’s view see also DeWaal 2006).

Significantly, Hoffman combines his developmental explication of empathy with a sophisticated analysis of its importance for moral agency. He is thereby acutely aware of the limitations in our natural capacity to empathize or sympathize with others, particularly what he refers to as “here and now” biases, that is, the fact that we tend to empathize more with persons that are in some sense perceived to be closer to us. (For a neuro-scientific investigation of how racial bias modulates empathic responses see Xuo, Zuo, Wang and Han 2009). Like Batson, Hoffman does not regard the moral realm as being exclusively circumscribed by our ability to empathize with other people. Besides empathic abilities, moral agency requires also knowledge of abstract moral principles, such as the principles of caring and justice. Hoffman seems to conceive of those principles as being derived from cognitive sources that are independent from our empathic abilities. Yet Hoffmann is rather optimistic about the natural compatibility of empathic motivation and our commitment to moral principles. He regards stable and effective moral agency as requiring empathy so that moral principles can have a motivational basis in an agent’s psychology. Within this context, he has lately emphasized a final stage of empathy development or what he calls “witnessing”, an empathic response to the suffering of others that is so intense that we “become fully committed to help”(Hoffman 2014, 82). As he explains—in light of examples from the history of abolitionism, the civil rights movement, serfdom reform in Russia, and various cases before the Supreme Court— it is particularly such witnessing that has contributed towards bending the arc of the moral universe towards justice. Accordingly, and despite our natural limitations in empathizing with others, Hoffman still regards empathy as the “bedrock of morality” and “the glue of society”(Hoffman 2014, 96. Besides Hoffman 2011 and 2014, see also Deigh 2011 for a measured evaluation of empathy in the legal context ).

More recently, such ultimately positive evaluation of empathy’s contributing role in constituting us as moral agents, as agents who address each other from the moral stance, has encountered penetrating criticism, particularly by Prinz (2011a,b) and Bloom (2016). Both emphasize the dark side of empathy, that is, the aforementioned “here and now” biases. More specifically Prinz mentions explicitly the cuteness, salience, and proximity effects—the fact that we tend to empathize more easily with attractive persons, with persons that are in close proximity and only if their suffering is particularly noteworthy— similarity biases and the fact that we tend to be rather selective in choosing whom to empathize with. Empathy is also very easily modulated by a variety of top-down factors that influence our perception of the social world and that let us register social divisions that seem to be prima facie incompatible with the more impartial stance demanded by the moral perspective. Research has documented these biases in a more fine-grained manner and shown that subjects generally “reported experiencing more empathy for the in–group then the out–group targets and more counter–empathy for the out–group than in–group targets”(Cikara et. al. 2014, 120), counter–empathy here being understood as the feeling of pleasure at the misfortune of another (Schadenfreude) or the feeling displeasure at something fortunate happening to another (Glückschmerz). This is particularly true if the other group is viewed to be in competition with one’s own group. Empathy can also be further reduced through various dehumanizing and objectifying strategies, strategies that have certainly employed in the context of the genocides of the twentieth century and the system of racial slavery in the United States (See Fuchs 2019, Kteily and Bruneau 2017). Heightened empathy for perceived wrongs done to members of the in–group can also lead to violent and immoral behavior (Bloom 2016, chap. 5). In addition, empathy tends to focus on the one (particularly if he or she is identifiable) rather than the many, what Bloom refers to as its spotlight feature. Empathy can mislead us particularly in contexts where we need to take into account statistically relevant information when addressing a moral or social problem, such as when thinking about the benefits of vaccination where it is more appropriate to think about the large numbers of children saved rather than empathizing with the bad effects such vaccination might have on one specific child. For all of these reasons, Prinz favors the moral emotions such as anger, guilt and shame as the foundation for morality, while Bloom prefers sympathy guided by reason as a more viable means than empathy to steer us in moral matters.

Here is not the place for a final evaluation of empathy’s contribution in regard to pro-social and moral motivation or moral and pro-social behavior, since this question is still very much the topic of an ongoing empirical investigation. Yet the following observations are certainly justified in light of the empirical evidence so far and might help to further clarify the debate. First, it seems to be pretty well established that however one defines our natural capacity for empathy, it is on its own not sufficient to keep us reliably on the path of morality (See also Decety and Cowell 2015). Whether that ultimately means that we should think of our capacity for empathy as a limited resource or whether it would be better to think of empathy as a motivated phenomenon and its limitations as being due to our reluctance to activate that capacity (Zaki 2014), is certainly another intriguing question for further empirical inquiry. One might also wonder why we should expect that the emotions such as sympathy and anger, which Bloom and Prinz point to, are less prone to bias and less affected by a universal human tendency to favor the in–group. Certainly sympathy within the context of Buddhism, to which Bloom appeals to is a highly regulated emotion, controlled through mindfulness practices or meditation and guided by an intellectual grasp about the detriments of various forms of attachment to this world. Persson and Savulescu (2018) therefore suggest that rather than giving up on empathy completely one should reform empathy by regulating it through one’s reflective capacities in light of our knowledge of its natural shortcomings or focus one’s empathy (cognitive and affective) particularly on another person’s concerns for his or her well-being as such empathy includes sympathy for the other (Simmons 2014). Such suggestions are also very much in line with proposals by David Hume and Adam Smith, who suggested already in the eighteenth century that we need to regulate empathy with the help of certain corrective mechanisms such as “some steady and general points of view” or the perspective of the“impartial spectator” in order to compensate for empathy’s limited scope. (For a good analysis of the philosophical discussion about empathy/sympathy in the eighteenth century see Frazer 2010).

Most importantly, in order to evaluate the empirical discussion about empathy’s role for morality, one needs to be very sensitive to how researchers define and measure empathy in arguing for and against empathy’s relation to moral motivation or moral judgment. Prinz and Bloom are quite explicit in defining empathy merely as an affective phenomenon, as our ability to feel what the other person feels. Evidence suggests indeed that merely sharing another person’s emotion empathically does not increase our concern or motivation for moral or pro-social action. Interestingly, however, perspective–taking and empathic concern/sympathy, which have always been seen as an integral part of empathy-related phenomena, are a slightly different matter. They do seem to be positively related to cooperation and charitable giving (Jordon et. al. 2016), to reducing prejudices against particular groups (Galinski and Morowitz 2011), and to an increase in one’s sensitivity to injustices done to others (Decety and Yoder 2015). Yet even here further research is needed as the effects of such perspective–taking could be modulated by the power differential between groups. It has, for example, been shown that in active intergroup conflicts, positive intergroup interaction can increase empathy for the other group. Yet within such contexts, taking the perspective of a person from the other group while interacting with them might also hinder the development of intergroup empathy if the dominant group is reminded through such perspective–taking of how they might be viewed by the non-dominant group. Even perspective taking by the non–dominant group might increase rather than decrease established negative stereotypes in thinking about the other group (Cikara et. al. 2014). It seems more effective if the non–dominant group is asked to articulate the difficulties of their lives (perspective–giving) and the dominant group is asked to translate that description into their own words (perspective–taking), even if the positive effects of such interaction is relatively short-lived (Bruneau and Saxe 2012).

So far, this entry has discussed mainly research exploring the relation between empathy and prosocial/moral behavior or motivation. Other important areas for considering empathy’s role in moral matters have to do with addressing the questions of how and whether empathy contributes to our ability to distinguish between moral and conventional norms, to the making of moral judgments, and how empathy can be appealed to in explicating the normative authority of such judgments. In considering the first question, psychologists and philosophers have generally followed Turiel in understanding moral norms as expressing concerns for “rights, justice, and the welfare of other people” (Turiel 1983, 3) and as having a very specific “signature response patterns” (Kelly et. al. 2007) associated with it. Moral norms are generally regarded to be more important than conventional norms in that their normative validity is conceived as being independent of social authority or specific social practices and agreements. Their scope is also judged to be much broader—they are thought of to be valid in other countries, for example—, and violation of moral norms is generally understood to be a more serious offense than the violation of other norms. Notice however that in distinguishing between moral and conventional norms subjects do not necessarily associate a strict universality in the Kantian sense with moral norms and view them as applicable to all rational beings. Indeed there is some evidence that 6–9 year old children, for example, view the moral/conventional distinction as being fully applicable only to behavior of individuals in the in-group and view prescription against harming members of the out-group to be more like conventional norms (Rhodes and Chalik 2013). Accordingly, the fact that empathy shows considerable in-group bias, as discussed above, does not automatically count as evidence against it playing a role in allowing humans to distinguish between moral and conventional norms within a social context.

Of central importance for assessing the role of empathy for grasping the moral/conventional distinction has been the research on the nature of psychopathy and autism. Both pathologies are seen as involving deficits in different dimensions of empathy but only psychopaths have great difficulties in living up to moral standards of their societies and only they were originally thought of as having difficulties in appropriately distinguishing between moral and conventional norms (Blair 1995 and 1996). More specifically, psychopaths show a selective deficit in affective or emotional empathy particularly in “processing fearful, sad, and possibly disgusted facial expressions”(Blair 2010, 710). In contrast to persons with autism they however do not show similar deficits in perspective taking or theory of mind capacities. In his 1995 article, Blair therefore blames the absence of what he calls the Violence Inhibition Mechanism(VIM) that allows us to respond appropriately to the observed distress cues in others for the psychopaths’ moral deficits and their inability to draw the moral/conventional distinction. In his later work, he speaks more broadly of a dysfunction of our Integrated Emotion System (IES), caused by a deficit in the amygdala to properly represent negative emotions. (Blair, Mitchel, and Blair 2005, for a recent survey regarding the very specific deficit of psychopaths in feeling and recognizing fear see also Marsh 2014). Yet one has to tread very carefully in drawing definite conclusions about the role of empathy for morality from the empirical research about psychopathy. The results of the empirical investigations are far from unified and do not point in the same direction (For a concise survey see Maibom 2017). Newer studies, for example, seem to suggest that psychopaths, as measured by the overall score of the revised psychopathy checklist (PCL–R), are able to understand the distinction between moral and conventional norms if tested under a forced choice paradigm (Aharoni et. al 2012.)Nevertheless even that study seems to allow for the possibility that emotional deficits are responsible for the psychopath’s shortcomings in accurately drawing the distinction since they are somewhat linked to the affective and antisocial facets of the PCL–R. Given the inconsistent results of the various studies, other researchers prefer to view a psychopath’s immorality not as a specific deficit in empathy, but understand it to be caused by their general inability to feel strong emotions, by their general coldheartedness, or even by shortcomings in their rational and prudential capacities. From that perspective, a psychopath might understand in an abstract manner that certain things are morally wrong to do, but he just does not care for morality, the welfare of another person, or even for himself. (For further discussion see Maibom 2005 and 2009, Nichols 2004, and Prinz 2011a,b). Similar considerations apply also to research regarding subjects with autism. Kennett (2002)has argued that evidence from autistic individuals, whose imaginative role-play and thus empathic capacities are diminished, does not support the claim that empathy is necessary for moral agency. Yet in her arguments she only considers the fact that persons with autism have difficulties with putting themselves in another person’s shoes but does not consider that they seem to have some ability to pick up on the emotional states of other people as revealed by their facial expressions. Moreover, while autistic subjects in general can distinguish between moral and conventional norms they do seem to lack a certain flexibility in evaluating the seriousness of the violation of a moral norm when they reflect on moral dilemmas or when they encounter an accidental or unintentional violation of such norms. (See McGeer 2008, Zalla et. al 2011, but see also Kennett 2011 and Leslie et. al. 2006 in response).

Philosophers have however not been merely be interested in appealing to empathy for explicating the psychological basis for our thinking that certain norms have moral status. Within the general framework of moral sentimentalism, which sees morality generally linked to our emotional responsiveness to the actions of others and ourselves, they have also appealed to empathy in explicating more generally the nature of moral judgments (see also Kauppinen 2014 and 2017a). David Hume, for example, has suggested that moral judgments are based on peculiar sentiments of moral approbations and disapprobation, which are causally mediated by our ability to empathize— or what he called sympathy— with the pain and pleasures of others (See also Sayre-Mcord 1994 and 2014). More specifically, sentiments of moral approbations arise in response to our ability to think about and enliven the pleasure and pain that others feel with the help of our empathic/sympathetic capacities when we consider the benefits (the pleasure and pain) which a person’s character traits and actions provide to himself and others. Yet Hume was already quite aware of some of the above mentioned limitations and biases of our natural willingness and capacity to empathize with others. Accordingly, he insisted that sentiments of approbations can only be conceived of as moral approbation if empathy/sympathy is regulated or corrected by what he refers to as “steady and general points of view” (Hume 1739–40 [1978], 581/2) so that our capacity for sympathy enables us to “touch a string, to which all mankind have an accord and symphony” (Hume 1748 [1983], 75). There are certainly a number of issues that can be raised in response to Hume’s proposal. Suffice it here to point out that it is difficult to fully understand how Hume is ultimately able distinguish between judgments about something being bad and something being morally wrong. Certainly natural disasters also cause us to sympathize/empathize with the pain it causes others, yet such sympathy is not mediating any judgments about the moral impermissibility of natural disasters. Hume himself might have thought to have solved this problem by thinking that sentiments of moral approbation have a peculiar or distinct character (see in this respect particularly Debes 2012). Yet pointing to the peculiarity of such sentiments seems to be rather unsatisfying for answering this challenge.

Michael Slote, one of the main contemporary proponents of the claim that empathy plays a constitutive role for moral judgments, does not follow Hume in thinking that empathy plays a moral role in allowing us to pick up on a subject’s pleasure and pain. Rather Slote, who also has been influenced by a feminist ethics of care (Slote 2007, 2010), suggests that empathy is central for moral approval in that we as spectators empathically pick up on whether or not an agent acted out of empathic concern for another subject. Moral approval of an action consists then in the subsequent reflective feeling of warmth when empathizing with an agent’s empathic concern, while moral disapproval is equivalent with a reflective feeling of chill due to our recognition that the agent acted without any empathic concern. Actions are then judged to be morally right or wrong in terms of whether they can be conceived of the actions of an agent we would morally approve of in that they are actions done out of empathic concern. Notice also that while Slote does regard empathy in the above sense to be constitutive of moral approval only if it is fully or well–developed, he does not follow Hume in thinking that empathy needs to be regulated in order to correct for some of its natural partiality. Indeed Slote thinks that this is a virtue of his account since he regards such partiality reflected in our moral intuitions. For example, he thinks that we have a greater moral obligation to help the child in front of us or members of our family rather than people who are more removed from us. Slote certainly deserves credit for reviving the debate about the role of empathy for morality in contemporary metaethics. Yet his conception of the relation between empathy and morality has also encountered some skepticism. First of all, it is questionable that only motivations of empathic concern, rather than the thought that one is doing the right thing, constitute proper moral motivations. Second, in light of the above research on empathy’s bias and natural shortcomings, it is rather questionable to maintain that all aspects of empathy’s partiality are sanctioned by our our moral intuitions. It is therefore hard to see how empathy’s moral role can be justified without appeal to some form of corrective mechanism. Third, phenomenologically speaking, moral disapproval is not necessarily based on a “chilly” feeling. At times we are rather upset and angry in encountering violations of moral norms. Finally, Slote’s proposed empathic mechanism underlying moral approval seems to lack a certain psychological plausibility. For Slote, we approve of an action because we recreate the empathic concern that the agent feels towards his or her subjects and that causes us to feel warmly towards the agent. Yet if a positive moral judgment of an actions is tied to providing us with the motivation or with a reason for doing a specific action, it is hard to see how moral approval, consisting in us feeling warmly towards the agent, should help us accomplish this. If Slote is right, it would rather provide us with a reason for merely praising or being nice towards the agent (See D’Arms 2011, Kauppinen 2014 and 2017a, Prinz 2001a,b, and Stueber 2011c).

There is one additional element to consider when debating empathy’s contribution to morality. Philosophers are not merely interested in answering factual and causal questions of why we care about morality, what causal role empathy plays in this respect, or how empathy causally contributes in allowing us to distinguish between moral and conventional norms and judging what is morally right or wrong. Rather they are also interested in genuinely normative questions in attempting to answer the question of why we should care about morality and why we should regard moral judgments as making normative demands on us. In morally blaming other persons we do assume that we evaluate their behavior according to standards that they as persons are in some sense already committed to. We assume that these standards are their own standards rather than standards that we impose from an external perspective on them. Unfortunately, even if one would agree with either David Hume or Michael’s Slote’s account of the causal role of empathy outlined above, it is doubtful that their account would help us to answer the genuinely normative question appropriately. Why exactly should I take a particular emotional reaction of another person towards me and my action, even if it is a feeling of warmth caused by empathy, as something that is normatively relevant for me. Certainly we all like to be liked and try to fit in with our peer group, but then moral judgments would be nothing more than a glorified form of peer pressure. Hume might respond that we should take them seriously because they are responses from the general point of view, but that in itself seems to be begging the question of why such perspective is articulating the appropriate normative standard for judging our behavior and character. This is also exactly the reason, why philosophers with Kantian inclinations have been in general skeptical about moral sentimentalism and positions that think of empathy as a foundation of morality (for a nice explication of Kant’s critical view of sympathy see Deimling 2017). Contemporary “Kantians” do at times, however, admit that empathy and perspective taking is epistemically relevant for moral deliberations, even if it is not solely constitutive for moral agency (Deigh 1996 and 2018; Darwall 2006, Shermann 1998, For a review see also Oxley 2011). Interestingly, philosophers sympathetic to moral sentimentalism have particularly turned to Adam Smith for inspiration in developing empathy based accounts of morality and in responding to the above normativity problem. In contrast to Hume, Smith conceives of empathy/sympathy not merely as the enlivening of a perceived emotion or feeeling but as imaginative perspective–taking. In taking up another person’s perspective we put ourselves in his situation and imagine how he would respond to the situation, how he would think and feel about it. If in bringing another person’s point of view “home to ourselves” in this manner, we recognize that we ourselves might have felt or acted like the other person, then we approve of the other person’s sentiment or action, otherwise we disapprove. Moreover, such approval constitutes moral approval if we have empathized with the other from the perspective of the impartial spectator, a perspective that Smith, like Hume, appeals to in order to correct for empathy’s natural shortcomings. More importantly, some authors think that within the Smithian framework we also find some answers to the normativity problem. They think that the impartial spectator perspective can be recast as an implicit commitment of our ordinary practice of making sense of each other as rational and emotional creatures with the help of empathic perspective taking (Stueber 2017) or argue that Smithian perspective–taking involves quasi-Kantian commitments to the dignity of a person, including his or her affective dimension. (Debes 2017, but see also Fricke 2005, Kauppinen 2017b, and Roughley 2018).

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  • Xu, X., X. Zuo, X. Wang, and S. Han, 2009. “Do You Feel My Pain? Racial Group Membership Modulates Empathic Neural Responses,” Journal of Neuroscience , 29: 8525–8529,
  • Zahavi, D., 2001. “Beyond Empathy: Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity,” Journal of Consciousness Studies , 8. 151–167.
  • –––, 2005. Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • –––, 2010. “Empathy, Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to Schutz,” Inquiry , 53: 285–306.
  • Zahavi, D., and S. Overgaard, 2012. “Empathy without Isomorphism: A Phenomenological Account,” in Empathy: From Bench to Bedside , J. Decety (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 3–20.
  • Zaki, J., 2014. “Empathy: A Motivated Account,” Psychological Bulletin , 140: 1608–1647.
  • Zaki, J. and K. Ochsner, 2012. “The Cognitive Neuroscience of Sharing and Understanding Others’ Emotions,” in Empathy: From Bench to Bedside , J. Decety (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 207–226.
  • Zalla, T., L. Barlassina, M. Buon, and M. Leboyer, 2011. “Moral Judment in Adults with Autism Spectrum Disorders,” Cognition , 12: 115–126.
  • Zhou, Q., C. Valiente, and N. Eisenberg, 2003. “Empathy and Its Measurement,” S.J. Lopez and C.R. Snyder (eds.), Positive Psychological Assessment: A Handbook of Models and Measures , Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 269–284.

Further Important Surveys of Empathy

  • Maibom, H. (ed.), 2017. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Empathy , New York: Routledge.
  • Matraver, D., 2017. Empathy , Cambridge: Polity Press.
How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.
  • Dictionary of the History of Ideas , maintained by The Electronic Text Center at the University of Virginia Library.

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empathy vs sympathy essay

What is empathy?

At its simplest, it is the awareness of the feelings and emotions of other people and a key indicator of emotional intelligence says DR VASILIOS SILIVISTRIS

The dictionary defines empathy as the ability to understand and share the feelings of another.

Empathy is a vicarious (experienced in the imagination through the feelings or actions of another person) emotional experience in which you feel and understand what another person feels.

The English word Empathy is derived from the Ancient Greek word ἐμπάθεια (empatheia) meaning physical affection, passion, partiality which comes from ἐν (en), in, at and πάθος (pathos), desire or suffering.

Empathy is an important part of the counselling technique developed by the American psychologist Carl Ranson Rogers (1902-1987).

One of the most important personality attributes is empathy, and a high level of empathy may lead to significant altruism and helping behaviour.

A lack of empathy could lead to a lack of helping behaviour or rude and insensitive comments. It is important to define empathy and gain an understanding of the meaning of empathy.

Empathy is not simply perspective-taking. Although being able to see things from another person’s perspective may result in the emotional experience of empathy, it is possible to adopt another person’s perspective without experiencing empathy.

If you are experiencing empathy, you feel happy when you observe a person expressing happiness and understanding the person’s happiness.

If you are experiencing empathy, you feel sad when you observe a person expressing sadness and understand the person’s sadness.

Thus, the above definition suggests that there are two elements of empathy: perspective-taking (understanding what another person feels), and vicarious emotion (feeling what another person feels).

Empathy versus sympathy

Although sympathy and empathy are similar emotional responses, one could feel sympathy without experiencing empathy.

Empathy, but not sympathy, may also require that one understands the person’s feelings.

Thus, if you feel sad when another person feels sad, but you do not understand why the person is feeling sad, the emotional response could be labelled as sympathy rather than empathy.

Empathy is, at its simplest, awareness of the feelings and emotions of other people.

It is a key element of Emotional Intelligence , the link between self and others because it is how we as individuals, understand what others are experiencing as if we were feeling it ourselves.

Empathy, sympathy and compassion

There is an important distinction between empathy, sympathy and compassion.

Both compassion and sympathy are about feeling for someone: seeing their distress and realising that they are suffering. Compassion has taken on an element of action that is lacking in sympathy, but the root of the words is the same.

Empathy, by contrast, is about experiencing those feelings for yourself, as if you were that person, through the power of imagination.

Three types of empathy

Psychologists have identified three types of empathy:

Cognitive empathy: understanding someone’s thoughts and emotions in a very rational, rather than emotional sense.

Emotional empathy: when you quite literally feel the other person’s emotions alongside them as if you had ‘caught’ their emotions.

Compassionate empathy: understanding someone’s feelings and taking appropriate action to help.

In addition, empathy is core in the therapeutic practice to create a safe and confidential therapeutic relationship with the client.

Dr Vasilios Silivistris (Vasos) is a psychotherapist, counselling practitioner

Home / Guides / Grammar Guides / Vocabulary Guides / Often Confused Words Guides / Empathy vs Sympathy

Empathy vs Sympathy

Empathy and sympathy are two words that share similar meanings but have very different uses. Empathy is a noun that refers to “one’s ability to understand the feelings of another while not always necessarily sharing them.” Sympathy , on the other hand, is a noun that refers to “the sharing of feelings of sorrow or pity for someone else.” While both have to do with feelings, empathy is more so related to one’s ability to understand the feelings of another, whereas sympathy is sharing feelings with another.

Here are some definitions and example sentences to help you understand the use of each word.

Empathy (noun)

One’s ability to understand the feelings of another while not always necessarily sharing them.

It is always important for those who work in social services to have empathy for those they work with.

Having been through so many tough experiences related to employment, I have developed a sense of empathy for those who are between jobs.

Remember that while empathy refers to the understanding of someone else’s feelings, it does not always mean that those feelings are directly shared.

Sympathy (noun)

The sharing of feelings of sorrow or pity for someone else.

Even if I didn’t know her well, I felt great sympathy for my coworker after her mother passed away.

It is always hard for me to watch dramatic movies, as I always cry out of sympathy for the characters’ suffering.

With sympathy , think of the individual feeling it as experiencing sadness or pity alongside someone else. For example, if you are writing a sympath y card, you are expressing that you are feeling the recipient’s emotions, while maybe not to their same extent, alongside them.

Main Points

  • Empathy is a noun that refers to one’s understanding of someone else’s feelings.
  • Sympathy is a noun that refers to one’s sharing of someone else’s feelings, usually those of suffering.
  • Think of empathy as a feeling that is developed over time, whereas sympathy is something that is felt when specific situations occur.

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