conclusion for terrorism essay

Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle Against Terrorists: A Framework for Program Assessment (2008)

Chapter: 3 conclusions and recommendations, 3 conclusions and recommendations, 3.1 basic premises.

The committee’s work was informed by a number of basic premises. These premises framed the committee’s perspective in developing this report, and they can be regarded as the assumptions underlying the committee’s analysis and conclusions. The committee recognizes that others may have their own analyses with different premises, and so for analytical rigor, it is helpful to lay out explicitly the assumptions of the committee.

Premise 1. The United States faces two real and serious threats from terrorists. The first is from terrorist acts themselves, which could cause mass casualties, severe economic loss, and social dislocation to U.S. society. The second is from the possibility of inappropriate or disproportionate responses to the terrorist threat that can do more damage to the fabric of society than terrorists would be likely to do.

The events of September 11, 2001, provided vivid proof of the damage that a determined terrorist group can inflict on U.S. society. All evidence to date suggests that the United States continues to be a prime target for such terrorist groups as Al Qaeda, and future terrorist attacks could cause

major casualties, severe economic loss, and social disruption. 1 The danger of future terrorist attacks on the United States is both real and serious.

At the same time, inappropriate or disproportionate responses to the terrorist threat also pose serious dangers to society. History demonstrates that measures taken in the name of improving national security, especially in response to new threats or crises, have often proven to be both ineffective and offensive to the nation’s values and traditions of liberty and justice. 2 So the danger of unsuitable responses to the terrorist threat is also real and serious.

Given the existence of a real and serious terrorist threat, it is a reasonable public policy goal to focus on preventing attacks before they occur—a goal that requires detecting the planning for such attacks prior to their execution. Given the possibility of inappropriate or disproportionate responses, it is also necessary that programs intended to prevent terrorist attacks be developed and operated without undue compromises of privacy.

Premise 2. The terrorist threat to the United States, serious and real though it is, does not justify government authorities conducting activities or operations that contravene existing law.

The longevity of the United States as a stable political entity is rooted in large measure in the respect that government authorities have had for the rule of law. Regardless of the merits or inadequacies of any legal regime, government authorities are bound by its requirements until the legal regime is changed, and, in the long term, public confidence and trust in government depend heavily on a belief that the government is indeed adhering to the laws of the land. The premises above would not change even if the United States were facing exigent circumstances. If existing legal authorities (including any emergency action provisions, of which there are many) are inadequate or unclear to deal with a given situation

or contingency, government authorities should seek to change the law rather than to circumvent or disobey it.

A willingness of U.S. government authorities to circumvent or disobey the law in times of emergency is not unprecedented. For example, recently declassified Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) documents indicate widespread violations of the agency’s charter and applicable law in the 1960s and 1970s, during which time the CIA conducted surveillance operations on U.S. citizens under both Democratic and Republican presidents that were undertaken outside the agency’s charter. 3

The U.S. Congress has also changed laws that guaranteed confidentiality in order to gain access to individual information collected under guarantees. For example, Section 508 of the USA Patriot Act, passed in 2001, allows the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to gain access to individual information originally collected by the National Center for Education Statistics under a pledge of confidentiality. In earlier times, the War Powers Act of 1942 retrospectively overrode the confidentiality provisions of the Census Bureau, and it is now known that bureau officials shared individually identifiable census information with other government agencies for the purposes of detaining foreign nationals. 4

Today, many laws provide statutory protection for privacy. Conforming to such protections is not only obligatory, but it also builds necessary discipline into counterterrorism efforts that serves other laudable purposes. By making the government stop and justify its effort to a senior official, a congressional committee, or a federal judge, warrant requirements and other privacy protections often help bring focus and precision to law enforcement and national security efforts. In point of fact, courts rarely refuse requests for judicial authorization to conduct surveillance. As government officials often note, one reason for these high success rates is the quality of internal decision making that the requirement to obtain judicial authorization requires.

Premise 3. Challenges to public safety and national security do not warrant fundamental changes in the level of privacy protection to which nonterrorists are entitled.

The United States is a strong nation for many reasons, not the least of which is its commitment to the rule of law, civil liberties, and respect

for diversity. Especially in times of challenge, it is important that this commitment remain strong and unwavering. New technological circumstances may necessitate an update of existing privacy laws and policy, but privacy and surveillance law already includes means of dealing with national security matters as well as criminal law investigations. As new technologies become more commonly used, these means will inevitably require extension and updating, but greater government access to private information does not trump the commitment to the bedrock civil liberties of the nation.

Note that the term “privacy” has multiple meanings depending on context and interpretation. Appendix L (“ The Science and Technology of Privacy Protection ”) explicates a technical definition of the term, and the term is often used in this report, as in everyday discourse, with a variety of informal meanings that are more or less consistent with the technical definition.

Premise 4. Exploitation of new science and technologies is an important dimension of national counterterrorism efforts.

Although the committee recognizes that other sciences and technologies are relevant as well, the terms of reference call for this report to focus on information technologies and behavioral surveillance techniques. The committee believes that when large amounts of information, personal and otherwise, are determined to be needed for the counterterrorist mission, the use of information technologies will be necessary and counterterrorist authorities will need to collect, manage, and analyze such information. Furthermore, it believes that behavioral surveillance techniques may have some potential for inferring intent from observed behavior if the underlying science proves sound—a capability that could be very useful in counterterrorist efforts “on the ground” if realized in the future.

Premise 5. To the extent reasonable and feasible, counterterrorist programs should be formulated to provide secondary benefits to the nation in other domains.

Counterterrorism programs are often expensive and controversial. In some cases, however, a small additional expenditure or programmatic adjustment may enable them to provide benefits that go beyond their role in preventing terrorism. Thus, they would be useful to the nation even if terror attacks do not occur. For example, hospital emergency reporting systems can improve medical care by prompt reporting of influenza, food poisoning, or other health problems, as well as alerting officials of bioterrorist and chemical attacks.

At the same time, policy makers must be aware of the phenomenon of “statutory mission creep”—in which the goals and missions of a program are expanded explicitly as the result of a specific policy action, such as congressional amendment of an existing law—and avoid its snares. In some instances, such as hospital emergency reporting systems, privacy interests may not be seriously compromised by their application to multiple missions. But in others, such as the use of systems designed for screening terrorists to identify ordinary criminals, privacy interests may be deeply implicated because of the vast and voluminous new data sets that must be brought to bear on the expanded mission. Mission creep may also go beyond the original understandings of policy makers regarding the scope and nature of a program that they initially approve, and thus effectively circumvent careful scrutiny. In some cases, a sufficient amount of mission creep may even result in a program whose operation is not strictly legal.

3.2 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PRIVACY

The rich digital record that is made of people’s lives today provides many benefits to most people in the course of everyday life. Such data may also have utility for counterterrorist and law enforcement efforts. However, the use of such data for these purposes also raises concerns about the protection of privacy and civil liberties. Improperly used, programs that do not explicitly protect the rights of innocent individuals are likely to create second-class citizens whose freedoms to travel, engage in commercial transactions, communicate, and practice certain trades will be curtailed—and under some circumstances, they could even be improperly jailed.

3.2.1 Protecting Privacy

Conclusion 1. In the counterterrorism effort, some degree of privacy protection can be obtained through the use of a mix of technical and procedural mechanisms.

The primary goal of the nation’s counterterrorism effort is to prevent terrorist acts. In such an effort, identification of terrorists before they act becomes an important task, one that requires the accurate collection and analysis of their personal information. However, an imperfect understanding of which characteristics to search for, not to mention imperfect and inaccurate data, will necessarily draw unwarranted attention to many innocent individuals.

Thus, records containing personal information of terrorists cannot be

examined without violating the privacy of others, and so absolute privacy protection—in the sense that the privacy of nonterrorists cannot be compromised—is not possible if terrorists are to be identified.

This technical reality does not preclude putting into place strong mechanisms that provide substantial privacy protection. In particular, restrictions on the use of personal information ensure that innocent individuals are strongly protected during the examination of their personal information, and strong and vigorous oversight and audit mechanisms can help to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed.

How much privacy protection is afforded by technical and procedural mechanisms depends on critical design features of both the technology and the organization that uses it. Two examples of relevant technical mechanisms are encryption of all data transports to protect against accidental loss or compromise and individually logged 5 audit records that retain details of all queries, including those made by fully authorized individuals to protect against unauthorized use. 6 But the mere presence of such mechanisms does not ensure that they will be used, and such mechanisms should be regarded as one enabler—one set of necessary but not sufficient tools—for the robust independent program oversight described in Recommendation 1c below.

Relevant procedural mechanisms include restrictions on data collection and restrictions on use. In general, such mechanisms govern important dimensions of information collection and use, including an explication of what data are collected, whether collection is done openly or covertly, how widely the data are disseminated, how long they are retained, the decisions for which they are used, whether the processing is

performed by computer or human, and who has the right to grant permissions for subsequent uses.

Historically, privacy from government intrusion has been protected by limiting what information the government can collect: voice conversations collected through wiretapping, e-mail collected through access to stored data (authorized by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, passed in 1986 and codified as 18 U.S.C. 2510), among others. However, in many cases today, the data in question have already been collected and access to them, under the third-party business records doctrine, will be readily granted with few strings attached. As a result, there is great potential for privacy intrusion arising from analysis of data that are accessible to government investigators with little or no restriction or oversight. In other words, powerful investigative techniques with significant privacy impact proceed in full compliance with existing law—but with significant unanswered privacy questions and associated concerns about data quality.

Analytical techniques that may be justified for the purpose of national security or counterterrorism investigations, even given their potential power for privacy intrusion, must come with assurances that the inferences drawn against an individual will not then be used for normal domestic criminal law enforcement purposes. Hence, what is called for, in addition to procedural safeguards for data quality, are usage limitations that provide for full exploitation on new investigative tools when needed (and justified) for national security purposes, but that prevent those same inferences from being used in criminal law enforcement activity.

An example—for illustration only—of the latter is the use of personal data for airline passenger screening. Privacy advocates have often expressed concerns that the government use of large-scale databases to identify passengers who pose a potential risk to the safety of an airplane could turn into far-reaching enforcement mechanisms for all manner of offenses, such as overdue tax bills or child support payments. One way of dealing with this privacy concern would be to apply a usage-limiting privacy rule that allows the use of databases for the purpose of counterterrorism but prohibits the use of these same databases and analysis for domestic law enforcement. Those suspicious of government intentions are likely to find a rule limiting usage rather less comforting than a rule limiting collection, out of concern that government authorities will find it easier to violate a rule limiting usage than a rule limiting collection. Nevertheless, well-designed and diligently enforced auditing and oversight processes may help over time to provide reassurance that the rule is being followed as well as to provide some actual protection for individuals.

Finally, in some situations, improving citizen privacy can have the

result of improving their security and vice versa. For example, improvements in the quality of data (i.e., more complete, more accurate data) used in identifying potential terrorists are likely to increase security by enhancing the effectiveness of information-based programs to identify terrorists and to decrease the adverse consequences that may occur due to confidentiality violations for the vast majority of innocent individuals. In addition, strong audit controls that record the details of all accesses to sensitive personal information serve both to protect the privacy of individuals and to reduce barriers to information sharing between agencies or analysts. (Agencies or analysts are often reluctant to share information, even among themselves, because they feel a need to protect sources and methods, and audit controls that limit information access provide a greater degree of reassurance that sensitive information will not be improperly distributed.)

Conclusion 2. Data quality is a major issue in the protection of the privacy of nonterrorists.

As noted in Chapter 1 , the issue of data quality arises internally as a result of measurement errors within databases and also as a consequence of efforts to link data or records across databases in the absence of clear, unique identifiers. Sharing personal information across agencies, even with “names” attached, offers no assurances that the linked data are sufficiently accurate for counterterrorism purposes; indeed, there are no metrics for accuracy that appear to be systematically used to assess such linking efforts.

Data of poor quality severely limit the value of data mining in a number of ways. First, the actual characteristics of individuals are often collected in error for a wide array of reasons, including definitional problems, identify theft, and misresponse on surveys.

These errors could obviously result in individuals being inaccurately represented by data mining algorithms as a threat when they are not (with the consequence that personal and private information about them might be inappropriately released for wider scrutiny). Second, poor data quality can be amplified during file matching, resulting in the erroneous merging of information for different individuals into a single file. Again, the results can be improper treatment of individuals as terrorist threats, but here the error is compounded, since entire clusters of information are now in error with respect to the individual who is linked to the information in the merged file.

Such problems are likely to be quite common and could greatly limit the utility of data mining methods used for counterterrorism. There are no obvious mechanisms for rectifying the current situation, other than col-

lecting similar information from multiple sources and using the duplicative nature of the information to correct inaccuracies. However, given that today the existence of alternate sources is relatively infrequent, correcting individual errors will be extraordinarily difficult.

3.2.2 Distinctions Between Capability and Intent

Conclusion 3. Inferences about intent and/or state of mind implicate privacy issues to a much greater degree than do assessments or determinations of capability.

Although it is true that capability and intent are both needed to pose a real threat, determining intent on the basis of external indicators is inherently a much more subjective enterprise than determining capability. Determining intent or state of mind is inherently an inferential process, usually based on indicators such as whom one talks to, what organizations one belongs to or supports, or what one reads or searches for online. Assessing capability is based on such indicators as purchase or other acquisition of suspect items, training, and so on. Recognizing that the distinction between capability and intent is sometimes unclear, it is nevertheless true that placing people under suspicion because of their associations and intellectual explorations is a step toward abhorrent government behavior, such as guilt by association and thought crime. This does not mean that government authorities should be categorically proscribed from examining indicators of intent under all circumstances—only that special precautions should be taken when such examination is deemed necessary.

3.3 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE ASSESSMENT OF COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAMS

Conclusion 4. Program deployment and use must be based on criteria more demanding than “it’s better than doing nothing.”

In the aftermath of a disaster or terrorist incident, policy makers come under intense political pressure to respond with measures intended to prevent the event from occurring again. The policy impulse to do something (by which is usually meant something new) under these circumstances is understandable, but it is simply not true that doing something new is always better than doing nothing. Indeed, policy makers may deploy new information-based programs hastily, without a full consideration of (a) the actual usefulness of the program in distinguishing people or characteristic patterns of interest for follow-up from those not of inter-

est, (b) an assessment of the potential privacy impacts resulting from the use of the program, (c) the procedures and processes of the organization that will use the program, and (d) countermeasures that terrorists might use to foil the program.

The committee developed the framework presented in Chapter 2 to help decision makers determine the extent to which a program is effective in achieving its intended goals, compliant with the laws of the nation, and reflective of the values of society, especially with regard to the protection of data subjects’ privacy. This framework is intended to be applied by taking into account the organizational and human contexts into which any given program will be embedded as well as the countermeasures that terrorists might take to foil the program.

The framework is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 .

3.4 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING DATA MINING 7

3.4.1 policy and law regarding data mining.

Conclusion 5. The current policy regime does not adequately address violations of privacy that arise from information-based programs using advanced analytical techniques, such as state-of-the-art data mining and record linkage.

The current privacy policy regime was established prior to today’s world of broadband communications, networked computers, and enormous databases. In particular, it relies largely on limitations imposed on the collection and use of certain kinds of information, and it is essentially silent on the use of techniques that could be used to process and analyze already-collected information in ways that might compromise privacy.

For example, an activity for counterterrorist purposes, possibly a data mining activity, is likely to require the linking of data found in multiple databases. The literature on record linkage suggests that, even assuming the data found in any given database to be of high quality, the data derived from linkages (the “mosaic” consisting of the collection of linked data) are likely to be error-prone. Certainly, the better the quality of the individual lists, the fewer the errors that will be made in record linkage, but even with high-quality lists, the percentage of false matches and false nonmatches may still be uncomfortably high. In addition, it is also the case that certain data mining algorithms are less sensitive to record linkage errors as inputs, since they use redundant information in a way that can, at times, identify such errors and downweight or delete them. Again, even in the best circumstances, such problems are currently extremely

difficult to overcome. Error-prone data are, of course, both a threat to privacy (as innocent individuals are mistakenly associated with terrorist activity) and a threat to effectiveness (as terrorists are overlooked because they have been hidden by errors in the data that would have suggested a terrorist connection).

The committee also notes that the use of analytical techniques such as data mining is not limited to government purposes; private parties, including corporations, criminals, divorce lawyers, and private investigators, also have access to such techniques. The large-scale availability of data and advanced analytical techniques to private parties carries clear potential for abuses of various kinds that might lead to adverse consequences for some individuals, but a deep substantive examination of this issue is outside the primary focus of this report on government policy.

3.4.2 The Promise and Limitations of Data Mining

Chapter 1 (in Section 1.6.1 ) notes that data mining covers a wide variety of analytical approaches for using large databases for counterterrorist purposes, and in particular it should be regarded as being much broader than the common notion of a technology underlying automated terrorist identification.

Conclusion 6. Because data mining has proven to be valuable in private-sector applications, such as fraud detection, there is reason to explore its potential uses in countering terrorism. However, the problem of detecting and preempting a terrorist attack is vastly more difficult than problems addressed by such commercial applications.

As illustrated in Appendix H (“ Data Mining and Information Fusion ”), data mining has proven valuable in a number of private-sector applications. But the data used by analysts to track sales, banks to assess loan applications, credit card companies to detect fraud, and telephone companies to detect fraud are fundamentally different from counterterrorism data. For example, private-sector applications generally have access to a substantial amount of relatively complete and structured data. In some cases, their data are more accurate than government data, and, in others, large volumes of relevant data sometimes enable statistical techniques to compensate 8 to some extent for data of lower quality—thus, either way, reducing the data-cleaning effort required. In addition, a few false positives and false negatives are acceptable in private-sector

applications, because a few false positives can usually be cleared up by contact with clients without a significant draw on resources, and a few false negatives are tolerable. Ground truth—that is, knowledge of what is actually true that can be used to validate or verify a new measurement or technique—is available in many private-sector applications, a point that enables automated learning and refinement to take place. All of the relevant data are available—at once—in private-sector applications.

These attributes are very different in the counterterrorism domain. Ground truth is rarely available in tracking terrorists, in large part because terrorists and terrorist activity are rare. Data specifically associated with terrorists (targeted collection efforts) are sparse and mostly collected in unstructured form (free text, video, audio recordings). The availability of much of the relevant data depends on the specific nature of data collected earlier (e.g., information may be needed to obtain a search warrant that then leads to additional information). Data tracks of terrorists in commercial and government administrative databases (as contrasted with government intelligence databases) are co-mingled with enormously larger volumes of similar data associated with innocent individuals, and they are not in any way apparent or obvious from the fact of their collection—that is, it is generally unknown who is a terrorist in any such database. And links among records in databases of varying accuracy will tend to reflect accuracies characteristic of the most inaccurate of the databases involved.

Such differences are not described here to argue that data mining for counterterrorist applications is ipso facto unproductive or operationally useless. But the existence of these differences underscores the difficulty of productively applying data mining techniques in the counterterrorist domain.

Conclusion 7. The utility of pattern-based data mining is found primarily if not exclusively in its role in helping humans make better decisions about how to deploy scarce investigative resources, and action (such as arrest, search, denial of rights) should never be taken solely on the basis of a data mining result. Automated terrorist identification through data mining (or any other known methodology) is neither feasible as an objective nor desirable as a goal of technology development efforts.

As noted in Appendix H , subject-based data mining and pattern-based data mining have very different characteristics. The common example of pattern-based data mining is what might be called automated terrorist identification, by which is meant an automated process that examines large databases in search of any anomalous pattern that might indicate a terrorist plot in the making. Automated terrorist iden-

tification is not technically feasible because the notion of an anomalous pattern—in the absence of some well-defined ideas of what might constitute a threatening pattern—is likely to be associated with many more benign activities than terrorist activities. In this situation, the number of false leads is likely to exhaust any reasonable limit on investigative or analytical resources. For these reasons, the desirability of technology development efforts aimed at automated terrorist identification is highly questionable.

Other kinds of pattern-based data mining may be useful in helping analysts to search for known patterns of interest (i.e., when they have a basis for believing that such a pattern may signal terrorist intent). For example, analysts may determine that a pattern is suggestive of terrorist activity on the basis of historical experience. By searching for patterns known to be associated with (prior) terrorist incidents, it may well be possible to uncover tangible and useful evidence of similar terrorist plots in the making. The significance of uncovering such plots, even if they are similar to those that have occurred in the past, should not be underestimated. Terrorists learn from their past failures and successes, and to the extent that counterterrorist activities can force them to develop new—and unproven—approaches, they will be placed at a significant disadvantage.

Patterns of interest may also be identified by analysts thinking about sets of activities that are indicative of or associated with terrorist activity, even if there is no historical precedent for such associations. Under some circumstances, terrorists might well be limited in the options they might pursue in attacking a specific target. If so, it might be reasonable to search for patterns associated with the planning and execution of those options.

Still, patterns of interest identified using these techniques should be regarded as indicative rather than authoritative, and they should be used only to suggest when further investigation may be warranted rather than as definitive indications of terrorist activity. The committee believes that data mining routines should never be the sole arbiter prior to actions that have a substantial impact on people’s lives. Data mining should be used to help humans make decisions when the combination of human judgment and automated data mining results in better decisions than human judgment alone. But even when this is the case, it does not negate the fact that data mining routines, on their own, can make obvious mistakes in deciding the rankings and that the use of human judgment can dramatically reduce the rate of errors.

Conclusion 8. Although systems that support analysts in the identification of terrorists can be designed with features and functionality that enhance privacy

protection without significant loss to their primary mission, privacy-preserving examination of individually identifiable records is fundamentally a contradiction in terms.

Systems can often be designed in ways that enhance privacy without compromising their primary mission. For example, in searching for a weapon at a checkpoint, a scanner might generate anatomically correct images of a person’s body in graphic detail. Since what is of interest is not those images but rather the presence or absence of weapons, a system could be designed to detect the presence or absence of a weapon in a particular scan and that fact (presence or absence) reported rather than the image itself. Procedural protections could also be put into place: for example, an individual might be given the choice of going through an imaging scanner or undergoing a pat-down search. (Note also that a different and broader set of privacy implications arises if images are stored for further use, as they may well be for system assessments.)

Nevertheless, in the absence of a near-perfect profile of a terrorist, it is not possible, even in principle, to somehow examine the records of an individual (who might or might not be a terrorist) but to expose those records only if he or she actually is a terrorist. (A profile of a terrorist is intended to enable the sorting of individuals into those who match the profile and those who do not. If the profile is perfect, and the data contained in individual records are entirely accurate, all of those who match can be regarded with certainty as terrorists and all of those who do not match can be regarded with certainty as nonterrorists. In practice, profiles are never perfect and data are not entirely accurate, and so the notion of degrees of match is much more relevant than the notion of simply match or nonmatch.)

As a result, any realistic system examining databases containing information about terrorists will bring a mix of terrorists and nonterrorists to the attention of analysts, who will decide whether these individuals warrant further investigation. “Further investigation” in this nonroutine context necessarily results in an examination of the private personal information for these individuals, and it may result in tangible inconvenience and loss of various freedoms.

Conclusion 9. Research and development on data mining techniques using real population data are inherently invasive of privacy to some extent.

Much of data mining is focused on looking for patterns of behavior, characteristics, or transactions that are a priori plausible (i.e., plausible on the basis of expert judgment and experience) as possible indicators of terrorist activity. But these expert judgments about patterns of interest

must be empirically valid if they are to have significant operational utility, whereby validity is measured by a high true positive rate in identifying terrorist activity and a low false positive rate.

On one hand, a degree of empirical validity can be obtained through the use of synthetic and anonymized data or historical data. For example, large population databases can be seeded with data created to resemble data associated with real terrorist activity. Although such data are, by definition, based on assumptions about the nature and character of terrorist activities, the expert judgment of experienced counterterrorism analysts can provide such data with significant face validity. 9 By testing various algorithms in this environment, the simulated terrorist signatures provide a measure of ground truth against which various data mining approaches can be tested.

On the other hand and by definition, the use of synthetic data to simulate terrorist signatures does not provide real-world empirical validation. Only real data can be the basis for real-world empirical validation. Thus, another approach is to use historical data on terrorists. For example, a great deal is known today about the actual behavioral and activity signatures of the September 11, 2001, terrorists. Seeding large population databases with such data and requiring various algorithms to identify known terrorists provide a complementary approach to validation.

The use of historical data on terrorists is limited in one fundamental respect: it does not account for unprecedented events. But it is entirely reasonable to suggest that the successful application of proposed tools and techniques to known past events is a minimum and necessary (though not sufficient) metric of success.

Using real population databases—large databases filled with actual behavioral and activity data on actual individuals—presents a serious privacy issue. Almost all of these individuals will have no connection to terrorists, and the use of such data in this context means that their private personal information will indeed be compromised.

It is a policy decision as to whether the risks to privacy inherent in conducting research and development (R&D) on data mining techniques for counterterrorism using real population data are outweighed by the potential operational value of using those techniques. The committee

recommends that such R&D should be conducted on synthetic data (see Section 3.7 ), but if the decision is made to use real population data, the committee urges that policy makers face, acknowledge, and report on this issue explicitly.

3.5 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING DECEPTION DETECTION AND BEHAVIORAL SURVEILLANCE

Conclusion 10. Behavioral and physiological monitoring techniques might be able to play an important role in counterterrorism efforts when used to detect (a) anomalous states (individuals whose behavior and physiological states deviate from norms for a particular situation) and (b) patterns of activity with well-established links to underlying psychological states.

Scientific support for linkages between behavioral and physiological markers and mental state is strongest for elementary states (simple emotions, attentional processes, states of arousal, and cognitive processes), weak for more complex states (deception), and nonexistent for highly complex states (terrorist intent and beliefs). The status of the scientific evidence, the risk of false positives, and vulnerability to countermeasures argue for behavioral observation and physiological monitoring to be used at most as a preliminary screening method for identifying individuals who merit additional follow-up investigation. Indeed, there is no consensus in the relevant scientific community nor on the committee regarding whether any behavioral surveillance or physiological monitoring techniques are ready for use at all in the counterterrorist context given the present state of the science.

Conclusion 11. Further research is warranted for the laboratory development and refinement of methods for automated, remote, and rapid assessment of behavioral and physiological states that are anomalous for particular situations and for those that have well-established links to psychological states relevant to terrorist intent.

A number of techniques have been proposed for the machine-assisted detection of certain behavioral and physiological states. For example, advances in magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), electroencephalography (EEG), and other modern techniques have enabled measures of changes in brain activity associated with thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. 10 Research in image analysis has yielded improvements in machine recog-

nition of faces under a variety of circumstances (e.g., when a face is smiling or when it is frowning) and environments (e.g., in some nonlaboratory settings).

However, most of the work is still in the basic research stage, with much of the underlying science still to be validated or determined. If real-world utility of these techniques is to be realized, a number of issues—practical, technical, and fundamental—will have to be addressed, such as the limits to understanding, the largely unknown measurement validity of new technologies, the lack of standardization in the field, and the vulnerability to countermeasures. Public acceptability regarding the privacy implications of such techniques also remains to be demonstrated, especially if the resulting data are stored for unknown future uses or undefined lengths of time.

For example, the current state-of-the-art of functional MRI technology can identify changes in the hemodynamics in certain regions of the brain, thus signaling activity in those regions. But such results are not necessarily consistent across individuals (i.e., different areas in the brains of different individuals may be active under the same stimulus) or even in the same individual (i.e., a slightly different part of the brain may become active even in the same individual under the same stimulus). Certain regions of the brain may be active under a variety of different stimuli. In short, understanding of what these regions do is still primitive. Furthermore, even if simple associations can be made reliably in laboratory settings, this does not necessarily translate into usable technology in less controlled situations. Behavior of interest to detect, such as terrorist intent, occurs in an environment that is very different from the highly controlled behavioral science laboratory.

Conclusion 12. Technologies and techniques for behavioral observation have enormous potential for violating the reasonable expectations of privacy of individuals.

Because the inferential chain from behavioral observation to possible adverse judgment is both probabilistic and long, behavioral observation has enormous potential for violating the reasonable expectations of privacy of individuals. It would not be unreasonable to suppose that most individuals would be far less bothered and concerned by searches aimed at finding tangible objects that might be weapons or by queries aimed at authenticating their identity than by technologies and techniques whose use will inevitably force targeted individuals to explain and justify their mental and emotional states. Even if behavioral observation and physiological monitoring are used only as a preliminary screening methods for identifying individuals who merit additional follow-up investigation,

these individuals will be subject to suspicion that would not fall on others not so identified.

3.6 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING STATISTICAL AGENCIES

Conclusion 13. Census and survey data collected by the federal statistical agencies are not useful for terrorism prevention: such data have little or no content that would be useful for counterterrorism. The content and sampling fractions of household surveys as well as the lack of personal identifiers makes it highly unlikely that these data sets could be linked with any reasonable degree of precision to other databases of use in terrorism prevention.

The content of the data collected by the federal statistical agencies under the auspices of survey and census programs is generally inconsistent with the needs of counterterrorist activities, which require individually identifiable data. Even ignoring issues of access, the value of the data collected on national household or business surveys for terrorism prevention is minimal.

The reasons are several:

Censuses collect little information beyond name, address, and basic demographic data on age, sex, and race; such data are unlikely to be of much value for identifying terrorists or terrorist behavior.

Because a substantial proportion of individuals move frequently, the 10-year cycle of censuses means that the census information is unlikely to be timely, even in supplying current addresses.

The census long form, which has been collected on a sample basis (and its successor program, the American Community Survey, ACS) have more information but still very little that is directly relevant to predicting terrorist activity. Moreover, because these data are collected only for a sample, the probability that those of interest would be in the sample for a given year of the ACS is very slight, and, furthermore, the ability to match files without identifiers into other record systems would be limited. At best, these data might provide background information to provide a description of the socioeconomic make-up of a clustered group of blocks.

Other household surveys also collect little of direct relevance to terrorism prevention, and because they typically draw on much less than 1 percent of the population, the chances of identifying new information on an individual of interest are rather low.

Regarding establishment surveys, for terrorism detection one might be interested in businesses that have increased activity with people in

various parts of the world, but such information is not contained on federal statistical system business censuses and surveys.

A variety of surveys collect information relevant to crime prevention and public health. Data collections on criminal activity, such as the National Crime Victimization Survey and the Uniform Crime Reports, contain data on victims of crime, and they are most useful in identifying geographic areas in which such criminal activity seems to be prevalent. Health surveys, such as the National Health Information Survey, the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, and the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (largely collected by the National Center for Health Statistics) have value in broader public health programs, but they cannot provide timely information for purposes of biosurveillance or for addressing a bioterrorist attack.

In addition, statistical agencies often collect information under a promise of confidentiality, and the costs of altering or relaxing the rules for confidentiality protection are quite substantial. The quality of the data collected could be adversely affected as a consequence of respondents’ decreased willingness to cooperate. Statistical agencies typically collect information under a promise of confidentiality, and reneging on such officially provided assurances could substantially reduce the quality of the data collected, resulting in much poorer data on the state of the nation. 11

Aside from census and survey data, statistical agencies also hold considerable administrative data (which they have collected from other agencies); such data may be merged with data collected for statistical purposes and thus create the potential for data sets and databases that could at some point conceivably be useful for purposes of counterterrorism. While these derived data sets are currently protected by pledges of

confidentiality if any of the component data sets are so protected, some additional consideration needs to be given to such constructs and how to respond to requests for them from other government agencies.

3.7 RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the conclusions presented above, the committee has two central recommendations. The first recommendation has subparts a-d.

3.7.1 Systematic Evaluation of Every Information- Based Counterterrorism Program

Recommendation 1. U.S. government agencies should be required to follow a systematic process (such as the one described in the frame work proposed in Chapter 2 ) to evaluate the effectiveness, lawfulness, and consistency with U.S. values of every information-based program, whether classified or unclassified, for detecting and countering terror ists before it can be deployed, and periodically thereafter.

Appendix J (“ The Total/Terrorist Information Awareness Program ”) recounts the story of the Total Information Awareness (TIA) program of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the intense controversy it engendered—which was a motivation for launching this study. The committee notes that in December 2003, the Department of Defense (DOD) inspector general’s (IG) audit of TIA concluded that the failure to consider privacy adequacy during the early development of TIA led DOD to “risk spending funds to develop systems that may not be either deployable or used to their fullest potential without costly revision.” 12 The DOD-IG report noted that this was particularly true with regard to the potential deployment of TIA for law enforcement: “DARPA need[ed] to consider how TIA will be used in terms of law enforcement to ensure that privacy is built into the developmental process.” 13 Greater consideration of how the technology might be used not only would have served privacy but also would probably have contributed to making TIA more useful.

The committee believes that a systematic approach to the development, procurement, and use of information-based counterterrorism programs is necessary if their full value is to be obtained. The framework

developed by the committee and provided in Chapter 2 is intended as a template for government decision makers to use in evaluating the effectiveness, appropriateness, and validity of every information-based counterterrorism program and system. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—and all agencies of the U.S. government with counterterrorism responsibilities—should adopt the framework described in Chapter 2 , or one similar to it, as a central element in their decision making about new deployments and existing programs in use. Failure to adopt such a systematic approach is likely to result in reduced operational effectiveness, wasted resources, privacy violations, mission creep, and diminished political support, not only for those programs but also for similar and perhaps for not-so-similar programs across the board.

To facilitate accountability, such evaluations (and the data on which they are based) should be made available to the broadest audience possible. Broad availability implies that these evaluations should be unclassified to the maximum extent possible—but even if evaluations are classified, they should still be performed and should be made available to those with the requisite clearances.

Such evaluations should be independent and comprehensive, and in particular they should assess both program effectiveness and privacy together, involving independent experts with the necessary technical, legal, and policy expertise to understand each of these areas and how interactions among them might affect the evaluation. For example, the meaning of privacy is in part technical, and an assessment of privacy cannot be left exclusively to individuals lacking such technical understanding.

Chapter 2 noted that much of the committee’s framework is not new and also that government decision makers have failed to implement many of the guidelines embedded in the framework even when they have been cognizant of them. It is the committee’s hope that by presenting to policy makers a comprehensive framework independent of any particular program, the pressures and exigencies associated with specific crises can be removed from the consideration and adoption of such a framework for application to all programs.

The committee also calls attention to four subrecommendations that derive from Recommendation 1.

Recommendation 1a. Periodically after a program has been operation ally deployed, and in particular before a program enters a new phase in its life cycle, policy makers should apply a framework such as the one proposed in Chapter 2 to the program before allowing it to continue operations or to proceed to the next phase.

A systematic approach such as the framework in Chapter 2 is not intended to be applied only once in the life cycle of any given program. As noted in Appendix D (“ The Life Cycle of Technology, Systems, and Programs ”), a program undergoes a number of different phases in its lifetime: identification of initial needs, research and technology development, systems development, and operational deployment and continual operational monitoring. Each of these phases provides a desirable opportunity for applying the framework to help decide whether and how the program should transition to the next phase. Each of the framework’s questions should still be asked. But the answers to those questions as well as the interpretation of the answers will vary depending on the phase. Such a review may result in a significant modification or even a cancellation of a given program.

The committee calls special attention to the importance of operational monitoring, whose purpose is to ensure that the initial deployed capability remains both effective at contributing to the mission for which it was designed and acceptable from a privacy standpoint. Often after initial deployment, the operational environment changes. Improved base technologies or entirely new technologies become available. Existing threat actors change their tactics, or entirely new threats emerge. Executive branch policies change, or new administrations take office. Analysts gain experience, or new analysts arrive. Interpretations of existing law change through court decisions, or new legislation is passed. Data-based models may change simply because more data have become available that change the parameters and estimates on which the models are based. Error rates may change for similar reasons. Because every program is necessarily embedded in this milieu, the net result is that successful programs are almost always dynamic, in that they evolve in response to such changing circumstances.

An evolved program is, by definition, not the same as the original program—and it is a fair question to ask whether the judgments made about any program in its original form would be valid for an evolved program. For these reasons, a policy regime is necessary that provides for periodic reassessment and reevaluation of a program after initial deployment, at the same time promoting and fostering necessary changes—whether technological, procedural, legal, ethical, or other.

Recommendation 1a is important to programs currently in existence—that is, programs in existence today, and especially programs that are operationally deployed today should be evaluated against the framework. To the best of the committee’s knowledge, no such evaluations have been performed for any data mining or deception detection programs in operation, although this is not to say that none have been done. If such evaluations have been performed, they should be made

available to policy makers (senior officials in the executive branch or the U.S. Congress), and if possible, the public as well. If not, they should be undertaken with all due speed. And if they cannot be performed without access to classified information, an independent group of experts with the requisite clearances should be chartered to perform such assessments.

Recommendation 1b. To protect the privacy of innocent people, the research and development of any information-based counterterrorism program should be conducted with synthetic population data. If and when a program meets the criteria for deployment in the committee’s illustrative framework described in Chapter 2 , it should be deployed only in a carefully phased manner, e.g., being field tested and evaluated at a modest number of sites before being scaled up for general use. At all stages of a phased deployment, data about individuals should be rigorously subjected to the full safeguards of the framework.

Almost by definition, technology in the R&D stage is nascent and unproven. Nascent and unproven technologies are not sufficiently robust or reliable to warrant risking the privacy of individuals—that is, the very uncertain (perhaps nonexistent) benefit that would be derived from their use does not justify the very real cost to privacy that would inevitably accompany their widespread use in operational settings. Thus, the committee advocates R&D based on synthetic population data whose use poses very little risk of violating the privacy of innocent individuals. In addition, the successful use of synthetic data in many fields, such as epidemiology, medicine, and chemistry, for testing methods provides another reason to explore its potential uses in counterterrorism.

The committee believes that realistic synthetic population data could probably be created along the lines originally suggested in Rubin and in Little and further developed by Fienberg et al. and Reiter, 14 for the specific purpose of providing the background against which terrorist signatures are sought. Furthermore, because it is difficult to create from entirely synthetic data large databases that are useful for testing and (partially) validating data mining techniques and algorithms, a partial substitute for entirely synthetic data is data derived from real population data in such a way that the individual identities of nonterrorists are masked

while preserving some of the important large-scale statistical properties of those data.

Using synthetic population data as the background, a measure of the utility of various data mining approaches can be obtained in R&D. Such results must be evaluated in the most rigorous and independent manner possible in order to determine if the program should move into deployment.

If the results are determined to be sufficiently promising (e.g., with sufficiently low false positive and false negative rates) that they offer significant operational capability, it is reasonable to apply the new capabilities to real data in an operational context. 15 But the change from synthetic to real data must be accompanied by a full array of operational safeguards that protect individuals from harm to their privacy, as suggested by the committee’s proposed framework. Put differently, if real data are to be used, they—and the individuals with whom they are associated—deserve the full benefit of the privacy protections associated with the program in question.

Transitioning to an operational context from R&D must also be done carefully and is best undertaken in small phases. The traditional approach to acquisition generally involves the deployment of operational capabilities in large blocks of capability (i.e., large functional components deployed on a wide scale). Experience indicates that this approach is often slow and cumbersome, and it increases technical, programmatic, and budgetary risks. The operational environment often changes significantly in the time between initial requirements specification and first deployment—thus, the capability may even be obsolete when it is first deployed. And deploying systems on a large scale before they are deployed on a small scale is almost always problematic, because small-scale operational trials are needed to shake out the inevitable bugs when R&D technologies meet the real world.

By contrast, phased deployment is based on a philosophy of “build-a-little, test-a-little, deploy-a-little.” Phased deployment recognizes that kinks and problems in the deployment of any new capability are inevitable, positing that by making small changes, system developers will be able to more easily identify and correct these problems than when everything changes all at once. Small changes are easier to reverse, should that become necessary. It also becomes feasible to test new capabilities offered by small changes in parallel with the baseline version, so that ground

truth provided by the baseline version can be used to validate the new capabilities when their domain of operation is the same.

The committee recognizes that, under this approach, operational capabilities will not have been subject to real-world empirical validation before deployment, although they will have had as much validation as possible with synthetic population data. And the phased deployment of privacy-sensitive capabilities reduces the likelihood of inappropriate or improper compromises of privacy from what they would have been under a more traditional acquisition model. 16

The approach recommended above (synthetic data before deployment, deployment only in measured phases) places a high premium on two actions. First, every effort must be made to create good synthetic data that are useful for testing the validity of machine-learning tools and are simultaneously very realistic. For synthetic terrorist data, both historical data and expert judgment play a role in developing signatures that might plausibly be associated with terrorist activity, and plausibility should be assessed through independent panels of judges without a vested interest in any given scenario. Such judges must also be trained in or experienced with evasion or obfuscation techniques. For synthetic population data, every use must be made of known techniques for confidentiality protection and statistical disclosure limitation 17 to reduce the likelihood that the privacy of individuals is compromised, and further research on the creation of better synthetic data to represent large-scale populations is certainly warranted.

Second, evaluation of R&D results must truly be independent and rigorous, with high standards of performance needed for a decision to deploy. As noted in Conclusion 4, the rule that “X is better than doing nothing” often drives deployment decisions, and, given the high potential costs to individual privacy of deployment, the benefits afforded by deployment must be more than marginal to warrant the potential cost.

Recommendation 1c. Any information-based counterterrorism program of the U.S. government should be subjected to robust, independent oversight of the operations of that program, a part of which would

entail a practice of using the same data mining technologies to “mine the miners and track the trackers.”

In practice, operational monitoring is generally the responsibility of the program managers and operational personnel. But as discussed in Appendix G (“ The Jurisprudence of Privacy Law and the Need for Independent Oversight ”), oversight is necessary to ensure that actual operations have been conducted in accordance with stated policies.

The reason is that, in many cases, decision makers formulate policies in order to balance competing imperatives. For example, the public demands both a high degree of effectiveness in countering terrorism and a high degree of privacy. Program administrators themselves face multiple challenges: motivating high performance, adhering to legal requirements, staying within budget, and so on. But if operational personnel adhere to some elements of a policy and not to others, the balance that decision makers intended to achieve will not be realized in practice.

The committee emphasizes that independent oversight is necessary to ensure that commitments to minimizing privacy intrusions embedded in policy statements are realized in practice. The reason is that losses of privacy are easy to discount under the pressure of daily operations, and those elements of policy intended to protect privacy are more likely to be ignored or compromised. Without effective oversight mechanisms in place, public trust is less likely to be forthcoming. In addition, oversight can support continuous improvement and guide administrators in making organizational change.

For example, program oversight is essential to ensure that those responsible for the program do not bypass procedures or technologies intended to protect privacy. Noncompliance with existing privacy-protecting laws, regulations, and best practices diminishes public support and creates an environment in which counterterrorism programs may be curtailed or eliminated. Indeed, even if shortcuts and bypasses increase effectiveness in a given case, in the long run scandals and public outcry about perceived abuses will reduce the political support for the programs or systems involved—and may deprive the nation of important tools useful in the counterterrorist mission. Even if a program is effective in the laboratory and expected to be so in the field, its deployment must be accompanied by strong technical and procedural safeguards to ensure that the privacy of individuals is not placed at undue risk.

Oversight is also needed to protect against abuse and mission creep. Experience and history indicate that in many programs that collect or use personal information, some individuals may violate safeguards intended to protect individual privacy. Hospital clerks have been known to exam-

ine the medical records of celebrities without having a legitimate reason for doing so, simply because they are curious. Police officers have been known to examine the records of individuals in motor vehicle information systems to learn about the personal lives of individuals with whom they interact in the course of daily business. And, of course, compromised insiders have been known to use the information systems of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to further nefarious ends.

The phenomenon of mission creep is illustrated by the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System II (CAPPS II) program, initially described in congressional testimony as an aviation security tool and not a law enforcement tool but which morphed in a few months to a system that would analyze information on persons “with [any] outstanding state or federal arrest warrants for crimes of violence.” 18

To guard against such practices, the committee advocates program oversight that mines the miners and tracks the trackers. That is, all operation and command histories and all accesses to data-based counterterrorism information systems should be logged on an individual basis, audited, and mined with the same technologies and the same zeal that are applied to combating terrorists. If, for example, such practices had been in place during Robert Hanssen’s tenure at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), his use of its computer systems for unauthorized purposes might have been discovered sooner.

Finally, the committee recognizes the phenomenon of statutory mission creep, as defined above in the discussion of Premise 5. It occurs, for example, because in responding to a crisis, policy makers will naturally focus on adapting existing programs and capabilities rather than creating new ones. On one hand, if successful, adaptation often promises to be less expensive and faster than creating a new program or capabilities from scratch. On the other hand, because an existing program is likely to be highly customized for specific purposes, adapting that program to serve other purposes effectively may prove difficult—perhaps even more difficult than creating a program from scratch. As importantly, adapting an existing program to new purposes may well be contrary to agreements and understandings established in order to initiate the original program in the first place.

The committee does not oppose expanding the goals and missions of a program under all circumstances. Nevertheless, it cautions that such expansion should not be undertaken hastily in response to crisis. In the committee’s view, following diligently the framework presented in Chapter 2 is an important step in exercising such caution.

Recommendation 1d. Counterterrorism programs should provide meaningful redress to any individuals inappropriately harmed by their operation.

Programs that are designed to balance competing interests (in the case of counterterrorism, collective security and individual privacy and civil liberties) will naturally be biased in one direction or another if their incentive/penalty structure is not designed to reflect this balance. The availability of redress to the individual harmed thus acts to promote the goal of compliance with stated policy—as does the operational oversight mentioned in Recommendation 1c—and to provide incentives for the government to improve the policies, technologies, and data underlying the operation of the program.

Although the committee makes no specific recommendation concerning the form of redress that is appropriate for any given privacy harm suffered by innocent individuals as the result of a counterterrorism program, it notes that many forms of redress are possible in principle, ranging from apology to monetary compensation. The most appropriate form of redress is likely to depend on the nature and purpose of the specific counterterrorism program involved. However, the committee believes that, at a minimum, an innocent individual should always be provided with at least an explicit acknowledgment of the harm suffered and an action that reduces the likelihood that such an incident will ever be repeated, such as correcting erroneous data that might have led to the harm. Note that responsibilities for correction should apply to the holder of erroneous data, regardless of whether the holder is the government or a third party.

The availability of redress might, in principle, enable terrorists to manipulate the system in order to increase their chances of remaining undetected. However, as noted in Item 7 of the committee’s framework on effectiveness, information-based programs should be robust and not easily circumvented by adversary countermeasures, and thus the possibility that terrorists might manipulate the system is not a sufficient argument against the idea of redress.

3.7.2 Periodic Review of U.S. Law, Policy, and Procedures for Protection of Privacy

Recommendation 2. The U.S. government should periodically review the nation’s laws, policies, and procedures that protect individuals’ private information for relevance and effectiveness in light of chang ing technologies and circumstances. In particular, Congress should reexamine existing law to consider how privacy should be protected in the context of information-based programs (e.g., data mining) for counterterrorism.

The technological environment in which policy is embedded is constantly changing. Although technological change is not new, the pace of technological change has dramatically increased in the digital age. As noted in Engaging Privacy and Information Technology in a Digital Age , advances in information technology make it easier and cheaper by orders of magnitude to gather, retain, and analyze information, and other trends have enabled access to new kinds of information that previously would have been next to impossible to gather about another individual. 19 Furthermore, new information technologies have eroded the privacy protection once provided through obscurity or the passage of time. Today, it is less expensive to store information electronically than to decide to get rid of it, and new and more powerful data mining techniques and technologies make it much easier to extract and identify personally identifiable patterns that were previously protected by the vast amounts of data “noise” around them.

The security environment is also constantly changing. New adversaries emerge, and counterterrorist efforts must account for the fact that new practices and procedures for organizing, training, planning, and acquiring resources may emerge as well. Most importantly, new attacks appear. The number of potential terrorist targets in the United States is large, 20 and

although the different types of attack on these targets may be limited, attacks might be executed in myriad ways.

As an example of a concern ripe for examination and possible action, the committee found common ground in the proposition that policy makers should seriously consider restrictions on how personal information is used in addition to restrictions on how records are collected and accessed. Usage restrictions could be an important and useful supplement to access and collection limitation rules in an era in which much of the personal information that can be the basis for privacy intrusion is already either publicly available or easily accessible on request without prior judicial oversight. Privacy protection in the form of information usage restrictions can provide a helpful tool that balances the need to use powerful investigative tools, such as data mining, for counterterrorism purposes and the imperative to regulate privacy intrusions of such techniques through accountable adherence to clearly stated privacy rules. ( Appendix G elaborates on this aspect of the recommendation.)

Such restrictions can serve an important function in helping to ensure that programs created to address a specific area stay focused on the problem that the programs were designed to address and in guarding against unauthorized or unconsidered expansion of government surveillance power. They also help to discourage mission creep, which often expands the set of purposes served by the program without explicit legislative authorization and into areas that are poorly matched by the original program’s structure and operation. An example of undesirable mission creep would be the use of personal data collected from the population acquired for counterterrorist purposes to uncover tax evaders or parents who have failed to make child support payments. This is not to say that finding such individuals is not a worthy social goal, but rather that the mismatch between such a goal and the intrusiveness of data collection measures for counterterrorist purposes is substantial indeed. Without clear legal rules defining the boundaries for use between counterterrorism and inappropriate law enforcement uses, debates over mission creep are likely to continue without constructive resolution.

A second example of a concern that may be ripe for legislative action involves the current legal uncertainty supporting private-sector liability for cooperation with government data mining programs. Such uncertainty creates real risk in the private sector, as indicated by the present variety of private lawsuits against telecommunications service providers, 21 and private-sector responsibilities and rights must be clarified along

with government powers and privacy protections. What exists today is a mix of law, regulation, and informal influence in which the legal rights and responsibilities of private-sector entities are highly uncertain and not well understood.

A coherent, comprehensive legal regime regulating information-intensive surveillance such as government data mining, would do much to reduce such uncertainty. As one example, such a regime might address the issue of liability limitation for private-sector data sources (database providers, etc.) that provide privacy-intrusive information to the government.

Without spelling out the precise scope and coverage of the comprehensive regime, the committee believes that to the extent that the government legally compels a private party to provide data or a private party otherwise complies with an apparently legal requirement to disclose information, it should not be subject to liability simply for the act of complying with the government compulsion or legal requirement. Any such legal protection should not extend to the content of the information it supplies, and the committee also believes that the regime should allow incentives for data providers to invest reasonable effort in ensuring the quality of the data they provide. Furthermore, they should provide effective legal remedies for those individuals who suffer harm as a result of provider negligence. Furthermore, the regime would necessarily preserve the ability of individuals to challenge the constitutionality of the underlying data access statute.

Listed below are other examples of how the adequacy of privacy-related law might be called into question by a changing environment ( Appendix F elaborates on these examples).

Conducting general searches. On one hand, the Fourth Amendment forbids general searches—that is, searches that are not limited as to the location of the search or the type of evidence the government is seeking—by requiring that all searches and seizures must be reasonable and that all warrants must state with particularity the item to be seized and the place to be searched. On the other hand, machine-aided searching of enormous digital transaction records is in some ways analogous to a general search. Such a search can be a dragnet that sweeps through millions or billions of records, often containing highly sensitive information. Much like a general search in colonial times was not limited to a particular person or place, a machine-aided search through digital databases can be very broad. How, if at all, should database searches be regulated by the Fourth Amendment or by statute?

A related issue is that the historical difficulty of physical access to ostensibly public information has provided a degree of privacy protection

for that information—what might be known as privacy through obscurity. But a search-enabled digital world erodes some of these previously inherent protections against invasions of privacy, changing the technological milieu that surrounds privacy jurisprudence.

Increased access to data; searches and surveillance of U.S. persons outside the United States. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the Fourth Amendment applies to searches and surveillance for national security and intelligence purposes that involve U.S. persons 22 who are connected to a foreign power or that are conducted wholly outside the United States. 23 Lower courts, however, have found that there is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for searches conducted for intelligence purposes within the United States that involve only non-U.S. persons or agents of foreign powers. 24 The Supreme Court has yet to rule on this important issue, and Congress has not supplied any statutory language to fill the gap.

Third-party records. Two Supreme Court cases ( United States v. Miller , 1976, and Smith v. Maryland , 1979) 25 have established the precedent that there is no constitutionally based reasonable expectation of privacy for information held by a third party, and thus the government today has access unrestricted by the Fourth Amendment to private-sector records on every detail of how people live their lives. Today, these third-party transactional records are available to the government subject to a very low threshold—through subpoenas that can be written by almost any government agency without prior judicial oversight—and are one of the primary data feeds for a variety of counterterrorist data mining activities. Thus, the public policy response to privacy erosion as a result of data mining used with these records will have to address some combination of the scope of use for the data mining results, the legal standards for access to and use of transactional information, or both. 26 (See also Appendix G for

discussion of how usage limitations can fill gaps in current regulation of the confidentiality of third-party records.)

Electronic surveillance law. Today’s law regarding electronic surveillance is complex. Some of the complexity is due to the fact that the situations and circumstances in which electronic surveillance may be involved are highly varied, and policy makers have decided that different situations call for different regulations. But it is an open question as to whether these differences, noted and established in one particular set of circumstances, can be effectively maintained over time. Although there is broad agreement that today’s legal regime is not optimally aligned with the technological and circumstantial realities of the present, there is profound disagreement about whether the basic principles underlying today’s regime continue to be sound as well as in what directions changes to today’s regime ought to occur.

In making Recommendation 2, the committee intends the government’s reexamination of privacy law to cover the issues described above but not be limited to them. In short, Congress and the president should work together to ensure that the law is clear, appropriate, up to date, and responsive to real needs.

Greater clarity and coherence in the legal regime governing information-based programs would have many benefits, both for privacy protection and for the counterterrorist mission. It is perhaps obvious that greater clarity helps to protect privacy by eliminating what might be seen as loopholes in the law—ambiguities that can be exploited by well-meaning national security authorities, thereby overturning or circumventing the intent of previously established policy that balanced competing interests. But the benefits of greater clarity from the standpoint of improving the ability of the U.S. government to prosecute its counterterrorism responsibilities are less obvious and thus deserve some elaboration.

First and most importantly from this perspective, greater legal clarity would help to reduce public controversy over potentially important tools that might be used for counterterrorist purposes. Although many policy makers might wish that they had a free hand in pursuing the counterterrorist mission and that public debate and controversy would just go away, the reality is that public controversy does result when the government is seen as exploiting ambiguities and loopholes.

As discussed in Appendix I (“ Illustrative Government Data Mining Programs and Activity ”), a variety of government programs have been shut down, scaled back, delayed, or otherwise restricted over privacy considerations: TIA, CAPPS II for screening airline passengers, MATRIX (Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange) for linking law enforcement records across states with other government and private-sector

databases, and a number of data-sharing experiments between the U.S. government and various airlines. Public controversy about these efforts may have prematurely compromised counterterrorism tools that might have been useful. In addition, they have also made the government more wary of national security programs that involve data matching and made the private sector more reluctant to share personal information with the government in the future.

In this regard, this first rationale for greater clarity is consistent with the conclusion of the Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee: “[privacy] protections are essential so that the government can engage in appropriate data mining when necessary to fight terrorism and defend our nation. And we believe that those protections are needed to provide clear guidance to DOD personnel engaged in anti-terrorism activities.” 27

Second, greater legal clarity and coherence can enhance the effectiveness of certain information-based programs. For example, the Privacy Act of 1974 requires that personal data used by federal agencies be accurate, relevant, timely, and complete. On one hand, these requirements increase the likelihood that high-quality data are stored, thus enhancing the effectiveness of systems that use data subject to those requirements. On the other hand, both the FBI’s National Crime Information Center and the passenger screening database of the Transportation Security Administration have exemptions from some of these requirements; 28 to the extent that these exemptions result in lower-quality data, these systems are likely to perform less well.

Third, the absence of a clear legal framework is likely to have a profound effect on the innovation and research that are necessary to improve the accuracy and effectiveness of information-based programs. Such clarity is necessary to support the investment of financial, institutional, and human resources in often risky research that may not pay dividends for

decades. But that type of research is essential to counterterrorism efforts and to finding better ways of protecting privacy.

Finally, a clear and coherent legal framework will almost certainly be necessary to realize the potential of new technologies to fight terrorism. Because such technologies will operate in the political context of an American public concerned about privacy, the public—and congressional decision makers—will have to take measures that protect privacy when new technologies are deployed. All technological solutions will require a legal framework within which to operate, and there will always be gaps left by technological protections, which law will be essential to fill. Consequently, a lack of clarity in that framework may not only slow their development and deployment, as described above, but also make technological solutions entirely unworkable.

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All U.S. agencies with counterterrorism programs that collect or "mine" personal data -- such as phone records or Web sites visited -- should be required to evaluate the programs' effectiveness, lawfulness, and impacts on privacy. A framework is offered that agencies can use to evaluate such information-based programs, both classified and unclassified. The book urges Congress to re-examine existing privacy law to assess how privacy can be protected in current and future programs and recommends that any individuals harmed by violations of privacy be given a meaningful form of redress.

Two specific technologies are examined: data mining and behavioral surveillance. Regarding data mining, the book concludes that although these methods have been useful in the private sector for spotting consumer fraud, they are less helpful for counterterrorism because so little is known about what patterns indicate terrorist activity. Regarding behavioral surveillance in a counterterrorist context, the book concludes that although research and development on certain aspects of this topic are warranted, there is no scientific consensus on whether these techniques are ready for operational use at all in counterterrorism.

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Conclusion: The Future of Terrorism

• Published: September 2018
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ISIS paid a steep, albeit foreseeable, price for inverting these rules for rebels. Its playbook of broadcasting the indiscriminate attacks instilled terror around the world, but quickly united the world against the group. In countless media interviews, think tank pundits repeated the conventional wisdom that ISIS was following a brilliant script—unaware that it was the opposite to the one that triumphant militant groups have successfully followed. Militant leaders have a choice. They can maximize terror as political losers or forgo the terror and possibly win. The good news is that moderation pays. The bad news is that extremism will nonetheless continue. This chapter explains why terrorism will persist despite its ineffectiveness and suggests ways to reverse this deadly trend.

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Essay on Terrorism

Students are often asked to write an essay on Terrorism in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Terrorism

Understanding terrorism.

Terrorism refers to the use of violence, often against civilians, to achieve political goals. It’s a form of fear-based manipulation, aiming to create panic and disrupt peace.

Impacts of Terrorism

Terrorism harms societies both physically and psychologically. It leads to loss of lives, property, and can cause trauma. It also hampers economic growth and societal harmony.

Countering Terrorism

Countering terrorism requires global cooperation. Nations must share intelligence, enforce strict laws, and promote education and understanding to prevent radicalization. Remember, peace and unity are our best defenses against terrorism.

Also check:

• Paragraph on Terrorism
• Speech on Terrorism

250 Words Essay on Terrorism

Terrorism, a term that sends chills down the spine, is an act of violence primarily intended to create fear, disrupt societal structures, and promote political or ideological agendas. It is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, which has been escalating in frequency and intensity worldwide.

The Root Causes

The root causes of terrorism are multifarious. It can be triggered by political instability, socio-economic disparities, religious fanaticism, or ethnic tensions. Often, it is a combination of these factors, creating a fertile breeding ground for extremist ideologies.

The Impact of Terrorism

The impacts of terrorism are far-reaching and devastating. Beyond the immediate human toll, it disrupts economic stability, social harmony, and political structures. It instills fear, leading to changes in behavior and attitudes, and can even alter the course of history.

Counter-Terrorism Strategies

Counter-terrorism strategies are as diverse as the causes of terrorism. They range from military interventions to intelligence operations, from diplomatic negotiations to socio-economic reforms. However, the most effective strategies are those that address the root causes of terrorism, rather than merely responding to its symptoms.

Terrorism, a grave threat to global peace and security, requires a comprehensive and holistic approach to be effectively countered. By understanding its root causes and impacts, we can devise strategies to combat it, ensuring a safer world for future generations.

500 Words Essay on Terrorism

Introduction to terrorism.

Terrorism, a term that sends chills down the spine of many, is a complex phenomenon that has been the subject of extensive study and debate. It is characterized by acts of violence or threats aimed at creating fear, disrupting societal order, and advancing political, religious, or ideological goals.

The Evolution of Terrorism

Historically, terrorism was primarily a tool of the weak against the strong, a way to destabilize oppressive regimes or draw attention to a cause. However, the advent of the 21st century has seen its evolution into a more global menace, with the rise of transnational terrorist networks like Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The digital age has made it easier for these groups to recruit, radicalize, and coordinate attacks, making terrorism a borderless problem.

The Psychology of Terrorism

Understanding the psychology of terrorism is crucial in tackling it. Many terrorists are not psychopaths or inherently evil people, but individuals manipulated into believing that their violent actions are justified. Factors such as social exclusion, economic deprivation, political oppression, and religious indoctrination can contribute to this mindset. This underscores the importance of addressing root causes to prevent terrorism.

Terrorism’s impacts are multifaceted. The immediate effect is loss of life and property, but the ripple effects are far-reaching. It instills fear and insecurity, disrupts economic activity, and can lead to restrictive security measures that infringe on civil liberties. Moreover, it can exacerbate social divisions and fuel cycles of violence and retaliation.

Counter-terrorism strategies must be as multifaceted as the problem they aim to solve. Military and law enforcement responses are necessary to protect citizens and bring perpetrators to justice. However, these approaches should be paired with efforts to address the underlying social, economic, and political conditions that breed terrorism.

Preventive measures include promoting social inclusion, economic development, and political reforms. Moreover, countering extremist narratives online and offline is crucial to prevent radicalization. International cooperation is also essential given the transnational nature of modern terrorism.

Conclusion: The Future of Counter-Terrorism

The future of counter-terrorism lies in a balanced approach that combines hard and soft power. While military and law enforcement measures are necessary, they are not sufficient on their own. The fight against terrorism must also be a fight for hearts and minds, addressing the root causes of terrorism, and building inclusive societies where extremist narratives find no fertile ground.

In conclusion, terrorism is a complex problem that requires a nuanced understanding and multifaceted response. It is not just a security issue, but a social, economic, and political one. By addressing it in this holistic manner, we can hope to make progress in the ongoing struggle against this global menace.

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How to defeat terrorism: Intelligence, integration, and development

Subscribe to global connection, norman loayza nl norman loayza lead economist, development research group - world bank.

July 25, 2016

My partner was caught at the Istanbul airport during the latest terrorist attack. She hid in a closet with a few people, including a small girl, disconcerted and afraid. And when the attack was over, she saw the blood, desolation, chaos, and tears of the aftermath. This was a horrific moment. Yet, it paled in comparison to what the injured and dead and their relatives had to suffer.

It seems that terrorism and political violence are becoming more prevalent and intense. They have been, however, long brewing and have affected many countries around the world. In the 1980s, my home country, Peru, suffered immensely from terrorism: The badly called “Shining Path” organization, with its communist ideology and ruthless tactics, terrorized first rural communities and then large cities with deadly bombs in crowded places and assassinations of official and civil society leaders.

A few years ago, Phil Keefer, lead economist at the World Bank, and I edited two books on what we perceived to be the main security threats of our time: terrorism and drug trafficking . We thought that the answers had to come from research, and we tried to gather the best available evidence and arguments to understand the links between these security threats and economic development.

After the myriad of recent terrorist attacks—in Istanbul, Munich, Nice, Bagdad, Brussels, and Paris, to name a few—we found it important to recap lessons learned. These lessons are not just academic: Understanding the root causes of terrorism can lead to policies for prevention and for reducing the severity of attacks. To defeat terrorism, a policy strategy should include three components: intelligence, integration, and development.

Intelligence . A terrorist attack is relatively easy to conduct. Modern societies offer many exposed and vulnerable targets: an airport, a crowded celebration by the beach, a bus station at peak hours, or a restaurant full of expats. And the potential weapons are too many to count: a squadron of suicide bombers, a big truck ramming through the streets, two or three comrades armed with semi-automatic guns. It is impossible to protect all flanks, and some of the measures taken to prevent the previous terrorist attacks are, well, frankly silly. For a strategy to have any chance against terrorism, it should be based on intelligence. Intelligence implies understanding the motivations, leadership structure, and modus operandi of terrorist organizations, and developing a plan that can anticipate and adapt to their constantly morphing operations. Importantly, the ideological dimension should not be ignored because it explains the extremes to which terrorists are willing to arrive: A suicide attack requires a person who has muted both his basic survival instinct and all sense of natural compassion for others. It was radical communism in the 1970s and 1980s; it is a perverted and fanatical misrepresentation of Islam nowadays. An intelligence strategy that targets the sources of terrorism, both the perpetrators and the social movements that underlie them, should be the first component of the campaign against terror.

Integration. Foreigners living in the U.S. like to make fun of Hollywood movies and the social rituals that Americans go through each year: Halloween and Thanksgiving are in many respects more popular than Christmas. Yet, thanks to these cultural norms along with widespread economic opportunities and equality under the law, the U.S. has mostly succeeded in what many countries, including some European ones, have failed: the integration of people of different ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds. The U.S. is no paradise of integration, but the social melting pot does work for immigrants: Within a generation or two, Mexican Americans, Italian Americans, Iranian Americans, and so forth are just Americans, with a single national identity and, at least by law, the same rights and obligations. In some European countries, in contrast, many immigrants feel like second-class citizens. There is little that can inflame more hatred than the feeling of being excluded, and a misguided search for a sense of belonging can be the trigger that incites religious, ethnic, and ideological radicalization. This may explain why France has suffered more from terrorist acts perpetrated by their own residents than the U.S. or U.K., that paradoxically are substantially more engaged in the war against ISIS and al-Qaeda. Social integration—especially of immigrants—through explicit and targeted programs from education at an early age to immigration and citizenship reforms is a key component in the fight against terrorism.       

Development. One of the puzzles in the evidence on terrorism is that while it tends to be led (and sometimes even perpetrated) by well-off and educated people, it represents the complaints and grievances of the disenfranchised, the poor, and the unemployed. The hundreds of thousands of unemployed and discouraged young men in places as diverse as Afghanistan, Somalia, South Africa, and Brazil are the potential armies of common and political violence. In South Africa and Brazil, lacking an overriding communal ideology, this violence is expressed in robberies, homicides, and common crime. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the violence is mostly political, taking the shape or at least the cover of religious fundamentalism. Somehow in Somalia, violence has adopted both criminal and political expressions: We worry about Somali pirates as much as we do about Somali jihadists. (On the link between vulnerable youth and violence, it is telling that the name of the main terrorist organization in Somalia, al-Shabaab, means literally “The Youth”) But there is hope. A couple of decades ago, thousands of unemployed young people joined terrorist organizations in Cambodia, Colombia, and Peru, when these countries were fragile. Since their economies started growing and providing employment, these armies for criminal and political violence have started to fade away. Investing in development, conducting economic reforms, and providing (yes, equal) opportunities is the third component of a winning strategy against terrorism.

A sound military and police strategy is undoubtedly important to counter terrorism. However, it’s not sufficient in the long run. If we want to defeat terrorism permanently and completely, we need to tackle it comprehensively, using political and military intelligence, social integration, and economic development.

For more, please see Keefer, Philip and Norman Loayza, Editors. Terrorism, Economic Development, and Political Openness . Cambridge University Press. 2008.

Global Economy and Development

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February 3, 2023

Fiona Hill, John Haltiwanger

July 16, 2022

Adedeji Adeniran, Marco Castradori

April 19, 2021

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How Terrorism Is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence

Virginia Held, How Terrorism Is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence , Oxford University Press, 2008, 205pp., $45.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780195329599.

Reviewed by Igor Primoratz, University of Melbourne

This is a book on terrorism and political violence more generally, written by a philosopher and accordingly focusing on conceptual and moral, rather than empirical or historical, questions. The book is meant for fellow philosophers and political theorists, but it is written clearly and without philosophical jargon, and will be accessible, and of much interest, to the general reader too.

While political violence is a traditional topic in political and moral philosophy, terrorism -- the type of political violence generally considered most difficult to defend -- was not much discussed before the attacks in the US on 11 September 2001. Virginia Held is one of the few philosophers who gave it sustained attention before it became a fashionable topic. The present book is a collection of seven essays she has published over the last twenty-odd years and one previously unpublished paper. Some essays discuss terrorism or political violence generally, while others look into such related issues as the ways the media deals with political violence, or collective responsibility for ethnic hatred and violence. There is also an essay on the methods of moral inquiry.

In her approach to moral questions, Held combines consequentialism, deontological ethics and the ethics of care. The relevance of the last approach to discussing issues of political violence is rather limited, and Held's position on terrorism and political violence is grounded in consequentialist and deontological considerations of a more traditional type. So is just war theory, but Held's views are not a version of that theory. Indeed, she doubts that just war theory can be of much help in understanding and judging contemporary armed conflicts.

The title of the book might be thought somewhat misleading, as Held does not so much seek to show how terrorism is wrong as how it can be right. To be sure, a title highlighting the latter prospect probably would not have been a good idea in the current atmosphere of the "war on terror." This "war" is both driven and defended by a "moral clarity" claimed by leaders of some major powers and by many analysts and commentators. Held rightly challenges this facile "moral clarity," according to which all terrorism is morally the same, clearly distinct from war, and a monopoly of insurgents, who are both amoral and utterly irrational and fanatical, and therefore never to be engaged with in dialogue or negotiation. She goes on to argue that we should not adopt a sweeping moral rejection of all terrorism, whatever the cause it serves, the circumstances in which it does so, and the consequences of refraining from it; that terrorism is not "uniquely atrocious"; and that it is not necessarily morally worse than war.

The scope and import of any moral assessment of terrorism depends on just what is meant by "terrorism". Accordingly, Held discusses at some length the question of how the term should be defined. The usage over the two centuries or so since the term entered political and moral discourse in the West has been notoriously confusing, fraught with moral emotions and political passions, and plagued by relativism and double standards. It is in such cases that philosophy can demonstrate its relevance to public debates by clarifying central concepts and main positions, spotting missteps in argument, exposing prejudice and double standards, and thus facilitating more rational and discerning moral deliberation and choice. Most definitions of terrorism crafted by philosophers acknowledge the two traits that make up the core concept underlining all shifts in descriptive and evaluative meaning: terrorism is violence aiming at intimidation (fear, terror). Beyond this, philosophers tend to disagree, most importantly on whether terrorism is violence against civilians (non-combatants, innocent people), or can also target members of the military and security services and highly placed government officials. This is the question of a narrow vs. wide definition. A wide definition is in line with common use over two centuries, whereas a narrow definition is revisionary. Yet a narrow definition may be more appropriate in the context of moral assessment of violence and terrorism. Surely there is a considerable moral difference between planting a bomb in an office of (what is considered) an extremely oppressive government and killing a number of its officials, and planting a bomb in a coffee shop and killing a number of common citizens.

Held prefers a wide definition, for reasons I do not find convincing. One is common use. Held points out that the attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983, or much Palestinian violence directed at Israeli soldiers, would not count as terrorism on a narrow definition, while the bombing of Dresden or Hiroshima would, and finds these implications unacceptable. To me, they seem just right. She quotes Walter Laqueur's remark that "most terrorist groups in the contemporary world have been attacking the military, the police, and the civilian population" (p. 55) as showing the inadequacy of a narrow definition. But surely the fact that a group has engaged in terrorism to an extent sufficient to consider it a terrorist group does not turn every act of political violence committed by the group into an act of terrorism. Finally, Held rejects narrow definitions on the ground that "it is not at all clear who the 'innocent' are as distinct from the 'legitimate' targets. We can perhaps agree that small children are innocent, but beyond this, there is little moral clarity" (pp. 19-20). Yet even if only "small children" were morally protected against violence that would be a weighty consideration, as indiscriminate political violence against civilians or common citizens is bound to kill and maim children too. Moreover, there are other classes of civilians that are just as clearly innocent in the relevant sense, i.e. innocent of the (alleged) injustice or oppression: opponents of the government, those too old or infirm to take part in political life, or those inculpably ignorant of the immorality of their government's policies.

The book offers two somewhat different definitions of terrorism: as "political violence that usually spreads fear beyond those attacked" and "perhaps more than anything else … resembles small-scale war" (p. 21), and as political violence employed with "the intention either to spread fear or to harm non-combatants" (p. 76). Both definitions run together war and terrorism, and imply that an act of war proper, i.e. one aimed at a legitimate military target, counts as terrorism. For, as Trotsky pointed out in his defense of the "red terror", "war … is founded upon intimidation… . [It] destroys only an insignificant part of the conquered army, intimidating the remainder and breaking their will" ( Terrorism and Communism , Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1961, p. 58). Held accepts this implication of her position; I find it problematic.

Philosophers working with a wide definition of terrorism usually distinguish terrorism that targets the military and high government officials and terrorism that attacks common citizens, and argue that the former type of terrorism can be morally justified in certain circumstances, while the latter type is never, or almost never, justified. Held does not take this line. Her book offers two different justifications of terrorist violence, and both apply to the latter as well as the former kind of terrorism.

The first is in terms of the responsibility of citizens in a democracy for what their government does on their behalf. This justification is only suggested at several points in the book and is never developed and defended from likely objections. Held does not make it clear whether she sees common citizens as proper objects of terrorist violence because, as voters, they authorize the government's actions and policies (p. 20), or on account of various types and degrees of support they give the government (pp. 56, 78). Both these lines of argument are open to serious queries.

Held's second justification of terrorism, presented in chapter 4 )“Terrorism, Rights, and Political Goals”) is carefully spelled out. It focuses on the issue of human rights. When human rights of a person or group are not respected, what may we do in order to ensure that they are? On one view, known as consequentialism of rights, if the only way to ensure respect of a certain right of A and B is to infringe on the same right of C, we will be justified in doing so. Held does not accept such trade-offs in rights with the aim of maximizing their respect. But she points out that rights sometimes come into conflict, whether directly or indirectly. When that happens, we cannot avoid comparing the rights involved in terms of their stringency and making certain choices. That applies to the case of terrorism too. Terrorism violates some human rights of its victims. But its advocates claim that in certain circumstances a limited use of terrorism is the only way of bringing about a society in which the human rights of all will be respected.

Even when that is so, it is not enough to make resort to terrorism justified. But it will be justified if an additional condition is met: that of distributive justice. If there is a society where the human rights of a part of the population are respected, while the same rights of another part of the population are being violated, and if the only way of putting an end to that and bringing about a society in which human rights of all are respected is a limited use of terrorism, and finally, if terrorism is directed against members of the first group, which until now has been privileged as far as respect of human rights is concerned -- then terrorism will be morally justified. This is an argument of distributive justice, brought to bear on the problem of violations of human rights. It is more just to equalize the violations of human rights in a stage of transition to a society where the rights of all are respected, than to allow the group which has already suffered large-scale violations of human rights to suffer more such violations (assuming that in both cases we are dealing with violations of the same, or equally stringent, human rights). Human rights of many are going to be violated in any case. "If we must have rights violations, a more equitable distribution of such violations is better than a less equitable one" (p. 88).

This is an original, deontological cum consequentialist justification of terrorism. Neither the indispensable contribution of terrorism to bringing about equal respect of human rights of all nor the justice in the distribution of violations of such rights in the transition stage is, in itself, enough to justify its use. Each is necessary, and jointly the two are sufficient for its justification. Obviously, a critique that reduces Held's position to either of its prongs falls short of the mark. So does the objection that terrorism is as a matter of fact highly unlikely ever to help usher in a better, more just society. If so, that tells against terrorism, rather than against Held's (or any other) stringent moral requirements for a morally defensible recourse to it.

Another objection is that in allowing for sacrificing such basic human rights as the right to life and to bodily security of individual victims of terrorism for the sake of a more just distribution of violations of the same rights within a group in the course of transition to a stage where these rights will be respected throughout that group, Held adopts a collectivistic position that offends against the principles of separateness of persons and respect for persons. In response, Held argues that

to fail to achieve a more just distribution of violations of rights (through the use of terrorism if that is the only means available) is to fail to recognize that those whose rights are already not fairly respected are individuals in their own right, not merely members of a group … whose rights can be ignored. … Arguments for achieving a just distribution of rights violations need not be arguments … that are more than incidentally about groups. They can be arguments about individuals' rights to basic fairness. (pp. 89-90)

Still, a common citizen belonging to the relatively privileged section of the population has done nothing to forfeit her right to life. If she is killed by a terrorist seeking to make the distribution of right to life violations in the entire population more just, her right to life is violated for reasons to do with the group: for the sake of more justice within the group. This has nothing to do with her sins of commission or omission, and in this sense Held's is a collectivistic argument -- and an argument that I, for one, do not find convincing. Held argues that, if we fail to resort to terrorism in the circumstances described in her argument, we thereby fail to recognize that individuals belonging to the disadvantaged section of the population "are individuals in their own right," rather than merely members of a group whose human rights can be ignored. This argument is predicated on moral equivalence of acts and omissions, and on ascription of negative responsibility. This, too, I find problematic. We do not fail to respect the right to life of disadvantaged individuals when we fail to kill or maim other individuals, personally innocent of the plight of the former. The disadvantaged individuals do not have a right that we should engage in terrorism in their behalf, and we do not have a duty to do that. Indeed, I believe we have a duty not to do that.

Whether Held's two-prong justification of terrorism can be successfully defended against this and other possible objections or not, it remains an original, complex, and highly important position on the morality of terrorism. The essay presenting it is the centerpiece of Held's book and her most valuable contribution to the discussion of terrorism as far as fellow philosophers are concerned. The general reader will find much of interest in all the essays in this book. In the wider context of public debate about terrorism and the "war" against it, Held provides a strong antidote to the simplistic deliverances of "moral clarity" many of our political leaders and "public intellectuals" claim to possess.

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Institute of Medicine (US) Committee on Responding to the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism; Stith Butler A, Panzer AM, Goldfrank LR, editors. Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2003.

Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy.

• Hardcopy Version at National Academies Press

5 Conclusions and Recommendations for Effective Prevention and Response

T he discussions in the preceding chapters have emphasized the need for a public health approach to prevention and intervention for psychological reactions and symptoms that are related to terrorism. Terrorism events and the ongoing threats of terrorism will affect the general population. Illustrative was the February 7, 2003, elevation of the threat condition designation from the “elevated risk” to the “high-risk” category—a decision based on specific intelligence that suggested places frequented by most Americans, such as hotels, apartment buildings, and malls, might be targets. The media continued to speculate about the possibility of a biological or chemical attack. News of the elevated threat condition sent large numbers of people in some communities to stores to purchase duct tape, water, and plastic sheeting, leaving store shelves empty. The country's ongoing “war on terrorism” will force Americans to live with a new sense of uncertainty. Psychological consequences, although variable in degree throughout the population, will result.

Based on its findings, the committee makes the following recommendations under a guiding principle of universal preparedness. Effective preparedness and response strategies will help to limit the psychological consequences of a range of terrorism events. Universal preparedness is the conceptual basis used to ensure that all hazards, all populations, and all phases are addressed. In considering preparedness for all populations, the committee underscores the importance of addressing issues for the nation's racial and ethnic minority groups whose needs are often not adequately met. It is also hoped that in such preparedness, lessons can be learned and potentially applied to the variety of other violent events that cause fear, anxiety, and stress in the communities in which Americans work and live. The committee's public health strategy, as outlined in Table 4-2 , is a strategic vision for assessing the completeness and effectiveness of plans to address the variety of violent events that affect the population and to define and address gaps in preparedness and response.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on its findings and conclusions, the committee offers several recommendations, under the principle of universal preparedness for all hazards, all segments of the population, and all phases of the event. The committee has developed recommendations that are grouped into five categories: (1) preventive measures, (2) education and training for providers, (3) workplace preparedness, (4) research needs, and (5) ensuring preparedness though a comprehensive public health strategy. The sequence in which the recommendations are presented does not reflect a priority order.

Finding 1: Terrorism involves the illegal use or threatened use of force or violence, and an intent to coerce societies or governments by inducing fear in their populations. Other acts of community violence can also be devastating to psychological health. Pervasive violence, such as repetitive urban assaults, school shootings, and workplace violence, are events that affect small and large, urban and rural communities. These events have elements that may be similar to terrorism in terms of psychological impact, and lessons learned from responses to terrorism may help to inform responses to these other events. Similarly, lessons learned from pervasive community violence may provide some benefits for examining responses to terrorism events.

Preventive Measures

Finding 2 : Terrorism and the threat of terrorism will have psychological consequences for a major portion of the population, not merely a small minority. Research studies that have examined a range of terrorism events indicate that psychological reactions and psychiatric symptoms clearly develop in many individuals. To optimize the overall health and well-being of the population, and to improve the overall response to terrorism events, it is necessary that these potential consequences be addressed preventively as well as throughout the phases of an event.

Recommendation 2-1: The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) including the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), should develop evidence-based techniques, training, and education in psychological first aid to address all hazards and all members of society during the pre-event, event, and immediate post-event phases of a terrorism event in order to limit the psychological consequences of terrorism. ( Chapter 2 , pages 61-62; Chapter 3 , page 96)

Techniques should be scientifically developed, implemented, and evaluated for their efficacy and effectiveness in decreasing distress, promoting healthy behaviors and positive coping, and limiting psychiatric illness. This training and education may help to reduce the negative impact of terrorism and other traumatic events while strengthening the natural support structures of communities. In these efforts, HHS should partner with the Red Cross and the Department of Defense, and public and private mental health care providers among others.

Recommendation 2-2: HHS, including NIH, SAMHSA, and CDC, should develop public health surveillance for pre-event, event, and post-event factors relevant to addressing the psychological consequences of terrorism and should develop methods for applying the findings of this surveillance through appropriate interventions for groups of special interest. ( Chapter 2 , pages 61-62)

This public health surveillance will include the determination of background rates of behavioral and psychological factors important in predicting psychological consequences, and the need for mental health services and prevalence of event and post-event consequences and risk factors for negative psychological consequences. Agencies should develop a common protocol and work cooperatively to develop, implement, and sustain comprehensive public health surveillance across phases. Epidemiologic surveillance data obtained under this recommendation should also be utilized to establish baseline community goals such as those incorporated in Healthy People 2010 (HHS, 2000).

Education and Training for Providers

Finding 3-1: Many mental health professionals do not have specific knowledge with regard to disaster mental health. Training and education emphasizing psychological consequences and methods of response should be provided to professionals within the mental health fields, including school-based mental health practitioners such as school counselors, school psychologists, and school social workers.

Recommendation 3-1: Academic healthcare centers, professional associations and societies for mental health professionals, and state boards of education, in collaboration with HHS, including SAMHSA, NIH, and CDC, should ensure the education and training of mental health care providers, including community- and school-based mental health care providers on responding to the psychological consequences of terrorism. ( Chapter 3 , pages 93-94)

An evidence-based models and implementation strategies should be developed. Any protocols that are developed should be evaluated. The goal of training should include instruction at various levels that will correspond to population needs and the risks associated with different types of events (for example, conventional explosives vs. biological). Training should address psychological consequences of terrorism and disaster response, including the provision of supervision. Disaster mental health curricula within graduate training programs should also be addressed to ensure that students are adequately trained.

Finding 3-2: A broad spectrum of professional responders is necessary to meet psychological needs effectively. Those outside the mental health professions, who may regularly interface with the public, can contribute substantially to community healing. These professionals include, but are not limited to, primary care providers, teachers and other school officials, workplace officials, government officials, public safety workers, and faith-based and other community leaders. However, these professionals will require knowledge and training in order to provide effective support. Basic knowledge of psychological reactions, as well as training in support techniques and recognizing serious symptoms that necessitate referral, should be provided.

Recommendation 3-2: Academic centers and professional associations and organizations, in collaboration with HHS, including SAMHSA, NIH, and CDC, should ensure the education and training of relevant professionals in health fields, including primary care providers, school-based health care providers, public health officials, and the public safety sector, in the psychological consequences of terrorism. ( Chapter 3 , page 82; Chapter 4 , pages 114-115).

Training should include identifying psychological consequences of terrorism and evidence-based psychological interventions, and risk communication.

Recommendation 3-3: SAMHSA, in collaboration with academic centers and state and local health care agencies, should ensure the provision of education and training in the psychological conse quences of terrorism for a range of relevant community leaders and ancillary providers. ( Chapter 4 , page 115)

Training should include identifying psychological consequences of terrorism and evidenced-based psychological interventions. In addition to training, creative opportunities exist for public, private, and academic linkages. Innovative methods should be developed for a wide variety of departments and organizations (for example, communications, public health, public administration, law, business, schools of education) to contribute their expertise in service of preparing for and responding to the psychological consequences of terrorism.

Workplace Preparedness

Finding 3-3: The workplace is a newly recognized and important environment in which to address public health planning for the psychological consequences of terrorism. Some examples of new occupationally exposed groups include construction workers, postal workers, utility workers, public health workers, and children and teachers in schools. Implementation of universal preparedness is required for the workplace, but specific considerations will be needed for critical occupational sites. Recent terrorism events have created new workplaces and categories of responders and have exposed traditional first responders to new levels of job-related stress and risk exposure.

Recommendation 3-4: The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) and the Department of Labor should collaborate to ensure the existence of appropriate guidelines to protect workers by incorporating the psychological aspects of preparedness into all planning and interventions. Because schools are a workplace for staff and students, the Department of Education should collaborate with state and local education systems to ensure preparedness. ( Chapter 3 , page 81).

Implementation of this recommendation will require collaboration with critical public and private business organizations to ensure training, dissemination, and implementation.

• The Department of labor and NIOSH should examine current plans for traditional first responders and ensure that guidelines are developed for other responders.
• Agricultural terrorism has the ability to affect many workplaces, including American farms and the food production and distribution system at the federal, state, and local levels. The committee recommends that HHS, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), in collaboration with state and local departments of health, ensure that psychological consequences are considered in preparedness and response plans.
• Because schools are a workplace for both staff and students, the committee recommends that the Department of Education in collaboration with state and local education systems ensure that universal preparedness is required in schools to address planning for psychological consequences of terrorism for students and teachers.

Research Needs

Finding 3-4: Research following terrorism events presents a multitude of practical and ethical challenges. Utilizing findings from research on other traumatized populations is not an adequate substitute, and support of disaster-specific and terrorism-specific research is necessary to provide information pertinent to the population and its needs for intervention. This research can be facilitated by improving cooperation and coordination among federal funding and regulatory agencies as well as by developing the high-quality methodology necessary for the conduct of these investigations.

Recommendation 3-5: Federal agencies such as CDC, NIH, SAMHSA, and NIOSH should coordinate research agendas, cooperate in establishing funding mechanisms, and award timely and sufficient funding of research on best practices to inform and guide interventions that will address the psychological consequences of terrorism. ( Chapter 2 , pages 61-62; Chapter 3 , page 96).

• These federal research agencies should develop an integrated and coordinated research agenda directly addressing psychological consequences of terrorism across the pre-event, event, and post-event phases to ensure the development of individual, population, community, and clinically based interventions. All areas of importance should be studied and duplication of research avoided. Topics of study may include, but are not limited to, the characteristics of terrorism that may differentiate its impact from other disasters; impact of terrorism on functional indicators such as marital and family relationships and school performance, understanding varied effect of terrorism events, and the impact of media accounts of terrorism events on psychological consequences.
• Whenever federal funding agencies such as the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), CDC, NIH, and SAMHSA provide grants for the implementation of new interventions, a portion of that funding should be mandated for evaluating those interventions.
• Research on the psychological consequences of terrorism should not only assess psychiatric disease in the affected population but also address restoring family, social, school, occupational, community, and individual functioning and building individual and community resilience.
• Institutional review boards should be encouraged to review research proposals on the psychological consequences of terrorism, cognizant of the short turnaround time required for obtaining early postdisaster data and the unique difficulties and challenges of disaster research. HHS should initiate a review of institutional review board procedures in order to establish rapid review procedures for proposals addressing the psychological consequences of terrorism.
• Research funding organizations should develop more timely mechanisms for consideration and review of research proposals as well as mechanisms for funding needed large awards in a short time.
• Research should be developed to evaluate the sources and mechanisms of lack of coordination among agencies at all levels. Strategies for effective coordination and communications should be identified and resulting effects on response capabilities during crisis evaluated.

Ensuring Preparedness Through a Comprehensive Public Health Strategy

Finding 4: Management of the psychological consequences of terrorism (and similar community events) is a pressing public health issue. Psychological interventions are needed for the pre-event, event, and post-event phases of terrorist attacks. Such interventions are necessary to address potentially affected individuals and populations, the injurious agents, and the physical and social environment, as identified in the committee's example public health strategy. The nation's present mental health system is an essential, but inadequate, resource to meet all the expected needs.

Recommendation 4-1: HHS and the Department of Homeland Security should analyze federal, state, and local preparedness for terrorism to ensure that the nation's public health infrastructure is prepared to adequately respond to the psychological consequences across a continuum of possible terrorism events, including weapons of mass destruction. The committee's example public health strategy should serve as a base from which components of the infrastructure are evaluated. ( Chapter 4 )

Organizing pre-event, event, and post-event interventions to protect, minimize effects, and respond to consequences will require the joint efforts of the mental health, public health, medical care, and emergency response systems in the United States. Using the example public health strategy provided by the committee will permit the evaluation necessary to define preparedness gaps and ensure that the appropriate infrastructure is available for response.

Recommendation 4-2: Federal, state, and local disaster planners must address psychological consequences in their planning and preparedness and their response to pre-event, event, and post-event phases of terrorist attacks. Consideration should be given to needs associated with different types of events and to needs of various segments of the population. Adequate federal, state, and local prioritization and funding of resources and support should be provided to ensure psychological preparedness and response. ( Chapter 3 , Chapter 4 )

• All health, safety, and security planning by the Department of Homeland Security should include mental health preparedness and response to mitigate and prevent negative psychological consequences.
• The groups and organizations that should be involved in planning to ensure a comprehensive response include, but are not limited to, the following: The American Red Cross, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Defense (including the National Guard and Reserve), the Department of Education, state emergency management planners, mental health practitioners, workplaces (workplace health programs), schools (including school health programs), faith-based communities, and primary care practitioners.
• Local capability should be developed to verify credentials and professionally screen and schedule volunteers who may offer services after a terrorism event. Liaisons should be made with other local agencies, such as police, to help efficiently mobilize volunteers.
• HHS, including the Surgeon General's Office, should collaborate with the National Organization of Broadcasters and national and local media in the development of a code of conduct for broadcasting and reporting on terrorism events that enhances the dissemination of official messages, improves access to essential societal information, and respects the principles of the freedom of expression.. These enhanced relationships and enhanced means of communication may help to minimize hoaxes and copycat events and the development of negative psychological consequences, as well as facilitate effective responses.
• Cite this Page Institute of Medicine (US) Committee on Responding to the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism; Stith Butler A, Panzer AM, Goldfrank LR, editors. Preparing for the Psychological Consequences of Terrorism: A Public Health Strategy. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2003. 5, Conclusions and Recommendations for Effective Prevention and Response.
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Essay on Global Terrorism for Students and Children

500+ words essay on global terrorism.

Global Terrorism

The world has changed significantly since the September 11 attacks. Security has become an all-encompassing concern. People nowadays plan their vacations according to the factor such as whether the destination is safe or not, which route possess the least danger. Thus, after terrorist strikes took place people no longer feel safe in their own countries.

As we know about the attack on Twin Tower on September 11 in the USA in which militants associated with the Islamic extremist group al-Qaida hijacked four airplanes and carried out suicide attacks against targets in the United States.

Among four planes hijacked, two of the planes were flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York City, a third plane hit the Pentagon Washington D.C., while the fourth plane crashed in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. These attacks eventually led to attack in Afghanistan by the USA to demolish Mullah Omar’s regime which is called War On Terror.

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War on Terror

After the September 11, 2001 attacks, an international military initiative was launched by the United States. This initiative was called the War on Terror. According to President Bush, this war was targeted at the radical network of terrorists as well as to the governments who supported them.

US and allied troops were deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, both believed to be home to terrorist cells and leaders. Lastly, President Barak Obama’s administration formally called an end to the War and announced the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden had allegedly been killed by US Navy Seals and Al-Qaeda wasn’t considered the threat it once used to be.

However, 2014 saw the emergence of ISIS or ISIL. The jihadist organization was dubbed a terrorist group by the UN. This led to the formation of a new operation called Operation Inherent Resolve that would target terror in South Asia and the Middle East.

Threat to Humanity

The word terrorism indicates that extremists who use terror tactics use to develop fear in the hearts of people everywhere. They succeed in it because they target civilians in places where they would ideally be safe such as schools, malls, shopping thoroughfares, pubs, nightclubs, churches, and mosques.

Also, the shock value of these tactics is much higher. Terrorism is a strategy that various organizations use to achieve their aims by targeting innocent people. Terrorist attacks affect public morale and generate an atmosphere of fear. These attacks create divides between people from different regions, ethnicities, and religions. Instead of coming together to fight this threat, people are suspicious of each other and close themselves up.

Terrorism is very much a reality of modern times. The mere threat of a terrorist attack is enough to generate panic and fear among the general populace. We cannot deny the fact that global terrorism has affected policy decisions to a great extent. The internet has given terrorist organizations a global platform to spread their agenda and recruit more people. However, it may be time for a more militaristic solution to the problem of global terrorism.

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Home / Essay Samples / Social Issues / Terrorism

Terrorism Essay Examples

Terrorism is a topic that encompasses a wide range of issues, including its causes, effects, and strategies to combat it. Essays on this subject can be informative, persuasive, argumentative or a combination of these types.

These essays demand thorough research and critical thinking, as they explore complex and often controversial issues. The goal is not only to present facts but also to make a compelling argument, drawing on evidence and logical reasoning

The structure of an essay on terrorism generally follows the traditional essay format, which includes an introduction, body paragraphs, and a conclusion. However, the specific content within these sections may vary depending on the type of essay (e.g., informative, argumentative, persuasive, etc.).

The Importance of Essays About Terrorism

Essays about terrorism play a crucial role in understanding one of the most pressing global challenges of our time. The purpose of such essays is to analyze the motivations, methods, impacts, and countermeasures related to acts of terrorism. By examining the complexities of terrorism, these essays contribute to informed discussions, policy decisions, and efforts to prevent and counteract terrorism.

One of the primary goals of essays about terrorism is to understand the motivations that drive individuals and groups to engage in acts of terrorism. These essays explore factors such as political, religious, ideological, and social grievances that may contribute to radicalization.

The Events at Amritsar as the Catalysator the Movement for Freedom of India

Gandhi advocated protest without the use of violent acts because he believed in the religious concept of ‘Ahimsa’, meaning ‘doing no harm’. Gandhi believed that protesting peacefully would assist the Indians in their fight for freedom and independence from the British simply by showing colonizers...

Amritsar Massacre: Response to the Gandhi and Indian Nationalist Movement

However, the situation in India is still not convincing enough to justify Dyer’s actions. The prevailing ideas of paternalism and racial attitudes in British India shaped Dyer’s actions should be self-evident, which could be said about the policies and practices within the empire and therefore...

The Taliban and Its Impact on the War

Parachinar is the capital of Kurram agency which boarders with three different Afghan provinces, namely ningrahar to its north, paktia to its west and khost to south west.it is the nearest city of Pakistan to Kabul. It also borders with north Waziristan, Orakzai and Khyber...

Genocide, Holocaust, Or Dehumanization: Causes and Consequences

Genocide, Holocaust, or Dehumanization are all methods that are deliberately aimed to erase a mass number of people on the basis of their caste, color, race, or Religion, usually carried out by a superior and stronger group of people. The method of genocide was popular...

Taliban and Evolution of Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan

 To analysis the eradication of regional terrorism in Afghanistan, we must look at The evolution of terrorist groups in Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union invaded at the request of Central government of Afghanistan which was called by Mujahidin Soviet designated government, in that war which...

Operation Anaconda: Mission to Destroy the Taliban

Operation Anaconda was an operation that took place in the Shahi-Kot Valley and Arma Mountains of Afghanistan from 2 March 2002 through 18 March 2002. It was a joint mission between U.S. military branches, six other nations, and Afghans led by Major General Franklin L....

Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory Explaining the Discrimination Malala Yousafzai Faced by the Taliban

The legendary story of Malala of Pakistan is one of the most famous and well-known stories in history. The attempted murder of Malala Yousafzai by the Taliban for speaking out for girls' education and peace can be viewed as an isolated act by religious extremists....

Suicide Bombing as an Aspects of Terrorism

Until the 1990s, terrorism tended to be relegated to a secondary position in the international politics due to the relative irrelevance to the world affairs. However, as the global tension escalated to a significant extent with the September 11 terrorist attacks, the significance of terrorism...

The End of Torure: Why the Guantanamo Bay Should Be Closed

There is always somebody with more information, money, and power. Usually it is the government, for various reasons, that will not give out information regarding torture. Therefore, whatever we see on TV, read in books, hear from other and sometimes experience ourselves will be the...

Change of the Concept of Sovereignty: 9/11 Attack, War on Terror, and Guantanamo Bay

Throughout history, there have been episodes with such an impactful magnitude that they have been able to change the course of history forever. For example, the assasination of Archduke Ferdinand II in 1914 was the incident which led to the outbreak of the First World...

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