what is balance of power essay

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The balance of power in world politics.

• Randall L. Schweller Randall L. Schweller Department of Political Science, Ohio State University
• https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.119
• Published online: 09 May 2016

The balance of power—a notoriously slippery, murky, and protean term, endlessly debated and variously defined—is the core theory of international politics within the realist perspective. A “balance of power” system is one in which the power held and exercised by states within the system is checked and balanced by the power of others. Thus, as a nation’s power grows to the point that it menaces other powerful states, a counter-balancing coalition emerges to restrain the rising power, such that any bid for world hegemony will be self-defeating. The minimum requirements for a balance of power system include the existence of at least two or more actors of roughly equal strength, states seeking to survive and preserve their autonomy, alliance flexibility, and the ability to resort to war if need be.

At its essence, balance of power is a type of international order. Theorists disagree, however, about the normal operation of the balance of power. Structural realists describe an “automatic version” of the theory, whereby system balance is a spontaneously generated, self-regulating, and entirely unintended outcome of states pursuing their narrow self-interests. Earlier versions of balance of power were more consistent with a “semi-automatic” version of the theory, which requires a “balancer” state throwing its weight on one side of the scale or the other, depending on which is lighter, to regulate the system. The British School’s discussion of balance of power depicts a “manually operated” system, wherein the process of equilibrium is a function of human contrivance, with emphasis on the skill of diplomats and statesmen, a sense of community of nations, of shared responsibility, and a desire and need to preserve the balance of power system.

As one would expect of a theory that made its appearance in the mid-16th century, balance of power is not without its critics. Liberals claim that globalization, democratic peace, and international institutions have fundamentally transformed international relations, moving it out of the realm of power politics. Constructivists claim that balance of power theory’s focus on material forces misses the central role played by ideational factors such as norms and identities in the construction of threats and alliances. Realists, themselves, wonder why no global balance of power has materialized since the end of the Cold War.

• empirical international relations theory

Introduction

The idea of balance of power in international politics arose during the Renaissance age as a metaphorical concept borrowed from other fields (ethics, the arts, philosophy, law, medicine, economics, and the sciences), where balancing and its relation to equipoise and counterweight had already gained broad acceptance. Wherever it was applied, the “balance” metaphor was conceived as a law of nature underlying most things we find appealing, whether order, peace, justice, fairness, moderation, symmetry, harmony, or beauty. 1 In the words of Jean-Jacques Rousseau: “The balance existing between the power of these diverse members of the European society is more the work of nature than of art. It maintains itself without effort, in such a manner that if it sinks on one side, it reestablishes itself very soon on the other.” 2

Centuries later, this Renaissance image of balance as an automatic response driven by a law of nature still suffuses analysis of how the theory operates within the sphere of international relations. Thus, Hans Morgenthau explained, “The aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying either to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity, to a configuration that is called the balance of power and to policies that aim at preserving it.” 3 Similarly, Kenneth Waltz declared, “As nature abhors a vacuum, so international politics abhors unbalanced power.” 4 Christopher Layne likewise avers, “Great powers balance against each other because structural constraints impel them to do so.” 5 Realists, such as Arnold Wolfers, invoke the same “law of nature” metaphor to explain opportunistic expansion: “Since nations, like nature, are said to abhor a vacuum, one could predict that the powerful nation would feel compelled to fill the vacuum with its own power.” 6 Using similar structural-incentives-for-gains logic, John Mearsheimer claims that “status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs.” 7

From the policymaker’s perspective, however, balancing superior power and filling power vacuums hardly appear as laws of nature. Instead, these behaviors, which carry considerable political costs and uncertain policy risks, emerge through the medium of the political process; as such, they are the product of competition and consensus-building among elites with differing ideas about the political-military world and divergent views on the nation’s goals and challenges and the means that will best serve those purposes. 8 As Nicholas Spykman observed many years ago, “political equilibrium is neither a gift of the gods nor an inherently stable condition. It results from the active intervention of man, from the operation of political forces. States cannot afford to wait passively for the happy time when a miraculously achieved balance of power will bring peace and security. If they wish to survive, they must be willing to go to war to preserve a balance against the growing hegemonic power of the period.” 9

In an era of mass politics, the decision to check unbalanced power by means of arms and allies—and to go to war if these deterrent measures fail—is very much a political act made by political actors. War mobilization and fighting are distinctly collective undertakings. As such, political elites must weigh the likely domestic costs of balancing behavior against the alternative means available to them and the expected benefits of a restored balance of power. Leaders are rarely, if ever, compelled by structural imperatives to adopt certain policies rather than others; they are not sleepwalkers buffeted about by inexorable forces beyond their control. This is not to suggest that they are oblivious to the constraints imposed by international structure. Rather, systemic pressures are filtered through intervening variables at the domestic level to produce foreign policy behaviors. Thus, states respond (or not) to power shifts—and the threats and opportunities they present—in various ways that are determined by both internal and external considerations of policy elites, who must reach consensus within an often decentralized and competitive political process. 10

Meanings of Balance of Power and Balancing Behavior

While the balance of power is arguably the oldest and most familiar theory of international politics, it remains fraught with conceptual ambiguities and competing theoretical and empirical claims. 11 Among its various meanings are (a) an even distribution of power; (b) the principle that power ought to be evenly distributed; (c) the existing distribution of power as a synonym for the prevailing political situation; that is, any possible distribution of power that exists at a particular time; (d) the principle of equal aggrandizement of the great powers at the expense of the weak; (e) the principle that our side ought to have a preponderance of power to prevent the danger of power becoming evenly distributed; in this view, a power “balance” is likened to a bank balance, that is, a surplus rather than equality; (f) a situation that exists when one state possesses the special role of holding the balance (called the balancer) and thereby maintains an even distribution of power between two rival sides; and (g) an inherent tendency of international politics to produce an even distribution of power.

The conceptual murkiness surrounding the theory extends to its core concept, balancing behavior. What precisely does the term “balancing” mean? Some scholars talk about soft balancing, 12 others have added psycho-cultural balancing, political-diplomatic balancing, and strategic balancing, 13 while still others talk about economic and ideological balancing. 14 Because balance of power is a theory about international security and preparations for possible war, I offer the following definition of balancing centered on military capabilities: “Balancing means the creation or aggregation of military power through either internal mobilization or the forging of alliances to prevent or deter the occupation and domination of the state by a foreign power or coalition. The state balances to prevent the loss of territory , either one’s homeland or vital interests abroad (e.g., sea lanes, colonies, or other territory considered of vital strategic interest). Balancing only exists when states target their military hardware at each other in preparation for a possible war. If two states are merely building arms for the purpose of independent action against third parties, we cannot say that they are engaged in balancing behavior. State A may be building up its military power and even targeting another state B and still not be balancing against B, that is, trying to match B’s overall capabilities with the aim of possible territorial conquest or preventing such conquest by B. Instead, the purpose may be coercive diplomacy: to gain bargaining leverage with state B.” 15

The Goals, Means, and Dynamics of Balance of Power

International relations theorists have exhibited remarkable ambiguity about not only the meaning of balance of power but the results to be expected from a successfully operating balance of power system. 16 What is the ultimate promise of balance of power theory? The purpose or goal of balance of power—if such a thing can be attributed to an unintended spontaneously generated order—is not the maintenance of international peace and stability, as many of the theory’s detractors have wrongly asserted. Rather it is to preserve the integrity of the multistate system by preventing any ambitious state from swallowing up its neighbors. The basic intuition behind the theory is that states are not to be trusted with inordinate power, which threatens all members of the international system. The danger is that a predatory great power might gain more than half of the total resources of the system and thereby be in position to subjugate all the rest.

It is further assumed that the only truly effective and reliable antidote to power is power. Increases in power (especially a rival’s growing strength), therefore, must be checked by countervailing power. The means of accomplishing this aim are arms and allies: states counterbalance threatening accumulations of power by building arms (internal balancing) and forming alliances (external balancing) that serve to aggregate each other’s military power. Because the “balance of power” primarily refers to the relative power capabilities of great power rivals and opponents (it is, after all, a theory about great powers, the primary actors in international politics) in the event of war between them, fighting power is the power to be gauged. In determining what capabilities to measure, context is crucial: “To test a theory in various historical and temporal contexts requires equivalent, not identical, measures.” 17 An accurate assessment of the balance of power must include (a) the military capabilities (the means of destruction) each holds and can draw upon; (b) the political capacity to extract and apply those capabilities; (c) the capabilities and reliability of commitments of allies and possible allies; and (d) the basic features of the political geography (viz., the military and political consequences of the relationships between physical geography, state territories, and state power) of the conflict. 18 While the exact components of any particular power capability index will vary, they typically include combinations of the following measures: land area (territorial size), total population, size of armed forces, defense expenditures, overall and per capita size of the economy (e.g., gross national product), technological development (which includes measures such as steel production and fossil fuel consumption), per capita value of international trade, government revenue, and less easily measured capabilities such as political will and competence, combat efficiency, and the like.

In summary, balance of power’s general principle of action may be put as follows: when any state or coalition becomes or threatens to become inordinately powerful, other states should recognize this as a threat to their security (sometimes to their very survival) and respond by taking measures—individually or jointly or both—to enhance their military power. This process of equilibration is thought to be the central operational rule of the system. There is disagreement, however, over how the process, in practice, actually works; that is, over the degree of conscious motivation required for the production of equilibrium. Along these lines, Claude provides three types of balance of power systems: the automatic version , which is self-regulating and spontaneously generated; the semi-automatic version , whereby equilibrium requires a “balancer”—throwing its weight on one side of the scale or the other, depending on which is lighter—to regulate the system; and the manually operated version , wherein the process of equilibrium is a function of human contrivance, with emphasis on the skill of diplomats and statesmen who carefully manage the affairs of the units (states and other non-state territories) constituting the system.

The manually operated balance of power system is consistent with the English School’s notion that states consider balance as something of a collective good. The role of great power comes with the responsibility to maintain the balance of power. It is “a conception of the balance of power as a state of affairs brought about not merely by conscious policies of particular states that oppose preponderance throughout all the reaches of the system, but as a conscious goal of the system as a whole.” 19

Nine Conditions that Promote the Smooth Operation of the Balance of Power

Recognizing the confusion and flexibility attending the term “balance of power,” any attempt to construct a list of conditions that make a balance of power system most likely to emerge, endure, and function properly should be seen as a worthy, if not foolhardy, exercise. In that spirit, I offer the following nine conditions, which are jointly sufficient to bring about an effectively performing balance-of-power system.

At Least Two Egoistic Actors under Anarchy that Seek to Survive. Within an anarchic realm, which lacks a sovereign arbiter to make and enforce agreements among states, there must be at least two states that seek self-preservation, above all, for a balance of power to exist. Further, states must be more self-interested than group-interested. Each desires, if possible, greater power than its neighbors. If states act to promote the long-run community interest over their short-run national interest (narrowly defined), or if they equate the two sets of interests, then they exist within either a Concert system or a Collective Security system. Simply put, states in a balance-of-power system are not altruistic or other-regarding; they act, instead, in ways that maximize their relative gains and avoid or minimize their relative losses. 20

Vigilance . States must be watchful and sensitive to changes in the distribution of capabilities. Vigilance about changes in the balance of power is not only salient with respect to actual or potential rivals. It is also necessary with regard to one’s allies because (a) when its allies are growing weaker, the state must be aware of the deteriorating situation in order to take appropriate measures to remedy the danger; conversely, (b) when its allies are growing rapidly and dramatically stronger, the state should be alarmed because today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy.

Mobility of Action . States must not only be aware of changes in the balance of power, they must be able to respond quickly and decisively to them. As Gulick points out: “Policy must be continually readjusted to meet changing circumstances if an equilibrium is to be preserved. A state which, by virtue of its institutional make-up, is unable to readjust quickly to altered conditions will find itself at a distinct disadvantage in following a balance-of-power policy, especially when other states do not labor under the same difficulties.” 21 Here, Gulick echoes a concern at the time (during the early ColdWar period) that democracies are too slow-moving and deliberate to balance effectively, putting them “at a distinct disadvantage” in a contest with an authoritarian regime.

States Must Join the Weaker (or Less Threatening) Side in a Conflict : As Kenneth Waltz puts it, “States, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them.” 22 According to structural realists, the most powerful state will always appear threatening because weaker states can never be certain that it will not use its power to violate their sovereignty or threaten their survival. Stephen Walt’s balance of threat theory amends this proposition to say: States, if they are free to choose and have credible allies, flock to what they perceive as the less threatening side, whether it is the stronger or weaker of two sides. For Walt, threat is a combination of (a) aggregate power; (b) proximity; (c) offensive capability; and (d) offensive intentions. 23 This last dimension, offensive intentions, is a nonstructural, ideational variable, which some critics of realism see as an ad hoc emendation—one that is only loosely connected, if at all, to neorealism’s core propositions. More on this in the conclusion of the article.

Obviously, balance of power predicts best when states balance against, rather than bandwagon with, threatening accumulations of power. But it is not necessary that every state or even a majority of states balance against the stronger or more threatening side. Instead, balancing behavior will work to maintain equilibrium or to restore a disrupted balance as long as the would-be hegemon is prevented from gaining preponderance by the combined strength of countervailing forces arrayed against it. The exact ratio of states that balance versus those that do not balance is immaterial to the outcome. What matters is that enough power is aggregated to check preponderance. 24

States Must Be Able to Project Power . Mobility of policy also means mobility on the ground. If all states adopt strictly defensive military postures and doctrines, none will be attractive allies. In such a world, external balancing would, for all intents and purposes, disappear, leaving balance-of-power dynamics severely limited. This condition is a very small hurdle for the theory to clear, however, since “great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability,” as John Mearsheimer has forcefully argued. 25

War Must Be a Legitimate Tool of Statecraft . Balancing behaviors are preparations for war, not peace. If major-power war eventually breaks out, as it did in 1914 and 1939 , there is no reason to conclude that the balance of power failed to operate properly. Quite the opposite: balance of power requires that “war must be a legitimate tool of statecraft.” 26 The outbreak of war, therefore, does not disconfirm but, in most cases, supports the theory. As Harold Lasswell observed in 1935 , the balancing of power rests on the expectation that states will settle their differences by fighting. 27 This expectation of violence exercises a profound influence on the types of behaviors exhibited by states and the system as a whole. It was not just the prospect of war that triggered the basic dynamics of past multipolar and bipolar systems. It was the anticipation that powerful states sought to and would, if given the right odds, carry out territorial conquests at each other’s expense that shaped and shoved actors in ways consistent with the predictions of realism’s keystone theory.

No Alliance Handicaps . For a balance-of-power system to operate effectively, alliance formation must be fluid and continuous. States must be able to align and realign with other states solely on the basis of power considerations. In practice, however, various factors diminish the attractiveness of certain alliances that would otherwise be made in response to changes in the balance of power that threaten the state’s security. These constraints—rooted in ideologies, personal rivalries, national hatreds, ongoing territorial disputes and the like—that impede alignments made for purely strategic reasons are called “alliance handicaps.” 28 In effect, they narrow the competitive alternatives available to states searching for allies.

Parenthetically, alliance handicaps explain why the alliance flexibility that seemingly derives from the wealth of physical alternatives theoretically available under a multipolar structure should not be confused with the actual alternatives that are politically available to states within the system given their particular interests and affinities. 29 Indeed, the greater flexibility of alliances and fluidity of their patterns under multipolarity, as opposed to bipolarity, is more apparent than real. Seen from a purely structural perspective, a multipolar system appears as an oligopoly, with a few sellers (or buyers) collaborating to set the price. Behaviorally, however, multipolarity tends toward duopoly: the few are often only two. This scarcity of alternatives due to the presence of alliance handicaps contradicts the conventional wisdom of the flexibility of alliances in a multipolar system.

Pursue Moderate War Aims . Because today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy, states should pursue moderate war aims and avoid eliminating essential actors. In Gulick’s words, “An equilibrium cannot perpetuate itself unless the major components of that equilibrium are preserved. Destroy important makeweights and you destroy the balance; or in the words of Fénelon to the grandson of Louis XIV early in the 18th century: ‘never … destroy a power under pretext of restraining it.’” 30 This lesson is easily grasped when one considers the composition of alignments before and after major-power wars. During the Second World War, for instance, the United States was allied with China and the Soviet Union against Italy, Germany, and Japan. After the war, the United States, victorious but wisely having chosen not to eliminate its vanquished enemies, allied with Japan, Italy, and West Germany against its erstwhile allies, the Soviet Union and Communist China.

For structural realists, moderate outcomes result because of, not in spite of, the greed and fear of states—to behave too forcefully, too recklessly expansionist, will lead others to mobilize against you. This is a very different understanding of moderation than the one that Edward Gulick and members of the English School have in mind when they speak of moderation within a balance of power: “restraint, abnegation, and the denial of immediate self-interest.” What is required is “the subordination of state interest to balance of power.” 31 For most realists, these notions better describe a Concert system than one rooted in balance-of-power politics, where states simply follow their narrow, short-run self-interests.

Proportional Aggrandizement (or Reciprocal Compensations ). Sometimes moderation toward the defeated power is unachievable. Under such circumstances, “if the cake cannot be saved, it must be fairly divided.” What is fair? Gulick suggests that “equal compensation” is fair. The concept of reciprocal compensation or proportional aggrandizement, he claims, “stated that aggrandizement by one power entitled other powers to an equal compensation or, negatively, that the relinquishing of a claim by one power must be followed by a comparable abandonment of a claim by another.” 32 Such an “equality” rule, however, would disrupt an existing balance. If, for instance, one state is twice as powerful as another, and together they are dividing up a third state, a division down the middle, giving them each half, will advantage the weaker power relative to its stronger partner. Instead, “proportional” compensation is not only fair but will maintain an existing equilibrium among the great powers. Simply put, the rule governing partitions must be that “the biggest dog gets the meatiest bone, and so on.” Returning to our example, a balance will be maintained if the defeated state is partitioned such that two thirds of it goes to the state that is twice as strong as its weaker associate, which receives the remaining third. Such proportional aggrandizement prevents any great power from making unfair relative gains at the expense of the others.

The Balance of Power as an International Order

At its essence, balance of power is a type of international order. What do we mean by an international order? A system exhibits “order” when the set of discrete objects that comprise the system are related to one another according to some pattern; that is, their relationship is not miscellaneous or haphazard but accords with some discernible principle. Order prevails when things display a high degree of predictability, when there are regularities, when there are patterns that follow some understandable and consistent logic. Disorder is a condition of randomness—of unpredictable developments lacking regularities and following no known principle or logic. The degree of order exhibited by social and political systems is partly a function of stability. Stability is the property of a system that causes it to return to its original condition after it has been disturbed from a state of equilibrium. Systems are said to be unstable when slight disturbances produce large disruptions that not only prevent the original condition from being restored but also amplify the effect of the perturbation. This process is called “positive feedback,” because it pushes the system increasingly farther away from its initial steady state. The classic example of positive feedback is a bank run caused by self-fulfilling prophesies: people believe something is true (there will be a run on the bank), so their behavior makes it true (they all withdraw their money from the bank); and others’ observations of this behavior increases the belief that it is true, so they behave accordingly (they, too, withdraw their money from the bank), which makes the prophesy even more true, and so on. 33

Some systems are characterized by robust and durable orders. Others are extremely unstable, such that their orders can quickly and without warning collapse into chaos. Like an avalanche, or peaks of sand in an hourglass that suddenly collapse and cascade, or a spider web that takes on an entirely new pattern when a single strand is cut, complex and delicately balanced systems are unpredictable: they may appear calm and orderly at one moment only to become wildly turbulent and disorderly the next. This inherent instability of complex, tightly coupled systems is captured by the popular catch phrase, “the butterfly effect,” coined by the MIT meteorologist, Edward Lorenz, to explain how a massive storm can be caused (or prevented) by the faraway flapping of a tiny butterfly’s wings. The principal lesson of the butterfly effect is that, when incalculably small differences in the initial conditions of a system matter greatly, the world becomes radically unpredictable. 34 Indeed, we can seldom predict what will happen when a new element is added to a system composed of many parts connected in complex ways. Such systems undergo frequent discontinuous changes from shocking impacts that create radical departures from the past.

International orders vary according to (a) the amount of order displayed; (b) whether the order is purposive or unintended; and (c) the type of mechanisms that provide order. On one end of the spectrum, there is rule-governed, purposive order, which is explicitly designed and highly institutionalized to fulfill universally accepted social ends and values. 35 At the other extreme, international order is an entirely unintended and un-institutionalized recurrent pattern (e.g., a balance of power) to which the actors and the system itself exhibit conformity but which serves none of the actors’ goals or which, at least, was not deliberately designed to do so. Here, international order is spontaneously generated and self-regulating. The classic example of this spontaneously generated order is the balance of power, which arises though none of the states may seek equality of power; to the contrary, all actors may seek greater power than everyone else, but the concussion of their actions (which aim to maximize their power) produces the unintended consequence of a balance of power. 36 In other words, the actors are constrained by a system that is the unintended product of their coactions (akin to the invisible hand of the market, which is a spontaneously generated order/system).

There are essentially three types of international orders:

A negotiated order. A rule-based order that is the result of a grand bargain voluntarily struck among the major actors who, therefore, view the order as legitimate and beneficial. It is a highly institutionalized order, ensuring that the hegemon will remain engaged in managing the order but will not exercise its power capriciously. In this way, a negotiated rule-based order places limits on the returns to power, especially with respect to the hegemon. Pax Americana ( 1945 –present) and, to a lesser extent, Pax Britannica (19th century) are exemplars of this type of “liberal constitutional” order. 37

An imposed order. A non-voluntary order among unequal actors purposefully designed and ruled by a malign (despotic) hegemon, whose power is unchecked. The Soviet satellite system is an exemplar of this type of order.

A spontaneously generated order. Order is an unintended consequence of actors seeking only to maximize their interests and power. It is an automatic or self-regulating system. Power is checked by countervailing power, thereby placing limits on the returns to power. The classic 18th century European balance of power is an exemplar of this type of order.

The predictability of a social system depends, among other things, on its degree of complexity, whether its essential mechanisms are automatic or volitional, and whether the system requires key members to act against their short-run interests in order to work properly. Negotiated (sometimes referred to as “constitutional”) orders are complex systems that rely on ad hoc human choices and require actors to choose voluntarily to subordinate their immediate interests to communal or remote ones (e.g., in collective security systems). As such, how they actually perform when confronted with a disturbance that trips the alarm, so to speak, will be highly unpredictable. In contrast, the operation of a balance-of-power system is fairly automatic and therefore highly predictable. It simply requires that states, seeking to survive and thrive in a competitive, self-help realm, pursue their short-run interests; that is, states seek power and security, as they must in an anarchic order. 38

Here, I do not mean to suggest that balance-of-power systems always function properly and predictably. Balancing can be late, uncertain, or nonexistent. These types of balancing maladies, however, typically occur when states consciously seek to opt out of a balance-of-power system, as happened in the interwar period, but then fail to replace it with a functioning alternative security system. The result is that a balance-of-power order, which may be viewed as a default system that arises spontaneously, in the absence or failure of concerted arrangements among all the units of the system to provide for their collective security, eventually emerges but is not accomplished as efficiently as it otherwise would have been.

Does Balancing Behavior Prevail Over Other State Responses to Growing Power?

There have been several recent challenges to the conventional realist wisdom that balancing is more prevalent than bandwagoning behavior, that is, when states join the stronger or more threatening side. 39 Paul Schroeder’s broad historical survey of international politics shows that states have bandwagoned with or hid from threats far more often than they have balanced against them. Similarly, I have claimed that bandwagoning behavior is more prevalent than contemporary realists have led us to believe because alliances among revisionist states, whose behavior has been ignored by modern realists, are driven by the search for profit, not security. 40 Most recently, Robert Powell treats states as rational unitary actors within a simple strategic setting composed of commitment issues, informational problems, and the technology of coercion and finds that “balancing is relatively rare in the model. Balances of power sometimes form, but there is no general tendency toward this outcome. Nor do states generally balance against threats. States frequently wait, bandwagon, or, much less often, balance.” 41 Powell freely admits, however, that a rational-unitary-actor assumption “does not mean that domestic politics is unimportant.” 42 None of these studies, however, has offered a domestic-politics explanation for bandwagoning or a theory of the broader phenomenon of underbalancing behavior, which includes buck-passing, distancing, hiding, waiting, appeasement, bandwagoning, incoherent half-measures, and, in extreme cases, civil war, revolution, and state disintegration.

In addition to studies of bandwagoning, there has been some work on what is called “buck-passing” behavior, a form of under-reaction to threats by which states attempt to ride free on the balancing efforts of others. Two popular explanations for buck-passing behavior are structural-systemic ones. Thomas Christensen and Jack Snyder claim that great powers under multipolarity will buck-pass when they perceive defensive advantage; while John Mearsheimer argues that buck-passing occurs primarily in balanced multipolar systems, especially among great powers that are geographically insulated from the aggressor. 43 Others argue that whether or not states balance against threats is not primarily determined by systemic factors but rather by domestic political processes. 44

Along these lines, it is important to point out that, when we speak of balancing and other competing responses to growing power, we are actually referring to four distinct categories of behavior. First, there is appropriate balancing , which occurs when the target is a truly dangerous aggressor that cannot or should not be appeased. Second, there is inappropriate balancing , which unnecessarily triggers a costly and dangerous arms spiral because the target is misperceived as an aggressor but is, in fact, a defensively minded state seeking only to enhance its security. 45 Third, there is nonbalancing , which may take the form of buck-passing, bandwagoning, appeasement, engagement, distancing, or hiding. These policies may be quite prudent and rational when the state is thereby able to avoid the costs of war either by satisfying the legitimate grievances of the revisionist state or allowing others to satisfy them, or by letting others defeat the aggressor while safely remaining on the sidelines. Moreover, if the state also seeks revision, then it may wisely choose to bandwagon with the potential aggressor in the hope of profiting from its success in overturning the established order. Finally, there is an unusual state of affairs, such as those we live under today, in which one state is so overwhelmingly powerful that there can be said to exist an actual harmony of interests between the hegemon (or unipole) and the rest of the great powers—those that could either one day become peer competitors or join together to balance against the predominant power. The other states do not balance against the hegemon because they are too weak (individually and collectively) and, more important, because they perceive their well being as inextricably tied up with the well-being of the hegemon. Here, potential “balancers” bandwagon with the hegemon not because they seek to overthrow the established order (the motive for revisionist bandwagoning), but because they perceive themselves to be benefiting from the status-quo order and, therefore, seek to preserve it. 46

Finally, there is underbalancing , which occurs when the state does not balance or does so inefficiently in response to a dangerous and unappeasable aggressor, and the state’s efforts are absolutely essential to deter or defeat it. In these cases, the underbalancing state not only does not avoid the costs of war but also brings about a war that could have been avoided or makes the war more costly than it otherwise would have been or both. 47

Criticisms of Balance-of-Power Theory

Since the end of the Cold War, many scholars of international politics have come to believe that realism and the balance of power are now obsolete. Liberal critics charge that, while power balancing may have been appropriate to a bygone era, international politics has been transformed as democracy extends its sway, as interdependence tightens its grip, and as institutions smooth the way to peace. If other states do arise over the coming decades to become peer competitors of the United States, the world will not return to a multipolar balance of power system but rather will enter a new multipartner phase. In the words of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “It does not make sense to adapt a 19th-century concert of powers or a 20th-century balance-of-power strategy. We cannot go back to Cold War containment or to unilateralism,” she said in a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in July 2009 . “We will lead by inducing greater cooperation among a greater number of actors and reducing competition, tilting the balance away from a multipolar world and toward a multipartner world.” 48

It is a view based on the assumption that history moves forward in a progressive direction—one consistent with the metaphor of time’s arrow. 49 Of course, realists have heard all this before. Consider Woodrow Wilson’s description of pre-World War I Europe: “The day we left behind us was a day of alliances. It was a day of balances of power. It was a day of ‘every nation take care of itself or make a partnership with some other nation or group of nations to hold the peace of the world steady or to dominate the weaker portions of the world’.” 50

While I suspect that social constructivists would agree with most (if not all) of the arguments posed by the liberal challenge to realism, the thrust of their attack is more conceptual and theoretically oriented. As mentioned, Stephen Walt’s “balance of threat” theory, by including “aggressive intentions” as a dimension of threat, widens the stimuli to which states perceive dangers to include more than just material power. Social constructivists, like Michael Barnett, charge that Walt, having shattered neorealist theory, does not go far enough in defining the ideational elements that determine threats and alliances. Ideology and ideas about identity and norms are, according to social constructivists, often the most important sources of threat perception, as well as the primary basis for alliance formation itself. 51

Finally, even self-described realists wonder if balance of power still operates in the contemporary world, at least at the global level. For various “sound realist” reasons, Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth see a world out of balance—one in which the United States maintains its unchallenged global primacy for another 20 years or more. 52 Edward Rhodes goes farther, urging the field to abandon, rather than hopelessly attempting to rehabilitate, the “balancing” metaphor and the logic that flows from it. Balancing behavior, he claims, makes no sense in a world devoid of “trinitarian wars” and the belief that any state, if too powerful and unchecked by other states, threatens the sovereignty of all other states. Today, nuclear arsenals assure great powers of the ultimate invulnerability of their sovereignty. 53 Moreover, war among the great powers in the present age is, if not downright ludicrous and unthinkable, far from an expected and sensible means to resolve their disputes. Balance of power is a theory deeply rooted in a territorial view of wealth and security—a world that no longer exists. 54

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1. See Vagts ( 1948 ), 82–101. For classic analyses on the balance of power, see Wolfers ( 1962 ), 122–124; Hinsely (1963 ); Dehio ( 1962 ); Sheehan ( 1996 ); Luard ( 1992 ); Claude ( 1962 ); and Seabury ( 1965 ). For impressive recent analyses, see Levy ( 2003 ), 128–153; and Paul ( 2004 ). See also Vincent & Wright ( 1989 ).

2. Quoted in Haas ( 1953 ), 453.

3. Morgenthau ( 1966 ), 163.

4. Waltz ( 2000 ), 28.

5. Christopher Layne ( 1997 ), 117.

6. Wolfers ( 1962 ), 15.

7. Mearsheimer ( 2001 ), 21.

8. See, for example, the description of the policy-making process in Schilling ( 1962 ), 5–27; and Hilsman ( 1971 ).

9. Spykman ( 1942 ), 25.

10. This theme fits squarely within the new wave of neoclassical realist research. Neoclassical realists argue that states assess and adapt to changes in their external environment partly as a result of their peculiar domestic structures and political situations. Because complex domestic political processes act as transmission belts between external factors (primarily, changes in relative power) and policy outputs, states often react differently to similar systemic pressures and opportunities, and their responses may be less motivated by systemic-level factors than domestic ones. See Rose ( 1998 ), 144–172; Schweller ( 2003 ), 311–348; and Lobell, Taliaferro, & Ripsman ( 2009 ).

11. For a sampling of this discussion, see J. A. Vasquez & C. Elman(Eds.), Realism and the balancing of power: A new debate . Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

12. T. V. Paul offers the following definition: “Soft balancing involves tacit balancing short of formal alliances. It occurs when states generally develop ententes or limited security understandings with one another to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power. Soft balancing is often based on a limited arms buildup, ad hoc cooperative exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions; these policies may be converted to open, hard-balancing strategies if and when security competition becomes intense and the powerful state becomes threatening.” (Paul, 2004 , p. 3). See also Pape ( 2005 ), 7–45; Paul ( 2005 ), 46–71; Brooks & Wohlforth ( 2005 ), 72–108; and Lieber & Alexander ( 2005 ), 109–139.

13. Joffe ( 2002 ), 155–180.

14. For economic balancing, see Heginbotham & Samuels ( 1998 ), 171–203, esp. pp. 192–193; and Moran ( 1993 ), 211–215. For ideological balancing rooted in ideological polarity and distance, see Haas ( 2005 ); and Haas ( 2012 ).

15. Schweller (2006 ), 9. Some would now refer to this definition as “hard” balancing as opposed to “soft” balancing.

16. Claude, Jr. ( 1989 ), 78.

17. Moul, ( 1989 ), 103.

18. Moul, ( 1989 ).

19. See Bull ( 1977 ), 106.

20. Realists call this “defensive positionality.” See Grieco ( 1990 ).

21. Gulick ( 1950 ), 68.

22. Waltz ( 1979 ), 127.

23. The original statement of balance of threat theory is K. N. Walt (1985), Alliance formation and the balance of world power, International Security , 9 (4), 3–43.

24. For this argument, see Schweller, ( 1997 ), 927–930 and at 929.

25. Mearsheimer ( 2001 ), 30.

26. Jervis ( 1986 ), 60.

27. Lasswell ( 1965 ), chap. 3. This was originally published in 1935.

28. Jervis ( 1986 ), 60.

29. See Snyder ( 1997 ), 148–149.

30. Gulick ( 1950 ), 72–73.

31. Ibid ., 33, 304.

32. Ibid ., 70–71.

33. See Hardin ( 1963 ), 63–64, 73.

34. The term “butterfly effect” grew out of Lorenz ( 1972 ), an unpublished academic paper.

35. This is Hedley Bull’s definition of social order in Bull ( 1977 ), 3–22.

36. The source of stability in a balance-of-power system (equilibrium) may arise as an unintended consequence, either of actors seeking to maximize their power or of the imperative for actors wishing to survive in a competitive self-help system to balance against threatening accumulations of power. See Waltz ( 1979 ), 88–93 and chap. 6.

37. For constitutional order, see Ikenberry ( 2001 ).

38. For this logic, see Betts ( 1992 ), 5–43.

39. For the dominant view that balancing prevails over bandwagoning and other responses to rising threats, see Walt ( 1987 ).

40. Schroeder ( 1994 ), 108–148; and Schweller ( 1994 ), 72–148. Also see Jervis & Snyder ( 1991 ); and Sweeney & Fritz ( 2004 ), 428–449.

41. Powell ( 1999 ), 196.

42. Powell ( 1999 ), 26.

43. Christensen & Snyder ( 1990 ), 137–168; and Mearsheimer ( 2001 ), 271–273.

44. See, for example, Schweller ( 2006 ); Levy & Barnett ( 1991 ), 369–395; and Levy & Barnett ( 1992 ), 19–40.

45. This view of appropriate and inappropriate balancing follows Jervis’s spiral and deterrence models. See Jervis ( 1976 ), 58–114.

46. See Carr ( 1964 ), 80–82. Also see Wohlforth ( 1999 ), 5–41.

47. For underbalancing behavior, see Schweller ( 2006 ).

48. Clinton ( 2009 ).

49. See Gould ( 1987 ).

50. Quoted in Claude Jr. ( 1962 ), 81.

51. See Barnett ( 1996 ), 400–447.

52. Brooks & Wohlforth ( 2008 ).

53. Rhodes ( 2004 ), 150–176.

54. Rhodes ( 2004 ), 150–176; and Schweller ( 2014 ).

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Balance of Power Concept in International Relations Essay

Introduction, iraq invasion.

“To some, power balancing is the inevitable and conflict-ridden by-product of anarchy and insecurity; to others, it is the unifying principle of a stable and cooperative international society” (Ikenberry 2008, p. 1). Ikenberry’s definition of power balance in international relations shows that, the concept is understood in different ways.

However, power balance (in international relations) is an ancient ideology which defines how states, cities and regions relate. In fact, the rivalry of most world powers is best understood through the lens of “power balance” (Little 2007, p. 1).

In modern international relations, a balance of power can only be achieved if states attain a level of stability among themselves. This level of stability is attained in the absence of competition. Realistically, many states have failed to achieve this equilibrium.

The concept of power balance is enshrined in a political system that defines the behavior of states in the system (Ikenberry 2008, p. 1). A balance of power is often desirable because; in its presence, the likelihood that one state takes advantage of another is low (or non-existent).

When a group of states (or one state) increases its power, other states are likely to retaliate by increasing their powers too (Ikenberry 2008, p. 1). It is an endless cycle of power struggle which is defined by the doctrines of equality (Sheehan 1996). Naturally, the doctrine of equality is cemented in the fact that, states would want to ensure they are secure (first) before tackling any other nationalistic agendas.

Since the 17 th century, there have been many examples of power balance tussles (Ikenberry 2008, p. 1). However, this paper focuses on the Russia–America cold war and the US-led invasion of Iraq (in 2003) as the main examples of power balance conflicts in present times. These two cases will be used as examples to understand the concept of balance of power.

The US and Russia were embroiled in a complicated balance of power tussle which was fueled by ideological, economic, and political differences (Ross 1993, p. 138). Many observers say that, the biggest difference between the two states was the difference in political systems (Ross 1993, p. 138).

Russia was a communist state and the US was a capitalist state. This difference often saw the two countries disagree on many issues, including the Cuban missile crisis that almost sent the two countries to war. The US and Russia could barely agree on any policy issue.

The conflict between the US and Russia started when the US was displeased by Russia’s resolve to withdraw from World War I (Mayall 1980, p. 161). Moreover, the US did not condone Russia’s political, social and economic systems, which were based on communism.

The US saw the communist system as a threat to its national security. For instance, the US worried about Russia’s growing influence in Europe (after the defeat of the Nazi Germany) because it already had a strong political and economic dominance in the region.

This worry was especially strong because the US knew that its political and economic ideologies were very different from Russia, and with Russia’s growing influence in Europe, its influence in Europe would be undermined (Ross 1993, p. 138).

These fears were rife when Russia and the US competed for international influence. US’s fear in this balance of power tussle is highlighted in earlier sections of this study, where it is noted that, in a balance of power tussle, states often strive to ensure they are secure, above all nationalistic issues.

The tense relations between Russia and America sparked the cold war, which was waged through military dominance. This balance of power tussle saw Russia detonate its first atomic weapon. This event marked the end of US’s autonomy of possessing nuclear weapons (Pandey 2009, p. 5).

The post-Nazi period marked the start of the cold war, where the US and Russia embarked on developing military armory (notably nuclear weapons). This military supremacy battle went on until the fall of the communism regime in 1991. The fall of communism marked the end of the cold war (Pandey 2009, p. 5).

From the above analysis, we see that, the US and Russia were engaged in a balance of power tussle that saw the two states striving to command a strong international influence over the other. Notably, this international influence was exercised in Europe, where the US and Russia strived to maintain a strong international influence.

Both states felt threatened by one other because they had opposing ideologies regarding most political and economic issues. However, with the fall of communism and USSR, the US warmed up to Russia, and the cold war ended.

This period marked the equilibrium of power between the two nations. This equilibrium is often marked with a feeling of security and an absence of military threats (Brown 2001, p. 106).

The US-led war on Iraq is a historic war of the 21 st century because it exhibits the concept of the balance of power in international relations. Though the war was won by ousting the long-serving Iraqi ruler, Saddam Hussein; the main objective of the mission (which was to eliminate weapons of mass destruction) was not achieved.

The US believed that, Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, but it failed to validate these accusations after attacking Iraq (Pandey 2009, p. 5). This justification for war is part of a wider understanding of balance of power in international relations because, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US became increasingly dominant in international politics.

Its military strength became virtually unrivaled and therefore, it wielded immense political and economic influence over other nations (Pandey 2009, p. 5). More so, this power was vested in the formation of NATO which acts as a military powerhouse for member states.

However, when analyzing the concept of balance of power (in the context of the Iraq war), we should perceive the US-led invasion on Iraq as an extreme consequence of power imbalance. This analogy is true because the US decided to invade Iraq despite UN’s disapproval of the invasion.

Records show that, most of the major world powers, such as, France, Germany, China and Russia opposed the invasion but the US went ahead to invade Iraq, anyway (Pandey 2009, p. 5). This domination is explained as, a consequence of power imbalance because the US wields a lot of power over other states in the world.

From this understanding, the US is able to impose its will over other nations. In relation to this analogy, Pandey (2009) explains that, “In International Relations, an equilibrium of power is sufficient to discourage or prevent one nation from imposing its will on or interfering with the interests of another” (p. 5).

Due to the imbalance of power between the US and other states, the US was able to impose its will over other states by invading Iraq.

The Iraq war is just an example of the gap in military power that exists between the US and major world powers (which even small states can do nothing to counterbalance). The US-led invasion in Iraq therefore reiterates the importance of striving for a balance of power among states because, if this equilibrium is not achieved, a sense of dominance will be witnessed.

The concept of power balance in international relations has never been more important than when trying to understanding how different states relate. This paper gives an example of the hostile relations that existed between the US and Russia, and the US-led invasion in Iraq as modern-day examples of the understanding of balance of power in international relations.

Considering the events that preceded the collapse of the USSR and the end of the cold war, we see that, there was an imbalance of power between the US and Russia before the collapse of the USSR. After the collapse of the USSR, there was a balance of power that improved diplomatic relations between the US and Russia.

On the flip side, we have witnessed the extremes of power imbalance between the US and other world nations, which saw the US, influence the decision to invade Iraq. From these examples, this paper highlights the importance of attaining a balance of power among world nations. If such an equilibrium is not achieved, powerful states will always impose their will over other states.

Brown, C. (2001) Understanding International Relations . London, Palgrave Macmillan.

Ikenberry, J. (2008) The Balance of Power in International Relations: Metaphors, Myths, and Models . Web.

Little, R. (2007) The Balance Of Power In International Relations: Metaphors, Myths And Models . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Mayall, J. (1980) The End Of The Post-War Era: Documents On Great-Power Relations, 1968-1975 . Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Pandey, S. (2009) Concept of Balance of Power in International Relations . Web.

Ross, R. (1993) China, the United States, and the Soviet Union: Tripolarity and Policy Making In the Cold War . New York, M.E. Sharpe.

Sheehan, M. (1996) The Balance Of Power: History And Theory . London, Routledge.

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Introduction, definitions and meaning.

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Balance of Power by Erik Underwood , T.V. Paul LAST REVIEWED: 15 January 2020 LAST MODIFIED: 15 January 2020 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199796953-0202

Balance of power is one of the most discussed and contested theoretical and policy concepts in international relations. It is in fact the bedrock of realism of all varieties, in particular classical and structural, and it is the most significant variable in systemic theories of international stability. The idea of balancing power has been popular since 17th-century Europe, although it was around in some fashion in ancient Greek, Indian, and Chinese statecraft. Beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, it took a prominent role in legal and political thought, with legal theorists and policymakers seeing the concept as central to considerations of international law and strategy. The fact that balance of power has found enduring relevance to scholars and policymakers throughout the ages suggests that the theory is one whose value should be carefully considered. The theory holds that when power is balanced among competing states, peace is obtained, but disequilibrium in power means a strong state can attack a weaker state and rob the latter of its security and independence. The goal of balance of power is to prevent any power from becoming too strong, first by deterring aggression, but if that fails, by ensuring that the aggressor does not significantly alter the balance of power. For realists, balance of power is born in the crucible of international anarchy. It is either a tool that states manually use to keep the power and aggressive behavior of other states in check, or a state of affairs generated by power competition among states. According to realism, states fear other states, and international anarchy creates a self-help system where one’s own strength and ability to find allies with similar interests are the only means to achieve security.

Haas 1953 offers some eight meanings and definitions of balance of power, showing how difficult it is to define the concept. While empirically the balance of power often refers to a description of the relative military balance between states, in international-relations theory the most commonly accepted definitions refer to an equilibrium of power between states that preserves stability and peace. Morgenthau 2006 defines a balance of power as “stability in a system composed of a number of autonomous forces. Whenever the equilibrium is disturbed either by an outside force or by a change in one or the other elements composing the system, the system shows a tendency to re-establish either the original or a new equilibrium.” For Waltz 1979 the balance of power refers to an equilibrium of power in the international system that states, as the units in the system, will achieve through their individual efforts at self-preservation. To structural and neorealists the question is not whether a balance of power will be achieved, but what distribution of power will be obtained under it. Power distributions are defined either as multipolar, with three or more great powers; bipolar, with two great powers; and unipolar, with power concentrated in one great power. It is also important to distinguish between a balance of power and balancing, the latter referring to efforts or strategies seeking to constrain the power of others, sometimes for the purpose of seeking a balance of power. For Rosecrance 2003 there is a set of stringent criteria to identify balancing by a state: it must be motivated by defensive and not offensive purposes, when seeking allies it must join the weaker coalition, and it must be willing to defend its allies and restore the balance of power when threatened. For Mearsheimer 2014 , balancing is something that self-interested states engage in to check the power-maximizing ambitions of their peers. The author defines balancing as where “threatened states seriously commit themselves to containing their dangerous opponent.” Alternatively, Walt 1987 argues that states do not balance purely against power; they balance against threat, and power is just one element that generates threat.

Haas, Ernst B. “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?” World Politics 5.4 (1953): 442–477.

DOI: 10.2307/2009179

In this classic article, in the context of the onset of the Cold War, Haas discusses the various ways in which scholars of his time understood balance of power in terms of (1) the distribution of power, (2) equilibrium, (3) hegemony, (4) stability and peace, (5) instability and war, (6) power politics in general, and (7) a universal law of history, as well as (8) a system and guide to policymaking.

Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics . New York: W. W. Norton, 2014.

In this book, Mearsheimer develops his theory of offensive realism, arguing that because states can never be certain of the intentions of other states, looking only to their power to determine their intentions, states must maximize their power, with each seeking to become a regional hegemon. Here every state is a potential aggressor and must be balanced.

Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace . Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006.

In this classical text, Morgenthau develops a theory of international politics that, among a wide variety of subjects, covers balance of power. For Morgenthau, states seek power because of an innate desire of humans for power and prestige, and power has many elements, including not just material but also ideational elements of national character and morale.

Paul, T. V., James Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, eds. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.

This colleciton of essays contains theoretical explanations, criticisms, and regional and global applications of balance-of-power theory and policy. It aso contains valuable citations and ideas as well as changing notions of balance of power in the contemporary world.

Rosecrance, Richard. “Is There a Balance of Power?” In Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate . Edited by J. A. Vasquez and C. Elman. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003.

In this book chapter, Rosecrance critiques definitions of balance of power which he argues define the concept too broadly. He provides a narrower definition to try to more accurately capture empirical cases: a state must be motivated by defensive purposes, when balancing through alliances it must join the weaker coalition, and it must be willing to defend those allies and the balance of power.

Walt, Stephen. The Origins of Alliances . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987.

In contrast to Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism and offensive realists such as Mearsheimer, Walt argues that states balance against threat. Aggregate and offensive power are seen as generators of threat, but geographical proximity influences the ability to project power, and states are concerned over whether other states possess aggressive intentions. Each of these decides whether a state sees a threat, and balances against that threat.

Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics . Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

In this seminal text, Watlz develops the theory of structural realism, which sees anarchy as the key driver of conflict, since with no higher power, states must rely on self-help. He develops a theory of balance of power, arguing that states will automatically form balances of power against more-powerful states, and that the main variation that will occur will be between bipolar (power concentrated in two great powers) or multipolar systems (power concentrated three or more great powers), with the former more stable.

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Balance of Power Theory in Today’s International System

“Balance of power theory grew out of many centuries of multipolarity and a few decades of bipolarity. Today the world is characterized by unprecedented unipolarity. Balance of power theory, therefore, cannot provide guidance for the world we are in.”

In responding to this statement, the essay will first discuss the logical fallacy inherent in its argument: though the balance of power theory (BOP) [1] emerged concurrent to certain types of power configuration in world politics—multipolarity and bipolarity in this case—it does not follow that it was these types of configuration per se that gave rise to the theory itself. Multipolarity and bipolarity can and should be considered, themselves, as manifestations of the underlying logic of the international system, which the BOP theory also embodies. This logic of relative positionality of states in an anarchic system, as this essay will argue, has not fundamentally changed since the emergence of BOP theory. This leads to the second empirical problem with the statement. On the one hand, a de facto unipolarity characterized by American hegemony has been around for much longer than the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, the current economic and political status of China places it in a pseudo-superpower position vis-à-vis the United States. Both of these mean that the degree of unipolarity that we observe today relative to the bipolarity of the Cold War is, if any, weak. Therefore, much of BOP’s relevance in the bipolar world will continue to be in today’s international system.

The BOP Theory: Core Assumptions and the (ir)Relevance of Polarity

We should first understand the logic that gave rise to the BOP theory. Two assumptions are of central relevance. First, the international system is considered to be anarchic, with no system-wide authority being formally enforced on its agents (Waltz 1979, 88). Because of this “self-help” nature of the system, states do not have a world government to resort to in a situation of danger, but they can only try to increase their capabilities relative to one another through either internal efforts of self-strengthening, or external efforts of alignment and realignment with other states (Waltz 1979, 118). Second, states are the principle actors in the international system, as they “set the terms of the intercourse” (Waltz 1979, 96), monopolize the “legitimate use of force” (Waltz 1979, 104) within their territories, and generally conduct foreign policy in a “single voice” (Waltz 1959, 178-179). Hence states are also considered to be unitary actors in the international system. This latter assumption is important because if non-state or transnational actors are powerful enough to challenge state actors, power configuration in the world may no longer be considered in terms of polarity but, instead, in terms of the number of layers of policy “networks” [2] . This essay bases its argument on these two core assumptions about the international system as well because they have been widely accepted not only in realism and neorealism but also in neoliberal institutionalism (Keohane 1984, etc.) and, to some degree, in constructivism (Wendt 1999, etc.) as well. Thus, they are not derivative from exclusively realist or neorealist beliefs such as relative power maximization.

With this in mind, the essay will now discuss why polarity is neither sufficient nor necessary to explain the balance of power. The question of sufficiency can be answered with respect to why balance of power does not always occur even in a multipolar or bipolar world, and that of necessity with respect to why balance of power can still occur even with unipolarity. According to Waltz, balance of power occurs when, given “two coalitions” formed in the international system, secondary states, if free to choose, will side with the weaker, so as to avoid being threatened by the stronger side (Waltz 1979, 127). This condition has led some to question the validity of BOP in a unipolar world, since two or more states need to coexist in the system in order for the theory to hold (Waltz 1979, 118).

However, as this essay mentions, once we accept the two core assumptions (that of anarchy and that of states being principle actors), this condition is not necessary for BOP to be relevant. The balance of power, as Waltz suggests, is a “result” – an outcome variable that reflects the causal effect of the explanatory variables which are, in his theory, anarchy and distribution of power in the international system. This tension within Waltz’s own argument has indeed invited criticism that his version of the BOP theory is essentially attempting to explain one dependent variable (the occurrence of balance of power) with another (polarity) (Lebow, 27). To sidestep this potential loophole, therefore, we need to assess the relevance of BOP by examining whether the same structural constraints that engender balancing in the multipolar or bipolar systems are also present in a unipolar world.

If the balance of power could not be directly deduced from system polarity, what then would predict its occurrence? To answer this question will require us to go back to the two core assumptions and see what explanatory variables can be derived from these assumptions that will have some observable implications with regard to balancing. The likelihood of balance of power is, therefore, a function of these variables which, as this essay will show, boil down to 1) intention , notably the intention or the perceived intention of the major powers in the system, 2) preference of the states, particularly that between absolute and relative gains, and 3) contingency , often related to the availability of new information in a given situation, which may exogenously change the first two variables. Most importantly, none of the three is conditional upon a certain type of polarity to be effectual.

Three Explanatory Variables for Predicting Balancing: Intention, Preference, Contingency

The intention, or the perceived intention of a major power, determines whether balancing will be preferred by secondary states over other options such as bandwagoning. We can think of this in terms both why smaller states sometimes succumb to the sphere of the strongest power in the system and why they sometimes stay away from it, or challenge it by joining the second biggest power if there were one. In his analysis of the conditions for cooperation under the security dilemma, Robert Jervis shows that when there is pervasive offensive advantage and indistinguishability between offense and defense (the “worst case” scenario), security dilemma between states can be so acute that it can virtually squeeze out the “fluidity” necessary for any balance of power to occur (Jervis 1978, 186-189). By incurring incorrect “inferences”, offensive advantage and offense-defense indistinguishability ultimately serve to alter the perceived intention of the adversary as being aggressive or non-aggressive (Jervis 1978, 201). This will then dictate the smaller states’ decision to whether balance the move. If, however, the major power is perceived to have not only a non-aggressive intention, but also a benign intention of providing certain public goods, smaller states may choose to free ride on these benefits while submitting to the major power’s sphere of influence in return; an outcome of so-called “hegemonic stability” may then ensue (Keohane 1984, 12). Thus along the dimension of perceived intention, balance of power occurs when states have reservations about the major power or the hegemon’s intention but not to the extent that a precipitation to war is so imminent as to render balancing infeasible.

Second, balance of power is closely related to the states’ preference for relative versus absolute gains. From an offensive realist point of view, John Mearsheimer contends that states concerned with balance of power must think in terms of relative rather than absolute gain – that is, their military advantage over others regardless of how much capability they each have. The underlying logic here is at once intuitive—given a self-help system and self-interested states, “the greater military advantage one state has…the more secure it is” (Mearsheimer 1994-95, 11-12)—and problematic since the auxiliary assumption that every state would then always prefer to have maximum military power in the system (Mearsheimer 1994-95, 12) is practically meaningless. Similarly, Joseph Grieco points out that with the ever present possibility of war in an anarchic system, states may not cooperate even with their allies because survival is guaranteed only with a “proportionate advantage” (Grieco in Baldwin ed., 127-130). The concern for relative gain predicts that states will prefer balance of power over collective security because the latter requires that states trust one another enough to completely forgo relative gain through unilateral disarmament, which is inherently at odds with the idea of having a positional advantage for self-defense (Mearsheimer 1994-95, 36).

Meanwhile, the neoliberal institutionalist cooperation theory essentially presumes the pursuit of absolute gain over relative gain for states to achieve cooperation (Keohane 1984, 68). On a broader scale, therefore, the pursuit of relative gain would undercut international cooperation in general, in both high and low politics. It is safe to say that in practice, states are concerned with both relative and absolute gains to different degrees under different circumstances. Scholars like Duncan Snidal and Robert Axelrod have rigorously demonstrated the complexity of situations in which these two competing interests dynamically interact and change over time (see for example Snidal in Baldwin ed. and Axelrod 1984, Chapter 2). In general, though, a prevalent preference for relative gains and, more specifically, military positionality among states increases the likelihood of balancing relative to collective security. If states tend to favor absolute gains instead, we are more likely to see phenomena such as deep international institutions and pluralist security communities.

But even if there existed a malign hegemon that other states wanted to balance against, and the states all pursued relative gains, balance of power would still be conditional. That is, even with the aforementioned systemic constraints, balance of power is not a given without knowing the specific contingency factors unique to each situation. One additional implication of an anarchic system is pervasive uncertainty resulting from the scarcity of information, since all states have an incentive to misrepresent in order to further their positionality in event of war (Fearon 1998, 274). This explains why, perhaps in a paradoxical way, historically even in periods of multipolarity and bipolarity characterized by intense suspicion and tension, balancing did not happen as often as BOP would predict. The crux is the unexpected availability of new information which leads to a change in the course of action by altering preexisting beliefs and preferences. The European states’ collective decision to buttress the rising challenger Prussia in the 1800s despite the latter’s clear expansionist tendency shows that neither intention nor preference can be taken as a given, but both are subject to circumstantial construction (Goddard, 119).

In times of crisis, this constructing effect may be especially strong. Such characterized the interwar period and resulted in a significant lag in the European states’ learning which may have otherwise incurred greater balance against the revisionist Germany (Jervis 1978, 184). Still caught up in a spirit of collective security from the first war, these states were too “hot-headed” to switch to the phlegmatic behavior of balancing (Weisiger, lecture). This, however, had less to do with their perception of Germany or their pursuit of relative/absolute gains than with the transformational effect of the trauma of World War I. In short, the more rapid and unpredictable is the flux of information in a given situation, the less likely that the balance of power contingent on existing beliefs and preferences will occur as predicted.

The Fall of USSR, the Rise of China, and Empirical Implications for the BOP Theory

Having shown that BOP has less to do with polarity than with intention of aggression, preference for relative gains, and circumstantial factors in an anarchic world, this essay will now show why our current system, characterized by American hegemony, is not so much different from the preceding ones. Doing so will not only address the necessity question mentioned earlier, but also show that even if we accept the premise that BOP is less applicable to unipolarity than to multipolarity and bipolarity, this hardly affects BOP’s relevance to today’s world.

Though BOP gained much leverage during the Cold War, which is considered a textbook case of bipolarity, a closer look at Waltz’s discussion of American dominance at the time reveals what really resembles a picture of American hegemony rather than bipolarity (Waltz 1979, 146-160). Most important, however, is the fact that concurrent to this widening gap between the U.S. and the USSR, a corresponding increase in the balance of power against the U.S. did not occur. Rather, we saw the opposite happen where Soviet satellite states started drifting away one after another. This greatly undermines BOP’s explanatory power even for bipolarity. Richard Lebow’s succinct summary of the years leading to the Soviet collapse illustrates that not only did the USSR productivity remain vastly inferior to that of the U.S., but also that its military (nuclear) capabilities never reached the level as to be a real challenger to the U.S. Hence, the actual period of strict bipolarity during the Cold War is much shorter than is conventionally believed (Lebow, 28-31). It is debatable as to what extent the Soviet “anomaly” was primarily the result of perception, preference, or contingency (such as that discussed in Risse, 26), but major discordances between the balance of power and polarity lend further support to this essay’s argument that BOP is not determined by polarity itself, but by variables inherent in the international system, which may or may not lead to a concurrence of balance of power and certain types of polarity.

The demarcation between the bipolar Cold War system and the unipolar post-Cold War system is, therefore, fuzzy at best. This has been further complicated by China’s rise in the most recent decades. To put things in perspective: at the peak of the Cold War, the U.S. enjoyed a GDP of $5,200 billion (USD)—about twice of that of the USSR ($2,700 billion). As of last year, it was $16,000—also about twice of that of China’s ($8,200 billion). [3] If we were to measure superpower status by nuclear capability (which many scholars use to pinpoint the start of Cold War), the picture is even more ambiguous, with as many as nine states currently having nuclear weapons, including North Korea. [4]

Rather than questioning American hegemony today, which this paper does not intend to do, these facts simply serve to remind us of the continuity rather than discreteness of the recent stages of polarity. Because of this, the supposed unipolarity as of present has little bearing on the validity of the BOP theory in explaining state behavior. Hans Morgenthau reaffirms the balance of power as a “perennial element” in human history, regardless of the “contemporary conditions” that the international system operates under (Morgenthau, 9-10). The essence of the BOP theory cannot be reduced to the occurrence of balance of power. With the logic of anarchy and principality of state actors largely unchanged, we can, therefore, imagine a situation of balancing against the U.S. even in a unipolar system—if the U.S. is no longer perceived as a benign hegemon and if states are more concerned with their military disadvantage as a result, especially when a combination of situational factors and diplomatic efforts further facilitates such a change in perception and preference.

Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation , 1984.

Fearon, James, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation,” International Organization 52:2, 1998.

Goddard, Stacie, “When Right Makes Might: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of Power,” International Security 33:3, 2008-2009.

Grieco, Joseph, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” in David Baldwin ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate , 1993.

Jervis, Robert, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30:2, 1978.

Keohane, Robert, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy , 1984.

Lebow, Richard Ned, “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism,” in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen eds., International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War , 1995.

Mearsheimer, John, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19:3, 1994-1995.

Morgenthau, Hans, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace , 1967.

Risse, Thomas, “‘Let’s Argue!’: Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization , 54:1, 2000.

Snidal, Duncan, “Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation” in David Baldwin ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate , 1993.

Waltz, Kenneth, Theory of International Politics , 1979.

Waltz, Kenneth, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis , 1959.

Wendt, Alexander, Social Theory of International Politics , 1999.

“The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency .

[1] I will use the acronym “BOP” to refer to the theory of balance of power, and “balance of power” to refer to the actual phenomenon of balance of power.

[2] This term is directly borrowed from the title of Networked Politics by Miles Kahler, but numerous works have alluded to the same concept, such as those by Kathryn Sikkink, Martha Finnemore and Anne-Marie Slaughter, to name a few.

[3] The World Factbook , Central Intelligence Agency.

— Written by: Meicen Sun Written at: University of Pennsylvania Written for: Mark Katz Date written: October 2013

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Balance of Power Essay

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In the modern International System where does the balance of power stand? In the past, it had shifted from empire to empire, sometimes many empires held power at once. To explain the polarity of the world today we must first examine the definition of power in order to know what it means to have power and how it spreads. Then we must look at the polarity of the past to determine how the powers of today got to where they are now and what it took to be unipolar and how it is challenged today. Power, since the beginning of human history has been a force that drives man. Every civilization has aimed to increase its power, locally or globally. How is power defined? According to Dr. Robert Dahl, political science professor at Yale University, …show more content…

A more modern example will be the Americans trying to limit the nuclear program of Iran, at this point with economic sanctions. If a nation manages to limit the power of others to the point where the balance of power is shifted towards them, then they will create a unipolar system in which they sit on top. Power is best strong when it is less dispersed (Ferguson, 2003). To determine if the current International System is a unipolar system we first have to look at the rise to power of the possible unipolar power. After World War 2, when most of Europe laid in ruins, two major powers, U.S.A and U.S.S.R, came out strong to become super powers. The United States was lucky to have no bombs dropped on it infrastructures, it still had a standing industry capable of mobilizing an army. On the other hand, the U.S.S.R greatly suffered in comparison to the United States. Fortunately, majority of its industry had still survived up in the Ural Mountains, untouched by the Nazi invasion. As a result of the destruction of other major powers, both these nations had an economic advantage in becoming super powers. The world had become bipolar, with power dispersed between the U.S.A and U.S.S.R. Both super powers were leaders of opposite ideologies and in a bipolar system the second- tier powers compared and aligned themselves with either powers

Utopia In The Truman Show

Power is having the capability or qualification to do something or control something. The idea of power is often analyzed in the Truman Show and Animal farm. In the Truman Show, Peter Weir suggests that power can be bad and that people shouldn’t have power

Imperialism Dbq Essay

As the world moved on from the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, it became clear that there were several countries rising far above the others, and therefore controlling global affairs. These global giants consisted of the United States and the European great powers. These countries were able to control global affairs because of their expanding scientific and technological knowledge, ideas of nationalism, and practice of imperialism. However, these factors came with side effects, such as radical political movements and a mounting tension among the countries. Early twentieth century, the United States and each of the European great powers became the first countries to hit the scientific and industrial revolutions, giving them significant leads over the rest of the world.

The Clash Of Civilizations By Samuel Huntington Essay

Huntington’s initial article argued that in the post-Cold War era the fundamental source of conflict would not be ideological or economic, but cultural. He continues by arguing that nation states will continue to be the most powerful actors in global affairs, but the conflicts of global politics that are to occur in the future will happen between

Balanced Bipolarity, Balanced Multipolarity & Unbalanced Multipolarity

Mearsheimer’s short article “The cause of great power war” explains the occurrence of major power wars. According to Mearsheimer, power gives rise to three kinds of systems which are known as Bipolarity, Unbalanced Multipolarity, and

Matthew Best Course Culminating Activity

Power is the ability to make people say and/or do things. It is the ability to get whatever you want. Power is necessary in any society, otherwise all would break loose; leaders must be established. When taken to an extreme, power is

Who Are The Most Important Actors Of The Global Political Economy?

At this point in time, the main actors in the international system are nation-states seeking an agenda of their own based on personal gain and national interest. Significantly, the most important actor is the United States, a liberal international economy, appointed its power after the interwar period becoming the dominant economy and in turn attained the position of hegemonic stability in the international system. The reason why the United States is dominating is imbedded in their intrinsic desire to continuously strive for their own national interest both political and economic. Further, there are other nature of actors that are not just nation-states, including non-states or transnational,

Abuse Of Power In Macbeth

Power is the capacity or ability to direct or influence the behavior of others or the course of events. Like Adolf Hitler and the play Macbeth, it is clear that power can be used in

Is American Power During Decline?

This essay argues that 1991 was the peak of American power. The Berlin wall had fallen in 1989, and then the USSR had disbanded in 1991, making the US the only superpower in the world. In 1991 America had military and financial power of that other nations could only dream of. Cox then argues that American power declined from that point because nations have a finite lifespan. As a realist he argued that all great nations go into decline and no matter how “singular and exceptional a powerful nations qualities might be, it cannot, for ever, determine the way in which the international system operates”. Williams reviewed Cox and almost instantly argued against his theory. Cox states the traditional realist view of a rise and fall of national power, but Williams argues a more liberal view, that American power, while not being as dominant, is still a

Relational Power Aspects

Every country since the beginning of time has competed with one another to be the most dominant country with the most power. International power differs a little bit from domestic power. Power in regards to global affairs are tangible and intangible resources that have underlying power relationships. Tangible things would be a powerful army. Some of the intangible things would be allies. There are three types of different relational power aspects. They are commanding change, controlling agendas, and establishing preferences. Commanding change is when you can convince others to change their preferences to better accommodate yours. Controlling agendas is when you make another person's agenda irrelevant and replacing it with your own. Establishing

How Did World War 1 Contribute To The Balance Of Power Theory

The balance of power theory is viewed as critical policy in the handling of international relations. To fully comprehend how the balance

The Future Of The Liberal World Order

In his article, “The Future of the Liberal World Order”, John Inkenberry discusses what he sees as a global shift in power, from the Western and Northern powers such as the United States and Great Britain to the more Eastern and Southern developing states like China, India and Brazil. This potential shift in power has sparked a fear in many people. This fear, as the global power switches from West to East and North to South, stems from the thinking that these new nations that are coming to power will abolish the liberal world order that we all know. I however believe that instead of challenging the United States for power and changing the world order to more reflect their ideologies, these emerging nations will instead seek a greater position of leadership in the already existing world order. Firstly, I will provide an argument of Inkenberry’s main arguments and why realists’ have started to worry. Second, I will show how China is rising to threaten the United States superpower position in today’s world order, and finally I will illustrate ways which show that China is not challenging the Liberal World Order and why.

Power In Conflict

Power can be defined in many ways. Most simply, it is the ability to get what you want.

Foucault - Power/Knowledge

Power is the ability to control others or one’s entity. Accordingly it can be defined as a kind of strength or as an authority. There are various theorisations about the meaning of this term in sociology thus it would be hard to give a comprehensive

Neorealist and Neo-Marxist Approaches to Globalization

International change takes place when great powers rise and fall and followed by the shift in the balance of power (Jackson and Sorensen, 2003).

The Balance Of Power Theory Essay

can be seen that in the real world the system is composed of of various types of

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U.S. Institutions - Balance of Power

This Editorial is one of a series on the U.S. Constitution and the structure of the U.S. government.

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One of the fundamental principles of the United States Constitution, the law of the land, is the balance and separation of power among the three branches of the Government: the Legislative, or law-making branch that is the U.S. Congress, the Executive branch which is headed by the President, and the Judiciary, which interprets the law at every level and settles legal disputes regarding the meaning and the application of the law.

The distribution of power among the three branches is meant to ensure that no one branch of the government is able to gain a disproportionate amount of power over the other two.

Each branch has separate and unique powers the others cannot impinge upon, but which are nonetheless subject to acceptance or rejection by the other two branches. This is how the balance of power is kept in check.

Thus, the Congress writes and enacts laws. It sets budgets and taxes and authorizes borrowing. It is the only body that can declare war. The Congress may override a presidential veto with a 60 percent vote.

Both the House of Representatives and the Senate initiate bills, or potential laws. The Senate also ratifies treaties, and confirms presidential appointments to federal posts.

The House of Representatives creates federal judgeships and courts except for the Supreme Court, and has the ability to start impeachment proceedings against federal officials, including the President.

Once proposed legislation passes through both Houses of the Congress, it goes to the President, who either signs the bill into law or vetoes it. In addition, the President is the Commander in Chief of all armed forces, has the power to make treaties and appointments to federal posts, and ensures that federal laws are executed throughout the country.

The Judicial branch of the Government, which includes the Supreme Court and all lower Federal courts, decides the meaning of laws, how to apply them to real situations, and whether a law breaks the rules of the Constitution.

“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands… may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny,” wrote James Madison, the Father of the Constitution.

“The defect must be supplied by so contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places."

Reflecting the Views of the U.S. Government as Broadcast on The Voice of America

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Balance of Power

The balance of power is one of the oldest concepts of international relations . It at once provides an answer to the problem of war and peace in international history. It is also regarded as a universal law of political behavior, a basic principle of every state’s foreign policy through the ages, and, therefore, a description of a significant pattern of political action in the international field. Before the present inquiry into a general theory of international relations, the balance of power was regarded as the only tenable international relations theory, especially from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century.

Broadly speaking, it refers to a relative power position of states as actors in international relations . With its emphasis on the cultivation of power and the utilization of power for resolving the problem of power, it appears to be a sensible way of action in an international society where their national interests and prejudices govern nations. The balance of power is part and parcel of a system of power politics. Its strength and life will always be determined by the latter.

Thus the theory of balance of power is widely held. It is an overused theory in international relations. It means different things to different scholars. Claude has aptly remarked that it is an ambiguous concept as it has so many meanings. 1

Similarly, Schleicher observes, “it is virtually meaningless” 2

Wight says the notion of the balance of power is notoriously full of confusion. 3

It is used as a policy, as a system, as a status, and as a symbol. It is also used at times as a propaganda ploy.

Therefore, it becomes a tough task to precisely explain the meaning of the term, which will be universally acknowledged at any given time. Despite this difficulty, an attempt has been made in the following paragraphs to describe the meaning and nature of the concept with prominent scholars of international relations.

Meaning And Nature In Balance Of Power:

To know the meaning of balance of power, one may take the analogy of a balancer with a pair of scales. If the weights in the two scales are equal, there is balance. The same thing can be applied to international relations. The two states or two coalitions of states are in balance if they are equally powerful.

In a world where many nations with different degrees of power exist and in which each nation endeavors to maximize its power, there is a tendency for the entire system to be in balance. In other words, different nations manipulate and group themselves in such a way that no single nation or group of nations is strong enough to dominate others because that of a rival group balances its power. It is believed that so long as this kind of balance is established, there is peace, and small nations’ independence is protected.

Definitions:

How different scholars have endeavored to define this concept is mentioned as under. Mostly it is defined as a state of dynamic equilibrium characterizing relations among nations . It is the process of matching some nations’ powers against those of other nations so that there is no upheaval or chaos in the relations among nations.

For example, Castlereagh defined balance of power as maintaining such a just equilibrium between the members of the family of nations as should prevent any of them from becoming sufficiently strong to impose its will upon the rest.  Similarly, Fay defines it as just equilibrium in power among the family of nations as it will prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong to enforce its will upon the others. 5

Besides, many other scholars have also explained the concept of balance of power in terms of equilibrium. In practice, however, nations have mostly desired preponderance, not an equilibrium of power. Spykman observes the truth of the matter that states are interested only in a balance in their favor.

The balance desired is the one that neutralizes other states, leaving the home state free to be the deciding force and the deciding voice. 6

Thus another usage of the balance of power refers to a situation in which competing powers prefer a disequilibrium condition and not of equilibrium. In this way, the balance of power sometimes means equilibrium and sometimes disequilibrium.

Dickinson also explains the two usages of the term “It means, on the one hand, and equality, as of the two sides when an account is balanced, and on the other hand, an inequality as when one has a balance to one’s credit at the bank.” 7

He further says this theory professes the former but pursues the latter. 8

Dyke explains the prime object of balancing power is to establish or maintain such a distribution of power among states. It will prevent anyone from imposing its will upon another by the threat of violence. 9

The concept of power assumes that through shifting alliances and countervailing pressures, no one power or combination of powers will be allowed to grow so strong as to threaten the rest’s security. 10

Thus as a status or condition, the balance of power has meant three things, namely,

• Equality or equilibrium of power among states results in balance.
• A distribution of power in which some states are stronger than others, and
• A ny distribution of power among states.

Thompson and Morgenthau have identified it as a policy. Thus it is held that in a multi-state system, the only policy that can check the erring behavior of other states is that of confronting power with countervailing power. 11

The balance of power is also known as a system of international politics . According to this meaning, the balance of power is a certain kind of arrangement for international relations working in a multi-state world . Martin Wight, A.J.P. Taylor, and Charles Lerche have used this term as a system.

Many other scholars have used it not as a concept but merely as a symbol of realism in international relations. This usage is based on the idea that the balance of power is nothing but a corollary of international relations’ power factor. The acceptance of the power factor gives way to foreign policies based on the balance of power. Louis Halle, John Morton Blum, and Reinhold Niebuhr have all treated power balance as a symbol of the realist philosophy.

Morgenthau has used the term in four different ways :

• A s a policy aimed at a certain gate of affairs,
• A s an actual state of affairs,
• A s an approximately equal distribution of power, and
• A s any distribution of power. 12

Haas pointed out that the concept had been utilized extensively in at least eight mutually exclusive meanings :

• E quilibrium resulting from an equal distribution of power among nation-states.
• E quilibrium resulting from the unequal distribution of power among nation-states.
• E quilibrium resulting from the dominance of one nation-state (the balancer).
• A system providing for relative stability and peace.
• A system characterized by instability and war.
• A nother way of saying power politics.
• The universal law of history  and
• A guide for policymakers. 13

Likewise, Schleicher has discussed three, Zinnes seven, and Wight nine meanings of power balance. 14

Despite the multiple, imprecise, and ambiguous nature, the balance of power is near the very core of international politics.

Pie-requisites:

Couloumbis and Wolfe have summed up four pre-requisites for the existence of a balance of power system, which are explained as under:

• A multiplicity of sovereign political actors results
• in the absence of a single centralized, legitimate, and strong authority over these sovereign actors.
• R elatively unequal distribution of power (i.e., states, wealth, size, military capability) among the political actors that make up the system. This permits states’ differentiation into at least three categories great powers, intermediate powers, and smaller nation-states.
• C ontinuous but controlled completion and conflict among sovereign political actors are perceived as scarce world resources and other values.
• A n implicit understanding among the rulers of the great.

Powers that the perpetuation of the existing power distribution benefits them mutually. 15

Assumptions:

There are certain assumptions of the balance of power that also operate as conditions affecting the balance’s stability. Quincy Wright has given five major assumptions, which are as follows: 16

• S tates are committed to protecting their vital interests by all possible means, including war, though it is up to each state to decide for itself as to which of its rights and interests are vital and which method it should adopt to protect them.
• T he vital interests of states are or may be threatened. If the vital interests are not threatened, then there should be no need for a state to protect them.
• T he balance of power helps protect the vital interests either by threatening other states with committing aggression or by enabling the victim to achieve victory in case aggression occurs. This assumption means that states are not generally likely to commit aggression unless they have superiority of power.
• T he Relative power position of various states can be measured to a great degree of accuracy. This measurement can be utilized in balancing the world forces in one’s favor.
• Politicians make their foreign policy decisions based on an intelligent understanding of power considerations.
• O ne more assumption may be added to the list presented by Wright. The balance of power assumes that there will be one balancer maintaining splendid isolation and ready to join.

The side of the scale, which becomes higher at any given period. Such a state always works on Palmerston’s advice that it can have no permanent enemies and permanent allies in the world. Its only permanent interest is to maintain the balance of power itself.

Characteristics:

The chief characteristics of the balance of power system can be enumerated as under:

1. Equilibrium:

The term suggests equilibrium, an equal distribution of power. When this equilibrium is lost, the balance of the sewer fails. Balance is not a permanent feature of international politics as occasional disequilibrium is not ruled out in the system. Thus, the concept is concerned with equilibrium as well as disequilibrium.

2. Temporary:

The balance of power is always temporary and unstable. With the change of time and conditions, it also changes and gives way to another system of balance of power. Neither a balance of power system nor its original contending powers can live long.

3. Active Intervention:

Balance of power is not  “a gift of the gods” but an outcome of the men’s active intervention. Whenever a state apprehends that the balance is being titled against it, it has to counter it quickly. It must be prepared to take necessary steps, including risking a war if it is determined to safeguard its vital interests, which would be in danger if it remains passive. Thus, the balance of power is the result of diplomatic activity, not of natural happening.

4. Status Que:

The balance of power normally favors the status quo. Therefore, those who benefit from it generally favor it, and it is opposed by those who see a loss to their position. History has witnessed many wars owing to these contrary motivations of the states.

5. Difficult to De amine Existence:

It is not easy to say when a balance of power has been accomplished. A real balance of power can never exist, and it probably would not be recognized as such if it did exist. “The only real test, presumably, is that of war, and resorting to war not only upsets the balance but also creates the very conditions which a balance of power policy is supposedly designed to prevent.” 17

6. Subjective and Objective Approaches:

It offers both a Subjective and objective approach. Historians take the objective view while statesmen take the subjective View. In the historian’s opinion, there is a balance between two states if they are equally powerful. To be more realistic, the statesman aims at not only equilibrium but a preponderance or imbalance in its favor.

7. Conflicting Aims:

Primarily it aims to preserve peace. At times it has achieved this aim in particular areas or the state system as a whole. At other times it has also tended to increase tensions between nations and to encourage wars.

8. Big-Power Game:

It is mainly a big power game. Big powers are neither interested in peace nor instability but in their security. Small powers are usually victims or, at best, spectators rather than players. They are used as mere weights on the scales. They are objects rather than subjects.

9. Unsuitable for Democracies:

Unless geographical, political, military, and other considerations are peculiarly favorable, democracy is never interested in this game. It is interested in power politics only in times of crisis. On the other hand, a dictatorship is most inclined to dominate the contest and gather all the rewards.

10. The Balancer:

It admits to the existence of some balancer state or states or an organization. The balancer state is not a small, insignificant power, but it is a powerful one in its own right, and the other contending powers try to cultivate such a balancer. Britain was such a balancer during the nineteenth century. During the post-war period, when the power distribution had become largely bipolar, the UNO tried to function as a balancer.

11. Operation Questionable:

Many scholars point out that the balance of power is largely inoperative and irrelevant under present conditions. According to them, it worked well only when it was confined to the European state system, and with the expansion of the state system to an international scale, it is impossible for any nation or international organization to play the role of a balancer or for the system to operate along its traditional lines.

The nuclear and space age has further relegated its relevance. There is truth in these contentions, yet the fact is that this game continues to be played, with nation-states as the chief actors. Palmer and Perkins rightly observe. Certainly, new forces and patterns are developing, and though still in their formative stages, they may make former preoccupation with the balance of power seem inconsequential indeed. 18

Types Of The Balance Of Power:

The balance of power has the following forms:

Simple Balance:

If power is concentrated in two states or two opposing camps, the balance of power is simple. This type’s chief characteristic is that states or groups of states are divided into two camps like the two scales of the balance. In simple balance, the power distribution between the two opposing camps is almost equal. The United States and the Soviet Union individually, and the Eastern and the Western block collectively were examples of the simple balance in the post-war period of bipolarism.

Multiple Balance:

When there is a wide dispersal of power among states, and several states or groups of states balance each other, the balance is called multiple or complex. There need not be a single system; instead, there may be many subsystems or local balances of power within a system. The multiple balance can be compared to a chandelier. A complex balance may or may not have a balancer. A simple balance may turn into a multiple or complex balance and vice versa.

Local, Regional, and Global:

Balances may, in terms of their geographical coverage, be spoken of as local, regional, and global. If it is at the local level, the balance is local, like we may speak of the balance of power between India and Pakistan. It is regional, if an area or a continent, say Europe or Asia, is involved. It is global or worldwide if all the countries participate in it through a network of alliances and counter-alliances.

Flexible and Rigid:

Sometimes, balances have also been known as rigid or flexible. When princes could make sudden and radical shifts in their alliances in the monarchical days, the balance was generally flexible. With the coming of ideologies and greater economic interdependence, the balance of power has tended to become rigid.

We Devices And Methods:

With time, the balance of power has developed certain means and methods, techniques, and devices through which it can be achieved and maintained. The same are as follows arms new Armament and Disarmament. The main device for achieving balance is the arm.

Whenever one nation increases its strength, its rival has no other alternative but to enter an arms race. If the first nation can preserve its strength, the balance of power will be upset, but if its opponents can also consolidate their power by arming themselves, the balance of power is preserved. The armament race between the United States and the Soviet Union in the post-war period was perhaps the greatest of all armament races.

Like armaments, disarmament can destroy or restore a balance of power. The states concerned may agree on a proportionate reduction in their arms to stabilize the balance of power among them. But in practice, disarmament is sparingly utilized, except on defeated powers after a general war.

Though it is often resorted to by victor powers to maintain a favorable balance of power, its overall role has been disappointing.

Alliances and Counter-Alliances:

The balance of power has often been maintained by the method of alliances and counter-alliances. Alliances have been the most convenient institutional device to increase one’s insufficient power. Nations have always endeavored to make, abandon, and remake alliances depending upon their interests. Several security pacts are designed to improve the military power position. Alliances can be offensive as well as defensive.

Offensive alliances, however, must be condemned as they breed counter-coalitions, and the outcome is generally warred. The Triple Entente countered the Triple Alliance of 1882 in 1907. Similarly, the Axis formed in 1936 was a counterweight against France and East European nations’ alliance. The Strange Alliance of the Second World War was a reaction against the Axis powers. It was, however, formed with a defensive purpose in the post-Second World.

The US, with its allies, formed NATO, SEATO CENTO, etc., and the USSR countered them with the Warsaw Pact.

Compensation and Partition:

A state enhances its power by acquiring new territories and thus tilts the balance in its favor. When such a thing happens, the other side also takes immediate steps to increase its power in compensation to preserve the balance. When some powerful nation occupies small nations’ territories, the powerful rival nations cannot tolerate this act. They place a condition either to share their prey with them or to allow them to compensate themselves elsewhere under such conditions.

The powerful rival nations divide small nations and swallow their share of the prey. Poland’s partition and later on its division between Russia, Prussia, and Austria is a well-known example of compensation and partition. After the Second World War , Germany, Korea, and Vietnam were partitioned similarly.

This method involves the redistribution of territory so that the international balance of power is not affected. Each Great Power becomes a beneficiary and a weak state of their victim. Generally, such redistribution arises after the war, yet it may also be needed during peacetime.

Intervention and Non-Intervention:

Intervention is another commonly used device for keeping balance. The allies may shift their loyalty from one side to another. Under such circumstances, it is quite usual for a big nation to regain a lost ally by intervening in domestic affairs and establishing a friendly government there.

Non-intervention suggests neutrality or guarantee of neutrality for certain states or efforts to localize war or protect the rights of neutrals in war times. At times neutrality also plays the role of keeping the balance of power.

Before the end of World War II, Britain intervened in Greece to see that it did not fall into the hands of local communists. After World War ll, the United States intervened in Guatemala, Cuba, Lebanon, Laos, Kuwait, etc., and the Soviet Union in North Korea, North Vietnam, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, etc.

Divide and Rule:

It is a time-honored policy as well as a technique. This method keeps the competitors weak by dividing them or keeping them divided, thereby maintaining a balance of power. The Romans adopted it to keep their control over scattered peoples. Britain often used it to keep its large empire under control. She has been a notorious practitioner of this policy. It has been her cardinal policy towards Europe.

Now this policy has become a device of the balance of power. Both the superpowers have endeavored to create divisions in the opposite camp. If the Soviet Union was interested in Western Europe’s disintegration, the USA was interested in creating a rift in the East European camp led by the Soviet Union.

Buffer States:

The setting up of a buffer state has also operated as another device for the balance of power. Such a state is usually a weak one. It is situated between two powerful neighbors. It always keeps safety apart by contributing to peace and stability and maintaining the balance of power.

There have been various instances of buffer states in history. Afghanistan had been a traditional buffer state between Imperial Russia and British India, as Tibet was a buffer state between Imperial China and British India. In Europe, Belgium and Holland had served as buffer states between France and Germany.

In the post-Second World War period, various lines, such as the 38th Parallel in Korea or the 17th Parallel in Vietnam, on partitioned countries, and the ceasefire zones are indirectly serving the cause of buffer states in a new world situation. They are also designed to prevent a confrontation of Superpowers and thereby preserve a balance of power.

Domestic Methods:

If a state feels that the balance has been tilted in favor of the rival, it will also become more powerful. It can do so only by improving elements of power domestically. The state concerned would try not merely to acquire more powerful weapons but also to develop related industries and other aspects of science and economy whose total effect would strengthen the balance.

Domestic measures needed for this purpose may also entail the introduction of compulsory military training and the allotment of more money in the defense budget. It may also include developing the indigenous capability to manufacture sophisticated weapons and related military hardware, including ICBMs.

Balance Of Power In The Past:

The concept of balance of power can be found in some form or the other in ancient times, especially among India, China, the Greek, and the Roman states. It is one of the oldest terms in international relations theory . In his Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, David Hume has maintained the Greek politics game as a distinct expression of the notion of the balance of power.

The Roman period saw a decline in the notion and operational aspects of the balance of power as Rome virtually demonstrated monopolistic power over the world. Similarly, it did not flourish during the entire range of the Middle Ages . 19

However, the development of the doctrine of the balance of power and its large-scale practice became feasible from the fifteenth century onwards. Bernardo Rucellai and Machiavelli made the theoretical contribution to the formulation and enunciation of the doctrine.

In the words of Morgenthau, “The alliances Francis concluded with Henry VIII and the Turks to prevent Charles V of Ha Hapsburg from stabilizing and expanding his empire are the first modern example on a grand scale of the balance of power.” 20

The sixteenth century facilitated an identifiable process of balance of power. In this very century, England held the balance between France and the Holy Roman Empire .

The seventeenth century, and during it, the Thirty Years War (16184648) provides, among other points of analysis, a perceptible analytical point about the balance of power. With the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the nation-state system’s establishment, the concept became more practicable than ever before. The period between 1648 (the Peace of Westphalia) and 1789 (the French Revolution ) is regarded as the first golden age of classical balance of power both in theory and practice.

The eighteenth century formally recognized the balance of power in the legal process. The phrase ad conservatism in European equilibrium adopted under the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) provisions illustrates this. The concept found expression in the works of Edmund Burke and David Hume during this period. The three partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795) provide an example of applying the balance of power.

The nineteenth century (1815-1914) can be considered the second golden age of the classical balance of power. Napoleon Bonaparte confronted Britain and the other European nations during this century. After successive wars spread over the years, Britain and her allies finally restored the balance of power.

The Congress of Vienna (1815) sought to establish a new balance of power resting on the principle of legitimacy and possibly preserving the status quo. Subsequently, Britain acted as a balancer in Europe’s politics through her pioneering leadership arising out of the Industrial Revolution and her overall leadership based on her developed navy and world trade. The balance of power prevented seven wars between 1871 and 1914. It maintained peace for a long time in this century.

In the twentieth century, Europe was divided into two camps, with the Triple Entente (1902) completed in opposition to the Triple Alliance (1882). When the delicate balance in the Balkans was disturbed, it led to the First World War. In the inter-war period, the doctrine was still followed, though, in theory, it was incompatible with the concept of collective security.

But finally, it proved stronger than the collective security embodied in the League of Nations. As a result, it provoked a series of alliances and counter-alliances, thereby leading to the Second World War. The post-war trends reveal that the balance of power has ceased to perform the traditional role that it played in the Euro-eccentric world order in both its theoretical and practical aspects.

However, this does not mean that the balance of power has completely not been in existence since 1945. A regional type of balance of power such as NATO, SEATO, the Warsaw Pact, etc., revealed their existence. Moreover, the superpowers have created such equilibrium in practically all major areas of tension and conflict that if the USA had built up Pakistan to match India in the politics of the Indian subcontinent, the USSR would have hobnobbed with India. There are so many similar examples.

According to the Soviet viewpoint, the balance of power was inconceivable before the twentieth century, in a situation where relations among the nations were rigidly hierarchical, and the dominance of imperialist power had no parallel anywhere. With the emergence and consolidation of a rival socialist system, the soviet Communists argued that the real balance of power came into being and countered capitalism’s designs and its highest stage of development imperialism. 21

Balance Of Power Today-Is It Relevant?

Today, the balance of power has witnessed several significant changes. Keeping in view the rapidly changing world conditions. it is being questioned whether the balance of power is relevant or valid or whether it has become obsolete. It seems that the theory of balance of power cannot be applied in the present circumstances in the classical sense of the term.

There are two different opinions in this respect. According to one view, the existing world conditions are least favorable for the balance of power’s existence or relevance. The other view holds that its validity is still relevant. Both views are discussed in detail:

Obsolete and Irrelevant:

The factors or unfavorable conditions or changes in the world that rendered the concept irrelevant and outdated are mentioned below:

1 . New Forces:

The balance of power Operated well in those times of modern history when in Europe, several states of approximately equal strength existed. Later on, when the European balance of power turned into a world balance of power, conditions became unfavorable for the successful working of the balance of power.

The effect of new forces like nationalism, industrialism, new methods and techniques of warfare, developments in international organization and law, growing economic interdependence of nations, mass education, the end of colonial frontiers, and the rise of many new nations have greatly changed the nature of contemporary world politics . All these forces and changes have made the balance of power too naive and too complex a phenomenon.

2. Numerical Reduction of Powers:

Before the Second World War, there were seven Great Powers. After this war, the USA and the USSR were the only two Great Powers left. In previous periods the balance of power was Operated by way of coalitions among several nations. The principal actors, though differing in power, were still of the same order of magnitude.

The greater the number of Great Powers, the greater the number of possible combinations that will oppose and balance each other. The numerical reduction of Great Power in the post-war period can play a major role in international politics has created unfavorable conditions for the balance of power system.

3. Bi-polarises:

As the balance of power presupposes the presence of three or more states of roughly equal power, and because the rise of a bipolar world system goes against this requirement, the balance of power is outmoded. All the major states were committed after the Second World War to one camp or another, and no single nation was strong enough to tip the balance between the two superpowers.

The disparity in power between the Super Powers and other powers is so wide that each is mightier than any other power or possible grouping. As a consequence, the major powers have not only lost their ability to tip the scales, but they have lost the freedom of movement to switch sides.

The wishes of the small powers have become meaningless. The will of the Super Powers and other compelling circumstances determine their alignments. Gone are the days of ever-shifting alliances.

It was also contended that the bipolar system was itself a guarantee of peace. The superpowers in this system would not use weapons of destruction, but those weapons would be an effective deterrent against other countries.

4. Lack of Balancer:

There is no power now to play a balancer’s role, which was successfully performed by Britain in yesteryear. Britain no longer holds so decisive a position to determine the balance. Its role as a balancer has ceased after the Second World War. The Great Powers are powerful enough to determine the scale’s position with their preponderance alone that the third power has no place to hold the balance.

5. Nuclear Weapons.

The impact of nuclear weapons has made the classical assumptions of the balance of power invalid. The changed character of modern warfare would shudder even the most ruthless supporter of the balance of power from taking the risk of encouraging a global conflict to the right balance. The threat of war is of limited utility in the nuclear age due to the nuclear stalemate.

5. Ideological Factor.

The ideological considerations in world politics became so potent that they overshadowed nationalism. The ideologies are cutting across national boundaries and thus undermining the balance of power concept. When foreign policy is guided by ideology, it loses its interest in the balance of power and lacks the essential means to follow it.

6. Disparities in the Power:

The inequalities in the power of states are increasing. Wide disparities can be seen among nations in the sphere of political, economic, and military power. While the superpowers are becoming more and more powerful, the lesser states are becoming weaker. Such a condition is contrary to the requirements of a working system of balance of power.

7. Collective Security:

The emerging importance of collective security, international law , and international organizations like the United Nations has further relegated the balance of power to the background. Many contemporary scholars believe that law and its enforcement should depend more on morals, the consensus of nations, public opinion , the United Nations, and collective security than on a mechanism of balance of power. They also consider that collective security and international organizations can better maintain world peace in the present circumstances.

8. Decline of Alliances:

The decline in the alliance system’s relevance, which is the cornerstone of the balance of power, has further made it obsolete. It is tough now for a state to observe any strict adherence to an alliance in an exclusive manner. It is becoming clearer that each nation has areas of both amity and enmity with every other nation. This trend is slowly leading to the rise of an almost universal bilateral system, against multilateral alliances.

Valid and Relevant

Although the balance of power has lost much of its significance in the conditions prevailing after the Second World War, its operation is still relevant. It is incorrect to say that it is fully obsolete or irrelevant or has no future.

The notion of its supposed irrelevance is based on an appreciation of the impact of values like peace and internationalism and the changes in international society. Those who consider it irrelevant and obsolete do so because they do not reckon with certain important factors. The factors that testify to the relevance and existence of balance

1. Reality of Power:

The change in international society has removed those conditions in which the balance of power functioned in the past, yet it has not eliminated power’s reality. As the balance of power is a technique of managing power, it can be denounced as irrelevant only after some other method of managing power has been found. Otherwise, the balance of power is still relevant, although its relevance would depend on how far its mechanism is modified to suit the changed conditions.

2. Objective Factors:

There are two other objective factors of the present international reality that prove a balance of power even in the days of bipolarism. One is the role of the uncommitted nations in maintaining an equilibrium between the two superpowers. These countries have been behaving like what Richard Rosecrance calls the multipolar buffer. 22

This shows that the buffer concept, which has been so significant in the past, is not completely wiped out today. The other is the superpowers’ role in maintaining an equilibrium between the countries directly involved in a crisis. An example of the former is the relaxation in the Cold War brought about by the uncommitted nations. The latter example is the attempts made by both the US and the Soviet Union to keep a balance in the Indian subcontinent in West Asia.

3. Nation-State System:

As long as the multi-nation-state system exists, the balance of power politics will continue to be followed by the nations’ practices. Palmer and Perkins observe: that in its heyday, it was a basic feature of the nation-state system. As long as the nation-state system is the prevailing international society pattern, the balance of power policies will be followed in practice; however, roundly, they are damned in theory. In all probability, they will continue to operate, even if effective supranational groupings, on a regional or world level, are formed. 23

4. Rise of Multipolansm:

Bipolarism remained a feature of international politics for almost two decades after the Second World War. It was argued above that owing to bi-polarization, the balance of power became obsolete. Since the early sixties, the bipolar ism has been declining and multifarious again rising. Britain, France, Germany, Japan, China, etc., have regained their lost power. Many middle-class or second-grade powers have also come on the scene. Thus the unfavorable conditions for the balance of power created by the numerical reduction of, Great Powers have now been removed to a great extent.

5. End of Ideology:

Though ideological considerations have played a significant role in the recent past for the last few years, its influence has been on the wane. By the late eighties, communism collapsed in the Soviet Union as well as in East Europe, the communist bloc disintegrated, and ideological struggle lost its edge. Consequently, ideology as a negating factor of the balance of power has disappeared.

6. Balance Exists:

After the collapse of Soviet power in the late eighties and the United States’ success in liberating Kuwait from Iraq, it is commonly believed that the only superpower left in the world is the United States. Militarily and economically, it is matchless. Thus in the present world, the USA can be regarded as a balancer. In this way, the above factors and developments prove that the balance of power is still relevant, valid, and meaningful, although in a different context.

Critical Evaluation:

The theory and practice of the balance of power have been a subject of great debate and discussion. There is disagreement among scholars on the point of its ultimate value and advantage.  It has been defended as well as criticized. Its advocates and critics have put forward various arguments for and against the balance of power. The Same are discussed below

Purpose, Utility, and Merits:

The advocates of the balance of power believe in its utility and give the following arguments in favor of it.

 1. Guarantees Peace:

Balance of power is the only guarantee of peace in the absence of the universal acceptance of the principles of collective security. When security continues to be a national obligation, it can never be ensured except by a balance of power. The prerequisite of security and order among sovereign states is that force is checked by counterforce within a balance of power. It has always served the cause of peace and order in history. If the balance is preserved, neither will there be aggression nor war, and therefore, peace will automatically be achieved.

2. Discourages War:

The balance of power prevents or discourages the resort to war. As a state cannot hope to win a war, it will not initiate one if its power is in equilibrium with a potential victim. Most of the wars of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries were due to imperial rivalries. In contrast, the balances were maintained in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which contained struggles between European powers. Whenever peace reigned in Europe, it owed its existence to the balance of power.

3. Curbs Imperialism:

Balance of power makes it difficult for any power to become so powerful as to overwhelm the rest. Indeed, the absence of a stable equilibrium creates an opportunity for the emergence of Powers of lesser caliber to dominant positions. Thus, the balance of power helps. In containing hegemony and universal imperialism.

4. Meets Justice:

In the absence of a supreme international authority capable of enforcing justice, the balance of power enables international law to command respect. Vattel mentioned this mutuality between the balance of power and the rule of law in international society in 1758. The balance of power acts as a deterrent to grandiose ambition and thus meets the cause of justice.

5. Maintains International law:

The balance of power is essential to the maintenance of international law. For example, Oppenheim supports this argument by observing the Balance of power is an indispensable condition to the very existence of international law. He further says that a law of nations can exist only if there is an equilibrium, a balance of power, between the family of nations. Several other authors of international law also agree with this argument.

6 Prunes Independence:

The balance of power has also proved useful in preserving the independence of small states. It prevents the destruction of any particular state because, in their interests, other states will not allow this to happen. The balance of power is designed to preserve each state’s independence by preventing any state from increasing its power to threaten the others.

7. Preset-ewes State System:

The balance of power preserves the multi-state system. It does so by preserving the identity of individual states. It helps in the preservation of a multiple nature of international society and its stability. It serves as a means of maintaining a community of states. Thus, it has served the cause of peace, justice, law, and independence, thereby preserving states’ communities through the ages.

Defects, Criticism, and Demerits:

Morgenthau has criticized the balance of power on three counts: its uncertainty, unreality, and inadequacy.  Its other defects and demerits can be explained as follows:

1. Does Not Bring Peace:

The balance of power does not bring peace. On the contrary, it encourages war. Many believe that nations will light only when the two are equally matched. But if the preponderance of power is on one side, the stronger nation may not fight to get what it requires, while the weaker nation would be foolish to begin a war for what it wants. In periods called the golden age of the balance of power, there were constant wars. Moreover, by pursuing the policy of preventive war and intervention, the balance of power may directly serve the cause of war.

2. Divides the World:

The operation of the technique of alliances and counter-alliances divides the world into rival camps, inflicted by mistrust and suspicion. Therefore, any local conflict will tend to become a big or world war. If it prevents small wars, it instigates the big ones having more devastating effects.

3. No Real Security:

As politicians never accept a real equilibrium of forces but always look ahead to a favorable balance in terms of the bank balance, they are regularly engaged in a struggle to improve their power position. Thus instead of security, it int intensifies the power struggle.

4. Does Not Increase Power:

Nations are not static units. They enhance their power through military aggression, seizing territory, and alliances. They employ certain domestic and foreign, internal, and external means for this purpose. They can consolidate their power from within by improving the social and economic organization. So the traditional method of the balance of power is not the only cause responsible for increasing power.

5. Does Not Meet justice:

The balance of power never aims at concluding treaties upon principles of justice. It aims merely at preventing the supposed preponderance of one power over another or acquiring the preponderance of one power over another. It acts based on expediency and immediate gains. Once these are realized, the system of alliances breaks down, and the world is once again sent back to mutual animosity and hostility.

6. Wrong Assumption:

Balance of power rests on the idea of power or physical force. Its underlying assumption is that if one nation possesses the ability to attack another, it will utilize that ability sooner or later. It assumes that states are naturally hostile political entities. It accepts the condition of enmity between states as normal relations. But it is difficult to accept such assumptions today.

Such assumptions take for granted that nothing other than power drives an urge for power to dominate states. However, states are interested in many things other than power. Many are genuinely interested in peace. Most civilized states accept that there are ethical norms that must be given precedence over mere power considerations. Peace also depends on the moral conscience of nations and the restraining influences of ethical norms.

7. Unrealistic:

Balance of power is, after all, a mechanical concept. To attempt to appropriate the law of statics and convert it into a principle to be applied in a dynamic world is, at the bottom, unrealistic. Balance of power entails many factors such as population, territory, resources, armaments, allies, etc. These are not static. Thus, it is tough to calculate precisely and pursue rationally a policy of balance of power over a considerable period.

8. Big Power Game:

It believes that the equilibrium among great powers would ensure world peace. In it, small countries matter little. They are required to play to the tune of the great powers. Thus the balance of power theory favors big powers and ignores smaller ones.

Despite the above defects and criticism, the balance of power is still a valid concept in international politics. The impact of new forces that shaped our contemporary world has prevented the balance from operating appropriately. In conclusion, it can be said that the balance of power is difficult to be applied in practice.

Even then, it has acted as a universal pattern of political action of states in history. It did something to preserve a nation’s independence and prevent any nation from becoming over-powerful. It has survived the passage of time the League of Nations or the United Nations and the nuclear age. The balancing process will continue in the future as the struggle for advantage and power in international relations.

It is wrong to ignore its current relevance as the long spell of peace at the center or global level is mainly caused by balance and deterrence. Notwithstanding the disturbance in local balance, superpowers always endeavor that such disturbance in the peripheral balance does not lead to the central balance’s tilting. Thus, central balance will generally be maintained in the future while periodic disturbances can occur in local balances.

Power Vacuum:

As stated above, the concept of balance of power has undergone a sea change, especially in the second half of the twentieth century. This period witnessed the emergence of two superpowers who strived to create their Spheres of influence in different parts of the world and devised new techniques of balancing each other.

One of the techniques was filling the power vacuum. Under the pretext of filling the power vacuum, each superpower endeavored to increase its power and contain or balance the opponent’s power.

The term power vacuum is of recent origin. The United States coined it during the Cold War days. The declining imperial powers Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, etc., were granted independence to their erstwhile colonies in post-World War II. After the decolonization, the newly independent countries found themselves very weak politically, economically, and militarily, needing some outside powers’ crutches.

This is an illustration of what a power vacuum implies. This afforded a golden opportunity to the newly emerged Super Powers the USA, and the USSR, to provide them the necessary props in political support, economic and military aid. In this way, superpowers filled the power vacuum in different weak countries after declining imperial or smaller powers. Super Powers vied with each other to woo these countries to their side.

For instance, the Soviet Union filled the power vacuum in East Europe, North Korea, Vietnam, and other decolonized Third World countries. The USA also took prompt action to counter the move of the Soviet Union by spreading its tentacles to these very countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America on the plea of containing the communist hegemony.

The concept of a power vacuum was given a definite shape by the United States in the wake of the British decision to withdraw East of Suez. The United States invoked this theory to justify its naval presence in the Indian Ocean.

It argued that a complete withdrawal from the Indian Ocean would lead to a dangerous power vacuum over a vast and vulnerable area which the US and Britain’s other allies would find extremely difficult to fill, a vacuum that would serve neither Britain’s long term interests nor its stake in world ace and Stability.

The Americans argued that if they did not move into the Indian Ocean, the vacuum would be filled by the Russians. In brief, over the vacuum theory’s pretext, the US justified its entry into the region.

The vacuum theory was vehemently rejected by India and other major littoral states of the region. For instance, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, India’s then Prime Minister, during her visit to some Southeast Asian countries in May 1966, said that the British withdrawal did not create any vacuum. If it did so, she asserted it should be filled by local powers and not by outside powers.

Even the US Congress disapproved of the power vacuum theory. However, despite this, the US Defense Department continued to increase its naval presence in the region. The US Defense Department insisted on the need for a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean since the early sixties.

By the early seventies, the US had established control over all the main gates to the Indian Ocean. Thus it had established a hold on Simonstown, at the entrance of the Atlantic Ocean, on Masirah, which served as an approach to the Persian Gulf on Diego Garcia which commanded central position in the Indian Ocean and Malacca Straits, which was the most important route from the Pacific through their political proximity to the ASEAN countries.

In sum, the US made the Indian Ocean an American lake. The Soviet Union countered and balanced America by entering into a friendship treaty with India in 1971 and consolidating its hold in Vietnam.

References:

1. Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power, and International Relations (New York, 1962), p.11.

2. Cp. Schleicher, International Relations: Cooperation and Conflict (New Delhi, 1963), p. 355.

3. Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power” in H. Butterfield and Martin Wight, ed., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London, 1966). Paperback, p.149.

4. Cited in Lenox A. Mills and Charles H. McLaughlin World Politics in Transition (New York, 1956), pp. 107-108.

5. Sidney B. Fay, “Balance of Power” Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York, 1937), II, p. 395.

6. Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics (New York, 1942), pp. 21-22.

7. C. Lowes Dickinson, The International Anarchy 1904-1914 (New York, 1926), pp. 5-6.

9. Vernon Van Dyke, International Politics (Bombay, 1966) p.221.

10. Norman D. Palmer 8: Howard C. Perkins, International Relations (Calcutta, 1970), p.212.

11. Kenneth W. Thompson and Hans J. Morgenthau, eds. , Principles and Problems of International Politics (New York. 1950), p. 103.

12. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, 1967) Fourth Edition, pp. 161-63.

13. Ernst Haas, “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda ?” World Politics, July 1953), pp. 442-77.

14. For detail, see C.P. Schleicher, n.2, p. 355. Dina A. Zinnes, ” An Analytical Study of the Balance of Power Theories,” Journal of Peace Research (Oslo), 4(1967), pp. 27087 Martin Wight, n.3,p. 151.

15. Theodore A. Couloumbis and James H. Wolfe. Introduction to International Relations: Power and justice (New Delhi, 1986) Indian Reprint of 3rd and, p. 43.

16 . Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago, 1942), Vol.11, pp. 74359.

17. Palmer and Perkins, n. 10, p. 214.

18. Ibid., p. 215.

19. For details, see Supra n. 10.p. 218-19.

20 . Morgenthau, n. 12, p. 173.

21. For details sees, William Zimmerman. Soviet Perspectives on International Relations 19564967, (Bombay, 1972) Indian ed., p. 250.

22 . See Richard N. Rosecrance, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future,” in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York, 1969), 2nd ed., p. 332.

23. Supra n. 10., p. 235.

24. L. Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1, RF. Roxburgh, Ed. (Longmans, 1926) p. 93-94.

25. For detail, see supra n. 12, pp. 202-221.

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12 thoughts on “Balance of Power”

High quality article of Balance of Power,Thank you, it is an honor to work with you.

It works quite well for me

It admits of the existence of some balancer state/ states or an organization. The balancer state is not a small, insignificant power, but in its own’ right it is a powerful one and the other contending powers try to cultivate such balancer. Britain was such a balancer during the ninetieth century. During the post-war period, when the distribution of power had become largely bipolar, the UNO tried to function as a balancer.

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Absolutely Great

Because the balance of power was now bipolar and because of the great disparity of power between the two superpowers and all other nations, the European countries lost that freedom of movement that previously had made for a flexible system. Instead of a series of shifting and basically unpredictable alliances with and against each other, the nations of Europe now clustered around the two superpowers and tended to transform themselves into two stable blocs.

can I know the editors name?

Its Team of university of Political Science

Can I find out the author and publication date of the article. To use as a reference in my homework

Binoy kumar malhotra: April 25, 2018

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Handout A: Background Essay – The Balance of Power between the Legislative and Executive Branches

Background Essay—The Balance of Power Between the Legislative and Executive Branches

Directions: Read the essay and answer the critical thinking questions at the end.

The constitutional principles of the American Founding that guided American politics before the Civil War were increasingly altered as a new approach to governance become predominant in the early twentieth century. The rise of an administrative state centralized more power in the hands of federal agencies in the executive branch and blurred the relationship of the branches of government and their respective constitutional powers. Even though the Constitution specifically granted authority to Congress to regulate interstate commerce in its enumerated powers in Article I, Section 8, Congress increasingly delegated that authority to the executive branch.

In the late nineteenth century, railroads and corporations began to grow exponentially as big business became larger through waves of mergers. Soon, trusts began to exercise monopolistic control over several industries and over the broader economy. Although they benefitted workers with jobs and often consumers with falling prices on goods, they also created an incredibly wealthy ruling class that formed corrupt ties to politicians.

Many Americans began to fear the effects of the rise of big business. Progressive thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries advocated the idea that only the federal government had the national power to regulate business. They believed that educated, scientific experts could rationalize the economic and social order by bringing efficiency to the marketplace. The experts would regulate business from the bureaucracy with new executive agencies where they would supposedly be free from political decision-making and its potential for corruption.

The Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 to regulate railroads and big business. The Justice Department prosecuted illegal trusts in industry, and Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to monitor the rates railroads charged and regulate other trade practices.

During the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, Congress significantly increased the number of executive agencies to regulate commerce. Roosevelt argued that, “Corporations should be managed with due regard of the public as a whole,” and presided over a large expansion of federal regulatory power. The Hepburn Act (1906) increased the ICC’s power and allowed it to set rates for railroad shipping. The uproar over Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle led to the passage of the Meat Inspection Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, which created the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with additional power over interstate commerce. Therefore, Congress delegated its authority to administrative agencies.

President Woodrow Wilson also supported enhancing executive authority over interstate commerce. He asserted that progressives sought to “interpret the Constitution according to the Darwinian principle” of a living Constitution with new meanings in different ages. Congress passed several key pieces of legislation that delegated authority to the executive to manage the economy. The most important were the Federal Reserve Act (1913), which established the Federal Reserve, and the Clayton Antitrust Act (1914),which created the Federal Trade Commission with power to manage competitive practices. World War I greatly enhanced federal executive power as the government nationalized the railroads and the War Industries Board directed the wartime economy. The executive had assumed many of powers constitutionally granted to Congress.

The progressive vision of the administrative state regulating the economy and commerce continued in the New Deal. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and a Democratic Congress struggled to find a way to deal with the worldwide crisis of the Great Depression. As the economy collapsed and unemployment skyrocketed, Congress passed a number of emergency laws with more regard for relieving suffering and stimulating the economy than worrying about the strict constitutionality of legislation.

Congress passed the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in 1933 and suspended antitrust legislation due to the economic emergency and allowed for “industrial self-regulation.” It created the National Recovery Administration (NRA) which was an executive agency that worked with business to set production quotas, prices of goods, and wages for each industry. The NRA (instead of Congress) regulated commerce between the states and within states.

The NIRA angered most constituencies that it was supposed to help. Big business resented the intrusion and regulation, consumers were angry over rising prices, and workers felt the promised right to strike was not adequately protected. Journalist Walter Lippmann complained, “The excessive centralization… [is] producing a revulsion of feeling against bureaucratic control of American economic life.” President Roosevelt defended economic cooperation and regulation against the former “individual self-interest and group selfishness” that he argued characterized American capitalism. The NIRA was quickly challenged in the courts and a case made its way to the Supreme Court.

The Schechter brothers owned two kosher butcher shops in New York City and operated under minute NRA regulations that controlled every step in how chickens were sold to a customer. The government accused them of selling unhealthy chickens and violating several parts of the poultry codes. The “sick chicken” case was decided by the Supreme Court in 1935.

In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States (1935), the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the NIRA was unconstitutional. Since the Schechter slaughterhouses conducted business within the state of New York, Congress (or any executive agency) could not regulate intrastate trade. More importantly, the Court held that Congress could not delegate its authority of regulating commerce to an executive agency such as the NRA since it violated the separation of powers. Justice Louis Brandeis even privately told administration officials: “I want you to go back and tell the president that we’re not going to let this government centralize everything.”

President Roosevelt was furious that the Court had restricted his ability to use the New Deal to resolve the economic crises as he and Congress saw fit. At a press conference, Roosevelt told reporters, “We have been relegated to the horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce.”

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court relented to Roosevelt’s expansive vision of federal regulatory power through the commerce clause a few years later. Congress continued to transfer its authority over regulating interstate commerce to the executive branch which continued to grow in power throughout the twentieth century.

This delegation of legislative power over to federal agencies fundamentally changed Congress. Instead of a deliberative body, representing the people in the creation of laws, Congress became more of an oversight body, which assumed the ability to supervise the dozens of newly-established agencies. Since Congress created and authorized the agencies (and funded them, too), Congress could intervene when an agency took the wrong course of action. Now an oversight body as opposed to a lawmaking body, Congress placed more authority in its committees to hold oversight hearings and monitor the administrative state in other ways.

Other institutions adapted to delegation as well. The president, in particular, began to use the bureaucracy to make policy outside of the legislative process, through executive actions in which Congress was not involved. And the people began to look more to the president as a policymaker than their elected representatives in Congress.

CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS

• What is an administrative state? How did the United States shift to being more administrative in policies and procedures?
• What were/are the effects of Congress delegating power to executive agencies?
• Why were anti-trust measures put in place by Congress? Were they necessary? Were they effective?
• In your opinion, has a growth in executive power infringed upon or supported constitutional principles? Explain your answer.

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Open Access

Decolonising global health research: Shifting power for transformative change

Roles Conceptualization, Formal analysis, Investigation, Methodology, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing

* E-mail: [email protected]

Affiliations United Nations University-International Institute for Global Health, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna, Jaffna, Sri Lanka

Roles Conceptualization, Writing – review & editing

Affiliation United Nations University-International Institute for Global Health, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Roles Conceptualization, Methodology, Supervision, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing

• Ramya Kumar, 
• Rajat Khosla, 
• David McCoy

Published: April 24, 2024

• https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pgph.0003141
• Reader Comments

Recent debates on decolonizing global health have spurred interest in addressing the power asymmetries and knowledge hierarchies that sustain colonial ideas and relationships in global health research. This paper applies three intersecting dimensions of colonialism (colonialism within global health; colonisation of global health; and colonialism through global health) to develop a broader and more structural understanding of the policies and actions needed to decolonise global health research. It argues that existing guidelines and checklists designed to make global health research more equitable do not adequately address the underlying power asymmetries and biases that prevail across the global health research ecosystem. Beyond encouraging fairer partnerships within individual research projects, this paper calls for more emphasis on shifting the balance of decision-making power, redistributing resources, and holding research funders and other power-holders accountable to the places and peoples involved in and impacted by global health research.

Citation: Kumar R, Khosla R, McCoy D (2024) Decolonising global health research: Shifting power for transformative change. PLOS Glob Public Health 4(4): e0003141. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pgph.0003141

Editor: Ananya Banerjee, McGill University, CANADA

Copyright: © 2024 Kumar et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License , which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

Funding: The authors received no specific funding for this work.

Competing interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

1. Introduction

Inequity within international research partnerships has troubled the field of global health for decades. In particular, power asymmetries between actors from wealthier and historically-privileged countries and their counterparts in the Global South (GS) have led to paternalistic ways of working, unequal sharing of resources, skewed distribution of benefits, and limited commitments to capacity strengthening [ 1 ]. Recent debates on decolonizing global health have brought renewed attention to addressing these problems in global health research. In addition to highlighting equity concerns, these discussions draw attention to the epistemic injustice and “white saviour” mentalities that underpin research collaborations [ 2 – 8 ].

Recognising that power asymmetries in global health are produced by both historical and current exploitation and resource extraction, our approach to decolonizing global health involves three intersecting dimensions: 1) colonialism within global health; 2) colonisation of global health; and 3) colonialism through global health [ 9 ]. The first dimension speaks to power differentials and resource disparities between different actors within the field of global health. The second deals with the dominance of certain powerful actors and vested interests over the overall complex of global health structures, systems, policies and practices. The third dimension refers to exploitative and extractive practices that occur through the health sector [ 9 ].

This paper uses this framework of three dimensions to arrive at a broader understanding of the scope of policies and actions needed to decolonise global health research. We begin by briefly outlining persisting inequities within research partnerships- already addressed by a large body of literature. Next, we draw attention to issues that are underexplored, specifically who controls the agenda of global health research (i.e., colonisation of global health research), and who benefits from such research (i.e., colonialism through global health research) ( Fig 1 ). We then present a brief review of recent guidelines and checklists that seek to decolonize global health research and/or centre the needs and aspirations of the GS in research, revealing an emphasis on addressing inequity within research partnerships. We end by recommending policies and actions that would decolonize the field of global health research in an effective and comprehensive manner.

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https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pgph.0003141.g001

This paper employs the terminology “Global North” (GN) and “Global South” (GS) to reflect asymmetries in power and access to resources between not just countries but also population groups. This terminology only partly corresponds to the classification of countries according to per capita gross national income, i.e., low-income, middle-income, and high-income countries (LIC, MIC, and HIC) [ 10 ]. However, where we quote from sources that explicitly refer to LICs, MICs or HICs, these terms are retained. We borrow from Garcia-Basteiro and Abimbola [ 11 ] to define global health research as research that seeks to address health inequity within and across countries, aiming to improve health in what they call “low-resource settings” described as regions weighed down by financial constraints, suboptimal service delivery, underdeveloped physical and knowledge infrastructure, historical, political and sociocultural contexts/specificities, and geographical, environmental and human resource limitations.

2. Colonialism within global health research: Who leads?

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in 2020, of the USD 37 billion spent worldwide on ‘biomedical research’, 98.7% went to HICs [ 12 ]. Perhaps more reflective of the global health research landscape, in 2021, 82% of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s (BMGF) grant funding went to HIC recipients [ 13 ]. This unequal distribution of funding is striking when one considers that much global health research is carried out in GS settings.

The inequitable global health research funding patterns reflect not only the wider socio-economic disparity between GN and GS, but also the biases within the global health research system. For example, grant calls, either explicitly or through eligibility criteria or capacity requirements, favour GN-based institutions [ 14 ] with research funding agencies of key donor countries often requiring principal investigators (PI) to be based in their country or compel PIs from the GS to partner with a researcher based in the donor country [ 15 , 16 ]. Eligibility criteria based on geographic location and experience may further restrict applications from GS-based researchers [ 17 ]. GN-based researchers are also better able to navigate the funding terrain with their training, networks and resources [ 18 , 19 ].

Although most global health funding agencies require GN-based researchers to “collaborate” with local “partners,” the terms of collaboration are usually set by the former who typically conceptualise the research before inviting others onboard [ 20 ]. This gives GS-based researchers limited influence over the research, despite their expertise and familiarity with the context [ 7 , 21 , 22 ], thus supporting what has been called “parachute” research, where GN-based collaborators fly in for weeks at a time for onsite “supervision” [ 23 , 24 ]. As grant cycles are usually short, the urgency to meet deadlines results in lopsided decision-making, hasty administrative approvals and, at times, the undermining of local administrative and ethics procedures [ 8 ].

Much grant funding goes towards the salaries of GN-based researchers with substantially less dedicated to research systems and capacity strengthening in GS settings [ 2 , 14 ]. This lack of long-term commitment to the development of GS-based institutions sustains the status quo [ 25 ]. Meanwhile, extant capacity strengthening initiatives are often uni-directional and paternalistic, involving assumptions about what competencies GS collaborators may lack [ 26 ].

Inequity is further reinforced by authorship patterns that are biased towards GN-based researchers [ 27 , 28 ]. Authorship guidelines of prominent journals systematically exclude non-native English writers [ 29 ] by giving weight to written contributions over field work [ 30 ]. Representation at conferences and symposia is similarly unequal, although research collaborations do enable participation for some GS-based researchers. Even so, visa and other barriers challenge researchers from travelling to meeting destinations [ 31 ].

3. Colonisation of global health research: Who controls?

Global health funding agencies wield significant power in defining global health problems and the approaches taken to addressing them [ 7 , 32 ]. Under the current system, researchers based at universities and other research institutions respond to grant calls, crafting their research to fit with the agendas and ideologies of global health funders rather than vice versa [ 33 ].

Extreme wealth concentration under neoliberal globalization and the rise of ‘philanthrocapitalism’ by which global health problems are framed as market opportunities, has seen a shift from public to private financing in global health [ 34 , 35 ]. However, private actors have interests and priorities that may be at odds with the public interest or with achieving equity in health. For instance, the shift from publicly-funded to industry-funded research has distorted scientific evidence on infant formula with detrimental effects on infant and child health [ 36 ]. Moreover, the funding decisions of corporations and foundations are ultimately approved by a handful of largely GN-based board members, who are not subjected to any independent mechanisms of accountability for their funding decisions or their impact on people affected by these decisions [ 32 , 37 ]. Although some funders have recently instituted measures to address diversity within their leadership [ 13 , 38 ], such change will not be transformative without redistributing power and resources, and genuine efforts to improve accountability [ 39 ].

Research funders favour specific thematic areas, not always based on the health problems prevailing in specific GS settings [ 19 , 40 ]. They tend to promote technology-based solutions and favour innovation and entrepreneurship in projects that yield quick and quantifiable results [ 41 ]. The preference for short-term impact over longer-term improvements in health results in grant proposals that centre “magic bullets” (e.g., vaccines, medicines, bed nets, mobile apps) rather than systems building, local capacity strengthening and unblocking the social and political barriers to the scale up of proven and more sustainable alternatives [ 42 , 43 ].

Academic programmes in global health continue to be characterised by what has been called a “white saviour complex” or a depoliticized, patronizing and charity-based approach shaped, in part, by a wider aid industry [ 44 , 45 ]. Global health curricula remain largely disconnected from the many realities and locales of the GS, both in geography and lived experience. Dominant Eurocentric epistemologies, which are embraced and propagated by powerful global health institutions, are usually given primacy in research training, even as heterodox methodologies that interrogate power and inequality are marginalized [ 45 , 46 ].

The inability of countries of the GS to weigh in on the global health research agenda and define their own priorities is perpetuated by their minimal contributions to research funding [ 25 , 47 , 48 ]. While domestic investment is critical to shift the balance of power, debt-ridden governments of lower-income countries may have limited leeway with their health and R&D budgets owing to fiscal constraints [ 19 ]. For these countries, HIC-driven global health research collaborations may present a welcome source of foreign currency. Too often however, external funding for health research takes place with little coordination among granting agencies [ 49 , 50 ], facilitating duplication, and making impact assessment difficult.

4. Colonialism through global health research: Who benefits?

The asymmetric global health research funding structure also gives powerful states and private actors opportunities to craft research in the GS in ways that they benefit from financially or economically. These benefits are primarily driven by the commercialization of research and publishing, supported by imperatives to expand markets, unfair intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes, and predatory academic journals.

Arguably, the biggest profits are made by commercial entities that hold patents for global health technologies often tested through research carried out in GS settings. Such research aids market expansion for medicines, vaccines, diagnostic tests, mobile devices, etc. benefitting big pharma, biotechnology, and big tech companies, while doing little to strengthen public health infrastructure and services or reduce dependency [ 19 , 41 ]. Indeed, some private foundations are routing a growing proportion of their tax-subsidised grants to private for-profit organisations, in both GN and GS settings [ 37 , 51 ].

Current IPR regimes which provide private companies with extensive monopoly rights over new and modified technologies despite much basic research being funded publicly is one aspect of an R&D ecosystem biased in favour of private financial interests at the expense of public health. This was seen with the billions of dollars of private profits generated from COVID-19 vaccines despite vast amounts of public and charitable funds that went into their development [ 52 ].

The unequal benefits accrued through authorship in global health journals have been widely studied [ 27 , 28 ] but less is known about their commercial dimensions. The revenue of academic publishers is estimated to be about USD 19 billion annually, where about half the market share is controlled by five transnational companies, with Elsevier alone accounting for 16% of the market share, with profit margins in the order of 40 per cent [ 53 ]. These corporations are all headquartered in the GN and maximise profits through article processing charges (APCs), subscriptions, and the uncompensated labour of authors and peer-reviewers. Ever-increasing APCs are required to publish ‘open access’ in prestigious journals, implemented in the name of equity, but barring most GS-based researchers through stringent waiver criteria [ 54 ]. Global spending on APCs alone is estimated to exceed USD 2 billion annually [ 55 ]. Academic journals are, in turn, linked to bibliometric platforms that track the ‘impact’ of research communications, which feed into commercialised university ranking systems [ 56 ]. With research funding and citations in ‘high-impact’ journals being key elements of performance indices, the top-twenty universities, as ranked by Academic Ranking of World Universities and Time Higher Education, are all located in the GN [ 57 ].

The current system of global health education supports extraction of wealth and other resources from GS to GN. A recent analysis of masters in global health degrees revealed that 95% of them are based in HICs, costing on average USD 37,732 in tuition [ 58 ]. Given the location and cost of global health postgraduate programmes, their graduates, including those from GS settings, are likely to be drawn to work with global or GN-based institutions both to repay the debt incurred and because of the lack of well-remunerated positions back home [ 58 ]. Ultimately, career trajectories in global health are skewed towards the GN and not “low-resource settings” where global health work and resources are much needed [ 23 ].

In sum, whether in terms of leadership, control or benefits, GN-based actors and institutions are privileged within the broader global health research ecosystem, often to the detriment of researchers, institutions and ‘beneficiaries’ in GS settings. It appears that global health research supports a renewed form of extractivism, where resources in the GS, including funding, knowledge and researchers, are drawn to the GN. In the next section, we examine whether and to what extent recent guidelines on decolonising global health research address the three intersecting dimensions of colonialism in global health research.

5. Recent guidelines that aim to decolonise global health research

We searched the literature for tools that either explicitly or in their framing seek to decolonise global health research and/or centre the needs and aspirations of the GS in research. As searches on PubMed and Scopus [(“decol*” OR “colonial*”) AND “global health” AND “research” AND (manual OR guideline OR checklist)] yielded less than 10 publications, we also searched Google Scholar, Google, and pursued reference lists of identified publications. Criteria for inclusion were: addressing equity in global health research with reference to colonialism or explicit attention to making research fairer for peoples and institutions in the GS; including a set of standards or guidelines; targeting researchers, research institutions or funders; published within the five-year period of 2019 to 2023. We identified eight tools that fit our criteria as described below.

Hodson et al. [ 40 ] offer a set of “practical measures” for global health researchers, underpinned by four principles: “1) seek locally derived and relevant solutions to global health issues, 2) create paired collaborations between HIC and LMIC institutions at all levels of training, 3) provide funding for both HIC and LMIC team members, [and] 4) assign clear roles and responsibilities to value, leverage, and share the strengths of all team members.” This guideline addresses specific challenges experienced in GS settings by advocating for: educating all team members on global health history; early engagement of GN-based researchers with local administrations; capacity strengthening to support independent research in GS settings; protected research time for all team members; preventing GS-based researchers being drawn away from regular work; and ensuring knowledge translation to local communities, among other measures. Despite the commitment to long-term capacity strengthening, the guideline focuses primarily on research processes within partnerships.

Kumar et al. [ 26 ] propose a set of individual and institutional level actions to advance equity in global health research. Those at the individual level include questioning “notions of absolute scientific objectivity” (p.146), adopting a decolonial approach towards global health concepts and implicit hierarchies, cultivating respect and humility, promoting fairness at all levels (including at the level of global health leadership), and going beyond ‘equality’ to recognize ‘equity’ within collaborations. At the institutional level, they support decentring the GN in global health efforts (including the location of centres of knowledge), promoting solidarity, investing in researchers from LMICs, bi-directional capacity strengthening, evaluating partnerships by “measures of fairness” and “ethical and culturally responsive engagement,” and correcting “colonising and unethical practices” (p.146). While some of these actions aim to rectify power asymmetries well beyond research partnerships, they do not include specific guidance on implementation.

Embracing a feminist decolonial approach, Singh et al. [ 59 ] offer a guideline for researchers working in situations of forced displacement that centres participant agency, voice, and experience; it aims to address power hierarchies through a set of recommendations targeting various stages of research. The guideline demands: consideration to “political, social, economic, and historical contexts and power hierarchies of the research setting” (p.561); involving marginalised groups in the research design; reflecting on how coloniality and gendered power relations may be reinforced during data collection; an intersectional analysis of gendered power relations; collaboration in analysis and knowledge dissemination; and using research to “challenge unjust systems and policies and deliver gender transformative and equitable programmes” (p.561). Although the guideline aims to reconfigure power within individual research projects, it offers no direction on how to redistribute power.

Rashid [ 8 ] offers guidance for researchers in LICs to “[navigate] the violent process of decolonisation in global health research.” The guideline includes a list of dos and don’ts to help researchers in LICs contend with power asymmetries in international research collaborations. They recommend carefully reviewing agreements, clarifying systems of reporting and accountability, insisting on inclusion in communications with funders, meticulous documentation, boosting one’s profile, expanding networks, and building solidarity. However, this guideline focuses on change at the individual level on the part of researchers in GS settings rather than systemic change.

The TRUST Code–“A Global Code of Conduct for Equitable Research Partnerships” is based on the core values of fairness, respect, care, and honesty [ 60 ]. Compiled by a team with wide representation from the GS, the TRUST Code consists of 23 articles. Apart from conventional ethical standards, the tool emphasises: bona fide involvement of local communities in research, fairness in the transfer and ownership of data and biological materials, and fair compensation of local collaborators. It emphasises cultural acceptability, community assent, respect for local ethics review and giving consideration to the impact of research on local human resources, animal welfare, and the environment. It calls for clarity on roles, responsibilities, capacity strengthening, transparency, and integrity of the research process. Although broadly framed around justice for communities and researchers in the GS, the tool primarily concentrates on making individual research partnerships more equitable.

The Research for Health Justice Framework proposed by Pratt and colleagues [ 61 ] offers two sets of guidelines, one for health researchers and another for granting agencies. Developed through an iterative process and fine-tuned through case studies in GS settings, the guidelines emphasize equity, justice, and inclusion, with accompanying explanations on implementation. The guideline for researchers addresses: selection of the research population and research problem, research capacity development, delivery of ancillary care, and knowledge translation practices. With respect to granting agencies, it asks that they prioritise the health concerns of the worst-off, promote ownership of the research agenda by LMIC researchers and support projects that seek to advance equity within healthcare systems, atop measures to support equitable research practices. While this framework is comprehensive in scope, the guidelines are still largely limited to the research process and do not explicitly seek to transform the global health granting system and the power asymmetries within it.

Focusing specifically on global health research funding, Charani et al. [ 19 ] outline eight areas of action for funders: 1) developing situational awareness, including an understanding of institutional dynamics and who benefits from grants; 2) formulating a mission statement that pledges equity in research; 3) equitable allocation of funds to cover differential needs of HIC- and LMIC-based researchers; 4) funding structures that encourage local ownership and leadership; 5) bi-directional capacity strengthening that enables all partners to engage with funders; 6) diversity and inclusion across the grant cycle, including in design, knowledge dissemination, access to training etc.; 7) knowledge generation, including methodologies, frameworks, tools and clarity on data ownership; and 8) reflection and feedback involving HIC and LMIC researchers on equal terms. Encouraging funders to include specific requirements for grant recipients to comply with participatory approaches and fair sharing of resources and benefits, the guideline also speaks to what should be funded, who should be funded and how. Moreover, among its recommendations—albeit with no details provided—are “a transparent process for tracking the progress of funding” and “a code of ethics for global health funders”.

The Global Health Decolonisation Movement Africa [ 17 ], self-described as a collective of African citizens, has published a guideline called, Pragmatic Approaches to Decolonising Global Health in Africa . What is unique about this guideline is that it addresses multiple “stakeholders” in HICs, including individual practitioners, funding agencies, academic and training institutions, scientific publishers, and event conveners and organisers, among others. The guideline broadly seeks to address racism against Africans within global health, and promotes African leadership and self-determination. The section for funders calls for diversifying grant review panels, rejecting “parachute” proposals, and removing requirements for researchers based in Africa to collaborate with HIC-based institutions. For academic and training institutions, the guideline recommends diversifying leadership and recruitment practices, and addressing coloniality in global health curricula. And for scientific journals, it demands diversifying authorship and peer-review panels. While this guideline emphasises diversity, equity, and inclusion, it remains constrained by the limitations of the current system of global health research funding.

In sum, there is considerable variation in guidance on improving equity in research partnerships and decolonising global health research. All reviewed sources strive to make the research process fairer and rectify power asymmetries through diversity, equity and inclusion measures, but only some engage with historical imbalances in power, interrogate dominant knowledge paradigms, centre the concerns of marginalized groups, and create space for self-determination. The guidelines for funders go beyond research partnerships to address who and what is funded. However, for the most part, these guidelines neglect the wider contextual factors that shape agenda-setting in global health research, as well as the actors and institutions that control and benefit from them.

6. Shifting the balance of power in global health research: Going forward

In this section, we draw on the three intersecting dimensions of colonialism in global health research to present seven action areas that we call for to mitigate inequitable, exploitative and extractive arrangements in global health research ( Fig 2 ).

https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pgph.0003141.g002

First, and most fundamentally, we call for a critical examination of the epistemological and ideological underpinnings of global health research. While current debates engage to some extent with the marginalization of indigenous perspectives, few question the dominance of positivist approaches and the biomedical paradigm. Guided by a biased hierarchy of evidence that favours quantitative assessments, global health research remains over-occupied with testing the efficacy of discrete, downstream and often clinical technologies and interventions, taking attention away from the social and structural determinants of health, which are more challenging to measure [ 41 , 43 , 62 ]. Shaped by neoliberal ideology, understandings of health and healthcare have evolved from collectivist to individualist interpretations, giving way to economistic evaluations based on assumptions that resource constraints in low-income settings are inevitable [ 63 ]. Global health education could challenge dominant paradigms and mainstream approaches that advance social justice and equity in health [ 64 ].

Second, we need a better and more detailed analysis of the overall pattern and performance of research funding: where it comes from, where it goes, how it is spent, and its impact. A few of the guidelines reviewed earlier do address the global health research funding system. For instance, Charani et al. [ 19 ] recommend that funding agencies self-monitor whom they fund and also call for a code of ethics for funders, while the Global Health Decolonisation Movement Africa [ 17 ] asks funders to remove requirements for researchers based in Africa to collaborate with GN-based institutions. Even so, these measures remain couched within the current structure and system of grant funding that lacks transparency and leaves power concentrated in the hands of largely GN-based donors. The problematic norm of donors funding favoured research areas over those that are identified locally remains largely unchallenged. At the very least, information should be available by funder, recipient, research area, and research setting, possibly through a centralized system that requires funders to provide information on their funding practices. Auditing such data should enable analysis of not only where research funding comes from and who receives it but also its impact.

Third, efforts to address power asymmetries in global health research must compel reform at the highest levels of global governance. By virtue of their funding contributions, powerful states, their bilateral agencies, private foundations, and corporate actors, among others, shape the global health research agenda. Bilateral agencies tend to push foreign policy and other domestic interests [ 65 , 66 ], while corporate actors are driven by profit, and many private foundations by the creed that the private sector can more effectively tackle intractable global health problems [ 67 ]. Bilateral and multilateral agencies should be held accountable for what they fund with taxpayer contributions, while private funders—who are primarily accountable to their boards—must be appropriately regulated and prevented from having undue influence on the shaping of research priorities [ 68 , 69 ].

A comprehensive guideline for research funders that promotes fairer distribution of resources and improved accountability is needed. Such a guideline could incorporate the measures proposed by Charani et al. [ 19 ], Pratt et al. [ 61 ] and the Global Health Decolonisation Movement Africa [ 17 ]. An international agreement, akin to the Declaration of Helsinki [ 70 ]—the World Medical Association’s ethical principles for medical research—could encourage and eventually normalise funding of equity-oriented research and local ownership. Decision-making on funding priorities must be shared with the GS, not just with governments but also with researchers, institutions, and the beneficiaries of research [ 26 ].

Fourth, national research systems should be supported and strengthened with in-built mechanisms of accountability. While there are calls for LMIC governments to invest more in R&D [ 25 ], the onus for change cannot be placed on these countries alone. Rather donors must also commit to investing in local research infrastructure, human resources, and higher education systems, all key to building research capacities. Meanwhile, government allocations for health research in GS settings should be guided by appropriate needs assessments and strategic plans to strengthen national research capacity [ 71 ] as once encouraged by the Commission on Health Research for Development (COHRED), an independent global initiative that supported research for heath and development in LMICs [ 72 ]. Systemic investments in research capacity strengthening with long-term budget commitments and harmonised mechanisms should be established [ 73 ] to replace the current piecemeal manner in which health research is conducted, often subject to the whims of external funders. Bi-directional scholarships for postgraduate training in research, with service requirements in GS settings, could target specific human resource gaps. Fifth, a global fund for research [ 74 ], guided by a multilateral framework that pools donor funds and channels them based on national health priorities may help to harmonise external funding, avoid duplication, and enable greater transparency and accountability.

Sixth, given acute human resource constraints in many GS countries, brain drain must be stemmed. The WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel [ 75 ] provides a multilateral framework but fails to hold the GN to account for their unethical recruitment practices. Instead, the Code focuses on the rights of migrating health workers and places the onus on ‘developing countries’ to retain them. It does not recognize the vast amounts of (often public) resources invested in health worker training in GS settings, nor does it recommend compensation to source countries for this training. Academic global health programmes should re-orient their curricula [ 76 ] so that the primary career pathways for global health practitioners are viewed to be in GS settings.

Lastly, interventions to promote fairer distribution of benefits should look beyond authorship and academic credit, to address extractivist practices within the research industry that impede access to knowledge and technologies in the GS. The current IPR regime upholds patent protection, allowing big pharma to control product pricing and restrict market entry of generic manufacturers who could drive down the cost of medicines and other health products [ 77 , 78 ]. IPR regimes need to be revised to enhance fairness in the distribution of the benefits of science rather than support industry benefits and profit over public health.

In this paper, we applied three intersecting dimensions (colonialism within global health; colonisation of global health; and colonialism through global health) to develop a broader and more structural understanding of the policies and actions needed to decolonise global health research. We highlighted the tendency of existing guidelines that seek to make research partnerships more equitable and less colonial, to target the behaviour of researchers and research institutions within the boundaries of individual research projects. Following such guidance should result in better and more appropriate global health research. However, efforts to decolonise global health research should go beyond addressing equity within research partnerships to reconfiguring power arrangements within the global health research ecosystem. This means re-orienting research along social justice and equity lines, building research capacities in GS settings, and moving away from the existing donor-driven model.

Of critical concern is the prevailing system of research funding that functions with little transparency or downward accountability. Data should be made available to scrutinize and evaluate the funding processes of research funders and the appropriateness and impact of funding patterns and practices. It would be important to examine not just the specific outputs and outcomes of individual grant programmes and research projects, but also the impact of the entire global health research portfolio on the overall functioning of health research systems at global and national levels and, in particular, how research outputs contribute towards advancing health equity. Quick fixes and half-hearted measures would simply not work. Time is now for the global health community to come together and demand a complete overhaul of the competitive global health research funding system, and its replacement or accompaniment with a more strategic and publicly-driven pooling and harmonised allocation of resources aimed at correcting the many deep and structural inequalities across the global health research ecosystem. This would also require fostering equity-oriented research approaches, grounded in local ownership, with systems of accountability built in.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Emer Breen, Tiffany Nassiri-Ansari, and Emma Rhule, for helpful feedback on earlier versions of the paper.

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What is ‘Balance of Power’? How could a state achieve this?

The concept of the balance of power (bop) is one of the oldest and the most talked about concepts of the international theory. the term seeks to explain the fundamental law on which the international politics is based. according to morgenthau, the term balance of power implies the actual state of affairs in which powers is distributed amongst several nations with approximate equality. the bop is based on the following aspects: a. it seeks to explain the dynamics of international power politics. b. it is based on two main assumptions. firstly, states are the principal actors in the international arena whose main interests are to safeguard their territorial integrity and sovereignty. secondly, it is based on the premise that the international system is anarchic, with no world government that can regulate actions of the states. thus, it is a self-help system in which the states are to guard their interests on their own. c. this can only come about if the states increase their military, economic and technological capabilities. d. the states may also enter into alliance with other states so as to counter balance another coalition. for example, during the cold war, the balance of power was maintained with the ussr, posing a challenge to the us, and also through the formation of military alliances counter weighing each other’s moves. states can achieve the balance of power through the following: a. a state may enhance its own capabilities by self strengthening its military and economic capabilities so as to serve as a challenge to the other states which is likely to turn aggressor in the future. b. a state may also enter into an alliance with other states. c. countries may also accumulate more weapons so as to maintain a balance in the international system. one of the best examples may be the race for nuclear weapons which was more of a chain reaction. with the us possessing nuclear weapons, the ussr became a nuclear power, followed by britain and france in order to maintain that balance in the european region. d. countries may also set up neutral buffer states which are relatively weak to maintain balance between the two powerful unfriendly nations..

The most serious challenge before the states is pursuing economic development without causing further damage to the global environment. How could we achieve this? Explain with a few examples.

What happens if conducting tubes of circulatory system develops a leak? State in brief, how could this be avoided?

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Gender pay gap in U.S. hasn’t changed much in two decades

The gender gap in pay has remained relatively stable in the United States over the past 20 years or so. In 2022, women earned an average of 82% of what men earned, according to a new Pew Research Center analysis of median hourly earnings of both full- and part-time workers. These results are similar to where the pay gap stood in 2002, when women earned 80% as much as men.

As has long been the case, the wage gap is smaller for workers ages 25 to 34 than for all workers 16 and older. In 2022, women ages 25 to 34 earned an average of 92 cents for every dollar earned by a man in the same age group – an 8-cent gap. By comparison, the gender pay gap among workers of all ages that year was 18 cents.

While the gender pay gap has not changed much in the last two decades, it has narrowed considerably when looking at the longer term, both among all workers ages 16 and older and among those ages 25 to 34. The estimated 18-cent gender pay gap among all workers in 2022 was down from 35 cents in 1982. And the 8-cent gap among workers ages 25 to 34 in 2022 was down from a 26-cent gap four decades earlier.

The gender pay gap measures the difference in median hourly earnings between men and women who work full or part time in the United States. Pew Research Center’s estimate of the pay gap is based on an analysis of Current Population Survey (CPS) monthly outgoing rotation group files ( IPUMS ) from January 1982 to December 2022, combined to create annual files. To understand how we calculate the gender pay gap, read our 2013 post, “How Pew Research Center measured the gender pay gap.”

The COVID-19 outbreak affected data collection efforts by the U.S. government in its surveys, especially in 2020 and 2021, limiting in-person data collection and affecting response rates. It is possible that some measures of economic outcomes and how they vary across demographic groups are affected by these changes in data collection.

In addition to findings about the gender wage gap, this analysis includes information from a Pew Research Center survey about the perceived reasons for the pay gap, as well as the pressures and career goals of U.S. men and women. The survey was conducted among 5,098 adults and includes a subset of questions asked only for 2,048 adults who are employed part time or full time, from Oct. 10-16, 2022. Everyone who took part is a member of the Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology .

Here are the questions used in this analysis, along with responses, and its methodology .

The  U.S. Census Bureau has also analyzed the gender pay gap, though its analysis looks only at full-time workers (as opposed to full- and part-time workers). In 2021, full-time, year-round working women earned 84% of what their male counterparts earned, on average, according to the Census Bureau’s most recent analysis.

Much of the gender pay gap has been explained by measurable factors such as educational attainment, occupational segregation and work experience. The narrowing of the gap over the long term is attributable in large part to gains women have made in each of these dimensions.

Related: The Enduring Grip of the Gender Pay Gap

Even though women have increased their presence in higher-paying jobs traditionally dominated by men, such as professional and managerial positions, women as a whole continue to be overrepresented in lower-paying occupations relative to their share of the workforce. This may contribute to gender differences in pay.

Other factors that are difficult to measure, including gender discrimination, may also contribute to the ongoing wage discrepancy.

Perceived reasons for the gender wage gap

When asked about the factors that may play a role in the gender wage gap, half of U.S. adults point to women being treated differently by employers as a major reason, according to a Pew Research Center survey conducted in October 2022. Smaller shares point to women making different choices about how to balance work and family (42%) and working in jobs that pay less (34%).

There are some notable differences between men and women in views of what’s behind the gender wage gap. Women are much more likely than men (61% vs. 37%) to say a major reason for the gap is that employers treat women differently. And while 45% of women say a major factor is that women make different choices about how to balance work and family, men are slightly less likely to hold that view (40% say this).

Parents with children younger than 18 in the household are more likely than those who don’t have young kids at home (48% vs. 40%) to say a major reason for the pay gap is the choices that women make about how to balance family and work. On this question, differences by parental status are evident among both men and women.

Views about reasons for the gender wage gap also differ by party. About two-thirds of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents (68%) say a major factor behind wage differences is that employers treat women differently, but far fewer Republicans and Republican leaners (30%) say the same. Conversely, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say women’s choices about how to balance family and work (50% vs. 36%) and their tendency to work in jobs that pay less (39% vs. 30%) are major reasons why women earn less than men.

Democratic and Republican women are more likely than their male counterparts in the same party to say a major reason for the gender wage gap is that employers treat women differently. About three-quarters of Democratic women (76%) say this, compared with 59% of Democratic men. And while 43% of Republican women say unequal treatment by employers is a major reason for the gender wage gap, just 18% of GOP men share that view.

Pressures facing working women and men

Family caregiving responsibilities bring different pressures for working women and men, and research has shown that being a mother can reduce women’s earnings , while fatherhood can increase men’s earnings .

Employed women and men are about equally likely to say they feel a great deal of pressure to support their family financially and to be successful in their jobs and careers, according to the Center’s October survey. But women, and particularly working mothers, are more likely than men to say they feel a great deal of pressure to focus on responsibilities at home.

About half of employed women (48%) report feeling a great deal of pressure to focus on their responsibilities at home, compared with 35% of employed men. Among working mothers with children younger than 18 in the household, two-thirds (67%) say the same, compared with 45% of working dads.

When it comes to supporting their family financially, similar shares of working moms and dads (57% vs. 62%) report they feel a great deal of pressure, but this is driven mainly by the large share of unmarried working mothers who say they feel a great deal of pressure in this regard (77%). Among those who are married, working dads are far more likely than working moms (60% vs. 43%) to say they feel a great deal of pressure to support their family financially. (There were not enough unmarried working fathers in the sample to analyze separately.)

About four-in-ten working parents say they feel a great deal of pressure to be successful at their job or career. These findings don’t differ by gender.

Gender differences in job roles, aspirations

Overall, a quarter of employed U.S. adults say they are currently the boss or one of the top managers where they work, according to the Center’s survey. Another 33% say they are not currently the boss but would like to be in the future, while 41% are not and do not aspire to be the boss or one of the top managers.

Men are more likely than women to be a boss or a top manager where they work (28% vs. 21%). This is especially the case among employed fathers, 35% of whom say they are the boss or one of the top managers where they work. (The varying attitudes between fathers and men without children at least partly reflect differences in marital status and educational attainment between the two groups.)

In addition to being less likely than men to say they are currently the boss or a top manager at work, women are also more likely to say they wouldn’t want to be in this type of position in the future. More than four-in-ten employed women (46%) say this, compared with 37% of men. Similar shares of men (35%) and women (31%) say they are not currently the boss but would like to be one day. These patterns are similar among parents.

Note: This is an update of a post originally published on March 22, 2019. Anna Brown and former Pew Research Center writer/editor Amanda Barroso contributed to an earlier version of this analysis. Here are the questions used in this analysis, along with responses, and its methodology .

What is the gender wage gap in your metropolitan area? Find out with our pay gap calculator

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Carolina Aragão is a research associate focusing on social and demographic trends at Pew Research Center

Women have gained ground in the nation’s highest-paying occupations, but still lag behind men

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Guest Essay

The Fantasy of Reviving Nuclear Energy

By Stephanie Cooke

Ms. Cooke is a former editor of Nuclear Intelligence Weekly and the author of “In Mortal Hands: A Cautionary History of the Nuclear Age.”

World leaders are not unaware of the nuclear industry’s long history of failing to deliver on its promises or of its weakening vital signs. Yet many continue to act as if a nuclear renaissance could be around the corner, even though nuclear energy’s share of global electricity generation has fallen by almost half from its high of roughly 17 percent in 1996.

In search of that revival, representatives from more than 30 countries gathered in Brussels in March at a nuclear summit hosted by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Belgian government. Thirty-four nations, including the United States and China, agreed “to work to fully unlock the potential of nuclear energy,” including extending the lifetimes of existing reactors, building nuclear power plants and deploying advanced reactors.

Yet even as they did so, there was an acknowledgment of the difficulty of their undertaking. “Nuclear technology can play an important role in the clean energy transition,” Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, told summit attendees. But she added that “the reality today, in most markets, is a reality of a slow but steady decline in market share” for nuclear power.

The numbers underscore that downturn. Solar and wind power together began outperforming nuclear power globally in 2021, and that trend continues as nuclear staggers along. Solar alone added more than 400 gigawatts of capacity worldwide last year, two-thirds more than the previous year. That’s more than the roughly 375 gigawatts of combined capacity of the world’s 415 nuclear reactors, which remained relatively unchanged last year. At the same time, investment in energy storage technology is rapidly accelerating. In 2023, BloombergNEF reported that investors for the first time put more money into stationary energy storage than they did into nuclear.

Still, the drumbeat for nuclear power has become pronounced. At the United Nations climate conference in Dubai in December, the Biden administration persuaded two dozen countries to pledge to triple their nuclear energy capacity by 2050. Those countries included allies of the United States with troubled nuclear programs, most notably France , Britain , Japan and South Korea , whose nuclear bureaucracies will be propped up by the declaration as well as the domestic nuclear industries they are trying to save.

“We are not making the argument to anybody that this is absolutely going to be a sweeping alternative to every other energy source,” John Kerry, the Biden administration climate envoy at the time, said. “But we know because the science and the reality of facts and evidence tell us that you can’t get to net zero 2050 without some nuclear.”

That view has gained traction with energy planners in Eastern Europe who see nuclear as a means of replacing coal, and several countries — including Canada, Sweden, Britain and France — are pushing to extend the operating lifetimes of existing nuclear plants or build additional ones. Some see smaller or more advanced reactors as a means of providing electricity in remote areas or as a means of decarbonizing sectors such as heat, industry and transportation.

So far, most of this remains in early stages, with only three nuclear reactors under construction in Western Europe, two in Britain and one in France, each more than a decade behind schedule. Of the approximately 54 other reactors under construction worldwide as of March, 23 are in China, seven are in India, and three are in Russia, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The total is less than a quarter of the 234 reactors under construction in the peak year of 1979, although 48 of those were later suspended or abandoned.

Even if you agree with Mr. Kerry’s argument, and many energy experts do not, pledging to triple nuclear capacity by 2050 is a little like promising to win the lottery. For the United States, it would mean adding 200 gigawatts of nuclear operating capacity (almost double what the country has ever built) to the current 100 gigawatts or so, generated by more than 90 commercial reactors that have been running an average of 42 years. Globally it would mean tripling the existing capacity built over the past 70 years in less than half that time, in addition to replacing reactors that will shut down before 2050.

The Energy Department estimates the total cost of such an effort in the United States at roughly $700 billion. But David Schlissel , a director at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis , has calculated that the two new reactors at the Vogtle plant in Georgia — the only new reactors built in the United States in a generation — on average, cost $21.2 billion per gigawatt in today’s dollars. Using that figure as a yardstick, the cost of building 200 gigawatts of new capacity would be far higher: at least $4 trillion, or $6 trillion if you count the additional cost of replacing existing reactors as they age out.

For much less money and in less time, the world could reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the use of renewables like solar, wind, hydropower and geothermal power and by transmitting, storing and using electricity more efficiently. A recent analysis by the German Environment Agency examined multiple global climate scenarios in which Paris climate agreement targets are met, and it found that renewable energy “is the crucial and primary driver.”

The logic of this approach was attested to at the climate meeting in Dubai, where more than 120 countries signed a more realistic commitment to triple renewable energy capacity by 2030.

There’s a certain inevitability about the U.S. Energy Department’s latest push for more nuclear energy. An agency predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission, brought us Atoms for Peace under President Dwight Eisenhower in the 1950s in a bid to develop the peaceful side of the atom, hoping it would gain public acceptance of an expanding arsenal of nuclear weapons while supplying electricity too cheap to meter.

Fast-forward 70 years, and you hear a variation on the same theme. Most notably, Ernest Moniz, the energy secretary under President Barack Obama, argues that a vibrant commercial nuclear sector is necessary to sustain U.S. influence in nuclear weapons nonproliferation efforts and global strategic stability. As a policy driver, this argument might explain in part why the government continues to push nuclear power as a climate solution, despite its enormous cost and lengthy delivery time.

China and Russia are conspicuously absent from the list of signatories to the Dubai pledge to triple nuclear power, although China signed the declaration in Brussels. China’s nuclear program is growing faster than that of any other country, and Russia dominates the global export market for reactors with projects in countries new to commercial nuclear energy, such as Turkey, Egypt and Bangladesh, as well as Iran.

Pledges and declarations on a global stage allow world leaders a platform to be seen to be doing something to address climate change, even if, as is the case with nuclear, they lack the financing and infrastructure to succeed. But their support most likely means that substantial sums of money — much of it from taxpayers and ratepayers — will be wasted on perpetuating the fantasy that nuclear energy will make a difference in a meaningful time frame to slow global warming.

The U.S. government is already poised to spend billions of dollars building small modular and advanced reactors and keeping aging large ones running. But two such small reactor projects based on conventional technologies have already failed. Which raises the question: Will future projects based on far more complex technologies be more viable? Money for such projects — provided mainly under the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act and the Inflation Reduction Act — could be redirected in ways that do more for the climate and do it faster, particularly if planned new nuclear projects fail to materialize.

There is already enough potential generation capacity in the United States seeking access to the grid to come close to achieving President Biden’s 2035 goal of a zero-carbon electricity sector, and 95 percent of it is solar, battery storage and wind. But these projects face a hugely constrained transmission system, regulatory and financial roadblocks and entrenched utility interests, enough to prevent many of them from ever providing electricity, according to a report released last year by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.

Even so, existing transmission capacity can be doubled by retrofitting transmission lines with advanced conductors, which would offer at least a partial way out of the gridlock for renewables, in addition to storage, localized distribution and improved management of supply and demand.

What’s missing are leaders willing to buck their own powerful nuclear bureaucracies and choose paths that are far cheaper, less dangerous and quicker to deploy. Without them, we are doomed to more promises and wasteful spending by nuclear proponents who have repeatedly shown that they can talk but can’t deliver.

Stephanie Cooke is a former editor of Nuclear Intelligence Weekly and the author of “In Mortal Hands: A Cautionary History of the Nuclear Age.”

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

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Secret Russian foreign policy document urges action to weaken the U.S.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry has been drawing up plans to try to weaken its Western adversaries, including the United States, and leverage the Ukraine war to forge a global order free from what it sees as American dominance, according to a secret Foreign Ministry document.

In a classified addendum to Russia’s official — and public — “Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” the ministry calls for an “offensive information campaign” and other measures spanning “the military-political, economic and trade and informational psychological spheres” against a “coalition of unfriendly countries” led by the United States.

“We need to continue adjusting our approach to relations with unfriendly states,” states the 2023 document , which was provided to The Washington Post by a European intelligence service. “It’s important to create a mechanism for finding the vulnerable points of their external and internal policies with the aim of developing practical steps to weaken Russia’s opponents.”

The document for the first time provides official confirmation and codification of what many in the Moscow elite say has become a hybrid war against the West. Russia is seeking to subvert Western support for Ukraine and disrupt the domestic politics of the United States and European countries, through propaganda campaigns supporting isolationist and extremist policies, according to Kremlin documents previously reported on by The Post . It is also seeking to refashion geopolitics, drawing closer to China, Iran and North Korea in an attempt to shift the current balance of power.

Using much tougher and blunter language than the public foreign policy document, the secret addendum, dated April 11, 2023, claims that the United States is leading a coalition of “unfriendly countries” aimed at weakening Russia because Moscow is “a threat to Western global hegemony.” The document says the outcome of Russia’s war in Ukraine will “to a great degree determine the outlines of the future world order,” a clear indication that Moscow sees the result of its invasion as inextricably bound with its ability — and that of other authoritarian nations — to impose its will globally.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation , which was published March 31, 2023, and approved by Russian President Vladimir Putin, deploys bland diplomatic language to call for “the democratization of international relations,” “sovereign equality” and the strengthening of Russia’s position on the global stage. Though the Foreign Policy Concept also charges that the United States and “its satellites” have used the Ukraine conflict to escalate “a many-years-long anti-Russia policy,” it also states that “Russia does not consider itself an enemy of the West … and has no ill intentions toward it.”

Russia hopes the West will “realize the lack of any future in its confrontational policy and hegemonistic ambitions, and will accept the complicated realities of the multipolar world,” the public document states.

The Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it did not comment “on the existence or nonexistence of internal ministry documents” and on the progress of work on them. “As we have stated several times on different levels, we can confirm the mood is to decisively combat the aggressive steps taken by the collective West as part of the hybrid war launched against Russia,” the ministry added.

Russia’s recent veto against extending U.N. monitoring of sanctions against North Korea over its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles program, effectively ending 14 years of cooperation, was “a clear sign” that the work contemplated in the classified addendum is already underway, said a leading Russian academic with close ties to senior Russian diplomats. The academic spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive deliberations in Moscow.

“Russia can create difficulties for the U.S. in many different regions of the world,” the academic said. “This is about the Middle East, northeast Asia, the African continent and even Latin America.”

The creation of the Foreign Policy Concept and the classified addendum followed a call to Russian academics for policy suggestions. One proposal submitted in February 2023 to the Foreign Ministry by the deputy head of Moscow’s Institute for the Commonwealth of Independent States, which maintains close ties to Russia’s security apparatus, laid out Russia’s options more bluntly still.

The academic, Vladimir Zharikhin, called for Russia to “continue to facilitate the coming to power of isolationist right-wing forces in America,” “enable the destabilization of Latin American countries and the rise to power of extremist forces on the far left and far right there,” as well as facilitate “the restoration of European countries’ sovereignty by supporting parties dissatisfied with economic pressure from the U.S.”

Other points in the policy proposal, which was also provided to The Post, suggested that Moscow stoke conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan to bring Russia and China closer together, as well as “to escalate the situation in the Middle East around Israel, Iran and Syria to distract the U.S. with the problems of this region.”

Zharikhin declined to discuss his proposal.

Western officials have warned that Russia has been escalating its propaganda and influence campaigns over the past two years as it seeks to undermine support for Ukraine. As part of that, it has sought to create a new global divide, with Russian propaganda efforts against the West resonating in many countries in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia.

“I think the U.S. was convinced that the rest of the world — North and South — would support the U.S. in the conflict with Russia and it turned out that this was not true,” Zharikhin told The Post in an earlier interview. “This demonstrates the single polar world is over, and the U.S. doesn’t want to come to terms with this.”

For Mikhail Khodorkovsky — the longtime Putin critic who was once Russia’s richest man until a clash with the Kremlin landed him 10 years in prison — it is not surprising that Russia is seeking to do everything it can to undermine the United States. “For Putin, it is absolutely natural that he should try to create the maximum number of problems for the U.S.,” he said. “The task is to take the U.S. out of the game, and then destroy NATO. This doesn’t mean dissolving it, but to create the feeling among people that NATO isn’t defending them.”

The long congressional standoff on providing more weapons to Ukraine was only making it easier for Russia to challenge Washington’s global power, he said.

“The Americans consider that insofar as they are not directly participating in the war [in Ukraine], then any loss is not their loss,” Khodorkovsky said. “This is an absolute misunderstanding.”

A defeat for Ukraine, he said, “means that many will stop fearing challenging the U.S.” and the costs for the United States will only increase.

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New Black congressional district in Louisiana bows to politics, not race, backers say

FILE - Rep. Garret Graves, R-La., speaks at a news conference after the House passed the debt ceiling bill, May 31, 2023, at the Capitol in Washington. Louisiana Sen. Cleo Fields, who served in Congress in the 1990s and is currently a state senator, has declared his candidacy for a new majority-Black congressional district created in January by the Legislature. The new map greatly alters the district currently represented by Graves. Opponents of the new map are challenging it in federal court, calling it a “racial gerrymander.” (AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana, File)

FILE - Democratic Louisiana Sen. Cleo Fields speaks during the swearing in of the state Legislature, Jan. 8, 2024, in Baton Rouge, La. Fields, who served in Congress in the 1990s and is currently a state senator, has declared his candidacy for a new majority-Black congressional district created in January by the Legislature. The new map greatly alters the district currently represented by U.S. Rep. Garret Graves. Opponents of the new map are challenging it in federal court, calling it a “racial gerrymander.” (AP Photo/Gerald Herbert, Pool, File)

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NEW ORLEANS (AP) — Politics and race are both factors in a pending court challenge of Louisiana’s new congressional maps. How much weight each carries is a major question before three federal judges whose ruling could affect the balance of power in the next Congress.

At issue is a congressional map that was approved this year with the backing of the state’s new governor, Jeff Landry — to the consternation of at least some of his fellow Republicans.

The map creates a new mostly Black congressional district in Louisiana, at the expense of a white Republican incumbent, Rep. Garret Graves, who backed another Republican in the governor’s election last fall. Given voting patterns in Louisiana, a mostly Black district would be more likely to send a Democrat to Congress.

Twelve self-described non-African American voters argued in a lawsuit that the new mostly Black district constitutes illegal “textbook racial gerrymandering.”

Not so, argue the new map’s backers. Politics, they argue, was the major influence in drawing the new district boundary lines. They say the new map protects most incumbents and draws together Black populations in a way that will comply with the federal Voting Rights Act, giving Louisiana, which is roughly one-third Black, a second majority Black district among six.

They also pointed to Republican backers of the plan, who said during legislative debates in January that they wanted to safeguard four GOP-held House districts, including those of House Speaker Mike Johnson and Majority Leader Steve Scalise.

That the new map put Graves in political peril by placing him in the new mostly Black district is further evidence race wasn’t the sole motivating factor, the map’s backers said in briefs and in testimony last week at a hearing in Shreveport.

“We all know that one of the main reasons it was drawn the way it was, was because Gov. Jeff Landry wants to get rid of Congressman Graves,” state Rep. Mandie Landry, a New Orleans Democrat who testified at the hearing, said in a social media post . Landry is no relation to the governor.

State Sen. Cleo Fields, a Black Democrat from the Baton Rouge area who served in Congress in the 1990s, has already declared his candidacy in the newly configured district.

Whatever the three judges decide will likely be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. It’s unclear when the judges will rule, but time is growing short. State election officials say they need to know the configuration of the districts by May 15 to prepare for the fall elections.

The controversy in Louisiana, as in other states, arose because new government district boundary lines are redrawn by legislatures every 10 years to account for population shifts reflected in census data. Louisiana’s Republican-dominated Legislature drew a new map in 2022 that, despite some boundary shifts, was favorable to all six current incumbents: five white Republicans and a Black Democrat. Then-Gov. John Bel Edwards, a Democrat, vetoed the map but the majority-Republican Legislature overrode the veto, leading to a court challenge filed in Baton Rouge.

In June 2022, Baton Rouge-based U.S. District Judge Shelly Dick issued an injunction against the map, saying challengers would likely win their suit claiming it violated the Voting Rights Act. As the case was appealed, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an unexpected ruling in June that favored Black voters in a congressional redistricting case in Alabama .

Dick sided with challengers who said the 2022 map packed a significant number of voters in one district — District 2 which stretches from New Orleans to the Baton Rouge area — while “cracking” the remaining Black population by apportioning it to other mostly white districts.

In November, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals gave the state a January deadline for drawing a new congressional district. Landry, who was the state’s attorney general when he was elected to succeed the term-limited Edwards, called a special session to redraw the map, saying the Legislature should do it rather than a federal judge.

The new map does not resemble the sample maps that supporters of a new majority Black district had suggested earlier, which would have created a new district largely covering the northeastern part of the state.

The new mostly Black district crosses the state diagonally, linking Shreveport in the northwest to parts of the Baton Rouge area in the southeast. And while its backers hail the creation of a new majority Black district, the plaintiffs say it results in “explicit, racial segregation of voters.”

The judges hearing the case are U.S. District Judges David Joseph and Robert Summerhays, both nominated to the court by former President Donald Trump; and Judge Carl Stewart of the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, nominated by former Democratic President Bill Clinton.

The judges have given no indication when they will rule. “We’re going to have to know soon,” Mandie Landry said, citing the upcoming elections.