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Social inequalities: theories, concepts and problematics

• Published: 17 May 2021
• Volume 1 , article number  116 , ( 2021 )

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• Renato Miguel Carmo   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-0052-4387 1  

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This article aims to present a concise perusal of the different approaches developed in the study of social inequalities and in the relationships that they establish with manifold social processes and problems. The text does not intend to be exhaustive from the theoretical point of view, but rather to present an overview of the analytical complexity of the inequalities systems and demonstrate that they should be tackled in a multidimensional, systemic and multiscale perspective.

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The most recent configuration of the ACM typology is composed of the following class categories: “ Employers and executives are employers or directors at private companies or in the public administration. They may be recruited from any of the groups in the occupational structure. Private Professionals are self-employed and very qualified in certain specialised professions, such as lawyers, architects, and so on. Professionals and managers are employees in upper or mid-level intellectual, scientific and technical jobs. They are different from the previous category essentially because they are not self-employed. Self-employed workers work on their own account without employees in administrative or similar occupations in services and commerce. They include craftsmen and similar workers, farmers and qualified workers in agriculture and fishery. Routine employees are administrative and similar personnel, service employees and salespeople. Industrial workers are manual workers employed in less qualified occupations in construction, industry, transports, agriculture and fishery (Carmo and Nunes 2013 , p. 378).

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Acknowledgements

This work was developed within the project EmployALL—The employment crisis and the Welfare State in Portugal: deterring drivers of social vulnerability and inequality, funded by the Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (PTDC/SOC-SOC/30543/2017).

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Carmo, R.M. Social inequalities: theories, concepts and problematics. SN Soc Sci 1 , 116 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s43545-021-00134-5

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• Inequalities
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The Sociology of Social Inequality

• Key Concepts
• Major Sociologists
• News & Issues
• Research, Samples, and Statistics
• Recommended Reading
• Archaeology

Social inequality results from a society organized by hierarchies of class, race, and gender that unequally distributes access to resources and rights.

It can manifest in a variety of ways, like income and wealth inequality, unequal access to education and cultural resources, and differential treatment by the police and judicial system, among others. Social inequality goes hand in hand with social stratification .

Social inequality is characterized by the existence of unequal opportunities and rewards for different social positions or statuses within a group or society. It contains structured and recurrent patterns of unequal distributions of goods, wealth, opportunities, rewards, and punishments.

Racism , for example, is understood to be a phenomenon whereby access to rights and resources is unfairly distributed across racial lines. In the context of the United States, people of color typically experience racism, which benefits white people by conferring on them white privilege , which allows them greater access to rights and resources than other Americans.

There are two main ways to measure social inequality:

• Inequality of conditions
• Inequality of opportunities

Inequality of conditions refers to the unequal distribution of income, wealth, and material goods. Housing, for example, is inequality of conditions with the homeless and those living in housing projects sitting at the bottom of the hierarchy while those living in multi-million dollar mansions sit at the top.

Another example is at the level of whole communities, where some are poor, unstable, and plagued by violence, while others are invested in by businesses and government so that they thrive and provide safe, secure, and happy conditions for their inhabitants.

Inequality of opportunities refers to the unequal distribution of life chances across individuals. This is reflected in measures such as level of education, health status, and treatment by the criminal justice system.

For example, studies have shown that college and university professors are more likely to ignore emails from women and people of color than they are to ignore those from white men,   which privileges the educational outcomes of white men by channeling a biased amount of mentoring and educational resources to them.

Discrimination of an individual, community, and institutional levels is a major part of the process of reproducing social inequalities of race, class, gender , and sexuality. For example, women are systematically paid less than men for doing the same work.  

2 Main Theories

There are two main views of social inequality within sociology. One view aligns with the functionalist theory, and the other aligns with conflict theory.

• Functionalist theorists believe that inequality is inevitable and desirable and plays an important function in society. Important positions in society require more training and thus should receive more rewards. Social inequality and social stratification, according to this view, lead to a meritocracy based on ability.
• Conflict theorists, on the other hand, view inequality as resulting from groups with power dominating less powerful groups. They believe that social inequality prevents and hinders societal progress as those in power repress the powerless people to maintain the status quo. In today's world, this work of domination is achieved primarily through the power of ideology, our thoughts, values, beliefs, worldviews, norms, and expectations, through a process known as cultural hegemony .

How It's Studied

Sociologically, social inequality can be studied as a social problem that encompasses three dimensions: structural conditions, ideological supports, and social reforms.

Structural conditions include things that can be objectively measured and that contribute to social inequality. Sociologists study how things like educational attainment, wealth, poverty, occupations, and power lead to social inequality between individuals and groups of people.

Ideological supports include ideas and assumptions that support the social inequality present in a society. Sociologists examine how things such as formal laws, public policies, and dominant values both lead to social inequality, and help sustain it. For example, consider this discussion of the role that words and the ideas attached to them play in this process.

Social reforms are things such as organized resistance, protest groups, and social movements. Sociologists study how these social reforms help shape or change social inequality that exists in a society, as well as their origins, impact, and long-term effects.

Today, social media plays a large role in social reform campaigns and was harnessed in 2014 by British actress Emma Watson , on behalf of the United Nations, to launch a campaign for gender equality called #HeForShe.

Milkman, Katherine L., et al. “ What Happens before? A Field Experiment Exploring How Pay and Representation Differentially Shape Bias on the Pathway into Organizations. ”  Journal of Applied Psychology , vol. 100, no. 6, 2015, pp. 1678–1712., 2015, doi:10.1037/apl0000022

“ Highlights of Women's Earnings in 2017 .”  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics , Aug. 2018.

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Chapter 9. Social Inequality

9.1. What Is Social Inequality?

Sociologists use the term social inequality to describe the unequal distribution of valued resources, rewards, and social positions in a society. Key to the concept are the notions of social differentiation and social stratification . The question for sociologists is: how are systems of stratification formed? What is the basis of systematic social inequality in society?

Social differentiation refers to the social characteristics — social differences, identities, and roles — used to differentiate people and divide them into different categories, such as race, gender, age, class, occupation, and education. These social categories have implications for social inequality. Social differentiation by itself does not necessarily imply a division of individuals into a hierarchy of rank, privilege, and power. However, when a social category like class, occupation, gender, or race puts people in a position where they can claim a greater share of resources or rewards, then social differentiation becomes the basis of social inequality.

The term social stratification refers to an institutionalized system of social inequality. It refers to a situation in which social inequality has solidified into an ongoing system that determines and reinforces who gets what, when, and why. Social differentiation based on different characteristics becomes the basis for social inequality.

Students may remember the word “stratification” from geology class. The distinct horizontal layers found in rock, called “strata,” are a good way to visualize social structure. Society’s layers are made of people, and society’s resources are distributed unevenly throughout the layers. The people with the most resources represent the top layer of the social structure of stratification. Other groups of people, with progressively fewer and fewer resources, represent the lower layers of society. Social stratification assigns people to socio-economic strata based on a process of social differentiation — “these type of people go here, and those type of people go there.” The outcome is differences in wealth, income and power. Again, the question for sociologists is how systems of stratification are formed. What is the basis of systematic social inequality in society?

Equality of Condition and Equality of Opportunity

In Canada, the dominant ideological presumption about social inequality is that everyone has an equal chance at success. This is the belief in equality of opportunity , which can be contrasted with the concept of equality of condition . Equality of opportunity is the idea that everyone has an equal possibility of becoming successful. It exists when people have the same chance to pursue economic or social rewards. This is often seen as a function of equal access to education, meritocracy (where individual merit determines social standing), and formal or informal measures to eliminate social discrimination.

Equality of condition is the situation in which everyone in a society has a similar actual level of wealth, status, and power. Although degrees of equality of condition vary markedly in modern societies, it is clear that even the most egalitarian societies today have considerable degrees of inequality of condition. Ultimately, equality of opportunity means that inequalities of condition are not so great that they greatly hamper a person’s opportunities or life chances. Whether Canada is a society characterized by equality of opportunity, or not, is a subject of considerable sociological debate.

To a certain extent, Ted Rogers’ story illustrates the idea of equality of opportunity. His personal narrative is one in which hard work and talent — not inherent privilege, birthright, prejudicial treatment, or societal values — determined his social rank. This emphasis on individual effort is based on the belief that people individually control where they end up in the social hierarchy, which is a key piece in the idea of equality of opportunity. Most people connect inequalities of wealth, status, and power to the individual characteristics of those who succeed or fail. The story of the Aboriginal gang members, although it is also a story of personal choices, casts that belief into doubt. It is clear that the type of choices available to the Aboriginal gang members are of a different range and quality than those available to the Rogers family. The available choices and opportunities are a product of habitus and location within the system of social stratification .

While there are always inequalities between individuals in terms of talent, skill, drive, chance, and so on, sociologists are interested in larger social patterns. Social inequality is not about individual qualities and differences, but about systematic inequalities based on group membership, class, gender, ethnicity, and other variables that structure access to rewards and status. In other words, sociologists are interested in examining the structural conditions of social inequality. There are of course differences in individuals’ abilities and talents that will affect their life chances. The larger question, however, is how inequality becomes systematically structured in economic, social, and political life. In terms of individual ability: Who gets the opportunities to develop their abilities and talents, and who does not? Where does “ability” or “talent” come from? As Canadians live in a society that emphasizes the individual (individual effort, individual morality, individual choice, individual responsibility, individual talent, etc.) it is often difficult to see the way in which life chances are socially structured.

Wealth, Income, Power and Status

Factors that define the layers of stratification vary in different societies. In most modern societies, stratification is indicated by differences in wealth , the net value of money and assets a person has, and income , a person’s wages, salary, or investment dividends. It can also be defined by differences in power (e.g., how many people a person must take orders from versus how many people a person can give orders to, or how many people are affected by one’s orders) and status (the degree of honour or prestige one has in the eyes of others). These four factors create a complex amalgam that defines an individual’s social standing within a hierarchy.

Usually the four factors coincide, as in the case of corporate CEOs, like Ted Rogers, at the top of the hierarchy — wealthy, powerful, and prestigious — and the Aboriginal offenders at the bottom — poor, powerless, and abject. Sociologists use the term status consistency to describe the consistency of an individual’s rank across these factors.

Students can also think of someone like the Canadian Prime Minister — who ranks high in power, but with a salary of approximately $320,000 — earns much less than comparable executives in the private sector (albeit eight times the average Canadian salary). The Prime Minister’s status or prestige also rises and falls with the fluctuations of politics and public opinion. The Nam-Boyd scale of status, based on education and income, ranks politicians (legislators) at 66/100, the same status as cable TV technicians (Boyd, 2008). There is status inconsistency in the prime minister’s position.

Teachers often have high levels of education, which give them high status (92/100 according to the Nam-Boyd scale), but they receive relatively low pay. Many believe that teaching is a noble profession, so teachers should do their jobs for the love of their profession and the good of their students, not for money. Yet no successful executive or entrepreneur would embrace that attitude in the business world, where profits are valued as a driving force. Cultural attitudes and beliefs like these support and perpetuate social inequalities.

Systems of Stratification

Sociologists distinguish between two types of stratification systems. Closed systems accommodate little change in social position. They do not allow people to shift levels and do not permit social relations between levels. Open systems, which are based on achievement, allow movement and interaction between layers and classes. The different systems also produce and foster different cultural values, like the values of loyalty and traditions versus the values of innovation and individualism. The difference in stratification systems can be examined by the comparison between class systems and caste systems.

The Caste System

Caste systems are closed stratification systems in which people can do little or nothing to change their social standing. A caste system is one in which people are born into their social standing and remain in it their whole lives. It is based on fixed or rigid status distinctions, rather than economic classes per se.

As noted above, status is defined by the level of honour or prestige one receives by virtue of membership in a group. Sociologists make a distinction between ascribed status: a status one receives by virtue of being born into a category or group (e.g., caste, hereditary position, gender, race, ethnicity, etc.), and achieved status:   a status one receives through individual effort or merits (e.g., occupation, educational level, moral character, etc.). Caste systems are based on a hierarchy of ascribed statuses, because people are born into fixed caste groups. A person’s occupation and opportunity for education follow from their caste position.

In a caste system, people are assigned roles regardless of their individual talents, interests, or potential. Marriage is endogamous (from endo- ‘within’ and  Greek gamos ‘marriage’) which means marriage between castes is forbidden, whereas exogamous marriage is a marriage union between people from different social groups. There are virtually no opportunities to improve one’s social position. Instead, the relationship between castes is bound by institutionalized rules, and highly ritualistic procedures come into play when people from different castes come into contact. People value traditions and often devote considerable time to perfecting the details of ritualistic procedures.

The feudal systems of Europe and Japan can, in some ways, be seen as caste systems in that the statuses of positions in the social stratification systems were fixed, and there was little or no opportunity for movement through marriage or economic opportunities. In Europe, the feudal estate system divided the population into clergy (first estate), nobility (second estate), and commoners (third estate), which included artisans, merchants, and peasants. In early European feudalism, it was still possible for a peasant or a warrior to achieve a high position in the clergy or nobility, but later the divisions became more rigid. In Japan, between 1603 and 1867, the mibunsei system divided society into five rigid strata in which social standing was inherited. At the top was the Emperor, then court nobles ( kuge ), military commander-in-chief ( shogun ), and land-owning lords ( daimyo ). Beneath them were four classes or castes: the military nobility ( samurai ), peasants, craftsmen, and merchants. The merchants were considered the lowest class because they did not produce anything with their own hands. There was also an outcast or untouchable caste known as the burakumin, who were considered impure or defiled because of their association with death: executioners, undertakers, slaughterhouse workers, tanners, and butchers (Kerbo, 2006).

The caste system in India from 4,000 years ago until the 20th century probably best typifies the system of stratification. In the Hindu caste tradition, people were expected to work in the occupation of their caste and enter into marriage according to their caste. Originally there were four castes: Brahmans (priests), Kshatriyas (military), Vaisyas (merchants), and Sudras (artisans, farmers). There were also the Dalits or Harijans (“untouchables”). Hindu scripture said, “In order to preserve the universe, Brahma (the Supreme) caused the Brahmin to proceed from his mouth, the Kshatriya to proceed from his arm, the Vaishya to proceed from his thigh, and the Shudra to proceed from his foot” (Kashmeri, 1990).

Accepting this social standing was considered a moral duty. Cultural values and economic restrictions reinforced the system. Caste systems promote beliefs in fate, destiny, and the will of a higher power, rather than promoting individual freedom as a value. A person who lives in a caste society is socialized to accept their social standing, and this is reinforced by the society’s dominant norms and values.

Although the caste system in India has been officially dismantled, its residual presence in Indian society is deeply embedded. In rural areas, aspects of the tradition are more likely to remain, while urban centres show less evidence of this past. In India’s larger cities, people now have opportunities to choose their own career paths and marriage partners. As a global centre of employment, corporations have introduced merit-based hiring and employment to the nation. The caste system has been largely replaced by a class system of structured inequality. Nevertheless, Dalits continue to experience violence and discrimination in hiring or obtaining business loans (Jodhka, 2018).

The Class System

A class system is based on both socio-economic factors and individual achievement. It is at least a partially open system. A class consists of a set of people who have the same relationship to the means of production or productive property — that is, to the things used to produce the goods and services needed for survival, such as tools, technologies, resources, land, workplaces, etc. In Karl Marx’s (1848) analysis, class systems form around the institution of private property, dividing those who own or control productive property from those who do not, who survive on the basis of selling their labour. In capitalist societies, for example, the dominant classes are the capitalist class and the working class.

In a class system, social inequality is structural , meaning it is built into the organization of the economy. The relationship to the means of production (i.e., ownership/non-ownership) defines a persistent, objective pattern of social relationships that exists independently of individuals’ personal or voluntary choices and motives.

Unlike caste systems, however, class systems are open in the sense that individuals are able to change class position. Individuals are at least formally free to gain a different level of education or occupation than their parents. They can move up and down within the stratification system. They can also socialize with and marry members of other classes, allowing people to move from one class to another. In other words, individuals can move up and down the class hierarchy, even while the class categories and the class hierarchy itself remain relatively stable. It is not impossible for individuals to pass back and forth between classes through social mobility , but the class structure itself remains intact, structuring people’s lives, privileges, wealth, and social possibilities.

In a class system, one’s occupation is not fixed at birth. Though family background tends to predict where one ends up in the stratification system, personal factors play a role. For example, Ted Rogers Jr. chose a career in media like his father but managed to move upward from a position of modest wealth and privilege in the petite bourgeoisie, to being the fifth-wealthiest bourgeois in the country. On the other hand, his father Ted Sr. chose a career in radio based on individual interests that differed from his own father’s. Ted Sr.’s father, Albert Rogers, held a position as a director of Imperial Oil. Ted Sr. therefore moved downward from the class of the bourgeoisie to the class of the petite bourgeoisie.

Making Connections: Case Study

The commoner who could be queen.

On April 29, 2011, in London, England, Prince William, Duke of Cambridge, married Catherine (“Kate”) Middleton, a commoner. Throughout its history, it has been rare, though not unheard of, for a member of the British royal family to marry a commoner. Kate Middleton had an upper-middle-class upbringing. Her father was a former flight dispatcher, and her mother was a former flight attendant. The family then formed a lucrative mail order business for party accessories. William was the elder son of Charles, Prince of Wales, and Diana, Princess of Wales. Kate and William met when they were both students at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland (Köhler, 2010).

The rules regarding the marriage of royals trace their history to Britain’s formal feudal monarchy, which arose with William of Normandy’s conquest in 1066. Feudal social hierarchy was originally based on landholding. The monarch’s family (royalty) was at the top, vassals, nobles and knights (landholders) below the king, and commoners or serfs on the bottom. This was generally a closed system, with people born into positions of nobility or serfdom. Wealth was passed from generation to generation through primogeniture , a law stating that all property was to be inherited by the firstborn son. If the family had no son, the land went to the next closest male relation. Women could not inherit property, and their social standing was primarily determined through marriage. From the late feudal era onward, a royal marrying a commoner was a scandal. In 1937, the British parliament obliged Edward VIII to abdicate his succession to King of the United Kingdom, so he could marry the American divorcée, Wallis Simpson. Not only was she a commoner, but she was also divorced , which contradicted the Church of England doctrine.

The rise of capitalism changed Britain’s class structure. The feudal commoner class generated both the new dominant class of the bourgeoisie or capitalists and the new subordinate class of the proletariat or wage labourers. The aristocracy and the royals continued as a class through their wealth and property, but their position in society became increasingly based on status and tradition alone. Today, the British government is a constitutional monarchy, with the prime minister and other ministers elected to their positions.  The royal family’s role is largely ceremonial. The historical differences between nobility and commoners have blurred, and the modern class system in Britain is similar to Canada. Since Edward VIII’s abdication in 1937, Queen Elizabeth II’s sister and several of her children and grandchildren have married commoners.

Today, the royal family still commands wealth, power, and a great deal of attention. In 2017, Forbes estimated the total wealth of the royal family to be $88 billion (Rodriguez, 2017). Since Queen Elizabeth II passed away in September 2022, Prince Charles has ascended the throne as king. His wife Camille Parker-Bowles, also a commoner and divorcée, is expected to become “Princess Consort.” If Charles had abdicated (chosen not to become king) or died, the position would go to Prince William. If that happened, Kate Middleton would be called Queen Catherine and hold the position of Queen Consort. She would be one of the few queens in history to have earned a university degree (Marquand, 2011). Of note here is, of course, Prince Harry, who married the commoner and divorcée Meghan Markle. Prince Harry is currently 6th in line for the British throne, after Prince William’s children. If she succeeded to Queen Consort, Meghan Markle would be the first queen with African heritage.

Initially there was a great deal of social pressure on Kate Middleton not only to behave as a royal, but to bear children. The royal family recently changed its succession laws to allow daughters, not just sons, to ascend the throne. Her firstborn son, Prince George, was born on July 22, 2013, so the new succession law is not likely to be tested in the near future. However, behind George is Princess Charlotte (b. 2015) and Prince Louis (b. 2018). Kate’s experience — from commoner to possible queen — demonstrates the fluidity of social class position in modern society.

Social Class

Social class is both obvious and not so obvious in Canadian society. It is based on subjective impressions, outward symbols, and less visible structural determinants. Can one tell a person’s education level based on clothing? Is opening an $80 bottle of wine for dinner normal, an exceptional occasion, or an insane waste of money? Can one guess a person’s income by the car they drive? There was a time in Canada when people’s class was more visibly apparent. In some countries, like the United Kingdom, class differences can still be gauged by differences in schooling, lifestyle, and even accent. In Canada, however, it is harder to determine class from outward appearances.

For sociologists, too, categorizing class is a fluid science. One debate in the discipline is between Marxist and Weberian approaches to social class (Abercrombie & Urry, 1983).

Marx’s analysis emphasizes a historical materialist approach to the underlying structures of the capitalist economy. Classes are historical formations that distribute people into categories based on the organization and structure of the economy. Marx’s definition of social class rests essentially on one materialist variable: a group’s relation to the means of production (ownership or non-ownership of productive property or capital). Therefore, in Marxist class analysis, there are two dominant classes in capitalism — the working class and the owning class — and any divisions within the classes based on occupation, status, education, etc. are less important than the tendency toward increasing separation and polarization of these two classes.

Marx referred to these two classes as the bourgeoisie and the proletariat . The capitalist class (bourgeoisie) lives from the proceeds of owning or controlling productive property (capital assets like factories, technology, software platforms or machinery, or capital itself in the form of investments, stocks, and bonds).  The working class (proletariat) live from selling their labour to the capitalists for a wage or salary.  Their interests are in conflict, as higher profits depend on lower wages, which accounts for the characteristic power dynamics, conflicts, instabilities and periodic crises of capitalist societies.

In addition, he described the classes of the petite bourgeoisie (the little bourgeoisie) and the lumpenproletariat (the sub-proletariat). The petite bourgeoisie are those like small business owners, farmers, and contractors who own some property and perhaps employ a few workers, but still rely on their own labour to survive. The lumpenproletariat are the chronically unemployed or irregularly employed, who are in and out of the workforce. They are what Marx referred to as the “reserve army of labour,” a pool of potential labourers who are surplus to the needs of production at any particular time.

Weber defined social class slightly differently, as the life chances one shares in common with others by virtue of possession of property, goods, skills or opportunities for income (1969). Life chances refer to the ability or probability of an individual to act on opportunities and attain a certain standard of living. Owning property or capital, or not owning property or capital, is still the basic variable that defines a person’s class situation or life chances. However, class position is defined with respect to markets rather than the process of production . It is the value of one’s capital, products or skills in the commodity or labour markets at any particular time that determines whether one has greater or fewer life chances.

This yields a model of class hierarchy based on multiple gradations of socio-economic status, instead of a division between two principle classes. Analyses of class inspired by Weber tend to emphasize gradations of status relating to several variables like wealth, income, education, and occupation. Class stratification is not just determined by a group’s economic position, but by the prestige of the group’s occupation, education level, consumption, and lifestyle. It is a matter of status — the level of honour or prestige one holds in the community by virtue of one’s social position — as much as a matter of class.

Based on the Weberian approach, some sociologists talk about upper, middle, and lower classes (with many subcategories within them) in a way that mixes status categories with class categories. These gradations are often referred to as a group’s socio-economic status ( SES ): their social position relative to others based on income, education, and prestige of occupation . For example, although plumbers might earn more than high school teachers and have greater “life chances” in a particular economy, the status division between blue-collar work (people who “work with their hands”) and white-collar work (people who “work with their minds”) means the plumbers might be characterized as lower class but teachers as middle class.

There is a randomness in the division of classes into upper, middle, and lower in the Weberian model. However, this manner of classification based on status distinctions captures something about the subjective experience of class and the shared lifestyle and consumption patterns of class that Marx’s categories often do not. An NHL hockey player receiving a salary of $6 million a year is a member of the working class, strictly speaking. He might even go on strike or get locked out according to the dynamic of capital and labour conflict described by Marx. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see what the life chances of the hockey player have in common with a landscaper or receptionist, despite the fact that they might share a common working-class background.

Class: Materialist and Interpretive Factors

Social class is a complex category to analyze. It has both a strictly materialist quality relating to a group’s structural position within the economic system, and an interpretive quality relating to the formation of status gradations, common subjective perceptions of class, differences of power in society, and class-based lifestyles and consumption patterns. Considering both the Marxist and Weberian models, social class has at least three objective components: a group’s position in the occupational structure (i.e., the status and salary of one’s job), a group’s position in the power structure (i.e., who has authority over whom), and a group’s position in the property structure (i.e., ownership or non-ownership of capital). It also has an important subjective component that relates to recognitions of status, distinctions of lifestyle, and ultimately how people perceive their place in the class hierarchy.

Making Connections: Classic Sociologists

Marx and weber on social class: how do they differ.

Often, Marx and Weber are perceived as at odds in their approaches to class and social inequality, but it is perhaps better to see them as articulating different styles of analysis.

Weber’s analysis presents a more complex model of the social hierarchy of capitalist society than Marx. Weber’s model goes beyond the economic structural class position to include the variables of status (degree of social prestige or honour) and power (degree of political influence). Thus, Weber provides a multi-dimensional model of social hierarchy. As a result, although individuals might be from the same objective class, their position in the social hierarchy might differ according to their status and political influence. For example, women and men might be equal in terms of their class position, but because of the inequality in the status of the genders within each class, women (as a group) remain lower in the social hierarchy.

With respect to class specifically, Weber also relies on a different definition than Marx. As noted above, Weber (1969) defines class as the “life chances” one shares in common with others by virtue of one’s possession of goods or opportunities for income. Class is defined with respect to markets, rather than the process of production. As in Marx’s analysis, the economic position that stems from owning property and capital, or not owning property and capital, is still the basic variable that defines one’s class situation or life chances. However, as the value of different types of capital or property (e.g., industrial, real estate, financial, etc.), or the value of different types of opportunity for income (i.e., different types of marketable skills), varies according to changes in the commodity or labour markets, Weber can provide a more nuanced description of an individual’s class position than Marx. A skilled tradesman like a pipe welder might enjoy a higher class position and greater life chances in Northern Alberta where such skills are in demand, than a high school teacher in Vancouver or Victoria where the number of qualified teachers exceeds the number of positions available. If one adds the element of status into the picture, the situation becomes even more complex, as the educational requirements and social responsibilities of the high school teacher usually confer more social prestige than the requirements and responsibilities of the pipe welder.

Nevertheless, Weber’s analysis is descriptive rather than analytical . It can provide a useful description of differences between the levels or “strata” in a social hierarchy or stratification system but does not provide an analysis of the formation of classes themselves.

On the other hand, Marx’s analysis of class is essentially one-dimensional. It has one variable: the relationship to the means of production. If one is a professional hockey player, a doctor in a hospital, or a clerk in a supermarket, one works for a wage and is therefore a member of the working class. In this regard, his analysis challenges common sense, as the difference between these different “fragments” of the working class seems paramount — at least from the point of view of the subjective experience of class. It would seem that hockey players, doctors, lawyers, professors, and business executives have very little in common with grocery clerks, factory or agricultural workers, tradespeople, or low level administrative staff, despite the fact that they all depend on being paid wages by someone.

However, the key point of Marx’s analysis is not to ignore the existence of status distinctions within classes, but to examine class structure dialectically in order to provide a more comprehensive and historical picture of class dynamics.

The four components of dialectical analysis were described in Chapter 1. An Introduction to Sociology : (1) Everything in society is related; (2) everything is caught up in a process of change; (3) change proceeds from the quantitative to the qualitative; and (4) change is the product of oppositions and struggles in society. These dialectical qualities are also central to Marx’s account of the hierarchical structure of classes in capitalist society.

With regard to the first point — everything in society is related — the main point of the dialectical analysis of class is that the working class and the owning class have to be understood in a structural relationship to one another. They emerged together out of the old class structure of feudalism. More significantly for Marx, each exists only because the other exists. The wages that define the wage labourer are paid by the capitalist; the profit and capital accumulated by the capitalist are products of the workers’ labour.

In Marx’s dialectical model, “everything is caught up in a process of change” occurs because the system is characterized by the struggle of opposites.  The classes are structurally in conflict because the contradiction in their class interests is built into the economic system. The bourgeoisie as a class is defined by the economic drive to accumulate capital and increase profit. The key means to achieve this in a competitive marketplace is by reducing the cost of production by lowering the cost of labour (by reducing wages, moving production to lower wage areas, or replacing workers with labour-saving technologies). This conflicts with the interests of the proletariat who seek to establish a sustainable standard of living by maintaining their level of wages and employment in society. While individual capitalists and individual workers might not see it this way, structurally, their class interests clash and define a persistent pattern of management-labour conflict and political cleavage in modern, capitalist societies.

So, from the dialectical model, Marx can predict that the composition of classes changes over time: the statuses of different occupations vary, the proportions between workers’ income and capitalists’ profit change, and the types of production and the means of production change (through the introduction of labour-saving technologies, globalization, new products and consumption patterns, etc.). In addition, change proceeds from the quantitative to the qualitative, in the sense that the multiplicity of changes in purely quantitative variables like salary, working conditions, unemployment levels, rates of profitability, product sales, supply and demand, etc., lead to changes in qualitative variables like the subjective experience of inequality and injustice, the political divisions of “left” and “right,” the formation of class-consciousness, and eventually change in the entire economic system through new models of capital accumulation or even revolution.

The strength of Marx’s analysis is its ability to go beyond a description of where different groups fit within the class structure at a given moment in time to an analysis of why those groups and their relative positions change with respect to one another. The dialectical approach reveals the underlying logic of class structure as a dynamic system, and the potential commonality of interests and subjective experiences that define class-consciousness. As a result, in an era in which the precariousness of many high status “middle class” jobs has become clearer, the divisions of economic and political interests between the different segments of the working class becomes less so.

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• Figure 9.3 Office Politics: A Rise to the Top by Alex Proimos, via Flickr, is used under a CC BY-NC 2.0 licence.
• Figure 9.4 Strata in the Badlands by Just a Prairie Boy, via Flickr, is used under a CC BY 2.0 licence.
• Figure 9.5 Fort Mason Neighborhood by Orin Zebest, via Flickr, is used under a CC BY 2.0 licence.
• Figure 9.6  Woman, construction, worker, temple, india, manual, poor, labourer, labour , via PxHere, is used under a CC0 Public Domain licence. 
• Figure 9.7 Royal wedding Kate & William by Gerard Stolk, via Flickr, is used under a CC BY-NC 2.0  licence. 
• Figure 9.8 Item B-03624 – Group of Nanaimo coal miners at the pithead by unknown photographer, [ca. 1870]  (Creation) via the Royal BC Museum/ British Columbia Archives Collection (Item B-03624), is in the public domain .
• Figure 9.9 James and Laura Dunsmuir in Italian Garden at Hatley Park, by unknown photographer, 1912-1920  (Creation), courtesy of Craigdarroch Castle Society,  is in the public domain .
• Figure 9.10 File:MAX WEBER.jpg  by Power Renegadas, via Wikimedia Commons, is used under a CC BY-SA 4.0 licence.
• Figure 9.11   Karl Marx by John Mayall, via Wikimedia Commons, is in the public domain .

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The Equal Society: Essays in Theory and Practice

George Hull (ed.), The Equal Society: Essays in Theory and Practice , Rowman and Littlefield, 2015, 354pp., $100.00 (hbk), ISBN 9781498515719.

Reviewed by Valentin Beck, Freie Universität Berlin

What would be the central characteristics of a society in which its citizens are truly treated as equals? While egalitarian thinkers are united in their affirmation of the value of equality, they notoriously have -- for centuries -- disagreed about its interpretation. Egalitarianism now is a dominant current within Western moral and political philosophy, but it is also very broad and multifaceted. There is a wide range of mutually inconsistent egalitarian conceptions, ranging from libertarian and meritocratic positions to social liberal, communitarian and socialist ones. Therefore, the decisive question is not whether one should be an egalitarian, but what kind of egalitarian one should be, and how to interpret the central tenet of equal treatment more concretely in political theory and practice.

The anthology under review sheds light on this question. It offers a fascinatingly rich collection of original essays from a diverse group of scholars, some of whom have been shaping egalitarian discourse for decades. An introduction by George Hull and a helpful index complete a collection that will surely be indispensable for those wishing to take stock of recent developments in egalitarian thought. The book's more theoretical first part is dedicated to expansions and revisions of the concept of equality. It focuses on theoretical innovations concerning, among other topics, the interpretation of "social" or "relational" equality, and methodological issues such as the relation of non-ideal to ideal theory. The second part contains contributions on more applied issues, namely equality in higher education (Ann E. Cudd), the challenges to equality posed by the gendered division of labour (Gina Schouten), workplace democracy (Pierre-Yves Néron), modern constitutionalism (David Bilchitz) and historical redress claims (Daryl Glaser). The division of the book into two parts should not be misinterpreted, however. All of the contributions in one way or the other address the theoretical challenge of fleshing out the tenet of equal treatment. And while the articles in the second part have a more specific focus, those in the first also contain more concrete references to what the tenet of equal treatment implies in practice.

The volume does not take stock of the entire range of egalitarian theories, but rather assembles a variety of innovative positions and perspectives. At least six such areas receive in-depth treatment in the volume: first, the idea of "social" or "relational equality", as opposed to "distributional equality" (Jonathan Wolff, Miranda Fricker, Tom P. S. Angier, Lucy Allais, Néron and Daniel Putnam); second, the focus on race as a neglected category in egalitarian thinking (Charles W. Mills and Glaser); third, reflection on capabilities as metric of justice and wellbeing (Fricker, Bekka Williams and Hull); fourth, the importance of rectificatory justice for establishing more equal societies (Mills and Glaser); fifth, African-communitarianism as a distinct egalitarian current (Thaddeus Metz); and sixth, a negativist methodology, according to which specific inequalities or injustices should be the starting point of egalitarian theorizing, rather than the affirmation of an abstract ideal (particularly Wolff, Mills and Fricker). The treatment of this array of topics is generally very stimulating and deserves to be studied in detail. Without wishing to neglect any of these areas or essays in particular, I will limit my more extensive comments to the essays of Mills, Fricker and Wolff, in which several of the above-mentioned innovative concepts are concerned. At the end of this review, I will briefly reflect on why the present volume, which is up-to-date on an impressive number of issues, excludes any treatment of international and global economic inequalities as well as intergenerational environmental inequalities.

In "Racial Equality" Mills addresses race as a neglected category as well as the issues of methodological negativism (see Hull's introduction, p. 3, for this term) and corrective justice, which are interlinked. Mills has gained prominence by arguing that contemporary political philosophy, and particularly its contractualist strand, does not adequately address racial inequalities in liberal societies. In this essay, he argues that race is an essential category and shows the extent to which it has been neglected in what he calls "mainstream social justice theory, particularly Rawlsianism" (p. 44). Beyond this deconstructive concern, however, Mills also demonstrates how egalitarian theorizing can better incorporate issues of racial inequalities. He points to different positions on the metaphysics of race, ranging from simple eliminativism, according to which race does not exist in any sense, to variants of anti-eliminativism, including the constructivist variant to which Mills himself subscribes. Anti-eliminativist constructivism holds that races do not exist biologically, but as "socio-political constructs brought into existence through discriminatory socio-political processes" (p. 44).

From this angle, Mills analyses different forms of racism in "racist societies", which are distinguished from "overtly racist regimes" such as the U.S. under Jim Crow, Nazi Germany or South Africa under apartheid, because they lack features such as an "overtly racist ideology" or de jure discriminations (see p. 49). What matters is that racist societies still structurally advantage whites to a very significant extent, even in the absence of formal discrimination. Mills sets aside racism of the interpersonal kind, embodied in individual actions, since it is deemed "not relevant for racial inequality as a broad social phenomenon" (p. 45). Alternatively, one might argue that individual racist behaviour is relevant and could be integrated into the structural analysis that Mills is championing, since structural injustices likely influence the forms that interpersonal racism takes. Be that as it may, Mills focuses on "socio-institutional" racism (see p. 45) as the more fundamental phenomenon and which can exist even in the absence of interpersonal racism. He holds that racially unequal societies possess a "racialized basic structure" (p. 54), which discriminates against black people even while they possess formal equality with white people. These distinctions allow for the observation that ideal theory of the Rawlsian kind, which justifies principles for societies that are at least approximately just, cannot address racial discriminations of the kind that are typical for Western societies, since they simply do not exist in this framework.

This is where methodological negativism comes into play. Mills states that, instead of focusing on scenarios of roughly full compliance, theorists should start by designing principles of non-ideal theory with the aim of establishing transitional justice. This will lead to substantially different principles and priority rules, compared for example to the well-known principles that are discussed by Rawls under the notion of justice as fairness. Ideal theory does not become altogether obsolete in this variant of methodological negativism, however. Its proper function is to illustrate the ideal of a just society, which could one day be realized if principles of non-ideal theory are implemented. So despite his harsh criticism of Rawlsian ideal theory, Mills acknowledges a need for ideal theory next to non-ideal theorizing. Within his framework of "modified Rawlsianism" (p. 66), his use of the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory is also broadly in line with Rawls' usage.

Fricker, too, is renowned for addressing a category that has hitherto been neglected in egalitarian thought, namely that of epistemic injustice (2007). In "Epistemic Contribution as a Central Human Capability", Fricker builds on central themes of her groundbreaking monograph. Her goal is to show that any society dedicated to furthering human well-being has to take seriously the ways in which it enables or constrains the capacities of its members to contribute to commonly shared knowledge. In order to enhance the well-being of their members, societies must realize their capability of epistemic contribution, understood as a "combined capability" in the sense coined by Martha Nussbaum (that is, as both an internally developed and an externally enabled capability). Fricker affirms and significantly extends the capabilities metric developed by Sen and Nussbaum. Her work is more closely aligned with Nussbaum than with Sen, since she emphasizes her sympathies for the project of formulating a "list of capabilities that might at least roughly capture workable universal characterisation of human well-being" (p. 77). However, Nussbaum's list is incomplete according to Fricker, because it displays a bias towards capabilities of practical as opposed to theoretical reason (see p. 75). In going back to Wolff and Avner de-Shalit (2007, p. 45), Fricker defends a "two-directional conception of human well-being" (p. 76), reminding us that "while it is good to receive it is also good to give " (p. 75). Fricker posits that the capability of epistemic contribution consists in being able to "contribute to the pool of shared epistemic materials -- materials for knowledge, understanding, and very often for practical deliberation" (p. 76).

It is not Fricker's aim to show that we can sometimes be morally obliged not to withhold knowledge from others, which would be a relatively easy and straightforward task depending on the concrete type and context of concealment in question. She instead aims to show that it is good and even essential for their wellbeing for individuals to contribute knowledge to society. Individuals' capabilities of epistemic contribution can be constrained or enabled by certain types of interpersonal behaviour as well as by societal structures. To justify why the protection of this capability of theoretical reason is important, Fricker draws on the value of non-domination in the sense of liberty from arbitrary interference made famous by Philip Pettit. Pettit argues that freedom from arbitrary interference can only be secured through public institutions which allow members of society to publicly contest such interferences. For such contestation, however, the capability of epistemic contribution must in turn be realized (see p. 86).

Beyond introducing a concept that deserves the concern of egalitarians in theory and practice, Fricker sheds light on a number of other hotly debated issues, such as the critique of recipient-oriented approaches to equality and the conceptualization of relational equality. Fricker also has interesting things to say on what she calls a "failure-first methodology" (p. 74), which informs her account of epistemic injustice and her concept of epistemic contribution. Her methodology is similar to Mills', in that it places an emphasis on starting with the negative. But it diverges at least in one respect: for Fricker, starting with the negative is not necessarily tied to non-ideal theorizing, since the concepts of "justice" and "equality" need to be comprehensively interpreted by taking into account the "endemic pressures for collapse into injustice and inequality" (p. 73). Fricker therefore emphasizes that a failure-first-methodology is conceptually distinct from the dichotomy of ideal and non-ideal theorizing and can yield fruitful results within either framework.

In "Social Equality, Relative Poverty and Marginalised Groups", Wolff answers these methodological questions differently. Wolff's aim is to analyze how absolute and relative poverty prevent the achievement of a (truly) equal society, which he defines as one that is free from asymmetrical relations and from relations of estrangement and alienation. His methodology for this enterprise is set out at the start of the essay. Like Mills and Fricker, Wolff emphasizes the importance of "starting from problems with the actual world rather than a depiction of an ideal world" (p. 24). But unlike Mills and Fricker, who each acknowledge the significance of ideal theory when appropriately combined with non-ideal theory, Wolff completely rejects ideal theory. He holds that "an ideal theory of social equality is hard to sustain, because it is very difficult to give precise and unique content to an ideal of social equality" (p. 22). Instead, there are "many different ways in which a society could count as a 'society of equals' . . . . Quaker Society, a Kibbutz, and a 1960s Californian Hippy community may all, if things go well, count as small-scale societies of equals" (p. 23). In place of the term of non-ideal theory Wolff suggests that of "real-world political philosophy" (p. 22), because it avoids any connotation of dependence on ideal theorizing.

Looking at the work of Mills, Fricker, and Wolff, we can distinguish three variants of methodological negativism. Mills' variant is placed within the classical Rawlsian understanding of ideal and non-ideal theory, but displays a much greater emphasis on the latter as opposed to the former. Fricker's approach underlines the distinctness and complementarity of the negativist methodology by stating that it can be applied to either non-ideal or ideal theorizing. Wolff's methodological negativism transcends the classic distinction of ideal and non-ideal theory by rejecting the focus on ideals for political theory altogether. Mills' and Fricker's approaches to methodological negativism are in principle compatible, but Wolff's approach cannot be reconciled with them, due to his complete rejection of ideal theory.

Methodological concerns are not the only focus in Wolff's article. His two main themes are providing an account of different forms of poverty, and reflecting on how to tackle them from a perspective that values the idea of "social equality" (widely treated as synonymous with "relational equality"). This idea has gained steam in recent years since being affirmed in the writings of thinkers such as Elizabeth Anderson, Samuel Scheffler and Tim Scanlon, and it is also treated in a number of other contributions to the volume (compare the third paragraph above; see also Fourie/Schuppert/Wallimann-Helmer 2015). Wolff dedicates particular attention to the notion of relative poverty and how it is connected with that of social (in)equality. Poverty is dependent on what is customary in a given society, Adam Smith noted when he wrote that "in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt" (Smith 1776, book 5, ch. 2). According to Wolff, "one is in relative poverty if one lacks the consumption and household goods customary in one's society, or lacks resources sufficient to allow a social life, or is unable to purchase what is needed to avoid shame" (p. 26). While this tripartite notion of relative poverty has material implications, it is preferable to purely monetary definitions (e.g. defining poverty as receiving an income below 60 percent of the median income). Numerical definitions of poverty scratch only at the surface of what it means to be poor, and fail to distinguish between material inequalities, as problematic as they may otherwise be, and poverty. Wolff's definition shows how relative poverty and social inequality are connected yet distinct phenomena. They are not identical because there can be other forms of inequality that are not reflected in a lack of resources to participate in customary social practices -- such as asymmetric race or gender relations. Wolff analyses different constellations of deprivation that result from the desire to "fit in", such as when people spend resources on status goods such as mobile phones despite lacking the resources for basic necessities (see p. 29). Fighting poverty effectively might also be complicated by the fact that "fitting in" to a local community might require different resources or efforts than fitting in to society more broadly.

Wolff's account of poverty is illuminating. It shows how relative poverty may be interpreted from a social egalitarian perspective, according to which equal distributions of specific goods are not of ultimate, but only derivative egalitarian concern. His essay should be of interest not only for normative and empirical theorists, but also for policy-makers and others who deal with the goal of poverty-alleviation in practice.

The articles by Mills, Fricker and Wolff are representative of a collection that embodies the state of the art of contemporary egalitarian theory in many respects. Two important subjects, however, are missing from the otherwise multifaceted picture. There is no engagement with economic inequalities beyond the nation state. Neither does this work treat intergenerational environmental inequalities resulting from environmental degradation and man-made climate change. These two concerns give egalitarians reason to question the fairness and legitimacy of the international order. To start with, the distribution of income and capital across nation states remains highly unequal, which increases incentives for those who find themselves in less fortunate circumstances to seek better living conditions abroad. Furthermore, while trade with resources, goods and services has never been more global and interdependent than today, it may be argued that the current system has primarily benefitted the world's wealthy and powerful, and that it rests on practices that are highly environmentally destructive and which violate the basic human rights of labourers and affected populations. Finally, past and present generations have contributed to environmental degradation and fossil fuel consumption to a much larger degree than future generations will, assuming they act in such a way as to avoid the most catastrophic outcomes.

What should we make of the absence of these topics in an anthology that seeks to shed light on contemporary egalitarian theorizing? An uncharitable reading may trace it back to an unexpressed particularism. It would be hard to argue that demands of equal treatment stop at national or communal borders or generational confines -- at least not in a highly interdependent world like ours. Neither could the widely shared social (or relational) egalitarian perspective plausibly attach any such categorical constraints to egalitarian demands. New technologies now allow an increasing number of the world's least well-off individuals to compare themselves to more privileged individuals across national boundaries, which in turn affects what they seek to achieve in life and what they will regard as justified or unjustified inequalities. A more charitable interpretation is that a single anthology simply cannot cover all of the issues that are currently at the forefront of egalitarian theory. However, it should be clear that while it remains important and rewarding to reflect on the conditions of "The Equal Society", an egalitarian should certainly not stop there. Instead, she should also ask what it would mean to transform transnational and transgenerational relations in a way so that all humans are (truly) treated as equals.

Carina Fourie, Fabian Schuppert, Ivo Wallimann-Helmer (eds.), Social Equality: On What It Means to Be Equals , Oxford University Press 2015.

Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing , Oxford University Press 2007.

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations [1776], edited by R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner, Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press 1976.

Jonathan Wolff/Avner De-Shalit, Disadvantage , Oxford University Press 2007.

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Social differentiation and social inequality: essays in honor of john pock (social inequality series).

David B. Grusky, Donald J. Treiman, John Pock

The field of social stratification is being transformed and reshaped by advances in theory and method as well as by new approaches to the analysis of macroeconomic, institutional, demographic, and ascriptive sources of inequality. In this tribute to John C. Pock, the editors have brought together established and emerging stars in the field. The result is an important new statement on contemporary developments and controversies in stratification scholarship. The chapters address such matters as recent trends in gender attitudes and the gender gap in earnings, race and class differentials in life chances and income, cross-national and institutional variability in employment systems and inequality, the division of domestic labor within households, and the implications of demographic change for social inequality.

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National Academy of Medicine; Alexander C, Murry VMB, Bogard K, editors. Perspectives on Health Equity and Social Determinants of Health. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2017.

Perspectives on Health Equity and Social Determinants of Health.

• Hardcopy Version at National Academies Press

1 HEALTH INEQUITIES, SOCIAL DETERMINANTS, AND INTERSECTIONALITY

Editors: NANCY LÓPEZ , PHD and VIVIAN L. GADSDEN , EDD.

In this essay, we focus on the potential and promise that intersectionality holds as a lens for studying the social determinants of health, reducing health disparities, and promoting health equity and social justice. Research that engages intersectionality as a guiding conceptual, methodological, and praxis-oriented framework is focused on power dynamics, specifically the relationships between oppression and privilege that are intrinsic to societal practices. Intersectional knowledge projects aimed at studying this interplay within and across systems challenge the status quo. Whether reframing existing conceptualizations of power, implementing empirical research studies, or working with community organizations and global social movements, intersectional inquiry and praxis are designed to excavate the ways a person's multiple identities and social positions are embedded within systems of inequality. Intersectionality also is attentive to the need to link individual, institutional, and structural levels of power in a given sociohistorical context for advancing health equity and social justice.

• HEALTH DISPARITIES, INEQUITY, AND SOCIAL DETERMINANTS: A BRIEF CONTEXT

The urgency to promote health, reduce health disparities, and address the social determinants of health is highlighted in countless reports ( Hankivsky and Christoffersen, 2008 ; World Health Organization, 2006 , 2015 ). In short, problems in health disrupt the human developmental process. They undermine the quality of life and opportunities for children, youth, and families, particularly those exposed to vulnerable circumstances. Despite incremental change within and across health-serving agencies and increased health education and scrutiny of patient care, we continue to see significant disparities in the quality of health and life options that children in racial and ethnic minority, low-income homes and neighborhoods experience ( Bloche, 2001 ). Research has uncovered several interconnections between health and environmental and social factors ( Chapman and Berggren, 2005 ; Thorpe and Kelley-Moore, 2013 ) but has not always shifted paradigms sufficiently to either disentangle intersecting inequalities or tease apart the ways social factors and structural barriers at once interlock to prevent meaningful and sustainable change.

In this essay, we focus on the potential and promise that intersectionality holds as a lens for studying the social determinants of health, reducing health disparities, and promoting health equity and social justice. Collins and Bilge (2016) describe intersectionality as follows:

A way of understanding and analyzing complexity in the word, in people, and in human experiences. The events and conditions of social and political life and the self can seldom be understood as shaped by one factor. They are shaped by many factors in diverse and mutually influencing ways. When it comes to social inequality, people's lives and the organization of power in a given society are better understood as being shaped not by a single axis of social division, be it race or gender or class, but by many axes that work together and influence each other. Intersectionality as an analytic tool gives people better access to the complexity of the world and of themselves . . . People use intersectionality as an analytic tool to solve problems that they or others around them face. (p. 2)

We ask: How do we engage in inquiry and praxis (action and reflection) that departs from the understanding that intersecting systems of oppression, including race/structural racism, class/capitalism, ethnicity/ethnocentrism, color/colorism, sex and gender/patriarchy, and sexual orientation/heterosexism, nationality and citizenship/nativism, disability/ableism, and other systemic oppressions intersect and interact to produce major differences in embodied, lived race-gender that shape the social determinants of health? How can we as scholars, researchers, and practitioners concerned with child and family well-being take seriously the reality of how intersecting systems of power produce lived race-gender-class and other social locations of disadvantage and develop an intersectionality health equity lens for advancing health equity inquiry, knowledge projects, and praxis?

We argue that the potential power of intersectionality as a transformational paradigm lies in two domains relevant to understanding social determinants. First, it is a critical knowledge project that questions the status quo and raises questions about the meaning and relationship between different social categories and intersecting systems of privilege and oppression ( Bowleg, 2008 ; Collins, 2008 , 2015 ; Collins and Bilge, 2016 ; Hancock, 2016 ; McCall, 2001 ; Yuval-Davis, 2011 ). It also pushes against the idea of “blaming the victim”—the simplicity of explaining health or educational outcomes by attributing problems to individuals' genetics or cultural and social behaviors alone. Second, by focusing on power relations at the individual, institutional, and global levels and the convergence of experiences in a given sociohistorical context and situational landscape, it serves as an anchor to advance equity and social justice aims for marginalized communities that have experienced and continue to experience structural inequalities ( Collins, 2008 , 2009 , 2015 ; Crenshaw, 1993 ; Weber, 2010 ). In both instances, researchers and practitioners cross traditional academic, sectoral, and disciplinary boundaries to reconceptualize a problem and combine methods from different disciplines (e.g., in interdisciplinary research), or they apply conceptualizations and methods from one discipline to closely examine issues in another (e.g., in transdisciplinary research, epistemologies, and methodologies).

There is growing evidence and professional wisdom to suggest that health disparities do not exist in isolation, but are part of a reciprocal and complex web of problems associated with inequality and inequity in education, housing, and employment ( LaVeist and Isaac, 2013 ; Schultz and Mullings, 2006 ; Weber, 2010 ; Williams and Mohammed, 2013 ). These disparities affect the unborn child through social-emotional challenges such as maternal stress and diagnosed and undiagnosed medical problems, including higher prevalence of gestational and preexisting diabetes in some pregnant populations. In other cases, they are observable at birth, particularly pronounced when prenatal care is unavailable, when the importance of care is not understood fully, and when young children are not exposed to the cognitive and social-emotional stimulation needed to thrive. These and other problems are manifested in parental stress, for example, in mother-headed and two-parent, low-income, and immigrant households alike. Parent and family adversity may reduce the number and quality of resources available and life experiences for children and families in the early years and throughout the life course. Such adversity is exacerbated by structural barriers that limit employment opportunities, increase housing instability, and contribute to homelessness, and that constrain efforts by families to effect positive change.

Over the past 20 years, two major shifts in discussions of health disparities and inequity have spurred interest and research. One shift is the growth in and opportunities presented by interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research (e.g., work extending from sociology and psychology to economics, among other fields) and cross-domain practice (e.g., medicine, education, and social work) (see Gadsden et al., 2015b ; LaVeist and Isaac, 2013 ). The reach of interests in these issues can be found not only in the social and medical sciences but also in contemporary ethical, moral, and political philosophy, such as Sen et al.'s (2009) linking of health equity and agency, and their commentaries on the implications for social justice. A second shift has been the heightened attention to health determinants, more frequently called social determinants of health, instead of a biomedical model that solely focuses on the individual-level makeup and behaviors of patients as the source of health disparity. The report of the Commission on the Social Determinants of Health ( CSDH, 2008 ) points to the importance of being attentive to the overlapping effects and simultaneity of intersecting inequalities and their implications for social determinants:

The poor health of the poor, the social gradient in health within countries, and the marked health inequities between countries are caused by the unequal distribution of power, income, goods, and services, globally and nationally, the consequent unfairness in the immediate, visible circumstances of people's lives—their access to health care, schools, and education, their conditions of work and leisure, their homes, communities, towns, or cities—and their chances of leading a flourishing life. This unequal distribution of health-damaging experiences is not in any sense a “natural” phenomenon, but is the result of a toxic combination of poor social policies and programmes, unfair economic arrangements, and bad politics. Together, the structural determinants and conditions of daily life constitute the social determinants of health and are responsible for a major part of health inequities between and within countries. (p. 1)

In emerging conceptualizations of these social determinants, racism and discrimination are overwhelmingly significant factors, but are not the only critical dimensions related to identity to be considered ( Williams and Mohammed, 2013 ). They are tied inextricably to multiple identities and social locations that children, youth, and adults assume, and define a context for health (Bauer et al., 2016; Brown et al., 2016 ). One might argue that there is no issue more important than ensuring health. How a person understands this point and is able to act upon it is determined by more than her or his cognitive ability to engage the idea. It is influenced as well by a range of dynamic and situational identities and social positions that are biological, cultural, and epigenetic; by social determinants (i.e., where people are born, grow up, work, and age, and interact with their changing environments); and by a person's social experiences and encounters, rather than solely her or his self-agency across a variety of social settings. Even individuals with the strongest work ethic and sense of agency, when faced with daily problems associated with intersectionality across any combination of racial, class, gender, sexual orientation, language, or disability systemic oppressions and discrimination, may find fighting against these inequalities daunting.

Several researchers have advocated for a new way of combining the insights and perspectives used in intersectional knowledge projects in order to move away from decontextualized, biomedical frameworks that often fetishize “cultural competence” as the panacea for structural intersecting inequalities ( Viruell-Fuentes et al., 2012 ). Instead of getting distracted by the alleged “deficits” or “individual behaviors” of marginalized communities, they call for what Chapman and Berggren (2005) refer to as a “radical contextualization of the social determinants of health perspectives.” Sen and colleagues (2009) acknowledge this shift:

In addition to the obvious benefit of deepening our insights into social inequalities and how they interact, the study of intersectionality . . . has the potential to provide critical guidance for policies and programmes. By giving precise insights into who is affected and how, in different settings, it provides a scalpel for policies rather than the current hatchet. It enables policies and programmes to identify whom to focus on, whom to protect, what exactly to promote and why. It also provides a simple way to monitor and evaluate the impact of policies and programmes on different subgroups from the most disadvantaged through the middle layers to those with particular advantages. (p. 412)

Our objective in the remainder of this essay is to provide a discussion of the possibilities for innovation in conceptualization, methodologies, and practices that can promote human development and health equity through an “intersectionality health equity lens.” We employ Jones's (2016) definition of health equity. Jones defines health equity as “the [active] assurance of optimal conditions for all people.” Jones explains that we can get there by “valuing everyone equally, rectifying historic inequities and distributing resources according to need.” Jones invites us to think deeply and critically about equity as a never-ending process that requires constant and ongoing vigilance and not just an outcome that once accomplished can be forgotten. Building on Jones's (2016) and Collins and Bilge's (2016) ideas about equity and intersectionality we define an intersectionality health equity lens as ongoing critical knowledge projects, inquiry, and praxis that can include research, teaching, and practice approaches that are attentive to the ways systems of inequality interlock to create conditions for either health equity or health inequities ( Collins, 2008 , 2015 ; Collins and Bilge, 2016 ; Crenshaw, 1993 ).

We also embrace Collins and Bilge's (2016) core ideas of intersectionality, namely a focus on inequality, relationality and connectedness, power, social context, complexity, and social justice. They use the analogy of “domains of power” to paint a picture of the way that power is visible at the “interpersonal” or individual level in terms of who is advantaged or disadvantaged at the level of social interactions. For example, individuals may experience privilege or disadvantages when searching for a job, housing, interacting with law enforcement, or even when accessing a voting booth. Collins and Bilge (2016) assert

Using intersectionality as an analytic lens highlights the multiple nature of individual identities and how varying combinations of class, gender, race, sexuality, and citizenship categories differentially position every individual. (p. 8)

Collins and Bilge (2016) also underscore that we must always be attentive to the “disciplinary” level as a domain of power that organizes and regulates the lives of people in ways that echo our distinct social positions with regard to systems of oppression. For example, rules about who will or will not be seen at a medical office because of the ability to pay a copay, who will or will not be admitted to a domestic violence shelter based on their English proficiency, and who has access to a gifted classroom, based on IQ test scores that are rooted in eugenicist origins, will inevitably impact the conditions for the advancement of health equity (see also Crenshaw, 1993 ; Zuberi, 2001 ).

Collins and Bilge also invite us to reflect on how power is visible at the “cultural” level or in the realm of ideas, norms, and narratives. For Collins and Bilge (2016) , ideas matter and how messages are manufactured creates explanations, justifications, or challenges to the status quo vis-à-vis inequalities. For instance, if the idea that racialized health inequalities are simply a matter of individual behavior, food ways, and choice, and that we live in a meritocracy, where your station in life is simply a matter of individual effort, then we are subscribing to what Bonilla-Silva refers to as “colorblind” racism or the belief that present-day realities of race gaps in health only mirror individual deficits of individuals or defective cultures.

The last arena where Collins and Bilge interrogate the dynamic of power includes the “structural” level or at the level of institutional arrangements, which interrogates how intersecting systems of institutionalized power, whether in the economy and labor market in terms of whose labor is valued and who is exploited, or at the political level in who is granted substantive citizenship rights and privileges and who is not, as well as at the level of who has access to structures of political power and influence, shapes the institutionalization of the conditions for health equity. For example, the struggle for sovereignty of indigenous people, as evidenced in the Standing Rock movement to protect indigenous land and water for generations in South Dakota provides a snapshot of the structural location of indigenous nations and capitalist neoliberal actors that are in a struggle to define the environmental context for current and future generations, which will have grave consequences for health justice for marginalized indigenous communities.

While an intersectionality health equity lens may inform or drive interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary research, it must also be considered as part of both the process of conceptualizing the problem and the product of research on the problem. Throughout this essay, readers should consider the potential applications of an intersectionality health equity lens, how its use enhances (or disrupts) our understanding of salient and longstanding issues, what might be learned from its use that will inform and deepen research and practice with children and families who are among the marginalized in society, and what types of intersectionality-focused approaches might lead to health access and equity. In the next section, we focus on the contributions of an intersectionality health equity lens for research and for promoting health equity.

AN “INTERSECTIONALITY HEALTH EQUITY LENS” FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

When developing or applying an intersectionality health equity lens, the researcher engages in deep self-reflection that contextualizes and recognizes the ways race, gender, class, sexual orientation, disability, and other axes of inequality constitute intersecting systems of oppression. Such systems produce very different lived experiences for entire categories of people who are embedded within complex webs and social networks at different levels (e.g., family, neighborhood, and community as well as institutional and structural). These lived experiences can either enhance or challenge the developmental pathways of children through adulthood and the ability of parents and families to ensure a positive trajectory for their children. They affect both the individual child and the networks and communities in which children live and grow and that define their access to resources.

An intersectionality health equity lens for the purposes of our discussion takes on the broader, philosophical meaning attached to praxis as a process involving health, educational, and social service researchers and practitioners in not only self-reflection but also action. Critical self-reflection allows researchers and practitioners to continually and closely examine their own race, gender, class, sexual orientation, disability, language, nativity/citizenship and social position, and their relationship to systems of inequality as part of intersecting systems of oppression and privilege. It argues for researchers and practitioners to draw upon their own experiences with health inequities and discrimination, and to understand and respond to new or subtle forms of inequities and discrimination. These subtle forms of inequity and discrimination are sometimes so deeply embedded in and accepted as societal practices that they may be difficult to uncover, yet render many children and families hopeless. The interplay between and among relevant systems and the statuses accompanying power attributed to different ethnic, racial, cultural, and socioeconomic groups affect both individuals and their social networks (e.g., family, neighborhood, and community). They are tied directly to and within institutional and structural hierarchies.

Crenshaw (1993) points to the entrenched nature of inequity, underscoring the need for a useful paradigm in which to locate the issues faced by African American women and other racially stigmatized, visible minority women of color. Credited with creating a systematic analysis of the concept of intersectionality, Crenshaw (1993) urged readers to “map the margins” by focusing on those social locations that remain invisible. She argues that such invisibility results from a reliance on a mythical, universal “black experience” (e.g., when we assume that the default category is the “black male experience” and by the same token when we speak about “‘women's experiences” and assume that all women's experiences are represented in white women's experience). In each of these dominant conceptualizations of the black [male] and [white] woman's experience, heteronormativity is the invisible structure.

Crenshaw (1993) also illustrates how language, and potentially nativity and citizenship status, can serve as other axes of stratification that have received less attention than race and class. To illustrate her point, Crenshaw flexes her intersectional lens to bring into sharp relief the effects of “good intentions” on the real lives of women. She demonstrates that, despite their good intentions, some domestic violence shelters may operate in ways that ignore the plight of immigrant women with children who may not speak English and are unable to access domestic violence shelters. It goes without saying that this would structurally exclude immigrant (both documented and undocumented) women and their children who do not speak English. “Nativism, English Only” categories are the invisible, yet real, structural barriers to addressing domestic violence in the aforementioned situation. By the same token, members of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and in-transition (LGBTQI) communities may not face explicit rules about being barred from these services because of their gender identity, but if counselors and other providers assume that their clients are in heterosexual, gender-conforming relationships, heteronormativity can operate as another type of an informal barrier.

One might well ask, given the complex relationships in addressing identity, whether it is possible to create intersectionality-grounded projects that integrate the issues of race, class, gender, disability, and other identities, statuses, and social locations in research on health and well-being for the range of issues facing marginalized children, youth, and families. Although we do not have a simple response, we highlight the need to address the real or perceived complexity of creating such projects and allowing time and resources for them to be developed well and to be refined ( Cacari-Stone et al., 2017 ; López et al., 2017a , 2018 ; Van Hattum et al., 2017 ). We similarly understand the limitations of relying on one-dimensional categories that are, at best, additive, for example, first race, then maybe class, then maybe gender, depending on the focus of the research. As the World Health Organization (2015) and several health researchers before (e.g., LaVeist and Isaac, 2013 ; Williams and Mohammed, 2013 ) suggest, understanding the social determinants of health requires a broad reach to identify, and respond to, the embedded and entrenched inequities of policies that are situated in place and context.

Intersectionality health equity lenses help us understand that every person's experience is fundamentally different than the experience of others, based on their unique identity and structural positions within systems of inequality and structural impediments ( Feagin and Sikes, 1994 ; López, 2003 , Nakano Glenn, 2002 , 2015 ; Weber, 2010 ). More than just a theory or framework to be used selectively, it is a commitment to developing a relentlessly critical and self-reflective lens that begins with the premise that race, class, gender, and other axes of social identities are intertwined and mutually constitutive, and that such a lens can help advance health disparities research, practice, and leadership by making the invisible visible ( López et al., 2017b ; López, 2018 ).

• INTEGRATING RACE, GENDER, CLASS, AND SEXUALITY AS LIVED EXPERIENCES: A CASE EXAMPLE

In considering intersectionality projects, we must be aware of the overwhelming inequities associated with longstanding problems of race and gender and the added problems of poverty and class—problems that have narrowed in some cases over time but where inequality persists. It should come as no surprise that an intersectionality-focused project might appear opaque or obscure initially, despite its potential to uncover the breadth of issues faced in ensuring health and well-being.

Imagine the year 2050, and all institutional data are derived from the critical insight offered by Bowleg (2008) :

It is the analysis and interpretation of research findings within the sociohistorical context of structural inequality for groups positioned in social hierarchies of unequal power . . . . that best defines intersectionality research. (p. 323)

López (2013) proposes the “racialized-gendered social determinant of health” as a heuristic device or framework for centering the lives of marginalized communities. This framework consists of two major concepts: (1) “lived race-gender” and (2) “racialized-gendered pathways of embodiment.” López (2003) offers an example of the enactment of these concepts in the minds and experiences of both the observer and the observed. For example, she makes explicit the ways race-gender disparities are enacted and experienced in school and society by young Dominican and Caribbean men and women in what she calls “New York Immigration and Racialization.” Consider Orfelia's narrative on the public's perceptions of blacks, Hispanics, and whites and the differential result of their identities on these perceptions:

If you put on the news, anyone who does anything bad, if he's not Black, he's Hispanic . . . . You watch the news and you see that when any white guy does something, you won't see their face. They might just say it, and that's all. But if it's a Dominican, a Hispanic, a Black, they put him on for about two minutes, so that you can know him. (p. 23)

Orfelia points to the ways she has internalized race and gender stigma as dominant identity markers and their intersections with place (Queens in New York) and other intersectional identities such as immigrant and Spanish speaker. The mental health costs of feeling racially stigmatized may become embodied by many youth who also feel what sociologist W. E. B. DuBois coined in 1903 as the “double consciousness” experienced by blacks in the U.S. context or the sense of always being seen with contempt, pity, or disdain because of one's stigmatized status ( DuBois, 1999 ; Vidal-Ortiz, 2005 ). 1

López also underscores the dominance of race and gender identities, along with other identities (e.g., social class, sexual orientation, age, ethnicity and nativity, and legal status) that form the basis for education and health frameworks. She draws upon a personal example to demonstrate connections among race, gender, sexuality, and social class and the significance attached to heteronormativity ( Box 1-1 ).

BOX 1–1

Contextualizing Lived Race-Gender and the Racialized-Gendered Social Determinants of Health.

While race, gender, and class were overriding identities in the short narrative in Box 1-1 , heteronormativity was the silent but overpowering lens for López and her cousin. 3 As López notes, the nature and type of her cousin's experiences in and out of school, within family and community contexts, and with stressors that were unnamed distinguished the two cousins. As she suggests through this anecdote, sexuality played only a small though apparently significant part in the everyday encounters that her cousin faced. What remains unanswered are questions about the ways race and gender (male and Dominican) played in her cousin's schooling, and the ways that gender nonconformance (what we now refer to as transgender identity) produced barriers to health access, care, prevention, and maintenance; to employment; to housing; and to the daily acceptances that allow individuals to maintain not just a healthy personal racial, gendered, class, ethnic, or sexual identity but also an identity that can be embraced in full in all social domains and situations that López's cousin traversed throughout their short life.

Focusing on López's cousin's experiences from a health equity perspective, several additional questions are raised: Did the health system fail her cousin, or was it the larger social system that did not accept their intersectional identities? To what degree do our current systems of data collection make her cousin's intersecting lived oppressions vis-à-vis race, national origin, class, sexuality, gender identity, and nativity invisible? If we collect data only on gender identity and not class, nativity, citizenship, ethnicity, language, and/or national origin, do we make some social locations invisible? Do we ignore the temporal element of identities across the life course? How would López's cousin's life experiences have been different if her cousin had been from an LGBTQI middle class, Dominican immigrant family that was light skinned, white-looking Latinx and not a visible minority? All of these data challenges are opportunities for establishing communities of practice committed to intersectionality praxis (action and reflection). 4 Bowleg (2008) provides us with critical epistemological, ontological, and methodological insights on advancing intersectional inquiry and praxis:

I argue that a key dilemma for intersectionality researchers is that the additive (e.g., Black + Lesbian + Woman) versus intersectional (e.g., Black Lesbian Woman) assumption inherent in measurement and qualitative and quantitative data analyses contradicts the central tenet of intersectionality: social identities and inequality are interdependent for groups such as Black lesbians, not mutually exclusive. In light of this, interpretation becomes one of the most substantial tools in the intersectionality researcher's methodological toolbox. (p. 312)

In studying these and other questions related to health access and equity, drawing upon broad conceptualizations and nuanced analyses is important as is drawing upon conceptually complementary methodological approaches. The efficacy of rigorous quasi-experimental studies and of large, integrated datasets, including administrative data, in identifying and addressing multiple problems facing differing communities is clear. For example, Brown and colleagues (2016) examine the influence of the intersecting consequences of race-ethnicity, gender, socioeconomics status (SES), and age on health inequality with almost 13,000 ( n = 12,976) whites, blacks, and Mexican Americans, based on panel data from the Health and Retirement Study. Drawing upon multiple-hierarchy stratification and life-course perspectives, they focus on (1) the variation of racial/ethnic stratification of health by gender and/or SES and (2) the decrease, stability, or increase of combined inequality in health between middle and late life. Analyses of the data indicated that the effects of racial/ethnic, gender, and SES stratification were interactive, resulting in the greatest racial/ethnic inequalities in health among women and those with higher SES.

Although improving our quantitative data infrastructure is of paramount importance, Chapman and Berggren (2005) also call upon health disparities researchers to take advantage of the benefits of qualitative data methods that “radically contextualize” the sociohistoric contexts that fuel the social determinants of health. They argue that qualitative methodologies such as participant observation, ethnography, and interviews can serve to demystify the link between structural, institutional, community, and individual processes that contribute to health inequities by shedding light on the social practices, interactions, policies, mechanisms, and processes that undergird manufactured health inequities. Rather than committing to one or the other, this focus on intersectionality will require the use of multiple methods, strategically layered to identify the problem and provide responsive interventions and equitable policies ( Minkler and Wallerstein, 2011 ).

An intersectional paradigm or conceptual universe takes identity categories embedded within systems of inequality as a starting point to understanding the interactions between individuals and systems and among individual identities, systems, and social locations across the life course. The categories are fluid and must be examined in combination with each other. Metzl and Hansen's (2014) concept of “structural competency” offers a useful example. It begins with the assumption that “inequalities in health [education, employment, housing, voting, law enforcement, nativity, etc.] must be conceptualized in relation to the institutions and social conditions that determine . . . resources” (p. 127). Discussions of intersectionality address Metzl and Hansen's concerns, described earlier, and emphasize the importance of examining the simultaneity of racism, sexism, heterosexism, classicism, and other axes of inequality for mapping and interrupting the sedimentation of health inequities in health care access and the social determinants of health. This perspective is moving slowly into mainstream health disparities research, as health focuses more directly on the social bases for health determinants ( WHO, 2015 ). Intersectionality considers the multiplicity of policies and practices constructed for different groups. At the same time, it acknowledges the ways these historically situated policies and practices reinscribe positions of power, dominance, and oppression that contribute to the social determinants of health, education, and well-being.

• DEVELOPING AN INTERSECTIONALITY HEALTH EQUITY LENS: CHANGING THE NARRATIVE FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

What happens when health research takes an intersectional stance in producing and using knowledge to effect positive practice and social change and advance equity? In what ways do our personal and professional positionalities contribute to this intersectional stance, our research, and the opportunities afforded by our ways of seeing and knowing the world? How do we address the health inequalities and inequities that reduce these opportunities for children, youth, and families and redirect them to promote social justice?

We are aware that the answers to these questions require time, depth of inquiry, and breadth of analysis, and that they contribute to, rather than outline, a social justice framework. Throughout this essay, we argue that a critical, self-reflexive intersectionality health equity lens and praxis depend upon a visceral commitment to uncovering the workings of the multiple systems of inequality in unpacking the social determinants of health. Such a lens might be expanded to become an “intersectionality equity” lens that questions further how our research, teaching, and practice can enact Crenshaw's (1993) idea of “mapping the margins.” To achieve this, Crenshaw argues, we must center the lives of groups that remain often invisible when we talk about the generic working class “women” or “men” or “Latinos” or “LGBTQ” communities.

In moving forward, we also must be committed to enlarging and diversifying the pool of research scientists who study the issues. By diversity within an intersectionality health equity lens, we are referring to research scientists whose own awareness of their intersectional identities—that is, ethnicity, race, gender, class, sexuality, nativity, and disability—pushes them to design research that produces greater knowledge and clarity about the conceptualization of sound intersectionality-grounded studies and the range of methods to ensure new knowledge, better applications of knowledge, and effective uses of knowledge to guide our understanding of human development and health.

Initiatives focused on advancing social cohesion through intentional efforts to increase the diversity and number of research scientists with lived experiences that reflect multiple intersecting systems of oppression may take different forms. For example, in April 2011, the Institute for the Study of “Race” and Social Justice at the University of New Mexico, with support from a National Institutes of Health workshop grant, convened a group of scholars from the health and biological sciences and social sciences who embodied the intersecting race, gender, sexual orientation, class, age, disability status, religious, ethnic, citizenship, and national origin backgrounds that form the rich tapestry of our diverse union ( Figure 1-1 ).

FIGURE 1–1 |

National Institutes of Health (NIH) R21 Workshop. This gathering convened diverse multidisciplinary scholars for a workshop entitled, “Mapping ‘Race’ & Inequality: Best Practices for Conceptualizing and Operationalizing (more...)

Other activities may include opportunities for interdisciplinary conferences and collaborative research, teaching, and writing. For example, at the University of Pennsylvania, one health disparities course is cofacilitated with tenure-track and clinical faculty within education and across the social sciences, medicine, and nursing. Bringing together all of the insights from health sciences, psychology, anthropology, art history, American studies, and law can actually generate new knowledge and new ways of doing research and developing equity-based policy. It is tremendously powerful to build on interdisciplinary knowledge. It is not the case that any one discipline has all the answers. We need all of us working together, harmoniously, to continue to make advancements and these insights should be reflected in what is considered required coursework for all disciplines interested in health equity.

An intersectionality health equity lens offers enormous possibilities for research projects that take seriously the multiple identities of children, youth, and families in the study of health and human development. One might argue that a relationship exists between social-ecological models of human development and health that highlight the intersections and interactions between and across contexts and discussions of intersectionality that consider social statuses.

In supporting an “intersectionality health equity lens” for research, we accept the limitations of implementation and of ways of looking at problems that children, youth, and families face. In our examples, drawn from our personal and research experiences, we suggest that there is little to no likelihood that a clean, one-size-fits-all approach exists to uncover the multiple intersectional identities in a given situation or sociopolitical and historical context. We also argue that to reveal the full expanse of complex intersecting factors that create social determinants of health and well-being, the discomforts associated with linking the different identities, the tendency to focus on one over another, and the difficulty of determining and building appropriate methodologies will have to be addressed (see Gadsden et al., 2014 , 2015a ). Palència and colleagues (2014) , referring to their research and practice in Barcelona, remind us that “the development of research designs and methods that capture effectively all of the tenets of intersectionality theory remains underexplored” (p. 8). While intersectional analyses have relied heavily on ethnographic approaches, the authors note that “quantitative researchers have acknowledged the tensions between conventional research designs, intended to test for independent effects, and intersectionality principles” (p. 8).

The social sciences and health sciences are making progress toward considering the range of factors outside of simple genetics and social environments that affect health and health interventions. Intersectionality knowledge projects draw upon and have the potential to create innovative research and policy paradigms that can lead to practical measures and solutions for advancing health equity. Such measures map and interrupt inequality among racially stigmatized and other marginalized communities in local, municipal, state, and national contexts. At a minimum, they suggest a revisioning of policies that cut across relevant areas of health, education, social services, and law.

In developing our focus on intersectionality and social determinants of health, we attach our analysis to the goals of advancing social justice, where commitments to equality and equity reside and power is shared. A list of resources focused on intersectionality appears in Box 1-2 and demonstrates the range of efforts. As these efforts suggest, for all health and health policy researchers, scholars, practitioners, and community leaders who embrace a social justice framework, an intersectionality health equity lens could help to illuminate the often stifled issues that affect the health, development, and well-being of children and families in marginalized communities. This would mean that they would take seriously the ways institutional rights and duties allow people to participate and receive resources such as health, education, and social services in ways that are fundamentally shaped by intersecting inequalities. That would also mean promoting equal access to the fair distribution of wealth, equal opportunity, and equality of outcome by making the invisible visible through interrogating how race and class systems of oppression work together in shaping the social determinants of health.

Partial List of Intersectionality-Focused Resources.

Organizations such as the NAM can serve as convergence spaces where intersectionality knowledge projects centering on the lives of multiple and diverse marginalized groups in a given sociohistorical context can be incubated and developed to advance health justice. How specialists see, treat, and understand the human experiences of children and families and the potential for their well-being will be revised. As a result, we begin to address the multiplicity of identities, social positions, and systems of intersecting inequalities that contribute to the social determinants of health for diverse populations of children, youth, and families and move closer to effecting sustainable change and equity.

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See also Gravlee (2009) on when race becomes embodied.

“They” or “their” is used to denote the gender history of the transgender person.

For more information on providing equitable health care services for diverse LGBTQI communities, see Vidal-Ortiz (2005) , NBER (2012) , and Johnson et al. (2017) . For information on the difference between ethical accuracy for civil rights and aesthetic accuracy for compliance only and the value added for having a separate question on Hispanic origin and race for the 2020 Consensus, please see Johnson et al. (2017) .

For more on the AfroLatin@ experience in the United States, see Román and Flores (2010) ; for more information on providing equitable health care services for diverse LGBTQI communities, see Ortiz et al. (2015) ; for more on segregation, see Vidal-Ortiz (2004) , NBER (2012) , and Saenz and Morales (2015) .

• Cite this Page LÓPEZ NANCY, GADSDEN VIVIANL, editors. HEALTH INEQUITIES, SOCIAL DETERMINANTS, AND INTERSECTIONALITY. In: National Academy of Medicine; Alexander C, Murry VMB, Bogard K, editors. Perspectives on Health Equity and Social Determinants of Health. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2017. 1.
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The Inter-Sectionality Theory and Social Inequality Essay

The inter-sectionalist theory indicates that cultural identifiers such as ethnicity, gender, as well as race, are the prime factors contributing to actions that result in mistreating a group of individuals, and uplifting others. Individuals interested in understanding social inequalities have stoutly held onto this theory. This is because; it is the only practical method that effectively addresses issues affecting the minority, underprivileged, as well as discriminated in the society.

To discern the main cause of social inequality, this theory integrates several factors to enhance its appropriateness. This document, therefore, will help to explain Don Imus’ characterization of the Rutgers and the Tennessee Women’s Basketball teams. In addition, it further aims to confirm whether Don Imus and D.L. Hughley’s status as men are indicative of that, maleness brings gender relations, or whether their comments are because of their race.

During a show that marked the fourth edition of MSNBC, Don Imus used abusive language when referring to a group of basketball players from the Rutgers basketball team. The Rutgers University basketball team had more black women players than whites. In his comments, Imus referred to them as “nappy-headed hos”. The term hos is abusive since it refers to harlots. Thus, in clear terms, Imus abused the Rutgers university team by referring to them as harlots, and this resulted in his suspension from work for several weeks. Similarly, he identified the Tennessee women as cute and excellent in their game.

It is, thus, apparent that Don Imus’s characterization of the two basketball teams has been influenced by his race, as well as his ethnic difference. In the Rutgers University team, black-American players are in large proportions, as opposed to the Tennessee basketball team, consisting of white players only. The fact that the Tennessee team consists of white players led to his strong support for the team. This is a clear indication of how racism, as explained by the inter-sectionalist theory, has a strong effect on decisions made by people.

Don Imus himself is white thus his strong support to the Tennessee team. The inter-sectionalist theory designates that black people possess a high chance of suffering from social inequality. It further specifies that black women suffer immensely from racism present in a society that is highly dominated by white. After a careful evaluation of the case together with the theory, it is visible that his actions justify the provisions of the theory. The main reason for the above conclusion is because; he shows disparity for the two teams, which has a strong basis on the two different races, represented.

Don Imus and D.L. Hughley’s status as men shows that maleness brings gender relations. Despite, their racial differences, they still hold to the same idea by referring to the Rutgers team as napkin-headed hos. In case their comments were strongly based on an individual’s race, then we would expect D.L. Hughley, who is black to differ from Don Imus’s statements. Contrary to expectations of different racists, Hughley supports his fellow commentator by repeating and reaffirming his abusive comments, therefore, proving that maleness determines gender relations.

The inter-sectionalist theory is amongst the appropriate methods of explaining the cause of social inequality. It is apparent that the fact that it puts a number of factors into consideration has enhanced its appropriateness in illustrating the cause of social inequality. The Don Imus case to a high notch depicts his racism through his statement, which indicates his like for the white team. However, D.L. Hughley’s support for his fellow ideas designates that maleness other than race determines gender relations.

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Guest Essay

The Happiness Gap Between Left and Right Isn’t Closing

By Thomas B. Edsall

Mr. Edsall contributes a weekly column from Washington, D.C., on politics, demographics and inequality.

Why is it that a substantial body of social science research finds that conservatives are happier than liberals?

A partial answer: Those on the right are less likely to be angered or upset by social and economic inequities, believing that the system rewards those who work hard, that hierarchies are part of the natural order of things and that market outcomes are fundamentally fair.

Those on the left stand in opposition to each of these assessments of the social order, prompting frustration and discontent with the world around them.

The happiness gap has been with us for at least 50 years, and most research seeking to explain it has focused on conservatives. More recently, however, psychologists and other social scientists have begun to dig deeper into the underpinnings of liberal discontent — not only unhappiness but also depression and other measures of dissatisfaction.

One of the findings emerging from this research is that the decline in happiness and in a sense of agency is concentrated among those on the left who stress matters of identity, social justice and the oppression of marginalized groups.

There is, in addition, a parallel phenomenon taking place on the right as Donald Trump and his MAGA loyalists angrily complain of oppression by liberals who engage in a relentless vendetta to keep Trump out of the White House.

There is a difference in the way the left and right react to frustration and grievance. Instead of despair, the contemporary right has responded with mounting anger, rejecting democratic institutions and norms.

In a 2021 Vox article, “ Trump and the Republican Revolt Against Democracy ,” Zack Beauchamp described in detail the emergence of destructive and aggressive discontent among conservatives.

Citing a wide range of polling data and academic studies, Beauchamp found:

More than twice as many Republicans (39 percent) as Democrats (17 percent) believed that “if elected leaders won’t protect America, the people must act — even if that means violence.”

Fifty-seven percent of Republicans considered Democrats to be “enemies,” compared with 41 percent of Democrats who viewed Republicans as “enemies.”

Among Republicans, support for “the use of force to defend our way of life,” as well as for the belief that “strong leaders bend rules” and that “sometimes you have to take the law in your own hands,” grows stronger in direct correlation with racial and ethnic hostility.

Trump has repeatedly warned of the potential for political violence. In January he predicted bedlam if the criminal charges filed in federal and state courts against him damaged his presidential campaign:

I think they feel this is the way they’re going to try and win, and that’s not the way it goes. It’ll be bedlam in the country. It’s a very bad thing. It’s a very bad precedent. As we said, it’s the opening of a Pandora’s box.

Before he was indicted in New York, Trump claimed there would be “potential death and destruction” if he was charged.

At an Ohio campaign rally in March, Trump declared, “If I don’t get elected, it’s going to be a blood bath for the whole country.”

In other words, Trump and his allies respond to adversity and what they see as attacks from the left with threats and anger, while a segment of the left often but not always responds to adversity and social inequity with dejection and sorrow.

There are significant consequences for this internalization.

Jamin Halberstadt , a professor of psychology at the University of Otago in New Zealand and a co-author of “ Outgroup Threat and the Emergence of Cohesive Groups : A Cross-Cultural Examination,” argued in his emailed reply to my inquiry that because “a focus on injustice and victimhood is, by definition, disempowering (isn’t that why we talk of ‘survivors’ rather than ‘victims’?), loss of control is not good for self-esteem or happiness.”

But, he pointed out:

this focus, while no doubt a part of the most visible and influential side of progressive ideology, is still just a part. Liberalism is a big construct, and I’m reluctant to reduce it to a focus on social justice issues. Some liberals have this view, but I suspect their influence is outsized because (a) they have the social media megaphone and (b) we are in a climate in which freedom of expression and, in particular, challenges to the worldview you characterize have been curtailed.

Expanding on this line of argument, Halberstadt wrote:

I’m sure some self-described liberals have views that are counterproductive to their own happiness. One sub-ideology associated with liberalism is, as you describe, a sense of victimhood and grievance. But there is more than one way to respond to structural barriers. Within that group of the aggrieved, some probably see systemic problems that cannot be overcome, and that’s naturally demoralizing and depressing. But others see systemic problems as a challenge to overcome.

Taking Halberstadt’s assessment of the effects of grievance and victimhood a step farther, Timothy A. Judge , the chairman of the department of management and human resources at Notre Dame, wrote in a 2009 paper, “ Core Self-Evaluations and Work Success ”:

Core self-evaluations (C.S.E.) is a broad, integrative trait indicated by self-esteem, locus of control, generalized self-efficacy and (low) neuroticism (high emotional stability). Individuals with high levels of C.S.E. perform better on their jobs, are more successful in their careers, are more satisfied with their jobs and lives, report lower levels of stress and conflict, cope more effectively with setbacks and better capitalize on advantages and opportunities.

I asked Judge and other scholars a question: Have liberal pessimists fostered an outlook that spawns unhappiness as its adherents believe they face seemingly insurmountable structural barriers?

Judge replied by email:

I do share the perspective that a focus on status, hierarchies and institutions that reinforce privilege contributes to an external locus of control. And the reason is fairly straightforward. We can only change these things through collective and, often, policy initiatives — which tend to be complex, slow, often conflictual and outside our individual control. On the other hand, if I view “life’s chances” (Virginia Woolf’s term) to be mostly dependent on my own agency, this reflects an internal focus, which will often depend on enacting initiatives largely within my control.

Judge elaborated on his argument:

If our predominant focus in how we view the world is social inequities, status hierarchies, societal unfairness conferred by privilege, then everyone would agree that these things are not easy to fix, which means, in a sense, we must accept some unhappy premises: Life isn’t fair; outcomes are outside my control, often at the hands of bad, powerful actors; social change depends on collective action that may be conflictual; an individual may have limited power to control their own destiny, etc. These are not happy thoughts because they cause me to view the world as inherently unfair, oppressive, conflictual, etc. It may or may not be right, but I would argue that these are in fact viewpoints of how we view the world, and our place in it, that would undermine our happiness.

Last year, George Yancey , a professor of sociology at Baylor University, published “ Identity Politics, Political Ideology, and Well-Being : Is Identity Politics Good for Our Well-Being?”

Yancey argued that recent events “suggest that identity politics may correlate to a decrease in well-being, particularly among young progressives, and offer an explanation tied to internal elements within political progressiveness.”

By focusing on “political progressives, rather than political conservatives,” Yancey wrote, “a nuanced approach to understanding the relationship between political ideology and well-being begins to emerge.”

Identity politics, he continued, focuses “on external institutional forces that one cannot immediately alleviate.” It results in what scholars call the externalization of one’s locus of control, or viewing the inequities of society as a result of powerful if not insurmountable outside forces, including structural racism, patriarchy and capitalism, as opposed to believing that individuals can overcome such obstacles through hard work and collective effort.

As a result, Yancey wrote, “identity politics may be an important mechanism by which progressive political ideology can lead to lower levels of well-being.”

Conversely, Yancey pointed out, “a class-based progressive cognitive emphasis may focus less on the group identity, generating less of a need to rely on emotional narratives and dichotomous thinking and may be less likely to be detrimental to the well-being of a political progressive.”

Yancey tested this theory using data collected in the 2021 Baylor Religion Survey of 1,232 respondents.

“Certain types of political progressive ideology can have contrasting effects on well-being,” Yancey wrote. “It is plausible that identity politics may explain the recent increase well-being gap between conservatives and progressives.”

Oskari Lahtinen , a senior researcher in psychology at the University of Turku in Finland, published a study in March, “ Construction and Validation of a Scale for Assessing Critical Social Justice Attitudes ,” that reinforces Yancey’s argument.

Lahtinen conducted two surveys of a total of 5,878 men and women to determine the share of Finnish citizens who held “critical social justice attitudes” and how those who held such views differed from those who did not.

Critical social justice proponents, on Lahtinen’s scale,

point out varieties of oppression that cause privileged people (e.g., male, white, heterosexual, cisgender) to benefit over marginalized people (e.g., woman, Black, gay, transgender). In critical race theory, some of the core tenets include that (1) white supremacy and racism are omnipresent and colorblind policies are not enough to tackle them, (2) people of color have their own unique standpoint and (3) races are social constructs.

What did Lahtinen find?

The critical social justice propositions encountered

strong rejection from men. Women expressed more than twice as much support for the propositions. In both studies, critical social justice was correlated modestly with depression, anxiety, and (lack of) happiness, but not more so than being on the political left was.

In an email responding to my inquiries about his paper, Lahtinen wrote that one of the key findings in his research was that “there were large differences between genders in critical social justice advocacy: Three out of five women but only one out of seven men expressed support for the critical social justice claims.”

In addition, he pointed out, “there was one variable in the study that closely corresponded to external locus of control: ‘Other people or structures are more responsible for my well-being than I myself am.’”

The correlation between agreement with this statement and unhappiness was among the strongest in the survey:

People on the left endorsed this item (around 2 on a scale of 0 to 4) far more than people on the right (around 0.5). Endorsing the belief was determined by political party preference much more than by gender, for instance.

Such measures as locus of control, self-esteem, a belief in personal agency and optimism all play major roles in daily life.

In a December 2022 paper, “ The Politics of Depression : Diverging Trends in Internalizing Symptoms Among U.S. Adolescents by Political Beliefs,” Catherine Gimbrone , Lisa M. Bates , Seth Prins and Katherine M. Keyes , all at Columbia’s Mailman School of Public Health, noted that “trends in adolescent internalizing symptoms diverged by political beliefs, sex and parental education over time, with female liberal adolescents experiencing the largest increases in depressive symptoms, especially in the context of demographic risk factors, including parental education.”

“These findings,” they added, “indicate a growing mental health disparity between adolescents who identify with certain political beliefs. It is therefore possible that the ideological lenses through which adolescents view the political climate differentially affect their mental well-being.”

Gimbrone and her co-authors based their work on studies of 85,000 teenagers from 2005 to 2018. They found that

while internalizing symptom scores worsened over time for all adolescents, they deteriorated most quickly for female liberal adolescents. Beginning in approximately 2010 and continuing through 2018, female liberal adolescents reported the largest changes in depressive affect, self-esteem, self-derogation and loneliness.

In conclusion, the authors wrote, “socially underprivileged liberals reported the worst internalizing symptom scores over time, likely indicating that the experiences and beliefs that inform a liberal political identity are ultimately less protective against poor mental health than those that inform a conservative political identity.”

From another vantage point, Nick Haslam , a professor of psychology at the University of Melbourne, argued in his 2020 paper “ Harm Inflation: Making Sense of Concept Creep ” that recent years have seen “a rising sensitivity to harm within at least some Western cultures, such that previously innocuous or unremarked phenomena were increasingly identified as harmful and that this rising sensitivity reflected a politically liberal moral agenda.”

As examples, Haslam wrote that the definition of “trauma” has been

progressively broadened to include adverse life events of decreasing severity and those experienced vicariously rather than directly. “Mental disorder” came to include a wider range of conditions, so that new forms of psychopathology were added in each revision of diagnostic manuals and the threshold for diagnosing some existing forms was lowered. “Abuse” extended from physical acts to verbal and emotional slights and incorporated forms of passive neglect in addition to active aggression.

Haslam described this process as concept creep and argued that “some examples of concept creep are surely the work of deliberate actors who might be called expansion entrepreneurs.”

Concept expansion, Haslam wrote, “can be used as a tactic to amplify the perceived seriousness of a movement’s chosen social problem.” In addition, “such expansion can be effective means of enhancing the perceived seriousness of a social problem or threat by increasing the perceived prevalence of both ‘victims’ and ‘perpetrators.’”

Haslam cited studies showing that strong “correlates of holding expansive concepts of harm were compassion-related trait values, left-liberal political attitudes and forms of morality associated with both.” Holding expansive concepts of harm was also “associated with affective and cognitive empathy orientation and most strongly of all with endorsement of harm- and fairness-based morality.” Many of these characteristics are associated with the political left.

“The expansion of harm-related concepts has implications for acceptable self-expression and free speech,” Haslam wrote. “Creeping concepts enlarge the range of expressions judged to be unacceptably harmful, thereby increasing calls for speech restrictions. Expansion of the harm-related concepts of hate and hate speech exemplifies this possibility.”

While much of the commentary on the progressive left has been critical, Haslam takes a more ambivalent position: “Sometimes concept creep is presented in an exclusively negative frame,” he wrote, but that fails to address the “positive implications. To that end, we offer three positive consequences of the phenomenon.”

The first is that expansionary definitions of harm “can be useful in drawing attention to harms previously overlooked. Consider the vertical expansion of abuse to include emotional abuse.”

Second, “concept creep can prevent harmful practices by modifying social norms.” For example, “changing definitions of bullying that include social exclusion and antagonistic acts expressed horizontally rather than only downward in organizational hierarchies may also entrench norms against the commission of destructive behavior.”

And finally:

The expansion of psychology’s negative concepts can motivate interventions aimed at preventing or reducing the harms associated with the newly categorized behaviors. For instance, the conceptual expansion of addiction to include behavioral addictions (e.g., gambling and internet addictions) has prompted a flurry of research into treatment options, which has found that a range of psychosocial treatments can be successfully used to treat gambling, internet and sexual addictions.

Judge suggested an approach to this line of inquiry that he believed might offer a way for liberalism to regain its footing:

I would like to think that there is a version of modern progressivism that accepts many of the premises of the problem and causes of inequality but does so in a way that also celebrates the power of individualism, of consensus and of common cause. I know this is perhaps naïve. But if we give in to cynicism (that consensus can’t be found), that’s self-reinforcing, isn’t it? I think about the progress on how society now views sexual orientation and the success stories. The change was too slow, painful for many, but was there any other way?

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Thomas B. Edsall has been a contributor to the Times Opinion section since 2011. His column on strategic and demographic trends in American politics appears every Wednesday. He previously covered politics for The Washington Post. @ edsall