simple essay about know thyself

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August 7, 2018 | Kenneth Best - UConn Communications

Know Thyself: The Philosophy of Self-Knowledge

Dating back to an ancient Greek inscription, the injunction to 'know thyself' has encouraged people to engage in a search for self-understanding. Philosophy professor Mitchell Green discusses its history and relevance to the present.

From Socrates to today's undergraduates, philosophy professor Mitchell Green discusses the history and current relevance of the human quest for self-knowledge. (Getty Images)

UConn philosopher Mitchell S. Green leads a Massive Open Online Course (MOOC) titled Know Thyself: The Value and Limits of Self-Knowledge  on the online learning platform Coursera. The course is based on his 2018 book (published by Routledge) of the same name. He recently spoke with Ken Best of UConn Today about the philosophy and understanding of self-knowledge. This is an edited transcript of their discussion.

Q. ‘Know Thyself’ was carved into stone at the entrance to Apollo’s temple at Delphi in Greece, according to legend. Scholars, philosophers, and civilizations have debated this question for a long time. Why have we not been able to find the answer?

A. I’m not sure that every civilization or even most civilizations have taken the goal to achieve self-knowledge as being among the most important ones. It comes and goes. It did have cachet in the Greece of 300-400 BC. Whether it had similar cachet 200 years later or had something like cultural importance in the heyday of Roman civilization is another question. Of course some philosophers would have enjoined people to engage in a search for self-understanding; some not so much. Likewise, think about the Middle Ages. There’s a case in which we don’t get a whole lot of emphasis on knowing the self, instead the focus was on knowing God. It’s only when Descartes comes on the scene centuries later that we begin to get more of a focus on introspection and understanding ourselves by looking within. Also, the injunction to “know thyself” is not a question, and would have to be modified in some way to pose a question. However, suppose the question is, “Is it possible to know oneself, either in part or fully.” In that case, I’d suggest that we’ve made considerable progress in answering this question over the last two millennia, and in the Know Thyself book, and in the MOOC of the same name, I try to guide readers and students through some of what we have learned.

Q. You point out that the shift Descartes brought about is a turning point in Western philosophy.

A. Right. It’s for various reasons cultural, political, economic, and ideological that the norm of self-knowledge has come and gone with the tides through Western history. Even if we had been constantly enjoined to achieve self-knowledge for the 2,300 years since the time Socrates spoke, just as Sigmund Freud said about civilization – that civilization is constantly being created anew and everyone being born has to work their way up to being civilized being – so, too, the project of achieving self-knowledge is a project for every single new member of our species. No one can be given it at birth. It’s not an achievement you get for free like a high IQ or a prominent chin. Continuing to beat that drum, to remind people of the importance of that, is something we’ll always be doing. I’m doubtful we’ll ever reach a point we can all say: Yup, we’re good on that. We’ve got that covered, we’ve got self-knowledge down. That’s a challenge for each of us, every time somebody is born. I would also say, given the ambient, environmental factors as well as the predilections that we’re born with as part of our cognitive and genetic nature, there are probably pressures that push against self-knowledge as well. For instance, in the book I talk about the cognitive immune system that tends to make us spin information in our own favor. When something goes bad, there’s a certain part of us, hopefully within bounds, that tends to see the glass as half full rather than half empty. That’s probably a good way of getting yourself up off the floor after you’ve been knocked down.

Q. Retirement planners tell us you’re supposed to know yourself well enough to know what your needs are going to be – create art or music, or travel – when you have all of your time to use. At what point should that point of getting to know yourself better begin?

A. I wouldn’t encourage a 9-year-old to engage in a whole lot of self-scrutiny, but I would say even when you’re young some of those indirect, especially self-distancing, types of activities, can be of value. Imagine a 9-year-old gets in a fight on the playground and a teacher asks him: Given what you said to the other kid that provoked the fight, if he had said that to you, how would you feel? That might be intended to provoke an inkling of self-knowledge – if not in the form of introspection, in the form of developing empathetic skills, which I think is part of self-knowledge because it allows me to see myself through another’s eyes. Toward the other end of the lifespan, I’d also say in my experience lots of people who are in, or near, retirement have the idea they’re going to stop working and be really happy. But I find in some cases that this expectation is not realistic because so many people find so much fulfillment, and rightly so, in their work. I would urge people to think about what it is that gives them satisfaction? Granted we sometimes find ourselves spitting nails as we think about the challenges our jobs present to us. But in some ways that frequent grumbling, the kind of hair-pulling stress and so forth, these might be part of what makes life fulfilling. More importantly, long-term projects, whether as part of one’s career or post-career, tend I think to provide more intellectual and emotional sustenance than do the more ephemeral activities such as cruises, safaris, and the like.

Q. We’re on a college campus with undergraduates trying to learn more about themselves through what they’re studying. They’re making decisions on what they might want to do with the rest of their life, taking classes like philosophy that encourage them to think about this. Is this an optimal time for this to take place?

A. For many students it’s an optimal time. I consider one component of a liberal arts education to be that of cultivation of the self. Learning a lot of stuff is important, but in some ways that’s just filling, which might be inert unless we give it form, or structure. These things can be achieved through cultivation of the self, and if you want to do that you have to have some idea of how you want it to grow and develop, which requires some inkling of what kind of person you think you are and what you think you can be. Those are achievements that students can only attain by trying things and seeing what happens. I am not suggesting that a freshman should come to college and plan in some rigorous and lockstep way to learn about themselves, cultivate themselves, and bring themselves into fruition as some fully formed adult upon graduation. Rather, there is much more messiness; much more unpredictable try things, it doesn’t work, throw it aside, try something else. In spite of all that messiness and ambient chaos, I would also say in the midst of that there is potential for learning about yourself; taking note of what didn’t go well, what can I learn from that? Or that was really cool, I’d like to build on that experience and do more of it. Those are all good ways of both learning about yourself and constructing yourself. Those two things can go hand-in-hand. Self-knowledge, self-realization, and self-scrutiny can happen, albeit in an often messy and unpredictable way for undergraduates. It’s also illusory for us to think at age 22 we can put on our business clothes and go to work and stop with all that frivolous self-examination. I would urge that acquiring knowledge about yourself, understanding yourself is a lifelong task.

Q. There is the idea that you should learn something new every day. A lot of people who go through college come to understand this, while some think after graduation, I’m done with that. Early in the book, you talk about Socrates’ defense of himself when accused of corrupting students by teaching them in saying: I know what I don’t know, which is why I ask questions.

It seems to me the beginning of wisdom of any kind, including knowledge of ourselves, is acknowledgment of the infirmity of our beliefs and the paucity of our knowledge. — Mitchell S. Green

A. That’s very important insight on his part. That’s something I would be inclined to yell from the rooftops, in the sense that one big barrier to achieving anything in the direction of self-knowledge is hubris, thinking that we do know, often confusing our confidence in our opinions with thinking that confidence is an indication of my degree of correctness. We feel sure, and take that surety itself to be evidence of the truth of what we think. Socrates is right to say that’s a cognitive error, that’s fallacious reasoning. We should ask ourselves: Do I know what I take myself to know? It seems to me the beginning of wisdom of any kind, including knowledge of ourselves, is acknowledgment of the infirmity of our beliefs and the paucity of our knowledge; the fact that opinions we have might just be opinions. It’s always astonishing to me the disparity between the confidence with which people express their opinions, on one hand, and the negligible ability they have to back them up, especially those opinions that go beyond just whether they’re hungry or prefer chocolate over vanilla. Those are things over which you can probably have pretty confident opinions. But when it comes to politics or science, history or human psychology, it’s surprising to me just how gullible people are, not because they believe what other people say, so to speak, but rather they believe what they themselves say. They tend to just say: Here is what I think. It seems obvious to me and I’m not willing to even consider skeptical objections to my position.

Q. You also bring into the fold the theory of adaptive unconscious – that we observe and pick up information but we don’t realize it at the time. How much does that feed into people thinking that they know themselves better than they do and know more than they think they do?

A. It’s huge. There’s a chapter in the book on classical psychoanalysis and Freud. I argue that the Freudian legacy is a broken one, in the sense that while his work is incredibly interesting – he made a lot of provocative and ingenious claims interesting – surprisingly few of them have been borne out with empirical evidence. This is a less controversial view than it was in the past. Experimental psychologists in the 1970s and 80s began to ask how many of those Freudian claims about the unconscious can be established in a rigorous, experimental way? The theory of the adaptive unconscious is an attempt to do that; to find out how much of the unconscious mind that Freud posited is real, and what is it like. One of the main findings is that the unconscious mind is not quite as bound up, obsessed with, sexuality and violence as posited by Freud. It’s still a very powerful system, but not necessarily a thing to be kept at bay in the way psychoanalysis would have said. According to Freud, a great deal with the unconscious poses a constant threat to the well-functioning of civilized society, whereas for people like Tim Wilson, Tanya Chartrand, Daniel Gilbert, Joseph LeDoux, Paul Ekman, and many others, we’ve got a view that says that in many ways having an adaptive unconsciousness is a useful thing, an outsourcing of lots of cognition. It allows us to process information, interpret it, without having to consciously, painstakingly, and deliberately calculate things. It’s really good in many ways that we have adaptive unconscious. On the other hand, it tends to predispose us, for example, to things like prejudice. Today there is a discussion about so-called implicit bias, which has taught us that because we grew up watching Hollywood movies where protagonist heroes were white or male, or both; saw stereotypes in advertising that have been promulgated – that experience, even if I have never had a consciously bigoted, racist, or sexist thought in my life, can still cause me to make choices that are biased. That’s a part of the message on the theory of adaptive unconscious we would want to take very seriously and be worried about, because it can affect our choices in ways that we’re not aware of.

Q. With all of this we’ve discussed, what kind of person would know themselves well?

A. Knowing oneself well would, I suspect, be a multi-faceted affair, only one part of which would have to do with introspection as that notion is commonly understood. One of these facets involves acknowledging your limitations, “owning them” as my Department of Philosophy colleague Heather Battaly would put it. Those limitations can be cognitive – my lousy memory that distorts information, my tendency to sugarcoat any bad news I may happen to receive? Take the example of a professor reading student evaluations. It’s easy to forget the negative ones and remember the positive ones – a case of “confirmation bias,” as that term is used in psychology. Knowing that I tend to do that, if that’s what I tend to do, allows me to take a second look, as painful as it might be. Again, am I overly critical of others? Do I tend to look at the glass as overly half full or overly half empty? Those are all limitations of the emotional kind, or at least have an important affective dimension. I suspect a person who knows herself well knows how to spot the characteristic ways in which she “spins” or otherwise distorts positive or negative information, and can then step back from such reactions, rather than taking them as the last word.

I’d also go back to empathy, knowing how to see things from another person’s point of view. It is not guaranteed to, but is often apt to allow me to see myself more effectively, too. If I can to some extent put myself into your shoes, then I also have the chance to be able to see myself through your eyes and that might get me to realize things difficult to see from the first-person perspective. Empathizing with others who know me might, for instance, help to understand why they sometimes find me overbearing, cloying, or quick to judge.

Q. What would someone gain in self-knowledge by listening to someone appraising them and speaking to them about how well they knew them? How does that dynamic help?

A. It can help, but it also can be shocking. Experiments have suggested other people’s assessments of an individual can often be very out of line with that person’s self-assessment. It’s not clear those other person’s assessments are less accurate – in some cases they’re more accurate – as determined by relatively well-established objective psychological assessments. Third-person assessments can be both difficult to swallow – bitter medicine – and also extremely valuable. Because they’re difficult to swallow, I would suggest taking them in small doses. But they can help us to learn about ourselves such things as that we can be unaccountably solicitous, or petty, or prone to one-up others, or thick-skinned. I’ve sometimes found myself thinking while speaking to someone, “If you could hear yourself talking right now, you might come to realize …” Humblebragging is a case in point, in which someone is ostensibly complaining about a problem, but the subtext of what they’re saying might be self-promoting as well.

All this has implications for those of us who teach. At the end of the semester I encourage my graduate assistants to read course evaluations; not to read them all at once, but instead try to take one suggestion from those evaluations that they can work on going into the next semester. I try to do the same. I would not, however, expect there ever to be a point at which one could say, “Ah! Now I fully know myself.” Instead, this is more likely a process that we can pursue, and continue to benefit from, our entire lives.

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Know Thyself

“Know thyself” is the dictum which appeared on the front of the temple in Delphi. But what does that mean and why is it important?

Presumably, it means to know, first and foremost, one’s own character and it is important because only by knowing one’s character can one be aware of one’s limitations and avoid likening oneself to the gods. But, more simply, it is only by knowing one’s character that one can try and improve from a moral point of view, or make the right decisions in one’s life.

Centuries have gone past and one important addition to that Delphic injunction has come from the discovery of the unconscious. Again, it looks as if it is only by knowing our deep-seated feelings, desires, beliefs and intentions that we can actually improve our lives.

Thus, if you start approaching the issue from the Delphic injunction, there seems to be a certain distance between each subject and themselves. One’s character is not only what we manifest in acting and by living as we do, but it is also an object for each of us to study and make sense of, as if alien.

In fact, it consists of one’s dispositional mental states, let them be conscious or unconscious, which are the object of what, in The Varieties of Self-Knowledge , I call “third personal self-knowledge”. That is to say, in order to get knowledge of those mental states, we need to engage in quite complex epistemic procedures that have no guarantee of being successful. In fact, they are broadly akin to the ones we use to gain knowledge of other people’s minds. Yet, when successfully executed, these procedures give us substantial knowledge of ourselves. They give us knowledge that is sometimes difficult to attain and which is valuable because it discloses to us important truths about ourselves, on the basis of which we can eventually make decisions that can actually improve the quality of our lives.

Still, there is an important difference between the application of these epistemic procedures in one’s own case and in the case of other people. Namely, often times, in our own case and in our own case only, the prompts we have to start with are inner feelings and other occurrent mental states we are immediately aware of. That is, mental states we are aware of in a “first-personal” way.

The overarching claim of The Varieties of Self-Knowledge is that a comprehensive account of self-knowledge should be an account of both first- and third-personal self-knowledge. Oddly enough, the contemporary debate on self-knowledge has tended to be oblivious to this rather obvious desideratum. On the one hand, behaviorists, for instance, have tried to reduce all of self-knowledge to third-personal self-knowledge. In a similar vein, contemporary cog.sci.-informed philosophers, like Peter Carruthers and Eric Schwitzgebel, have tried to deny the existence of first-personal self-knowledge drawing on recent empirical data, which show how ignorant or positively mistaken we can be regarding our own minds. Contemporary proponents of an inferentialist conception of self-knowledge, like Quassim Cassam, have tried to diminish the role of first-personal self-knowledge by arguing that at most it would give us knowledge of rather irrelevant mental states – like feeling pain in one’s foot right now. By contrast, in his view, important truths about oneself could only be revealed through inference to the best explanation starting with the observation of one’s own behavior and inner promptings . While I do agree that the latter kind of knowledge is certainly more interesting, it should be recognized that it would simply be impossible without knowledge of one’s occurrent mental states. Furthermore, while certainly not revelatory of one’s character, one’s first-personal knowledge of one’s own bodily sensations like pains, for instance, clearly serves an invaluable role. It is only that way that we can avoid certain dangers and set forth eradicating their causes. Finally, although a case can be made, based on empirical findings, against the width of first-personal self-knowledge, this does not mean that it is vanishingly small.

On the other hand, if one looks at the purely philosophical literature on self-knowledge, which has developed in the last fifty years or so, one will be struck by quite the opposite phenomenon. Namely, an enormous amount of attention has been devoted to first-personal self-knowledge with very little work done on third-personal self-knowledge. Why so? Well, because of what I would call a kind of philosophical snobbery. Let me explain. Since at least Descartes, philosophers have been puzzled by the characteristic traits of first-personal self-knowledge. For our minds seem to be “transparent” to us. Whatever is occurring within them, it seems immediately evident to us. The painful or pleasurable sensations I am feeling right now are “self-intimating”. If I am feeling pain in my foot, I am immediately aware of it, and if I have the relevant concepts, I can immediately self-ascribe that sensation. Conversely, if I do so ascribe it, unless there are reasons to doubt of my sincerity or of being cognitively well-functioning, the self-ascription is guaranteed to be correct. We therefore appear to be “authoritative” with respect to our own mental states. Since, however, such knowledge is not independent of experience, nor is it based on an observation of our own mental states, through something like a mental eye, or on the observation of our own behavior and on the inference to its likely cause, we seem to be confronted with a serious epistemological problem. How does that knowledge come about and how can it exhibit those traits, which seem to set it apart from all other kinds of empirical knowledge we have—that is, transparency and authority? The difficulty of making sense of this epistemological problem has led many philosophers to discard third-personal self-knowledge as philosophically uninteresting, because they have always ultimately considered it just one more instance of knowledge based on inference to the best explanation.

Indeed, some contemporary theorists, like Richard Moran, have gone so far as to argue that it is only when we deliberate what to believe, desire and intend, based on weighing reasons, that we are actually capable of first-personal self-knowledge. While in all other cases—that is to say, in those cases where we gain knowledge of ourselves through third-personal means and, interestingly, also when we make self-ascriptions of occurrent sensations—we would not be operating in that mode and there wouldn’t be anything epistemologically distinctive.

Again, I do agree that there is something epistemologically puzzling about first-personal self-knowledge and that it is a phenomenon in need of philosophical explanation. Yet, third-personal self-knowledge too is epistemologically interesting, once one realizes the variety of methods by means of which it can come about, over and beyond inference to the best explanation. Moreover, while I do agree that there is definitely something distinctive about our knowledge of what I would call our “commissive propositional attitudes”, I do think that self-ascriptions of sensations are also a manifestation of first-personal self-knowledge, even though, as we will see, they do call for a subtly different account than the one we might want to give for our knowledge of our commissive propositional attitudes.

11 Comments

I believe that historians often interpret “Know Thyself” as “know your place in the scheme of things – where you fit in society.”

Maybe so. Originally it was meant to remind humans of their limitations.

The dual approach that that Annalisa Coliva recommends, which allows both first-person and third-person routes to self-knowledge, seems to me very sound indeed. Often in spite of all the external “third-person”) evidence we can know (n.b.) what is going on with us, by some small but persistent and closely-held private insight. On the other hand, a whole world of private personal insights can be rotten and fall apart at a word or two from a friend or someone who knows us, and is perhaps a little unsympathetic. I am moved to wonder whether there isn’t such a thing as “second-person” knowledge. This would be the same as third-person knowledge in Coliva’s sense (which seems to be a matter of method as well as available data), but differ in regard to the relationship to the one known of the knower. “You” is different from “She” and “He”. There can be an element of accusation, say, or a compliment and a celebration, or a confrontation, which you don’t get in third-person style reports. I am thinking of Tolstoy’s account of sharing a room with his older brother, both now grown men, and Tolstoy kneeling by the side of the bed as he had done since childhood, to pray, and his brother looking at him and say, ‘You don’t still do that, do you?’ Tolstoy reports that at that moment his childhood faith collapsed. He had not himself known that his faith had been dead for a long time, but his brother knew. This is the sort of perhaps confrontational thing thing I had mind as “second-person” knowledge parallel to Annalisa Coliva’s other two senses.

Coliva recognizes the epistemological problem about first-person self-knowledge. How do I know that I am feeling uneasy, say? I wonder whether she would share with us any insight she has into this problem. Sometimes I think of it like this. There is the first-person state, uneasiness, over in the left-hand corner. In the right is me, doing something called “feeling” the state. Now is this like a person feeling a bolt of cloth, say, or feeling the texture of a coat? And if so, what is the perceptual system, the mechanism by which we do it?

That’s great Jonathan! I do think there is third-personal self-knowledge based on testimony. More on that in the next post. And indeed I will say more about my views about first-personal self-knowledge in the third one.

I will also say more about the way in which we can get to know ourselves through the interction with others and even through literature and movies.

How would I realize that I am feeling uneasy, say? I ponder whether she would impart to us any knowledge she has into this issue. In some cases I consider it like this. There is the main individual state, uneasiness, over in the left-hand corner. In the privilege is me, accomplishing something many refer to as “feeling” the state. Presently is this like a man feeling an electrical jolt, say, or feeling the surface of a coat? What’s more, assuming this is the case, what is the perceptual framework, the component by which we isn’t that right? A lot seems counter-factual and ridiculous Brainology

A philosophical position of very great interest is seond person knowledge about ourselves, a knowledge that is neither equal to first person knowledge of ourselves or to the third person point of view. Instead of discussing this, my point of view is that we can learn much about ourselves and others by studying the second person access to ourselves.

Correction…nor to the third person point of view.

Thanks Olav. If you prefer to call self-knowledge based on testimony second-person self-knowledge, no problem. What matters, anyway, is the fact that testimony is a source of self-knowledge. More on this in the second post, which is now out.

I understand: Stimuli to brain reveal states of mind which can be identified as in two parts. 1.A mental state (correlated to brain state)in its feelings,emotions & dispositions.These are all based on neuronal reactions. These are first- personal traits and 2.A mental activity (Correlated to brain activity)related to stimuli and neuronal reactions. The mental parts correlated to neuronal reactions is the present interacting self.We can call them mental reactions to stimuli.

We can know the mental state in a higher level consciousness directly.The lower level consciousness is capable of knowing the activity portion.Our character can be known indirectly through several observations of behaviour,indirectly.These are third- personal traits.

Thanks for the comment! I do not talk about brain activity. I do not think we can directly know brain activities as such. My book concernes only mental self-ascriptions, whatever their realization might be. In the third post, I will address the issue of first-personal self-knowledge. But yes, you are right that I think we can know our own mental dispositions in a third personal way, using a variety of methods, which I’ve briefly presented in the second post.

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Self-Knowledge

In philosophy, “self-knowledge” standardly refers to knowledge of one’s own mental states—that is, of what one is feeling or thinking, or what one believes or desires. At least since Descartes, most philosophers have believed that self-knowledge differs markedly from our knowledge of the external world (where this includes our knowledge of others’ mental states). But there is little agreement about what precisely distinguishes self-knowledge from knowledge in other realms. Partly because of this disagreement, philosophers have endorsed competing accounts of how we achieve self-knowledge and of its epistemic status. These accounts have important consequences for a broad range of issues in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and moral psychology.

This entry focuses on knowledge of one’s own mental states. A separate topic sometimes referred to as “self-knowledge” is knowledge about a persisting self. This topic is addressed in a supplement: Knowledge of the Self .

1.1 Epistemic security

1.2 special method, 1.4 first-person authority, 2.1 general doubts, 2.2 doubts based on empirical results, 3.1 acquaintance accounts, 3.2 inner sense accounts, 3.3 self-interpretation accounts, 3.4 empiricist transparency accounts, 3.5 reasons accounts, 3.6 rationalist accounts, 3.7 agentialist accounts, 3.8 expressivist accounts, works cited, further reading, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the distinctiveness of self-knowledge.

What is special about self-knowledge, compared to knowledge in other domains? Self-knowledge is thought to differ from other sorts of knowledge in one or more of the following ways.

• Self-knowledge is especially secure, epistemically.
• Self-knowledge is (sometimes) acquired by use of an exclusively first-personal method.
• Our capacity for self-knowledge reflects our cognitive agency.
• One’s pronouncements about one’s own mental states carry a special authority or presumption of truth.

The differences between these are subtle. Statement (1) identifies the distinctive feature of self-knowledge as the epistemic status of a certain class of beliefs, whereas statement (2) identifies it by the method one uses in forming these beliefs. Statement (3) emphasizes the subject’s agency, typically in relation to attitudes like beliefs and intentions, which are sensitive to reasons. Statement (4) focuses on the way that self-ascriptions of mental states, such as saying “I’m in pain”, are treated by others. Statements (1) and (2) are ways of cashing out the notion that we enjoy “privileged access” to our own mental states. Only these first two statements construe the distinctive feature of self-knowledge as plainly epistemic; however, most who endorse (3) also claim that this agential relation grounds a special epistemic relation. A minority of philosophers denies that self-knowledge is special at all (see Section 2).

The strongest epistemic claims on behalf of self-knowledge are infallibility and omniscience. One is infallible about one’s own mental states if and only if (hereafter, “ iff ”) one cannot have a false belief to the effect that one is in a certain mental state. One is omniscient about one’s own states iff being in a mental state suffices for knowing that one is in that state. (This omniscience thesis is sometimes expressed by saying that mental states are self-intimating or self-presenting .) Few if any contemporary philosophers maintain that we are infallible or omniscient about all of our mental states. Here is a simple example that challenges both infallibility and omniscience. Kate trusts her therapist’s insights into her own psychology, and so she believes him when he tells her that she distrusts her mother. But the therapist is mistaken—in fact, Kate trusts her mother. Hence, Kate’s self-ascription I distrust my mother shows that she is fallible about her own attitudes (mistakenly taking herself to distrust her mother) and that she is not omniscient (she fails to recognize that she trusts her mother).

In the case described, Kate’s belief about her attitude is based on the testimony of another person. A more restricted infallibility thesis would limit the relevant domain to self-ascriptions based on an exclusively first-personal method—perhaps introspection . Descartes thought that we could in principle achieve infallibility in this circumscribed realm, but only by exercising meticulous care:

There remains sensations, emotions and appetites. These may be clearly perceived provided we take great care in our judgments concerning them to include no more than what is strictly contained in our perception—no more than that of which we have inner awareness. But this is a very difficult rule to observe, at least with regard to sensations. (Descartes 1644/1984: I.66, p. 216)

A common objection to even restricted infallibility claims is the idea, often attributed to Wittgenstein, that where one cannot be wrong, one cannot be right either. For instance, Wright maintains that the possibility of error is required for concept application, which is in turn required for substantial self-knowledge.“[E]rror—if only second-order error—has to be possible, if a genuine exercise of concepts is involved” (Wright 1989: 634).

In its unqualified form, the omniscience thesis seems even less plausible than the unqualified infallibility thesis. [ 1 ] On pain of regress, omniscience seems to require that self-knowledge is not always a matter of grasping one mental state by being in another: that is, it seems to require that some mental states comprehend themselves (so to speak). James rejected this idea.

No subjective state, whilst present, is its own object; its object is always something else. (James 1884: 2)

Some modify the omniscience thesis by claiming that, for some states, anyone who is in a state of that kind is justified in believing that she is, even if the thinker doesn’t actually have this belief (Peacocke 1999; Siewert 1998; Silins 2012; Smithies 2012). Horgan and Kriegel (2007) defend a modified omniscience thesis, based on the idea that sensations are by definition conscious.

Others argue that we are infallible or omniscient about our beliefs and other attitudes because there is a constitutive connection between the first-order attitude and the belief that one has that attitude (see 3.6 and 3.7). This connection varies. On some views, so long as we are rational and have the relevant concepts, believing that p constitutes a belief that one believes that p (Shoemaker 1994). Others reverse the constitution relation: taking oneself to believe that p can constitute believing that p (Coliva 2012a, Bauman 2017).

Claims of infallibility and omniscience concern general relations between beliefs about mental states and those mental states themselves. The most famous philosophical argument involving self-knowledge, Descartes’ cogito argument (Descartes 1641/1895), does not concern these general relations. Instead, it concerns the certainty of a particular instance of belief. Descartes aims to demonstrate that, so long as you are carefully attending to your own thoughts, you can know with certain that you’re thinking—and, hence, that you exist. This can be certain even if there is a supremely powerful evil genius who controls your thoughts and seeks to deceive you.

Perhaps the most widely accepted view along these lines is that self-knowledge, even if not absolutely certain, is more secure, epistemically, than other kinds of empirical knowledge—most obviously, perceptual knowledge. Some who take this line maintain that there is a causal gap between a perceptual state and its object, and this gap introduces sources of error that are absent in direct introspective apprehension of a sensation (Russell 1917; Chalmers 2003; Gertler 2012; Horgan 2012; Siewert 2012).

Most philosophers accept that there is some method of grasping one’s own mental states that is special in the sense that it is available exclusively to the subject. Traditionally, this special method was construed as a kind of “inward” gaze, directed at the mental state to be grasped.

The term “introspection”’—literally, “looking within”—captures a traditional way of conceiving how we grasp our own mental states. This term uses a spatial metaphor to express a divide between the “inner” world of thought and the “external” world. The term “introspection” is used in various ways in the self-knowledge literature. Perhaps the most common usage is that suggested by the term’s literal meaning: on this usage, introspection is inner observation—or “inwardly directed attention” (Goldman 2006: 246)—that, when successful, yields awareness of a mental state. The notion that inner observation is the special method by which we achieve self-knowledge is central to the acquaintance and inner sense accounts (see 3.1 and 3.2 below).

While the term “introspection” connotes a looking within, a view that has recently gained prominence envisions the method unique to self-knowledge as requiring precisely the opposite. On this view, we ascertain our own thoughts by looking outward, to the states of the world they represent. This is known as the transparency method, in that self-knowledge is achieved by “looking through” the (transparent) mental state, directly to the state of the world it represents. This view is associated with a famous passage from Evans.

[I]n making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward—upon the world. If someone asks me “Do you think there is going to be a third world war?”, I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question “Will there be a third world war?” (Evans 1982: 225)

The idea that the special method by which we achieve self-knowledge involves transparency is central to empiricist transparency accounts (see 3.4 ) and to some agentialist accounts (see 3.7 ).

Many of our mental states, such as itches and tickles, are states we simply undergo. But some argue that others are active. “Our rational beliefs and intentions are not mere mental attitudes, but active states of normative commitment” (Korsgaard 2009: 39). This idea inspires the claim, central to many versions of agentialism, that the truly distinctive kind of self-knowledge is knowledge of these “active states of normative commitment” (see 3.7 ). Such self-knowledge is distinctive because believing and intending are things we do . According to these agentialists, this means that rational beliefs and intentions are not known simply through observation, which is the means by which we know other empirical phenomena (including sensations).

The views just described take the subject to be in a special epistemic position, vis-à-vis her own mental states. But a competing approach, sometimes attributed to Wittgenstein (Wright 1989), maintains that the special authority of self-ascriptions is primarily a matter of social-linguistic practices, which dictate that we should treat subjects as authoritative about their own states. On this view, one who responds to a self-ascription like “I believe that it’s raining” with “no, you don’t” (in ordinary circumstances) exhibits a misunderstanding of social-linguistic norms.

The first-person authority view diagnoses the authority granted to self-ascriptions as deriving from social norms rather than from the subject's privileged epistemic position. Strictly speaking, then, this position is not concerned with self- knowledge . However, some contemporary expressivist accounts (see 3.8 ) regard the phenomenon of first-person authority as centrally important to understanding self-knowledge.

2. Doubts about the distinctiveness of self-knowledge

The idea that self-knowledge is not profoundly special was especially prevalent during the heyday of behaviorism. For instance, Ryle (1949) suggests that the difference between self-knowledge and other-knowledge is at most a matter of degree, and stems from the mundane fact that each of us is always present to observe our own behavior.

Doubts about self-knowledge are also fueled by more general epistemological concerns, such as doubts about the possibility of theory-free observations (Dennett 1991), and the familiar worry that the observational process unavoidably alters the target of observation (Hill 1991). [ 2 ] Others argue that while self-attributions may express self-knowledge, they are not epistemically superior to other kinds of beliefs.

I suspect … [that our] judgments about the world to a large extent drive our judgments about our experience. Properly so, since the former are the more secure. (Schwitzgebel 2008: 268)

In the same vein, some (including Stich 1983) deny that self-knowledge is special, relative to knowledge of others’ states, by claiming that ordinary (“folk”) concepts of psychological states are theoretical concepts. If psychological states are theoretical entities, both self-ascriptions and other-ascriptions will proceed by inference from observed data—presumably, behavior. (See the entry on folk psychology as a theory .)

Skepticism of a different kind stems from a puzzle raised by Boghossian (1989). On most accounts, attitudes such as desires and beliefs are individuated in part by their relations to other states and/or the environment. [ 3 ] For example, a desire for lemonade partly consists in being disposed to go to the refrigerator when one believes that there is lemonade there, and to feeling happy at the prospect of drinking lemonade. Believing there is lemonade in the refrigerator partly consists in being disposed to go to the refrigerator when one desires lemonade, and to feeling surprise if one finds the refrigerator empty. More generally, dispositional (or “standing”) beliefs and desires consist, partly or wholly, in dispositions to reason, behave, and affectively react in certain ways, relative to circumstances ( see the entry on belief ). Boghossian’s puzzle concerns how we could have privileged access to our relationally-individuated mental states. He considers three ways that self-knowledge could be achieved: (a) on the basis of inner observation, (b) on the basis of inference, or (c) on the basis of nothing. He argues that (a) would not allow for knowledge of relationally-individuated states, and that (b) and (c) do not provide for access that is truly privileged. The result is a trilemma regarding self-knowledge.

Philosophers have responded to Boghossian’s trilemma in a variety of ways. Some deny the assumption that recognizing a relationally-individuated state requires identifying the relational properties that make it the state that it is (Burge 1988; Heil 1988). Others argue that self-knowledge can be privileged even if it rests on inference (Dretske 1994; Byrne 2005; Lawlor 2009). And some maintain that we can know our attitudes through introspective observation, and that this weakens the case for relational construals of attitudes (Pitt 2004).

Empirical work in psychology constitutes another source of doubt about the epistemic status of self-ascriptions. In a widely cited paper, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) present studies showing that subjects routinely misidentify the factors that influenced their reasoning processes. For instance, subjects in one study explained their preference for a product by its apparent quality, when in fact the products were all precisely alike: the subjects’ preferences were apparently driven by the product’s spatial position relative to its competitors seemed to drive the preferences.

The accuracy of subject reports is so poor as to suggest that any introspective access that may exist is not sufficient to produce generally correct or reliable reports. (1977: 33)

While these studies are instructive, Wilson acknowledges that their results are limited in that they apply only to the unconscious sources of decisions; they are silent as to our privileged access to our current states.

[T]o the extent that people’s responses are caused by the conscious self, they have privileged access to the actual causes of these responses; in short, the Nisbett and Wilson argument was wrong about such cases. (Wilson 2002: 106)

Schwitzgebel (2002) has marshalled other sorts of empirical evidence to show that introspective reports are unreliable. But he has also suggested that our attitudes about introspection may be particularly obstinate. This conclusion is borne out by his collaboration with a psychologist on a study of introspection using a method called Experience Sampling (Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel 2007). Strikingly, their careful analysis of the study’s results does not resolve their differences about the reliability of introspection: Hurlburt remains “optimistic” about introspection’s reliability while Schwitzgebel remains “a skeptic”).

This outcome suggests that not only careful empirical work, but also difficult conceptual work, is required for determining the scope and degree of introspection’s reliability—solving what Goldman aptly terms “the problem of calibration” (Goldman 2004: 14). Some targets of introspection, such as sensations, can be identified only through introspection itself: third-personal methods (for instance, identifying pain via a brain scan) depend on prior correlations between third-personal and introspective data. Goldman notes that, for this reason, we can fix the range of introspective reliability only by using introspection and evaluating its results for internal coherence and for consistency with other sources. But since there is no clear consensus as to how to evaluate the results of introspection, or how to weigh its results against other sources of evidence about mental states, the problem of calibration is especially thorny and complex as it relates to introspection. Spener (2015) proposes that we calibrate introspection by reference to abilities that we could not possess unless introspection were reliable (relative to certain circumstances, and about certain states). For example, our ability to focus binoculars on a distant object suggests that introspection is reliable in identifying when things look blurry.

3. Accounts of Self-Knowledge

Accounts of self-knowledge vary across a number of dimensions, including: how self-knowledge is achieved; the kind and degree of epistemic security that self-ascriptions possess; the nature of our (epistemic) privilege and (social-linguistic) authority relative to our mental states; and the role of our observational, rational, agential, and expressive powers in explaining first-person privilege and authority.

These accounts also differ as to their scope. Acquaintance theorists mainly aim to explain how we know what we’re currently thinking and feeling (our “occurrent” states). Reasons theorists and Agentialists are exclusively concerned with self-knowledge of those attitudes that represent our commitments, such as beliefs and intentions. Proponents of the Inner Sense, Self-Interpretation, Empiricist Transparency, Rationalist, and Expressivist accounts differ as to the scope of these accounts. Each of these is taken, by at least one of its proponents, to apply to all kinds of mental states. This variety means that hybrid views are possible. For instance, one might think that an Acquaintance account explains how we know our sensations while Agentialism best explains self-knowledge of beliefs.

In what follows, I proceed from broadly empiricist accounts, which take self-knowledge to be a form of empirical knowledge, to accounts that emphasize the role of a priori reasoning in self-knowledge, and finally to accounts that take the special features of self-knowledge to derive from our capacity for agency or self-expression.

The idea that we know our mental states through acquaintance with them is usually associated with Russell (1917), but such accounts trace their lineage at least to Descartes (see the entry on knowledge by acquaintance vs. description ). According to these accounts, our awareness of our mental states is sometimes peculiarly direct in both an epistemic sense and a metaphysical sense. It is epistemically direct in that I need not rely on awareness of something else in order to be aware of my mental state. It is metaphysically direct in that no event or process mediates between my awareness and the mental state itself. By contrast, my awareness of last night’s rain is epistemically indirect in that I achieve it only through being aware of something else (such as the wet pavement). This awareness is metaphysically indirect in that various factors, including the wet pavement and perhaps my visual experience thereof, mediate between my awareness of the rain and the rain itself.

Acquaintance accounts hold special appeal for epistemic foundationalists, who claim that all of our knowledge rests on a foundation of beliefs that are justified, but not justified by other beliefs.

The claim that introspective access is both epistemically and metaphysically direct is most plausible for sensations like pain. This is because how a sensation appears—how it seems to the subject—and how it actually is (its nature) are, according to many philosophers, one and the same. That is, “there is no appearance/reality distinction in the case of sensations” (Hill 1991: 127; compare Kripke 1980: 152–3).

Limiting acquaintance accounts to self-knowledge of sensations—or, more strictly, to self-knowledge of mental states individuated by phenomenology—does not entirely fix their scope, as philosophers disagree as to which kinds of mental states are individuated by phenomenology. Recently, the idea that thoughts have a distinctive phenomenology has received renewed attention (see the entry on consciousness and intentionality ). Pitt (2004) uses the fact that we seem able to know what we’re thinking in a direct, highly secure way—one that is best explained by an acquaintance model of introspection—to argue that thoughts have distinctive phenomenological properties with which we are acquainted. Some philosophers also argue that conscious attitudes, such as judgments, have distinctive phenomenologies.

The purported epistemic and metaphysical directness of introspection does not imply that we are either infallible or omniscient about our own states, since it is an open question whether all of our states are introspectible. But if introspection involves epistemically and metaphysically direct access to one’s phenomenal states, then its proper use may allow the relevant self-attributions to achieve a high degree of certainty. And some philosophers have drawn on the concept of acquaintance to argue that at least some mental states, such as intense sensations, may be “luminous”: that is, that being in a state of that kind may ensure that one can know that one is (Weatherson 2004; Duncan 2018). These arguments are responses to Williamson’s (2000) “anti-luminosity” argument, which seeks to establish that no mental states are luminous.

The idea that we know (even some of) our sensations by acquaintance remains highly controversial. The idea that we know our beliefs or other attitudes by acquaintance is even more controversial. As James (1884) observed, self-knowledge requires more than even direct contact with a mental state: it requires that one properly conceptualize the state, classifying it as e.g. pain or coldness . The greatest challenge for acquaintance accounts is to explain how this conceptualization occurs. In particular, they must show that awareness of a mental state that is direct and immediate can also be an epistemically substantial grasp of the state as a state of a certain kind.

One approach to this challenge draws on the phenomenon of demonstrative reference (Gertler 2001; Chalmers 2003). Demonstrative reference often involves literal pointing: by pointing to my desk, I can demonstratively refer to it as “that (desk)”. When it comes to experiences, we don’t pick them out by pointing but, instead, by attending to them. As Sosa aptly observes, “Selective attention is the index finger of the mind” (2003: 279). By attending to how an experience feels (or appears), one can use this appearance—e.g., the itchiness of an itch—to refer to the feature demonstratively, as “ this quality”. One can then register the presence of the itch by thinking “I’m now experiencing this quality” Since reference is secured by attending to the itchiness, one grasps the feature in question, as itchiness. Chalmers refers to this grasp of phenomenal features as a “direct phenomenal concept”.

The clearest cases of direct phenomenal concepts arise when a subject attends to the quality of an experience, and forms a concept wholly based on the attention to the quality, “taking up” the quality into the concept. (Chalmers 2003: 235)

One worry about acquaintance accounts stems from the observation that we sometimes err about our experiences. However, most acquaintance theorists will concede that we can be wrong about our own phenomenal states. The theory implies only that, under certain conditions, an experience’s phenomenal reality—the “quality” in Chalmers’ terms— constitutes how it appears to the thinker—the “concept” of that quality (see also Horgan and Kriegel 2007; Gertler 2012). When those conditions are met, we are aware of the experience in a way that could not occur in the absence of that experience, and so our self-ascription of the experience will be true.

Some critics charge that acquaintance accounts construe introspective beliefs as too close to their objects to qualify as genuine knowledge (Wittgenstein 1953; Stalnaker 2008). In effect, this objection denies that direct introspective attention to an instance of a phenomenal quality can provide an epistemically substantial grasp of that quality.

While acquaintance accounts construe introspection as fundamentally different from perception in its epistemic and metaphysical directness, inner sense accounts take the opposite tack: they construe introspection as similar to perception in crucial respects.

Locke, an early inner sense theorist, described the introspective faculty as follows.

This Source of Ideas, every Man has wholly in himself … And though it be not Sense, as having nothing to do with external Objects; yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be call’d internal Sense. (Locke 1689/1975: II.1.iv.)

Inner sense accounts construe introspection as similar to perception in that it involves a monitoring mechanism or “self-scanning process” (Armstrong 1993: 324) that takes mental states as input and yields representations of those states as output. The monitoring mechanism involved in inner sense forms representations of the mental states it takes as input. This process is reliable, according to some inner sense accounts, because the mechanism “redeploys” the content of the input state in the representation of those states that is its output (Nichols and Stich 2003; Goldman 2006). On such accounts, and in contrast to acquaintance accounts, the connection between the introspected state (the input) and the introspective state (the output) is causal and contingent. But inner sense accounts allow that introspection also differs from perception in significant ways. Perception is achieved through dedicated organs such as eyes and ears, whereas there is no (literal) organ of introspection. Perception ordinarily involves sensory experiences, whereas “No one thinks that one is aware of beliefs and thoughts by having sensations or quasi-sense-experiences of them” (Shoemaker 1994: 255).

Because inner sense accounts construe introspection as a causal process, they are particularly well-suited to reliabilist (or, more broadly, epistemically externalist) approaches to self-knowledge. For example, Armstrong characterizes the introspective process as “a mere flow of information or beliefs” (Armstrong 1993: 326). The causal connections involved in self-monitoring need not be known by the subject in order to deliver self-knowledge, and inner sense accounts generally regard knowledge based in introspection as non-inferential. Inner sense is a first-personal method because the relevant scanners or monitoring mechanisms are directed only towards one’s own states. Strikingly, however, this asymmetry of access is merely contingent. It is possible, in principle, for one’s “inner sense” mechanism to be linked to someone else’s mental states, thereby allowing for “direct [read: non-inferential] awareness of the mental states of others”, through a kind of telepathic scanning (Armstrong 1993: 124).

Perhaps the chief benefit of inner sense accounts is that they are especially conducive to a broadly naturalistic picture of mentality. By assimilating introspection to perception, inner sense accounts construe mentality as epistemically continuous with the nonmental, and thus allow a single overarching epistemology to apply to both self-knowledge and knowledge of external things. Since most of the leading arguments for mind-body dualism depend on the claim that our epistemic relations to mental states diverge in crucial ways from our epistemic relations to physical objects, the claim that the mental is epistemically continuous with the nonmental paves the way for assimilating mentality to the nonmental realm ontologically as well. [ 4 ]

Shoemaker (1994) offers a sustained critique of inner sense accounts. His main objection centers on the charge that, in construing the capacity for self-knowledge as similar to sensory capacities like vision, inner sense accounts imply that the capacity for self-knowledge is one that a rational person might lack. As he puts this, they imply that a rational creature could be “self-blind”, unable to recognize its own mental states. But, he says, self-blindness is impossible in a rational creature (at least, one with ordinary mental states and who possesses mental state concepts). Shoemaker’s discussion has been as influential for its positive suggestion—that our capacity for self-knowledge is closely tied to rationality (see 3.6 and 3.7 )—as for its critical treatment of inner sense accounts.

Kind (2003) contends that the possibility of self-blindness does not directly threaten inner sense accounts. Even if Shoemaker is right that rational creatures will generally be capable of self-awareness, this conclusion is silent as to how such awareness occurs. So it does not rule out the possibility that it is achieved through inner sense. Gertler (2011a: ch. 5) argues that the inner sense theorist can block Shoemaker’s objection by stipulating that no creature qualifies as rational if it is self-blind. “No rational creature is self-blind” would then be a de dicto truth and, as such, is compatible with the inner sense account. Shoemaker’s challenge to inner sense views requires a stronger thesis, namely that the capacity for self-knowledge is a de re necessary characteristic of rational beings: that is, rational beings must be capable of self-knowledge in order to exist at all.

Another objection to inner sense accounts targets their epistemic externalism. Inner sense accounts are not likely to appeal to those who take self-knowledge to involve internal or accessible reasons for belief (Peacocke 1999: 224).

Some philosophers maintain that grasping our beliefs and desires—and perhaps also our emotions—requires engaging in a process of self-interpretation (Lawlor 2009; Carruthers 2011; Cassam 2015). Self-interpretation accounts are one response to a point mentioned earlier (sec. 2.1 ): that our attitudes are partly defined by their causal roles, including how they dispose us to reason, behave, and affectively react (see the entries on belief and desire ). Whether a given state plays the relevant causal role seems not to be knowable simply by introspective observation. (This point echoes the first horn of Boghossian’s trilemma. See also Peterson 2019.) We can know this only by interpreting our current thoughts or feelings, explaining them as manifestations of a particular belief, desire, or other attitude. Since this interpretive process relies on inference, self-interpretation accounts are sometimes labelled “inferentialism”. But inferentialism is a broader category, encompassing some transparency accounts (sec. 3.4).

Lawlor uses the following example. A woman named Katherine finds herself thinking “have another” as she stands by her son’s crib. Hearing those words (in “inner speech”) does not, on its own, provide her with knowledge about whether she wants to have another child. She must interpret this thought: is it a genuine longing or just an idle daydream? The best interpretation is the one that best explains the introspected thought. Arriving at this explanation will often involve imaginative exercises: e.g., Katherine may imagine a newborn baby in her arms and, noticing that this leads her to feel happy, infer that she desires another child. Lawlor’s approach is supported by research suggesting that “people can detect their nonconscious dispositions and motives by vividly imagining a future situation and attending to how it would make them feel.” (Wilson and Dunn 2004, describing a study by Schultheiss and Brunstein (1999).)

Carruthers’ (2011) Interpretive-Sensory Access account similarly takes self-knowledge to require self-interpretation. Rejecting the idea that there is an “inner sense”, a cognitive faculty dedicated specifically to self-knowledge, Carruthers proposes that a single “mindreading” system detects both one’s own mental states and the mental states of others. In fact, he hypothesizes that our “mindreading” system “evolved for outward-looking social purposes” and was only later co-opted for self-knowledge (2011:69). This system takes sensory data as input; interprets these data by drawing on situational facts and background information; and yields representations of mental states as output.

Like the inner sense view, Carruthers’ account takes the output of these states to qualify as knowledge on epistemically externalist grounds--roughly, because of the system’s reliability. By contrast, Lawlor’s account is friendly to epistemic internalism. Self-interpretation is based on internal, accessible evidence including thoughts and feelings, as well as evidence from one’s own behavior.

The idea that we must engage in interpretation to know our own attitudes and emotions echoes Ryle’s (1949) view that our means of achieving self-knowledge is broadly similar to our means of knowing others’ states. In particular, self-interpretation theorists maintain that, just as we know others’ attitudes by inference from what they say, self-knowledge often involves inference from inner speech. (I’m indebted here to Byrne 2012a.) Ryle suggests that the experience of inner speech is a maximally effective type of “eavesdropping”.

We eavesdrop on our own voiced utterances and our own silent monologues. … [T]here is nothing intrinsically proprietary about this activity. I can pay heed to what I overhear you saying as well as to what I overhear myself saying, though I cannot overhear your silent colloquies with yourself. (Ryle 1949: 184)

Self-interpretation accounts do recognize differences between self-knowledge and other-knowledge. Most crucially, in our own case we have access to introspective evidence (about our experiences), whereas our only evidence for others’ states is their behavior, prominently including their verbal behavior.

Is our access to introspective evidence also inferential, in a way that threatens a regress? Self-interpretation theorists maintain that even understanding what you’re currently feeling will require self-interpretation. Cassam explains this using Lawlor’s example: “When you identify your feeling as the yearning for another child what you are doing is interpreting it” (Cassam 2015: 163). Cassam argues that this process is holistic, as you rely on knowledge of your recent mental life (e.g., recently feeling envy about others’ pregnancies) and perhaps your recent behavior (going out of your way to visit a friend with a newborn) to interpret your current feelings.

The self-interpretation view is compatible with the idea that we know some of our states non-inferentially. Carruthers argues that interpretation is not required for knowledge of any state that can be recognized solely on the basis of raw sensory data, since sensory data are the inputs to the mindreading system. Cassam is more circumspect about this possibility, pointing out that even knowledge of basic sensations like pains sometimes requires cognitive effort (2015: 164).

Critics of self-interpretation accounts contend that it neglects the profound asymmetry between self-knowledge and other-knowledge: that our rationality guarantees that we have non-inferential access to our own attitudes (Shoemaker 1994) or that the need to engage in self-interpretation implies that we are alienated from our attitudes (Moran 2001). These claims form the basis for some rationalist and agentialist views (see 3.6 and 3.7).

Transparency accounts are inspired by the idea discussed above in connection with Gareth Evans’ famous remark: that if asked whether you believe that there will be a third world war, you answer by directly considering the likelihood of a third world war. The metaphor of transparency expresses the notion that one “looks through” the (transparent) mental state to directly consider what it represents.

Some philosophers use the idea that mental states are “transparent” to advance rationalist or agentialist accounts of self-knowledge, which are non-empiricist (see 3.6 and 3.7 ). The current subsection concerns transparency accounts that see Evans’ procedure as generating empirical justification or warrant for self-ascriptions (Dretske 1994; Fernández 2003, 2013; Byrne 2005, 2018).

Dretske describes self-knowledge as “a form of perceptual knowledge that is obtained—indeed, can only be obtained—by awareness of non-mental objects” (Dretske 1994: 264). E.g., I can know that I’m thinking it’s snowing only by inference from my awareness of a non-mental object, such as the falling snow. This account secures first-person privilege, since my awareness of the snow would not similarly support an inference about anyone else’s mental state. The account requires that we rely on background beliefs to justify the inference from seeing snow to I’m thinking that it’s snowing . One worry about this account is that it’s not clear that the relevant background beliefs will be available or justified (Aydede 2003).

Fernández’s version of the transparency account avoids this worry by taking self-knowledge to be non-inferential. He argues that a single state can serve as the basis for both the belief that p and the belief that one believes that p . For example, seeing snow falling will ordinarily result in the belief that it’s snowing; this visual experience may also form the basis for the self-ascription I believe that it’s snowing . Fernández (2013) labels this “the bypass model”, to indicate that it takes self-attributions of belief to be based directly on the basis for the first-order belief, “bypassing” the first-order belief itself. The self-ascription is justified in a way that is “partly internalist” (ibid.: 44) in that I have access to the basis for my belief that I believe that it’s snowing, namely the fact that I (seem to) see falling snow. The account is also “partly externalist” (ibid): my self-ascription is warranted because my perceptual state that is its basis tends to correlate with the belief that it’s snowing.

The bypass method is exclusively first-personal, since only I can base a belief directly on my perceptual state. And it is more secure than others’ knowledge of my mental states. Others know my states only by inference—from my behavior, and/or their observations of the evidence available to me. But self-knowledge that satisfies the bypass model is non-inferential, since the self-ascription (e.g., the belief that I believe that it’s snowing) is not inferred from its basis (e.g., seeing falling snow).

By contrast, Byrne’s (2005, 2018) transparency account is explicitly inferentialist. He claims that we know our beliefs by reasoning according to the “doxastic schema” (Gallois 1996).

Byrne argues as follows. To reason in accord with the doxastic schema is to infer I believe that p from the premise p ; one does not infer from a premise unless one believes the premise; so such reasoning will yield true self-ascriptions. The doxastic schema is thus self-verifying. [ 5 ] And it is self-verifying regardless of whether the premise is justified, or even whether the thinker regards it as justified.

Byrne’s main thesis, that self-knowledge is achieved through use of the doxastic schema, rests on two basic claims. The first claim is that it’s independently plausible that we actually use the doxastic schema (as Evans’ remarks suggest). The second claim is that the hypothesis that we use the doxastic schema best explains the special security and asymmetry of self-knowledge. On his proposal, the special epistemic security of self-knowledge is a matter of externalist warrant: the doxastic schema is not only self-verifying but also yields self-ascriptions that are “safe” in that they could not easily have been false. [ 6 ] The asymmetry of self-knowledge consists in the fact that following this schema will not yield knowledge of others’ states. Reasoning from it’s snowing to you/they believe that it’s snowing will not reliably yield true beliefs about others’ beliefs.

One objection to transparency accounts is that answering the question “Do you believe that p ?” by directly considering whether p may not shed light on what one believed before the question arose (Shah and Velleman 2005). For example, to answer the question “Do you believe that there will be a third world war?” by considering geopolitical matters may produce a new belief rather than revealing a pre-existing belief. In general, reflection on accessible evidence about whether p may actually change a pre-existing belief on this issue (Wilson and Kraft 1993). The transparency theorist cannot avoid this worry by stipulating that, when considering whether p , one should not draw a new conclusion. Avoiding new conclusions would require already knowing one’s beliefs, that is, which conclusions one had already drawn.

Transparency theorists can respond by arguing that the objection misconstrues the aim of these accounts. The objection charges that the account may not explain first-person access : how it is that, if you believe that p , you can know that you do. Transparency accounts may be intended to address a different question, namely, what kind of exclusively first-personal method could deliver self-ascriptions that constitute knowledge. And even if considering geopolitical matters produced a new belief that a third world war is likely, the inference that Byrne describes—from a third world war is likely to I believe that a third world war is likely —would arguably yield self-knowledge. Still, the objection exposes a possible limitation of transparency accounts. Because they cannot distinguish newly-formed judgments from previous dispositional beliefs, they cannot account for our apparent ability to knowledgeably answer the question “Do you believe that p ?”, where that question concerns what one believes at the time the question is posed (Gertler 2011b).

Another objection concerns these accounts’ presumption that self-knowledge need not meet epistemically internalist conditions on knowledge. Boyle (2011) targets Byrne’s view on this point, arguing that even if the inference from p to I believe that p reliably yields true (and safe) self-ascriptions, this inference cannot explain self-knowledge since it will not appear reasonable to the thinker: after all, in general the fact that p doesn’t imply that I believe that p . Fernández addresses this worry, in arguing that beliefs formed through the bypass method will seem reasonable to the subject. Other critics argue that the transition from p to I believe that p is not a genuine inference. Valaris (2011) argues that, unlike genuine inferences, this transition cannot be used in hypothetical contexts—e.g., when one reasons from a premise one doesn’t believe, to see what follows from it. Barnett (2016) argues that this transition violates plausible, broadly evidentialist restrictions on inferences.

Fernández limits his account to explaining self-knowledge of beliefs and desires, while Byrne extends his account to encompass self-knowledge of all of our mental states. Critics express skepticism about extending the transparency account beyond beliefs: to desires (Ashwell 2013a, 2013b), to thoughts or intentions (Samoilova 2016), or to beliefs held with less than 100% confidence (Tang 2017).

Above, we saw that on standard views of beliefs and desires, these attitudes are at least partly constituted by dispositions to reason, behave, and affectively react. This is one basis for thinking that self-knowledge of attitudes must be inferential. After all, dispositions seem to be linked with counterfactual truths, and such truths can be known only through inference.

The reasons account of self-knowledge, first advanced by Peacocke (1999), says that we can sometimes know our beliefs without relying on inference. While beliefs are dispositional states, judgments are occurrent: a judgment that p is an event . Peacocke argues that judging it’s snowing (say) provides you with a reason to think that you have the dispositions associated with the belief that it’s snowing—e.g., to put on boots when leaving the house (if you desire dry feet). In other words, Peacocke thinks that judging it’s snowing gives you reason to believe that you believe that it’s snowing.

Notably, on this view the judgment can serve as a reason for the corresponding self-ascription of belief so long as the judgment is conscious. You need not be aware of the judgment. An analogy may illuminate the basic idea here. An itch can serve as a reason for scratching even if there is no further conscious state (distinct from the itch) that constitutes an awareness of the itch. Peacocke argues that, in a broadly similar way, a conscious judgment that p can serve as a direct reason for my self-ascribing the belief that p , without my introspecting the judgment and inferring that I believe that p , or even having any distinct awareness of that judgment. (Compare Silins 2012.)

The non-inferential transition from judging that p (a conscious, occurrent state) to believing that one believes that p (that is, to self-ascribing a belief) is a rational one, on this view, because judging is conceptually linked with believing: making a judgment “is the fundamental way to form a belief” (Peacocke 1999: 238). Similarly, since remembering that p is conceptually linked with believing that p , a conscious memory that p can justify the belief that one believes that p . And anyone in a position to self-ascribe a belief will possess the concept of belief, and so will grasp—or at least, manifest cognitive dispositions appropriately reflecting—these conceptual truths. [ 7 ]

Drawing on Peacocke, Paul (2012) develops a reasons account of how we know our intentions. On this account, the transition from deciding to do something (or remembering that one has so decided) to believing that one intends to do that thing is rational, since it is a conceptual truth that deciding normally suffices for intending.

Silins (2020) presents a different argument for the reasons account as applied to belief. He thinks that judgments like it’s snowing but I don’t believe that it is —known as “Moore-paradoxical judgments”—are plainly irrational. But if the judgment that p didn’t provide justification for self-ascribing the belief that p , these judgments could be perfectly rational. Silins concludes that judging that p provides (propositional) justification for self-ascribing the belief that p . This explains why Moore-paradoxical judgments are irrational: in making such a judgment “you flout the justification given to you by your judgment that p” (Silins 2020: 334).

Coliva (2008) objects that judgments cannot rationalize self-ascriptions of belief in the way the reasons theorist contends, because they are not suitably accessible. Her argument rests, in part, on a claim reminiscent of the self-interpretation view: that the phenomenology of a conscious thought—such as “things will look up”—does not indicate whether this is the content of a judgment or, instead, of a wish. McHugh (2012) responds on behalf of the reasons account, arguing that there is a “phenomenology characteristic of judging that p ” that is present in cases where ordinary self-knowledge is possible (2012: 148). This dispute suggests that the prospects for the reasons account, as an account of self-knowledge of the attitudes, may depend in part on whether attitudes have “proprietary phenomenology” (Pitt 2004). (For more on that question, see the entry on consciousness and intentionality .)

Rationalist accounts of self-knowledge maintain that our status as rational thinkers guarantees our capacity for self-knowledge. Some agentialist accounts (discussed in the next subsection) agree with that claim, but on agentialist views this guarantee stems from the agency exercised in rational deliberation. I reserve the term “rationalist” for accounts that focus on rationality and are independent of claims about agency.

Shoemaker explains the link between rationality and self-knowledge with his “constitutivist” [ 8 ] thesis, namely: for rational thinkers with the appropriate conceptual repertoire, being in certain mental states constitutes knowledge that one is in them. What it is for a rational creature to feel pain is, in part, for that creature to believe that they are in pain; what it is for a rational creature to believe that p is, in part, for it to believe that it believes that p ; etc. Shoemaker cashes out this idea with a functionalist analysis of mental states, proposing that in rational creatures, the causal role defining a mental state are also sufficient for belief that one is in that mental state (Shoemaker 1994: 287–9).

Inspired in part by Shoemaker’s arguments, Stoljar (2018, 2019) has recently proposed an ambitious, systematic explanation of the (supposed) fact that rational thinkers are necessarily capable of self-knowledge. Stoljar posits that what it means to be rational is to be guided by the rules of rationality, which include the following “introspective principle”:

If one is in a conscious state C, … one will believe that one is in C. (Stoljar 2019: 405; ellipsis in original)

(The ellipsis indicates that further conditions must be added; the details are not crucial here.) If rationality partly consists in following this principle, then no rational creature will be self-blind. Stoljar (2019) argues that his proposal also explains why, as Evans claimed, we can know that we believe that p by considering p . He proposes that a belief is conscious, in the relevant sense, when one attends to its content—e.g., to it’s snowing . Together with the introspective principle above, this means that a rational person who believes that p , and who attends to p , will believe that they believe that p .

Smithies (2019) also defends the idea that rational thinkers are necessarily capable of knowing their beliefs. His starting point is the claim that Moore-paradoxical beliefs are always irrational. He notes that such beliefs may seem rational if a thinker doesn’t know what they believe: e.g., if someone believes that p but has misleading evidence suggesting that they don’t believe that p . Smithies concludes that, since such beliefs are always irrational, a rational thinker will know all of their beliefs. “Rationality requires knowing what you believe, since otherwise you’re liable to fall into an irrational Moorean predicament” (ibid.: 174). To explain how we are able to know all of our beliefs, he proposes a nonstandard conception of belief: “to believe that p is to be disposed to judge that p when you consciously entertain whether p ” (ibid.: 175–6). Given that conception, beliefs are necessarily accessible to the subject, since they consist in dispositions to conscious judgments. This means that a rational thinker who believes that p will have (available) justification for believing that they believe that p .

Rationalist accounts face two related challenges. First, to defend the idea that rationality guarantees the capacity for self-knowledge, these accounts must adopt a fairly demanding conception of what it is to be rational. But if a conception of rationality is too demanding, then it is questionable whether it applies to cognitively flawed creatures like us (Kornblith 2012; Cassam 2015). Second, in order to explain how we can meet their demanding standards for rationality—how we can follow Stoljar’s introspective principle, or can know all of our beliefs—rationalists tend to invoke nonstandard conceptions of “conscious” or “belief”. The challenge here is to show that the process of achieving self-knowledge is psychologically realistic and that it applies to the kinds of states that we actually possess.

Many philosophers share the intuition that, necessarily, no rational thinker is self-blind. The success of rationalist accounts of self-knowledge depends on whether there are conceptions of rationality, consciousness, belief, etc. that are robust enough to exclude the possibility of self-blindness yet psychologically realistic enough to explain the cognitive achievements of actual human beings.

The accounts of self-knowledge canvassed thus far treat self-knowledge as a largely epistemic phenomenon. But as noted in Section 1 , some philosophers deny that the special character of self-ascriptions is primarily epistemic. One version of this denial charges that by focusing on our access to our mental states, standard accounts of self-knowledge portray the introspective thinker as passive, a mere spectator (or detector) of a cognitive show. Agentialists contend that the special character of self-knowledge stems from the fact that we exercise agency over our mental states, and hence are responsible for them.

The privilege of first-person knowledge is … really more like the knowledge of a person driving a car as opposed to that of her passenger. The passenger may very well see where the driver is going, but still does not know in the immediate executive sense of the driver herself. (McGeer 1996: 505) The phenomena of self-knowledge … are themselves based as much in asymmetries of responsibility and commitment as they are in difference in capacities or in cognitive access. (Moran 2001: 64)

Many versions of agentialism are inspired by a broadly Kantian approach to reason and agency (Burge 1996; Moran 2001; Bilgrami 2006; Boyle 2009). On this approach, a thinker’s most basic self-conception (as an “I”) is agential: we see ourselves as authors of our beliefs and intentions, rather than as an inert thing in which attitudes merely occur. This authorial agency is essentially rational: it is exercised when we believe or intend on the basis of reasons. Agentialism differs from rationalism in taking our capacity for self-knowledge to derive from our agency and not (just) from our rationality. Agentialists maintain that our rational agency guarantees that we are capable of—or even that we possess—self-knowledge.

Agentialists differ as to the precise link between agency and self-knowledge. I begin with Burge, who argues that our responsibility for our beliefs entitles us to belief self-ascriptions. Burge uses the following reasoning. Our rational agency confers on us the obligation to (try to) satisfy certain rational norms: that one’s beliefs should conform to one’s evidence; that a belief set should be internally consistent; etc. In order to satisfy these rational norms—e.g., to assess our beliefs for conformance with our evidence, or for consistency with other beliefs—we must rely on judgments as to which beliefs we have. So our responsibility to satisfy rational norms epistemically entitles us to those judgments about our beliefs (and other attitudes) that are crucial for satisfying those norms.

[I]f one lacked entitlement to judgments about one’s attitudes, one could not be subject to rational norms governing how one ought to alter those attitudes given that one had reflected on them. (Burge 1996: 101) [ 9 ]

This appears to be a version of “ought implies can” reasoning. The upshot is that being responsible for one’s attitudes requires, and thereby implies, that we can know those attitudes.

Burge's reasoning has a distinctly transcendental flavor (see the entry on transcendental arguments ). Transcendental reasoning also fuels Moran’s agentialism. But while Burge uses it to establish a general entitlement to self-ascriptions, Moran deploys it to show that self-knowledge can be achieved in a specific way, namely by reflection on reasons. He reasons as follows. We could not engage in rational thought unless we had the “epistemic right” to the assumption that our attitudes are shaped by our reasons. (This is “something like a Transcendental assumption of Rational Thought” (Moran 2003: 406).) So we do have the epistemic right to that assumption. And our right to that assumption gives us the epistemic right to use the transparency method associated with Evans’ famous remarks: to answer the question “do you believe that p ?” by considering reasons bearing on p (ibid.) So the self-ascriptions produced by the transparency method constitute knowledge.

Moran’s agentialist transparency account differs markedly from empiricist transparency accounts ( 3.4 ). For empiricists, the transparency method provides for self-knowledge because it is reliable or generates self-ascriptions that could not easily be false. For agentialists, our entitlement to use the transparency method is rooted in a normative fact: that we are responsible for our attitudes.

Some worry that Moran’s account is too demanding. O’Brien argues that I am not justified in self-attributing the belief that there will be a third world war, on the basis of considering geopolitics, unless I recognize that my reasons for expecting a third world war constitute evidence that I believe it will occur. But this recognition in turn requires a reflective grasp of the nature of deliberation that seems unnecessary for ordinary self-attributions (O’Brien 2003: 379–81).

Other philosophers have supplemented Moran’s argument by claiming that the agentialist transparency account is needed to make sense of various phenomena. Keeling (2018) cites the fact that we confabulate reasons for our attitudes (Nisbett and Wilson 1977) as showing that, as rational agents, we take ourselves to be obligated to know the rational basis for our attitudes, and hence to be justified in taking our attitudes to reflect our reasons. Marcus and Schwenkler (2019) argue that we cannot satisfy the honesty norm for assertions unless we have non-empirical knowledge of what we believe, of the sort provided by the transparency method.

Like Burge and Moran, Bilgrami (2006) regards self-knowledge as intimately tied to the phenomenon of rational agency. But his view is not merely that, as rational agents, we are necessarily capable of knowing our attitudes. He argues that we could not exercise the agency involved in believing unless we actually knew our beliefs. Beliefs are necessarily known by the thinker because they are commitments.

[C]ommitments [such as beliefs] … are states that, were we not to live up to them, we should be prepared to criticize ourselves and be prepared also to try and do better, by way of living up to them … We cannot therefore have commitments without believing that we have them. … Thus the very condition for having a commitment presupposes that one has a second-order belief that one has that commitment. (2006: 287)

Boyle also thinks that our responsibility for our attitudes means that we must be generally aware, at least tacitly, of our conscious beliefs. The capacity to deliberate about whether p requires an awareness of how p is being represented: e.g., awareness that it is represented as a settled matter, as opposed to a hypothesis to be examined (Boyle 2019: 1034). This means that a rational thinker who consciously believes that p has a tacit awareness of that belief. Importantly, for Boyle this awareness is not higher-order: the belief that p is not an object of a separate state of awareness. Instead, it is an in-built awareness:

[F]or a person who consciously believes that p , being aware of her own belief and seeing the world from the perspective of p -believer are two aspects of the same awareness. (ibid.: 1018)

The agentialist views discussed thus far have been inspired by the Kantian idea that we are responsible for our beliefs and intentions because, in believing or intending, we exercise a distinctive type of agency, viz. rational agency . Whether positive this distinctive type of agency is needed to explain the epistemic and normative aspects of self-knowledge invoked by agentialists is a matter of controversy (Gertler 2018; Sorgiovanni 2019).

Some agentialist views are independent of the idea that our attitudes are exercises of rational agency. McGeer’s (1996) view, a pioneer of empiricist agentialism, takes self-ascriptions to be “commissive”: in self-ascribing an attitude, we commit to behaving in ways that fit that attitude.

[W]e are actors as well as observers and so can be good, even excellent, “predictors” of our future behavior because we have the power to make these “predictions” come true. … [W]e do not just wait to see if our actions make sense in light of intentional self-attributions, but rather make them make sense. (McGeer 1996: 507)

McGeer’s account does not invoke the idea of rational agency. This means that it does not rest on positing a distinctive agential faculty, and allows its scope to extend beyond reasons-sensitive attitudes such as beliefs and intentions. For example, saying (or judging) “I want to go to the beach” commits one to act in ways that make sense given that desire: e.g., to go to the beach when an opportunity presents itself. The normativity of this commitment stems not from the requirements of rationality but, instead, from our ordinary practical obligations. In expressing an attitude, we provide others with ways of explaining and predicting our behavior; this obligates us to behave in ways that fit the attitudes we express or self-ascribe (or to convey that our attitudes have changed).

Coliva (2012a) develops a related view concerning self-ascriptions of commitments—which for her include not only beliefs and intentions but also rationally held conative attitudes, such as desires. Provided that a thinker is rational and has the relevant concepts, their self-ascriptions of commitments will be true because they will create the attitudes ascribed.

[A] judgement (or a sincere assertion) such as 
“I believe/desire/intend/wish/hope that P” is like a performative , namely like “I promise to buy you an ice-cream”… : it makes a certain thing happen , for it does create the first-order propositional attitude as a commitment. … [J]udging “I believe/desire/intend/wish/hope that P” becomes just an alternative way of undertaking the same commitments one would make by judging that P (is worth pursuing or having)… (Coliva 2012a: 235–6)

The agency operative in Coliva’s account is our power to undertake commitments through self-ascriptions. This contrasts with the kind of agency at work in Kantian agentialist views, which is exercised simply in having beliefs or intentions. However, Coliva’s account still has a rationalist element in that self-ascriptions involve committing to there being good reasons for the attitude.

We now consider the prospects for agentialism generally. The agentialist’s primary burden is to explain the epistemic dimension of self-knowledge. After all, most cases of knowledge involve a belief being controlled by what is known: e.g., I know my dog’s location only if my belief about his location is controlled by (sensitive to) his actual location. By contrast, the agential approach focuses on our control over what is known. Agentialism is not a genuine competitor to the accounts of self-knowledge unless it explains how agency relative to our attitudes provides for self-knowledge. (Parrott’s (2015) non-epistemic version of agentialism is explicitly not a competitor to those accounts, as its aim is to explain why it is reasonable to defer to others’ self-ascriptions.) Because the various versions of agentialism differ as to the way that agency secures justification or warrant for self-ascriptions, their responses to this challenge will differ.

A possible drawback of agentialism is its limited application. Most versions of agentialism apply only to attitudes are sensitive to reasons. (McGeer’s is an exception.) But arguably, non-instrumental desires and some other types of attitudes are insensitive to reasons: this is part of the motivation for self-interpretation accounts (3.3). And some beliefs and intentions are insensitive to reasons. Beliefs that are deeply entrenched (such as superstitions) or comforting (as in wishful thinking) sometimes persevere in the face of counter-evidence. Intentions that run counter to one’s goals (e.g. akratic or self-sabotaging intentions) sometimes withstand practical deliberation.

Agentialists generally hold that we can know such recalcitrant attitudes, but only through a process of self-observation, which they regard as problematic. (McGeer is again an exception.) Agentialists argue that if I can know about my own attitude only through observation, then I am “alienated” (Moran 2001) from that attitude; my relation to it, qua agent, is “brute, contingent, non-rational” (Burge 1996); and I can view it only from a “third-person perspective” (Bilgrami 2006) and not “ as my own” (Boyle 2009). [ 10 ] Some of agentialism’s critics maintain that knowing an attitude through an observational process does not preclude a thinker from regarding it as her own in the relevant sense (Reed 2010; Borgoni 2015). Some even claim that a detached perspective on one’s own attitudes can be especially enlightening: it can help us to recognize and combat recalcitrant attitudes (McGeer 2008; Levy 2016), and it may be necessary for genuine self-understanding (Doyle 2019).

Expressivist views highlight similarities between utterances like “I’m in pain” and direct expressions of one’s mental states, such as wincing or saying “ouch!” (Wittgenstein 1953; Finkelstein 2003; Bar-On 2004; Campbell 2020). In particular, these views center on the idea that utterances like “I’m in pain”— avowals —directly express the mental states they ascribe. The most radical version of expressivism—what Bar-On (2004) calls Simple Expressivism, sometimes attributed to Wittgenstein—says that avowals, like non-linguistic expressions of mental states such as wincing, are neither true nor false. On that view, avowals do not express knowledge any more than wincing does. Most contemporary expressivists take avowals to express self-knowledge. Since our concern is with self-knowledge, our discussion will be limited to those views.

Avowals include thoughts like I want some water as well as utterances like “I’m in pain”. According to the expressivist, the relation between an avowal and the mental state it expresses is direct in two respects. First, no judgment to the effect that I’m in pain or desire water intervenes between my pain or desire and my avowal. Just as a wince flows from my pain directly, a spontaneous avowal flows from my pain (or desire) directly, unmediated by any judgment. Second, the knowledge expressed in such avowals is epistemically “groundless” in that it is not based on evidence that one is in pain or desires water. Obviously, the subject can directly express only her own mental states.

Expressivist approaches differ as to the feature of avowals that they aim to explain. Finkelstein and Bar-On focus on the social-linguistic aspect of avowals, known as first-person authority: we ordinarily defer to others about their own mental states, so avowals are presumed to be true. Campbell focuses on the epistemic aspect of avowals, known as first-person privilege: our capacity to avow our mental states constitutes a privileged epistemic position vis-a-vis those states.

Finkelstein allows that my avowal “I’m so happy!” may be caused by my happiness. But he denies that this is a matter of brute causation, as hitting someone’s knee with a hammer brutely causes his leg to kick out. Rather, what differentiates these cases is that my happiness and my spontaneous avowal “have, we might say, a particular kind of intelligibility” (Finkelstein 2003: 126). This does not mean that my happiness rationalizes the avowal. (A relevant contrast here is with the reasons account.) Instead, he says, my avowal, like my smiling, makes sense together with my happiness in something like the way that a dog’s pain and its moaning make sense together, in “the logical space of animate life”.

Since dogs are not usually thought to possess self-knowledge, this analogy raises the question: Does my avowal “I’m happy” express knowledge that I’m happy? The answer is complex, on Finkelstein’s view. Whether the avowing subject is to be credited with self-knowledge depends, he thinks, on how one understands “knowledge”: in particular, avowals do not express knowledge if knowledge requires an epistemic grounding in evidence.

Bar-On’s account focuses on the fact that avowals enjoy a presumption of truth. To use one of her examples: if I say “I’m so happy!”, it would be inappropriate (in ordinary circumstances) for you to question whether I am the one who is happy, or whether what I’m feeling is happiness . This presumption of truth is explained, on Bar-On’s account, by the fact that my avowal flows directly from my happy feeling. That is, my avowal is not based on evidence about how I feel, and no judgment to the effect that I’m happy mediates between my happiness and the avowal.

Bar-On maintains that avowals can represent “genuine and privileged self-knowledge” (Bar-On 2004: 405), although the avowing subject typically has not “formed the active judgment [that he is happy] on some basis”, and cannot offer evidence bearing on his happiness (ibid.: 363). She is not committed to a particular account of how avowals constitute knowledge, but she presents a number of approaches compatible with her view, which she calls Neo-Expressivism.

On one of these approaches, a conscious state can provide epistemic warrant for a self-ascription directly, in the two senses of directness mentioned earlier: that is, without mediation by a judgment and without serving as evidence for the avowal.

[A]vowing subjects enjoy a special epistemic warrant, since their pronouncements, when true, are epistemically grounded in the very states they ascribe to themselves, which states also serve as the reasons for their acts of avowing. (Bar-On 2004: 405)

(By “epistemically grounded”, Bar-On simply means warranted : such avowals are not based on evidence.)

Although both Finkelstein and Bar-On maintain that avowals may qualify as knowledge, providing an epistemology of self-knowledge is, for them, at most a peripheral goal. These views are concerned with avowals that issue directly from the states they express, in something like the way a dog's moaning issues directly from its pain. But to some critics, this spontaneous, reflexive quality of avowals—that they are not informed by evidence or reasoning—means that they cannot represent to the kind of epistemic achievement required for knowledge.

Campbell (2020) draws on the idea at the core of expressivism—that only the subject can directly express their mental states—to explain our special epistemic position relative to our own mental states. Her account contrasts with Finkelstein’s and Bar-On’s in taking the epistemic dimension of avowals (first-person privilege) to be the basis for their social-linguistic dimension (first-person authority).

Campbell proposes that an avowal like “I’m in pain” can express not only pain but also knowledge that I’m in pain (2020: 15). This proposal draws on her Rational Response account of knowledge, which says that knowing that p is “being able to rationally respond to or operate with , the fact that p” (ibid.: 12). On this account, to know that I want water is to have the rational capacities to act on, express, and reason with my desire for water. I exercise these capacities when I rationally respond to my desire in any of a variety of ways: pouring myself a glass of water, or altering my route so that I will pass a drinking fountain, or saying “I want some water”. The utterance “I want some water” expresses self-knowledge, of the uniquely first-personal kind, if it is a direct, rational response to my desire for water. This response must be direct in the ways described earlier: not based on an intermediate judgment or on evidence about my desire. The requirement that it be rational distinguishes expressions of self-knowledge from brute reactions, e.g. a dog’s responding to his thirst by going to his water bowl.

This last point highlights an aspect of Campbell’s account that deserves further discussion. The account rests on distinguishing rational responses to the fact that p from non-rational (or “brute”) reactions. If the account is to explain rather than presuppose first-person privilege, what makes a response rational must not be analyzed in epistemic terms. E.g., the rationality of a response must not lie in its being justified or warranted. This is a fruitful area for future work on this new contribution to the self-knowledge literature.

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Anthologies on self-knowledge:

• Cassam, Q. (ed.), 1994, Self-Knowledge , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Coliva, A. (ed.), 2012, The Self and Self-Knowledge , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Gertler, B. (ed.), 2003, Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge , Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing.
• D. Smithies and D. Stoljar (eds.), 2012, Introspection and Consciousness , Oxford: Oxford University Press,
• Wright, C., B. Smith, and C. Macdonald, (eds.), 1998, Knowing Our Own Minds , Oxford: Clarendon Press.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Philpapers. Topic: self-knowledge , compiled by Bourget and Chalmers.
• Philpapers. Topic: introspection , compiled by Bourget and Chalmers.

belief | certainty | consciousness | consciousness: and intentionality | consciousness: higher-order theories | dualism | epistemology | externalism about the mind | folk psychology: as a theory | folk psychology: as mental simulation | introspection | justification, epistemic: foundationalist theories of | justification, epistemic: internalist vs. externalist conceptions of | Kant, Immanuel: view of mind and consciousness of self | knowledge: analysis of | knowledge: by acquaintance vs. description | mental content: causal theories of | personal identity | physicalism | private language | propositional attitude reports | self-consciousness | self-deception | transcendental arguments

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Socrates and Self-Knowledge

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Boris Hennig, Socrates and Self-Knowledge, The Philosophical Quarterly , Volume 68, Issue 271, April 2018, Pages 421–424, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqx019

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The idea of this book is to closely examine all passages where Socrates talks about the Delphic precept, ‘Know Thyself’, and see what picture of self-knowledge emerges. Given that Socrates is a key figure in the transmission of this precept, it is very likely that such a project leads to significant results.

After a discussion of the inscription itself, Moore discusses the relevant passages in the Charmides , the Alcibiabes I, the Phaedrus , the Philebus , Xenophon's Memorabilia , and other texts. A detailed discussion of the Apology is missing; however, it might have been helpful. There are far more things to be praised than questioned in the book. In its details, it is rich, well crafted, and largely convincing. The reader of this review should keep this in mind while I concentrate on a couple of things I am less than fully satisfied with.

Socratic self-knowledge is not simply a sort of introspective, first personal knowledge (p. 2). Moore captures this by arguing that it amounts to self-constitution (p. 140). He is right, but I think his insight is compromised in three ways.

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• Philosophy and Psychology

The Origin of the Famous Saying "Know Thyself"

Looking for Your True Self? 10 Strategies for Self-Knowledge

Follow these 10 pathways to a more vital sense of self..

Posted March 18, 2016 | Reviewed by Jessica Schrader

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The what and the how of self-knowledge

What do people mean when they advise you to “know yourself"?

That was the subject of this post , where I described six key elements of self-knowledge. To remember them, just memorize this simple acronym: VITALS. “VITALS” (or “VITAL Signs”) stands for:

• I nterests/Passions
• T emperament
• A round-the-Clock ( biorhythms )
• L ife Purpose/ Goals
• S trengths/Skills

I loved creating the acronym “VITALS,” because, well, I love acronyms, and VITALS reflects a happy reality—once you know something about yourself and act on it, you actually do build a more vital sense of self. (For more details on VITALS, click here .)

So now you know what to look for. But how do you learn about your VITAL signs? And where can you find them?

The process can be haphazard and serendipitous. You may have a teacher who tells you that you have a strength in math or science, and the seed of a career idea is planted. You may become outraged when you witness or experience an injustice and decide you have a life goal to rectify this wrong. You may be one of the happy few who can build a life around an outstanding interest or passion , like pop star Gwen Stefani who said , “When I was able to first write a song, that’s when I found my whole self.”

While luck and genes play a part in learning who you are, you can also apply deliberate strategies to help you find your true self. Think of your search as a treasure hunt, with clues and red herrings scattered along the way. Here are 10 useful strategies to use:

10 Strategies of Self-Discovery

1. Listen to compliments and absorb them. If you have a tendency to dismiss or brush off compliments, stop! While it’s true that some people might manipulate you through compliments, many more might be noticing one of your VITAL signs—something you yourself may have overlooked. In 11th grade, my English teacher wrote at the top of one of my papers: “Do you like to write? There’s much in this essay that says that you do.” Although I took another career path, I never forgot this comment, and here I am writing after all. (Thanks, Helen Hollander!)

Knowing your own strengths is one of the foundations of self-confidence as well as of self-knowledge. Become a person who “takes in the good,” listening for compliments that could be clues to your strengths.

2. Notice your emotions and "flow" states.

When do you get happily lost in whatever you are doing? Flow states are a clue to what is satisfying to your true self. Positive feeling states like love, joy, and contentment can also contain clues.

Even negative emotions can help you out in your quest for self-knowledge. At times, emotions like anger , sadness, and fear can tell you what you may need to confront, accept, or change in your life. At other times, these same emotions might hint at people, places, or things you need to minimize or avoid to maintain your selfhood and sanity.

3. Notice what you are thinking.

Yes, mindfulness . Of course, you can meditate in order to observe the contents of your mind. But you can also just be mindful of the thoughts that arise on a minute-by-minute basis. These thoughts can guide you toward a better understanding of yourself. For example, your friend persuades you to buy a particular dress; this purchase sparks regret, not joy, because you wish you’d saved the money. Now you realize that at this moment you value savings over more possessions. A VITAL sign?

4. Become friends with your mistakes.

Learning to be yourself is easier when you develop a growth mindset —the ability to see a hard problem as a challenge rather than a stress . When you don’t have to be perfect, you can accept your mistakes, recognize that your missteps could lead to a potential learning experience, and figure out what you could do differently the next time.

Even outright failure, while painful, can be a spur to new directions. Terry Gross , the revered NPR host of “Fresh Air,” started out as an eighth grade teacher in an inner-city public school in 1972. She couldn’t control the class and was fired after six weeks. Think of all the wonderful interviews the public would have missed had she stayed—unhappily—in teaching!

5. Keep a journal or take time to reflect.

Keep a journal of the moments that might be clues to your identity . I love the now-classic “Three Good Things” exercise: At day’s end, think of three good things that you did, or that happened to you, during the day. Research indicates that this activity will increase your happiness quotient, as well as strengthen your “ gratitude attitude.” But it can also highlight moments that gave you a measure of satisfaction or self-confidence, and those moments could be clues to your VITAL signs. Example: You are playing with your niece and notice that you handled several tricky situations well. Clue?

6. Listen to other people, but make and live by your own decisions.

Assuming you are an adult, with an adult’s complicated life, only you know what is best for you in the long run. When you make your own decisions—however they turn out, you pave the way for self-knowledge. Develop a healthy suspicion of “shoulds.” What do you want ?

7. Talk to a therapist or counselor.

In your search for self, you may get blocked by various barriers, both internal and external. (I’ll write more about these in an upcoming blog.) A therapist or career counselor can help remove these barriers and/or help you explore new paths and grow in new directions.

8. Try personality and temperament tests.

While best done under a mental health professional’s supervision, you can also find versions of well-researched personality and temperament tests on the Internet. Although I haven’t tested out these free versions myself, you might find them helpful … as long as you take them with a few grains of salt:

Career builder The Myers-Briggs Temperament Indicator (MBTI) Holland Code Career Test

Caution 1: Some tests on the Internet lack scientific validity. Watch out! Caution 2: Remember, no test is the final authority on you. You are!

9. Practice assertiveness .

You may know yourself, but can you be yourself? When you express your feelings, wants, needs, and opinions in a direct, honest, and appropriate way, you are being assertive. You are also strengthening your sense of self. Example: Your spouse is critical of something you did and yells at you. You reply, “Don’t speak to me that way. If there’s something wrong, I’ll talk about it--but without the yelling.” Now you know: Being treated with respect is important to you. You can defend yourself.

10. Surround yourself with good people who accept you and foster your growth.

Some friends and relatives help you become your best self, while others thwart your self-expression and self-discovery. While you can probably learn something from all of them, you may find that your path is easier when most of the people you associate with have your best interests at heart and leave you free to follow your own star.

Some people think there’s no such thing as a “true self.” I disagree. When your outer life and actions are congruent with your inner VITAL Signs, you experience a strong and distinct sense of self. Life becomes more exciting and vibrant.

But it IS true that we evolve over time, and your true self is constantly evolving, expanding, and contracting, again and again. Knowing yourself is a dynamic process, not a static one. Your true self is less like a snapshot and more like a video.

What experiences, books, ideas, and people have helped you “find yourself"?

© Meg Selig, 2016. All rights reserved.

If you benefited from this post, you might also enjoy these:

• "Know Yourself? 6 Specific Ways to Know Who You Are"
• "The Assertiveness Habit"
• Living With Integrity (Cynthia Kane)

For more on habits, health, and happiness, scroll down to my photo below and follow me on Facebook , Twitter, or LinkedIn.

Meg Selig is the author of Changepower! 37 Secrets to Habit Change Success .

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At any moment, someone’s aggravating behavior or our own bad luck can set us off on an emotional spiral that threatens to derail our entire day. Here’s how we can face our triggers with less reactivity so that we can get on with our lives.

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Why is Self-Awareness Important: A Roadmap to 12 Benefits

Self-awareness involves a deep understanding of one's emotions, strengths, weaknesses, and drives. People who are self-aware can objectively evaluate themselves, manage their emotions, align their actions with their values, and understand how they affect others. Moreover, self-aware individuals are often more confident and creative, making them more capable of handling leadership roles and fostering positive relationships both personally and professionally.

Sanju Pradeepa

Hey you! Yeah I’m talking to you. Ever wonder why you act the way you do or make certain choices? Well it all comes down to self-awareness – how well you know yourself, your strengths and weaknesses, your motivations. Self-awareness is so important for success, happiness, relationships, personal growth – pretty much everything in life!

In this article, we’ll explore why you should care about self-awareness and the many benefits it provides. We’ll look at simple ways to increase your self-awareness and understand yourself on a deeper level. Self-knowledge is power, so keep reading to learn why self-awareness matters and how you can become more in tune with yourself.

Table of Contents

What is self-awareness .

Self-awareness is simply understanding yourself – your strengths, weaknesses, values, and goals. Why is it so important? For starters, it helps you make better choices. When you know yourself well, you can determine what really motivates or upsets you. You’ll have an easier time setting boundaries and spotting the influences that shape your attitudes and behaviors .

Self-awareness gives you insight into your thoughts and behaviors. You can observe how you respond to challenges, analyze your automatic reactions, and work to shift negative patterns. The more you understand what drives you, the less likely you’ll be to act in ways you regret.

When you know yourself, you can share your authentic self with others. Your friends and loved ones will appreciate your honesty and openness. You also have an easier time understanding other people and are better equipped to resolve conflicts in a compassionate way. Strong, healthy relationships are built on mutual understanding, and that starts with understanding yourself.

No one is perfect, but self-awareness gives you the power to keep improving. As you uncover more about yourself, you can refine your strengths, work to overcome your weaknesses, and pursue new opportunities for growth. Self-improvement is a journey, not a destination, but self-awareness makes the journey possible.

In summary, self-awareness is the foundation for living consciously and intentionally. It empowers you to steer your own course through life, make the most of each moment, and become your best self. Isn’t that worth the effort required to know yourself? Absolutely.

4 Types of Self-Awareness To Develop Emotional Intelligence

Why is self-awareness important.

The importance of self-awareness lies in its ability to enable individuals to understand their own actions, reactions, and emotions, thereby facilitating a deeper understanding of oneself. It is the first step towards self-improvement and self-acceptance , as it allows for the recognition of personal strengths and weaknesses.

With self-awareness, people can make more informed decisions, improve their relationships, and navigate life with greater confidence and clarity. It also plays a crucial role in leadership, as self-aware leaders are known to be more effective, empathetic, and capable of building strong teams. Ultimately, self-awareness can lead to a more fulfilling and purposeful life.

1. Self-Awareness Allows You to Know Your Strengths

Knowing yourself inside and out is so important. When you understand your strengths, you can lean into them and achieve great things. Think about your natural talents, skills, and abilities. What comes easily to you? What energizes you?

For example, if you’re a natural communicator, pursue opportunities that allow you to connect with others. If you’re good with numbers, look for jobs or hobbies involving finance or analytics. Play to your strengths, and you’ll be far more engaged and effective.

Discover Your Core Values: Your values are fundamental to who you are. Take time to identify what’s most important to you, like family, achievement, adventure, or creativity. Then use those values to guide your decisions and set meaningful goals. When your actions align with your values, you’ll feel more fulfilled.

Understand Your Personality: Are you an introvert or extrovert? Optimistic or practical? Self-disciplined or spontaneous? Knowing your personality type helps you better understand your tendencies, strengths, and weaknesses. You can then find careers, relationships, and hobbies that are well suited to your nature.

Recognize Your Emotional Patterns: Pay attention to how you typically react in stressful situations or when you’re excited or frustrated. Do you get angry quickly? Become anxious and worried? Or stay calm and logical? Recognizing your emotional patterns leads to better self-management and healthier relationships. You can develop strategies to avoid triggers and react in more constructive ways.

In the end, self-awareness is about gaining insight into yourself and using that understanding to live authentically. Make the effort to know yourself deeply. It will empower you to build a life aligned with who you truly are.

2. Self-Awareness Helps You Understand Your Weaknesses

When you develop self-awareness, you gain insight into your weaknesses and shortcomings. This allows you to identify areas where you need to improve to become a better person. Recognizing your weaknesses isn’t about beating yourself up, but rather understanding your blind spots so you can strengthen them.

You Can Address Your Weak Points: Once you pinpoint specific weaknesses, such as impatience, poor time management, or difficulty delegating, you can take steps to address them. You may need to develop new habits and skills to overcome your weak points. For example, if you struggle with impatience, you could practice active listening, take deep breaths to stay calm in stressful situations, and learn to see things from other perspectives. Self-awareness allows you to turn your weaknesses into opportunities for growth.

You Make Better Decisions: When you understand your weaknesses, you can account for them in your decision-making. You may realize that a particular role or responsibility plays to your weaknesses, allowing you to avoid taking it on or requesting additional support. You can also get input from others who balance out your weaknesses before finalizing important choices. Self-aware leaders are able to make decisions that minimize risks and maximize the chances of success.

You Can Ask For Help: No one is perfect, and we all have weaknesses we need help strengthening. Self-aware individuals recognize when they need assistance and are able to ask for help in a constructive way. Whether you need an accountability partner, coaching, or mentoring, acknowledging your weaknesses is the first step to getting the support you need to improve. Asking for help when you need it is a sign of wisdom and maturity.

In summary, developing self-awareness of your weaknesses leads to personal growth, better decision-making, and the ability to ask for help when you need it. Rather than being a source of embarrassment, your weaknesses can become your strengths when you gain insight into yourself and take action to address them.

20 Importance of Knowing Yourself: A Guide to Self-Discovery

3. it enables you to manage your emotions more effectively.

When you have a strong sense of self-awareness, you gain insights into what triggers your emotions and how those emotions influence your thoughts and actions. This self-knowledge helps you better manage emotional reactions in the moment.

You can catch yourself when emotions start to spiral out of control and take a step back to evaluate the situation objectively before responding. Maybe a rude customer triggers feelings of anger and frustration. Instead of snapping at them, take a few deep breaths to avoid escalating the conflict. Respond in a courteous, professional manner.

Self-awareness also allows you to address the root causes of emotional reactions, so you can avoid or better handle triggers in the future. If interactions with a micromanaging boss frequently leave you feeling stressed and inadequate, reflect on the reasons why their behavior bothers you so much. Their actions say more about them than you. Don’t give them power over your self-worth .

With practice, you can strengthen your emotional intelligence through self-reflection and by learning new coping strategies. If you have trouble managing anger, try physically removing yourself from the situation until you calm down. Call a friend to gain a more balanced perspective. Challenge any irrational thoughts fueling your anger. Make a plan for addressing what’s really bothering you once you’re feeling calm and rational.

Emotions color all of our thoughts and experiences. But they don’t have to control us or sabotage our happiness and success. Self-awareness gives us the insight and tools we need to influence our emotional well-being. We can choose to respond to life’s challenges in a constructive way instead of always reacting impulsively. And that, my friend, is incredibly empowering.

Emotional Self-Awareness: 9 Tips to Become Emotionally Aware

4. self-awareness enhances your self-confidence.

When you understand yourself better, you gain confidence from that knowledge. Self-awareness allows you to accept yourself, flaws and all, which builds your self-belief.

You Know Your Strengths and Weaknesses: The more insight you have into your abilities and shortcomings, the better equipped you are to play to your strengths. If you know you excel in creative work but struggle with logic and analysis, pursue opportunities that leverage your creativity. Accept the areas you need to improve in, and don’t be afraid to ask for help. Knowing yourself in this way allows you to focus your efforts where they matter most.

You can set challenging but achievable goals . With self-awareness comes an understanding of what motivates and fulfills you. You can set goals that align with your values and priorities. You also have a realistic sense of what you can accomplish, so you can push yourself outside your comfort zone without the risk of becoming overwhelmed. Success builds on success, so achieving your goals, no matter their size, fuels your self-belief.

You Accept Yourself : When you understand why you think and act the way you do, self-acceptance follows. You can show yourself compassion instead of harsh self-judgment. You come to realize that while you have room for improvement, you are enough as you are. This self-kindness is the foundation of self-confidence.

You Learn From Your Mistakes: The self-aware person can admit when they are wrong without damaging their self-esteem. You see errors and failures as opportunities to learn and grow. Each lesson you learn about yourself strengthens your self-knowledge and ability to make better choices next time. This willingness to learn from your mistakes, rather than hide from them, builds resilience and self-belief .

In all these ways, self-awareness and self-confidence go hand in hand. Make the effort to look within, understand why you do what you do, and accept yourself with compassion. This relationship with yourself will make you open to life’s challenges in a way that cultivates confidence from the inside out. Gain wisdom, pursue meaningful goals, learn and grow-your self-belief will flourish.

5. Self-Awareness Builds Emotional Intelligence

Self-awareness allows you to understand your own emotions and how they influence your thoughts and actions. When you are self-aware, you can manage your emotional reactions and behaviors more effectively. This builds your emotional intelligence, which is crucial for success and well-being.

You Gain Insight into Your Emotional Triggers: We all have emotional triggers-situations, events, or interactions that provoke an emotional reaction, whether positive or negative. When you are self-aware, you can identify what triggers certain emotions in you. You can then anticipate your reactions better and manage them in a healthy way.

You Can Regulate Your Emotions: With self-awareness comes the ability to regulate your emotions. You are able to evaluate emotional reactions and determine whether they are helpful or unhelpful in a given situation. You can make a conscious effort to amplify or dampen certain emotions when needed to achieve your goals or to connect with others. Emotional regulation leads to greater resilience and stability.

Your Relationships Improve: When you understand your own emotions, you can also understand the emotions of others better. This makes you more empathetic and effective in your interactions and relationships. You are able to communicate in a way that addresses others’ emotional needs and defuses tension or conflict. Your increased empathy and ability to navigate emotional situations lead to healthier, more satisfying relationships.

In summary, self-awareness is the foundation for emotional intelligence and psychological well-being. By developing insight into your emotional triggers and reactions, you gain the ability to regulate your emotions in a healthy way. You can achieve greater balance and stability in your life, as well as more meaningful connections with others. Self-awareness is a skill that takes continuous effort to develop but has rewards that make it well worth the investment.

What Does It Mean to Be Emotionally Mature and Its Impact

6. self-awareness helps you connect better with others.

When you understand yourself-your strengths, weaknesses, values, and motivations-you can build better relationships. Self-awareness allows you to understand how you’re perceived by others and why you react in certain ways.

You Communicate More Effectively: Knowing your communication style, you can adapt to different situations. If you’re normally direct, you may soften your approach with someone who prefers indirect communication. You also understand how your words might affect others, helping you get your message across more constructively.

You Empathize Deeper: By reflecting on your own experiences, behaviors, and triggers, you gain insight into the human condition. This allows you to be more compassionate and sensitive towards others. You can put yourself in their shoes and understand their perspectives, even if you don’t share them.

You Value Others: When you accept yourself , flaws and all, you can accept others for who they are. You appreciate people for their innate worth, not just for what they can do for you. This makes others feel valued, boosting trust and intimacy in your relationships.

You Manage Conflict Better: Self-awareness helps you stay calm and focused during conflict because you understand the underlying issues. You can address problems objectively without accusation or attack. You also recognize how your behavior might contribute to the situation, allowing you to make necessary changes. This approach fosters open communication and resolution.

Developing self-awareness is a journey, not a destination. But making the effort to understand yourself and connect authentically with others is worth it. Strong, healthy relationships are built on mutual understanding and that starts with knowing yourself. Overall, self-awareness allows you to be fully present in your interactions and find meaning, even in simple everyday moments. And that is what life is all about.

7. It Allows you to Align Your Values With Your Actions

Self-awareness helps you gain clarity on what really matters to you-your core values and priorities in life. But knowing your values isn’t enough. You have to actually live them, through your choices and behaviors each day.

Self-awareness gives you the insight to see whether you’re walking the walk in addition to talking the talk. Are you spending your time and energy on the things that you claim are most important? For example, if family is a top value, are you making time to connect with loved ones each week or are you frequently working late? If health is a priority, are your daily habits reflective of that or do you struggle to exercise and eat right?

Without self-awareness, it’s easy to drift through life on autopilot and lose track of whether you’re aligning with your values. Take time for regular self-reflection to check in on how well your values and actions match up. You may find some areas that need adjustment. Don’t be too hard on yourself , as no one is perfect. But do make a plan for how to better embody your principles in the choices you make each and every day.

Living according to your values has significant benefits. It leads to less internal conflict and a clear conscience. It helps build self-respect and the respect of others. It sets an example for people around you and contributes to the greater good. Most importantly, staying true to your values is the path to a meaningful and purposeful life.

So get to know yourself, decide what really matters, and make sure your feet are walking that path. Self-awareness is the compass that can guide you there.

Signs You Respect Yourself: 10 Ways to Tell If You Value It

8. self-awareness improves your decision making.

When you understand yourself better, you make better choices. Being self-aware enhances your decision making in several key ways:

You know your strengths and weaknesses. When facing a decision, you can evaluate options through the lens of your abilities and shortcomings. You’ll gravitate toward choices that play to your strengths and avoid weaknesses.

You recognize your motivations . Self-aware people understand what drives them—whether it’s a desire for power, status, money, or making a difference. This insight helps guide you to opportunities that align with your key motivations.

You anticipate your reactions. If you know how you typically respond in various situations, you can predict your reactions to different options. You may choose a path that leads to an emotional state you prefer, or avoid one that would frustrate or upset you.

You accept your biases. Everyone has biases that cloud their judgment. But self-aware individuals recognize their own prejudices and tendencies towards certain types of errors or faulty logic. You can then make a deliberate effort to consider evidence that contradicts your preconceptions.

You learn from your mistakes. When you review your past decisions, self-awareness allows you to understand where you went wrong and gain valuable wisdom. You can pinpoint the thought processes, assumptions or emotional drives that led you astray, then make corrections for the future.

In the end, self-awareness gives you the insight to make choices that lead to outcomes you want and avoid those you will regret. By tuning in to your inner world, you’re able to navigate life’s twists and turns with more wisdom and grace. Every mistake and triumph becomes an opportunity to expand your understanding of yourself-and make better decisions as a result.

9. Self-Awareness Enables Continual Growth and Development

A key benefit of developing self-awareness is that it allows for constant improvement and progress. When you have an accurate assessment of your strengths, weaknesses, values, and goals, you can make better choices that align with your priorities and work on areas that need improvement.

Self-awareness means regularly reflecting on your thoughts, behaviors, and habits so you gain insight into how you can enhance your effectiveness and well-being. By understanding your tendencies, preferences and triggers, you can anticipate situations that may cause difficulties and prepare strategies to navigate them successfully. You can also leverage your strengths and pursue opportunities that play to them.

Developing self-awareness requires ongoing effort and practice. It involves stepping back to examine yourself objectively, accepting both positive and negative aspects of yourself without judgment. You must be willing to identify blind spots, recognize room for growth and make a habit of soliciting feedback. However, self-awareness is a journey, not a destination. As you gain life experiences, your sense of self will evolve. New challenges will emerge and demand continual learning and adaptation.

Self-awareness provides an opportunity for progress, but only if you act on the insights you gain. Once you identify areas you want to improve, take concrete steps to expand your knowledge and skills through reading, taking a course, working with a coach or mentor, or any other means that helps you achieve your goals. Develop strategies and take action to adopt positive behaviors and thought patterns while reducing negative ones. Review your progress regularly and make adjustments as needed.

Growth and progress feel rewarding, so improving your self-awareness and acting on it will increase your motivation and well-being over time. While self-awareness may reveal uncomfortable truths, it is the only way to reach your full potential. Make developing self-knowledge and using it constructively a lifelong practice. Your future self will thank you.

Personal Growth and Personal Development

10. it helps you become a better leader.

Being self-aware and having a good understanding of yourself helps you become a better leader in several ways:

• You develop emotional intelligence. You gain insight into your strengths, weaknesses, values, and triggers. This allows you to regulate your emotions and reactions healthily, improving your interpersonal skills and ability to motivate others.
• You build trust with your team. When you’re transparent about who you are and what drives you, it builds authenticity and trust with your employees. They see you as a “real” leader who is confident and secure.
• You make better decisions. Self-awareness gives you perspective on your biases, bind spots, and automatic thought patterns. This clarity helps you make decisions based more on facts and logic rather on emotion or ego.
• You adapt your leadership style. You can identify what leadership approaches work best for you and your team based on your personality, skills, and work environment. You can then tailor your style accordingly.
• You spot areas for growth. Self-reflection reveals areas where you could improve—be it communication, delegation, time management, etc. You can then work to develop those skills to become a stronger leader. In summary, being self-aware is a prerequisite for effective leadership. The more you understand yourself, the better equipped you are to lead and inspire others.

Can Leaders Grow Without Self-Awareness: Can Or Cannot?

11. self-awareness helps you manage stress.

When you have a good understanding of yourself and your tendencies, it becomes easier. to manage stress and stressful situations in a healthy way. Self-aware people:

• Know their stress triggers—what exactly causes them to feel overwhelmed, anxious or upset . This allows them to either avoid these triggers or prepare themselves mentally for them. Are able to recognize the early warning signs of stress in their own bodies and minds. They can then take action sooner to reduce their stress levels.
• Understand which coping strategies work best for them. Different people destress in different ways – some prefer exercise, others talking to friends, meditation, etc. Self-aware individuals know which activities renew and calm them.
• Can catch negative thought patterns that exacerbate stress. They can reframe these thoughts in a more positive and objective light.
• Tend to practice good stress-reducing habits regularly like getting enough sleep, eating well, and exercising. These healthy routines stem from an awareness of their importance. In short, self-knowledge gives you the tools to effectively manage stress and adversity. The more in tune you are with yourself – your triggers, tendencies, needs and coping strategies – the better equipped you’ll be to handle life’s pressures without letting them overwhelm you.

12. Self-Awareness Leads to More Fulfillment and Happiness

• When you fully understand your needs, desires, strengths and weaknesses, you’re better equipped to live a fulfilling life. Self-aware people:
• Know what truly makes them happy and can pursue those things. They understand their values, passions and interests , allowing them to make choices that bring them joy.
• Are better at setting and achieving goals that match their aspirations. They can identify and avoid goals that don’t align with who they truly are.
• Tend to have healthier relationships. They understand their own relationship needs, communication style, and triggers for conflict. This helps them build stronger connections with others.
• Experience less regret. They make choices aligned with their authentic selves, minimizing “what ifs” and “if onlys”.
• Feel more in control of their lives. With a solid grasp of who they are and what they want, self-aware individuals experience less confusion, doubt , and dependence on others’ opinions. In summary, self-knowledge gives you a foundation for living a life that truly satisfies you. When your choices, priorities, and relationships stem from an awareness of your authentic self, you set the stage for greater meaning, contentment, and joy.

The Importance of Self-Awareness at Work

Self-awareness is crucial for professional success and fulfillment. Some ways self-aware individuals excel at work:

• They understand their strengths, weaknesses, preferred work styles and communication needs. This self-knowledge helps them choose the right roles and responsibilities that play to their strengths.
• They manage interpersonal relationships more effectively. They are aware of how their behavior impacts others and how to work well in a team.
• They recognize and address potential blind spots. Self-awareness allows them to catch issues like biases , defensiveness, and overconfidence that could hold them back.
• They adapt more easily to change. With a clear understanding of themselves, self- aware individuals can adjust to new situations and demands at work.
• They communicate more effectively. They understand their communication preferences and how to match their style to different audiences.
• They solicit and utilize feedback more productively. Self-aware people are open to critique from others to improve their performance.
• They achieve goals more readily. With a clear vision of their strengths, weaknesses and preferences, self-aware individuals can set meaningful work goals and achieve them. In summary, self-awareness gives professionals key insights into how they operate and interact at work. This inner knowledge allows them to maximize their contributions, build strong relationships and thrive in an evolving work environment.

Improving Your Relationships Through Self-Awareness

Self-Awareness also improves the quality of our relationships with others. Here are some ways:

• You understand your emotional triggers and reactivity patterns. This allows you to catch yourself before overreacting to a partner or friend.
• You recognize your communication preferences and needs. This makes it easier to express yourself clearly and have your needs met in relationships.
• You know how you tend to give and receive love. This self-knowledge helps you match your style to the preferences of your partner or loved ones.
• You realize your blind spots and weaknesses. This awareness helps you avoid behaviors that strain relationships, like defensiveness, jealousy and control issues.
• You grasp your values and priorities. This clarity guides you in choosing partners and friends who are a good match for who you truly are.
• You detect when a relationship needs work. Self-aware individuals pick up on subtle issues and address problems sooner rather than later.
• You empathize more easily with others. With a clear sense of self, you can step outside your own perspective and see the world from another’s viewpoint. In summary, self-awareness provides key insights that strengthen your closest bonds. You understand how to give and receive love in healthier, more fulfilling ways. You develop relationships built on self-knowledge, open communication and mutual respect.

Final Thought

A part of being truly self-aware is recognizing the importance of self-awareness itself. By gaining insights into our inner strengths, weaknesses, values, and preferences, we improve our work performance, relationships, and overall wellbeing. Self-awareness helps us live in greater alignment with who we truly are as individuals. As you continue cultivating self-awareness through reflection, feedback, and self-discovery, remember to be kind yet courageous with yourself. Change happens incrementally over time, so celebrate every new insight and the progress you’ve already made on this lifelong journey of self-discovery.

• What Self-Awareness Really Is (and How to Cultivate It) It’s not just about introspection. by  Tasha Eurich January 04, 2018
• Self-awareness From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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Home / Essay Samples / Life / About Myself / Self-Discovery: Understanding and Knowing Yourself Better

Self-Discovery: Understanding and Knowing Yourself Better

• Category: Life
• Topic: About Myself , Being Yourself , Finding Yourself

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