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The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has variously been labelled as “insecure and instable”, “a region that does not inspire confidence in the potential for peaceful governance”, “a disaggregated region notable for its lack of homogeneity”, and “a troubled and unstable region, apparently without any real unity, common identity or collective goal”. Cursory scrutiny of contemporary literature on maritime security in the Indian Ocean tends to reinforce the perception of the IOR as a region riddled with state on state friction, internal chaos within states and the vulnerability of large sections of its population to several non-traditional threats such as natural disasters, food and water shortages, poverty, epidemic, piracy, terrorism and transnational organised crime. This assessment, unfortunately, is true to a large extent. In 2011, a total of 142 political conflicts were recorded in the IOR, representing more than a third of the 388 conflicts worldwide, including 12 of the world’s 20 wars, as well as an additional eight limited wars. The displacement of Rohingyas from the Rakhine province in Myanmar in 2017 and the devastating earthquake and tsunami in Indonesia in September 2018 illustrate the gravity of non-traditional security challenges in the region.

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Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)

Last updated on October 17, 2022 by ClearIAS Team

India is surrounded by ocean on three sides.

This makes maritime security a critical component of India’s internal and external security.

The Indian ocean naval symposium (IONS) was formulated by India to effectively address this concern.

Table of Contents

What is Indian Ocean naval symposium (IONS)?

The ‘Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) is a voluntary initiative that seeks to increase maritime cooperation among navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region by providing an open and inclusive forum for discussion of regionally relevant maritime issues. In the process, it endeavors to generate a flow of information between naval professionals that would lead to common understanding and possibly cooperative solutions on the way ahead. It consists of a series of gatherings held every two years amongst Indian Ocean littoral republics.

The symposium was first held in 2008 with India as the host.

The chairmanship and location of the Symposium rotates between the various member states.

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Members of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium

There are 25 member countries of IONS, including 8 observer countries, that touch or lay within the IOR. The following four sub-regions have been created by geographically classifying the members:

South Asian Littorals: Bangladesh, India, Maldives , Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and United Kingdom (British Indian Ocean Territory)
West Asian Littorals: Iran , Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates
East African Littorals: France (Reunion), Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania.
South East Asian and Australian Littorals: Australia , Indonesia, Malaysia , Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Timor-Leste

The eight observing countries in the IONS are Germany, China, the Netherlands, Spain, Russia, Italy, Japan , and Madagascar.

Significance of IONS

Maritime security : Similar to how the Western Pacific Naval Symposium operates, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium serves as a security framework for the whole Indian Ocean region.

Peaceful relations : This voluntary initiative has been taken up by the participating nations’ navies and maritime security organizations to maintain harmony with regard to the activities over the Indian Ocean.

Platform for interaction : The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium serves as a group that also makes it easier to organize lectures, essay contests, and numerous workshops while keeping the primary goal in mind.

Disaster response : Additionally, it helps to create a strong response system and HADR (humanitarian aid and disaster relief) against natural disasters.

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Also read: Indian ocean rim association , Maritime security challenges: major threats to India

Importance of IONS in the Indian context

IONS fits into India’s three goals in the area: enhancing and deepening ties with the Indian Ocean littoral states; establishing its leadership potential and goals of serving as a provider of network security; and realizing India’s vision of a stable and rules-based maritime order in the IOR.
India will be able to expand its area of influence from the Straits of Malacca to Hormuz with its assistance.
IONS can be utilized to balance out China’s growing influence in the area.

Previous year question

Consider the following in respect of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)

Inaugural IONS was held in India in 2015 under the chairmanship of the Indian Navy
IONS is a voluntary initiative that seeks to increase maritime cooperation, among navies of the littoral states of the Indian ocean region

Which of the above statements is/are correct?

(D) Neither 1 nor 2

Answer: (B) 2 only

Article written by: Caroline Abraham

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Indian Ocean Naval Symposium

The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) refers to a series of meetings held every two years. These meetings are held between the various coastal states located in the Indian Ocean region. A forum is organised as a part of the meetings to increase cooperation in relation to maritime security.

Other objectives include discussing various regional maritime problems and promoting friendly relationships among the various member states. The 24 member states of the IONS are classified under four sub-regions, namely the South Asian sub-region, the West Asian sub-region, the South-East Asian and Australian sub-region, and the East African sub-region.

As a part of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium UPSC syllabus , several details will be of importance for the students. These details are provided below. You are required to study them thoroughly.

Role of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium

The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium works as a security construct in the entire Indian Ocean region, similar to the functioning of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. The maritime security agencies and the navies of the member states have taken up this voluntary initiative to maintain harmony among them in relation to the activities over the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium acts as an organisation that also facilitates the organising of lectures, essay competitions and various workshops with the original objective in consideration.

The role of the IONS will be important for the upcoming UPSC Prelims demanding a critical analysis of the same from the students. This shall include the various facets of the organisation as stated above.

6th Indian Ocean Naval Symposium

The 6 th edition of the IONS was held in Tehran, the capital of Iran, between April 22 and April 25 of 2018. The various member states took part in this meeting. There was, however, addition of states in this meeting. The littoral states from the Caspian Sea also took part in this edition of the IONS.

The event marked the taking over of the IONS presidency by the Iranian Navy. There are 32 international navies that are a part of the IONS. Out of these, 24 of them are members and, 8 of them are observers. As of 2021, 7 editions of the IONS have taken place. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium 2022, which happens to be the 8 th edition of the meetings, will be held in Thailand.

The importance of the 6 th edition of the IONS in the UPSC Exam will be primarily because of the addition of the Caspian Sea littoral states. You are required to pay much attention to this particular aspect.

Also, read:

Importance of the IONS in the Indian Context

IONS have been found to be a much-required initiative with consideration of the three-fold ambitions of India in the Indian Ocean region. These ambitions are stated below and are of immense significance in the UPSC 2023:

To strengthen and better India’s relations with the coastal states in the Indian Ocean region
To establish the leadership potential of the Indian Navy in this context while aiming to become a net security provider
To fulfil the Indian ambition of a maritime border in the Indian Ocean region that is rules-based and stable in nature

Furthermore, the IONS can well help the Indian ambition to strengthen its influence right from the Straits of Malacca till Hormuz. India certainly aims to use the IONS as a counterbalance against China’s increasing pressure in the Indian Ocean region. This section will be of immense significance for the IAS Preparation given India’s interest in the entire initiative.

Frequently Asked Questions on the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium

When was the ions first held.

The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium was first held in the year 2008. India acted as the first host for the symposium.

Which are the member states of the IONS?

The member states of the IONS are stated below according to the regional classifications:

South Asian Region: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Seychelles.
South-East Asian and Australian Region: Indonesia, Australia, Timor Leste, Thailand, Malaysia, and Myanmar.
West Asian Region: Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE, and Iran.
East African Region: South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, Mauritius, France, Eritrea, and Kenya.

What are the eight observing countries in the IONS?

The eight observing countries in the IONS are Germany, China, the Netherlands, Spain, Russia, Italy, Japan, and Madagascar.

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10th Anniversary — Indian Ocean Naval Symposium

In line with the vision of the Prime Minister Narendra Modi – SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) – the theme for the 10th anniversary seminar was ‘IONS as a Catalyst for SAGAR’.

The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) is an extremely significant regional maritime security initiative which was launched by India in February 2008 to attain collectively beneficial maritime security outcomes within the Indian Ocean by providing an open and inclusive forum for discussion of regionally relevant maritime issues. IONS endeavours to generate a flow of information among naval professionals resulting in common understanding and possible agreements on the way ahead to tackle common concerns. The outcomes of the discussions could thereafter be implemented through agreements to enhance of regional maritime security.

IONS are a security construct for the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) which is similar to the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. It is a voluntary initiative among the navies and maritime security agencies of the member nations. In addition to the symposiums, numerous other activities like workshops, essay competitions and lectures are also held under the umbrella of the organisation. There are 36 littorals in the Indian Ocean which have been geographically grouped into the following four sub-regions:

South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan, Seychelles and Sri Lanka. West Asia: Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and Yemen. East African: France, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Djibouti, Egypt, Eriteria, Comoros, Madagascar, Somalia and Sudan. South East Asia & Australia: Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Timor Leste.

The 10th anniversary commemorative activities of the IONS were held on the November 13 and 14, 2018, at Kochi. Admiral Sunil Lanba, Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS), was the Chief Guest for the inaugural event, the IONS Seminar, scheduled on November 13, 2018, at the Lulu Bolgatty International Convention Centre, Kochi. The Seminar was attended by Chiefs and senior representatives from the navies of the majority of member nations.

In line with the vision of the Prime Minister, Narendra Modi – ‘SAGAR’ (Security and Growth for All in the Region) - the theme for the 10th anniversary seminar was “IONS as a Catalyst for SAGAR”. ‘SAGAR’ is in consonance with India’s ‘Act East’ policy and the nation’s diplomatic, economic and military outreach in the region.

26 of the 32 countries which constitute the total membership of IONS participated in the Seminar which aimed to discuss maritime issues pertaining to cooperative capacity-building to deal with common security concerns in the region. The IONS initiative endeavours to generate a flow of information among naval professionals so as to enable a common understanding of regional maritime issues and in turn facilitate generation of mutually beneficial maritime security outcomes.

During the Seminar, CNS released of the ‘Special Cover’ designed to commemorate the 10th Anniversary of IONS at Lulu International Convention Centre, Kochi in the presence of Fisheries, Harbour Engineering and Cashew Industries Minister of Kerala, Mercy Kutty Amma, the Post Master General PMG, Northern Region, Shri Jithendra Gupta and the Commander of Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) Navy Rear Admiral Hossein Khanzadi. The commemorative Special Cover of IONS 10th Anniversary celebrations depicted a map of the Indian Ocean and littoral countries of the IOR, signifying the geopolitical importance of the region. It also has a sail-boat that majestically symbolises the importance of ancient trade routes used by the natives of the region to establish trade and socio-cultural links with the countries in the region.

The national flags of member nations form an integral part of the cover and symbolise the support and cooperation of these countries the common cause of maritime security, goodwill and growth in the region. Chiefs of Navies of Bangladesh, Iran, Japan, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, the Netherlands, South Africa and the UAE as well as senior delegates from 16 other IONS member nations attended the IONS celebrations.

The release of the Special Cover was followed by a Seminar during which eminent guest speakers exchanged views on the ways to address emerging maritime threats in the IOR, leverage the IONS for better coordination and resource sharing, and enhances Maritime Domain Awareness in the region. A total of 16 papers were presented over three sessions. Bilateral meetings among Chiefs of participating navies were also held on the sidelines of the seminar wherein issues of common concern were discussed.

IONS endeavours to generate a flow of information among naval professionals resulting in common understanding and possible agreements on the way ahead to tackle common concerns. The outcomes of the discussions could thereafter be implemented through agreements to enhance of regional maritime security.

Admiral Sunil Lanba, along with the Commander of Islamic Republic of Iran Navy, Rear Admiral Hossein Khanzadi flagged off a “Tall Ship Sail Together” from Naval Base, Kochi on November 14, 2018. The Royal Omani Vessel Zinat-al-Bihaar along with two Indian Naval Sailing Ships Sudharshini, Tarangini, with one each “Sea Rider” from Sri Lanka, China, United Kingdom, Australia, Bangladesh and Maldives are participating in this ‘Sail Together’ which is planned over a distance of 1,200 nm to Muscat and back. It seeks to retrace the maritime trade route of yesteryears between the Malabar Coast and the Persian Gulf. The ships were accompanied by smaller Indian sailing vessels Mhadei which would be heading towards Seychelles while the others would continue towards Muscat. A grand fly past with nine helicopters and three fixed wing aircraft was undertaken to mark the occasion. The event carried with it the memories of a glorious maritime past and the ancient cultural exchange that opened long-distance political and economic relations between the great civilisations of India and those in Persia and Arabia. The route also honours the sociocultural and maritime history that is shared among populations across the Indian Ocean as a result of this trade.

To have Kerala as the starting point for the sail-together is both appropriate and befitting. Kerala’s coastal magnificence has been a legendary maritime hub for traders from across the world dating all the way back to the first century AD. Its majestic shipyards known by the iconic Urus, have been in the midst of intense ship-building and maritime trade over 1,500 years. Arab traders were especially captivated by these vessels and were among the first major patrons of these boats.

The ‘Sail Together’ would culminate with the Tall Ships being received at Muscat on November 29, 2018.

Information Fusion Centre

On the sidelines 10th Anniversary of IONS, CNS announced that the Indian Navy was all set to open an international Information Fusion Centre (IFC) for IOR aiming to improve maritime security in the region. The IFC will be a separate platform for the members of the IONS. “We have the approval from the Government of India to get in touch with a number of nations on technical agreement on exchanging information on white-shipping. We have signed agreements with 18 countries and operationalised 11 of them, where online information exchange on white-shipping has started. All this is put together in the Indian Navy’s “Information Management and Analysis Centre” (IMAC) at Gurugram. To start with, we are going to set up the IFC as an adjunct to the IMAC where we will share information virtually with like-minded countries and once we have infrastructure in place we will invite other countries” Admiral Sunil Lanba stated. White-shipping refers to commercial shipping. Dismissing the allegations that the Indian Navy has not been responsive in helping the fishermen in distress during the Cyclone Ockhi and the mid-sea collision in which five people died and seven went missing, CNS clarified that the Indian Navy has done its best. “During Ockhi, the Navy and the Coast Guard picked up hundreds of fishermen under severe weather conditions. We went out of the way and continued search and rescue operations for more than 40 days. In the case of mid-sea collision, we conducted search for days together. We deployed underwater survey vessels to find the sunken boat, but could not find it. We presume the missing fishermen were caught in the sunken boat,” he said. Responding to a question on initiatives taken by India to overcome growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean, CNS said a mission-based deployment of Indian Naval ships has been undertaken in “our areas of interests”.

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Commander Amila Prasanga Wins Prestigious IONS Academic Essay Competition 2022

Commander Amila Prasanga, a Military Research Officer at the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) under the Ministry of Defence and a member of the Sri Lanka Navy, emerged as the distinguished victor in the esteemed Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Academic Essay Competition 2022.

Under the guidance of Admiral Pierre Vandier, Chief of Staff of the French Navy and Chair of IONS, the competition, organized by the French IONS Secretariat, showcased exceptional intellect and collaboration among participants from IONS's 25 member countries and 8 observer countries' navies. Commander Amila Prasanga's winning essay, titled "Fishing for the Future: Strategies and Collaborations for the Preservation of Indian Ocean Fisheries," garnered acclaim for its remarkable originality and eloquence.

The announcement of winners took place at the 8th edition of the IONS Symposium 2023 in Bangkok, Thailand, hosted by the Royal Thai Navy. This significant victory brought notable recognition to both the INSS and the Sri Lanka Navy, emphasizing their dedicated commitment to fostering intellectual discourse and resolutions for global maritime security challenges.

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Publications - Study Papers

India's island diplomacy: the cases of the maldives, madagascar, and mauritius, introduction.

India has a series of multifaceted strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) based on its geographical location, its historical ties with regional actors, and overarching national and regional security concerns. The intent to actively protect national interests in the region has emerged as an increasingly crucial component of India’s wider diplomatic and strategic engagement in the IOR under the administration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Over the course of the 21st century, India has come to face a strategic environment in the region that is increasingly defined by China’s growing economic but also wider naval strategic presence. The IOR has thus emerged as another space in which the underlying issues in the China-India relationship, shaped primarily by border conflicts and China’s relationship with Pakistan, has come to play out.

With a vast coastline of over 7,500 kilometers and several strategically positioned islands and archipelagos, most notably the Lakshadweep archipelago and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India has been a major regional stakeholder in the development of security and governance regimes in the Indian Ocean since independence. Its proximity to and dependence on major regional shipping lanes, including the Straits of Malacca, Palk, and Balb al-Mandab, makes a continued access and navigability of these sea lanes of communication a key strategic interest for India. New Delhi’s exposure to maritime supply chain vulnerability is specifically pronounced in the energy sector: India imported almost 85% of its crude oil as of 2020-2021, most of which originates in the Persian Gulf and is transported to India via sea (Sharma, 2023). Further, the IOR is home to abundant natural resources, including oil, gas, minerals, and fisheries. Ensuring uninterrupted access to these resources while promoting trade and investment and expanding economic cooperation are central to India's engagement with the wider IOR.

The growing economic and strategic presence of the Chinese has complicated India’s historical understanding of the Indian Ocean as “India’s Ocean” , a space in which India remains an outsized and near-hegemonic actor (Scott, 2015). The Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) has served as a framework through which China has expanded its presence in the IOR by funding ostensible infrastructure investments in a region desperately dependent on the influx of more foreign capital. Some of these investments have focused on the construction and expansion of ports that India fears could be transformed into dual-use assets in the future, tying into broader Indian concerns regarding China’s alleged ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ in South Asia. Besides the Indian concerns regarding China, India and other regional actors face non-traditional security challenges, including piracy and illicit trafficking (Srivastava, 2017). Developing maritime security capacities has subsequently remained a key policy priority, both for India and smaller countries in the Indian Ocean

To assert Indian leadership and constrain China’s regional presence to some extent, India has significantly ramped up its economic and strategic presence in the IOR in recent years. India has expanded its engagement in maritime security cooperation, joint patrols, and information-sharing initiatives to combat threats and promote regional security collaboration. Cultural diplomacy has played a key role in structuring India’s wider engagement, with India launching several initiatives that have sought to highlight the historical-cultural links between the IOR and the Indian subcontinent and the role of Indian diaspora communities while advocating for improved people-to-people ties and a greater Indian economic presence in the IOR, especially via infrastructure investments. Island nations in the IOR have simultaneously not been without agency in the overarching contest for influence between China and India. For smaller countries, Beijing and New Delhi striving for influence allows island nations to hedge between the two to maximize developmental outcomes. Complex relations with India also contribute to idiosyncratic developments in individual countries that warrant further attention to understand the dynamics shaping strategic processes in the IOR today.

This paper studies the progress and challenges of India’s engagement with three key littoral Indian Ocean States: the Maldives, Madagascar, and Mauritius. After briefly elaborating on China’s emerging role in the IOR, the paper summarizes the general framework India has employed under Prime Minister Modi in its interaction with the region. The paper then examines how this blueprint has been applied in the three case study countries, what specific local contexts shape the effectiveness of this engagement until now, and what limitations remain in the respective bilateral relationships. The paper finds that although India’s growing diplomatic presence has created some positive outcomes, the Indian presence is partially contentious and shaped by a variety of factors that make developments contingent on specific local contexts. Carefully navigating these contexts and respective concerns will be paramount in order to ensure India’s long-term role as an alternative to China.

China’s emerging role in the Indian Ocean

The perhaps most transformative development in the regional security architecture in the Indian Ocean in the 21st century is the growing naval presence and economic importance of China. China already possesses one naval base in Djibouti, which was constructed to promote Chinese responsiveness to piracy around the Gulf of Aden in the late 2000s (Tanchum, 2021). While expanding the overall size of its naval forces, China has also steadily expanded its presence in the IOR through a growing number of naval deployments, the holding of military exercises in the region (Baruah, 2022), and a growing subsurface presence around major maritime chokepoints (Panneerselvam, 2022). As part of the BRI, China has invested heavily into the construction of physical infrastructure, including ports that lie near major maritime chokepoints (Mishra, 2021). In India, policymakers are suspicious of China’s provision of mostly untransparent loan deals which, the narrative suggests, could be used to exert geopolitical leverage over domestic politics and build up a long-term military presence in the region (Mukherjee, 2020). Concerns regarding China’s growing economic and naval presence have also concerned policymakers in other larger Indian Ocean stakeholder countries, including in the United States (White, 2020).

As mentioned above, India has perceived this development as an incursion into a geographical and political space New Delhi has long conceived of as its own sphere of influence. As such, the entry of a new actor that already competes with India elsewhere manifests a challenge to its strategic objectives. A growing economic and naval presence of China in the region is interpreted by policymakers in New Delhi as a potential long-term threat to the security of crucial sea lines of communication on which India depends for the import of goods, an anxiety further exacerbated by China’s mostly unrecorded subsurface presence and activities throughout the IOR (Singh, 2022). In India, deep suspicions also remain regarding the supposedly economic nature of the BRI: rather, Chinese investments are seen as directly aiming to establish a naval forward presence in the IOR that could be leveraged in the case of conflict with India. Many in India suspect China to aim to establish a ‘string of pearls’ of ports in the Indian Ocean that could restrict Indian navigability and market access in times of conflict (Ashraf, 2017). If China is indeed viewed as seeking to build a ‘string of pearls’ of potentially militarized maritime/naval assets, the geography and policy posturing vis-à-vis Chinese investments of regional island nations is of crucial importance to India. These countries serve as major maritime connectivity nodes. As such, they have emerged as countries India has focused its diplomatic outreach on.

India’s diplomatic engagement with the IOR under Modi

While India’s security calculations toward the IOR have been reshaped by a growing presence of Chinese investments and naval assets, non-traditional security challenges such as piracy, illicit trafficking, and climate change continue to be relevant in shaping India’s aims. Crucially, these non-traditional challenges are immediate policy issues for smaller island countries. As such, most of the engagement has not openly focused on containing China but on addressing the security concerns of island countries in the IOR. There is a notable overlap in boosting the capacities of island nations to respond to traditional and non-traditional threats, specifically in regard to boosting maritime domain awareness capacities, joint patrolling, and information sharing.

India’s aspirations surrounding a more proactive role in the IOR are situated in a complex history that has also led to many island countries being suspicious of India’s strategic ambitions. In the past, Indian administrations have repeatedly asserted their perception of the Indian Ocean as a sphere of influence by intervening militarily. Interventions have occurred in Mauritius in 1983, the Maldives in 1988, and Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990. These interventions and India’s self-proclaimed regional leadership role have historically contributed to a conception in some island nations of India as an overbearing neighbor with hegemonic aspirations that aims to construct regional order on unilateral terms (Moorthy, 2020). For some, China is viewed as an alternative that brings less historical baggage and is willing to provide infrastructure investment on favorable terms for the receiving country. Today, Indian diplomacy thus faces the challenge of aiming to affirm India’s role without reinforcing the perceptions informing regional distrust toward India while competing with a China that allows smaller countries to hedge their bets.

Against this larger backdrop, engagement with island countries in the Indian Ocean has become a discursive cornerstone of the Modi’s government foreign policy approach toward the region. The IOR was made part of Modi’s ‘neighborhood first’ policy, which seeks to prioritize regional engagement within South Asia and reaffirm India’s role in the region (Sidhu & Godbole, 2015). The Modi government has sought to strengthen bilateral and regional ties through initiatives focused on trade, connectivity, defense cooperation, cultural exchanges, and capacity-building. As part of this, India has launched the "SAGAR" (Security and Growth for All in the Region) doctrine, which stresses the importance of fostering peace, stability, and collective prosperity in the IOR (Schöttli, 2019). Indian governmental discourse has framed SAGAR as linked to other continental connectivity initiatives launched by the Modi government, including the International North-South Transport Corridor and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway. The rhetoric of the Modi administration vis-à-vis the region has mainly emphasized India’s role as a facilitator of regional connectivity and development to avoid a return to a more hegemonic foreign policy discourse and logic.

The emphasis on a series of cultural diplomacy frameworks focused on facilitating people-to-people contact is consistent with this non-confrontational approach. Cultural exchanges and festivals promoting the varied cultural heritage of the Indian subcontinent have served as a key platform on which Indian artists, musicians, and performers can interact with the regional populations (High Commission of India, Mauritius, n.d.). Another significant aspect of India's cultural diplomacy is the promotion of yoga, Ayurveda, and traditional medicine, for which government authorities have organized a range of workshops, wellness programs, and training sessions in Indian Ocean countries. Notably, these initiatives seek to leverage the partially significant Indian and South Asian presence in the countries in the IOR.

India’s engagement with the region under Modi is situated in a broader process of narrative-building in which India emphasizes the continuity of cultural, economic, and social exchanges between the subcontinent and the islands that have occurred for centuries. These connections are viewed as forming the basis for constructive bilateral ties and joint initiatives in various sectors. Indian initiatives have, for example, promoted heritage tourism to attract visitors from Indian Ocean Island nations to historical sites in India such as ancient temples, forts, and archaeological sites that hold cultural and historical significance for both India and the island nations (High Commission of India, Mauritius, n.d.). Further, India has sought to use Indian diaspora communities in these countries, many of which maintain strong ties with their ancestral homeland, as a cultural bridge with the island countries (The Hindu, 2021). As part of this community-based approach, Indian cooperation has promoted the teaching and learning of Indian languages, such as Hindi and Tamil. This forms part of a broader attempt to enhance the familiarization of Indian Ocean Island countries with components of historical and contemporary Indian culture.

Educational exchanges and scholarships have come to occupy a key place in the Indian soft power strategy surrounding cultural engagement. India has offered scholarships and educational opportunities to students from Indian Ocean countries, allowing them to pursue higher education in India. Much of this has been channeled via the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program, which provides scholarships and exchanges in areas such as education, arts, and sports (ITEC, 2022). These initiatives seek to contribute to the development of human capital, build long-term relationships, and create a network of future political stakeholders in the region with deep links in and appreciation for India. India also supports capacity-building in administrative and bureaucratic contexts. India-supported programs encompass various sectors such as education, healthcare, agriculture, and skill development. As part of the ITEC program, for instance, training is provided to individuals from Indian Ocean countries in areas such as technology, management, and public administration. Here too, the overt emphasis is on cooperation rather than an imposition of Indian economic or strategic objectives.

While soft power evidently occupies a central role in India’s broader strategy toward the region, security cooperation is not wholly absent from India’s regional engagement. Frameworks for security and defense cooperation have primarily emphasized the bolstering of maritime capacities for littoral States. One of the key initiatives taken by India is the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which aims to promote maritime cooperation, regional security, and information sharing among Indian Ocean littoral countries (The Hindu, 2022). The IONS provides a platform for dialogue, coordination, and capacity-building in areas such as maritime domain awareness, disaster response, and counter-piracy operations. Notably, the IONS is explicitly framed as a framework for responding to non-traditional security challenges. India has also strengthened its bilateral defense ties with Indian Ocean countries through various initiatives. As will be discussed below, India has increasingly invested efforts into defense dialogues, joint military exercises, and naval patrols with countries such as the Maldives, Madagascar, and Mauritius. These activities aim to enhance mutual trust and interoperability, between the national armed forces and law enforcement agencies.

Frameworks for capacity-building and intelligence sharing have been key components of the security component of the recent engagement strategy. The Indian government has provided training and scholarships for military personnel from littoral countries focused on maritime security, counterterrorism, and disaster response. India has also extended lines of credit to these countries for the procurement of defense equipment and infrastructure development related to defense needs (Roy-Chaudhury, 2017). Further, India has promoted engagement in initiatives such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) to combat piracy, maritime terrorism, and other security threats in the region. India has contributed to joint patrols, surveillance, and information-sharing efforts to maintain maritime domain awareness and secure sea lines of communication by establishing coastal radar systems and expanding the network of Automatic Identification System (AIS) to track vessels. These measures aim to improve the surveillance and response capabilities of Indian Ocean countries in the face of mostly non-traditional security challenges.

India has also sought to counter the infrastructure-focused component of the BRI by providing investment for infrastructure itself. Examples include the construction of ports, airports, roads, and railways. For instance, India has been involved in the development of the Chabahar Port in Iran, which provides an alternative route for trade with Afghanistan, Central Asia, and beyond (Aliasgary & Ekstrom, 2021). Similarly, in Sri Lanka, India has invested in infrastructure projects and has promised to increase private and public sector investment as Sri Lanka seeks to diversify from Chinese loans (Nikkei Asia, 2023). These initiatives aim to boost connectivity but are also designed to contribute to the economic development of the host nations and present an alternative to Chinese infrastructure investments.

The initiatives India has pursued so far imply a distinct signaling and power projection element. India's engagement with the island nations remains influenced by the desire to project its influence and strengthen its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean, reinforcing Indian control at a time when China’s growing presence questions some of the architectural tenets of the present order. There is a clear ambition to avoid a conception in littoral States of India as an overbearing and imposing actor. This is and will remain a tightrope to walk.

India’s diplomatic engagement in the Maldives, Madagascar, and Mauritius

The maldives.

India and the Maldives have a long history of cultural, economic, and political ties that have shaped the bilateral relationship since both countries have gained independence. Historically, Maldivian society has been strongly influenced by Indian culture, language, and religion. Today, areas of cooperation include trade, tourism, defense, and development assistance. However, perceptions of overextended Indian influence and interference have contributed to an increasingly complicated relationship in the past decades.

The Maldives has faced a range of domestic crises throughout the 2010s, starting with a series of eventually escalating protests that led to the resignation of pro-Indian President Mohamed Nasheed in 2012. His successor Abdulla Yameen pushed for closer relations with China, leading to the signing of a bilateral free trade agreement and the inking of multiple investment agreements as part of the BRI (Macan-Markar, 2023). Following a range of controversial moves, Yameen declared a state of emergency in the country, leading Nasheed to demand an Indian intervention in the Maldives to restore the rule of law (Rasheed, 2018). Yameen was succeeded in 2018 by Ibrahim Mohamed Solih from the MDP (Maldivian Democratic Party), which Nasheed also belonged to. Since then, relations between India and the Maldives have normalized again. Over time, however, Yameen’s party, the Progressive Party of Maldives, has launched the so-called ‘India Out’ campaign, lobbying for more limitations on Indian influence while welcoming a greater Chinese presence to balance India’s role in domestic politics (Shivamurthy, 2022). In the Maldives, the roles of China and India have become key factors in internal political processes.

Critics of the relationship have lamented India’s military presence in and around the Maldives, the lack of transparency in bilateral agreements, and decisions regarding the extent of Indian influence over Maldivian security forces, including the police and the coastguard (Didi, 2022). ‘India out’ slogans have been of continued importance and have been supported by some political parties, some traditional and non-traditional news outlets and, it is suspected, Chinese investors (Shivamurthy, 2022). The frequent politicization of the bilateral relationship, still shaped by the memory and impact of India’s intervention in the country in 1988, thus continues to be a major factor in influencing Maldivian perceptions and the perceived appeal of China as a balancer against Indian influence.

India has sought to emerge as a more significant economic stakeholder in the country to contribute to more positive perceptions of Indian influence. India has sought to boost national development through various infrastructure projects and economic initiatives, especially surrounding the development of tourism infrastructure, including airports, harbors, and resorts (Al Jazeera, 2020). The development of the Addu City airport is a notable example of the Indian private sector’s contribution to the Maldivian tourism industry (PSM News, 2023). Furthermore, India has provided financial assistance and concessional loans to support the Maldivian economy. Development assistance from India has focused on sectors such as healthcare, education, fisheries, and renewable energy. These initiatives are framed as seeking to promote sustainable development and improve the well-being of the Maldivian people in tacit opposition to the elite-focused investment provided by China.

India remains a key security partner in the build-up and maintenance of the Maldives’ maritime security capacities. For the Maldives, trilateral security cooperation with India and Sri Lanka is crucial for the response to a range of non-traditional security challenges, including illicit trafficking, piracy, and the unregulated exploitation of fishing grounds (Didi, 2022). Both countries have expressed their continued commitment to collaborate on security and defense, with India handing over a fast patrol vessel and a landing craft to the Maldives, and the two countries jointly laying the foundation for a naval dockyard for the Maldives National Defense Force in Ekatha (Pandit, 2023). During a visit to the Maldives in May 2023 by Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, the bilateral security relationship was once again a topic of discussion (Financial Express, 2023), with a joint statement following the meeting reaffirming the importance of a rules-based order and a shared commitment to maintaining stability in the region (Pandit, 2023). Since the election of Solih, the Maldives has entrenched itself in an openly pro-India position that has reinforced India as one of the key stakeholders in providing capacity-building functions to the country, especially in the maritime domain.

Despite the return to normality in the bilateral relationship under the Solih administration, the India-Maldives ties remain complex and subject to change, depending on domestic political shifts. China’s growing economic and political influence has added a major variable to the equation that provides Maldivian opposition groups with a backer to balance India. While the Solih government has stabilized India’s role in the country for the time being, it is clear that ‘India out’ slogans present a form of discontent that is at least partially rooted in perceptions of Indian interference. Indian policymakers will have to carefully manage these perceptions and pursue an approach that reassures skeptics in the country. Additionally, the political transitions in the Maldives have impacted the continuity of India-Maldives relations. Each change in government brings its own priorities and perspectives, which can lead to significant and relatively sudden shifts in the bilateral dynamics. Lastly, the Maldives' small size and limited resources pose challenges to the implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects and economic initiatives. This necessitates careful planning, coordination, and financial sustainability to ensure successful long-term results.

In conclusion, India has been actively involved in the development of the Maldives through economic and infrastructure cooperation while playing a key role in building up (maritime) security capacities in the country. However, challenges and limitations exist, including the role of China, concerns about Indian dominance, and associated domestic polarization that can lead to rapid shifts in policy following the election of a new government. Overcoming these challenges and fostering a balanced and mutually beneficial relationship will require continued dialogue, trust-building, and understanding between the two countries. Large parts of the Maldivian establishment recognize India's role as a key development partner and a regional security provider. It will remain crucial for India to maintain close dialogue and coordination with the political leadership to address any concerns and build trust.

Madagascar has historically existed outside of the immediate strategic purview of India, presenting a different situation when compared to the Maldives. Over the course of the 21st century, India-Madagascar relations have evolved, with India emerging as an important development and investment partner for Madagascar. While bilateral relations were initially established following Madagascar's independence from France in 1960, the relationship between the two countries remained relatively low-key until the late 1990s, when India began to expand its economic and diplomatic engagement in Africa. In recent years, India's engagement with Madagascar has been driven by the growing demand for energy and the need to diversify its sources of energy supply. India has also sought to present itself as an alternative to BRI infrastructure investments provided by China.

India's economic engagement with Madagascar has primarily focused on investments in agriculture, energy, and infrastructure sectors. India has been providing technical assistance, training, and financial support to Madagascar's agricultural sector through the ITEC program while extending lines of credit to Madagascar to promote agricultural production and processing. India's investments in the energy sector in Madagascar have been driven by the aim to secure access to uranium resources and to promote renewable energy sources (The Economic Times, 2011). India's state-owned Uranium Corporation of India Limited (UCIL) has a 51% stake in a joint venture with Madagascar's Office des Mines Nationales et des Industries Strategiques (OMNIS) for uranium exploration and mining in Madagascar. India is also involved in developing solar energy projects in Madagascar while investing in the development of physical infrastructure such as the Antananarivo ring road project and the rehabilitation of the Ambatovy port in Madagascar. As part of its provision of development financing, India has extended a line of credit to Madagascar for the construction of a power plant and the upgrading of the country's power transmission and distribution systems (The Financial Express, 2022). Cooperation in the energy sector consequently plays a key role in the bilateral relationship.

The relative absence of complicated historical ties when compared to the Maldives contributes to a greater emphasis on cultural diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges. India's cultural center in Antananarivo offers language classes, yoga, and cultural events and India has been providing scholarships to Malagasy students to study in India. Additionally, the Indian diaspora in Madagascar, most of which have been merchants in the past, has been actively contributing to the economic development of the country and has become a key domestic stakeholder within Madagascar.

As is the case in the Maldives, maritime security cooperation has played a key role in structuring India’s bilateral engagement with Madagascar. Defense and security measures have included joint initiatives, capacity-building programs, and defense trade that seeks to both bolster Antanarivo’s capacities while providing an alternative for Chinese investments and influence (Parashar, 2021). The first joint patrol was organized in 2019 as the Indian Navy sought to bolster its presence around sea lanes in the western Indian Ocean, with the joint patrol focusing on patrolling Madagascar's exclusive economic zone and the organization of passage exercise. Since then, Madagascar's defense minister has expressed interest in inviting a greater Indian presence to benefit from joint exercises, capacity building measures, and establishment of a semaphore system on the coast (Parashar, 2021). Within India’s defense bureaucracy, the 2019 establishment of the Indian Ocean Region Division within the Ministry of External Affairs has aimed to formalize and improve India’s diplomatic presence throughout the wider region, including island nations and territories in the southern Indian Ocean in the diplomatic framework (The Wire, 2019). Such bureaucratic changes and enhanced collaboration with non-traditional partners such as Madagascar signal the significance of the Indian Ocean as an essential strategic theater for India that is critical for its diplomatic, military, and regional engagements (Baruah, 2022).

As is the case in the Maldives, however, domestic political situations remain a key factor shaping the extent and nature of India’s role. Indian investments have been instrumental in promoting agricultural productivity, supporting renewable energy development, and enhancing infrastructure connectivity while India’s involvement in the uranium mining sector has also helped Madagascar in exploring its mineral potential. The bilateral trade between the two countries has grown steadily, with exports from India to Madagascar reaching north of 350 million US$ in 2021, compared to 150 million US$ in 2013 (Trading Economics, 2022). The implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects in Madagascar, however, has been slow due to bureaucratic hurdles and issues related to land acquisition. The COVID-19 pandemic has also negatively affected Indian investment and trade in Madagascar. Madagascar's political instability has also affected India's engagement with the country: the 2009 coup and the political crisis that followed led to a temporary freeze in India's engagement with Madagascar (Ministry of External Affairs, 2014), indicating the effect internal volatility can have on bilateral ties.

In conclusion, India's investments in agriculture, energy, and infrastructure sectors have had a positive impact on Madagascar's economy and development that is generally recognized by both the Malagasy public and elite circles, which have courted Indian investments and partnerships in various sectors. Within the public sphere, the Indian diaspora in Madagascar plays a crucial role in fostering generally positive perceptions of India. However, as with any foreign engagement, there can be occasional concerns about issues such as economic dominance and cultural influence. As is the case in the Maldives, India’s win-win narrative surrounding a greater Indian economic presence must be careful not to escalate these concerns. While India's efforts to promote cultural diplomacy and people-to-people exchanges have further strengthened the bilateral relationship, challenges related to infrastructure implementation and political instability persist. Sustaining and deepening the India-Madagascar relationship will require continued efforts in addressing these challenges and exploring new avenues for cooperation.

Mauritius serves as a key maritime hub and plays a crucial role in India's maritime security and trade interests due to its proximity to major shipping lanes. Its location in the more central portion of the southern Indian Ocean furthermore provides strategic advantages for Indian naval operations and surveillance activities, including concerning Chinese naval and submarine operations.

As is the case in the Maldives and Madagascar, development, and infrastructure assistance as well as trade play a key role in shaping Indian strategy towards Mauritius. Mauritius has historically served as an important gateway for Indian businesses to access African and global markets and bilateral trade has been growing steadily, with India being Mauritius’ second-largest trading partner as of 2022, accounting for 9.75% of all national imports (TrendEconomy, 2023). In terms of industry, the trade relations primarily revolve around sectors such as textiles, pharmaceuticals, information technology, and financial services (Ministry of External Affairs, n.d.). Further, India has been actively involved in providing development assistance and implementing infrastructure projects in Mauritius that aim to enhance socio-economic development, strengthen institutional capacities, and promote sustainable growth. The extension of lines of credit has been a key policy tool for India to contribute to the construction of road networks, ports, and water supply systems. These projects contribute to the development of critical infrastructure and support Mauritius' efforts to become a regional economic hub.

The Indo-Mauritian diaspora has played a significant role in strengthening the cultural ties between the two countries. The majority of the population in Mauritius traces its roots back to India, which has resulted in a shared cultural heritage and strong familial connections that remain till today. Indian cultural traditions, languages, and festivals continue to be celebrated in Mauritius, and the diaspora actively participates in promoting cultural exchanges between the two countries. This diaspora acts as a bridge, facilitating people-to-people contact and fostering a sense of cultural affinity. This is a notable difference to the Maldives, where Indian cultural influence is at times viewed with suspicion, and Madagascar, where Indian cultural influence is less pronounced. The diasporic element in the contemporary relationship provides India with improved soft power leverage that does not face the same obstacles and complications it does elsewhere in the region.

India’s support for Mauritius on the question of the Chagos Archipelago has contributed to close diplomatic relations. India has supported Mauritius' claim to sovereignty over the archipelago, which continues to be held by the United Kingdom and hosts a US military base but is claimed by Mauritius. In 2017, India voted in favor of a Mauritius-backed resolution in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that sought an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legal status of the archipelago (The Wire, 2017). India reiterated diplomatic support for the Mauritian position after the ICJ ruled in 2019 that the UK's continued presence in the Chagos Islands is illegal (Wintour, 2021). India's support for Mauritius' claim to sovereignty is seen as part of its broader policy of strengthening ties with its Indian Ocean neighbors (Revi, 2020) and has contributed to a favorable political climate in the bilateral ties.

As part of this close diplomatic relationship, India and Mauritius have a long-standing security and defense partnership that has played a critical role in bolstering the maritime capacities of Port Louis. In 2021, India’s Minister of External Affairs traveled to Mauritius to ink two crucial agreements: the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation and Partnership Agreement (CECPA), a bilateral free trade agreement, and a security-focused agreement that oversaw the lease of Indian maritime and air military equipment to Mauritius as well as a loan of 100 million US$ aimed at facilitating Mauritian defense acquisitions from India (Beri, 2021) These agreements come on the back of existing frameworks that have led to close security ties. Since 1974, Indian maritime personnel has been seconded to Mauritius to serve as part of the Mauritian Coast Guard, exemplifying the close security relationship between both countries. Most crucially, Mauritius has given permission to India to construct a naval base on the remote island of Agaléga (Greene, 2021). Recent satellite images and other documents detail progress on the construction of two naval jetties and a large runway on the island. The strategic outpost would allow India’s navy to observe shipping routes around southern Africa, which now account for a significant portion of China’s energy imports. The island would also provide a useful location for communications and electronic intelligence facilities, allowing India to enhance its intelligence-gathering capacities in the southern Indian Ocean. These developments speak to the continued strength and endurance of the bilateral security relationship.

The historical and contemporary political and social proximity between India and Mauritius make complications less pronounced when compared to the Maldives and Madagascar. In Mauritius, India enjoys a positive and warm perception among the public that is driven by the role and size of the Indo-Mauritian diaspora. India's development assistance and infrastructure projects have contributed to the positive perception of India in Mauritius. On an elite level, Mauritian political leadership has consistently expressed positive views about India's diplomatic engagement. The longstanding historical, cultural, and economic ties between the two countries have created a sense of shared interests and mutual respect. The continued closeness between both countries is reflected in recent developments, including closer defense cooperation and, most notably, the signing of CECPA in 2021. Some issues, for instance instability and changes in governance in Mauritius, can provide potential complications going forward. Another challenge is the issue of double taxation and tax evasion. The presence of a large number of Indian companies and investments in Mauritius has led to concerns over the misuse of the tax treaty between the two countries, an issue that a protocol to amend the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) has sought to address (Fowler, 2019).

Conclusion: Progress made and the way forward

India's recent diplomatic engagement with the Maldives, Madagascar, and Mauritius has shown significant progress in advancing New Delhi’s diplomatic presence. Naturally, the extent and nature of cooperation (as well as limits thereto) are shaped by a variety of factors. Key factors include the presence/absence of Indian military intervention in the past (and the associated perceptions of Indian presence), the domestic politicization of relations with India, the degree to which China is welcomed as a balance to Indian influence, and the role of the Indian diaspora. Despite the progress made over the past years, challenges remain that need to be addressed to ensure the long-term success and sustainability of India's engagement in these countries.

Competition with other external actors, particularly China, poses a significant challenge for India's diplomatic engagement in the Maldives, Madagascar, and Mauritius. China's massive infrastructure investments and financial assistance as part of the BRI have garnered attention and support from these countries to fill extant infrastructure gaps. India, therefore, needs to navigate this competitive landscape and ensure that its engagements are attractive, beneficial, and sizable enough to counterbalance China's influence. In effect, India must remain capable to actively deliver on the win-win rhetoric it has established under the Modi administration. A non-interventionist, multilaterally focused approach will be key to ensuring continued buy-in from local and regional stakeholders.

Balancing development projects with local sensitivities and sustainability concerns is another challenge for India. While development projects are crucial for fostering economic growth and infrastructure development, it is essential to ensure that they align with local aspirations and priorities. Engaging local communities, conducting thorough environmental assessments, and addressing sustainability concerns are essential for the long-term success and acceptance of these projects. India must focus on building trust and partnerships with local stakeholders to ensure that development projects are sustainable and meet the needs of the local population on their terms.

Addressing historical and geopolitical complexities is another significant challenge in India's diplomatic engagement. Historical factors, such as colonial legacies, past relationships, and at times critical perceptions vis-à-vis Indian policy can influence the perceptions and sentiments of these countries towards India. The ‘India out’ campaign in the Maldives, marks the most obvious epitome of this. Navigating these complexities requires a nuanced understanding of the historical context and a proactive approach to address any historical grievances or geopolitical concerns.

Ensuring inclusive growth and addressing socio-economic disparities is a critical challenge for India's diplomatic engagement. While development projects and investments can contribute to economic growth, it is crucial to ensure that the benefits reach all sections of society and address existing socio-economic disparities. Inclusive growth entails creating opportunities for marginalized communities, promoting sustainable livelihoods, and investing in human capital development. India needs to focus on capacity-building initiatives, skill development programs, and inclusive policies to ensure that its engagement contributes to the overall socio-economic development of these countries.

In addressing these challenges, India’s strategy must consist of multiple components. Firstly, India should prioritize an approach that considers the specific needs and aspirations of each country as well as the specific concerns regarding Indian involvement. This includes conducting thorough assessments of the local context, engaging with key stakeholders, and developing tailored initiatives that address the specific challenges faced by each country. Further, India must focus on bolstering the indigenous capacities of smaller island nations to enable their resilience in the face of a range of different security challenges. In this, India could enhance its collaboration with other Indian Ocean countries, most notably Australia and France. India must focus on emphasizing transparency and accountability in its wider engagement with the IOR.

In conclusion, while India's new diplomatic engagement with the Maldives, Madagascar, and Mauritius has made significant strides, some challenges remain. Competition with other external actors, balancing development projects with local sensitivities and sustainability concerns, addressing historical and geopolitical complexities, and ensuring inclusive growth and addressing socio-economic disparities are crucial areas that require continued attention. By strengthening regional partnerships, promoting transparency and accountability, and focusing on people-to-people exchanges, India can overcome these challenges and further enhance its diplomatic engagement in these countries.

June 2023. © European Foundation for South Asian Studies (EFSAS), Amsterdam

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INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL SYMPOSIUM (IONS) – 2023

Culmination of ions coc (19 - 22 dec 23), bangkok, thailand india took over as the co-chair of ions working groups on maritime security and hadr republic of korea navy welcomed as the latest ‘observer’.

The 8 th edition of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Conclave of Chiefs (CoC) was conducted by Royal Thai Navy at Bangkok, Thailand from 19 – 22 Dec 23. Chiefs of Navies/ Senior Delegates from 27 Members/ Observer countries participated in the event. Admiral R Hari Kumar, Chief of the Naval Staff, attended the event with a three member Indian Naval delegation.

( https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1988673 )

During the Conclave of Chiefs, Thailand assumed the duties of Chair of IONS and Work Plan for next two years was finalised. As a first , Flag designed by India was selected as the IONS Flag . India also took over as the co-Chair of IONS Working Groups on Maritime Security and HADR for the forthcoming cycle . Republic of Korea Navy was welcomed by the Conclave as the latest ‘Observer’, raising the collective strength of IONS to 34 (25 Members & 09 Observers).

During the Conclave, CNS, IN held fruitful interaction with the host, Adm Adoong Pan-Iam, Commander-in-Chief, Royal Thai Navy and complimented him for taking over Chairmanship of IONS . Both Leaders expressed commitment towards sustaining an upward trajectory of Bilateral Defence engagements including naming of IN - RTN Bilateral based on historical and cultural connect. Further, he also interacted with Heads of Delegation from Australia, Bangladesh, France, Iran, Italy, Malaysia, Maldives, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Spain, and discussed bilateral maritime issues. On the side-lines of Conclave, the CNS also visited Indian Naval Ship Kadmatt, at Bangkok, and interacted with the ship’s crew, commending them for successful long range deployment.

IONS was conceived by the Indian Navy in 2008 as a forum which seeks to enhance maritime cooperation among Navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region by providing an open and inclusive platform for discussions on regionally relevant maritime issues that would lead to common understanding on the way ahead. The inaugural edition of IONS was held in Feb 2008 at New Delhi, with Indian Navy as the Chair for two years (2008 - 2010). India is also scheduled to take over as the Chair of IONS (2025-27) during 9 th CoC planned to be conducted in India in end 2025 .

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VM/JSN 247/23

Commander Amila Prasanga of Navy wins prestigious IONS essay competition 2022

Commander Amila Prasanga of the Sri Lanka Navy emerged triumphant, winning the prestigious Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) essay competition 2022.

Organised by the French IONS Secretariat, Indian Ocean Naval Symposium essay competition 2022, was held under the guidance of Admiral Pierre Vandier, Chief of Staff of the French Navy and Chair of IONS.

Winners of the competition were announced at the 08th edition of the IONS Symposium 2023, held in Bangkok, Thailand, hosted by the Royal Thai Navy. Open to both uniformed and civilian members from IONS's 25 member countries and 08 observer countries' navies, this competition attracted a diverse array of participants, transcending ranks and backgrounds. Commander Amila Prasanga's winning essay, titled "Fishing for the Future: Strategies and Collaborations for the Preservation of Indian Ocean Fisheries," stood out for its exceptional originality and eloquence.

This remarkable victory brought significant recognition to the Sri Lanka Navy, highlighting its commitment to fostering intellectual contributions towards global maritime security challenges.

In addition, this achievement underscored the profound involvement of the Sri Lanka Navy and Coast Guard in fostering such insightful contributions for the security and well-being of our oceans on a global scale.

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Indian Ocean Naval Symposium

Recently, the 8th edition of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Conclave of Chiefs (CoC) was conducted by the Royal Thai Navy at Bangkok, Thailand.

About indian ocean naval symposium.

It is a voluntary initiative that seeks to increase maritime co-operation among navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region by providing an open and inclusive forum for discussion of regionally relevant maritime issues.
It was conceived by the Indian Navy in 2008 as a forum which seeks to enhance maritime co-operation among Navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region.
The inaugural edition of IONS was held in Feb 2008 at New Delhi, with Indian Navy as the Chair for two years (2008 - 2010).
In the process, it endeavours to generate a flow of information between naval professionals that would lead to common understanding and possibly cooperative solutions on the way ahead.
South Asian Littorals: Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and United Kingdom (British Indian Ocean Territory)
West Asian Littorals: Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates
East African Littorals: France (Reunion), Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, South Africa and Tanzania.
South East Asian and Australian Littorals: Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Timor-Leste.
Observers: China, Germany, Italy, Japan, Madagascar, the Netherlands, Russia and Spain.
As a first, Flag designed by India was selected as the IONS Flag.
India also took over as the co-Chair of IONS Working Groups on Maritime Security and HADR for the forthcoming cycle.
Republic of Korea Navy was welcomed by the Conclave as the latest ‘Observer’.

Q1) What is the Indian Ocean Rim Association?

It was established in 1997 as an intergovernmental organisation of States on the rim of the Indian Ocean. It has members from Africa, West Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia , Europe and Oceania. The Association’s membership has expanded to 23 member states and 11 dialogue partners.

Source: INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL SYMPOSIUM (IONS) – 2023

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Daily News Analysis

INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL SYMPOSIUM

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The 8th edition of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Conclave of Chiefs (CoC) was conducted by Royal Thai Navy at Bangkok, Thailand from 19 – 22 Dec 23.

Key Highlights of the 8th IONS Conclave of Chiefs (CoC)

The Royal Thai Navy hosted the 8th IONS Conclave of Chiefs in Bangkok, Thailand, from December 19 to 22, 2023.
Chiefs of Navies and Senior Delegates from 27 Member and Observer countries actively participated in the event.
Thailand assumed the role of Chair of IONS for the next two years during the conclave.
India's designed flag was chosen as the official IONS flag for the first time.
India also took on the role of co-Chair of IONS Working Groups on Maritime Security and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) for the upcoming cycle.
Republic of Korea Navy was welcomed as the latest 'Observer,' thereby increasing IONS' collective strength to 34 (25 Members & 09 Observers).
India is set to host the 9th CoC of IONS in late 2025 and will assume the Chairmanship of IONS for the term 2025-27.
This upcoming leadership role signifies India's commitment to enhancing maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region.

History of IONS

Inception : IONS was conceived by the Indian Navy in 2008 as an open and inclusive platform for regional maritime cooperation. The inaugural edition took place in New Delhi in 2008.
Purpose : IONS serves as a forum to discuss maritime security, foster friendly relationships among member states, and address regionally relevant maritime issues.

Role of IONS

Similarity to Other Symposia : It operates as a security construct for the Indian Ocean region, resembling the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, aiming to enhance maritime security cooperation among member nations.
Voluntary Initiative : IONS involves voluntary participation from navies and maritime security agencies, organizing various activities like workshops, essay competitions, and lectures.
Member States and Sub-regions : The 25 member nations of IONS are categorized into four sub-regions based on their geographical location within the Indian Ocean region.

The recent 8th edition of IONS highlighted the growing importance of multilateral cooperation in maritime security and the significance of joint efforts among Indian Ocean littoral states in addressing common challenges and fostering regional stability.

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Indian Ocean Naval Symposium

The 7 th edition of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Conclave of Chiefs was hosted by French Navy at Paris from 15 – 16 Nov 21.

It’s Still the Indian Ocean: Parsing Sino-Indian Naval Competition Where It Counts

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Editor’s Note: This is part of a short series examining maritime geography and strategic challenges in specific bodies of water, ranging from the Arctic Ocean to the Gulf of Guinea and the South China Sea.

The growth of the Chinese navy over the past decade has been phenomenal. For a navy that as recently as 2002 had to have German technicians flown in to fix the diesel engine of the crippled destroyer Qingdao, which was then on a world tour, the progress has been astounding. According the Department of Defense , the Chinese navy is now the world’s largest at 370 ships and submarines. This number is projected to grow to 435 by 2030. By comparison, growth in the Indian navy has been significantly less spectacular. From 2014 – 2024 the total number of Indian major surface combatants has slightly increased from 25 to 29. Considering that China and India are engaged in a rivalry that has led to fatalities as recently as 2020, and that the rivalry is now expanding to the maritime domain, India’s slow progress should be a strategic liability.

Discussions in New Delhi on geostrategic issues are heavily dominated by China and over the last few years there has been a great deal of attention paid to the maritime dimension of the rivalry. In addition, there is growing concern among India watchers about the overall increasing power disparity between China and India and what that may mean for India’s ability to resist Chinese aggression in the years to come.

However, we argue the growing power disparity between India and China should be viewed within the context of a set of broader transregional factors that place different levels of burdens on China and India. While China has substantially improved its state capacity, it also faces greater transregional security challenges and commitments, which act as offsets. More specifically, we argue that the evolving maritime rivalry is real. However, for several reasons, including geography and the balance of other pressing security threats, China’s massive advantage on paper fails to manifest itself on the high seas of the Indian Ocean.

There are two factors that need to be accounted for when assessing India’s ability to resist Chinese aggression. One is how India and China define their strategic goals and what they see as necessary to ensure their security. For instance, if India does not perceive its security to include locations that are beyond the Indian Ocean region and has stable borders with its neighbors, then that changes its calculations regarding its military necessities. The second factor pertains to the number of other security threats the two countries have. China and India both have multiple security threats that force limited resources to be divided and allocated to meet these challenges. This means that while China has clear advantages in certain areas, these are offset by its substantial geographic disadvantage vis-à-vis India.

Goal-Oriented Naval Capacity: India and China

Any discussion of India’s naval capabilities within the context of the Sino-Indian rivalry has to focus on the Indian Ocean. India views this as its sphere of influence and seeks to have a dominant role there. This led Beijing to issue a statement saying that “ the Indian Ocean is not India’s ocean .” Yang Zhen of the Northeast Asia Research Center of Shanghai University of Political Science and Law has even argued that India seeks to keep outside powers out of the Indian Ocean by constructing three different layers of “fences” spaced at different intervals around the ocean.

In 2015, the Indian navy released a white paper that articulated the importance of the Indian Ocean for Indian security. It seeks to establish a substantial amount of control and influence there in the face of a perceived increase in Chinese activity and seeks to monitor and control terrorist and non-state actors as well. Indeed, India’s recent anti-piracy missions have demonstrated its ability and willingness to police the international waters in the Indian Ocean.

Over the years, India has been concerned about a growing Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean and, more specifically, in its immediate neighborhood. Indian authorities have repeatedly expressed concern over the presence of Chinese naval vessels off the coast of Sri Lanka and the procurement of Chinese naval platforms and submarines by Bangladesh. In this regard, India’s goals are strategically and geographically well defined. India sees control over the Indian Ocean, along with the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, as central to its security and economic interests. There is no articulation of Indian interests that involves establishing a significant naval presence either in the South China Sea or the Pacific Ocean.

In other words, India has the ability to use its current and developing naval capabilities to bolster its security in its own backyard as it does not have security commitments in other areas of the greater Asian region. Much of India’s energy imports pass through the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. These fall within India’s backyard and do not cause the supply lines of the Indian navy to be stretched too thin — owing both to its own capabilities as the resident naval power and its growing partnerships with the littoral nations . Moreover, in the Indian Ocean, India can follow a strategy of denial where it does not allow China to freely roam, but rather creates sufficient challenges to the Chinese, making Chinese inroads into the region that much harder .

The Indian navy has been adding to its capabilities to bolster its power projection by inducting new platforms. In addition to the two aircraft carriers that are currently in operation, the Indian navy seems to be planning to induct two more . Some remain skeptical about how effective Indian aircraft carriers are likely to be against China. But Indian capabilities are likely to be sufficient for a denial strategy against China and will be more than sufficient against transnational pirates and the Pakistani navy. Additionally, the acquisition of Rafale fighters for the navy will bolster its power projection in the years to come. What is more, Chief of the Naval Staff Adm. R. Hari Kumar declared that the Indian navy aspires to be operating between 170 and 175 ships by 2035 . Despite concerns about delays and India’s ability keep pace with the Chinese, India’s presence in the Indian Ocean will grow in magnitude in the years to come, providing it with sufficient leverage against the Chinese there.

There is no doubt that, overall, China is far ahead of India when it comes to naval hardware. In fact, on the surface there appears to be no contest in terms of what China can bring to a fight . But what this comparison does not capture, is the fact that the vast majority of China’s fleet is not designed for an Indian Ocean contingency but is reserved for a war in the western Pacific, close to its home ports. This situation has led some to call China the “ great power lite ” with a relatively small global military posture and military that acts as a break on future overseas military endeavors. Furthermore, the Chinese navy’s assets are dispersed over three naval commands: the Northern, Eastern, and Southern. Considering its proximity to the Indian Ocean, the Southern Theater Command would be the most likely to deal with India. However, in terms of critical naval assets such as destroyers and frigates, this command is allocated less than one-third of the Chinese navy’s overall vessels.

The Capacity to Compete

Concerns in India about Chinese naval incursions into the Indian Ocean are not new, but they may not be entirely justified either. For all the limitations of Indian policy to date, China faces even greater challenges in the region.

Indian fears about a “string of pearls” strategy, where China surrounds India with military bases in the region, have been around since the early 2000s. Such concerns have led India to actively take part in what is termed “ Mission Based Deployments .” These are designed to shadow and monitor Chinese warships as they enter the Indian Ocean. In in-depth interviews in 2023 with Indian security experts in New Delhi, experts told one of the authors that these activities were initiated in 2017 and continue to the present. However, multiple experts admitted that the Indian navy suffers from a shortage of naval hardware and that these deployments are placing a significant physical strain on the hulls of Indian warships. A prominent Indian security scholar stated that New Delhi may not have the money to continues them. Further complicating the strategic landscape for India is the fact that, during interviews over the past year, multiple Indian policy experts argued that India has yet to devise a comprehensive China strategy. A retired Indian ambassador even stated that in New Delhi there is “no regional approach to South Asia, we deal with issues as they come up, ad hoc , defensive, short-term attributes to our security approach.”

Although Indian security experts and officials talk of 6 to 8 Chinese warships present in the region at any given time, these are mostly related to anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia. In fact, we believe that, given the extent to which the Indian Ocean is critical to China’s economic vitality, China’s naval presence there should not be so shocking. An estimated 80 percent of Chinese energy imports transit the ocean and 95 percent of trade between China and Africa, Europe, and the Middle East passes through the ocean. In fact, Chinese security experts have admitted that China free-rides off the United States in the region.

Although Chinese security scholars have spoken about a future Chinese Indian Ocean fleet , one has not yet emerged. And any Chinese armada in the region would have to deal with the tyranny of geography, which provides India with a home field advantage. China is actively working on overcoming its significant challenges with air cover on the high seas, including outfitting its latest aircraft carrier with an electromagnetic catapult launch and arresting devices. However, these emerging carrier battle groups are not yet ready for engagements with capable adversaries and are likely at least a decade away from being able to conduct effective combat missions. In addition, any Chinese flotilla in the Indian Ocean would be dependent on at sea replenishment as they lack naval bases in the region. The Chinese navy is hard at work building supply ships such as the Type 901, but these are not a substitute for safe and friendly ports of call. These challenges for China are a critical asset for India.

China’s Southern Theater Command is home to some of the navy’s most advanced warships, including four highly advanced Renhai cruisers, each equipped with 112 missiles, as well as 14 guided missile destroyers and 15 frigates. Many of these vessels have integrated data-link systems that if effectively utilized, multiply their combat capabilities. The challenge for the Chinese navy is that these are more for guarding China against the U.S. Navy than for projecting power into the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, in the event of hostilities between India and China, their entry into the northern Indian Ocean would be difficult due to both the Indian Tri-Service (assuming smoother inter-services cooperation) command at the southern tip of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and to the high probability of India using its smaller, but lethal, force of diesel-electric submarines to guard the choke points between the Indonesian archipelago and the Indian Ocean.

The geographical challenge to the Chinese navy acts as a significant and arguably the most important structural constraint on Beijing’s ability to wage high-intensity naval warfare in the Indian Ocean. Granted, India will have to improve its inter-service coordination to enable military operations to more effective ly exploit this. But still, the challenge should not be underestimated. Apart from the threats associated with transiting through narrow straits to enter the Indian Ocean, Beijing lacks reliable air cover. While China has made progress in carrier-based aviation, they are still years away from achieving a level of competence where they could go head-to-head with India in India’s backyard.

The tyranny of geography would require the Chinese navy to either reload in a friendly port (extremely difficult in the event of war) or to replenish at sea. According to some estimates, while the Chinese navy is busy manufacturing replenishment ships, they currently only have two Type 901 vessels that are specifically designed to keep up with carriers. Furthermore, based on previous deployments, a single replenishment ship can only supply 2 to 3 combatants for 2 to 3 weeks , after which it will need support from either a friendly port or additional underway replenishment. While the Chinese navy does have 9 Type-093 replenishment ships, these are significantly slower and smaller than the Type-901, and with a top speed of 19 knots , the Type-093 cannot keep up with Chinese carriers. (The Type-901 can travel at 25 knots.)

Overall, from a capacity standpoint, New Delhi is not even in the same league as Beijing when it comes to naval modernization. However, the amount of firepower that the Chinese navy would bring to a fight with India would almost certainly be a fraction of its overall force structure. A fully equipped Chinese navy could easily overwhelm the Indian navy, but it would also leave the Chinese mainland wide open to attack from China’s primary rival, the United States.

Comparing Indian and Chinese military capabilities in isolation from the broader transregional context can lead to inaccurate assessments. China faces security challenges at a much larger scale than India. Moreover, India currently also benefits from strategic partnerships with countries such as the United States, Japan, and France that give it greater latitude in the Indian Ocean, which is its principal area of interest. Growing power disparity will certainly keep Indian strategic thinkers worried for some time to come, but they should not lose sight of the strategic advantages India currently enjoys. These reflect India’s fewer supply-chain vulnerabilities in its own backyard, the nature of other security threats the two countries face, and, most important, the enormous geographical advantage India has over China in the Indian Ocean. Any Chinese naval flotilla sent to engage the Indian navy would be without reliable air cover and, due to logistical constraints, would only be able to sustain combat operations for a few weeks.

These critical Indian advantages are extremely difficult for Beijing to overcome, especially when one considers that the Indian Ocean is not its primary area of strategic concern. While the United States is China’s principal rival, Pakistan, despite its nuclear arsenal, does not compete with India in the Indian Ocean. What is more, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Asia-Pacific region more broadly are far more vital for Chinese national interests than the Indian Ocean at this time. While India is asserting its place as the resident power in the Indian Ocean, it is also coordinating its efforts with the U.S. Navy , which gives India additional leverage against China in the region. The Chinese navy is slowly working to overcome its strategic liabilities in the Indian Ocean, but for at least the next couple of decades, India will likely hold a critical advantage over China there.

Prashant Hosur Suhas is assistant professor of international relations at Clarkson University, Potsdam, NY.

Christopher K. Colley is assistant professor of international security studies at the U.S. Air War College. Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency.

Image: Rumsey Map Collection

Rewind and Reconnoiter: War is on the Rocks with John Mueller

Techcraft on display in ukraine, in brief: the state of european defense.

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International
Foreign affairs

First Sea Lord’s Sea Power Conference 2024: Minister Trevelyan's keynote speech

Minister for the Indo-Pacific Anne-Marie Trevelyan gave a keynote speech at First Sea Lord’s Sea Power Conference at Lancaster House in London.

First Sea Lord, Council for Geostrategy – thank you for bringing us all together once again, here at Lancaster House, our small residence that the Foreign Office likes to use to welcome our international friends and allies. I am delighted to have the opportunity to share a few thoughts in my capacity as Minister for the Indo-Pacific, and as a well known and often teased strong advocate of our Royal Navy. I mean, if there is an opportunity to go to sea, perhaps that will be the solution to many people’s challenges. I am always happy to take up that challenge.

But first, I would like to thank you and all those who serve in the Royal Navy - above and below the surface - for all that you do to keep our citizens and UK interests secure every single day.

All too often, the Royal Navy’s continuous deployments go unnoticed, unknown to most and therefore unsung – though we in this room certainly understand the reasons why that must often be so.

It has been interesting as a politician, as someone with a constituency, to watch those who never knew, or asked, what your sailors do, sit up and watch in amazement as young men and women aboard HMS Diamond shared the dramatic images of their elimination of drones attacking civilian shipping in the Red Sea.

In awe, and honestly with pride, the Royal Navy and her exploits are being talked about in the pub (I can guarantee that one) and on dog walks by middle-aged ladies (because I went on one just the other day), as young and old are reminded of the threats to our assumed way of life.

Nor has the tireless work of our Royal Navy gone unnoticed by our adversaries, or those whom they seek to crush – as the challenges proliferate, we see your men and women step up across vast areas of ocean and an increasing breadth of activity.

Most critically of course, our submariners are deployed 24/7, 365 days a year, on our continuous at sea deterrent – silently patrolling global waters, the effective deterrent our adversaries know is there, somewhere, always ready to defend.

Protecting the freedom of navigation on which we all depend, wherever it is threatened is at the core of the Royal Navy’s work – and HMS Diamond has been demonstrating that at the centre of the UK’s critical role in the US-led international coalition to uphold freedom of navigation in the busy shipping lanes of Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden…

Sharing analysis from the UK Hydrographic Office has allowed US planners to establish the temporary pier needed to deliver aid to Gaza – with RFA Cardigan Bay playing a vital part…

And our sailors aboard HMS Tamar and HMS Spey in particular are working with countries in the Indo-Pacific, to build and protect sustainable blue economies that are so critical – supported by the UK’s £500m Blue Planet Fund…

As well as supporting small island states respond to shocks – like the crew of HMS Spey volunteering their free time to work alongside Tonga’s National Visually Impaired Association, in the wake of a devastating volcanic eruption and tsunami… and I can tell you they have got friends for life on that island. It was really touching to discover the affection with which the work they have just done made a difference.

These are just a few examples of the recent work you have been leading. So I know you all agree that it was great to hear the Prime Minister’s announcement on 2.5% of GDP for defence spending, and a first picture from the defence Secretary yesterday on what this might look like for the Royal Navy.

As the Foreign Secretary said last week, this is a world more dangerous, more volatile, more confrontational, than most of us have ever known. We need to face up to that fact and act accordingly. Not in a year or two. Not in a few months. But now.

What is going to be vital is that the new integrated procurement model which we have set out, must turn government’s relationship with industry into a true strategic partnership – the 2.5% commitment will allow long term planning on shipbuilding, for instance, which will be vital to our ability to get the next generation of ships and submarines into service as quickly as possible. Those platforms will carry the innovative inventions which give us that critical military advantage. So we must now make industry the sixth domain of our defences.

Whilst government, or rather the taxpayer – those ladies keep telling me that when I do the dog walking – it’s their money not ours. They are funding the Royal Navy, it is our defence and security industries which deliver the infrastructure, skilled workforce and platforms, weapons and kit for that your sailors need to deploy.

This First Sea Lord’s Conference takes place as our world becomes increasingly dangerous, unstable and unpredictable. We must not divorce foreign and economic policy from domestic politics. All over the western world, we see the rise of political movements that want us to pull up the drawbridge, claiming that we will be better off if we focus purely on domestic concerns. But this is the wrong answer. Because what happens abroad matters directly to our citizens.

Our approach must not be to ignore the rise of these movements. It must be to deal with what has caused them to grow, so we can engage with the world and therefore safeguard our national interests. And so it is more important than ever that our understanding of the strategic importance of the maritime - from the margins of the conversation into the heart of foreign policy – is centre stage.

The impacts of

Instability … in the Middle East;
Aggression… in the Black Sea;
Military and economic coercion in the South China Sea;

and the double-edged sword of emerging technologies are rippling out across the globe.

Households everywhere are feeling the pressure of all this on their budgets. Fuel, food and fertiliser price spikes courtesy of Putin’s illegal war have shaken the economies of all, but the poorest have suffered most.

Governments have had to underwrite these cost of living hikes where they can.

So after a long period of - perhaps naive – optimism, people now understand once again why defence needs to be prioritised, and that the Royal Navy has a central role to play.

Credible deterrence across these many unstable theatres requires our Royal Navy, alongside our allies and friends, to be fitter than ever - to sustain free and open navigation routes, protecting undersea energy and cables, and assisting many countries in safeguarding the sovereignty of their EEZs.

We must work with our US allies to take some of the strain in support of their leadership to assure the security of so many, from NATO on their east to Indo-Pacific friends on their west.

As I travel across the Indo-Pacific, all my conversations with counterparts have the challenge of maritime security and protection on the agenda.

For the UK, our work across the Indo-Pacific continues to be a priority – as we set out in our integrated review refresh last year – the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are indivisible.

Together, we are standing up for our shared security, freedom, and prosperity – and there is nothing selfless about wanting to focus on the two thirds of global maritime trade which passes through Indo-Pacific waters.

We are leaning into our role as Dialogue Partners in ASEAN and IORA, as well the Pacific Island Forum. Our bilateral maritime dialogues with Brunei, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Maldives, Philippines, and Vietnam are going from strength to strength, with Maritime Domain Awareness and then work on how to manage policing these waters once the malign activity is known at the heart of what we are doing– but sadly we know there is great deal more to do.

As the Defence Secretary highlighted, our second Naval Littoral Response Group is hard at work keeping the Indian Ocean safe and open.

The challenge we have set ourselves with the USA to help our Australian counterparts develop a nuclear-powered submarines fleet is going to require an enormous commitment from our British industries – it is they who are building new relationships with Australian companies, universities and state governments, to prepare for the SSN-AUKUS fleet.

And we must never forget why this was agreed – it is because nuclear-powered submarines can travel greater distances, be undetected for longer, and therefore increase the credible deterrence to those who would wish to disrupt or deny the free flows of trade critical to Australia and all our economic security.

The hard work of getting SSN-AUKUS underway had been kicked off with £4bn of contracts to BAE Systems, Rolls Royce, and Babcock for the first elements of the UK’s SSN-AUKUS submarines.

But this is just the tip of the iceberg – not in financial terms, but in the uplift in infrastructure and skills which will be needed to deliver it on time. This truly will need to be a national endeavour across all three nations for us to meet the challenge we have set ourselves.

At its peak AUKUS – Pillar 1 - is expected to support more than 21,000 jobs in the UK and will need Australia to grow a skilled workforce which presently does not exist. So its great to see the Royal Navy welcoming Australian personnel as they begin their specialised training.

Pillar 2 activity is also getting into its stride - we have run a first series of successful AI and autonomous undersea capability trials with our AUKUS family. Later this year we will conduct trilateral maritime autonomy exercises. We are also now considering other countries that might contribute to AUKUS Pillar 2 projects, with Japan in the first instance.

The AUKUS Industry Forum, Defence Investor Network, and electronic warfare Innovation Challenge, are all now up and running to help improve and strengthen engagement and real understanding between government and industry. I will keep saying it – it is industry that builds the tools our sailors must have to deliver the effect we need.

We must get better at demonstrating that government understands that, if we are to go faster to get ahead of the threats we see growing around us.

As part of that effort, from next year, the UK, US, and Japan will hold regular trilateral military exercises – this will build on the continuous deployment of HMS Spey and HMS Tamar in the Indo-Pacific, and is part of the commitment we have made with the USA in the Atlantic Declaration and Japan in the Hiroshima Accord.

Next year will also bring CSG25 (maybe I can hitch a lift on that first, maybe that’s a solution). Our aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales will be deployed to the region at the head of a Carrier Strike Group, including a port visit in Japan. And I can tell you there is a long lists of states requesting where else they would like you to visit. Some of the smaller island states may be tricky to park, but we will have to work on that one.

This work is immensely important in and of itself – but it is increasingly important in light of the increasing number of incidents involving unsafe conduct against vessels in the South China Sea over recent months.

That includes actions by Chinese vessels against the Philippines coastguard which have endangered lives, caused damage to civilian vessels, and made headlines around the world – as tensions mount over the Second Thomas Shoal.

We expect all states to uphold UNCLOS – it has a vital role in upholding peace, prosperity, and security, by making sure we all play by a set of rules designed and agreed to guarantee all our futures.

So we will support our partners to shine a light on these actions that heighten tension, risk escalation, and threaten regional peace and stability.

Indeed, from the Caribbean to the Pacific Ocean, the Royal Navy’s Maritime Domain Awareness Programme sets the global gold-standard when it comes to building the trust, partnerships, and capabilities we need to plan-ahead and respond to everything from illegal fishing to state threats.

We hope to expand this shared security expertise further, because we all need to look beyond what seems most alarming in a headline – to scan the horizon for what should really be keeping us up at night, so we can get the right pieces into place, across multiple theatres.

And, while it may seem trite to say that ‘together, we are stronger’ – from NATO to the MDA Five Eyes Partnership Forum, we should recognise that even when trust has been strained, and our resolve tested, we hold firm.

As we continue to work on inter-agency cooperation, on integrated defence and security, and indeed counter-terrorism – let us be clear about what is at stake, right now.

For us Brits, our identity as a maritime nation is a deep and enduring part of our view of ourselves.

Around the globe, others are looking to us to make good on the promise of that legacy for our shared future – by defending the values we hold dear, not just for ourselves but for all whose who long to feel the benefits of freedom and prosperity in their lives as well.

Indeed, they are looking to all of us – as determined adversaries and ruthless opportunists seek to bludgeon the brave into submission – to support them as they are brave enough to stand up for the future they want to shape for their citizens. So we need to ensure that our Navy and armed forces have what they need to do so.

For all of us right now, we face a defining litmus test in Ukraine.

As we strive to sustain our unwavering support and galvanise others to their cause – it is important that we recognise that it is at sea where the allied contribution is felt most keenly, combined with the Ukrainians’ indomitable spirit.

The UK is providing 60 small boats, alongside our mighty Storm Shadows, and uncrewed sea systems, with some £2 billion earmarked to become Ukraine’s largest supplier of drones.

Alongside Norway, we are proud to be leading a new Maritime Capability Coalition. Together, we are providing mine detection drones, raiding craft, Sea King helicopters – helping Ukraine build its navy, develop a marine corps, and defend its sovereign waters.

And we know it is making a difference.

Ukraine has struck the Kremlin’s Naval HQ in Sevastopol, and sunk or disabled around a third of the Russian Black Sea Fleet – including the notorious Moskva, forcing the rest into hiding. But as you said, probably only for now.

In the first months of 2024, agricultural exports reached the highest level since the war began – getting grain from Ukraine to those who need it most, has been a key British focus, just as we work to disrupt Russia’s shadow fleet, and increase the cost of Putin’s war machine with the largest ever package of sanctions.

In short, the Ukrainians have the will, they have the skills, and they have proved their effectiveness – if we back them. The UK will commit at least £3 billion a year for military support to Ukraine – building on more than £7bn to date. We welcome the recent release of funding from the US, as well as the EU. But it is up to all of us to make this a priority for as long as it takes for the Ukrainians to prevail.

The reality is that we MUST get on a war footing in order to safeguard peace once again – just as twelve founding NATO nations did 75 years ago, when they gathered in Washington D.C, after conflict had engulfed the globe for the second time in a generation.

We can be proud to be sending some 20,000 UK personnel to the enormous Exercise Steadfast Defender – with our carrier strike group out in full force.

And if all NATO countries were to commit at least 2.5% of their GDP to defence when we all meet in Washington this summer – as we in UK are now committed to – then our collective budget would increase by more than £140 billion.

But it’s not just a commitment for meeting a future figure, it’s about upping the pace on investing now in our defence industrial partners. Then we really will be changing gear, enabling our defence industries, their innovation and people, to invent, build, weld, innovate to give us the hardware and the software our armed forces need in order to protect more than a billion people across the NATO family and global security – from malign actors who have been investing at an incredible rate, and for too long, we have just been watching

Ladies and gentlemen - It’s not all about NATO, it’s not all about maritime capability, and there’s only so far money goes.

There is more we can and must do to build more partnerships and achieve greater coordination. As I said last year, gunning for interoperability and interchangeability is a no-brainer.

There is more we can and must do to send the clear, unequivocal, united signal to our adversaries that we will stand up for our values and our freedom – that they will not grind us down, nor will they wear us out, nor divide us.

So we must make good on our word – it will be mission critical to deterrence which is effective in keeping the peace because it is credible, and those who would wish us harm need to know that.

Be it in Ukraine or anywhere else, if we allow our word to be shot down by tyrants and chancers – we send our every adversary the signal that it is open season on all that we hold dear.

And in so doing, we would be gambling every gain hard-won – not only of the rules to which we have all signed up – but of the tacit good faith treaties on which we rely to hold the fragile peace.

We must do all we can to stack the odds in our favour. The future is not guaranteed. So it is up to all of us to write the next chapter together. Governments can and must provide the money and the leadership, but only industry can give us the tools to enable our brave military personnel to deliver that credible deterrence, denial capability or front-line defence should it be necessary. That safe and secure, peaceful and prosperous world we wish for our children doesn’t come free.

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IMAGES

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COMMENTS

Welcome to Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
The 'Indian Ocean Naval Symposium' (IONS) is a voluntary initiative that seeks to increase maritime co-operation among navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region by providing an open and inclusive forum for discussion of regionally relevant maritime issues. In the process, it endeavours to generate a flow of information ...
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium ( IONS) is a series of biennial meetings between the littoral states of the Indian Ocean region. It provides a forum to increase maritime security cooperation,discuss regional maritime issues, and promote friendly relationships among the member states. [1] [2] [3] [4]
PDF Indian Ocean Naval Symposium Essay Competition 2022
Essays will be judged against the following criteria: - Originality 10% - Problematic treated 10% - Logical structuring 20% ... Indian Ocean Naval Symposium Essay Competition 2022 Author's Certificate I hereby testify: * I have not used any confidential information and /or resources in the
Soundings Papers: Problems and prospects of maritime security
Soundings Papers: Problems and prospects of maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region: a case study of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Soundings No. 15 Download. PDF : 960.27 KB by. Commander Ranendra Singh Sawan. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has variously been labelled as "insecure and instable", "a region that ...
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium: Advancing India's Interests in the IOR
November 15, 2018. Credit: Indian Navy. The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) will be celebrating its 10th anniversary this week at Kochi, India. Primarily created as an open and inclusive forum ...
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium: Uniting the Maritime Indian Ocean Region
5 The events held since IONS 2008 are: Essay Competition (December 2008), by the Indian Navy; Technical Seminar (19-21 May 2009), by the Sri Lankan navy; Preparatory Workshop (1-2 October 2010), by the Kenyan navy; Essay Competition (December 2009), by the South African navy; 'HADR' Workshop (October 11--12, 2010), by the Bangladeshi navy; and Essay Competition by the South African ...
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)
The 'Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) is a voluntary initiative that seeks to increase maritime cooperation among navies of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region by providing an open and inclusive forum for discussion of regionally relevant maritime issues. In the process, it endeavors to generate a flow of information between ...
INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL SYMPOSIUM (IONS)
The 8th edition of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Conclave of Chiefs (CoC) is being hosted by Royal Thai Navy at Bangkok, Thailand from 19 - 22 Dec 23.Adm R Hari Kumar, Chief of the Naval Staff, is leading a three-member Indian Naval delegation for the Conclave. IONS was conceived by the Indian Navy in 2008 as a forum which seeks to enhance maritime co-operation among Navies of the ...
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
The 7th edition of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Conclave of Chiefs is being hosted by the French Navy at Paris from 15 th -16 th Nov 21. The inaugural edition of IONS was held in Feb 2008 at New Delhi, with the Indian Navy as the Chair for two years. The IONS Chair is presently held in France.
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS)
The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium acts as an organisation that also facilitates the organising of lectures, essay competitions and various workshops with the original objective in consideration. ... 6th Indian Ocean Naval Symposium. The 6 th edition of the IONS was held in Tehran, the capital of Iran, between April 22 and April 25 of 2018. The ...
10th Anniversary
The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) is an extremely significant regional maritime security initiative which was launched by India in February 2008 to attain collectively beneficial maritime security outcomes within the Indian Ocean by providing an open and inclusive forum for discussion of regionally relevant maritime issues.
Commander Amila Prasanga Wins Prestigious IONS Academic Essay
Commander Amila Prasanga, a Military Research Officer at the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) under the Ministry of Defence and a member of the Sri Lanka Navy, emerged as the distinguished victor in the esteemed Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Academic Essay Competition 2022. Under the guidance of Admiral Pierre Vandier, Chief ...
Publications
Publications - Study Papers. ... One of the key initiatives taken by India is the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which aims to promote maritime cooperation, regional security, and information sharing among Indian Ocean littoral countries (The Hindu, 2022). The IONS provides a platform for dialogue, coordination, and capacity-building in ...
INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL SYMPOSIUM (IONS)
The 8 th edition of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Conclave of Chiefs (CoC) was conducted by Royal Thai Navy at Bangkok, Thailand from 19 - 22 Dec 23. Chiefs of Navies/ Senior Delegates from 27 Members/ Observer countries participated in the event. Admiral R Hari Kumar, Chief of the Naval Staff, attended the event with a three member Indian Naval delegation.
Sri Lanka Navy
Organised by the French IONS Secretariat, Indian Ocean Naval Symposium essay competition 2022, was held under the guidance of Admiral Pierre Vandier, Chief of Staff of the French Navy and Chair of IONS. Winners of the competition were announced at the 08th edition of the IONS Symposium 2023, held in Bangkok, Thailand, hosted by the Royal Thai Navy.
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
It was established in 1997 as an intergovernmental organisation of States on the rim of the Indian Ocean. It has members from Africa, West Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia , Europe and Oceania. The Association's membership has expanded to 23 member states and 11 dialogue partners. Indian Ocean Naval Symposium was conceived by the Indian Navy ...
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium UPSC
The 8th edition of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Conclave of Chiefs (CoC) was conducted by Royal Thai Navy at Bangkok, Thailand from 19 - 22 Dec 23. Details. Key Highlights of the 8th IONS Conclave of Chiefs (CoC) The Royal Thai Navy hosted the 8th IONS Conclave of Chiefs in Bangkok, Thailand, from December 19 to 22, 2023.
Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
371. Indian Ocean naval chiefs. The 7 th edition of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Conclave of Chiefs was hosted by French Navy at Paris from 15 - 16 Nov 21.
7th Edition of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
Why in News. Recently, the 7 th edition of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) was hosted by the French Navy at Réunion island.. It is a biennial event which was conceived by the Indian Navy in 2008.; Key Points. About: The IONS is a voluntary and inclusive initiative that brings together navies of Indian Ocean Region littoral states to increase maritime co-operation and enhance regional ...
It's Still the Indian Ocean: Parsing Sino-Indian Naval Competition
In 2015, the Indian navy released a white paper that articulated the importance of the Indian Ocean for Indian security. It seeks to establish a substantial amount of control and influence there in the face of a perceived increase in Chinese activity and seeks to monitor and control terrorist and non-state actors as well.
India as a Net Security Provider in the Indo-Pacific: Ambitious But
In this handout photo from the Indian Navy, an Indian destroyer assists the Palau-flagged vessel MV Islander, which caught fire after a suspected drone attack, in the Gulf of Aden, Feb. 22, 2024 ...
First Sea Lord's Sea Power Conference 2024: Minister Trevelyan's
Indeed, from the Caribbean to the Pacific Ocean, the Royal Navy's Maritime Domain Awareness Programme sets the global gold-standard when it comes to building the trust, partnerships, and ...

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INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL SYMPOSIUM (IONS) – 2023

Commander Amila Prasanga of Navy wins prestigious IONS essay competition 2022

Indian Ocean Naval Symposium

Recently, the 8th edition of Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) Conclave of Chiefs (CoC) was conducted by the Royal Thai Navy at Bangkok, Thailand.

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